TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY.
PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
D. DEFENSES – CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
#1 GENOBIAGON V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-40452, [OCTOBER 12, 1989]
FACTS:
On December 31, 1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by
appellant bumped an old woman. The appellant's rig was following another,
the old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but
as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-
grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead
of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence,
fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-
stander, Vicente Mangyao shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after
appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant,
Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it
was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place
where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was
unconscious, and the food and viands she was carrying were scattered on
her body. The victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital
where she died three hours later.
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence. The trial
court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged. The petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be held liable considering that the reckless
negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led
to her death?
HELD:
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate
the accused. "The defense of contributor" negligence does not apply in
criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot
allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence
#2 M.H. RAKES VS. THE ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
G.R. NO. L-1719 [JANUARY 23, 1907]
FACTS:
The plaintiff was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor
to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. There were two cars,
immediately following one another, which were piled lengthwise of seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds and at the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars but were without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from slipping off. At a certain spot, near the water's
edge, the track sagged, the tie broke and the car canted or upset, which
result to the rails sliding off and caught the plaintiff resulting into the
breaking of his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie was not
clear in the evidence. However, the trial court found out that it has been the
dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of the
bay raised by a recent typhoon. Moreover, the superintendent of the
company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in the sand. No
effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence.
According to plaintiff’s witnesses, a depression of the track, varying from
one half inch to one inch and a half, was apparent to the eye, and a fellow
workman of the plaintiff alleges that the day before the accident he called
the attention of McKenna, the foreman, and asked him to simply straighten
out the crosspiece, reset the block under the stringer and renewing the tie,
but still leaving the very same timbers as before. It has not proven that the
company inspected the track after the typhoon or had any proper system of
inspection.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show
a breach of duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on
iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to
maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the
roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure
of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition.
ISSUE: The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence
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of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it.
HELD:
In two particulars plaintiff is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work;
and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead
of along the boards, either before or behind it.
As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a
serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the
plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper. While
the method of construction may have been known to the men who had
helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked
at this job less than two days. A man may easily walk along a railway without
perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. His lack of caution in
continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not
of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under
the severe American rule.
In respect of the second charge, While the judge remarks that the evidence
does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope
attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to
operate the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that,
therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it
as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by
the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the
necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to
get hold upon the car. Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the
conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded car, upon the
open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing
under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is,
the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act
of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although
it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece
been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the
last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes
to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible
for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
#3 PHILIPPINE BANK COMMERCE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 97626. [MARCH 14, 1997]
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC),
represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to
recover from Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC the sum of P304,979.74
representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said
bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited
to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and
inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the
current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these
deposits were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to
the account of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains
an account with the same bank. During this period, petitioner bank had,
however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly
statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had
never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly
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statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner
bank.
Irene Yabut would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original
and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor
and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the
account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was
left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and
stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining
only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.
The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes.
After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left
blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written
thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's
account number. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms.
Yabut, she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she
deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they
were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the
account of Cotas. This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without
private respondent's knowledge.
The trial court found petitioner bank negligent. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by RMC — petitioner
bank's negligence or that of private respondent's?
HELD:
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence
of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller,
which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee.
It appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips despite the
glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished
contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in
accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility.
The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital
information — that of the name of the account holder — should have
already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the
incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by
being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account
holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled
up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the
too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate
copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank
space later on.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" petitioner bank was
indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. Here, assuming that private
respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee,
thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank,
thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by
its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than
one (1) year covering various deposits, common human experience
dictates that the same would not have been possible without any
form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms.
Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller
nonetheless.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private
respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements
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of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage
would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their
financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private
respondent.

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D. DEFENSES – FORTUITOUS EVENT
#1 JUNTILLA VS. FUNTANAR
G.R. NO. L-45637. [MAY 31, 1985]
FACTS:
Plaintiff was a passenger of a public utility jeepney on the course of the trip
from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro. It
was registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar but was actually
owned by Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the
right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the
plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness.
When he came to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his
right palm. Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh
and on his back; because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao
City but on the way, he discovered that his `Omega' wrist watch was lost.
Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed a Civil Case for breach of contract with
damages against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that
caused losses to the petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents
taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was
only slightly used at the time it blew up.
ISSUE:W/N respondent should be absolve from their liability due to
fortuitous event?
HELD:
The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the
negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles,
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures
to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all
times.
The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast
speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner
that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump
into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show
that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The
petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and
fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the
grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the
explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions
were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to
cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused
by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the
jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
#2 HERNANDEZ VS. COA
G.R. NO. 71871. [NOVEMBER 6, 1989]
FACTS:
Teodoro M . Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing
officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in
Cavite. He went to the main office of the Authority in Manila to encash two
checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of
the Project. He estimated that the money would be available by ten o'clock
in the morning and that he would be back in Ternate by about two o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day. For some reason, however, the processing
of the checks was delayed and was completed only at three o'clock that
afternoon. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the
Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day.
Petitioner decided to take the money with him to his house in Marilao,
Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following morning
On that afternoon, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan.
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While the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons boarded with knives in
hand and robbed the vehicle. One pointed his weapon at the petitioner's
side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took the money he was
carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the
initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with
Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after. The petitioner sustained injuries in
the lip, arms and knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and
pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the
stolen money he took with him has not been recovered.
Petitoner filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section
638 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Commission on Audit, through
then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. denied the petitioner's request on
the ground that the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability of Mr.
Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the
cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in
Ternate, Cavite, immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office,
which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of
said cash thru robbery could have been aborted.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of petitioner are so tainted with negligence or
recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief
from accountability for the stolen money?
HELD:
It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motives
when he encashed the checks on, so his co-employees in Ternate could
collect their salaries and wages the following day.
As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite,
one could easily agree that the former was the safer destination, being
nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to the two places.
It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not
be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and
was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if,
as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep
while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it
cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence.
This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions,
something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could
have happened, and did.
#3 GOTESCO INVESTMENT VS. CHATTO
G.R. NO. 87584. [JUNE 16, 1992]
FACTS:
Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto
went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater, owned by
Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then
were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the
movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its
balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they
walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated
for one (1) day. The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff
suffered several injuries.
Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff Gloria
Chatto went to Illinois, USA for further treatment. She was treated at the
Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about
three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County
Hospital five (5) or six (6) times.
Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling
of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater
did not suffer from any structural or construction defect.
ISSUE: W/N the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to
construction defects and not to force majeure?
HELD:
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it
were due to force majeure. To our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could
not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the
investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held,
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incompetent. The finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent
Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. The building was
constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was no
shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects
could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence
and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the
testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises
before the date of the accident.
“The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants
that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the
purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means."
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
"Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured,
and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the
control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had
been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant."
#4 SERVANDO VS. PHILIPPINE STREAM NAVIGATION CO.
G.R. NOS. L-36481-2. [OCTOBER 23, 1982]
FACTS:
Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel,
FS-176, for, carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Upon
arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning the cargoes were
discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau
of Customs. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse
was razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees cargoes.
Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss
of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of
Customs' warehouse?
HELD:
The following essential characteristics (1) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as
to render it impossible for the debtor to ful􏰇ll his obligation in a normal
manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the case at bar, the
burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which
happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not
have foreseen the event.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The
storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof
by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent.
Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government,
it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having
no control whatsoever over the same.
#5 NATIONAL POWER VS. CA
G.R. NOS. 103442-45. [MAY 21, 1993]
FACTS: The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to recover
actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to
property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on
26-27 October 1978. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam.
The plaintiffs alleged, that:
1. defendant NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose
hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray,
Bulacan;
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2. defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of
the incident in question;
3. despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of
the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise
due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam;
4. when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable
limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly,
negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways,
thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the
banks of the Angat River; and
5. as a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs,
together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were
washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of
27 October 1978.
In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that:
1. the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the
operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant;
2. the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of
its employees;
3. Written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan
warning the residents therein about the impending release of a
large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and
advising them to take the necessary precautions;
4. The water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the
collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and
property;
5. In spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised,
they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted and;
6. The damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by
a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and
character of damnum absque injuria.
By way of a special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC
cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.
ISSUE: W/N the damages incurred by respondents were caused by
fortuitous event?
HELD:
The flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters but by
stored waters suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam.
We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage
sustained by the plaintiffs therein was the negligence of the petitioners, and
that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the
affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was
insufficient.
It did not prepare or warn the persons so served, for the volume of water to
be released, which turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents near
or along the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away, should have
been advised to evacuate. Said notice, addressed `TO ALL CONCERN (sic),'
was delivered to a policeman for the municipality of Norzagaray. Said notice
was not thus addressed and delivered to the proper and responsible
municipal officials who could have disseminated the warning to the
residents directly affected.
Defendants-appellees doubly knew that the Angat Dam can safely hold a
normal maximum headwater elevation of 217 meters. Yet, despite such
knowledge, defendants-appellees maintained a reservoir water elevation
even beyond its maximum and safe level, thereby giving no sufficient
allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water that will inevitably be
brought by the coming typhoon.
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there
concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for
in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability.
Petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to
escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by the private respondents
since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was
not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human
factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of
the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly,
resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was
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thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.
#6 SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 126389. [JULY 10, 1998]
FACTS:
Respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while
petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road.
On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon
"Saling" hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioner's building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and
destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents' house.
After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed
buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building
official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. It then recommended that "to avoid any further
loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity,"
the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a "structural
hazard."
In their Complaint for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private
respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others' houses.
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood
several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its
roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip- top condition", and
furthermore, typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond
human control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection report found that,
while typhoon "Saling" was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to
private respondents' house "could have been avoided if the construction of
the roof of building was not faulty." Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification.
ISSUE: Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school
building's roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon "Saling", was,
within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event?
HELD:
Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that
typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private
respondents' house.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount
of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising
from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have
been no human participation amounting to a negligent act.
At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the
negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by
presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely
relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an
ocular inspection of petitioner's school building after the typhoon. As the
term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or
viewing. 20 What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the
real cause behind.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation
was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of
petitioner's school building. Private respondents did not even show that the
plans, specifications and design of said school building, were deficient and
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the
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approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that
the construction of such building was basically flawed.

Engr. Reyna admitted that it was a legal requirement before the

construction of any building to obtain a permit from the city building official
(city engineer, prior to the passage of the Building Act of 1977). In like
manner, after construction of the building, a certification must be secured
from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the
edifice. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy,
these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper
construction of subject school building.

Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted
by typhoon "Saling", the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs
— without any deviation from the original design — and subsequently,
authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building.

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D. DEFENSES – ASSUMPTION OF RISK
#1 AFIALDA VS. HISOLE
G.R. NO. L-2075. [NOVEMBER 29, 1949]
FACTS:
Deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as
caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the
animals he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his
injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him
for support.
Defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of
action, and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has
taken this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code,
which reads: "The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is
liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from
him or stray away.
"This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it."
ISSUE: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is
caused to its caretaker?
HELD:
In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of
the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for
injury caused by it to its caretaker.
#2 ILOCOS NORTE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 53401. [NOVEMBER 6, 1989]
FACTS:
A strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos
Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After the
typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede,
the deceased Isabel Lao Juan ventured out of the house of her son-in-law,
Antonio Yabes and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five
Sisters Emporium to look after the merchandise therein that might have
been damaged. Wading in waistdeep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was
followed by Aida Bulong and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and Linda
walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the
deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing
so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon
their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio
Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from
her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had
been electrocuted. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe
Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the
people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the
electric current.
In another place, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the
National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30
A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way,
he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from
the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he
decided to go to the INELCO Office. As he turned right at the intersection of
Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung
across the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the current
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of the water." Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no
lineman therein, he returned to the NPC Compound.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another
inspection trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan. Using the
resuscitator he acquired from an in-service training on resuscitation, he
tried to revive the deceased. His efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was
setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow
wound. Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way.
He told them about the grounded lines of the INELCO. In the afternoon of
the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the
restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the
morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the
body. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic which indicated
death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically
charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the
left hand was a burned wound.
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its
officers and employees, Through the testimonies defendant sought to prove
that the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area,
including Area No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes, did not
suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property.
The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had
been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service
operator and in line with its business of supplying electric current to the
public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries
to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as
floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12 linesmen charged with
the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively
assigned to them.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the
aforesaid CFI. Petitioner advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the
deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due
to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In this
regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's
knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a
wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus,
charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must
have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she
tried to open her gate
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death?
HELD:
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for
which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which
directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place.
In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier
of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident
that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant
did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men
(linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office
A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril
when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency
was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard
to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.
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D. DEFENSES – DUE DILIGENCE
#1 RAMOS VS. PEPSI
G.R. No. L-22533. [February 9, 1967]
FACTS:
Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. and
Andres Bonifacio as a consequence of a collision involving the car of Placido
Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the time
of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos. PEPSI-COLA's tractor- truck was
then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
The CFI rendered judgment finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that
PEPSI- COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The Court of
Appeals ruled in PEPSI-COLA's favor, as testified to by Añasco, PEPSI- COLA
did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his
qualifications, experiences and record of service. Such being the case, there
can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence in the
selection of its drive.
ISSUE: W/N PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence and should not be held
liable?
HELD:
The uncontradicted testimony of (the) personnel manager of defendant
company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a
member of the bottle crop in the production department: that when he was
hired as a driver, defendant company had size him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances, and later on, he was sent to
the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of, first,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of
which he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member
of the Safety Council. In view therefore, we are of sense that defendant
company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
choice or selection of defendant driver.
From Article 2180, two things are apparent; (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection; or both; and (2) that the
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
#2 METRO MANILA VS. CA
G.R. No. 104408. [June 21, 1993]
FACTS:
Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney then
driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant
Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated where she
then worked as a machine operator. While the passenger jeepney was
travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila
another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus
driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew
Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As
both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew
Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow
their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision
between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side
portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant
Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and
(she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious
with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital
where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was
confined for twenty-four days, and as a consequence, she was unable to
work for three and one half months.
A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent. The trial
court, in its decision found both drivers of the colliding vehicles concurrently
negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations
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and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an
intersection. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as defendant Lamayo,
were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by plaintiff Custodio.
Defendant MMTC, on the bases of the evidence presented was, however,
absolved from liability for the accident on the ground that it was not only
careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings
but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it
that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and
regulations before the start of duty, and that it checked its employees to
determine whether or not they were positive for alcohol and followed other
rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation
and of the company.
The Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision by holding MMTC
solidarily liable with the other defendants for the damages awarded by the
trial court because of their concurrent negligence, concluding that while
there is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to
prove that an employer has exercised the due diligence required of it in the
selection and supervision of its employees, based on the quantum of
evidence adduced the said appellate court was not disposed to say that
MMTC had exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its driver, Godofredo Leonardo.
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that
"(t)he mere formulation of various company policies on safety without
showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt
petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the
erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency
and safety were followed." Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely
going through the motions of compliance therewith will warrant stern
sanctions from the Court.

ISSUE: W/N MMTC should be held solidarily liable?

HELD:
Witness Garbo neither testified nor presented any evidence that driver
Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the clearances and
trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. The supposed clearances,
results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and
complied with were never presented in court despite the fact that, if true,
then they were obviously in the possession and control of petitioner.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on
hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
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D. DEFENSES – PRESCRIPTION
#1 Kramer Jr., vs. CA
G.R. No. 83524. [October 13, 1989]
FACTS:
In the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned
by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its
way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and
Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the
M/V Asia Philippines owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a
consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish
catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine
protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The
Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the
proximate cause of the maritime collision.
The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent
who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision.
and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code should be computed from the said date.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted arising from a
marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations?
HELD:
It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last
element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act
or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the
cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision
of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from
the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that
the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before
he can file an action for damages. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence
or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.

The petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages. The private respondent

􏰇led a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code,3 the
prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a
quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the
petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date
when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the
maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on
May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.

The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled by the 􏰇ling of the marine protest and that their cause of action
accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining
the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final,

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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
#2 Allied Banking vs. CA
G.R. No. 85868. [October 13, 1989]
FACTS:
On April 1, 1976, private respondent Joselito Z. Yujuico obtained a loan from
the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) in the amount
P500,000.00, payable on or before April 1, 1977. Private respondent issued
a corresponding promissory note. At the time private respondent incurred
the obligation, he was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a member of
the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank.
On March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued
Resolution No. 675 forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the
Philippines. This was followed by Resolution No. 677 issued by the Monetary
Board ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.
It appears that in a Memorandum of Agreement executed by and between
Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) and Arnulfo Aurellano as Liquidator of
GENBANK, ALLIED acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilities of
GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from private respondent
under the promissory note.
Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory note,
petitioner ALLIED, filed, a complaint against private respondent for the
collection of a sum of money.
Sometime in 1987 and in the course of the proceedings in the court below,
private respondent, then defendant in the court below, 􏰇led a Motion to
admit Amended/Supplemental Answer and Third-Party Complaint. Private
respondent sought to implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as
third-party defendants. It was alleged in the third-party complaint that by
reason of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of
GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his
obligation under the loan such that he should not now be held liable
thereon.
Acting on the motion and on the opposition filed thereto, the Regional Trial
Court issued an order dated August 13, 1987 denying the admission of the
third-party complaint. When the case was re-raffled to Branch 61 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, on February 29, 1988, reiterated the order
denying the admission of private respondent's third-party complaint.
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
questioning denying private respondent's motion to admit third-party
complaint. On September 5, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision.
It is the position of petitioner that the cause of action alleged in the third-
party complaint has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed
as "tortious interference," petitioner asserts that under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict 15 the action against third-party
defendants should have been 􏰇led within four (4) years from the date the
cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on
March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to
desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that the
claim should have been 􏰇led at the latest on March 25, 1981. On the other
hand, private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations
Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the
proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12, 1986 when
the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 became final and executory. Thus, it is
contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17,
1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7, 1979 when
the complaint in the case was filed.
ISSUE: W/N the cause of action under the third-party complaint
prescribed?
HELD:
There can be no question in this case that the action for damages instituted
by private respondent arising from the quasi-delict or alleged "tortious
interference" should be filed within four (4) years from the day the cause of
action accrued.
In the case of Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this
Court ruled that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the
right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that
the prescriptive period must be reckoned.
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Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be
admitted as above discussed, however, since the cause of action accrued on
March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the General Bank to
desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint
was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed.
The third party complaint should not be admitted.

