THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region
VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel
C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon.
CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the
vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO
DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking
custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return
the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3]
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph
of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an
information which is quoted herein below:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon,
at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber,
with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS
(P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or
license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.
Thereafter trial was conducted.
The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest
Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his
house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848
coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some
lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1
x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00
per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the]
owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora.
The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his
employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then
took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt
marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked
as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a
Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted
lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told
him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture
shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in
the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house
in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the
prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case
would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution
rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series
were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would
merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been
established:
That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to
procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of
the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya,
Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and
thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing.
They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2
inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used
by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood
shavings were loaded, Asan Abingasked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to
his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also
located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject
assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their
way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood
shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were
owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his
vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion
also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the
person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca
Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead
impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned
to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, CalbayogCity and told the latter about what happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle
to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized
lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to present
documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized.
Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive
Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C.
Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to
forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was
approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division
of the DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration
of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner
thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the
DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26,
1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance,
which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence.
The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood
shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house
in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the
authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the
evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the
vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was
untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval
of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court
the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned
by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept
control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had
x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was
a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber.xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long
become final and executory.
Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the
OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question
[was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known
to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.
Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a
violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who
committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating
the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral
Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as
already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused
Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the
decision has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return
of property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake,
error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the
confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3)
whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating
the vehicle administratively.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of
the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue
of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly
authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order
the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally
cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions
of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC
covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found;
it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress,
all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal
meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording
correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial
arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially
an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically
covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in
a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either
in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement
of any forest product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is
vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly
authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the
enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93,
amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the
guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of
forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private
respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two
(72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit
or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The Information did not contain any
allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed
or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false,
falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only
when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the
trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private
respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This
does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal
Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January
31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered
the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and
pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958. [22]Reynaldo
R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO),
replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the
ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to
release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68.On
the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which
involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only
the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private
respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus
be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are factual
issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main
limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and
the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for
certiorari or prohibition.[27]
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD
705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a
conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides
that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed
against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD
705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or
conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in
violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705,
and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is
immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or
conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized
representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such
a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended,
does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts
the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect
the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles.
Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper
documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents
would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble
of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest
resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement
and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should not be
degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably
restrict its scope.[30]
Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third
issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the
assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the
trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Judge Clemente C. Rosales; rollo, pp. 39-47.

[2] Rollo, pp. 53-54.

[3] Rollo, p. 47.

[4] RTC Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 39-42.

[5] Rollo, pp. 33-35.

[6] Rollo, p. 35.

[7] Order of Forfeiture; rollo, p. 147.

[8] Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 48-51.

[9] Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, Annex C, rollo, p. 38; Annex 11, rollo, p. 147; and Annex H, rollo, p. 177.

[10] Rollo, pp. 53-54.

[11] The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for private respondents

on January 30, 2001. The resolution of this case was delayed by private respondents failure/refusal to file their
pleadings on time. The Court had to issue two separate Orders of Arrest and Commitment against private respondents
on April 20, 1998, for their failure to submit their Comment on the Petition (rollo, pp. 71-72) and against
 Atty. Sisenando Fiel Jr. on November 20, 2000 for his failure to file the Memorandum for private respondents (rollo,
pp. 258-259).
[12] Rollo, p. 228. The Memorandum for Petitioner was signed by Attys. Fiel I. Marmita and Chona S. Apostol-Octa.

[13] Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 18, August 2, 1995; Department of Health v. National Labor

Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700, 707, December 29, 1995.

[14] 111 VLD 74.

[15] Ibid, p. 75.

[16] Globe-Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 701, March 3, 1992.

[17] Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictonary, 2nd ed., p. 371, citing Kolambugan Lumber & Development Co. v. Yia, 56

Phil 201, 203, October 15, 1931.

[18] Ibid, p. 211, citing Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 108 Phil. 566, 572, May 31, 1960.

[19] Id., p. 290, citing Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. Coscolluela, 44 Phil. 527, 531, February 20, 1923.

[20] 1, DENR Administrative Order 54-93.

[21] 5 and 7 of PD 705 (25 YLD 6-7).

[22] April 6, 1995 Order; rollo, p. 151.

[23] Letter dated May 10, 1995; rollo, p. 152.

[24] 5 (m) and (n), Rule 131, Rules on Evidence.

[25] San Miguel Foods, Inc. -Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68, 84, October 10, 1996.

[26] De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 389, 393, August 7, 1996; Taedo v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80,

86, January 22, 1996.

[27] 9, PD 705.

[28] Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

258 SCRA 404, 407, July 5, 1996.

[29] 111 VLD 73.

[30] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, 472, January 23, 1995.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations
makes one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as
amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents
 In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de
Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria
(Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac),
were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.[7]

Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a
Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge
not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin),
then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against
Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the
Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and
Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the
accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official
position and committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named
accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano
Latayada, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying
sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority
and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They
alleged that the Joint Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing
the Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations
against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also
asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of
witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of
the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated January 27,
1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997,
only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were
not based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to
the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise
opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not
guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada
(Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver,
petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while
the rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber
10 to 15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro
City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate
number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then the president of a
community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala
even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]

At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed
that the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any
scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the timber would be used
for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and
Boyatac delivered the timber.[23]

Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the
morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to
cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut
leaves.[24]

On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas
(Casenas), a radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and
covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at the other
side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which
consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26] and
subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was
then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications
for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber was already
delivered on December 31, 1995.[27]

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office,
received and signed for the confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not
around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense

In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and
Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The
project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire
from Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked
for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the
same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However,
the timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they
were received by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs
demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the
culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and the deceased
Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The
dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain
of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches,
while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each
other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The
accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for
the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay
Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame
excuse. There is no dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge.
The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains though that the said forest
products were obtained without the necessary authority and legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.[30]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding
[d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of
merit in its Resolution[35]promulgated on September 22, 2006.

Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;
 2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT
THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN
ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE

PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF
SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE
VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN
ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a
denial of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being
included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they
claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who
appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they
argue that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for
reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and
to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the
prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation
was conducted in the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal
gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the timber,
which were the object of the offense.

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria,
Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said
complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit
of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their
counter-affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as
a respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part
of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that
was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint
and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity
to submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not
afforded a preliminary investigation.Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly
relied on the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly
conducted in this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor,
a public officer who is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted
that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino
B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail
over the declaration of witnesses.[41]

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have
been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own
investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the
accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after
the requisite preliminary investigation.[42]

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue
again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and
actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment
against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a
preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating
in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission
of the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no
longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion
of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March
13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or

Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.[45]

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the
mere possession of forest products without the proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal
documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not
submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding
the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
petitioners culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from
petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the
seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of said timber were
also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated
timber were placed in the custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There
was a photograph of the timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]

The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and
Pansacala who testified that Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement
of the timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with
Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the
delivery of timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof
was legal and pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:

Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident
on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also
engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.

Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one
but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.

Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut
lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being
loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.

Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still
he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he
was the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.

Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior
to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.

Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products,
you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of
acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used
to build his house and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in
Pagalungan.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the
repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let
me sign it.

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano
Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep
of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already
there. So, it was delivered.

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.

Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the
compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.

Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.

Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of
the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.
 PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.

COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.

Q How much?
A P2,000.

Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber
from Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is
not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to
possess (animus possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime]
is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.[54]

There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the
requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery
and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority.Given these and
considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the
illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore,
inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the

Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been
established. They assert that the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the
cause of the prosecution.

We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to
the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized
timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that
even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record.The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and
photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners
themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they
were charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.

We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual
findings of a trial court are binding on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted
facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The legal precept applies to this case in which the
trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]

The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under
Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these
provisions read:

Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
 Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the
requisite legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this
allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets
and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in its maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in
the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted

from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00.This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the
basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying
circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously
fixed the minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the
RTC rendered its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the
Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

[2] CA rollo, pp. 135-148; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo
G. Tayag and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[3] Records, pp. 162-173; penned by Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga.

