Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

DOI 10.1007/s12124-014-9274-2

The Connection Between Language and the World: A

Paradox of the Linguistic Turn?

Cintia Rodríguez

Published online: 24 June 2014

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish draw on the dialogic turn as they consider
that, in order to interpret the meaning of an utterance, it is necessary to emphasize its
contextual nature. Among other aspects, they address what context is and what is being
done while speaking. Taking these two issues as point of departure, it is worth
pondering on (1) what revolves around language and what the status of nonlinguistic
semiotic systems is for the philosophers of language, (2) Umberto Eco’s critique of the
Philosophy of Language, which has not problematized the pre-linguistic relationship
with things, and (3) how ontogenesis may shed light on this scheme where linguistic
and nonlinguistic aspects are inevitably interrelated. I will reflect on the pragmatic
aspects in adult-child communication at its pre-linguistic level. I will underscore the
key role played by the object as a complex referent and as a tool for communication.

Keywords Linguistic/Dialogic turn . Nonlinguistic semiotic systems . Object as tool of

communication . The naturalized object

In Sensitizing questions: A method to facilitate analyzing the meaning of an utterance,

Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish address the “dialogic turn” in line with the “linguistic
turn,” which I will analyze below. Although they draw heavily upon Bakhtin, they also
refer to Wittgenstein, Mead and contemporary scholars like Valsiner, Wertsch and
Markova, among others. According to Gillespie and Cornish, thanks to the dialogic
turn, “a sophisticated understanding of human dialogue as contextual, temporal and
relational” (p. 1) is developed, thanks to which the analysis unit is not the sign but the
text (Castañares 1985).
In this way, the “meaning is not found within an utterance, in either its logical
structure or the dictionary definition of its component words, rather it is found in the
relation between the utterance and what is going on” (italics in the original, p. 2). In
order to interpret the meaning of a given utterance, those researchers who are

C. Rodríguez (*)
Facultad de Psicología, Departamento de Psicología Evolutiva y Educación, Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, Campus de Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain
e-mail: cintia.rodriguez@uam.es
90 Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

influenced by dialogism “emphasise[s] the contextual, social and unfinished nature of

meaning” (p. 1). This complex approach, which considers the context in order to
understand the meaning of an utterance, however, is problematic. For this reason,
Gillespie and Cornish aim is to contribute to developing new methods which enable
scholars to interpret qualitative research. In order to address this issue from a dialogic
standpoint—this will help them ‘unpack’ the meaning of a sentence—they raise these
six questions: 1. What is context? 2. What is being done? 3. Who is the addressee of the
utterance? 4. Who is speaking? 5. What future is envisioned? 6. What are the answers?
Apart from these six questions, there are other ‘sub-questions’.
Gillespie and Cornish intend to establish a dialog with Grossen, who claims that
“Method is not compatible with dialogism, if ‘method’ means ‘inflexible procedure’,
and ‘method of analysis’ is not compatible with dialogism if ‘analysis’ means ‘breaking
down into component parts” (p. 4).
For reasons of space, I will not address the well-known, heated controversy about
whether Bakhtin is the real author of books like Marxism and the Philosophy of
Language, among others, or whether it is necessary to resort to the origin of dialogic
turn—and its keen interest in ideology and the importance of the Philosophy of
Language (Hierro 1986)—as approached by other theoreticians like Volóshinov
(1930/2010; see also Sériot 2010) and Medvedev. These two scholars were very active
during the 1920s, a decade when a significant body of the texts which have been
attributed to Bakhtin since the 1970s should be chronologically dated. (For an enlight-
ening study of this issue, see Bronckart and Bota 2011/2013).
As is commonly known, the linguistic turn includes pragmatic aspects, among
others. It was introduced in the 20th century by philosophers of ordinary language
such as the later Wittgenstein (1953/1988), Austin (1962/1990), Grice (1981/1998),
Quine (1995) and Habermas (1988) who, in spite of not being a philosopher of
language himself, uses as point of departure the same axioms—the identification of
thought and language. Contrary to what is believed, addressing the idea of ‘Meaning’
after, or departing from, language does not pertain to the 20th century but it starts in
Aristotle (Aizpún, “personal conversation”). Understanding the meaning of language
outside language, considering the aspects of its context, of what happens outside
language and in the real world—otherwise, it is impossible to understand the meaning
of language itself—fall out of the scope of Philosophy and fall into the research area of
Social Sciences. (Few areas have escaped their influence and Psychology is not an
exception in this respect.) There are a number of psychologists who follow this
pragmatic approach. From the mid-1970s—Bruner is one of its most outstanding
advocates (see Rodríguez 2007a)—this approach has had a great impact on language
acquisition and the origin of children’s intentional communication (Tomasello 1999;
Guidetti 2003).
Later on in this article, and departing from the first two questions raised by Gillespie
and Cornish—“what is context?” And “what is being done while speaking?”—I will
ponder on (1) what revolves around language, what the status of nonlinguistic semiotic
systems is for the philosophers of language; (2) the criticism which, based on Peirce’s
semiotics, is led by Umberto Eco; (3) the pragmatic aspects in adult-child communi-
cation at a pre-linguistic level, given that ontogenesis can shed light on this scheme
where nonlinguistic and linguistic aspects are inevitably interrelated. I will underscore
the key role played by the object as a complex referent and as a tool for communication.
Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103 91