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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
IV. CAUSATION
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE – DEFINITION
#1 Bataclan vs. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126. [October 22, 1957]
FACTS:
Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, Mariano
Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by
its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen
passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were
Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara,
seated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the
Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, seated on the left
side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just
behind the four last mentioned.
At about 2 :00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within
the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the
best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up
to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly,
shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said that they could not get out
of the bus.
There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers
already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made
any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped
inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in
the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently
fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached the These men
presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men
who answered the call for help set it on fire.
The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned
the bus, including himself; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though
he must have suffered physical injuries was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
ISSUE: On what degree does Medina Transportation be held liable?
HELD:
The proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion., all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might be probably result therefrom.
We do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in
the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them.
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The driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They,
or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
#2 Fernando vs. CA
G.R. No. 92087. [May 8, 1992]
FACTS:
Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition
request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued and
Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he
signed the purchase order. However, before such date, , bidder Bertulano
with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto
Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The
bodies were removed by a fireman.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five
victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was
found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied
the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as
`asphyxia' caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working
below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in
hemorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in
this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic
tank.
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic
tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen
sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was
compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing
danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or
render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public
respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.
The trial court dismissed the case. The CA reversed the decision and ordered
defendant to pay for damages.
ISSUE: W/N the city of Davao is negligent? W/N the negligence is the
immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims?
HELD:
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and
the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that
the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of
both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be
considered the proximate cause of the accident. In Taylor v. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co this Court set a guideline: The test is simple.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to
his own proper hurt.
While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty
to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing
one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to
clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public
respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder. It is likewise an
undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re- empty the
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public
toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance
with the sanitary and plumbing specications in constructing the toilet and
the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have
leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight. The only indication that the
septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed emptying was when water
came out from it. Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no
report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite the presence of people living
near it or passing on top of it or using the public toilet for their personal
necessities.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of
the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection
of the public. While the construction of these public facilities demands
utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of
warning signs is not one of those requirements.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic
gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes
its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on
their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the
septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent
person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are
no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service,
who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and
that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident. We held that when a person holds himself
out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
#3Urbano vs. IAC
G.R. No. 72964. [January 7, 1988]
FACTS:
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them
who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches
wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was
used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier
on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said
leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier.
Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed
the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus. Javier died in the hospital. Filomeno Urbano was
charged with the crime of homicide.
The lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible
for Javier's death. CA reversed the decision and held that Javier’s death
was due to his own negligence.
CA - The proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own
negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed,
and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in.
Petitioner - the proximate cause of the death of Javier was due to his own
negligence and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE: W/N the death of Javier was caused by Urbano’s unlawful act?
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from
any liability for Javier's death?
HELD:
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at
the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980,
he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have seen more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that
at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
#4 Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-65295. [March 10, 1987]
FACTS:
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner
meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio
had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car
and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed.
He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump
truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned
by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e.,
on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which
Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck
was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result
of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate
cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the
time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio which the CA
affirmed.
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and
effective for that eventful night;
(b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision
with the dump truck;
(c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before
contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and
(d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
HELD: Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying
home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna
and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was
parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked — in other words, the negligence of petitioner
Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's
injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner,
the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
That the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in all
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later
in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an Efficient Intervening or independent cause.
What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than
a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
#5 Pilipinas Bank vs. CA
G.R. No. 105410. [July 25, 1994]
FACTS:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio
Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation and Vicente
Tui. To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, requested PCIB Money
Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00
from his savings account therein and have it deposited with his current
account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was requested to make the
deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller
the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip
he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was '815' and so this was the
same current account number he placed on the deposit slip below the
depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES.
Noting that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren
Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was
for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account number. He, thus,
posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's
surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
The October 10 check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was
presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that
his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the
payee was advised to try it for next clearing. The check was redeposited but
was again dishonored. Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of
Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that same date met the same
fate.Two days after the October 10 check was again dishonored, the payee
returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its
face value which he did if only to save his name.
Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged
an immediate verification of his account.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit
posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to
the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did
not effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00.
ISSUE:
HELD:
For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private
respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of
jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which
it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would
result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." In the case at
bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's
employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in
the name of another depositor who had a similar first name.
Lower Court - The bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed
to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As
earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the account of
Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio appearing
on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same
Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone
beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and
proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which
is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. IAC, et al:
“The bank is not expected to be infallible but, as correctly observed by
respondent Appellate Court, in this instance, it must bear the blame for not
discovering the mistake of its teller despite the established procedure
requiring the papers and bank books to pass through a battery of bank
personnel whose duty it is to check and countercheck them for possible
errors.”
#6 Quezon City vs. Dacara
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
G.R. No. 150304. [June 15, 2005]
 The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
FACTS:
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota
Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then
being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr.
allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government which however,
yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara for and in behalf
of his minor son, Jr., filed a complaint for damages against the Quezon City
and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.
In an Answer), defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but
alleged that the subject diggings were provided with amount of soil and
barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after
it which was visible during the incident. In short, defendants claimed that
they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary
measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell
into the diggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure
to exercise due care.
RTC rendered its decision that petitioners were negligent. CA affirmed that
petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
respondent.
ISSUE: W/N Fulgencio Jr was negligent at the time of the accident?
HELD:
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such
that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the
subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof
but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability
would deem just and equitable.
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28,
1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his
car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done
relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
re􏰇ectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an
adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where
darkness is pervasive.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were
signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the
wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik
Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained
that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is
quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS – REMOTE
#1 Gabeto vs. Araneta
G.R. No. 15674. [October 17, 1921]
FACTS:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata to go to a cockpit on
Calle Ledesma in Iloilo City. When the driver started the ride, Agaton
Araneta, stepped out into the street, layed his hands on the reins and
stopped the horse; he protested to the driver that he called the carromata
first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call
of Araneta, and had taken up the two passengers as the first one who
offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled the reins of
the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta in order that the
vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the
horse's head or the rottenness of the material which it was made, the bit
came out of the horse's mouth. The horse was then pulled over to near the
curb, the driver alighted and fix the bridle.
While Pagnaya was fixing the bridle, the horse, being free from the control
of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, it pulled one of the wheels
of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya over. After going
a few yards further, the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box
which was fixed to a post, the box came down with a crash and frightened
the horse resulting that it set out the horse in full speed up to the street.
One of the passengers, Basilio Ilano was able to alighted but Proceso
Gayetano had retained his seat, and after the horse had proceeded in front
of the Mission Hospital, Gayetano jumped from the rig, receiving injuries
which resulted to his death.
ISSUE:
W/N Araneta be held liable for the death of Gayetano?
HELD:
The mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping
the horse would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano;
because it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he got out of the carromata and
went to to fix the bridle. The evidence is furthermore convincing that, after
Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and an
appreciable interval of time elapsed before the horse started on his career
up the street.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the
middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently
ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by
getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the
person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the
defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from
the action of the horse thereafter.
#3Urbano vs. IAC
G.R. No. 72964. [January 7, 1988]
FACTS:
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them
who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches
wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was
used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier
on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said
leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)

Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed
the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus. Javier died in the hospital. Filomeno Urbano was
charged with the crime of homicide.
The lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible
for Javier's death. CA reversed the decision and held that Javier’s death
was due to his own negligence.
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have seen
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus
2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano
from any liability for Javier's death?

HELD: The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote
cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions,
with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980,
he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of
Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected
with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS – CONCURRENT
#1 FAR EASTERN SHIPPINGS VS. CA
G.R. No. 130068. [October 1, 1998]
FACTS:
The M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and
operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port,
as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine
Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen
Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No.
4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside
him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel
and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind
was ideal for docking maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North
Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered
the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel
on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However,
the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief
conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When
Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code.
Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow
of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) through the Solicitor General, filed
before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for a sum of money against Far
Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots'
Association praying that the defendants therein be held jointly and severally
liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs of suit.
ISSUE:
1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely
liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of
destination, for his negligence? and (2) Would the owner of the vessel be
liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory
pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the compulsory pilot, Capt.
Gavino, who was in command and had complete control in the navigation
and docking of the vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the
time being in the command and navigation of a ship and his orders must be
obeyed in all respects connected with her navigation. Consequently, he was
solely responsible for the damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the
owners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did not commit
any act of negligence when he failed to countermand or overrule the orders
of the pilot because he did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In other
words, the master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on the
competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does not observe that a
compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot.
HELD:
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth
4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such office as compulsory
pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care
and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master
An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a
reasonable person in the position of the actor would recognize as necessary
to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another. Those
who undertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to
exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard
minimum of special knowledge and ability
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabankov
is no less responsible for the collision. His unconcerned lethargy as master
of the ship in the face of troublous exigence constitutes negligence.
Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required
to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is
incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to
refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the
master is justied in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the
circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising
that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise,
observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the
vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in
the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master
to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should have
acted accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilance
commensurate with the circumstances.
As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring
with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate
cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not
have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable
to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors
that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without
the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not
the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer
is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible
for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily
liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
#2 Sabido vs. Custodio
G.R. No. L-21512. [August 31, 1966]
FACTS:
In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks,
one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company (LTB), and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by
Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road
curve. Agripino Custodio, a passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the
left side as truck was full of passengers was sideswiped by the truck driven
by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died.
It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was hanging in the
left side of the LTB Bus. Otherwise, were he sitting inside the truck, he could
not have been struck by the six by six truck driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact
alone, of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side of the truck, makes
the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)

certainly its employees, who are the driver and conductor were negligent. without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
They should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running
manner. Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as Nicasio Mudales. board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the
opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
Belen (widow) testifed that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the chance.
LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if
he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never
collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road,
the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Agripino Custodio. It is incredible
that the LTB was running on the middle of the road when passing a curve.
He knows it is dangerous to do so.

The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. and its driver Nicasio Mudales had violated the
contract of carriage, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of
a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarily liable in
the manner above indicated.

ISSUE: W/N t the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the
negligence of the carrier and its driver?

HELD:
The carrier and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed
Agripino Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus, in violation of
Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the proximate cause
of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that likewise, the
petitioners are guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a
proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners'
truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was
negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the
road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger
bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding
on its running board.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, to its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In
fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
TESTS – “BUT FOR”
#1 Bataclan vs. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126. [October 22, 1957]
FACTS:
Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, Mariano
Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by
its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen
passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were
Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara,
seated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the
Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, seated on the left
side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just
behind the four last mentioned.
At about 2 :00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within
the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the
best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up
to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly,
shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said that they could not get out
of the bus.
There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers
already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made
any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped
inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in
the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently
fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached the These men
presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men
who answered the call for help set it on fire.
The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned
the bus, including himself; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though
he must have suffered physical injuries was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
ISSUE: On what degree does Medina Transportation be held liable?
HELD:
The proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion., all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might be probably result therefrom.
We do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in
the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)

The driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They,
or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
TESTS – SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR
#1Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs IAC
G.R. Nos. 66102-04. [August 30, 1990]
FACTS:
Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales,
Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the
jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and
driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for
Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective homes.
Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day
because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to
pay P24.00 for the trip. Riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes
Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro
Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina
Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales.
Upon reaching, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was
detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on
the brake, as a result the jeepney which was then running on the eastern
lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on
the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced
the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where
it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater
portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming
from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the
time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the
western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit the bus bumped from
behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three
passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida
Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical
injuries.
ISSUE: Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the
passengers of the jeepney?
HELD:
PERTINENT PARTS OF THE DECISION RELATED TO THE TOPIC:
Under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Here, We find
defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did
not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's
conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers
of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not even
attempt to avoid the mishap, but also because it was the bus which was the
physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers
of the jeepney.
It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the
accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour,
assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed
in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the
collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters,
measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point
of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the
jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters
away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north
and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes
admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the
time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of
45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour,
delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily,
he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid
the collision is to ask too much from him.
TESTS – CAUSE VS. CONDITION
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
#1 Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-65295. [March 10, 1987]
FACTS:
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner
meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio
had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car
and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed.
He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump
truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned
by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e.,
on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which
Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck
was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result
of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate
cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the
time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio which the CA
affirmed.
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and
effective for that eventful night;
(b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision
with the dump truck;
(c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before
contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and
(d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
HELD:
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that
night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished
his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew
and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked — in other words, the negligence of petitioner
Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's
injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner,
the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
That the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in all
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an Efficient Intervening or independent cause.
What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than
a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the
petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability.
#2 Manila Electric Co. vs. Remonquillo
G.R. No. L-8328. [May 18, 1956]
FACTS:
Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother
to repair a "media agua" said to be in a leaking condition. The "media agua"
was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said "media agua",
Magno received from his son thru that window a 3' X 6' galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end
of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila
Electric Company strung parallel to the edge of the "media agua" and 2 1/2
feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor and was later
affirmed by the CA.
The CA found out that as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises
ordered by the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the edge of
the 'media agua' on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30
inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that 'all wires
be kept three feet from the building.'
Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at bar the
reckoning should not be from the edge of the 'media agua' but from the side
of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or
more then the minimum prescribed. That even assuming that the distance,
within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from the
edge of the 'media agua', the fact that in the case of the house involved
herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the
owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to
construct a 'media agua' only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead
he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the
width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the
electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the plaintiff is that
although the owner of the house in constructing the "media agua" in
question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after making that
"media agua", its construction though illegal, was finally approved because
he was given a final permit to occupy the house; that it was the company
that was at fault and was guilty of negligence because although the electric
wire in question had been installed long before the construction of the
house and in accordance with the ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet,
mere compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the requirement of
due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary
measures as may be warranted; that negligence cannot be determined by a
simple matter of inches; that all that the city did was to prescribe certain
minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required that
primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house, the
obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing such wires at a distance
of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric Co should be held liable?
HELD:
Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the permit,
exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only
a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the "Media agua" as illegally constructed
and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house
owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector.
Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit
at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced,
to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said
distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be
ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by
house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of
course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction
of the "media agua" was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely
contributed to it. Had said "media agua" been only one meter wide as
allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have
stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe
margin between the edge of the "media agua" and the yawning 2-story
distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the
fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and e􏰇cient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause."
#3 Rodriguez vs. Manila Railroad Co.
G.R. No. 15688. [November 19, 1921]
FACTS:
The defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of
Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that on January 29, 1918, as one of its
trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks was emitted from the
smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four
houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs and the same were entirely
consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with the exception
of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though
the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The 􏰇fire occurred immediately
after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing at the time.
It is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously
negligent in relation to the origin of said fire, in the following respects,
namely, first, in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in
charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the locomotive which
emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack
protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its
locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality
which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of
Remigio Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the
defendant company, though exactly how far away from the company's track
does not appear. It further appears that, after the railroad track was laid,
the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the
company and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not
comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof on his
house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials of the main
roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon
this fact it is contended for the defense that there was contributory
negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza
ISSUE: W/N Manila Rail Road should be held liable?
HELD:
The proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the
negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that
Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant
company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was
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an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible,
but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence
destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not
created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by
the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and
thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact
would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.

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B. EFFICENT INTERVENING CAUSE

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V. LIABILITY HELD:
A. POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil
Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost"
#1 Vestil vs. IAC
and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that as
G.R. No. 74431. [November 6, 1989]
the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked
FACTS:
by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals
Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at
Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated.
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due
have done to the animal.
to "vomiting of saliva." The following day the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as
the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any
such animal may cause.
case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R.
Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants
and dismissed the complaint.

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was
appealed. It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the
dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the
injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of
the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the
appellees.

Article 2183 reads as follows: “The possessor of an animal or whoever may

make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage.”

ISSUE: W/N petitoners should be held liable?

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B. THINGS THROWN OR FALLING FROM A BUILDING

#1Dingcong vs. Kanaan

G.R. No. 47033. [Abril 25, 1941]
FACTS:

ISSUE:
HELD:

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C. DEATH/ INJURIES IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
#1 Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine
G.R. No. 36858. [March 6, 1933]
FACTS:
Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine
Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of
the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district
according to the records of the company.
Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally
injured by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan
had moved to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without notifying the
company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after
making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the
practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were
required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.
Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck which caused the death of
Leopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence. The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan
brought the present action to recover from the defendant corporation
under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812.
The defendant denied all the allegations thereof, and as a defense Leopoldo
Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his
death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work
on Sunday
ISSUE: W/N the Company should be held liable?
HELD:
The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and
in pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was run over by the
truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment
with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had
finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was
authorized to make collections for the defendant. The employer is not an
insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee
while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee
is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident
that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment,
because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his
employment.
We do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for
injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the
nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if the deceased had been killed
while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the
pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the
right, prima facie, to recover.
Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant
corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte to Manila, and that
the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the
accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work
on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These are
additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and in
pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw 􏰇t to
change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make
use of a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the
defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one;
and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his
employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
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D. STRICT LIABILITY/PRODUCT LIABILITY administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the complaint is
based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists a pre-existing
#1 Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines vs. CA contractual relation between the parties
G.R. No. 110295. [October 18, 1993]
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent action for damages should be treated as one for
FACTS:
breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability which
Lydia L. Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. She
must therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold
alleges that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen,
pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held
an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite)
which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same
and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the
Code?
public; on or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students
complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained
HELD:
fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; she then went
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case is
over her stock of soft drinks and discovered the presence of some fiber-like
founded on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the
substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic
Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in
matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said
the complaint
bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health for
examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties
Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as
against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not
a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages,
limited to those prescribed in Article 1567. The vendee may also ask for the
her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted not long after that she had to
annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud. The vendor could
close shop; she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the
likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and
petitioner the payment of damages
an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be
true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general
The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to
rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself
exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground,
be deemed to arise from quasi-delict. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict
the petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of warranty
may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations
under Article 1561 of the Civil Code, it should have been brought within six
months from the delivery of the goods pursuant Article 1571 of the said
Code. Private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages
which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action
is based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was
seasonably filed

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the existing E. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
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#1 Gilchrist vs. Cuddy
G.R. No. 9356. [February 18, 1915]
FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and
that on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S.
Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to be
delivered on the 26th of May, the week
beginning that day. A few days prior to this
Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which
he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that
he had made other arrangements with his film.
The other arrangements was the rental to these
defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for
the week and the injunction was asked by
Gilchrist against these parties from showing it
for the week beginning the 26th of May.
Cuddy willfuly violated his contract, he being
the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because
the defendants had offered him more for the
same period. Mr. Espejo at the trial on the
permanent injunction on the 26th of May
admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the
owner of the 􏰀lm. He was trying to get it
through his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila.
He is the agent of the same concern in Iloilo.
Did the appellants know that they were
inducing Cuddy to violate his contract with
a third party when they induced him to
accept the P350? Espejo admitted that he
knew that Cuddy was the owner of the 􏰀lm.
He received a letter from his agents in
Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he
could not get the film for about six weeks.
The arrangements between Cuddy and the
appellants for the exhibition of the film by
the latter on the 26th of May were perfected
after April 26, 90 that the six weeks would
include and extend beyond May 26. The
appellants must necessarily have known at
the time they made their offer to Cuddy that
the latter had booked or contracted the 􏰀lm
for six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the
inevitable conclusion is that the appellants
knowingly induced Cuddy to violate his
contract with another person. But there is no
specific finding that the appellants knew the
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identity of the other party.
ISSUE:
HELD:
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 14 we held
that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse
behind one's conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful
motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is
􏰀nancially interested, and such interest
motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that
he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
#2 So Ping Bun vs. CA
G.R. No. 120554. [September 21, 1999]
FACTS:
Tek Hua Trading Co., through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered
into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects
of four (4) lease contracts were premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-
B and 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store
its textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that
should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease
shall be on a month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but
Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was
dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including
Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp.,
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek
Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his
own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
Lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the
latter of the 25% increase in rent. gain on December 1, 1990, the lessor
implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letters were new lease
contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish
the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's part, and
agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did not
answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal
contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun
claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been
occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent.
DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The lease contracts in favor of
Trendsetter were executed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property
of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an
unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his
private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person
induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In
the case before us, petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latter's property right.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justifed where the
defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for
interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's
motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exists where his sole
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motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe
that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that of the
party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an
economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that
wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self- protection.
Moreover, justification for protecting one's financial position should not be
made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject
matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in
a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. As early as
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be
a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested,
and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an
officious or malicious intermeddler. In the instant case, it is clear that
petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his
enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner
took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from
it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest

to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find
that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits
forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice.
The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the
contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does
not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and
causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly
conrmed the permanent injunction and nulliffication of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The
injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by
petitioner's interference

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F. LIABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