[4] CA rollo, pp. 158-159; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-

Liacco Flores and Mario V. Lopez.

[5] Id. at 149-156.

[6] Records, p. 4.

[7] Dated July 25, 1987 and is entitled as AMENDING SECTION 68 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705, AS AMENDED,

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PENALIZING POSSESSION OF TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS WITHOUT THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS
REQUIRED BY EXISTING FOREST LAWS, AUTHORIZING THE CONFISCATION OF ILLEGALLY CUT, GATHERED,
REMOVED AND POSSESSED FOREST PRODUCTS, AND GRANTING REWARDS TO INFORMERS OF VIOLATIONS
OF FORESTRY LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS.
Section 1 thereof reads:
Section 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
[8] Records, pp. 7-10.

[9] Id. at 5-6.

[10] Id. at 2-3.

[11] Id. at 2.

[12] Id. at 30-31.

[13] Folder of Exhibits, p. 4; executed by Laurence Amiscaray, Roy Cabaraban, Pedro Morales, Jr. and Arthur Roda, to the

effect that their investigation revealed that the cutting of trees was done under the supervision of Boyatac and Baillo.
[14] Records, p. 34-A.
[15] Id. at 2.
[16] Id. at 75-76.

[17] Id. at 53 and 56.

[18] TSN, October 14, 1997, pp. 3-10.

[19] TSN, October 16, 1997, p. 51.

[20] Id. at 44.

[21] Id. at 55.

[22] She was a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime

subject of this case. She later succeeded petitioner Villarin as Barangay Captain.
[23] TSN, October 16, 1997, pp. 13-14.

[24] TSN, October 14, 1997, p. 25.

[25] TSN, January 20, 1998, p. 6.

[26] Joint Affidavit; supra note 13.

[27] TSN, June 2, 1998, pp. 8-9.

[28] Records, pp. 140, 145.

[29] Id. at 173.

[30] Id. at 172-173.

[31] Id. at 181-186

[32] Id. at 205-206.

[33] CA rollo, p. 147.

[34] Supra note 5.

[35] Supra note 4.

[36] Rollo, pp. 17-18.

[37] Records, p. 3.

[38] Id at 4.

[39] Id. at 9.

[40] RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(m).

[41] Records, p. 75

[42] Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 923 (2004).

[43] Records, pp. 181-197.

[44] Aquino v. Hon. Mariano, 214 Phil. 470, 474. (1984)

[45] Aquino v. People, G.R. No. 165448, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 50, 58.

[46] Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.

[47] Exhibit B, id. at 2.

[48] Exhibit C, id. at 3.

[49] Exhibit J, id. at 11.

[50] TSN, October 14, 1997, pp. 4-7; TSN, October 16, 1997, pp. 41-42.

[51] See Reply to Peoples Comment, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 125-126.

[52] TSN, June 2, 1998, pp. 4-12.

[53] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 391, citing People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615,

May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 134.

[54] Id.

[55] Rimorin, Sr. v. People, 450 Phil. 465, 474 (2003).

[56] Id. at 475.

[57] Id. at 477.