What Revolves Around Language? When the Philosophers of Language Deal

with Nonlinguistic Issues

This is the question raised by the philosophers of the linguistic turn—focusing on

language is what characterizes analytical philosophy (Hierro 1986)—and by those who
draw upon them when, in order to understand linguistic meaning, they also deal with
issues that are language-related per se, but are part of what is said and without which it
is impossible to understand not only the meaning of what has been said but also what
the speaker’s intention is (Grice 1975, 1981). According to Gillespie and Cornish,
showing a keen interest in ordinary language (Julio 1998) entails including aspects such
as the context in which the sentence is uttered, when it is uttered, what utterances
precede it, and so on.
Apparently, there is a paradox: in order to understand the meaning of language, it is
essential to look, and move, beyond it, make it more permeable and somehow let
nonlinguistic issues interact with language. One may claim that language, as a semiotic
system, should be integrated into other sign systems so that the linguistic level can be
intelligible. This might sound paradoxical, especially if one bears in mind that language
has become the semiotic system par excellence (Castañares 2002). Besides, among the
aspects mentioned by the authors are those pertaining to the “meaning of utterances,
that is, phrases spoken, written or gestured.” This enables other nonverbal—i.e.
gestures—semiotic areas to be part of the linguistic scenario. In fact, this is not far
from what linguists like Kendon (2000) or McNeill (2000) affirm “when they consider
gestures as part of language itself and its use.”
The issue raised here which I would like to explore is how far we have to expand the
linguistic perimeter, how many ingredients we should include apart from language,
what the weight of each of these is. To put it in simple terms, what the status of
nonlinguistic aspects is, what role the world plays and how diverse sign systems
establish a dialog, in case this happens. As pointed out above, I will focus on two
aspects introduced by Gillespie and Cornish which exceed linguistic limits: context,
and what is being done while speaking.
The first striking thing is that no matter how much the linguistic area is open to
context or to what is being done while speaking or to the consequences of what is said,
the point of departure, the basis and the measure is language as a powerful common
sign system. It is from that point that they include context-related issues, with what is
being done while speaking, and so on, and then they return to language. In this sense, it
is necessary to be more specific about the question which opens this section and raise
this question: what revolves around language when departing from language? Or,
rather, what revolves around language when language is already shared? This system
is likely to leave loopholes for other semiotic systems which are necessary for language
to be meaningful and can be interpreted. I will briefly address this issue. That is to say,
what role nonlinguistic components play; to what extent nonlinguistic systems of
meaning effectively come into play in the analyses made by the philosophers of the
Linguistic Turn.
I have just explained that there is an unquestionable point of departure: language.
Interlocutors already have and share a mature language. The subsequent analyses are
made from that point, no matter how much one introduces concepts like context, action
and practical activities. Although I do not intend to be very exhaustive, I will show
92 Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

some common denominators among outstanding representatives of this view where, in

spite of a statement of intent, one finds it difficult to see how action/object/ experience
and (linguistic) communication can get integrated, as if this was such a thick mixture.
In order to illustrate this point, I have chosen Jürgen Habermas, who is one of the
most influential cultural philosophers nowadays. At the outset of his paper “What is
Universal Pragmatics?” (1976), he establishes a clear-cut difference between lan-
guage—as a sociocultural tool—and non-verbal actions which, in fact, he ignores:

“[…] [S]ince language is the specific medium of reaching understanding at the

sociocultural stage of evolution, I want to go a step further and single out explicit
speech actions from other forms of communicative action. I shall ignore nonver-
bal actions and bodily expressions” (1976, p. 21, italics added).