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Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan
G.R. No. 61516. [March 21, 1989]
FACTS:
On July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI-
Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located
on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result
thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, during the period of her confinement in said
two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her
right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has
persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital to
the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently
still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed that she has
difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to
the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter. She
has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her
former jovial self; she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and
other activities which she used to do prior to the incident.
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-
officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building
Official for Dagupan City, admitted the existence of said manhole along the
sidewalk in Perez Blvd. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at
least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government. But as
City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said
manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered,
and the job is specifically done by his subordinates.
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is
located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the
City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that
it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision
through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held
concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE: Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the
City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or
street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter
of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer The same charter of
Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement
of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. 7 Thus the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk
where the open drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages
or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city
officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt
the city, as in the case at bar.
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VI. PERSONS LIABLE
A. THE TORTFEASOR
Article 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter
Article 2181
Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim.
Article 2194
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.
#1 Worcester vs. Ocampo
G.R. No. 5932. [February 27, 1912 ]
FACTS:
The defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors and
administrators of a daily newspaper known as 'El Renacimiento' and
'Muling Pagsilang,' which was published and circulated daily in Spanish and
Tagalog. It has having a large circulation throughout the Philippines.
A civil action was filed against the defendants alleging that for a long time,
the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff
in the said newspaper. The plaintiff, Honorable Dean C. Worcester, was a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior. They attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not
only as a private person but also as an official of the Government. They
wrote and published on 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and
false libel an editorial entitled Birds of Prey which includes the immortal
legend, Mane, Tecel, Phares.
The terms and language used on the said editorial was intended to be
understood by the public as referring to the plaintiff due to a public known
facts that the plaintiff in compliance with his duties in his position has
ascended on previous occasion on the mountains of the Province of Benguet
to study the native tribe known Igorot; that in the said mountains exist large
deposits of gold; the plaintiff takes part in the enactment and repealing of
laws, that he has under his direction and control the enforcement of the
laws and the ordinances of the city of Manila relating to the slaughtering of
cattle, also had under his direction and control the Bureau of Science of the
Government as such, he is generally known as a man devoted to the study
of science; has journeyed to and explored the Islands of Mindoro,
Mindanao, and other regions of the Philippine Archipelago at one time
investigated and prepared a report for the Civil Commission of the
Philippines in regard to a certain proposition for the purchase of a parcel of
land for the city of Manila and once opened negotiations with a certain firm
engaged in the hotel business in regard to the location of a prospective hotel
on one of the filled-in lands of the city of Manila.
The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and made the defendants jointly
and severally liable for damages. The publication maliciously intended to
incite the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a
corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason
to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the
Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for
him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular
that he would have to resign his office as member of the Civil Commission
of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
ISSUE: W/N defendants should be made solidarily liable?
HELD:
YES.
Each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he
participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants
might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might
have been sued jointly and severally, as they were.
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It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, o
also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way the commission
of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled,
in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who
inflicted or committed the actual tort.
Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They can not insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount. A payment in full
of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. There can be but one
satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement,
generally operates to discharge all.
#2 Chapman vs. Underwood
G.R. No. 9010. [March 28, 1914]
FACTS:
There was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with
occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, Creveling. He desired to board a
"San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being
told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately passed from
the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car.
The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear
platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he
could not reach it, stopped beside the car, and waited for it to come abreast
of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind
and run over by he defendant's automobile.
The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile
driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. When the front of the "San
Marcelino" car was almost in front of defendant's automobile, defendant's
driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver,
would be responsible?
HELD:
Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the
plaintiff. He was passing an incoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff,
in coming out to board the car, was not obliged for his own protection, to
observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only
to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to
the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left
should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars
coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted
to pass upon that side of the street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver.
As held in the case of Johnson vs. David:
“The owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent
acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner
is present, unless the negligence acts of the driver are continued for such a
length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the driver,
by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly
or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
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presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.”
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time
the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the
injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to
correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the
interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the
happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge
defendant with the negligence of the driver.
#3 Caedo vs. Yu Khei Tai
G.R. No. L-20392. [December 18, 1968]
FACTS:
Marcial was driving his Mercury car to the airport with his son Ephraim
(scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro) together with them were Mrs.
Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a carretela owned by a certain
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the
other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in
front of him, only eight meters away. The carretela was provided with two
lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning
to take the necessary precautions.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the
carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he
did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim
of the rig's left wheel wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded
obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On
his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed,
judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble -
beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela,
or else squeeze in between them in any case. Bernardo gave for his car's
right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela
and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation,
tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right,
but was unsuccessful.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with
the driver?
HELD:
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable on Rafael
Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs.
“ART. 2184.In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that driver
was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.”
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but
rather the relationship of paterfamilias. Ultimately, the negligence of the
servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him,
reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury
or damage.
Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own
cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they
are not trained or endowed with sucient discernment to know the rules of
traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations
that are continually encountered on the road.
Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that
had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for
over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws
and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
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imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is,
in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave
him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. There
was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had
reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of
the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind
it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence for he
was not himself at the wheel. And even he did see it at the distance, he could
not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the
opposite direction.
#4 Rodriguez Luna vs. IAC
G.R. No. 62988. [February 28, 1985]
FACTS:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular
collision. The collision took place at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the
deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a
minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
The CFI rendered judgment sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and
Jose dela Rosa jointly and severally liable to the sum of P1,650,000.00 as
unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory
damages, and P60,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal
interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.
This was affirmed by the CA but with modification as to the amount of the
award to be given (defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00)
as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole amount shall
have been totally paid ). Both parties filed a petition for review.
The petition for review was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, they
informed that the decision sought to be reviewed was not yet final because
the Lunas had a pending motion for reconsideration. For prematurity, this
Court set aside all previous resolutions.
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to
explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court
directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the
special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could
make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and this
Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in
enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet.
ISSUE:
W/N should the award be P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as
originally adjudged? and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be
with interest at the legal rate?
HELD:
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the
deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that
his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual
gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of
Appeals took into account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had
been engaged in car racing as a sport, having participated in tournaments
both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and manner of life should be
"one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table in actions for
damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna could not have lived
beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was
reduced to 10 years only.
1. It should be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged
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support his family.

The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years
said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that
he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That
Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That
Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-
kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-
pedalled four wheeled conveyance.
It was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the
deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the
same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his
annual personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating price
of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a
statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to
suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold
sources thereof.c
2. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-
delicate case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may
be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.)
As with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only
from the date of the trial court's decision.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Quasi Tort
Though not a recognized term of English law, may be conveniently
used in those cases where a man who has not committed a tort is
liable as if he had. Thus, a master is liable for wrongful acts done by
his servant in the course of his employment. Broom, Corn. Law, 690;
Underh. Torts, 29.
ART 58 PD 603
Article 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code.
ART 216 FC
Art. 216. The family is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects.
ART 218 FC
Art. 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or
agreement which is destructive of the family shall be recognized or
given any effect.

The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, where it was held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code applied. to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had
attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become
merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now
married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his
father should be subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to
do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond
the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property
either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to

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ART 221 FC
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
 own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;
 persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of
annulment of marriage;
 received.
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the
compulsory heirs of their legitime.

ART 236 FC
Art. 236. The family home may be dissolved upon the petition of the
person who has constituted the same, with the written consent of his or
her spouse and of at least one half of all the other beneficiaries who are
eighteen years of age or over. The court may grant the petition if it is
satisfactorily shown that the best interest of the family requires the
dissolution of the family home.
ART 101 RPC
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3,
5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by
a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor
under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person
be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their
accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be
made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the
persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable
and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
exempt from execution.
ART 102 RPC
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and
proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons
or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have
been committed by them or their employees.
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Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the
inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect
to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees
ART 103 RPC
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
SEC 6 RA 9344
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section
20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to
an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
ART 2180 NCC
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
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ART 2181 NCC father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante
satisfaction of the claim. (1904) Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint.

ART 2182 NCC ISSUE: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents and severally with his son?
or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his
own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall HELD:
be appointed. (n) It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
1. PARENTS
institution.
#1 Exconde vs. Capuno
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his
G.R. No. L-10134. [June 29, 1957]
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them is a necessary consequence of the
FACTS:
parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student
the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating
of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Dr.
them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the
Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school
other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation"
Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can
run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left
relieve themselves of such liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence. It
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at
#2 Salen vs. Balce
the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
G.R. No. L-14414. [April 27, 1960.]
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident
that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from
Dante Capuno was accused of double homicide through reckless
wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant. At the
imprudence and was found guilty of the crime charged. He was only fifteen
time, Gumersindo Balce was a minor and was living with defendant. As a
(15) years old when he committed the crime.
result of Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted
of homicide and was sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased an
Sabina Exconde filed an action for damages against Delfin Capuno and his indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. Upon petition of plaintiffs, a writ of
son Dante Capuno. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be execution was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was returned
held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is Dante Capuno and not his

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unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no property in
his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant, the father of
Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but
defendant refused.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of
P2,000.00?
HELD:
Under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is civilly liable for the
acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under
9 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there
is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the
act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability
(Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to
leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the
person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority and control.
But a minor over 15 years who acts with discernment is not exempt from
criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case resort should
be had to the general law, the Civil Code, which, under Article 2180, provides
that "The father and, in case of his death, or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their
company."
This provision covers not only obligations which arise from quasi-delicts but
also those which arise from criminal offenses. To hold otherwise would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent.
#3 Fuellas vs. Cadano
G.R. No. L-14409. [October 31, 1961]
FACTS:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas,
were both 13 years old. They were classmates at St. Mary's High School,
Dansalan City. In the afternoon of September 16, 1954, while Pepito was
studying in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of Ernesto Cabanok and
surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked
Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which
angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor.
Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home.
Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of
the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in angry mood. Angelito Aba, a
classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico.
Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck
and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground.
Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon,
Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly
cried out "My arm is broken." Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was
helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the
Lanao General Hospital. An X-Ray taken showed that there was a complete
fracture of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting . On
November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito's release from the
hospital, the plaster cast was removed, the right forearm of Pepito was seen
to be shorter than the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be fully
used.
It wass contended that the appellate court held the petitioner liable
pursuant to par. 2, of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art.
2176 of the same Code; that according to the last article, the act of the minor
must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being
no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but
deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable.
Appellant submits that he should not be held liable.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their
minor children who acts with discernment is determined under the
provisions of Art. 2180, N. C. C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes, the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damages is
caused with criminal intent.
#4 Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 34840. [September 23, 1931]
FACTS:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South
Road.The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was
owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by
Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's
father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the
collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother together with several
other members of the Gutierrez family were accommodated therein. A
passenger in the autobus, Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San Pablo,
Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile
resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fractured right leg.
ISSUE:
W/N both of the defendants may be held laible?
HELD:
The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the
general use of his family, is liable for its negligent operation by one of his
children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied
and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members
of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that
the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family
is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the
negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.
One G, a passenger in a truck, recovers damages in the amount of P5,000
from the owner of a private automobile not in the car, the machine being
operated by a son 18 years of age, with other members of the family
accommodated therein, and from the chauffeur and owner of the truck
which collided with the private automobile on a bridge, causing physical
injuries to G as a result of the automobile accident.
#5 Rodriguez Luna vs. IAC
G.R. No. 62988. [February 28, 1985]
FACTS:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular
collision. The collision took place at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the
deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a
minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
The CFI rendered judgment sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and
Jose dela Rosa jointly and severally liable to the sum of P1,650,000.00 as
unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory
damages, and P60,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal
interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.
This was affirmed by the CA but with modification as to the amount of the
award to be given (defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00)
as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole amount shall
have been totally paid ). Both parties filed a petition for review.
The petition for review was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, they
informed that the decision sought to be reviewed was not yet final because
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the Lunas had a pending motion for reconsideration. For prematurity, this
Court set aside all previous resolutions.
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to
explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court
directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the
special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could
make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and this
Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in
enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet.
ISSUE:
W/N should the award be P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as
originally adjudged? and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be
with interest at the legal rate?
HELD:
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the
deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that
his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual
gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of
Appeals took into account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had
been engaged in car racing as a sport, having participated in tournaments
both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and manner of life should be
"one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table in actions for
damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna could not have lived
beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was
reduced to 10 years only.
3. It should be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years
said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that
he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That
Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That
Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-
kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-
pedalled four wheeled conveyance.
It was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the
deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the
same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his
annual personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating price
of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a
statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to
suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold
sources thereof.c
4. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-
delicate case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may
be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.)
As with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only
from the date of the trial court's decision.
The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, where it was held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code applied. to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had
attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become
merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now
married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his
father should be subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to
do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond
the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property
either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to
support his family.
#6 Libi vs. IAC
G.R. No. 70890. [September 18, 1992]
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FACTS:
Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at
the time of the incident and from which she died was an 18-year old first
year commerce student of the University of San Carlos; while petitioners are
the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor and living with his aforesaid
parents, and who also died in the same event.
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978
when Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell after she found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands
for reconciliation but Julie refused this prompted Wendell to threat Julie. In
order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou
Alfonso.
Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with
the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime
inside the residence of private respondents. Due to the absence of an
eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both
minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's
vicarious liability. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. CA
ruled against the defendant.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners should be held liable for vicarious liability?
HELD:
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be
engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug
users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of
Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18
holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he
was in possession of that firearm.
The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their
legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions
of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years
of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years
or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the
enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of
her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who
exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
#7 Tamargo vs. CA
G.R. No. 85044. [June 3, 1992]
FACTS:
Adelberto Bundoc, a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
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Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was
living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages,
a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on
the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption
was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.
The trial dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents?
HELD:
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against
him. (Article 2176 of the Civil Code) Upon the other hand, the law imposes
civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. (Article 2180 of the Civil Code) This principle of parental liability is a
species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine
of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is
not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed
by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence
of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children
living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority
vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when
an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the
parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority.
The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption
can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in
the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
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(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject
to their control at the time the tort was committed.
#8 Cuadra vs. Monfort
G.R. No. L-24101. September 30, 1970
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in
Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962
their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed
the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an
earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at
her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and
the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became
swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who
thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye.
ISSUE:
W/N the parents should be held liable for the act of their minor child?
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be
drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in
failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary,
his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was,
as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of
the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much
less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the
tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate
her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but
only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

HELD:
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or
negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness
or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one
person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself
liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as
that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The
basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault
or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may
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2. GUARDIANS
ART 216 FC
Art. 216. The family is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects
. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
ART 218 FC
Art. 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or
agreement which is destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given any effect.
ART 2180 NCC
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
ART 2181 NCC
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or

incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

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Augusto attempted to get the 'pitogo' from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him
3. TEACHERS AND HEADS OF INSTITUTIONS not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes
of the 'pitogo'. However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he
ART 218 FC aggressively pushed the latter. The 􏰇ght started then. After Augusto gave
Art. 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or successive blows to Manuel, Jr. and the latter was clutching his stomach
agreement which is destructive of the family shall be recognized which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr.
or given any effect. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.