[58] Id.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160932 January 14, 2013
SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO
P. CERICOS,Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPA YON, JULIAN D. AMADOR, BOHOL
PROVINCIAL CHIEF, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR,
RESPECTIVELY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL SUED IN BOTH
THEIR OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
Antecedents
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in
Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and
purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the
residents of Loboc and six other municipalities. The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-
Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the
requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586 on the following justifications, to wit:
1) The whole project simply involves tapping of water from the Loboc River, filtering and
purifying it, and distributing the same to the consumers in the covered towns;
2) From the source to the filtration plant, then to the purifier stations, then finally to the
consumers’ households, water flows through steel pipes;
3) The filtration and purifying process employs the latest technology—
"electrocatalytic"—internationally accepted for safety and environment friendliness;
4) No waste is generated, as the electrocatalytic process dissolves all impurities in the
water;
5) The project involves no destruction [n]or harm to the environment. On the other hand,
it is environment friendly.1
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project,
respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter
dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination
is required.
 2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability
should be established. Proper indorsement from the Protected Area Management
Bureau or PAMB should be secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to respondent EMB Region 7
Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC
because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.3
On April 3, 2002, RD Lipayon notified the petitioner that its documents substantially complied
with the procedural aspects of the EMB’s review, and that the application was assigned EMB-
DENR-7 Control No. CNC-02-080 for easy reference in case of follow-up and submission of
additional requirements.4
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination
document was required for the project due to its significant impact in the area.5
On August 26, 2002, RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following documents to
enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical area
or not, to wit:
1. Certification from DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) that it is not within areas declared by law as national parks, watershed
reserves, wildlife preservation area, sanctuaries and not within the purview of Republic
Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, and other
issuances including international commitments and declarations;
2. Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that] the areas within the
project do not constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species or
indigenous wildlife (Flora and Fauna).
3. Certification from the following:
3.1. Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAGASA) that the area is not frequently visited or hard-hit by
typhoons. This shall refer to all areas where typhoon signal no. 3 not hoisted for
at least twice a year during the last five (5) years prior to the year of reckoning.
Years to be considered shall be from January 1995 to December 2001.
3.2. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) that the area
was not subjected to an earthquake of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale
or its equivalent and hit by tsunamis during the period of 1638 until the year 2001.
3.3. PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to earthquakes of at least
intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent during the period of 1949
until the year 2001.
3.4. PAGASA that the area is not storm surge-prone.
3.5. Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7) that the area is not located
along fault lines or within fault zones and not located in critical slope.
3.6. City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not flood prone.
3.7. Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the Bureau of Soils and
Water Management (BSWM) that the area is not classified as Prime Agricultural
Land.
 4. Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office or its equivalent office that areas in
your project are not set-aside as aesthetic potential tourist spot.
5. Certification from the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) that areas within your
project are not recharged areas of aquifer.
6. Certification from DENR regional Office and/or Environmental Management Bureau
7 (EMB 7) that Loboc River is not characterized by one or any combination of the
following conditions:
a. Tapped for domestic purposes;
b. With controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities; and
c. Which support wildlife and fishery activities.
A Certificate of Non-Coverage will duly be issued to your foundation once all the above
mentioned required certifications are complied with.
Projects that are covered by P.D. 1586 or the Environmental Impact System (EIS) Law should
not start unless the Project Proponent should secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), otherwise penalties shall be imposed.6 (Emphases supplied)
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight certifications,7 including the certification
issued by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), as follows:
That the project area, Loboc, Bohol was subjected to an earthquake of Intensity VII in the
adapted Rossi-Forel scale of I-IX last February 8, 1990. The magnitude of the earthquake is
6.8 and the highest intensity reported was VIII, based on the Rossi-Forel Intensity Scale.
During the said earthquake, the PMI Academy Building collapsed while minor cracks were
sustained by the municipal hall, public school, town church and some other houses in the town.
There were reports that immediately after the earthquake, the force of the incoming waves
from the sea caused Alijuan River in the town of Duero to flow inland. The report also states
that the waves affected 10-50 meters of the coastal beach of the towns of Jagna, Duero,
Guindulman, Garcia Hernandez and Valencia.8 (Emphases supplied)
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (RO-MGB) to the effect that the project area was not located along a
fault line/fault zone or a critical slope because RO-MGB did not have the data and expertise
to render such finding, and thus had to forward the petitioner’s request to the MGB Central
Office.9
Upon the MGB’s advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the required certification from
PHIVOLCS, but the certification did not state whether the project area was within a critical
slope. Instead, the certification stated that the project site was approximately 18 kilometers
west of the East Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon’s letter dated February 4,
2003 declared that the project was within an environmentally critical area, and that the
petitioner was not entitled to the CNC, viz:
After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was found out that the area was
subjected to an earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale wherein the
magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8 with the highest intensity reported of VIII and you fail to
support certification that the project area is not within critical slope. And based on the Water
Usage and Classification per Department Order (DAO) 34 Series of 1990, subject river system
was officially classified as Class B intended for swimming and bathing purposes. Moreover,
one component of your project involves opening of roadway connected to the barangay road.
Therefore, we reiterate our previous stand that your project is covered by the EIS System
pursuant to P.D. 1586, the Environmental Impact Statement Law.11
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Loay, Bohol,12 alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of
right after having complied with the certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier
issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same area.
In the decision dated November 18, 2003,13 the RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus
upon the following considerations, namely: (1) PHIVOLCS certified that the project site had
been subjected to an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990; (2) the CNC issued by the EMB to a
similar waterworks project of the DPWH in the same area was only for the construction of a
unit spring box intake and pump house, and the DENR issued a cease and desist order relative
to the DPWH’s additional project to put up a water filtration plant therein; (3) the determination
of whether an area was environmentally critical was a task that pertained to the EMB; (4) the
assignment of a control number by the EMB to the petitioner’s application did not mean that
the application was as good as approved; (5) the RTC would not interfere with the primary
prerogative of the EMB to review the merits of the petitioner’s application for the CNC; and (6)
there was already a pending appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONER’S DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS
NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER;
B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAS EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES THROUGH AN APPEAL TO RESPONDENT DENR
SECRETARY WHO HAS SAT ON SAID APPEAL UP TO THE PRESENT;
C. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FROM
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY.14
The petitioner insists that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion by finding that the
application substantially complied with the procedural aspects for review and by assigning
Control No. CNC-02-080 to its application; that after the petitioner complied with the
requirements enumerated in the August 26, 2002 letter of RD Lipayon, the EMB became duty-
bound to issue the CNC to the petitioner; that the EMB issued a CNC to a similar project of
the DPWH in the same area; that it filed an appeal with the DENR Secretary, but the appeal
remained unresolved; and that it brought the petition for mandamus precisely as a speedier
recourse.
In their comment, RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act complained of against them
involved an exercise of discretion that could not be compelled by mandamus; that the
petitioner’s proposed project was located within an environmentally critical area, and the
activities to be done were so significant that they would create massive earth movement and
environmental degradation; that the petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping; and
that the petitioner had no cause of action against them for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
On his part, the DENR Secretary, through the Solicitor General, contends that the petition
raises questions of fact that are not proper in a petition for review; that the petitioner should
have appealed to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; that the grant or denial of a CNC
application is discretionary and cannot be compelled by mandamus; and that the petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether the appeal directly to this Court
from the RTC was proper, and, secondly, whether the petition for mandamus was the correct
recourse.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for its lack of merit.
1.
Petitioner’s appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court
This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules of Court, whose Section 1
expressly requires that the petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth. Yet, the petitioner hereby raises a question of fact whose resolution is decisive in this
appeal. That issue of fact concerns whether or not the petitioner established that its project
was not located in an environmentally critical area. For this reason, the Court is constrained to
deny due course to the petition for review.
It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusive and binding
unless any of the following exceptions obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.15 However, none of the aforementioned
exceptions applies herein.
2.
Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand
the performance of the act by the respondents.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an
administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative
processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency
the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.16 The court of law must allow
the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the
specialized areas of its competence.17 This rests on the theory that the administrative authority
is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so.18
The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.
At the time RD Lipayon denied the petitioner’s application for the CNC, Administrative Order
No. 42 dated November 2, 200219 had just vested the authority to grant or deny applications
for the ECC in the Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a
specific implementing guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to
be appealed, the petitioner could have been easily guided in that regard by the Administrative
Code of 1987, which provides that the Director of a line bureau, such as the EMB,20 shall have
supervision and control over all division and other units, including regional offices, under the
bureau.21 Verily, supervision and control include the power to "review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units."22 Accordingly, the petitioner should
have appealed the EMB Regional Director’s decision to the EMB Director, who exercised
supervision and control over the former.
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated Administrative Order No. 2003-
3023 in order to define where appeals should be taken, providing as follows:
Section 6. Appeal
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC/CNC applications may, within 15 days
from receipt of such decision, file an appeal on the following grounds:
a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or
b. Serious errors in the review findings.
The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle
grievances between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action.
Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
The proponent or any stakeholder may file an appeal to the following:
1âwphi1
Deciding Authority Where to file the appeal
EMB Regional Office Director Office of the EMB Director
EMB Central Office Director Office of the DENR Secretary
DENR Secretary Office of the President
Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR
Secretary.1âwphi1 However, the records reveal that the subject of the appeal of the petitioner
was an undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its application
for the CNC,24 not the decision of RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending
appeal with the DENR Secretary had related to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should
still have waited for the DENR Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so rendered its resort to mandamus in
the RTC premature. The omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.25
Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not establish
that the grant of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD
Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.
The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the
Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is not
required to secure an ECC.26 The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that
required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on the
environment, thus:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. – Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and
goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall
prepare, file and include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the
quality of the environment a detailed statement on–
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented
(c) alternative to the proposed action
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the
same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a
finding must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.
xxxx
P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared
by the President of the Philippines as environmentally critical,27 thus:
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas
not declared by the Presidents as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical
and shall not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however
require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards
as it may deem necessary.
On December 14, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2146 declaring areas and
types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EIS System, as follows:
A. Environmentally Critical Projects
I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous metal industries
b. Iron and steel mills
 c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
d. Smelting plants
II. Resource Extractive Industries
a. Major mining and quarrying projects
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests
4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products
6. Grazing
c. Fishery Projects
1. Dikes for fishpond development projects
III. Infrastructure Projects
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges.
B. Environmentally Critical Areas
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife
preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of
indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards,
floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions;
a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate
authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions:
a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
 b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and
storm floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
12. Coral reef, characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions:
a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;
b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
Projects not included in the foregoing enumeration were considered non-critical to the
environment and were entitled to the CNC.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC
is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment
and discretion by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the
project or project area is classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to
be submitted by the applicant.
The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion in its case when he
made his finding that the application substantially complied with the procedural requirements
for review. As such, he was then obliged to issue the CNC once the petitioner had submitted
the required certifications.
The petitioner errs on two grounds.
Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application
when he made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements
for review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive aspect of the application, that is,
whether the project and the project area were considered critical to the environment. In fact,
this was the reason why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit certifications from the
various government agencies concerned. Surely, the required certifications were not mere
formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his decision on whether to grant or
deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the
requirement to submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the
effect that the project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification
showed that the project site had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that
sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural
calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be issued the
CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner grossly misunderstood the nature
of the remedy of mandamus. To avoid similar misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a
short exposition on the nature and office of the remedy is now appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It is believed that the writ was
originally part of the class of writs or mandates issued by the English sovereign to direct his
subjects to perform a particular act or duty.28 The earliest writs were in the form of letters
missive, and were mere personal commands. The command was a law in itself, from which
there was no appeal. The writ of mandamus was not only declaratory of a duty under an
existing law, but was a law in itself that imposed the duty, the performance of which it
commanded.29 The King was considered as the fountain and source of justice, and when the
law did not afford a remedy by the regular forms of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the
sovereign were invoked in aid of the ordinary powers of the courts.30
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the King’s name out of the court of King’s Bench that
had a general supervisory power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, gradually
supplanted the old personal command of the sovereign.31 The court of King’s Bench, acting
as the general guardian of public rights and in the exercise of its authority to grant the writ,
rendered the writ of mandamus the suppletory means of substantial justice in every case where
there was no other specific legal remedy for a legal right, and ensured that all official duties
were fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was properly within its control.32 Early on, the writ
of mandamus was particularly used to compel public authorities to return the petitioners to
public offices from which they had been unlawfully removed.33
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ emanating from the King himself,
superintending the police and preserving the peace within the realm.34 It was allowed only in
cases affecting the sovereign, or the interest of the public at large.35 The writ of mandamus
grew out of the necessity to compel the inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial
powers invested in them by restraining their excesses, preventing their negligence and
restraining their denial of justice.36
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly prerogative features and has
been assimilated to the nature of an ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to
be an extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in extraordinary cases and where
the usual and ordinary modes of proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford
redress to a party aggrieved, and where without its aid there would be a failure of justice.37
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart from the other
remedial writs, i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a
pre-existing duty.38 In fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus
will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought
to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same. 39 The
petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of
the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the
act.40
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary
remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those
that are discretionary.41 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.42
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for mandamus rendered its
petition in the RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 35.