If we take for granted, as Habermas claims, that “language is the specific medium of
reaching understanding at the sociocultural stage of evolution”, then should we infer
that nonverbal actions are not part of the sociocultural world? If this is the case, are they
part of the natural world? If so, there is a natural/cultural dichotomy which questions
the specifically linguistic, sociocultural stage because language would have to “estab-
lish” or “hold” a dialog with the natural element. This causes serious problems at the
level of ontogenesis—this has been one of the most controversial issues criticized in
Piaget’s sensorimotor theory when he ignores the need of consensus between the child
and others before language. This raises a serious problem when it comes to explaining
development (see Rodríguez 2006)—and in the pragmatic analysis of language, the
target of the philosophers of language.
The following two quotes are from another paper by Habermas, “Actions, Speech
Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld” (1988):

“I shall exemplify ‘action’ by means of everyday or practical activities such as

running, handing things over, hammering, or sawing; I shall exemplify ‘speech’
by means of speech acts such as commands, avowals, and statements. In both
cases we may speak of ‘actions’ in a broader sense. However […] I shall choose
from the outset two different descriptive models. First, I shall describe actions in
the narrower sense—simple nonlinguistic activities of the aforementioned sort as
purposive activities; with these, the actor intervenes in the world in order to
achieve his intended goals through the choice and implementation of appropriate
means. Second, I shall describe linguistic utterances as acts by means of which a
speaker wishes to reach understanding with another person about something in
the world” (1988, p. 215, italics added).

“Every speech act with which a speaker reaches understanding/with another

person/with regard to something situates the linguistic expression in relation to
the speaker, in relation to the hearer, an in relation to the world” (1988, p. 246).

Something striking about both excerpts is the ambiguity between the central role
played by the world, on the one hand, and the fact that the activities pertaining to the
world are considered as “simple nonlinguistic activities” on the other. Habermas seems
to have forgotten that human basically learn to use tools (they even learn to hammer) in
Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103 93

a functional way and within communicative contexts—see in Basilio and Rodríguez

(2011) the semiotic complexity children deploy when they learn to hammer in a
functional way when they interact with an adult—where, apart from language, are
manifested other sign systems about the material world thanks to which the activity is
performed. Besides, material tools are cultural products which function as signs
(Barthes 1985; Castañares 1985; Groupe μ 1992). The French Semiotician Roland
Barthes explained this very clearly in the 1980s: “In effect, there is a great obstacle in
studying the purpose of objects, and I will call this obstacle “the obstacle of evidence: if
we are to study the purpose of objects, we need to give ourselves a kind of shake-up, of
detachment, in order to objectify the object, to structure its meaning.” (1985, p. 254).
[My translation]. All this is part of the basic ways to communicate when language still
does not exist. Willy nilly, they are the foundations of speech acts.
Sperber and Wilson talk about something in line with what I have just mentioned
about Habermas. Their works are based and elaborate on those by Grice—much of
what, at first sight, seems to be arbitrary semantic facts may be regarded as a
consequence of very general pragmatic restrictions (Wilson and Sperber 1981/1998,
p. 146). They try their best not to restrict the linguistic framework of language.
However, in the following excerpt their trivialization about anything that is related to
the material world is most striking. By borrowing from Barthes’s term l’obstacle de
l’évidence about the object, that is to say, what we can confirm in the following quote:

“Perceptual mechanisms assign to a sensory stimulus a conceptual identification

of that stimulus, e.g. [1] This is an orchid. [2] The doorbell is ringing. [3] The
pavement is wet […] Under normal conditions of perception, these elementary
descriptions of stimuli become strong assumptions. That these assumptions are
generally correct is du to the fact that human perceptual mechanisms are the
outcome of a long biological evolutionary process, and are well adapted to the
task […] The linguistic input mechanisms assign to a particular type of sensory
stimulus a logical form” (Sperber and Wilson 1986 p. 81, italics added).

Once again the material world is naturalized. It is devoid of rules and, as a

consequence of this, of the rules which support our encounter with it. In this way, it
has more relevance with objects (an orchid, a bell ringing or wet floor) and, therefore,
are regarded as something evident by Sperber and Wilson. The inferences necessary to
be able to interpret their meaning are straightforward thanks to the biological processes
which have formatted our perceptual mechanisms. Consequently, they are not a product
of the action of sign systems. This partly accounts for the fact that they draw upon
Fodor, an innatist scholar, in order to address cognitive mechanisms.
In the case of the pragmatic philosopher Quine, whose works on reference are well
known, he also advocates the idea of the complex language opacity vs. the evidence of
physical things. When considering what is nonlinguistic, it is enough to identify the
referent. Once identified, there is nothing more to say, all the meaning-related problems
are sorted out. Conversely, from my standpoint, the identification of the referent is by
no means an arriving point but only the starting point of the possibility of interpretation.