ART 219 FC ISSUE: W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible
Art. 219. Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered instead of the father? Since the accident happened during recess time and
at Lourdes Catholic School
among members of the same family. Judicial and administrative
officials shall foster this mutual assistance.
HELD:
*ART 2180 NCC SEE PREVIOUS PAGE Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which provides that "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody",
#1 Mercado vs. CA
applies to an institution of arts and traders and not to any academic
G.R. No. L-14342. [May 30, 1960]
institution and contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
FACTS:
supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co- plaintiff- appellants Ana Pineda
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-
father and mother to the teacher, and so would the responsibility for the
appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado.
torts of the pupil.
Manuel Quisumbing and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes
Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go
Catholic School. A 'pitogo', may be described as an empty nutshell used by
to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents
children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and
after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a 'pitogo'. As a result, Augusto
Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school
It was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. Undeniably, the
must, therefore, be held to be without merit.
'pitogo' belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim
and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that
While moral damages include physical suffering, which must have been
the 'pitogo' belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to
caused to a boy wounded by another boy in a 􏰇ght, they should not be
him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which they could play.
awarded if the decision of the court does not declare that any of the cases
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the 'pitogo' belonged to
speci􏰇ed in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be
Augusto. He thought it was the 'pitogo' of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when
recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. In the case at bar
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it does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever
presented, since the offender was nine years old, and it does not appear
that he acted with discernment when he in􏰇icted the physical injuries. Even
if it be assumed that the court considered the offender guilty of a quasi-
delict when it imposed the moral damages, the award should not be
sustained since it is apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused
to the offended party was his own fault or negligence.
#2 Palisoc vs. Brillantes
G.R. No. L-29025. [October 4, 1971]
FACTS:
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and
three o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in
the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes
were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a
machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon
made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because
of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed
by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid
the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face
downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness and died.
The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages. The trial court found
defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute on the ground that
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants
cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.
ISSUE:
W/N the defendants- school officials be held jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors with the defendant?
HELD:
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child" This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and
352 of the Civil Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation
as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions
to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow
students.
The basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 (now 2180)is some
culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc., are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority and where the parent places the
child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under
his custody, for the reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with
the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction. The school itself, likewise, has
to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under
the same cited article.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil
Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate
and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants
officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article
— "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its head and teachers exercise
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over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act
must live an board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the
law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving)
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
#3 Amadora vs. CA*
G.R. No. L-47745. [April 15, 1988]
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises.
These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out,
though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was
only seventeen years old.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and
all the defendants were completely absolved. It was found out that Article
2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a
school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held
that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the
incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and that in any event the defendants had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under
the custody of the private respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending
student is supposed to be "in its custody."?
HELD:
The provision in Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following
the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher
over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: "Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody."
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Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, "teachers should apply to
the words "pupils and student's and "heads of establishments of arts and
trades" to the word "apprentices."
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as
it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of
a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not
on the school itself.
If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts
of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof
that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense of bonus pater familias is also available to the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had
taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180.
It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he
is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his
child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of
the student under him regardless of the student's age.
#4 Ylarde vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722. [July 29, 1988]
FACTS:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School. Private
respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school
was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old
school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge
stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the
name of Sergio Banez stated burying them one by one.
Deciding to help his colleague, Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his
male pupils, aged ten to eleven. He ordered them to dig beside a one-ton
concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The
work was left unfinished. The following day, Aquino called four of the
original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils —
Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde,
dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this
point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils
remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about
by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block,
private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said
private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private
respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom
where he could get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino
allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after Aquino left, three of the four kids playfully jumped into
the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on
top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time
but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof,
Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
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Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against
both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed
the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the
demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for damages?
HELD:
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for
the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and
not a school of arts and trades.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head
of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by
their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades,
it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. Hence, applying the
said doctrine to this case, We rule that private respondent Soriano, as
principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly
admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not
give any instruction regarding the digging. From the foregoing, it can be
easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being
negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.
It is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross
negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an
excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after
they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and
could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go
to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation
when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4)
went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's
safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously
attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such
a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child
Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around.
Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with
whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and
not knowing the risk they were facing, three of them jumped into the hole
while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and
the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that
the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate
child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural
and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino.
Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the
unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the
lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.
#5 Salvosa vs. IAC
G.R. No. 70458. [October 5, 1988 ]
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution and
also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, that it has a
full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication,
Broadcast and Telytype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman
and Automotive Mechanics courses these courses divest BCF of the nature
or character of being purely or exclusively an academic institution.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the
full control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way
of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant
to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education
and Culture, is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building.
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The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly
appointed armorer. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking
space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died
and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of
Homicide.
The heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon,
Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of
BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive
Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc. as party
defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio
Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents,
as heirs of Napoleon Castro
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used
in [Art. 2180 - 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody' means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school"
cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call
of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not
include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school"
or being in the "protective and supervisory custody" of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
We hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon
Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from
his acts. Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident,
Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B.
Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded. Apart
from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the
school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to
be held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to
be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the
ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
#6 St. Francis High school vs. CA
G.R. No. 82465. [February 25, 1991.]
FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at the St. Francis High School,
wanted to join a school picnic. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow
their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for
the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with
them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the
water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the
students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to
resuscitate him ashore failed.
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Respondent spouses filed a complaint, against the St. Francis High School,
and the teachers for Damages. The trial court found in favor of the
respondent. On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against
the St. Francis High School.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code is applicable to the case at bar?
HELD:
Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the
negligence of those under them. Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty
at all of any negligence. Consequently, they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
It is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must
have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the
school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the
teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear
from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the
I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This
picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin
because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered
as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by
petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and
their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or
consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180
has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we
were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers will
forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer
for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission
he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
#7 Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA
G.R. No. 84698. [February 4, 1992]
FACTS:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to
file suit for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the
time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course
at the PSBA.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence
on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA,
are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore- stated article.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
the rule in in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-
cited cases of Exconde , Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals. In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180)
plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
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school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within
the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not
really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied.
A contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless
the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
Conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed
inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence.
#8 Soliman Jr vs. Tuazon
G.R. No. 66207. [May 18, 1992]
FACTS:
Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private respondent
Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and
one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard.
On 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the
campus ground and premises of REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was a
regular enrolled student of said school taking his morning classes, the
defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without
any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner, shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber.
Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries
sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private respondent
school was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon,
and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The first paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code offers no basis for
holding the Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard
Jimmy Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent
school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy
Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client
or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc.. It is settled that where the
security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen
or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
As a general rule, clients or customers of a security agency has no hand in
selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by
the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary
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course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property
are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may
give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not,
by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions
or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in
the contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being
no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy
Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the
Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or
an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., the 7th paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
similarly not available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central
Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon. Persons exercising
substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted
upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute
parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon
who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was
not pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school
had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
Article 2180 of the Civil Case was not applicable where a student had been
injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not
exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however,
the Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established
between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand,
and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties: "When an academic institution
accepts students for enrollment, there is established acontract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably su􏰇ce to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning
must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts
and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air
or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life
and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken
to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof." In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:
"In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet,
no 􏰇finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there
be a 􏰇finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach
of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs
under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. The Court is
not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of
schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier,
cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in
the populous student communities of the so-called 'university belt' in
Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang
wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed
inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be
the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and
place."
#9 St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitranos
G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002
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FACTS:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos,
spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos 􏰇led on June 9, 1995 a case
against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary's Academy
It appears that defendant- appellant St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Mary's Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with
other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in
a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos
died as a result of the injuries he sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages?
HELD:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel
spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident
was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there
was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to
drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel
II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Considering that the
negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Mary's Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident. Consequently, we 􏰇nd that petitioner likewise
cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00
awarded by the trial court and a􏰇rmed by the Court of Appeals. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to
petitioner. For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the
accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay
death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the
grant of attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the
rule. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justi􏰇cation. Thus, the
grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on
the highways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented
by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
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because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not
the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
4. OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS
#1 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Phil American
FACTS:
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was
owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be
used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that
Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
ISSUE:
Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, embrace
the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of
which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage
arose?
HELD:
The terms "employer" and "owner and manager of establishment or
enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code do not include the
manager of a corporation owning a truck the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
Under Article 2180 the term "manager" is used in the sense of "employer"
and does not embrace a "manager" who may himself be regarded as an
employee or dependiente of his employer.
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc
5. EMPLOYERS
#1 PhilTranco Services vs. CA
G.R. No. 120553. June 17, 1997
FACTS:
In the early morning of March 24, 1990, , Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his
easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street of Calbayog City. On the
Magsaysay Blvd., also in Calbayog City, defendant Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus driven by defendant Rogasiones
Manilhig y Dolira was being pushed by some persons in order to start its
engine. The Philtranco bus was heading in the general direction of the said
Gomez Street. As the bus was pushed, its engine started. As the engine of
the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was
also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus
bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and,
thereafter, was run over by the said bus. The bus did not stop although it
had already bumped and ran over the victim; instead, it proceeded running
towards the direction of the Rosales Bridge.
The trial court handed down a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly
and severally pay the private respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a
public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco,16 for damages arising from
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the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or
solidary with the driver.
Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse
if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid
from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise
to the action based on quasi-delict.
#2 Castilex Industrial vs. Vasquez Jr.
G.R. No. 132266. [December 21, 1999.]
FACTS:
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle. He was traveling
counter-clockwise, but without any protective helmet or goggles and was
only carrying a Student's Permit. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad, a
manager of Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-
Lux Pick-up.
On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a
parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short
cut. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped
his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later
to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died.
An action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin
Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting
from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-
issued vehicle?
HELD:
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor
vehicle, so as to 􏰇x liability upon the employer because of the employee's
action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. In
Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had
the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employee's
assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of
the infliction of the injury or damages."
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business
or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply.
A distinction must be made between the fourth and fifth paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to
employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry.
The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either
in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while
the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in
both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees,
whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the
occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. Under
the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business
or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show,
to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope
of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only
then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
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It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX
at the time of the tort occurrence.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City.
Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City,
which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. A
witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente
Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and
Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover,
prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified
that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his
car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been
ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August
1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place
which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps,
and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his
service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or
one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD
with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be
relieved of vicarious liability
#3 Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC
G.R. No. 75112. August 17, 1992
FACTS:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he
was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the
morning of each school day. Having a student driver's license, Funtecha
requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle
while the latter was on his way home. It is significant to note that the place
where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin
Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free
board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a
road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was
clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had
to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a
sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop
to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against
vehicular traffic, and hit him.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had
knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge
of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms
ISSUE:
HELD:
The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the
present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since
Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private
respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have
recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time
of the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the
interest and for the bene􏰇t of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not
steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the
school authorities. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in
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the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of
his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by
the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that
the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and
in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny
any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any
act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or
for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some
bene􏰇t from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer
is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was
at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official
appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being su􏰇cient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the bene􏰇t of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulation for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987]) An employer is
expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for
in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial
to their employer. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it
has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official
driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the
petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its
employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary.
However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee
for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
#4 National Power Corp vs. CA
G.R. No. 119121. August 14, 1998
FACTS:
A convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation
(NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute to its
destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-
collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three
(3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to
seventeen other passengers.
The heirs of the victims 􏰇led a complaint for damages against National
Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO). When
defendant PHESCO 􏰇led its answer to the complaint it contended that it was
not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw
but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with
the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects.
On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of
the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO.
The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. The
decision was reversed by the CA holding NPC liable.
ISSUE: As between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba and
therefore, would be liable for damages to the victims?
HELD:
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PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only" contracting vis- a-vis NPC and as such,
it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an
employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the
employees of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the
principal employer is responsible to the employees of the "labor-only"
contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal
employer. Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it
supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be
considered as employees of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person
who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the
performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes
responsibility over the employees of the latter.
It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will
determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an
injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the "labor only"
contractor. This is consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor
was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-
employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor)
and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers.
NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. 21
Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have
recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence
which gave rise to the action.
#5 LRT-A vs. Natividad
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
FACTS:
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing
a "token. Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area,
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. At the exact moment that
Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.
Private respondent Marjorie Navidad, the widow of Nicanor, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and Prudent Security
Agency for the death of her husband.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent by awarding actual, moral
and compensatory damages. Prudent Security Agency appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court exonerated Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor and instead held LRTA and Roman jointly and severally
liable. In exempting Prudent from liability, the appellate court stressed that
there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It
ruled that Navidad failed to show that Escartin in􏰇icted 􏰇st blows upon the
victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by
reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA
and operated at the time by Roman.
ISSUE:
HELD:
If there is any liability that could be attributed to Prudent, it could only be
for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the
general rule that negligence must be proved. Regrettably for LRT, as well as
the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, the Court is
concluded by the factual 􏰇nding of the Court of Appeals that there was
nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor Navidad, for the reason that
the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. The
Court also absolved petitioner Rodolfo Roman, there being no showing that
he is guilty of any culpable act or omission and also for the reason that the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his
own fault or negligence.
The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of
its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In
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the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage. Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could
only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions,
in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however,
for the employer's liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further,
how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual
and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply.
In 􏰇ne, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of
a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply. Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving
spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the
factual 􏰇nding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent)
to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its
employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven . . . ." This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of
the records of the case. There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner
Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also
be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence
#6 McKee vs. IAC
G.R. No. 68102. July 16, 1992
FACTS:
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong
Pulo Bridge along Mac Arthur Highway a head-on- collision took place
between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by
Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee
and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with
two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound
for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about ten (10)
meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car.
The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the
way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car,
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on
the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to
return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The
collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on
the said bridge.
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that
it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused
the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes
negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as
employers of Galang.
ISSUE:
HELD:
As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris
tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
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damage. Article 2180 reads as follows: "The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. . . . Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. . . . The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. The answers of the private
respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts
obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to
Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they
were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very
well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence. Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys
into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means
possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the
initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient
intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual
cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would
not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency
signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to
go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the
far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under
the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards
the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the
fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters
and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and
truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare.
Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially
accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given
situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
#7 Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996
FACTS:
Plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi Lancer.
She noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right
tire was at and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she
parked along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the
car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side
of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell
to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left
leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle
connected to the rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital for
twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home,
considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet.
He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of
Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was
suddenly confronted, with a car coming from the opposite direction,
temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding
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with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see
because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
device, and the area was poorly lighted.
The lower court found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and
liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court
likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally
liable for damages. Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the CA’s decision insofar
as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the
car driven by Richard Li.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of
pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for
his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however,
that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus
pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we
are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly
and solidarily liable for the damage.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly
owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans
through which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given
period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies provide
liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to
purchase cars, which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not
otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since
important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all
sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the
unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company
sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or
for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other
employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued
car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial,
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal o􏰇ce
hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the o􏰇ce,
visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company
clients.30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly con􏰇ned to routine
hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of
representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both
social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by
Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li — as well as the
corporation — to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing
the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between
Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to
whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving pro􏰇ciency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. 31 Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting
its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the
injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
6. STATE
#1. Merrit vs. Government
G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916
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FACTS:
Plaintiff was riding on a motorcycle, going toward the western
part of Calle Padre Faura, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he
was ten feet from the southwestern intersection, the General
Hospital ambulance instead of turning toward the south after
passing the center thereof as is prescribed by the ordinance and
the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly into the
right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely
injured. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of
the skull and that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered
material injury.
ISSUE:
Whether the Government is legally liable for the damages
resulting therefrom?
HELD:
The Government of the Philippine Islands in only liable for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are
acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the General
Hospital is not such a special agent.
#2 Rosette vs. Auditor General
G.R. No. L-1120. August 31, 1948
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim
of Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government for damages caused
to buildings belonging to the claimant, which according to the appellant's
claim were destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous warehouse of
the Emergency Control Administration, ECA, due to the negligence of a
certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near
a 􏰇five gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the
officers of the said ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in
storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances
of the City of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N the Government is liable?
HELD:
There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the
Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an special
agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control Administration did not
act as special agents of the Government within the meaning of that word in
article 1903 of the Civil Code as defined in Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands in storing gasoline in the warehouse of the ECA, the
Government is not responsible for the damages caused through such a
negligence. Act No. 327, in authorizing the 􏰇ling of claims against the
Government with the Insular Auditor, and appeal by private persons or
entities from the latter's decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any
and all claims against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible
for all claims which may be 􏰇led with the Insular Auditor under the
provisions of said Act.
#3 Mendoza vs. De Leon
G.R. No. 9596. February 11, 1916
FACTS:
This is an action for damages against the individual members of the
municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the
revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff
under the provisions of Act. No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After
user of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected under
and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein defendants,
awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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The Municipal Code confers both governmental and business or corporate
powers upon municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former it is not
liable to private persons. It's liability to them for the wrongful exercise of
the latter is the same as that of a private corporation or individual.
Officers and agents of municipal corporations charged with the
performance of governmental duties which are their nature legislative,
judicial, or quasi-judicial, are not liable for the consequences of their official
act unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, with the
express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.
Officers of municipalities charged with the administration of patrimonial
property of a municipal corporation are liable for mismanagement of its
affairs as are directors or managing officers of private corporations; not for
mere mistakes of judgment, but only when their acts are so far opposed to
the true interests of the municipality as to lead to the clear inference that
no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to
secure such interests, but that they must have acted with an intent to
subserve some outside purpose regardless of the consequences to the
municipality and in a manner inconsistent with its interest.
The defendant councillors regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to the
plaintiff for two years. After continuous user of a little more than one year,
they forcibly evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the ferry
leased to him. Held: Under the evidence of record, that there is no manner
of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without foundation and as there
was therefore no occasion whatever for rescinding the contract, the
defendant councillors are liable personally for the damages resulting to the
lessee by their wrongful action.
#4 City of Manila vs. Teotico
G.R. No. L-23052. January 29, 1968
FACTS:
Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take
him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a
jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his
head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Teotico was brought to the Philippine
General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and
the upper lip, apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital.
Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance a complaint for damages
against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. The CFI dismissed the complaint which was
affirmed by the CA. However, the CA ordered the City of Manila to pay
damages.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act 409 is a special
law and the Civil Code is a general legislation; but as regards the subject-
matter of the provisions of sec. 4, Rep. Act 409 and Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, the former establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City
of Manila for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of city o􏰇cers to enforce the provisions of said Act; while article 2189
of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces,
cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury suffered
by any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets and
other public works under the control or supervision of said municipal
governments. In other words, sec. 4 of Rep. Act 409 refers to liability arising
from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 of the Civil Code, governs liability due to defective streets in particular.
The Civil Code is decisive herein because the present action is based on the
alleged defective condition of a road.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets
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belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of
Manila.
#5 Republic vs. Palacio
G.R. No. L-20322. May 29, 1968.
FACTS:
Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a Civil Case No. against the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or agency under the
Department of Public Works and Communications, to recover possession,
with damages, of 958-square meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan, which
the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied, at the instance of
its co-defendant. For failure to appear and answer the complaint, therein
defendant Irrigation Service Unit was declared in default.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, claiming that defendant Irrigation Service Unit
has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. The motion was denied, on
the ground that the said defendant although a mere agency of the Republic
of the Philippines, is engaged in the private business of selling irrigation
pumps and construction materials on installment plan.
of irrigation pumps and systems by thus engaging in private business, the
Government, had actually consented to the suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with the Philippine
National Bank in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished
to satisfy a money-judgment?
HELD:
The mere waiver of the State of its immunity does not render its property
and funds liable to seizure under legal process. Judgments against a State,
where it has consented to be sued, operate merely to liquidate and establish
the plaintiff's claim but they cannot be enforced by processes of law; it is up
to the legislature to provide for their payment in such manner as it sees fit.
he initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it induced the
Handong Irrigation Associations, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of
respondent Ortiz. This liability thus arose from tort and not from contract
and it is a well-entrenched rule embodied in art. 2180 of the Civil Code that
the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents specifically
commissioned to carry out acts complained of outside of such agent's
regular duties. In the absence of proof that the tortious inducement was
authorized, neither the State nor its funds are liable therefor.

An order of garnishment was served by the Sheriff of Manila against the

deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation
Service Unit at the Philippine National Bank

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, 􏰇led with
the lower court an urgent motion to lift the order of garnishment, for the
reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public funds and exempt
from attachment or execution.

The appellate court sustained the propriety of the disputed garnishment-

order, and dismissed the Government's petition, on the basis that the
Irrigation Service Unit, is engaged in a private business of purchase and sale
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C. OTHERS

ART 1723 NCC

The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a
building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion
of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those
plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The
contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls,
within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the
use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any
violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
contractor.

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of

any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of
the building.

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1. PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS
ART 2190 NCC
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
ART 2191 NCC
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or
property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if
not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the
place. (1908)
ART 2192 NCC
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should
be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article
1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said
article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
2. EMPLOYEES
#1 Araneta vs. Joya
G.R. No. L-25172. [May 24, 1974] 

FACTS:
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the
Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors that an employee,
Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in
television. The board, however, failed to act on the proposal. Nevertheless,
the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a company director,
inquired about the trip and was assured by the respondent that Taylor's
expenses would be defrayed not by the company but by other parties.
While abroad, Taylor continued to receive his salaries. The items
corresponding to his salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon the
orders of, and approved by, the respondent and were included in the semi-
monthly payroll checks for the employees of the corporation. The petitioner
signed three of these checks. The others were signed by either the
respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the
bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in
the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043 20, all told, on
account of Taylor's travel and studies.
Ace Advertising filed a complaint against the respondent for recovery of the
total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its
knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied
the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the
company's board of directors, and that in any event under the by-laws he
had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the trip which was for
the company's benefit.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace
Advertising. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict?
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HELD:
The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in
good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having testified
or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his
being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner
remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning
the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus
the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of
Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to
perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an
officer. The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace
Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the
parties, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the
commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery
of damages
3. ENGINEER/ ARCHITECT
#1 Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping
G.R. No. L-53064. September 25, 1980
FACTS:
A Complaint for damages was instituted by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy
Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck and his driver, Salvador
Mendoza. As alleged therein, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck
because of his reckless negligence, he rammed into the residential house
and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed
to the ground causing damage to plaintiff.
The trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor. On appeal
they alleged that the trial Court erred in making them jointly and severally
laible.
ISSUE:
HELD:
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated
by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his
employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the
same Code, which explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise
responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee
(driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
But although the employer is solidarily liable with the employee for
damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee
(driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended
party to satisfy the latter's claim.
#2 Malipol vs. Tan
G.R. No. L-27730. January 21, 1974.
FACTS:
Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante
on the shoulder of the road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was
hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he was
sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel
that got detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with the aid of the
barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City Hospital where he died
that same night.
The gasoline tanker driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant
Ernesto Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline business of
the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan.
ISSUE:
HELD:
We must, however, point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is
stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was
primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged therein, and the
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appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for damages for breach of contract of
that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the
Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not correct. The action in the driver for damages.
instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime.
The complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much The trial court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence
less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their respective
is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized employers, jointly and severally liable for damages.
driver of the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was operated by
appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer the Court of Appeals differed with the trial court in the assessment of
in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and liabilities of the parties. In its view only petitioner Francisca Viluan, as
solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the operator of the bus, is liable for breach of contract of carriage. The driver,
complaint shows, on quasi delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which Hermenegildo Aquino cannot be made jointly and severally liable with
treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an petitioner because he is merely the latter's employee and is in no way a
establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is party to the contract of carriage.
primary and direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer, however, can demand
from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his ISSUE:
liability. 10 The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and HELD:
directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the That in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the
Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally
the damages that she would have to pay to appellees. liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though are of the view that
under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.
#3 Viluan vs. CA
G.R. Nos. L-21477-81. April 29, 1966 Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modi􏰇ed in the sense that
petitioner as well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana are
FACTS: jointly and severally liable for the damages awarded by the trial court.
Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured when a
passenger bus on which they were riding caught 􏰇re after hitting a post and
crashing against a tree. The bus, owned by petitioner and driven by
Hermenegildo Aquino. It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the
Gabaldon school building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger
bus owned by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to
overtake it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his
bus and raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a
result of which it hit a post, crashed against a tree and then burst into
flames.
Among those who perished were Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca Lacsamana ,
Narcisa Mendoza and Gregorio Sibayan, whose heirs sued petitioner and the
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VII. TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's
A. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
ART 32 NCC when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and 

any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages: (19) Freedom of access to the courts.