2 Id. at 39.

3 Id. at 40.

4 Id. at 44.

5 Id. at 45.

6 Id. at 52-53.

7 Id. at 54-64.

8 Id. at 58.

9 Id. at 59.

10 Id. at 64.

11 Id. at 65.

12 Id. at 16-27

13 Id. at 125-134.

14 Id. at 6.

15 Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229; The Insular Life

Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86; Langkaan
Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. L-139437, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542,
549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 97, 110; Sta. Maria
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127549, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 351, 357-358.
16 Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265.

17 Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v. Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., G.R. No.

175039, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 83, 89.

18 Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 482, 486-487.

19 RATIONALIZING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)

SYSTEM AND GIVING AUTHORITY, IN ADDITION TO THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, TO THE DIRECTOR AND REGIONAL DIRECTORS OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU TO GRANT OR DENY THE ISSUANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATES.
20 Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999) converted the Environmental Management Bureau from

a staff bureau to a line bureau. Under Section 20, in conjunction with Section 41, Chapter 8, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Director of a line bureau shall have supervision and control over all division and
other units, including regional offices, under the bureau.
21 Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 8, Sections 20 and 41.

22 Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(1).

23 It took effect on August 4, 2003.

24 Rollo, pp. 42-43.

25 Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court.

26 This definition is based on DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30, Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)

for the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System.

27 Section 4 of P.D. No. 1586 provides:
 Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. - The President of the
Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally
critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President
may by his proclamation reorganized such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or
instrumentalities including the realignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
28 High, A Treatise On Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Third Edition (1896), §2, p. 5.

29 In re Lauritsen, 109 N.W. 404 (Minn. 1906).

30 High, op. cit., §3, p. 7.

31 Id.

32 Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Commissioners of Allegheny County, 32 Pa. 218 (1858).

33 Antieau, The Practice Of Extraordinary Remedies, Vol. 1, 1987 Edition, §2.00, p. 291.

34 Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612, 625 (1924).

35 High, op. cit., §3, pp. 6-7.

36 Ferris, et al.., The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 1926 Edition, §187, p. 218.

37 High, op. cit., §4, p. 9.

38 Id. §7, p. 11.

39 Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association Incorporated, G.R. No.

143870, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 358, 375.

40 Wightman-Cervantes v. Mueller. 750 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.C.2010).

41 High, op. cit., §24, pp. 31.

42 Philippine Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, Inc., G.R. No. 163088, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 763.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J.,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO,
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA,
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES,
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA,
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA,
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO,
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR.,
GOVERNMENT, NACHURA,
Petitioners, REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
MANILA BAY, represented and
joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated:
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents. December 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late
gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on
the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by
itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the
voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their
respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the
first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To
most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to
carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their
cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a
sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once
brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact
recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject
official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against
several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed
from:

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or

commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public
health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for
 which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class
B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean
the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an
ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality
Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from
different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of
contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4]

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in
behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along
the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study
being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean
the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

 On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily,
to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification
to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To
attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are
directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their
respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme
of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage]

treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their
capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide,
construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install,
operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-
generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels
that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and

appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as
well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of
wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to

revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish
and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the
purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that
obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and
liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and
 engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in
removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-
biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and
sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through
education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all
costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG),
Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and
agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a
Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the
consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions
of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents
and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed
the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require
petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[7]

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition
on the following ground and supporting arguments:
 THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE
PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152
REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL
POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE
CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER
CLEANING IN GENERAL

II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A
MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Qualityand Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general
or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can
petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. [8] A
ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[9] It
connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by
law.[10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
 Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of
judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its
mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to
such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by
law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice
Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of
ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and
desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months
from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the
MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the
MMDAs waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and

implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and
sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and
operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of
other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste.
(Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of
sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each
site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are
Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among
others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open
dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled
dumps.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not
only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as
earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to
act officially according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that
allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. [14] Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-
related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment
and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the
other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction
over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity,
causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using
available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution.
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report,
an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and
adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency

responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless
otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers
and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24)
months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall
thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said
report;
 b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve
(12) months following the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within
12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated
water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water
quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need
arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.[16] Within
twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned
to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR,
with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-
government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a
comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation
Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation
of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases
should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them
under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and
control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the
cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged
with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be
necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns
comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water
districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these
districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these
districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA,
as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities,
inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal
system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is
mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO
292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in
coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic
resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable
basis.[21]Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR
for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked
under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national
development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-
wide services relating to flood control and sewerage management which include the
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated
flood control, drainage and sewerage system.

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and
MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro
Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood
control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent
laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law
of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24]or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary
responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control
Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement
of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel,

barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any
 method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters
of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown,

discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment,
or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state
into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed
into such navigable water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable
water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall
be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides,
or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act
of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to
perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA
6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires
the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained
the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the
PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules,
and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This
was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both
the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws,
rules, and regulations.[25]

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop,
regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and
national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police
authority within the

ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions
and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the
area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons
and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]
 Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL
73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception
facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into
the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the
vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP
Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions
of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of
jurisdiction.[29]

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated
are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning
of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable
or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open
dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or
demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places
such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination
with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws
along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater
directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the
DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code),
is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas
that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under
Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned
agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In
areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.
 In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and
Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the
regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies
through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD
1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at
all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission
on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper
use of the environment.Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the
other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school
curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33]
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives.[34]

One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth
in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh,
brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated
from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and
quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble
objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear,
categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each
agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the
cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has

deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary
to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to

contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In
case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for
such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup
Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152).
Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections

15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in
excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain,
remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that
the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use:
Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the
polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with
other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and
cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by
the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative
determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the
Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said
disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than
real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the
designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern
themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to
cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the
succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and accidental
spills, as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants

discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances

in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the
government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations
of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned.They maintain that the
application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding
containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the
aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water to pre-spill
condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or
accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as

delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for
accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in
fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g),
PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations
of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated
in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills
as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD
1152.

To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their

narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water
quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying
that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition.
As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said
Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This
section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take
such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine,
the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that
it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who
fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government
agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that
they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution
incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the
Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come
in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their
cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard,
what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid
as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive
program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs.
17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.[35]

Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation
of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of
the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line
between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to
pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152
mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of
the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that
empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person
who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an
establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the
contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are
so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized
as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are
so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of
the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of
the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been
required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting,
it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of
RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup
situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay.Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves
the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices
under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal
level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, [36] the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized
structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the
National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If
there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay,
these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or
unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all
efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary
said as much.[38]

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD
1067 or the Water Code,[39] which prohibits the building of structures within a given length
along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in
urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in
the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No
person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
 recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any
kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing
along or near the banks of the PasigRiver, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment
facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters,
from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to
comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study
on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage
Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking.Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the

Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of
lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the
surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are
used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount
of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably
generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say
that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and
possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into
the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40]

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be
established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003).
Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA
of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No
open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of
solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open
dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further
 that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity
of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5)
years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill
which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like
littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation
of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do
not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage
system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275,
which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious
wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or
solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or
machine of substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and
other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize
the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately
act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the
essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the
tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and
mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical
landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore
the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived
in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished
if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their
minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners,
has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must
transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at
hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies
and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions
in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
 RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve
waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly
provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and
it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean
up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to
future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly
as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONSin view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now
read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34
[1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment
and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed
to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It
is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance
with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25
of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of
general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay,
to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said
facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water,
and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay,
under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate,
and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal,
and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage
and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage
in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in
accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend
violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent
marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures
to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood
control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in
Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood
control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,
Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing
laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1)
year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have
the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from
septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable
time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its
environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the
DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and
hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and
the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,
and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG,
PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Now the Department of Education (DepEd).

[2] Gore, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH 161.

[3] Rollo, p. 74.