“Bodies present no evident problem here; intersubjective agreement is established

in primary cases by ostension, nearly enough, and indirectly in other cases by
94 Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

reduction to those primary cases through causal chains. When we come to

abstract objects, however, there is no such recourse. Who is to say whether what
you refer to as the number nine is the same thing as what I refer to by that
phrase?” (1995, p. 69, italics added)

Quine’s Word and Object (1960) opens by emphasizing the difficulty in translating.

“Language is a social art. In acquiring it we have to depend entirely on intersub-

jectively available cues as to what to say and when. Hence there is no justification
for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men’s dispositions to respond
overtly to socially observable stimulations. An effect of recognizing this limita-
tion is that the enterprise of translation is found to be involved in a certain
systematic indeterminacy” (p. ix).

Quine’s uncertainty about translation is, to my mind, the same uncertainty about a
view which holds that there are social norms in language but not what is underneath
(see Rodríguez 2006). The following quote emphasizes this dichotomy: “this familiar
desk manifests its presence by resisting my pressures and by deflecting light to my
eyes. Physical things generally, however remote, become known to us only through the
effects which they help to induce at our sensory surfaces” (Quine 1960, p. 1).
This approach to the object table is striking for two reasons. First, because what
Quine says about it can be said about an array of things. Second, because what
distinguishes a table from another object in daily life is precisely what it is used for,
what I do with it or how I can reach an agreement with others about what I can or I must
do with it (Rodríguez and Moro 1998; Moro and Rodríguez 2005; Dimitrova 2013;
Dimitrova and Moro 2013). Taking into account that he is a pragmatic philosopher who
has focused on the issue of reference, what I find quite striking is that he has
overlooked the pragmatic components of objects—i.e. their public properties. He
disregards what distinguishes and identifies tables in daily life. It has to do with the
use publicly attributed to the object as a table. It is a collective matter which cannot be
reduced to the decision made by a single individual. As a consequence of this, one may
wonder what “power” language has over an object so ‘poorly’ defined. For the two
aforementioned reasons, the name ‘table’ might lead me to better know how I can use it
on my own or in communication with others, rather than giving an idea that “resists my
pressures,” and that “deflects light to my eyes.”
I will conclude this quick overview with a quote, this time by two evolutionist
psychologists, Bjorklund y Gardiner, who also naturalize the object and minimize the
role of the educational influence on the child’s encounter with the world: “When given
objects or an apparatus, [children] do not need to be told to interact with them to see
what they might do […]. They do this spontaneously. In the process, they discover
important properties about objects and how something works” (2011, p. 167, emphasis
added). Psychology literature is full of exceptions to the rule according to which the
encounter between the child and the world takes place spontaneously.
If we take these contributions into account, it seems as if language—with its cultural,
communicative, semiotic complexity—is placed on nonlinguistic, flat realities which
are devoid of such properties. Realities presented in a naturalized way, which, I believe,
could hinder the aforementioned mixture. There is another dichotomy between the
Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103 95

powerful linguistic rules and the naturalized material world, which paradoxically
comes into play when we consider speech acts or the pragmatic aspects of language.

What Revolves Underneath Language?

All in all, it seems licit to wonder what revolves underneath language, but this time
without the solid support given by language. It seems licit to raise this question if later
on it is necessary to revisit nonlinguistic areas in order to understand linguistic
utterances. The clearer the “nonlinguistic” aspect is, the better the systems of
meaning, rules and nonlinguistic consensus are identified with each other, the easier
it will be to understand what needs including in this analysis. Aizpún (2001a) expresses
this idea very clearly.

The ‘real’ can be accessed through several paths. Likewise, different levels can be
reached, on the basis of the way to access the chosen language used, because each
kind of language involves a way to see and connects us with one “place” or
another in the world (2001a p. 311, my translation).