(1) Freedom of religion;

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's
(2) Freedom of speech;
 act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
 to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
 prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
 preponderance of evidence.
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be

 (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
adjudicated.
public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; 
 The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his
act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
statute.
unreasonable searches and seizures; 

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
 1. Lim vs. De Leon
G.R. No. L-22554. [August 29, 1975]
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
FACTS:
not contrary to law;
 Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the RAFAEL". A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint alleging that
government for redress of grievances;
 after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
 After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon,
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
 filed with the CFI an information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to upon against Jikil Taha. That upon being informed that the motor launch was
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, in Balabac, Palawan, de Leon wrote to the Provincial Commander requesting
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
custody of the motor launch. He further explained that its subsequent sale
to Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
Upon order of the Provincial Commander, the motor was seized and
impounded.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha , filed a complaint for damages against defendants-
appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that
Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search
warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without
his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon
who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order
the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by
Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to
Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure
of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962,
the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and
because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond
repair. For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs-
appellants prayed that defendants- appellees be ordered to pay jointly and
severally each of them the sum of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the
complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in was
sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya and was sometime in April 1962,
forcibly taken with violence upon persons from Alfredo Timbangcaya
without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of
a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable for damages
granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful?
plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and
2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
"(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudicated."
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
"(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
36."
HELD:
Under Article 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code, a person whose
constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefore.
In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there is
a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required
that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of Article 32 of the Civil Code is to put an end to official
abuse by the plea of good faith.
While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing an unlawful
order of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would
warrant exculpation from liability. Thus, where it is shown that the motor
launch was impounded by a subordinate officer only after repeated request
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by the fiscal, after being shown a letter justifying the necessity of seizure,
and after he was made to explain the delay of the seizure by his superior, he
cannot be held liable for damages.
2. Aberca vs. Ver
G.R. No. 69866. [April 15, 1988]
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other
violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units
of the AFP, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General
Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila."
Plaintiffs allege that complying with said order the TFM raided several places
by employing defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these
raids, they confiscated purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants and for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of
a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish
them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
In a motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry
into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
(2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants
are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution? Who can be held liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well?
HELD:
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or
any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional
rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining
his liberty.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No
longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the
factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
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responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily
be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless
be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes
the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
3. MHP Garments vs. CA
G.R. No. 86720. September 2, 1994
FACTS:
MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms,
supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement,
petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be
undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms
and other scouting supplies."
Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes
Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de
Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake
the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine
Constabulary.
Petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and two (2) other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Quezon City went to the
stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant,
they seized the boy and girl scouts’ pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed
private respondents.
A criminal complaint was filed for unfair competition, the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal dismissed the complaint and also ordered the return of the seized
items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands.
Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to
recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were turned. The
other items returned were of inferior quality. Thus, a complaint for damages
was filed.
ISSUE:
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the
Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was
only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents.
HELD:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is
not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make
such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have
abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in
the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put
an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort
In no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons
who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they
instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scouting supplies
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee.
Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl
scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable
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to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner
corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably
seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.
B.DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES
ART 33 NCC
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
ART 353 RPC
Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of
a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
ART 354 RPC
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
1. Marcia vs. CA
ART 355 RPC
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.
ART 356 RPC
Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a
compensation. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 2,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to
publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of
the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the
publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration.
ART 357 RPC
Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official
proceedings. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 20 to 2,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager or a
newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the
private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the
pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative
proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned.
ART 358 RPC
Art. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious
and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
ART 359RPC
Art. 359. Slander by deed. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200
to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not
included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
G.R. No. L-34529. January 27, 1983
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FACTS:
A passenger bus operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee,
private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente
Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein
petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against Felardo Paje. An action for damages was filed against the Victory
Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje.
While the action for damages was in progress the criminal action proceeded.
The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However,
on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted, nd the conclusion that
"CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was
NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as appellant was concerned,
it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."
As a consequence, herein private respondents, moved for the dismissal of
the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
W/N civil action for damages against private respondents for physical
injuries resulting from negligence is an independent one, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, under the provisions of articles 33,
2176 and 2177 of the New Civil Code and section 2 of rule 111 of the Rules
of Court?
HELD:
An acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did
not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the
crime. The Supreme Court in Albornoz vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, that
"where the judgment in a criminal action contains an express declaration
that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil
liability is barred, under Section 1(d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." Then,
this Court speaking through the then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
ruled that "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Otherwise stated, under Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, unless
the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent will
not carry with it the extinction of civil liability. Hence, in the case at bar,
where the injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the
result of criminal negligence, but on appeal to the Court of Appeals
respondent Paje was acquitted in a decision promulgated on November 9,
1962, with the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this
case, and that he was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE and insofar as
he was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT, no independent civil
action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
Art. 33 of the Civil Code speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries while the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and
physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting
in homicide and physical injuries. Hence the latter case is not one of the
three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and therefore, no
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
2. Madeja vs. Caro
G.R. No. L-51183. [December 21, 1983]
FACTS:
In a Criminal Case, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja.
The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja
reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of
the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss. According to the respondent judge, "under
the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action
may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action.
ISSUE:
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HELD:
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Ruleso of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil
Code is the applicable provision. There are at least two about Art. 33 of the
Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: (I) The civil action for damages
which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
Commission; and (2) The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.
It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide.
Reckless imprudenoe or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of
the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in
the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. In the light of
the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
3. Arafiles vs. Phil Journalists
G.R. No. 150256. March 25, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight, was at the
Western Police District. Emelita, an employee of the National Institute of
Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner Arafiles,
a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with
attempted rape before the then on duty Patrolman Benito Chio at the
General Assignments Section of the headquarters.
In the presence of Morales, Emelita executed a sworn statement narrating
the events surrounding the reported offenses committed against her by
petitioner. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Emelita for the
purpose of reporting the same in the next issue of Peoples Journal Tonight.
Morales then wrote an account about Emelitas complaint and submitted it
to his editor, it appeared as headline on Peoples Journal Tonight entitled:
“GOVT EXEC RAPES COED”
About a year following the publication petitioner instituted a complaint
against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that on account of
news item aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a director
of the NIAS at the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical
Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he became the object of
public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and
serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the position of
Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.
In their Answer, respondents prayed for the dismissal, they alleged that the
news item, having been sourced from the Police Blotter which is an official
public document and bolstered by a personal interview of the victim is
therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional provision
of freedom of the press.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on the ground
that the article did not give a hint that it was sourced from a personal
interview and police blotter then it would have been fair, for the mind of the
reader would be offered the other side to speculate on.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended
with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages?
HELD:
Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is
entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case.A civil action for
libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment
and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely
independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action
because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by
the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil
liability arising therefrom.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may
have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of
words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the
impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes
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complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner
and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to
the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of
what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a
news item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must
enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of
this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The
newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them
to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors]
usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
I. DEFAMATION
1. MVRS Publication vs. Islamic Da’Wah Council
FACTS:
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of
more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations filed a complaint for
damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim
nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC, arising from an article
published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of
the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent
to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a
religion in this country.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC.,in their defense, contended that the article did
not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not
entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief
or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage,
prejudice or injury to Muslims.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed
by the article were not specifically identified. The CA, however, ordered the
petitioners to pay damages to private respondents Muslims to whom it was
clear the defamation was directed.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are liable for damages?
HELD:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring
a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the
esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of
anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or
tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational
interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may
have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable
as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an
allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to
advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
speci􏰇cally pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the
press, under the Bill of Rights. In the instant case, the Muslim community is
too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly
defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and
generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons
would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of
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Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites,
the Kharijites, the Su􏰇s and others based upon political and theological
distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of
the Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose
construction is not so well de􏰇ned as to render it impossible for any
representative identi􏰇cation. Our conclusion therefore is that the
statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not speci􏰇cally
identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the
subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim
to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages
II. FRAUD
1. Salta vs. De Veyra
FACTS:
Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos'
branch. As such, his duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the
granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the
performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care and
prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and
regulations of the bank.
PNB filed two civil complaints against Salta charging him of indiscriminately
granting certain loans in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud, and
manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount
of the loans. The two civil cases were assigned to two different salas of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. At the same time, the bank caused to be
filed, a criminal case, based on the same acts. Petitioner was acquitted in
the criminal case on the ground that the elements of the crime charged were
not proven. Based on his aquittal petitioner filcd a Motion to Dismiss in each
of the two civil cases. The two presiding judges in the separate civil cases
took diametrically opposing views. One judge denied his motion and the
other granted it.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which
is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision.
Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil
actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the
cause of action averred in the complaints. The following allegation in the
complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient
averment of fraud: "That there was fraud committed by the defendant in
granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which
fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme
aforementioned
It is significant to note that under Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is made
clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the
criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
"regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to
conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the
same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed
similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the
complaint states that "the defendant as manager of Malolos Branch, in gross
violation of the bank rules and regulations, and without exercising necessary
prudence, . . . . extended a number of credit accommodations. . ." On this
allegation of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained as an
entirely independent action from the criminal case. Consequently, Section
3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no application thereto.
III. PHYSICAL INJURIES
1. Capuno vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company
G.R. No. L-19331. April 30, 1965
FACTS:
The case arose from a vehicular collision. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola
delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The
collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
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Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. The
information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by
the heirs of the three victims. On October 1, 1953, While the criminal case
was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed
a civil action, also for damages, against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of
the Philippines and Jon Elordi.
The parties entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00
the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for
reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of
Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act."
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only
on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges
against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein
appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola,
Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which,
upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of
February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing
death. In other words, the civil action for damages could have been
commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent,
Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would
not have been stayed by the 􏰇ling of the criminal action for homicide
through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was 􏰇led only on
September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years.
An action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil
Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall
begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) maybe brought" which
means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the
four- year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the 􏰇ling of
the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived
the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such
reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could 􏰇le
— as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of
the criminal case.
The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
2. Corpus vs. Paje
G.R. No. L-26737. July 31, 1969
FACTS:
A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by
Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in
the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons.
An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje. The heirs of Clemente
Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages.
On November 7, 1960, the accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty and
convicted of the crime charged in the information. Said defendant appealed
the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1961,
while defendant's appeal was pending decision in the Court of Appeals,
Clemente Marcia's heirs, instituted a separate civil action for damages based
upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje
reversing the appealed judgment and acquitting the appellant after 􏰇nding
that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the
collision was a case of pure accident. The defendants filed in the civil action
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the
acquittal by the Court of Appeals.
The defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that
plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed
considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months
after the collision and that according to Article 1146 of the Civil Code an
action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within tour years.
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ISSUE:
HELD:
The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the
criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a
case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death
of Clemente Marcia, the driver of the jeep which 􏰇gured in the collision,
which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the
defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa)
and physical injuries.
The term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes
homicide, the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In People
vs. Buan, it was held that the "offense of criminal negligence under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent as
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense." It is, therefore,
clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for
reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide
(death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two
other persons.
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action
for damage that may be instituted in connection with the said offense.
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes
under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal
action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a
separate civil action. In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3),
the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the
ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily
extinguished also the civil action for damage based upon the same act.
Assuming that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia
was base upon a quasi-delict, the action has already prescribed. An action
upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146,
Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the
quasi- delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running
of the said period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal
action for reckless imprudence.
3. Madeja vs. Caro
G.R. No. L-51183. December 21, 1983
FACTS:
EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The offended party Carmen
L. Madeja, widow of the deceased, reserves her right to file a separate civil
action for damages. The criminal case still pending, when Carmen L. Madeja
sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages. She alleged that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. According to the respondent
judge, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Ruleso of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil
Code is the applicable provision. There are at least two about Art. 33 of the
Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: (I) The civil action for damages
which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
Commission; and (2) The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.
It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
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includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and
attempted
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of
the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in
the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. In the light of
the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
4. Dulay vs. CA
G.R. No. 108017. April 3, 1995
FACTS:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, filed on an
action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp.
("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss. SUPERGUARD claimed that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and
that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent
the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. It further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that
petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability.
Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss
and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge
held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to
constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the
part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in
the performance of his duties. Respondent judge also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The above order was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners
maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action
can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is
the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed
with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article
2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only
applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely
personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been
part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers only acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned
tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that
no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is
the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela,
the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98
[1977]), this Court already held that: ". . . Article 2176, where it refers to
'fault or negligence,' covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
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Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law." The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held: "Article
2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
C.NEGLECT OF DUTY
ART 34 NCC
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to
render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall
be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence
shall suffice to support such action.
The management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors who
were invited to a luncheon. Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of
D.ACTION FOR DAMAGES WHEN NO
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION IS PROVIDED
ART 35 NCC
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this
Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses
or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action
for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by
a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by
the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the
termination of the criminal proceedings.
VIII. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. ABUSE OR RIGHTS
1. Velayo vs. Shell Corporation
G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956
FACTS:
Commercial Air Lines, Inc (CALI) fuel needs were all supplied by the Shell
Corporation Ph.
The books of the Shell Corp PH showed that CALI owed it a balance of
P170,162.58. However, Shell Corp had reasons to believe that the
financial condition of the CALI was satisfactory. As a matter of fact, CALI's
Douglas C-54 plane, was offered as partial settlement of their accounts.
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Directors of the CALI, informed the creditors present that this corporation
was insolvent and had to stop operations. He explained the memorandum
agreement executed by the CALI with the Philippine Air Lines, Inc and the
balance sheet of the corporation wherein its assets includes a C-54 plane.
There was a general understanding among all the creditors present on the
desirability of consummating the sale in favor of the Philippine Air Lines Inc.
The creditors agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue
the discussion of the payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain
creditors. Furthermore, The creditors unanimous opinion that it would be
advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for
a fair pro-rata division of its assets although the management of the CALI
announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata
division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings.
Shell Corp Philippines effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit against
CALI to Shell Oil Company, USA assigning its credit, amounting to
$79,440.00. Shell Oil Company USA filed a complaint against the CALI in
the Superior Court of California, U.S.A for the the collection of an assigned
and a writ of attachment against C-54 plane
Unaware of Defendant's assignments of credit and attachment suit, the
stockholders of CALI resolved in a special meeting to approve the
memorandum agreement of sale to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
The National Airports Corporation learned of Defendant's action in the
United States and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment
against the CALI. The CALI, also prompted by Defendant's action in getting
the alleged undue preference over the other creditors by attaching the C-54
plane in the United States, beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
CALI filed, a petition for voluntary insolvency and was issued an order which
necessarily stayed the National Airports Corporation's action against the
CALI and dissolved its attachment thus compelling the National Airports
Corporation to file its claims with the insolvency court.
After properly qualifying as Assignee, Alfredo M. Velayo, In order for him to
recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against
Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding
with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in
favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54
plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages
because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from
assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE:
HELD:
A creditor's transfer of assignment of its credit to another without the
knowledge and at the back of other creditors of the insolvent may be a
shrewd and surprise move that enables the transferor creditor to collect
almost if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Courts of Justice cannot
countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign corporation
to the detriment of the Government and local business.
Where a creditor taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency
proceedings were to be instituted by C if the creditors did not come to an
understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent assets
among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at
such understanding as if really the case schemed and affected the transfer
of its credits to its sister corporation in the United States, where C's plane C-
54 was and by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed
of said insolvent's property depriving the latter and the assignee that was
later appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane, said creditor acted
in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of
the insolvent for which it is held liable in accordance with pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code.
The provision of section 37 of the Insolvency Law making the person coming
within its purview liable for double the value of the property sought to be
disposed of constitute a sort of penal clause which shall be strictly
construed, and since the same result may be obtained by applying only the
provisions of the Civil Code, the said provisions of the insolvency law is not
applicable to a creditor disposing its own credit and not the insolvent's
property.
--
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The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that are
contrary to public policy but are not forbidden by statute. There are
countless acts of such character, but have not been foreseen by the
lawmakers. Among these are many business practices that are unfair or
oppressive, and certain acts of landholders and employers affecting their
tenants and employees which contravene the public policy of social justice.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute
law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may
be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from
a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy."
Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that:
"Even if an act or event causing damage to another's property was
not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall
be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited."
with mere much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity
for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.
It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code only came
into effect on August 30, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts
that took place in 1948, prior to its effectivity. But Article 2252 of the Civil
Code, though providing that:
"Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this
Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect.
. . ."
implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation — and
it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar Defendant had any vested or
acquired right to betray the con􏰇dence of the insolvent CALI or of its
creditors — said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be
given retroactive effect. Moreover, Article 2253 of the Civil Code further
provides:
". . . But if a right should be declared for the 􏰇rst time in this Code,
it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
may give rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin."
and according to Article 2254, "no vested or acquired right can arise from
acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right
of others."
2. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998
FACTS:
Defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff
went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and
Allah Al- Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning
when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast at the
room of Thamer. Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and
rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her
about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to
help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal
Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police
for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not
succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she
might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff
to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDI. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.
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Her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Miniewy, Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about
the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on
her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not
until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her
to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, plaintiff was not allowed
to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see
Mr. Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought
her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal offcer again escorted plaintiff to the same
Saudi court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to 􏰇ve months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition."
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer,
petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then
asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on
appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the
international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the
case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her
return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without
her being informed of the cause.
Morada 􏰇fied a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-
Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
ISSUE:
W/N The trial court has jurisdiction to hear and try the case based on Article
21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
HELD:
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
"connecting factor" or "point of contract" could be the place or places where
the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we 􏰇nd that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the places where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and
observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her,
she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is
the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told,
it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci
delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an
occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which
in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
this case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the
most signi􏰇cant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
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nationality place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred
and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here,
although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the records, the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private
respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our
view, has been properly established. Prescinding from this premise that the
Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the
most interest in the problem
3. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp vs. CA
G.R. No. 81262. August 25, 1989
FACTS:
Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In
1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
After private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
(Executive Vice-President and General Manager) confronted him by stating
that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers
open, and to leave the office keys.
When Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry
went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then
ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the
police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing
private respondent of participation in the anomalies not satisfied with the
police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, finding Tobias guilty.
Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to
the filing of criminal charges against him
Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner submitted a second
laboratory crime report clearing Tobias again for the said anomalies.
Notwithstanding the said police report, cases were filed against Tobias for
estafa. In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated. Unemployed, Tobias sought
employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the
latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty. Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages
anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent?
HELD:
Article 19 of the Civil Code known to contain what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When
a light is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
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remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not
hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances
called for its application the question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after
examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances,
finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.
An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as
ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave.
Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected
from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for he imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the
Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee Under
the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article
21 of the Civil Code.
Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias,
Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else
the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed
in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." he scornful
remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias
being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of Tobias' personal
dignity. The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a
letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter,
Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which,
Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further
damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for
damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which
does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is
not actionable his principle finds no application in this case. It bears
repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to
dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was
exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held
liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection
with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result
of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
4. Abenson Enterprise vs. CA
G.R. No. 88694. January 11, 1993
FACTS:
September, October, and November 1980, Albenson Enterprises
Corporation (Albenson) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc.
(Guaranteed) the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part
payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No.
136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L.
Woodworks.
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced
the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the SEC, Albenson
discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry,
Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L.
Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of
one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank,
Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature
appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
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Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or
make good the dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or
that the signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that
Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted
business with Albenson.
Albenson fied a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son
Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E. L. Woodworks,
on the ground floor of Baltao Building the very same business address of
Guaranteed.
Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal
Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial
Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S.
Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not
the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him respondent
Baltao 􏰇filed a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the
account of 'E.L. Woodworks,' not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff
used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975 . . . The possibility is that it was
with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business
on the ground 􏰇oor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the
defendants may have been dealing with.
ISSUE:
Petitioners contend that the civil case 􏰇filed in the lower court was one for
malicious prosecution. They assert that the absence of malice on their part
absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private
respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on
Article 19, 20 and 21 * of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercises, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each
provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other.
As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article
(Article 21), combined with Articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil
wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple
and adaptable that the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to
conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked
by the application of these articles". There is however, no hard and fast rule
which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Article 20 and 21 or
other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each
case.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes
damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.
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Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals,
good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to
injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes
injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.
The criminal complaint 􏰇led against private respondent after the latter
refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand
was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to 􏰇nd the best possible
means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person
who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways
to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to 􏰇nd means
to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a
wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for
damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action
for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code,
more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In
order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3)
elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the
action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor
was actuated or impelled by legal malice
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is
later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the
principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if
the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the
second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that
one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one
has acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases
where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The
reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public
justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to
be sued at law when their indictment miscarried. he presence of probable
cause signi􏰇ed, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant
case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or
by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-
founded anxiety to protect their rights when they 􏰇led the criminal
complaint against private respondent
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges where false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting
a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action
was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be
clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken
identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners
would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao
is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonor check. However,
the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to
determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to
private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the
dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed
Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was
obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized
as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been
discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-af􏰇davit before
investigating Fiscal Sumaway and was immediately recti􏰇ed by Provincial
Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation
resulting in the dismissal of the complaint. Furthermore, the adverse result
of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to
the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages
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may be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an
adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to
the winning party Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results
from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
5. Amonoy vs. Spouse Gutierrez
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001
FACTS:
This case had its roots from the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal.
Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda. On the Project of Partition two (2)
of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda.
The attorney's fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00. Asuncion Pasamba
and Alfonso Fornilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said
two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment
of his attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees.
Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed
away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter,
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
Because his attorney's fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid
Amonoy filed for their foreclosure. The heirs opposed, contending that the
attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable. But on 28 judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay. Failing in that, the
two (2) lots would be sold at public auction
They failed to pay, the said lots were foreclosed the auction sale was held
where Amonoy was the highest bidder. A deficiency was claimed and to
satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest
bidder was Amonoy. Included in those sold was the lot on which the
Gutierrez spouses had their house.
Thereafter, the CFI issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a
notice to vacate. On Amonoy's motion the Orders were issued for the
demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the
Gutierrez spouses. A temporary restraining order was granted on 2
enjoining the demolition of the petitioners' houses. The TRO was made
permanent by the Court, but the house of respondents had already been
destroyed.
A Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house
was filed by respondents against petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for damages?
Petitioner invokes this damnum absque injuria in arguing that he is not liable
for the demolition of respondents' house. He maintains that he was merely
acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
HELD:
Well- settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate
exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque
injuria — for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who
merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held
liable for damages.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May
30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But
the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the
demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court. The CA
also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process
server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself. Petitioner,
however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he
unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until the
middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally
justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were
tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit
before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but
an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received
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the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled
to proceed with the demolition.
Petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on
the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not
give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when
damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be
obscured, much less abated. In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is
premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused
to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally
or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
6. University of the East vs. Jader
G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000
FACTS:
Jader was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law. In the first semester
of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade.
He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student, he filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor
Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
payment of the required fee. He took the examination, Professor Carlos
Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five.
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law
met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed
to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws. The plaintiff
attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name
was called.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of
absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
Respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner denied liability arguing
mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in
the tentative list of graduating students
ISSUE:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case?
HELD:
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a
contract of education is entered into between said institution and the
student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are
considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the
school's commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are
the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the
former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result
of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from
sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of
the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor
directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already
complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or
whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not
an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's
way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list
of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony
have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student
of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most
importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced
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preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be su􏰇ciently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article
19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from
taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school
that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel
its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with
respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students
do not exercise control, much less in􏰇uence, over the way an educational
institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and
teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders.
Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the
submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control
means that no other person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.
The college dean is the senior o􏰇cer responsible for the operation of an
academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the
supervision of faculty and student services. He must see to it that his own
professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of
a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not
promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the
professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. Considering
further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which
is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in
its students, more speci􏰇cally the principle of good dealings enshrined in
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Article 19 was intended to expand the
concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
speci􏰇cally in statutory law. In civilized society, men must be able to assume
that others will do them no intended injury — that others will commit no
internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
a􏰇rmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and
moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal
in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in
the theory of liability is justi􏰇able reliance under conditions of civilized
society. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be
indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The
conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil
obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally
calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner
ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely
the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme
Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's
liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of
an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had
satis􏰇ed all requirements of the course. Petitioner cannot pass on its blame
to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay
of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must
suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern
tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of
right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts
can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
While petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for
the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals'
􏰇ndings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar
examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for
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himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible
for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, speci􏰇cally those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold
embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has satis􏰇ed all the requirements including his school records,
before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.
7. Garciano vs. CA
G.R. No. 96126. August 10, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute. On January 13, 1982, or before the school
year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her
daughter was taking her to Austria. he application was recommended for
approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the
President of the school's Board of Directors
Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband,
Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision of
Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the
Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her
services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of
any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her
refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a
temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written
contract.
Upon her return from Austria, she received the letter informing her that her
services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She
made inquiries from the school about the matter, the members of the Board
of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a
letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual
duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter
or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or
authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared
null and void.”
The president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of
Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the
Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's
deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano. Petitioner
filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI,
against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the
school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone
possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of the
school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for
work. Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee
and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her
through her husband by defendants-appellants had no legal effect
whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from reporting for work. What
is more, it was subsequently repudiated by the Board of Directors which
directed her to report for work. There was, therefore, no reason why she
did not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had been
presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from
reporting for work
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises
only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or
morals, good customs or public policy. The Court of Appeals was correct in
finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice.
While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they
actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as
ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr.
Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers
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allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them
liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free
speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were
not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not
"illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She
was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with
that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form
of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover
them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to
demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed
as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not
themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited
in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral damages are
recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21
(Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioner is not without
fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report
back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known
to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract of employment.
Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to report for duty
on July 5, 1982.
8. Barons Marketing vs. CA
G.R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998
FACTS:
Plaintiff [Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. private respondent herein]
appointed defendant [petitioner Barons Marketing, Corporation] as one of
its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such dealer, defendant was
given by plaintiff 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiff's electrical
products. This credit term was to be reckoned from the date of delivery by
plaintiff of its products to defendant
During the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, defendant
purchased, on credit, from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the
total amount of P4,102,438.30. These wires and cables were in turn sold,
pursuant to previous arrangements, by defendant to MERALCO. Under the
sales invoices issued by plaintiff to defendant for the subject purchases, it is
stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount due for attorney's fees and
collection. On September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of
P300,000.00 out of its total purchases thereby leaving an unpaid account on
the aforesaid deliveries of P3,802,478.20.
On several occasions, plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment of its
outstanding obligations due plaintiff. In response, defendant wrote plaintiff
on October 5, 1987 requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding
account in monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month
commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment. Plaintiff, however,
rejected defendant's offer and accordingly reiterated its demand for the full
payment of defendant's account.
Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. 􏰇led a complaint before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court against petitioner Barons Marketing Corporation for the recovery of
P3,802,478.20 representing the value of the wires and cables the former had
delivered to the latter, including interest. Phelps Dodge likewise prayed that
it be awarded attorney's fees at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded,
exemplary damages amounting to at least P100,000.00, the expenses of
litigation and the costs of suit.
Petitioner, in its answer, admitted purchasing the wires and cables from
private respondent but disputed the amount claimed by the latter.
Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim against private respondent,
alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due to Phelps Dodge's acts.
Such acts were purportedly calculated to humiliate petitioner and
constituted an abuse of rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of right?
HELD:
We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good
faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the
party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad
faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioner's allegation that private
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respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship
with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal directly with
Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition
is merely speculative. Moreover, we􏰇find that private respondent was
driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioner's offer and
instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by
private respondent, the corporation had its own "cash position to protect in
order for it to pay its own obligations." This is not such "a lame and poor
rationalization" as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent
were to be required to accept petitioner's offer, there would be no reason
for the latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this
would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a pro􏰇t-
oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that what we have
here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under these
circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to have acted in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate the
provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Having ruled that private respondent's acts did not transgress the provisions
of Article 21, petitioner cannot be entitled to moral damages or, for that
matter, exemplary damages. While the amount of exemplary damages need
not be proved, petitioner must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. As we have
observed above, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
It may not be amiss to state that petitioner's contract with private
respondent has the force of law between them. Petitioner is thus bound to
ful􏰇ll what has been expressly stipulated therein. In the absence of any
abuse of right, private respondent cannot be allowed to perform its
obligation under such contract in parts. Otherwise, private respondent's
right under Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with
petitioner defiled. The principle of autonomy of contracts must be
respected.
9. BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 120639. September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Marasigan was a complimentary member of the BPI Express Card
Corporation (BECC), subject to the terms and conditions stipulated in the
contract. Marasigan oftentimes exceeded his credit limit but this was never
taken against him by BECC and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in
check was tolerated. Their contractual relations went smoothly until his
statement of account for October 1989 was not paid in due time. Plaintiff
admitted having inadvertently failed to pay his account because he was
attending to some commitments. He was informed by his secretary that
BECC was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account asking
him to issue a check and was threatening to suspend his credit card.
Marasigan then issued a check postdated December 15, 1989. However, on
November 28, 1989, BECC served Marasigan a letter by ordinary mail
informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit
card. He was told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any
inconvenience and unless he settles his outstanding account within 5 days
from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled.
There is no showing that Marasigan received this letter before December 8,
1989. Thus, con􏰇dent that he had settled his account with the issuance of
the postdated check, he entertained some guests on December 8, 1989 at
Cafe Adriatico. When he presented his credit card, said card was
dishonored.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent Marasigan can recover moral damages arising
from the cancellation of his credit card?
HELD:
To 􏰇find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19 the following
elements must be present: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Time and again this Court has held that good faith is presumed and
the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. This private
respondent failed to do. In fact, the action of the petitioner belies the
existence of bad faith. As early as 28 October 1989, petitioner could have
suspended private respondent's card outright. Instead, petitioner allowed
private respondent to use his card for several weeks. Petitioner had even
noti􏰇ed private respondent of the impending suspension of his credit card
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and made special accommodations for him for settling his outstanding
account. As such, petitioner cannot be said to have capriciously and
arbitrarily canceled the private respondent's credit card.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish
that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed
to the plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of
tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition
of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach
of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
B. ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Art. 21 NCC. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
1. ELEMENTS
1. Ruiz vs. Secretary of National Defense
G.R. No. L-15526 December 28, 1963
FACTS:
A contract was executed between the defendant Allied Technologists Inc.,
(corporation, for short), and the Republic of the Philippines, for the
construction of the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were
stockholders and officers of the corporation. The construction of the
hospital was terminated in 1955.
On August 20, 1954, and June 20, 1955, Civil Case Nos. 23778 and 26601,
respectively, were filed by same plaintiffs herein, making as parties-
defendants in both cases, the same defendants herein, the Secretary of
National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez (Engineer), the Finance Officer, and
the Auditor of the Dept. of National Defense, Pablo D. Panlilio and Allied
Technologists, Inc. Civil Case No. 23778 was dismissed by the CFI on
October 12, 1954 and the dismissal was affirmed by this Court on July 7,
1955, in G.R. No. L-8638. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed on
September 13, 1955.
On appeal, this Court reversed the order of dismissal, under the impression
that the real controversy was confined merely between defendant Panlilio
and plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera over the 15 percent of the contract price,
which was retained by the Department of National Defense. The retention
of the 15 percent of the contract price in the sum of P34,740.000 was made
to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the
construction. The last case, however, was remanded to the court of origin,
for further proceedings. Panlilio and the corporation filed their amended
answers, stating that the amount retained by the Department of National
Defense was already paid to defendant corporation, as sought for by the
plaintiffs in their complaint.
In view of this development, the trial court invited the parties to a
conference, in which the plaintiffs indicated their conformity, to the
dismissal of the complaint with respect to the retention of the 15% of the
contract price; but insisted upon the hearing of the second question, which
sought the declaration and recognition of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, as
two of the three architects of the hospital. The trial court, nevertheless,
dismissed the complaint, for being already academic and moot. Hence, this
appeal by plaintiffs-appellants, who alleged in their lone assignment of error
that "the lower court grievously erred in ordering the dismissal of the case,
with costs against the plaintiffs.
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ISSUE:
HELD:
The contention of the appellants in the case at bar that their claim for
recognition as co-architects of the Veterans Memorial Hospital is divisible
and separable from their allegations for non-payment by the government of
a portion of the architectural fees and that the lower court should have
merely ordered the striking out of the moot portion of appellant's cause of
action and proceeded with their claim for recognition was held to be
without merit, because the allegations of the amended complaint show that
there is an indivisible and single cause of action which is primarily to prevent
payment exclusively to the defendant architect, the architectural fees, and
that the matter of recognizing them as co-architects of the hospital was
merely incidental thereto.
Where the sole object of the appeal in a case is only to secure for appellants
a recognition that they were co-architects in the construction of a hospital
so as to enhance their professional prestige, it is held that a judicial
declaration to that effect is unnecessary, because a brilliant professional
enjoys the respect and esteem of his fellow men, even without a court
declaration of such fact, while an incompetent one may summon all the
tribunals of the world to proclaim his genius in vain.
The appellants' contention in the case at bar that their claim for recognition
as co-architects is authorized under Article 21 of the Civil Code on the
ground that the word "injury" in said article refers also to honor or credit,
is held to be without merit, because this Article envisions a situation where
a person has a legal right and such right is violated by another in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and it presupposes losses
or injuries, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said
violation, which situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
2. EXAMPLES
A. Breach of Promise to Marry, Seduction and
Sexual Assault
1. Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964
FACTS:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise
of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be. “Will have to
postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving on the Convair today”
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE. “
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Sued by
Beatriz for damages
ISSUE:
HELD:
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied
for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to- be's
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the 􏰇ower girl were prepared.
A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating:
"Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned
to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding,
he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon". But he
never returned and was never heard from again.
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
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good customs, for which the erring promisor must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said
Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said
Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.
2. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-18630. December 17, 1966
FACTS:
From December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco,
courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that
"defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for
plaintiff who also in due time, reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in
consideration of defendant's promises of marriage plaintiff consented and
acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until
December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which
the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc hat thereby plaintiff became unable to
support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry
plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The
prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn
child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for
her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary
damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The essential feature under Article 21 of the Civil Code is seduction, that in
law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded
In the case at bar the facts show that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion, for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises
of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relation upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code and, no other cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without
prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff
against defendant- appellant, if any.
3. Bunag vs. CA
G.R. No. 101749. July 10, 1992
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking on her way to
the San Juan de Dios Canteen defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in
a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were
sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel,
and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited
her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant to which plaintiff
obliged, as she believed in his sincerity.
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while
Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right side. The car traveled north on its way
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to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City,
it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the
duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any noise as they were
ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted.
Frightened and silenced, the car traveled its course thru F.B. Harrison
Boulevard until they reached a motel.
Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and
amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the
joint strength of the two male combatants. Eventually, she was brought
inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her
will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack because after
Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held
her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened
her that he would ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she
did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on
her virginity.
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to
allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her,
so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together proceeded to the house of Juana de
Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas. hey filed their
applications for marriage license and after that plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband
and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 complaint Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents on October
3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep
and eat because of the deception done against her by defendant- appellants
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed
by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado
Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr .
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed
by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado
Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr.
ISSUE:
HELD:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time- honored rule that
an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article
2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
provide for in the statutes.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts or petitioner
in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with
her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting
with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitutes acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award
of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21, in relation to
paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil
Code.
4. Constantino vs. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227. May 14, 1992
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FACTS:
Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez.
In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, that she met Ivan Mendez at
Tony's Restaurant where she worked as a waitress; that the day following
their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico
where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted
Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at
about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to
which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan
brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual
contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they
repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November,
1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant;
that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no
sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the
child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because
of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress.
ISSUE:
HELD:
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record,
that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence
her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.
While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November,
1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence the
letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a
conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom
she must have confided the attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while
still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months
pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy,
the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend is belied by
Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the
reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with
her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may
be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations
that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must
be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Article 19 & 21 of
the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals
that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita
was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan
(TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because
of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation
with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime
in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the
months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their
sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise
of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
5. Quimiguing vs. Icao
G.R. No. L-26795. July 31, 1970
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, sued Felix Icao. In her complaint it was averred that the
parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential
relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts
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and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence,
she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial
judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result