[4] Id. at 53.

[5] Id. at 109-123. Penned by Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle (now retired Court of Appeals Justice).

[6] Id. at 47-58. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S.

Labitoria and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.

[7] Id. at 52.

[8] Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301, 306.

[9] BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).

[10] Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 490 (1912).

[11] G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 657, as subsequently reiterated on February 13, 2008.

[12] RA 9003 was approved on January 26, 2001.

[13] 2 Feria Noche, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED.

[14] BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).

[15] Providing for the Reorganization of the [DENR], Renaming it as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

and for Other Purposes.

[16] Per DENR Secretary Jose Atienza, the DENR is preparing an EO for the purpose. TSN of oral arguments, p. 118.

[17] Per information from the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, DENR, as validated

by the DENR Secretary during the oral arguments. TSN, pp. 119-120.
[18] An Act Creating the [MWSS] and Dissolving the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority [NAWASA]; and

for Other Purposes.

[19] Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism.The [DENR] and its concerned attached agencies x x x shall coordinate and enter

into agreement with other government agencies, industrial sector and other concerned sectors in the furtherance of the
objectives of this Act. The following agencies shall perform tile functions specified hereunder:
xxxx
 b) DPWH through its attached agencies, such as the MWSS, LWUA, and including other urban water utilities for the
provision or sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment and disposal of sewage within
their area of jurisdiction.
[20] Book IV, Title IV, Sec. 2.

[21] Sec. 14. Monitoring Control and Surveillance of the Philippine Waters.A monitoring, control and surveillance

system shall be established by the [DA] in coordination with LGUs and other agencies concerned to ensure that the fisheries
and aquatic resources in the Philippine waters are judiciously and wisely utilized and managed on a sustainable basis x x x.
[22] Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism.x x x x

a) Philippine Coast Guard in coordination with DA and DENR shall enforce for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters x x x specifically from offshore sources;
xxxx
c) DA, shall coordinate with the DENR, in the formulation of guidelines x x x for the prevention, control and abatement
of pollution from agricultural and aquaculture activities x x x Provided, further, That the x x x BFAR of the DA shall be primarily
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management and conservation of the
fisheries and aquatic resources.
[23] Book IV, Title V, Sec. 2. Mandate.The [DPWH] shall be the States engineering arm and is tasked to carry out the

policy enumerated above [i.e., the planning, design, construction, and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially x x x
flood control and water resources development systems].
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.The Department, in order to carry out its mandate, shall:
xxxx
(2) Develop and implement effective codes, standards, and reasonable guidelines to ensure the safety of all public
and private structures in the country and assure efficiency and proper quality in the construction of public works;
(3) Ascertain that all public works plans and project implementation designs are consistent with current standards
and guidelines;
xxxx
(8) Provide an integrated planning for x x x flood control and water resource and water resource development systems
x x x.
[24] Sec. 6. Enforcement and Implementation.The [PCG] shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing the laws,

rules and regulations governing marine pollution. However, it shall be the joint responsibility of the [PCG] and the National
Pollution Control Commission to coordinate and cooperate with each other in the enforcement of the provisions of this decree
and its implementing rules and regulations, and may call upon any other government office, instrumentality or agency to
extend every assistance in this respect.
[25] Sec. 124. Persons and Deputies Authorized to Enforce this Code x x x.The law enforcements of the [DA], the Philippine

Navy, [PCG, PNP], PNP-Maritime Command x x x are hereby authorized to enforce this Code and other fishery laws x x x.
[26] <http://www.ppa.com.ph> (visited November 20, 2008).

[27] EO 513, Reorganizing the Philippine Ports Authority, Sec. 2 provides further:

Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:

Sec. 6-c. Police Authority.x x x Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police authorities;
xxxx
e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law.
[28] International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978

Relating Thereto.
[29] Sec. 10. Role of LGUs in Solid Waste Management.Pursuant to the relevant provisions of RA No. 7160, otherwise

known as the Local Government Code, the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
the provisions of this Act within their respective jurisdictions.
[30] Sec. 72. Scope of Supervision of the Department.The approval of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is

required in the following matters:

xxxx
(g) Method of disposal of sludge from septic tanks or other treatment plants.
[31] Sec. 5.1.1.a. It shall be unlawful for any person, entity or firm to discharge untreated effluent of septic tanks and/or sewage

treatment plants to bodies of water without obtaining approval from the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representatives.
 [32] Sec. 53. Environmental Education.The [DepEd] shall integrate subjects on environmental education in its school
curricula at all levels. It shall also endeavor to conduct special community education emphasizing the relationship of man and
nature as well as environmental sanitation and practices.
[33] Sec. 56. Environmental Education in the Formal and Nonformal Sectors.The national government, through the

[DepEd] and in coordination with concerned government agencies, NGOs and private institutions, shall strengthen the
integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with particular emphasis on the theory and practice of
waste management principles like waste minimization, specifically resource conservation and recovery, segregation at source,
reduction, recycling, re-use, and composing, in order to promote environmental awareness and action among the citizenry.
[34] Title XVII, Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy.The national budget shall be formulated and implemented as an instrument

of national development, reflective of national objectives and plans; supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic
development plans and oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that the
utilization of funds and operations of government entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the context of a
regionalized governmental structure and within the totality of revenues and other receipts, expenditures and borrowings of all
levels of government and of government-owned or controlled corporations; and prepared within the context of the national
long-term plans and budget programs of the Government.
[35] Rollo, p. 76.

[36] Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1 SCC 226 (1998).

[37] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 4 SC 463 (1987).

[38] TSN, p. 121.

[39] Repealed Art. 638 of the CIVIL CODE. See E.L. Pineda, PROPERTY 399 (1999).

[40] Asian Development Bank, THE GARBAGE BOOK 44-45 (November 2006).

[41] G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 805.

[42] Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy,

the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of
their prescribed powers and functions.
[43] Sec. 8. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and Disposal.Within five (5) years following the effectivity of this

Act, the Agency vested to provide water supply and sewerage facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other
highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as defined in [RA] 7160, in coordination with LGUs, shall be required to connect the existing
sewage line found in all subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational facilities, hospitals,
market places, public buildings, industrial complex and other similar establishments including households to available
sewerage system. Provided, That the said connection shall be subject to sewerage services charge/fees in accordance with
existing laws, rules or regulations unless the sources had already utilized their own sewerage system: Provided, further, That
all sources of sewage and septage shall comply with the requirements herein.
[44] Supra note 19.

[45] Sec. 65. Functions of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.As a line bureau, the BFAR shall have the

following functions:
xxxx
q. assist the LGUs in developing their technical capability in the development, management, regulation, conservation,
and protection of fishery resources;
xxxx
s. perform such other related function which shall promote the development, conservation, management, protection
and utilization of fisheries and aquatic resources.
[46] Supra notes 26 & 27.

[47] Among the prohibited and penalized acts under Sec. 48 of RA 9003 are: (1) littering and dumping of waste matters

in public places; (2) open burning of solid wastes; (3) squatting in open dumps and landfills; (4) transporting and dumping in
bulk of collected domestic, industrial, commercial and institutional wastes in areas other than centers and facilities prescribed
under the Act; (5) construction or operation of waste management facilities without an Environmental Compliance Certificate;
and (6) construction or operation of landfills or any waste disposal facility on any aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed
area.
[48] Supra note 32.

[49] Supra note 33.

THIRD DIVISION

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., G.R. No. 158290

VICTOR C. AGUSTIN,
ALFREDO L. HENARES, Present:
DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE
BELO HENARES, and
CRISTINA BELO HENARES, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
- versus - VELASCO, JR., JJ.

LAND TRANSPORTATION Promulgated:

FRANCHISING AND
REGULATORY BOARD and October 23, 2006
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility
vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, [1] the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,[2] a study of the
Asian Development Bank,[3] the Manila Observatory[4] and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources[5] (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in
the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles
and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling
case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of dust, dirt,
smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various
engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and
the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from
engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with
hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain;
and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful
nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to
petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted
into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With
prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak
hearts.[6]

Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use
natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with
the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing
high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major
sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment
Monitor 2002[7], stating that in four of the countrys major cities, Metro
Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep
into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million. [8] The
study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about
US$140 million.
Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at
about US$120 million.
Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila
(averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro
Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent
increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study
done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.[9]
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines studies in 1990-91 and 1994
showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic
obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest
among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms
among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also
revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than
their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners

propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of
methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane,[10] is colorless and
odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than
coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel;
reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60
percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners,
the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for
global warming.[11]
 Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for
a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie
in Section 16,[12] Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[13] and
Section 4[14] of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners motion to implead the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section
3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the
correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board
or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[15] Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains
that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of an act done.