Some voices should be heard in this sense. To give two examples, I will mention
Herbert Clark and Umberto Eco. Both of them draw upon Peirce’s semiotics, the father
of American pragmatism. According to Clark, “communication is ordinarily anchored
to the material world—to actual people, artifacts, rooms, buildings, landscapes, events,
processes […] every act of communication takes place in a material situation that plays
an essential role in that communication” (2003, pp.243–244). On the other hand, Eco
points to an issue which is most relevant to what I am addressing here and which, at the
same time, affects the Psychology of Early Development. He claims that, although
philogenetically speaking it is possible to avoid the problem of the origins of language
due to the lack of archeological remains—in any case, see the remarkable study by
Corbalis (2002) about the origin of language—one cannot ignore it from an ontogenetic
perspective. He raises the following question: “Why have I been induced to say
something?” (Eco 1997/1999, p. 21). According to him, Saussure’s structural semiotics,
among others, has never addressed this problem. (In this respect, he partly coincides
with Gillespie y Cornish). Languages are considered already constructed systems when
users express themselves, affirm, point something out, ask questions or make com-
mands. Castañares (1994) also reproaches Saussure for leaving the represented object
outside linguistics “with an argument which is worth considering: the lack of pertinence
of that problem within the—strictly speaking—linguistic domain” (p. 158, my transla-
tion). Once again, one is to face up against the difficulty to provide the object with a
meaning so that it cannot be removed from the analysis.
Eco continues to explain that the motivations for speaking are not linguistically, but
psychologically-related.

Analytical philosophy accepts the very concept of truth (which does not have to
do with how things are in fact, but with what should be included if a statement is
considered to be true), but it has not problematized our pre-linguistic relation
with things. In other words, stating that snow is white is true as long as snow is
96 Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

white, but how we know (or how we are sure) that snow is white is something
that is attached to a theory of perception, or to optics. The only one who has
transformed the problem into the basis of his semiotic, cognitive, metaphysical
theory has, undoubtedly, been Peirce. (ibid., p. 21–22, italics added)

Therefore, Peirce has included non-related-to-language issues in semiotics—see

Riba (2003) about how indebted Psychology is to Peirce’s semiotics; Valsiner 2014.
In his semiotics, there is room for the Dynamic Object—this connects with, or is close
to, reality—and what is to be found in the origin of the immediate Object—already
inside the semiotic triangle, the referent. The following quote is quite self-explanatory.
It places the object (of the world) in the origin of semiotics. This is closely connected
with Early Development, an area which, as indicated above, can shed much light on
these issues for obvious reasons. This is what Eco says.

A Dynamic Object impels us to produce a representamen, which produces an

Immediate Object in a quasi-mind, in its turn, translatable in a series of potentially
infinite series of interpreters and, at times, through the habit developed in the
course of an interpretation process, we return to the Dynamic Object and we do
something with it. Clearly, from the moment when we have to talk about the
Dynamic Object (to which we have returned) we are at the starting point again,
we have to rename it through another representamen, and up to a point the
Dynamic Object remains as a Thing in Itself, always present and never appre-
hensible, unless it is precisely through semiotics. Even in this case, the Dynamic
Object is what impels us to produce semiotics. We produce signs because there is
something that requires to be uttered. By using a very little philosophical, but
efficient expression, the Dynamic Object is Something-which-gives-you-a-kick
and says “Speak” or “Speak about me” or even more, take yourself into account!”
(p. 22)

The question “why have I been induced to say something?” that Eco
addresses to the Philosophy of Language is also a basic question in order to
understand Early Development in general and language acquisition in particular.
It connects with the origin of the baby’s intentional communication, one of the
highlights nowadays after the breakgrounding works by Bates et al. (1975),
which directly draw upon the philosophers of language, especially Austin’s
Speech Acts. Hence, pondering on early communication can shed much light
on how this works and the pragmatic aspects of sign systems less complex than
language. The semiotic systems are constructed (Rivière 1985). It is essential to
resort to them in order to explain the origin of language in ontogenesis—the
most basic ones are the foundation of the most complex ones such as language.
What remains more unclear is how language itself is created (Casla 2012) and
how the basic systems operate as foundation.
And, since the Dialogic/Linguistic Turn opens up a path for other sign systems in the
linguistic system, it would be timely to be able to talk about what happens in Early
Development when adults and children, in spite of the huge communicative asymmetry
which characterizes them (the former command language and the latter do not), can
communicate with each other very well on many occasions. Although the adult usually
Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103 97

takes the initiative at the beginning, the child can communicate intentionally towards
the end of his/her first year of age.
In the next section, I will deal with what Early Development shows us about the
semiotic status of the object and its importance in the origins and development of
intentional communication. Two facts are worth emphasizing: (1) the referent object is,
semiotically speaking, complex and it is not static because it evolves; (2) the object is
not only part of the context but it can also be a tool for communication. A detailed
analysis of what is at stake might help “put in order” all the semiotic levels, which
come into play, and are precisely to be found between the first two aims set by Gillespie
and Cornish, what is context and what is being done.