of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:
HELD:
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided
in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the
motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just
as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married
man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the
original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.

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6. Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396. May 30, 1962
FACTS:
At the time of her disappearance, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried.
Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her
parents in the same town.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their
family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as
a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other
the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but
also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors
about their love affair reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime in 1955,
and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from
further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant
and Lolita continued nonetheless.
On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her
brothers and sisters checked up her things and found that Lolita's clothes
were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper
inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper
approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of
defendant. In English it reads:
"Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of
this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday
morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love"
ISSUE:
HELD:
Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious scheme or trickery and
seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown
by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the
frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to
teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached
the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their
house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiff even 􏰇led deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from
the parental h o m e , Held; The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.
B. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
1. Lao vs. CA
G.R. No. 47013. February 17, 2000
FACTS:
The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (Corporation) entered
into a contract of sales agent with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao
agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the corporation to
his business address in Tacloban City. For his services, Lao would receive
commission depending on the kind of cigarettes sold, fixed monthly salary
and operational allowances. As a guarantee to Lao's compliance with his
contractual obligations, his brothers Jose and his father Tomas executed a
deed of mortgage in favor of the corporation in the amount of P200,000.00.
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The agreement went on smoothly. But in February 1968, Lao failed to
accomplish his monthly sales report.
Due to this failure, the corporation reminded Lao of his enormous accounts
and the difficulty of obtaining a tally thereon despite Lao's avowal of regular
remittances of his collection. In 1969, the corporation summoned Lao, for
an accounting, collections and that Lao's liability was established.
Ching Kiat Kam allowed Lao to continue with the sales agency provided Lao
would reduce his accountability to P200,000.00, the amount secured by the
mortgage. The Corporation thereafter credited in favor of Lao the amount
of P325,053.47 representing partial payments he had made but without
prejudice to the result of the audit of accounts. Subsequently, the
Corporation discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction business
so much so that it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales
to finance his business.
In the demand letter of April 15, 1979, counsel for the Corporation sought
payment of the obligations of Lao, warning him of the intention of the
Corporation to foreclose the mortgage since Lao appeared to encounter
difficulties in complying with his obligations under the contract of agency,
the Corporation sent Ngo Kheng to supervise Lao's sales operations in Leyte
and Samar. Ngo Kheng discovered that, contrary to Lao's allegation that he
still had huge collectibles from his customers, nothing was due the
Corporation from Lao's clients. From then on, Lao no longer received
shipments from the Corporation which transferred its vehicles to another
compound controlled by Ngo Kheng. Shipments of cigarettes and the
corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo Kheng .
On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint (Civil
Case No. 4452) for accounting and damages against the corporation. The
lower court ordered the formation of a Committee on Audit to determine
the true and correct accountability of Andres Lao to the corporation. After
the accounting, the trial court promulgated a supplemental decision
wherein it dismissed Lao's claim of overpayment and ordered Lao to pay the
corporation the sum of P167,745.20.
The corporation appealed the decision, just as Lao appealed the
supplemental decision to the Court of Appeals. On October 26, 1981, the
appellate court rendered a decision ordering the corporation to pay Lao the
total amount of P190,000.00 for damages. Likewise, the appellate court
reversed and set aside the supplemental decision of the trial court and
ordered the corporation to reimburse Lao's overpayment of P556,444.20.
The corporation filed motions for reconsideration but the same were
denied.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of Civil Case 4952, the corporation filed a
complaint for estafa (Criminal Case No. 26500) against Lao for his alleged
failure to remit the amount of P224,585.82 which he allegedly
misappropriated and converted for his personal use. The said case was
dismissed later but during the pendency of said Criminal Case, Lao lodged a
complaint for malicious prosecution (Civil Case No. 5528) against the
corporation praying for the award of damages. On March 18, 1977, the
lower court rendered a decision in the action for malicious prosecution
finding the corporation liable for damages.
.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Malicious prosecution has been de􏰇ned as an action for damages brought
by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor
of the defendant therein. As thus de􏰇ned, the fact of termination of the
criminal prosecution, civil suit or legal proceeding maliciously 􏰇led and
without probable cause, should precede the complaint for malicious
prosecution. Such a complaint states a cause of action if it alleges: (a) that
the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least instigated the
prosecution; (b) that the prosecution 􏰇finally terminated in the acquittal of
the plaintiff; (c) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without
probable cause, and (d) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by
improper and sinister motives.
The contention of Lao that the elements of an action for malicious
prosecution are evidentiary in nature and should be determined at the time
the plaintiff offers evidence and rests his case, is untenable. To rule
otherwise would, in effect, sanction the 􏰇ling of actions without a cause of
action. The existence of a cause of action is determined solely by the facts
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alleged in the complaint. Consideration of other facts is proscribed and any
attempt to prove extraneous circumstances is not allowed. 55 As this Court
said in Surigao Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris, 56 "unless the plaintiff
has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is
commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or
accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or
an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible."57 Thus, the circumstance that the estafa case concluded in
respondent Lao's acquittal during the pendency of the complaint for
malicious prosecution did not cure the defect of lack of cause of action at
the time of filing of the complaint.
Neither does the Court 􏰇find merit in respondent Lao's submission that the
complaint for malicious prosecution is viable inasmuch as it is also anchored
on Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. This may appear to be a persuasive
argument since there is no hard and fast rule which can be applied in the
determination of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated, resulting in damages under the said articles of the Civil Code on
Human Relations. Indeed, a party injured by the 􏰇ling of a court case against
him, even if he is later on absolved, may 􏰇le a case for damages grounded
either on the principle of abuse of rights or on malicious prosecution. 58
However, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights or malicious
prosecution, a reading of the complaint here reveals that it is founded on
the mere 􏰇ling of the estafa charge against respondent Lao. As such, it was
prematurely 􏰇led and it failed to allege a cause of action. Should the action
for malicious prosecution be entertained and the estafa charge would result
in respondent Lao's conviction during the pendency of the damage suit,
even if it is based on Articles 20 and 21, such suit would nonetheless become
groundless and unfounded. To repeat; that the estafa case, in fact, resulted
in respondent Lao's acquittal would not infuse a cause of action on the
malicious prosecution case already commenced and pending resolution.
The complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on
Articles 20 and 21 should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action
and therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court of origin. It should be stressed, however, that the dismissal of
subject complaint should not be taken as an adjudication on the merits, the
same being merely grounded on the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action.
2. Que vs. IAC
G.R. No. 66865. January 13, 1989
FACTS:
Magtanggol Que filed a complaint for estafa against private respondent
Antonio Nicolas for issuance of several checks which were subsequently
dishonored when presented for encashment. The charge was dismissed for
lack of merit, the investigating fiscal holding that the controversy was an
accounting matter that did not necessarily involve deceit on the part of
Nicolas.
Subsequently, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que, this
time in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for what he claimed was his
malicious prosecution by the latter. It was now Que's turn to claim
harassment. In his counterclaim, he averred that Nicolas had maliciously
filed the complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City;
that the private respondent was really indebted to him in any case; and that
it was he who had suffered damages as a result of the unwarranted suit.
The dispute goes back to several previous business transactions between
the protagonists when they were still on amicable terms. In July and August
of 1975, the private respondent ordered from the petitioner certain
amounts of canvass strollers which were delivered to and accepted by
Nicolas, who issued five checks therefor to Que. The total face value of the
checks was P7,600.00. Payment thereof was subsequently stopped by
Nicolas and Que was unable to encash them. Nicolas explained later that he
had ordered the "stop payment" because of defects in the articles sold
which despite his requests Que had not corrected. Que for his part argued
that the allegedly defective articles were never returned to him until after
he had filed the charge for estafa and that Nicolas had earlier merely ignored
his complaints about the dishonored checks.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the absence
of malice. It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling
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but only by an anxiety to protect his rights when he filed the criminal
complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. If he averred that the private
respondent had no funds in the bank when he issued the postdated checks
and intended to cheat the payee, it was because the circumstances of the
case as Que saw them led him to this conclusion. Even if the fiscal found that
no deceit was involved and that the petitioner's claim was unfounded, the
mistaken charge was nonetheless, in the legal sense, not malicious.
We agree with the petitioner that the mere dismissal of the criminal
complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a cause of action because the
proceedings therein did not involve an exhaustive examination of the
elements of malicious prosecution. What was inquired into in that
preliminary investigation was whether or not there was a prima facie
showing of estafa that would justify the filing of the corresponding
information. Nowhere in the fiscal's investigation report is there any
statement imputing malice to the complainant nor could it have as this was
not the matter in issue.
There is in fact a stronger suggestion of malice in the circumstance that the
private respondent filed his complaint for damages in Valenzuela, Bulacan,
as his alleged residence, notwithstanding that his place of business, in which
he had dealings with the petitioner, was Caloocan City. The Court finds the
petitioner's claim of harassment more plausible. However, inasmuch as
good faith is presumed, and applying this presumption both to the
petitioner and the private respondent, we hereby rule that, absent sufficient
rebuttable evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice in their mutual
relations.
3. Drilon vs. CA
G.R. No. 107019. March 20, 1997
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon. General
Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, requested the Department of Justice to order the investigation
of several individuals named therein, including herein private respondent
Homobono Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December
1989 coup d'etat.
Petitioner Aurelio Trampe, the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to
continue the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the and
assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators.
In April 17, 1990, the panel released its findings, thru a Resolution that
there is probable cause to hold herein respondents for trial for the crime of
REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.
The Resolution became the basis for the filing of an Information charging
private respondent with the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated
murder before the Regional Trial Court.
Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him,
private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages, In his complaint,
Adaza charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and
malicious experimentation by 􏰇ling against him a charge of rebellion
complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners, according
to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute
books.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The term malicious prosecution has been de􏰇ned in various ways. In
American jurisdiction, it is de􏰇ned as: “One begun in malice without
probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace v.
Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of
injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in
favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies,
called the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459,
102 Ga. 264., Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803 119 Wis. 625).” In Philippine
jurisdiction, it has been de􏰇ned as: “An action for damages brought by one
against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding
has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in
force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v.
Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).”
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In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further
fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action
􏰇nally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
All these requisites must concur.
It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. Elsewise stated, a
suit for malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution
has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that
it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors,
who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when
their indictment miscarried. In the case under consideration, the decision of
the Special Team of Prosecutors to 􏰇le the information for rebellion with
murder and frustrated murder against respondent Adaza, among others,
cannot be dismissed as the mere product of whim or caprice on the part of
the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary investigation. Said decision
was fully justi􏰇ed in an eighteen (18)-page Resolution dated April 17, 1990.
Here, since the petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was
probable cause to hold respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of rebellion
with murder and frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself, through
counsel, did not allege in his complaint lack of probable cause, we 􏰇find that
the petitioners cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution.
As to the requirement that the prosecutor must be impelled by malice in
bringing the unfounded action, suffice it to state that the presence of
probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. At
the risk of being repetitious, it is evident in this case that petitioners were
not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass
private respondent, but only by a well-founded belief that respondent
Adaza can be held for trial for the crime alleged in the information.
C. PUBLIC HUMILIATION
1. Patricio vs. Leviste
G.R. No. 51832. April 26, 1989
FACTS:
Rafael Patricio, an ordained Catholic priest, and actively engaged in social
and civic affairs in Pilar, Capiz, where he is residing, was appointed Director
General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz.
On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while a benefit dance
was on-going in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta,
petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the
public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private
respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was
in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his
companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his
hand which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile
manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before
petitioner could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit
petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion
ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the
municipal building.
As a result of the incident, a criminal complaint for "Slander by Deed was
filed by petitioner but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint
for damages was filed by petitioner with the court a quo. In a decision, the
court ruled in favor of herein petitioner, holding private respondent liable
to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, moral
shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting
petitioner on the face in public.
ISSUE:
HELD:
We find petitioner's claim for moral damages, meritorious. There is no
question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a
defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
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wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. An
award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit: "ART. 2219. Moral damages
may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. (4) Adultery
or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious
prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred
to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 32, 34, and 35 . . ."
Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of
the same Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage." The fact that no actual or
compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not adversely
affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be
awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations
of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that the wrongful
act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the complainant.
It is clear from the report of the Code Commission that the reason
underlying an award of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is to
compensate the injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person,
thus — ". . . Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule: 'ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.'
In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective
damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of
example or correction for the public good (Art. 22, 29, Civil Code). Exemplary
damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the
offender. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run
through the body politic. The amount of exemplary damages need not be
proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral, temperate
or compensatory damages, as the case may be (Art. 2234, Civil Code),
although such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right. (Art. 2233,
Civil Code).
2. Grand Union Supermarket vs. Espino
G.R. No. L-48250. December 28, 1979
FACTS:
Jose J. Espino, Jr., and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at the
defendants' South Supermarket in Makati. Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file
which he needed in his hobby and had been wanting to buy, plaintiff picked
up that item. He held it in his hand thinking that it might be lost, because of
its tiny size, if he put it in his wife's grocery cart. In the course of their
shopping, plaintiff and his wife saw the maid of plaintiff's aunt. While talking
to this maid, plaintiff stuck the file into the front breast pocket of his shirt
with a good part of the merchandise exposed.
At the check-out counter, the plaintiff paid for his wife's purchases but he
forgot to pay for the file. As he was leaving by the exit, he was approached
by a uniformed guard of the supermarket who said: "Excuse me, Mr., I think
you have something in your pocket which you have not paid for." pointing
to his left front breast pocket. Suddenly reminded of the file, plaintiff
apologized thus: "I am sorry," and he turned back toward the cashier to pay
for the file. But the guard stopped him and led him instead toward the rear
of the supermarket. The plaintiff protested. A crowd of customers on their
way into the supermarket saw the plaintiff being stopped and led by a
uniformed guard toward the rear of the supermarket.
The guard directed him to a table and gave the file to the man seated at the
desk. The man at the desk looked at the plaintiff and the latter immediately
explained the circumstances that led to the finding of the file in his
possession. The man at the desk pulled out a sheet of paper and began to
ask plaintiff's name, age, residence and other personal data. Plaintiff was
asked to make a brief statement, and on the sheet of paper or "Incident
Report".
Plaintiff and his wife were directed across the main entrance to the shopping
area, down the line of check-out counters, to a desk beside the first
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checkout counter. To the woman seated at the desk, who turned out to be
defendant Nelia Santos- Fandino, the guard presented the incident report
and the file. Plaintiff explained and narrated the incident that led to the
finding of the file in his pocket, telling Fandino that he was going to pay for
the file because he needed it. But this defendant replied: "That is all they
say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . . . They all
intended to pay for the things that are found to them." Plaintiff objected
and said that he was a regular customer of the supermarket.
Extracting a P5.00 bill from his pocket, plaintiff told Fandino that he was
paying for the file whose cost was P3.85. Fandino reached over and took the
P5.00 bill from plaintiff with these words: "We are fining you P5.00. That is
your fine." Plaintiff was shocked. He and his wife objected vigorously that
he was not a common criminal, and they wanted to get back the P5.00. But
Fandino told them that the money would be given as an incentive to the
guards who apprehend pilferers. People were milling around them and
staring at the plaintiff. Plaintiff gave up the discussion.
Private respondent's complaint filed on October 8, 1970 is founded on
Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5.00 fine. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch XIX dismissed the complaint.
Interposing the appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed and set
aside the appealed judgment, granting and damages as earlier stated.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petitioner Nelia Santos Fandino, after reading the incident report, remarked
the following: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito?" Such a remark made in the
presence of private respondent and with reference to the incident report
with its entries, was offensive to private respondent's dignity and
defamatory to his character and honesty. When Espino explained that he
was going to pay the file but simply forgot to do so, Fandino doubted the
explanation.
The admission of Fandino that she required private respondent to pay a fine
of P5.00 and did in fact take the P5.00 bill of private respondent tendered
by the latter to pay for the file, as a fine which would be given as an incentive
to the guards who apprehend pilferers clearly proved that Fandino branded
private respondent as a thief which was not right nor justified.
The testimony of the guard that management instructed them to bring the
suspected customers to the public area for the people to see those kind of
customers in order that they may be embarrassed; that management
wanted "the customers to be embarrassed in public so that they will not
repeat the stealing again"; that the management asked the guards "to bring
these customers to different cashiers in order that they will know that they
are pilferers" may indicate the manner or pattern whereby a confirmed or
self-confessed shoplifter is treated by the Supermarket management but in
the case at bar, there is no showing that such procedure was taken in the
case of the private respondent who denied strongly and vehemently the
charge of shoplifting.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the whole incident that befell
respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his
own act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his forgetfulness in checking
out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to
his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish,
wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of
omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such
contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that
private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that
many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing
interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence
in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers
or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to
witness private respondent's predicament. We do not believe that private
respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass
him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage
the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and
promoted by good public relations.
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Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they could be adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil Code).
Considering that exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts, that
they are penal in character granted not by way of compensation but as a
punishment to the offender and as a warning to others as a sort of
deterrent, We hold that the facts and circumstances of the case at bar do
not warrant the grant of exemplary damages.
Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their
property, a right which the law accords to them. Under Article 429, New Civil
Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof and for this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. And since a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office exempts him from civil or criminal liability,
petitioner may not be punished by imposing exemplary damages against
him.
D. UNJUST DISMISSAL
1. Singapore Airlines vs. Paño
G.R. No. L-47739. June 22, 1983
FACTS:
Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by petitioner as Engineer Officer
with the opportunity to undergo a B-707 "conversion training course,"
which he accepted. Twenty six days thereafter, or on October 26, 1974, Cruz
entered into an "Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the
Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited" Cruz signed the Agreement with his
co-respondent, B. E. Villanueva, as surety.
Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on
leave without approval of the application during the second year of the
period of 􏰇five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz and his
surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid
Agreement.
In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time
had he been required by petitioner to agree to a straight service of 􏰇ve years
under Clause 4 of the Agreement (supra) and that he left the service on
"valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company", so
that no damages may be awarded against him. And because of petitioner-
plaintiff's alleged ungrounded causes of action, Cruz counter claimed for
attorney's fees of P7,000.00.
ISSUE: whether or not this case is properly cognizable by Courts of justice or
by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission?
HELD:
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy
must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim
for damages arises from employer- employee relations, and the latest
amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under P.D. No. 1691 and B.P.
Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee
relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim
for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just
cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices
served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence
without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously
and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion
training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the
purview of Civil Law. Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the
abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job — as the latter
was not required in the Complaint to report back to work — but on the
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manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in
terms of the damages which petitioner had o suffer.
2. Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
G.R. No. L-59825. September 11, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioners Ernesto Medina and Jose Ong, former Plant Manager and
Comptroller, respectively, of respondent Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance a complaint for
damages against private respondents, alleging, among others, that
respondent company, through its president and chief executive officer,
respondent Aboitiz, without provocation, dismissed and publicly humiliated
petitioners
Cosme de Aboitiz, acting in his capacity as President and Chief Executive
Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines,
Inc., went to the Pepsi-Cola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and without
any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated the plaintiffs with the
use of the following slanderous language and other words of similar import
uttered in the presence of the plaintiffs' subordinate employees, thus —
'GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP . . . YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE
BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO
ARE FIRED!' (referring to Jose Ong).
Plaintiffs filed a joint criminal complaint for oral defamation against the
defendant Cosme de Aboitiz but Hon. Jose B. Castillo, dismissed the
complaint allegedly because the expression 'Fuck you' and 'You are both shit
to me' were uttered not to slander but to express anger and displeasure.
Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Review with the office of the Secretary of Justice
the Deputy Minister of Justice, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., reversing the
resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directing him to file against defendant
Cosme de Aboitiz an information for Grave Slander.
That the employment records of plaintiffs show their track performance and
impeccable qualifications, not to mention their long years of service to the
Company which undoubtedly caused their promotion to the two highest
positions in Muntinlupa Plant, Ernesto Medina as the Plant General
Manager and Jose G. Ong who was the Plant Comptroller
The defendant corporation, acting through its President, Cosme de Aboitiz,
dismissed and slandered the plaintiffs in the presence of their subordinate
employees although this could have been done in private.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied. While trial was in progress,
private respondents filed another motion to dismiss because of
amendments to the Labor Code which vested on Labor Arbiters original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving employer- employee relations,
including claims for damages. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Where plaintiffs' complaint for damages arising from the alleged disgraceful
termination of employment does not allege any unfair labor practice, theirs
is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the
defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and
not the Labor Code. Hence, it is error for the Court of First Instance to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
IX. OTHER TORTS
A. DERELICTION OF DUTY
Art. 27 NCC. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative
action that may be taken.
1. Amaro vs. Samanguit
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G.R. No. L-14986. July 31, 1962
FACTS:
Appellants filed suit for damages against the chief of police of the City of
Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admittedly by
both parties, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the
Civil Code.
On October 5, 1958 appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near
the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together
with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his witnesses, "went to the office of
the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they
were harassed and terrorized;" that in view thereof they "gave up and
renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime. “that
upon advice of the City Mayor given to appellee an investigation (of said
crime) was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to
file or had already􏰇filed an information for illegal discharge of firearms
against the assailant; and that "having finished the investigation of the crime
complained of, the defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs
in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when
he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their
signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction
of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime."
The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on
the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal is proper?
HELD:
The refusal of appellee Chief of Police to give complainants assistance,
which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law, constitutes an actionable
dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code.
An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or
uncertainty of the complaint, for these are not grounds for a motion to
dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars.
B. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Art. 28 NCC. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
C. VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND PRIVACY
Art. 26 NCC. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations
of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.

1. St. Louis vs. CA
G.R. No. L-46061. November 14, 1984
FACTS:
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S.
Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday
Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE
THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of
Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was a
write-up:
“xxxThey used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped
neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs
of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free
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from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took
shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and
determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house . . .
for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving
community of BROOKSIDE HILLS . . . a beautiful first-class
subdivision planned for wholesome family living."
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5,
1969. Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of
the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On
that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:
“This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December
15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which
boldly depicted my house at the above-mentioned address and
implying that it belonged to another person. I am not aware of any
permission or authority on my part for the use of my house for such
publicity. “
"This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and
much more the apparent distortions therein are I believe not only
transgression to my private property but also damaging to my
prestige in the medical profession”
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in
charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He
contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no
rectification or apology was published.
On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty
actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. In its answer dated
March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and
that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila
Times.
It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new
advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not
publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Judge Jose M. Leuterio found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake in
misrepresenting the house of Doctor J. Aramil as belonging to Arcadio S.
Arcadio, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered
mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a
month. Moreover there was a violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26,
Civil Code). The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial court.
Those factual findings are binding on the Supreme Court. The trial court
awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and
P2,000) as attorney's fees. They are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and
2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and
actions mentioned in Article 26. The acts and omissions of the firm fall under
Article 26. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the
Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the
Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification". Persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were
confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way,
his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
2. Concepcion vs. CA
G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in July, 1985, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion angrily accosted
respondent Nestor Nicolas at the latter's apartment and accused him of
conducting adulterous relation with his deceased brother's wife, Florence
Concepcion, also Nestor's business partner. As a result of the incident,
Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could
no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with
Nestor by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business
venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with
their commitments to their clients and customers. Nestor was forced to
write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas
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􏰇led a civil suit against him for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the
Nicolas spouses and awarded them damages. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals a􏰇rmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argued that in awarding damages to the private respondents,
appellate court was without legal basis to justify its verdict since the act
imputed did not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code and did not
constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. Petitioner also
criticized the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the
judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe 􏰇rst hand the
demeanor of the witness of respondent spouses as he was not the original
judge who heard the case.
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although
incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
X. DAMAGES
A. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT
Art. 2195 NCC. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to
all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.

ISSUE: Art. 2197 NCC. Damages may be:

HELD: (1) Actual or compensatory;

The factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages (2) Moral;

by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioner's
posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident (3) Nominal;

complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It (4) Temperate or moderate;

does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner
was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. (5) Liquidated; or

(6) Exemplary
1. People or corrective.

vs. Ballesteros
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in G.R. No. 120921. January 29, 1998
our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is FACTS:
a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial
country, is how far it digni􏰇es man. If the statutes insu􏰇ciently protect a Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao,
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall at Carusipan to
exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the attend a dance. The group did not tarry for long at the dance because they
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving
violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. It is them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity,
petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived
those enumerated in Arts. 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The provocation of Galo and his companions.
violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are
merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their
Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out
as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under from the eastern side of the "topdown" jeep and landed just beside it. He
Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering,
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scurried to the side of the road and hid in the rice􏰇eld. His younger brother
Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died.
Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the
right foot, back of the right thigh, and legs and thighs, respectively. The
stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and
was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney. He did not survive.
The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others
injured.
Warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued.
Charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder.
All pleaded not guilty. Para􏰇n tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros
produced positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.
After trial, the three accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, quali􏰇ed by treachery, and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, accused prays for the reversal of the trial court's decision and
their acquittal from the charges.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the
victims. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these
were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
2. Spouses Custodio vs. CA
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
FACTS:
The grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa
against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito
Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro
Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of
sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero. Said property may
be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
defendants herein As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property,
there are two possible passageways
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated
the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw
that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants
Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said
fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.
And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the
area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence
because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at)
the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were
drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear
were even lost.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their
favor?
HELD:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
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both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, o plaintiff.
r damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
breach or wrong. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that " (e)very owner may
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or
be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
before damages may be awarded, it is not sufficient to state that there constituted thereon.
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must
be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not
deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Many accidents occur and many injuries are in􏰇icted by acts or omissions
which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to
such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.
The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong.

Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said

to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have
acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,
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Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be
respectively applicable to all obligations
mentioned in Article 1157.
Art. 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
 ISSUE:
(3) Nominal;
 HELD:
(4) Temperate or moderate;
 erred in holding petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100)
(5) Liquidated; or
 cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the
(6) Exemplary or corrective.