The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly
too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence
of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as
alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative
fuel.

The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act
No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy
(DOE), under Section 26[16] of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for
all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency
and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 21[17] of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC
is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein
respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General
opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and
regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles
mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2[18] and Section 21.[19] Petitioners state
that under these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the
benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought
about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is
tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
 Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in
fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court that the Solicitor General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY

LAW

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY

RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF
REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO
REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS[20]
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring
this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against respondents to
compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

According to petitioners, Section 16,[21] Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy
statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment.
This policy is enunciated in Oposa.[22] The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep.
Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant
petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in
this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to
challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 4[23] of Rep.
Act No. 8749.

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government
agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and
with the same agencies awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air
pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents
functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes
as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG
as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be addressed
to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative
fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners
challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners propose could be done through a less
circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
in his ponencia in the Oposa case,[24] describes as inter-generational responsibility and inter-
generational justice.
Now, as to petitioners standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their
case before this Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses
on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held
previously, a partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Courts discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised.
We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance
to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners
for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The
consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment
due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these
considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could
issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following
cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled;
and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[25] we said,

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require
anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to
control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be
necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The
writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law.The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
 In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on
a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act
No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically
provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this
Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall
review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need
arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure
substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the
general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs,
shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution
from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor
vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to
oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for
motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

In Oposa[26] we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of
the responsible government agencies to advance the said right.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer
for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG
as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the
use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing
a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290,
entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took
effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean
burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower
pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the
natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one
of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of
the components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related
facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE
as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR,
through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par.
4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for
a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in
Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential
franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened
routes A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner
environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by
the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e.,
a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by
law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to
order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No.
290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC
surveys.

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate
branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.[27] The need for future changes
in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court,
especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to
a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to
address by themselves the environmental problemsraised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology with the twin concepts of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational
justice in Oposa,[28] where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the
rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation
to clean air. In Oposawe said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly
found in the Constitution even if the right is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. . .[29]

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have
placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as
the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in
particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public
utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any
judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, p. 4.
[2] Id. at 6.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 7.

[6] Id. at 5, 7-8.

[7] Id. at 9.

[8] Id. at 10.

[9] Id. at 9-10.

[10] Id. at 11, citing Alternative Fuels: A Key to Reducing Air Pollution. The Environmental Education and Information Division

Environmental Management Bureau-DENR.

[11] Id. at 11-12, citing Bacallan, J.J. Alternative Fuels for Vehicles. Business and Environment. First Quarter 2003. Volume 8,

No. 1, page 12.

[12] Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with

the rhythm and harmony of nature.

[13] G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

[14] SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought

to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:

a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and programs
and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or
activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be
served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the
atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and
regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions
against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and
public health impact of a project or activity.
[15] Rollo, p. 64.

[16] SEC. 26. Fuels and Additives.- Pursuant to the Air Quality Framework to be established under Section 7 of this Act, the

Department of Energy (DOE), co-chaired by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in
consultation with the Bureau of Product Standards (BPS) of the DTI, the DOST, the representatives of the fuel and
automotive industries, academe and the consumers shall set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related
products, to improve fuel composition for increased efficiency and reduced emissions: . . .
[17] SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set

pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review,
revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all
major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
...
[18] SEC. 2. Declaration of Principles. - . . .

...
Finally, the State recognizes that a clean and healthy environment is for the good of all and should therefore be the concern
of all.
[19] SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set

pursuant to and as provided in this Act.

[20] Rollo, pp. 93-94.

[21] Supra note 12.

[22] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13.

[23] Supra note 14.

[24] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13.

[25] G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761, 771-772.

[26] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 805, 808.

[27] Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 748, 754.

[28] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 803.

[29] Id. at 805.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g.,
TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES,
Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-
Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and
as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region
VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D.
ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as
representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE
SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected
Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director -
Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for Region
VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
"Until one has loved an animal,
a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
Anatole France
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
I
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their
personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the
issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal
guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They use
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international
and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation
pour autrui.3As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert
that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait
as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary
steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this
court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of
"epistolary jurisdiction."5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to
continue to define environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable.
However, the space for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public
interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other values protected
by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated
set the balance between competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the
necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural
rights for animals through their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are
asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of
Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident
Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear
consent from their animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to
pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial notice that
the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident Marine
Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are
the strategies that they agree with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of
guardianship between them and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law
cannot be founded on feigned representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have
legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing
have already been liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of
environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons,
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be
authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified
'in the following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe,
the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident
Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party
in interest.7 When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that
another party's act or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both
material and based on an enforceable legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real
party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall
be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to
directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an
identified real party in interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action.
Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not an
exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of
Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that
for the Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident
Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized
by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine
jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the
subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.
In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which
Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals
may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With
court approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals
in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans
who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek
judicial redress even though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate
challenges - such as identifying the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already
well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a
judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless - and nonhuman -
entities such as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on
their own behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for
removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a guardianship are
well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible.
The court indicated that AL VA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an
established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that
the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy
organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an
organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating
its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue
legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a
court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit
organizations with an established history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to
serve as official guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The American
legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and interests of
nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to
nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice.
To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal system must
recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a viable means of
enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has
been urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more compelling as
applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain
and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively different from other legally
protected nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the
integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them
meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce,
Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is found in the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to
encourage civic participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should
reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable representatives of the natural
environment, which includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as
similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g.,
cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities
that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states,
and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as
having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest.
The same cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we,
as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we
represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans,
we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know
what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the
court held that an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an
animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16Such sympathy cannot stand
independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to
represent animals was further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication"
to asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing
doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment
of animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing
so, the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated
ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible.
The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an
established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that
the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy
organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an
organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating
its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue
legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a
court-sanctioned guardianship.18(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human
stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party
who has enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined
in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines
or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign
representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of
environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let
alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that
humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves,
which of course includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have
given to the rule on standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury
on their part, they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the following: [I]t is
imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the
suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a
potential "injury."20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding this rule alongside the
appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I
opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives, should be
used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental
concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational
responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would
preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual
concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for
those who will exist at a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the
unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations
from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the
autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again
restricted their ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be
allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual
concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any
countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be
born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of
catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the
light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect.
He or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be
enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed
on the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the real party in
interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is
not merely a curiosity about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be
present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as
representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a
representative, that representative is not and does not become the real party in interest. The
person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to be a
third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.
....
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an
identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the
representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit
under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental
law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that
allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party
in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations
yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized
the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future
generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations,
is dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the
suit, putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially
result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall
upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and
generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue,
especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the
matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others.
Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based
on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's decision
will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of
"real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a
judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern
rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what
their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be
any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product
of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably
cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be
considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I
concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant
ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine
Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in
interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future generations of
Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract
46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant
reduction of their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage they suffered, which
has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied
petitioners, most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic
of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of
"legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human
petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-
petitioner" for "her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon
Strait."28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her
consent. In our jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party
but was unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted.
In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which
a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if
known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his
person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained
should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3,
Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff
can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in
the complaint.30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action
but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or
other court processes. Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any
party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk
of being denied due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-
equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy
directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may
have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former
President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234, 31 which declared Tañon Strait
as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of
Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article
XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration
Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly
classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII,
Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does
not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph
4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing rights to
JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use
of communal marine and fishing resources.35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-
workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development,
and use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones.
This is the clear import of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This
is also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973
and 1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or association at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploitation,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and
binding service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other forms of assistance
are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer
interpretation from the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are
the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification.
Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result
in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further
subjectivity from those who spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who
may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already
in the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were read by those who
ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the
standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement
and interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against
three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that
provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for
and on behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress
within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No.
87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law
is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President
may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources
means that service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article
XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and
ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion
emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory
activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered
that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected
seascape under Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of
energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress
specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2,
hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to
exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall
be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall
be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of
an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such
activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a
protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the
requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary
Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases
where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty
cannot be delegated to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the
President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse and
corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom
deliberations, as follows:
• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term
service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial
assistance. • They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the
1973 Constitution.
• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate
service contracts.
• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would
eliminate or m minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law
regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
involved in the signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional
requirement renders SC-46 null and void.
IX
Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the
execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite
to the validity of any service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization of
Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively
took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under
paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.
X
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also
null and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular,
SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon Strait is covered by
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of
policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all
components of the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population,
resource exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment
notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as
well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the
Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common
ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural
heritage; that effective administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation
among national government, local and concerned private organizations; that the use and
enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity
and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS), which shall encompass outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important
public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of
which shall be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental
Impact Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the
scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact
assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken
into consideration in the decision-making process.45(Emphasis supplied)
The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured
under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is
implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken,
the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The
program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to
Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of
energy resources found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2,
hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to
exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall
be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall
be allowed only through a taw passed by Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining
an Environmental Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered
by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992,
which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon
Strait is not a nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering
information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that the exploration caused the least
possible damage to the area.49
Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for
cases involving Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in light of
resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local
resources under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape, the institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.
Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46.
Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the
second subphase of its project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region
VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007. 51
Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any
environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992.
XI
Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient
species, we do not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources
that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly
causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign representation of any
other species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to
claim any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and
courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and power endowed on
our species.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote:
(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;
(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 180771), p. 7-8.