Early-Childhood Development: An Area Which Can Shed Light on What

Revolves Around Language (And What Revolves Underneath It)

Below I advocate the idea that objects are not alien to semiotics. They are part of the
framework of semiotic systems, of the dialog between systems, which is especially
relevant in the area of Early-Childhood Development. Therefore, objects (1) offer
opportunities for actions, as Piaget brilliantly explains. They are also part of that
semiotic framework through (2) different levels of use from the early—i.e. non
canonical— to the cultural: rhythmic (Moreno et al. submitted), canonical, symbolic
(Cárdenas et al. 2014; Palacios and Rodríguez 2014) and private (Basilio and
Rodríguez 2011) uses, which are governed by rules agreed on with others. This is an
issue overlooked by Piaget. In communicative situations, (3) objects play a major role
in intentional communication as referent (Tomasello et al. 2007). This is essential when
the actors do not possess a common linguistic system. (4) The fact that the
object may turn into a referent does not imply, by any means, that it is a
“complete, absolute” reality (Aizpún 2001b, my translation) nor literal or
exclusively defined as a physical reality (Rodríguez and Moro 2008). The
object as referent within the triangle of intentional communication is “read”
and interpreted very differently. Interpretation, among other things, pertains to
the child’s development. The possibilities of different uses evolve dramatically
during the child’s first two years of age. For this reason, the pragmatic aspects
of communication—communicative intention, the consequences of communica-
tion and so on—even when there is no language or language is used at a very
initial stage, are directly affected by all these aspects.
Finally, (5) the object itself acts as a tool for communication with regard to ostensive
signs/uses, since the sign and referent coincide (Rodríguez et al. submitted). Curiously
enough, this remarkable fact has been neglected in studies about Early- Childhood
Development.
All this is part of the context, and what is done while speaking, a central issue in
language pragmatics. I will look at this in more detail below.
It seems licit to wonder about what layer of meaning and what segments (shared
with others) of reality language operates on. Approaching this issue in this way
involves questioning a deeply-rooted idea in the history of thought which holds that
the existence of ‘objectivities’ are given a priori, whether it be in the subject or—and
here lies the key—“in a kind of structural, complete, absolute reality to which one
98 Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

needs adapting through intellectual activity and, therefore, accepting as a model: veritas
est adaequatio rei et intellectus” (Aizpún 2001b, p. 60, my translation).
One may claim that before children can talk, they are adept users of cultural rules—
they make gestures, they use objects and tools in a complex way, they can reach
significant degrees of self-regulation, etc.—rules they also use when they communicate
with others. There is no agreement, however, on how to address this issue. For instance,
culturally-oriented psychologists typically emphasize Vygotski’s unfortunate division
where language is a borderline between lower psychological functions—where lan-
guage does not exist—and higher psychological functions—where language exists. A
clear example of this is found in Fernyhough (2009). Given this situation, the ontoge-
netic explanation of language acquisition is questionable. Would it be placed within a
‘semiotic void’? How come such a sign—the interrelation between signifier and
signified is arbitrary—can take place if previously there have been no more basic
levels of consensus? This seems to be very unlikely.
“We do things with words” is one of the best known maxims introduced by the
philosophers of the linguistic turn. It is the axis of Gillespie and Cornish’s paper and, as
such, it underscores the non-modular character of language when it comes to address-
ing its meaning. However, very little has been said about the fact that before doing
things with words, things are done with objects (Español 2004), things which, when
taking the child’s development into account, vary significantly. This entails that the
semiotic systems involved and, therefore, the semiotic complexity may be very differ-
ent from each other. For instance, the child at age 4 months, at 8 months, and at
15 months uses the same object very differently. To give an example, it is necessary to
be aware of what point the child at with regard to such diversity in order to be able to
infer the meaning of his/her communicative intention. However, when I mentioned
Habermas, Sperber and Wilson, and Quine above, I explained that somehow the object,
the material world (‘the physical reality’) is trivialized when it is naturalized. This does
not usually fall into the normative nor consensus aspects. The referent, unlike what
happens in the case of Peirce, is rejected from semiotics. It seems as if the actual
‘Meaning’ can only stem from language, no matter how much the aspects of context are
considered when an utterance is analyzed.
Nowadays nobody questions that names are not natural attributes of things. There
seems to be, however, a general agreement on considering that the functional, conven-
tional uses of objects are truly natural attributes. In this way, is naturalized something
that in ontogenesis is the product of the action of the sign and in sociogenesis the
product of centuries of tradition and educational transmission (De los Reyes Leoz
2009)—ignoring that one thing is the object and another thing is its uses. In fact, the
idea that autistic children find it difficult to use objects on the basis of their function and
how they use them is being more and more questioned (Sterner and Rodríguez 2012;
Williams and Kennedy-Scott 2006).
Much has been said about the permanence of the object as one of the main pillars of
cognitive development. However, it is typically addressed—no matter whether it is
approached from a constructivist or an innatist perspective—using a common denom-
inator: the lonely child who grants permanence to the outside world, regardless of the
kind of consensus reached with others. The fact that objects have a functional perma-
nence and are related to their public uses is an often overlooked issue. At this level,
there is a consensus between the members of social groups. This kind of permanence is
Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103 99