2 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

3 Rollo (G.R. No. 180771), p. 16.

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 180771), p. 123-124.

5 Id. at 196.

6 1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 2.

7 See Consumido v. Ros, 555 Phil. 652, 658 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

8 Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 252 Phil. 831, 839 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], citing Lee et al. v.

Romillo, Jr., 244 Phil. 606, 612 ( 1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
9 1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 3.

10 Ang, represented by Aceron v. Spouses Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 699, 709 [Per J.

Reyes, Second Division]. ·

11 1997 RULESOFCIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 3.

12 Rollo (G.R No. 180771), p. 8.

13 Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513 (2007)
<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/califomialawreview/vol95/iss2/4> (visited March 15, 2015).
14 Id. at 517-519.

15 Id. at 513-514. Footnote 1 of Marguerite Hogan's article cites this case as Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v.

Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir., 1985).

16 In that case, the claim was based on a law called "National Environmental Policy Act."

17 Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra.

Club v. Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513, 514 (2007)

<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/califomialawreview/vol95/iss2/4> (visited March 15, 2015).
18 Id. at 515, 518.

19 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R No. 206510, September 14, 2014

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/september2014/206510 _ leonen.pdf> [Per

J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
20 Id. at 11.

21 J. Leanen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 205257, February 3, 2015

<http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/pdf/web/viewer.htm l?fi!e=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/207257_leonen.pdf> [Per J.

Del Castillo, En Banc].
22 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 803 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

23 J. Leanen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R No. 206510, September 14, 2014, 13

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/september:iO 14/206510 _leonen.pdf> [Per

J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
24 J. Leanen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 205257, February 3, 2015

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/february2015/207257 _ leonen.pdf> [Per J.

Del Castillo, En Banc]. See also De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 254, 265 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third
Division], citing Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 900-902 (1996) [Per J. Regalado, En
Banc].
25 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 205257, February 3, 2015, 3-5

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/february2015/207257_leonen.pdt> [Per J.
Del Castillo, En Banc].
26 Id. at 7.

27 Rollo (G.RNo.180771), p.12.

28 Id. at 8.

29 1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 9.

30 1997 RULES OP CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 10. e 31

31 Declaring the Tañon Strait Situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a

Protected Area Pursuant to R.A. 7586 (NIPAS Act of 1992) and Shall be Known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape,
May 27, 1998.
32 Rollo (G.R No. 181527), p. 26.

33 Id. at 26-28.

34 Rollo (G.R No. 180771), p. 81-83.

35 Id.

36 486 Phil. 754 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

37 Id. at 815.

38 Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive

issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
39 Declaring the Tañon Strait Situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a

Protected Area Pursuant to R.A. 7586 (NIPAS Act of 1992) and Shall be Known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape,
May 27, 1998.
40 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 14.

41 See Jason v. Executive Secretary Ruber Torres, 352 Phil. 888 (1998) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

42 a Bugal-B'laan Tribal.Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754, 813-814 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
43 Declaring the Tañon Strait Situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a
Protected Area Pursuant to R.A. 7586 (NIPAS Act of 1992) and Shall be Known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape,
May 27, 1998.
44 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 2.

45 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 12.

46 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 12.

47 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 14.

48 Rollo (G.R No. 180771), p. 91-92.

49 Id. at 85.

50 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 2.

51 Rollo (G.R No. 181527), p. 58-59.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131442. July 10, 2003]
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA,
VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO,
ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO
PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC,
FILEMON BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA
MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented
by their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS,
minor, represented by her parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS,
MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO
BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO
COVE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES Region IV, represented by its Regional Executive
Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein represented by GOVERNOR
RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE
MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO,
JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO
BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL
ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Order[2] dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7 (Manila RTC), dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (RED Principe) of
Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), issued an
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in
Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.[3]
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs power
barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would
provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the
construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the
mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June
1999.[4]
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera,[5] sought
reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15
July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
stop the construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1)
NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment Oscar
Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative (ORMECO), which is engaged in the
distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto
Galera.[6] Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as additional
defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G.
Valencia. Petitioners further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents
had already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a 20-
day temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the mooring facility. However, the
trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCORs manifestation that the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring
facility.[7]
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial
officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of
action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction
of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,[9] and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO 96-37) on the
documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the
ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
petitioners complaint.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial courts order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable and
meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this legal
action in Court x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x elevated
to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an
action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting
or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved
party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of
Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr.,
214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture
& Natural Resources, L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-
22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al.
vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and bereft of
merits that the controverted act in question is patently illegal and there was an immediate need
for judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has jurisdiction
and authority over the same x x x. And corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the
Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and
protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the DENR may appropriately resolve
before resorting to [the] Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of
Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial
jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are being or about to be committed outside its
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled: Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction
within their respective designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the
preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a
jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their
respective designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the case at bar
of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and
Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public
utility, created under special legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution of electric
power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its
infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989
x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs. Honorable
Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs
against [the] National Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818,
(Circular No. 2-91).
xxx
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself together with
the Annulment of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo
that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter enforce the same against the Provincial
Government of Oriental Mindoro which was impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party
together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being performed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this court? x x xIndisputably, the injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed
for in the petition are inseparable x x x.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the
available administrative remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ
prayed for in the Amended [Complaint].[10]
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the reliefs sought.[11]
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners principal cause of action
is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental
protection and on local government participation in the implementation of environmentally
critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCORs ECC. If the ECC is void,
then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental
Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with
pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for
purposes of granting petitioners main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the
court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners complaint.
Petitioners complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether
petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro
then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of the parties.[12]
Petitioners main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR
Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional
Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office
there.Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited
to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. [13] Moreover,
Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No. 1818) prohibited[14] courts from issuing injunctive writs
against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present
case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA No. 8975), which took effect on 26 November 2000,
superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves
the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its
violation.[15] Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an
injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under
PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental
Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the
ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However,
since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity
of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first
avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the
complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.[16]
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD No. 1586) and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental
Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-37[17] and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-
37. Section 4[18] of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or
a project located within an environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure
an ECC prior to the projects operation.[19] NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the
mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located within
an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14
December 1981.[20]
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the
implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final decision
of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of
the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of
discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable
injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited
to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the
issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference,
the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be
appealed based on this provision.Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make
the appellants action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of
such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of
the REDs or Secretarys decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the REDs decision, unless the Secretary directs
otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his
decision. (Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary
and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the
opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural
Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners omission renders their
complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.[21] Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err
in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR
Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and
regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2)
Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the
provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social
acceptability of the mooring facility.
Petitioners contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party
from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, [22] this does not apply
in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 (PD No. 1605),[23] as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone the coves and waters embraced
by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island. This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of marinas,
hotels, restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic];
commercial docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its
mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats,
tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by other human activities are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other commercial
structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President
upon the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of Puerto Galera Bay as protected
by Medio Island,[24] PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that
Minolo Cove is one of the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera [25] and thus protected under PD
No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any
event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that
will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro, including
Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure
intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a
commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or commercial docking as
contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate
PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and
restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the
legislative concern for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment. [26] These
provisions require every national government agency or government-owned andcontrolled
corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure
the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland,
rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species. Sections 26 and 27
respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance.
- It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
authorized or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
causepollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, non-governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain
the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section x x x 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless
appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[27] the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean
projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to
wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause
the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, [28] the
mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the
six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter
if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes
pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of the
mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not
violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for
ECC Applications
 Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical
area is required to submit an Initial Environment Examination, which must contain a brief
description of the environmental setting and a documentation of the consultative process
undertaken, when appropriate.[29] As part of the description of the environmental setting, the
ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the
DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of consultations and the issuance
of a locational clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission renders the
issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions
required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not render the issuance of the
ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent
illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC [without any] semblance of
compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer
has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse
of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority.[30]
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-
37[31] to issue ECCs for projects located within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe
issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the Environmental
Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR
regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite
authority.[32] This clothes RED Principes acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim
that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners
may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum
before resorting to judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse
because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure
a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to
secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building permits, from the municipal
government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCORs ECC is subject to
cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify petitioners conduct in
ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR
Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the
requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically,
petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing
decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for
the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must
undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to
the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The
aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease
and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37,
including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC. This is the
applicable procedure to address petitioners complaint on NAPOCORs alleged violations and
not the filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain
the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of
protecting the environment.[33] Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators
of environmental laws.[34] Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in
accordance with established rules of procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve
orderly and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] While petitioners refer to the petition in this case as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court will treat it as a petition for review under Rule 45 as petitioners themselves had intended in their
Motion, dated 3 December 1997, for a 30-day extension within which to file a petition for review of the ruling in
question on pure questions of law.
[2] Penned by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas.

[3] Municipal Ordinance No. 12, dated 13 December 1991.

[4] On 7 May 1999, respondent NAPOCOR sought an extension of the ECC for another 18 months from 1 July 1999 or until

31 December 2000 (Rollo, p. 200). However, there is nothing in the records to indicate the DENRs response on the
request.
[5] Joined by some minor residents and by the bangus, bangus fry, and other marine life of Minolo Cove as co-petitioners.

[6] Mayor Gregorio Delgado, Vice-mayor Aristeo Atienza, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Municipal Health Engineer

Rodel Rubio, and Municipal Planning and Development Officer Wilhelmina Lineses.
[7] In view of this development, petitioners wrote respondents RED Principe and Oscar Dominguez on 6 August

1997 requesting the issuance of a cease and desist order to enjoin the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro
from proceeding with the construction of the mooring facility (Rollo, p. 123). In his letter of 7 August 1997, respondent
RED Principe informed petitioners that his office will conduct an investigation on the matter (Rollo, p. 124).
[8] As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1605-A.

[9] The Local Government Code of 1991.

[10] Rollo, pp. 45-50.

[11] Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 339 Phil. 433 (1997).

[12] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 4, Sec. 2.

[13] See Hacbang v. The Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., G.R No. L-17907, 30 May 1963, 8 SCRA 103, in relation to par. 3(a),

Resolution, dated 11 January 1983, providing for the interim or transitional rules and guidelines relative to the
implementation of the Judiciary Act of 1981 (BP Blg. 129).
[14] Section 1 of PD No. 1818 provides as follows:

No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,
forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and
arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any
lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
[15] Section 3 of RA No. 8975 prohibits courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing temporary restraining orders,

preliminary injunctions, or preliminary mandatory injunctions against the government, its agencies, or any person or
entity whether public or private, involving national government projects, defined in Section 2 of the law as follows:
National government projects shall refer to all current and future national government infrastructure, engineering works and
service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations, all projects
 covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-
and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of
equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair
and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
See also SC Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, dated 13 November 2000.
[16] Dy v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 676 (1999); Pestanas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, 27 February 1978, 81 SCRA 574.

[17] Dated 2 December 1996 but effective 5 January 1997.

[18] Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own

initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain
projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of
the said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific
functions and responsibilities.
[19] See Republic v. City of Davao, G.R No. 148622, 12 September 2002.

[20] PROCLAIMING CERTAIN AREAS AND TYPES OF PROJECTS AS ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AND WITHIN THE

SCOPE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM ESTABLISHED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL

DECREE NO. 1586.
xxx
B. Environmentally Critical Areas
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and
fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
a. tapped for domestic purposes;
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities;
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities.
11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm floods;
d. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any of the following conditions:
a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;
b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
(Emphasis supplied)
[21] Pestanas v. Dyogi, supra, note 16.

[22] Mangubat v. Osmea, Jr., G.R No. L-12837, 30 April 1959 (unreported).

[23] DECLARING THE ENCLOSED COVES AND WATERS EMBRACED BY PUERTO GALERA BAY AND PROTECTED BY

MEDIO ISLAND, AN ECOLOGICALLY THREATENED ZONE AND FORBIDDING THEREIN THE CONSTRUCTION
OF MARINAS, HOTELS, RESTAURANTS OR ANY STRUCTURES ALONG ITS COASTLINE DRAINING INTO THE
ENDANGERED ZONE AND CAUSING FURTHER POLLUTION; AND FURTHER FORBIDDING UNWARRANTED
 SHIP DOCKING, SHIP REPAIR EXCEPT IN DULURUAN; AND APPOINTING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ECOLOGICALLY ENDANGERED ZONES REHABILITATION AND PRESERVATION.
[24] As described in the title of PD No. 1605.

[25] As described in the whereas clause and text of PD No. 1605.

[26] A. PIMENTEL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: THE KEY TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 124 (1993).

[27] 416 Phil. 438 (2001).

[28] Rollo, p. 17.

[29] Section 19, paragraphs (a) and (e).

[30] Mangubat v. Osmea, Jr., supra, note 22.

[31] DAO 96-37, Article III, Sec. 23.

[32] REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).

[33] Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

[34] Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 214 (1996).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by
their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE
and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors,
represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and
REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their
parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and
VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in
the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from
the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from
the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water
for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or
25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included —
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
— especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with
a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed
with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary
to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life
of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
 22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter
in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is
well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint
a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a
bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file
a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
 xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal
wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
— generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law
in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to
the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
 Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting
such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the
judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order.
The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed
for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there
is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
 and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of
the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are
likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this
suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit.
I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living
in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require
public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language.
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of
oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines
and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No.
1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements
of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
 (i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners
are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language
of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal
right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal
right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards,
and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if
petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more
of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory,
is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of
the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are
likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this
suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit.
I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living
in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require
public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language.
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of
oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines
and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No.
1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements
of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners
are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language
of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal
right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal
right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards,
and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if
petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more
of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory,
is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 164; 186.
2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
4 Rollo, 67.
5 Id., 74.
6 Rollo, 70-73.
7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.
8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.
10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No.
292.
11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.
14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
15 E.O. No. 292.
16 Section 1.
17 Section 2.
18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.
Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA
462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona
vs. Rosal, supra.
21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
22 1991 ed., 226-227.
23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs.
Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].
24 Rollo, 44.
25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].
26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].
27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.
28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.
29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].
31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. supra.; Phil. American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172[1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].