not acquired if the child remains alone. It is necessary to resort to the knowledge of
other more expert individuals. In this way, the child learns thanks to the signs he/she
has acquired while he/she has been communicating with others. In the course of their
first year of life, children begin to use object on the basis of their function. And, as
explained before, this is a public issue. They grant them functional permanence, which
entails that they start to be used as members of classes not as unique exemplars
(Rodríguez 2012). Ultimately, this opens up significant possibilities of consensus in
their communication with others from their common ground—the public uses granted
by the adult and the baby—that these offer (Dimitrova 2013). Undoubtedly, the
consensus reached with others about the functional permanence, which offers a com-
mon ground, facilitates the interpretation of others’ communicative intention.
One may think that language is placed, partly at least, over that material reality
which has begun its systematization, its segmentation and which permits to have joint
forms of activities thanks to the action of sign systems. Understanding its evolution is
essential when one analyzes the pragmatic aspects of adult-baby interactions in the
course of the first two years of age. In light of this, the idea of a flat, obvious, evident,
identical referent seems to be groundless.
Taking deictic gestures into account may also be helpful. In these gestures, the
referent is always present—unlike what happens with symbolic gestures where the
referent, or part of the referent, is absent. Let us consider how the pointing gestures
work. It is common knowledge that at the beginning children are incapable of reading
as pointing an index finger towards a specific direction. Children look at the finger/
hand, not toward the direction indicated by the pointing. From a certain moment—
towards the second half of their first year of age—children start to interpret that a
pointing gesture does not involve having to look at the hand. The gesture is not the
referent, but what they can see at the end of the direction given. By following that
direction, one encounters that what, the sign’s referent. There is, though, a second level
which begins at this stage and which typically passes unnoticed: the process of
interpreting does not come to an end when the child identifies the referent—that is
pointed to. It is the beginning, rather. Knowing that that is pointed to does not entail
that the addressee of the gesture immediately knows what that means.
In order to understand a gesture, it is not enough to identify the referent. It is
essential to know what part of the referent has to be considered, from what point of
view, what others point to that for. What communicative intention is behind it. What he/
she expects afterwards. It is not possible to answer all these questions without taking
into account what can be done with the object and what its public use is. Thus,
identifying the what for involves having agreed on certain knowledge about what
has been pointed to. Otherwise, it is impossible to move forward in terms of commu-
nication. It is precisely here that the object shows a complex, cultural, multifaceted
nature, the semiotic layers which have been placed on top of it. The object, then, gets
away from the ‘physical reality’ and turns into the object with functions, in the object
interpreted by its pragmatic aspects. To put it in simple terms, staying on a pragmatic
position of communication entails taking these aspects into consideration.
All this is connected with the third question raised by Gillespie et Cornish: Who is
the addressee of the utterance? They draw upon Rommetveit, who believes that the
speaker monitors what he is saying in accordance with what he assumes to be the
listener’s outlook and background information. What has just been mentioned in
100 Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103

connection with what is pointed to in the world is closely interrelated to this issue.
What kind of information others have.
It is worth here to take up one of Peirce’s most brilliant ideas which can be applied to
any subject—not only in adult-baby interaction—and which is very clearly explained
by Castañares:

“[…] There are many different representations of the dynamic object. But the
object represented by a sign is ‘immediate’ because the sign that it represents
does so from a point of view or a fundament. For this reason, a representation
does not exhaust the dynamic object, which can be conceived outside that
specific semiotic relation, although, […] it is not aside of all representation”
(1994, p.160, my translation).

Before coming to an end, I would like to give another paradigmatic example:

gestures with an interrogative function—protointerrogatives. For instance, in order to
conclude that an ostensive gesture—showing others the object itself—performed by a
speechless child, it serves to ask others whatever in connection with (1) either the use of
an object a child has difficulties with (Rodríguez 2006, 2007b) or (2) with how to find
something missing that the child knows the adult is aware of (Moro and Rodríguez
1991) it is necessary to consider the specificity of the object in detail—its function,
what it is, what can be done with it, consensus of previous uses, etc.—that are part of
the communication of the question in this case. If these important requisites are not
considered, it is impossible to identify the interrogative function.
Not long ago I insisted (Rodríguez 2009) on the fact that in order to understand the
meaning of a gesture, at least three things are needed: 1. The gesture itself—it is either
an ostentive, index or symbolic gesture, or a mixed gesture, when several semiotic
ingredients come into play; 2. What part of the world is being pointed to by means of
the gesture: this not only includes the identification of the referent but also the
functional properties of what is shown or pointed to both interlocutors. We know that
no matter how often adults point to an object that the child identifies as referent—he/
she looks at it, touches it, etc.—the child will be incapable of understanding A’s
intentions if the child ignores the functional properties of the object. What
can be done with it, what it is for, etc. in such a way that it is not enough to
identify the referent: it is that. It is necessary to complete it: it is that for this
reason, because of this. I anticipated the reason above: one thing is the object,
another thing is what I can use it for. The semiotic systems involved which
come into play in the constructs of such uses vary in the course of ontogenesis.
Finally, it is necessary to consider (3) circumstances. By circumstances, I mean
what revolves around the production of a gesture. One thing is to show an
object after completing a task successfully and another thing is to show the
same object with which the child has difficulties in completing the task. In the
former case, the child might be saying “please, give a round of applause for
what I have just done,” whereas in the latter case the child might be asking:
how am I supposed to continue to do this?”, “I need your help because I don’t
know how to resume.” In the former case, it would be an ostensive gesture—
regarded as a “trophy”—whereas in the latter case it would be a gesture with
an interrogative function.
Integr Psych Behav (2015) 49:89–103 101

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, I have attempted to show how two apparently different areas
like the Linguistic/Dialogic Turn with their explanation about the interpretation of
language and of the text which considers not-related-to-language aspects such as
context and what is done while speaking, and the area of communication between
adults and babies when children still cannot talk, may share common areas. Identifying
such aspects may be really fruitful.
I have placed a special emphasis on the semiotic complexity of the material
world. What directly affects “what is done while speaking” and what we
understand by “context.” In this way, I have distanced myself from certain
points of departure advocated by the Philosophers of the Linguistic Turn when,
in spite of their efforts to place language within a pragmatic framework which
includes nonlinguistic issues in the interpretation of language, in fact what
happens when the object is naturalized, the object, the actions and anything
connected with it are trivialized. This is very clearly explained by Clark when,
in relation to communication between adults, he explains that “The actions are
not considered part of the communication proper. Why not? If pointing is a
communicative act, I argue then so is placement. Yet if it is, we must revise
our views of both communication and context. Much of what is now called
context are really acts of communication” (2003, p. 244).
If an object is naturalized, I understand that the pragmatic perspective about
language remains inconclusive. Perhaps, one of our challenges in the future will be
to establish a dialog between the area of the pre-linguistic development, including all
the uncertainties existing about the dialogue between what revolves underneath lan-
guage and language itself, and those theoreticians keenly interested in opening up the
limits of the text and of introducing the context, the intentions, what is done while
speaking and so on. To put it in simple terms, the challenge lies in understanding the
Pragmatics of the Object in its articulation with the Pragmatics of Language. If one of
the two actors is left out, the process cannot be carried out and, therefore, completed
successfully.

Acknowledgments This paper was supported by the project EDU2011-27840, I+D+I from the Ministry of
Science and Innovation, Spain.

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Cintia Rodríguez is Profesora Titular in the Department of Developmental Psychology at the Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid. She coordinates the research group DETEDUCA. Her research career started at the
School of Geneva, developing the Pragmatics of the Object perspective, in early sociocognitive development.
She has published books as El Mágico Número Tres [The Magic Number Three] (1998, Paidós), L’objet et la
construction de son usage chez le bébé [The object and the construction of its use in babies] (2005, Peter
Lang), Del Ritmo al Símbolo [From Rhythm to Symbol] (2006, Horsori) and After Piaget (2012, Transaction
Publishers).