3. Heirs of Borlado vs. CA
G.R. No. 114118. August 28, 2001
FACTS: SYNOPSIS
On 23 November 1972, respondents Salvacion Vda. De Bulan, Bienvenido
Bulan, Jr., and Norma B. Clarito 􏰇led a complaint for ejectment against the
Heirs of Simeon Borlado before the Municipal Trial Court of Maayon, Capiz.
The said case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the
petitioners, their agents tenants, privies and members of their families were
ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the respondents
together with all improvements and standing crops and to pay, among
others, said respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from
1972 to the present in the total amount of one thousand one hundred
(1,100) cavans of palay. Instead of appealing the adverse decision to the
then Court of First Instance; (now RTC), petitioners filed the present case
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City. However, this case was
dismissed by the trial court for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed in toto the appealed decision. Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its
function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of
the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event.
Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal, viacertioraribefore the
Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration. Nevertheless, as a
matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay
every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in question.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. The
Court cannot sustain the award. "Palay" is not legal tender currency in the
Philippines. The Court denied the petition.
Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
land in question. The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form
of damages. We cannot sustain the award. "Palay" is not legal tender
currency in the Philippines.
4. Lazatin vs. Twano
FACTS:
The case at bar had its genesis in Civil Case entitled "Angel C. Twaño and
Gregorio T. Castro, plaintiffs, versus F. L. Lazatin, et al., defendants, Dionisio
P. Tanglao, Intervenor", for the recovery of P35,000.00, plus interest,
realized in connection with the purchase by them (plaintiffs and defendants)
from the U.S. government, and the subsequent sale, of some 225 auto-
trucks. After trial, the CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint as well as the
intervention. The order of dismissal was taken to the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment reversing the said order and declaring that plaintiffs and
defendants were co-owners in the business of buying and selling surplus
auto-trucks, and ordered the defendants (one of them Lazatin) to pay to the
plaintiffs therein, the sum of P10,000.00, with legal interest from the 􏰇ling
of the complaint. The said decision became 􏰇nal; it was executed, with the
levy of the properties of defendant Lazatin and their subsequent sale at
public auction, wherein the plaintiffs Twaño and Castro were the
purchasers. Before the expiration of the redemption period, on August 2,
1952, defendant Lazatin, deposited with the Sheriff of Pampanga, the sum
of P13,849.88, redemption price.
On August 9, 1952, the same Francisco Lazatin, filed the present action, to
recover from the same Twaño and Castro, the sum of P19,676.09,
supposedly a balance of the proceeds of auto-trucks, sold directly to
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purchasers by said defendants. On the same date, plaintiff Lazatin, alleging
that "there is no security whatsoever for the payment of the amount
claimed in the complaint and that the defendants are moving or are about
to remove or dispose of their property with intent to defraud their creditors,
particularly the plaintiff", secured a writ of attachment in the amount he
deposited, and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff of Pampanga refused to deliver
the sum of P13,849.88 which should have been paid to the herein
defendants.
ISSUE:
HELD:
In order that an attachment defendant may be entitled to moral damages,
he must allege and establish that the writ of attachment was maliciously
sued out.
Where there is no issue of malice, the attachment defendant is entitled to
recover only the actual damages sustained by him by reason of the
attachment.
Where the attachment is maliciously sued out, the damages recoverable
may include a compensation for every injury to his credit, business, or
feelings.
An action to recover damages from the attachment plaintiff, for the
wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment (Malicious attachment) is
identical with or analogous to the ordinary action for malicious prosecution
5. Board of Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw
FACTS:
NACOCO's charter was amended [Republic Act 5] to grant that corporation
the express power "to buy, sell, barter, export, and in any other manner deal
in, coconut, copra, and dessicated coconut, as well as their by-products, and
to act as agent, broker or commission merchant of the producers, dealers or
merchants" thereof. The charter amendment was enacted to stabilize copra
prices, to serve coconut producers by securing advantageous prices for
them, to cut down to a minimum, if not altogether eliminate, the margin of
middlemen, mostly aliens.
General manager and board chairman was Maximo M. Kalaw; defendants
Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the Board; defendant
Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, 1947.
NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading
activities. Amongst the scores of contracts executed by general manager
Kalaw are the disputed contracts, for the delivery of copra.
A n unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from ful􏰇lling
these contracts. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the
Philippines: the 􏰇rst in October, the second and third in November, and the
fourth in December, 1947. Coconut trees throughout the country suffered
extensive damage. Copra production decreased. Prices spiralled.
Warehouses were destroyed. Cash requirements doubled. Deprivation of
export facilities increased the time necessary to accumulate shiploads of
copra. Quick turnovers became impossible, financing a problem.
When it became clear that the contracts would be unpro􏰇table Kalaw
submitted them to the board for approval. It was not until December 22,
1947 when the membership was completed. Defendant Moll took her oath
on that date. A meeting was then held. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the
situation, apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was
taken on the contracts. Neither did the board vote thereon at the meeting
of January 7, 1948 following. Then, on January 11, 1948, President Roxas
made a statement that the NACOCO head did his best to avert the losses,
emphasized that government concerns faced the same risks that confronted
private companies, that NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw
was to remain in his post. Not long thereafter, that is, on January 30, 1948,
the board met again with Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in attendance. They
unanimously approved the contracts
As was to be expected, NACOCO but partially performed the contracts
The buyers threatened damage suits. Some of the claims were settled
NACOCO seeks to recover the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from general
manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar,
Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under
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Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176, new Civil Code); and
defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach
trust for having approved the contracts
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages,
HELD:
may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except
Where the suit revolves around alleged negligent acts of decedent for
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to
having entered into contracts without the prior approval of the Board of
the circumstances of each case.
Directors, to plaintiff's damage and prejudice, and is against the decedent
and other directors for having subsequently approved those contracts in bad
faith and/or breach of trust, the case is not a mere action for money nor a 
 Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
claim for money arising from contract, but is embraced in suits Filed "to entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal," loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
which survive. Section 1, Rule 87, Rules of Court. referred to as actual or compensatory damages. 


Where the damage suffered by the corporation was due to a force majeure, Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not
which prevented it from fulfilling obligations on contracts executed without
only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits
fault or negligence of the general manager or the directors, there is a case
of damnum absque injuria, where conjunction of damage and wrong is here which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)

absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is
wanting. Art. 205. Indemnities that must be paid by either spouse on
account of a crime or of a quasi-delict shall be paid from the
The board of directors of a corporation holds the duty to act for the common assets, without any obligation to make
corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing it cannot be reimbursement.

controlled in the reasonable exercise and performance of such duty. So long
as it acts in good faith its orders are not reviewable by the courts.

B. KINDS OF DAMAGES
1. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATARY

Algarra vs. Sandejas

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MORAL DAMAGES
a. CONCEPTS
Art. 2217 NCC. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission.
1. Kierulf vs. CA
G.R. No. 99301. March 13, 1997
FACTS:
The Pantranco was traveling along EDSA, the driver lost control of the bus,
causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island
occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the
front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi. As a result, the points of
contact of both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries were infilcted
on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. The bus also hit and injured a
pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA.
Despite the impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front
portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and
gasoline dispensing equipment.
As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries, required major
surgeries like "tracheotomy, open reduction, mandibular fracture,
intermaxillary repair of multiple laceration" and prolonged treatment by
specialists.
The spouses aver that the disfigurement of Lucila's physical appearance
cannot but affect their marital right to "consortium" which would have
remained normal were it not for the accident. Thus the moral damages
awarded in favor of Lucila should be increased to 1,000,000.00, not only for
Lucila but also for her husband Victor who also suffered "psychologically."
ISSUE:
How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are victims of vehicular
accidents entitled to?
HELD:
The established guideline in awarding moral damages takes into
consideration several factors, some of which are the social and financial
standing of the injured parties and their wounded moral feelings and
personal pride. This Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often
enough that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the
court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection
to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer.
Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium is not supported by
the evidence on record. His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he
had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital
consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had
failed to make out a case for loss of consortium.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding
moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that
no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no supercilious
manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given
her. The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may
be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected
to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her
social and financial standing.
Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner
Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and
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wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and
ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations
and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and
thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even
had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to 􏰇t. She
suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
accident. In this light and considering further the length of time spent in
prosecuting the complaint and this appeal, we find the sum of P400,000.00
as moral damages for Petitioner Lucila to be fair and just under the
circumstances.
B. PROOF AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
1. Miranda-Ribaya vs. Carbonell
G.R. No. L-49390. January 28, 1980.
FACTS:
Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged in the pawnshop business and in
the buying and selling of jewelry. One of her agents, informed her that a
millionaire logger, Marino Bautista, was interested to buy big diamond
stones. Acting upon this information, Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by her agent
decided to drop by the house of Bautista, Mrs. Ribaya was impressed by the
residence of the Bautista and included within herself that the Bautistas were
indeed millionaires as represented by her agent.
Mrs. Ribaya then offered to sell to the Bautistas ten (10) pieces of jewelry
and was paid in the form of the two (2) Equitable Banking Corporation
checks.
As some of the owners of the jewelry sold to the defendants by Mrs. Ribaya
wanted to get back their jewelry, Mrs. Ribaya went back to the house of the
Bautistas bringing with her three (3) pieces of jewelry for the purpose of
exchange for some pieces previously sold to defendant Bautista.
Instead of returning the jewelry, defendant Bautista sent another Bank of
America. Mrs. Ribaya then deposited to her account at the Continental Bank
the checks in her possession. All the checks paid by the defendant Bautista
were dishonored by the bank for the reason that the accounts of the
defendant were closed.
Suspecting that the Bautistas might have pawned the pieces of jewelry, she
went to the pawnshop section of the Manila Police Department to verify and
to her chagrin she discovered that most of the jewelry she had sold were
pledged to various pawnshops in Manila.
Defendant Bautista assured Mrs. Ribaya that he would pay her their
obligation. After failing to keep these promises, Mrs. Ribaya demanded from
the defendant Marino Bautista the surrender of the pawnshop tickets
covering the pledge of the different pieces of jewelry. There were, however,
three (3) pawnshop tickets covering jewelry which did not belong to Mrs.
Ribaya included.
The trial court rendered judgment sentencing respondents-defendants to
pay petitioners-plaintiffs the sum of P125,460.79 with interest and 25%
thereof for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On petitioners' claim
for moral and exemplary damages, respondents had pleaded that
respondent Marino Bautista had acted "in utmost good faith" and that
damages in any concept could not be assessed against them, and the trial
court upheld them ruling that "the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs [was]
insufficient to warrant its grant."
ISSUE:
HELD:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like (San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, 21 SCRA 292). While in the complaint of plaintiffs-
appellants there is an allegation of mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock, there is no proof of the alleged mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock. There must be
clear testimony on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and similar injuries. Plaintiff must testify to his said injury (Francisco vs.
Government Service Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577). It would seem that
'physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and similar injury' must be testified to by the plaintiff,
and not merely inferred from certain proven facts, like having sleepless
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nights. Having sleepless nights is not necessarily due to mental anguish,
serious anxiety and the like."
In the present case, petitioner Niceta took the witness stand and established
by uncontradicted testimony that due to respondents' deceitful and
malevolent acts of defraudation, she had suffered "extreme" anguish and
"could not sleep for three months," since she was forced to close her
pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelries and borrow money in order
to pay off the owners of the jewelries wrongfully gotten by respondents
from her. The evidence of record shows the magnitude of respondents'
wanton, fraudulent and malevolent acts of defraudation.
Thus, petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta
suffered "extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a
clear demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious
anxiety and similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that
show her to be clearly entitled to moral damages.
We do not share respondent court's narrow view that petitioner Niceta's
failure to use in her testimony the precise legal terms or "sacramental
phrases" of "mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or
moral shock" and the like justifies the denial of the claim for damages. It is
sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and
evidence has been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the
averments of the complaint. Indeed, petitioner Niceta vividly portrayed in
simple terms the moral shock and suffering she underwent as a result of
respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and confidence.
2. Del Rosario vs. CA
G.R. No. 118325. January 29, 1997
FACTS:
The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed charged MFC with violation of Section 3
of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or
Misbranding of any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc."
It alleged that; in selling to the public roofing materials known 'Banawe'
shingles (MFC) made representations on the durability of the product and
sturdiness of its installation.
These representation 3⁄4 particularly those characterizing the shingles as
"STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG " and that the BANAWE METAL TILE
structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the
strong hook action on its overlaps"— prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the
Banawe shingles and them installed at their residence;" but (b)arely two
(2) months after completion of the installation, portions of the roof of were
blown away by strong wind brought about by typhoon "Ruping."
After due proceedings, the DTI rendered judgment declaring that MCF had
indeed misrepresented its product because "as the records showed," strong
winds actually blew off part of the structure/roof of the del Rosario Spouses
and the same acted in parts (instead of as a single unit) when strong winds
blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off.
MFC was accordingly sentenced to pay an "administrative fine of
P10,000.00" otherwise its "business name and registration would be
deemed suspended and its establishment closed until the fine was fully
paid." The decision of the DTI was affirmed in toto by the Office of the
President; and the latter judgment was in turn affirmed by this Court.
MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed
by the Del Rosario Spouses. This prompted the latter to commence a civil
action against MFC . The spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages
resulting from the events just narrated, contending that aside from the
destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical
wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and
furniture.
ISSUE:
HELD:
That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express
warranties made to the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights
of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately
demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory
evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the
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Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a
period of about a month, they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness,
fear, embarrassment and anger. "As declared by this Court in Makabili v.
Court of Appeals, among other precedents: It is essential . . . in the award of
damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial
the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection
to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of
pecuniary estimation are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974]) and
are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint (San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968]). As reflected in the records of
the case, the Court of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial
court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental
sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its obligation
to petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent acted
in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay
the basis and justification for this Court to award petitioners moral and
exemplary damages."
3. Raagas vs. Traya
G.R. No. L-20081. February 27, 1968
FACTS:
A complaint was filed the spouses Raagas against Octavio Traya, his wife,
and Bienvenido Canciller alleges the latter was "recklessly" driving a truck
owned by his co- defendants the said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-
year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous death. The plaintiffs ask for
actual damages in the sum of P10,000, moral, nominal and corrective
damages in a sum to be determined by the court, P1,000 as attorney's fees,
P1,000 for expenses of litigation, plus costs.
In their answer with counterclaim for moral and actual damages and
attorney's fees the defendants deny that Canciller was "driving recklessly"
and assert that the truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low
speed and on the right side of the road"; that it was the child who "rushed
from an unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left
rear tire of the said truck and died", and consequently the defendants are
not to blame for the accident which was "entirely attributable to an
unforeseen event" or due to the fault of the child and negligence of his
parents.
RTC rule on the pleadings, condemning the defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of their child
Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, P1,000 actual damages,
P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs."
The court reasoned that the denial in the answer "did not affect the
plaintiffs' positive allegation in their complaint that the truck did not have
a current year registration plate when the accident occurred," and that
"unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation (article 2185 new Civil Code)."
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered
judgment on the pleadings?
HELD:
The plaintiff's claim for actual, moral, nominal and corrective damages, was
controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect that the
defendants "have no knowledge or information su􏰇cient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter
being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an event and/or
by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment
has the effect of tendering a valid issue.
Even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint
are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed
admitted. Actual damages must be proved and a court cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages,
but must depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on
evidence of the actual amount. Although an allegation is not necessary in
order that moral damages may be awarded, it is essential that the claimant
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its
causal relation to defendant's acts.
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4. Enervida vs. De la Torre
G.R. No. L-38037. January 28, 1974
FACTS:
Roque Enervida, filed a complaint against the defendant-spouses de la
Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father, Ciriaco
Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared
null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five
years, in violation of the provision of the Public Land Law. He further prayed
that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate
son and sole heir of his deceased father.
In due time, defendants filed their answer, stating among others that the
plaintiff has no cause of action against them as his father, Ciriaco Enervida,
is still living; that it is not true that plaintiff is the only son of Ciriaco Enervida
as he has also other living children and that the sale of the property in
question did not take place within the prohibited period.
During the pre-trial conference on the case, plaintiff-appellant admitted
that his father, Ciriaco Enervida, is still living and that he has four other living
brothers and sisters. He also admitted that the sale of the land actually took
place on November 20, 1957, but was formalized only on December 3, 1957.
He likewise admitted the authenticity of a certified true copy of Original
Certificate of Title on which the title is based was issued to Ciriaco Enervida.
In view of plaintiff's admission of the material facts at the pre-trial
conference, the defendant spouses were constrained to ask for summary
judgment. Acting upon the motion for summary judgment, the Court
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo committed an error in dismissing the case
based on defendants' motion for summary judgment?
HELD:
On the strength of the admissions by plaintiff-appellant at the pre-trial
conference which the latter never bothered to oppose or deny in a later
motion or by counter-affidavits, the order granting summary judgment was
indeed proper (Jugador v. Vera).
Lastly, the plaintiff-appellant assailed the award of damages and attorney's
fees by the court a quo to respondents.
As the case at bar is clearly an unfounded civil action, the respondents may
recover attorney's fees. As to attorney's fees, the award is correct and
proper, in view of the finding of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals
that petitioner's action against respondents is clearly unfounded, since
Article 2208, par. (4), of the New Civil Code authorizes the recovery of
attorney's fees "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff".
"Finally, with respect to moral damages, we are inclined to agree with
petitioner that these damages are not recoverable herein. It will be
observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally
recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art.
2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages
may be recovered (Art. 2219). A like enumeration is made in regard to the
recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two
enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is
expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's
fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral
damages.
It is true that Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded
in "analogous cases" to those enumerated, but we do not think the Code
intended" a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings" to be one of these
analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would
have expressly mentioned it in Art. 2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else
incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in Art. 2219. Besides, Art. 2219
specifically mentions "quasi- delicts causing physical injuries", as an instance
when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-
delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras. 96
Phil. 321), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309, par.
9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34 35 on the chapter
on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
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"Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court (Art. 2216). It is, nevertheless, essential that the
claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage
(Art. 2217) and its causal relation to defendant's acts. This is so because
moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Algara vs. Sandejas,
27 Phil. 284). The trial court and the Court of Appeals both seem to be of the
opinion that the mere fact that respondent were sued without any legal
foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made
no definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist
of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they
are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they
are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or
exemplary damages."
5. People vs. Bugayong
G.R. No. 126518. December 2, 1998
FACTS:
Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan got married. Out of this marital union
they begot three (3) children, namely: ALBERT, HONEYLET and ARLENE. The
spouses Alberto and Leticia Cauan separated way back in 1983. Albert and
Arlene stayed with their mother. Later, Alberto and Leticia started living
together with another woman and another man. Leticia cohabited with the
accused RODELIO BUGAYONG.
3 and was nine years old. Arlene said that the penis of BUGAYONG partly
entered [her] vagina and she got hurt.
ISSUE: Whether the averment in the Information in respect to the time of
the commission of the crime sufficiently apprised appellant of the "nature
and cause of the accusation against him."? (1993-1994)
HELD:
The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, an
amount which is automatically granted to the offended party without need
of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of rape.
Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to
pay the victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In
People vs. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998, p. 19, per curiam. See also
People vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 126921, August 28, 1998, the Court resolved
that moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the
criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the
need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice.

Leticia, the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG, ALBERT and the then 11-year-old
ARLENE) were residing at No. 13 MRR Queen of Peace, Baguio City.
On October 15, 1994 accused RODELIO BUGAYONG had ARLENE hold his
penis inside the room he share[d] with Leticia. Bugayong threatened to
maim Arlene if she [did]- not hold his penis. When the penis was already
hard and stiff, he placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance
came out from the penis.

The young girl CATHERINE BUGAYONG saw this incident. Arlene testified
that her stepfather had been doing the same act when she was still in Grade

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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
C.CASES WHERE ALLOWED
Art. 2219 NCC. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
 foreclosure sale.
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;
 manager of the defendant corporation offering to give defendant the
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
 compound. In the meantime, the plaintiff received the monthly payments
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may
bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
Art. 2220 NCC. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
1. Francisco vs. GSIS
G.R. No. L-18287. March 30, 1963
FACTS:
Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of
P400,000.00, out of which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to her,
mortgaged in favor of Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter
referred to as the System), a parcel of land with twenty-one (21) bungalows,
known as Vic-Mari Compound payable within ten (10) years in monthly
installments and with interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.
The System extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on the ground that up
to that date the plaintiff-mortgagor was in arrears on her monthly
installments. The System itself was the buyer of the property in the
The plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general
amount of 30,000 to cover the arrearage of P52,000 but as regards the
balance: for the GSIS to take over the administration of the mortgaged
property and to collect the monthly installments.
The defendant received the amount of P30,000.00, and issued therefor its
official receipt. It did not, however, take over the administration of the
of some of the occupants thereat.
Then the System sent three (3) letters, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for
the payment of her indebtedness, since according to the System the one-
year period for redemption had expired. Atty. Francisco sent a letter,
protesting against the System's request for proposal.
The defendant countered the preceding protest that, by all means, the
plaintiff should pay attorney's fees of P35,644.14, publication expenses,
filing fee of P301.00, and surcharge of P23.64 for the foreclosure work done;
that the telegram should be disregarded in view of its failure to express the
contents of the board resolution due to the error of its minor employees in
couching the correct wording of the telegram. The remittances previously
made by Atty. Francisco were allegedly not sufficient to pay off her
daughter's arrears, including attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in
foreclosing the mortgage, and the one-year period for redemption has
expired.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
Hence, the plaintiff instituted the present suit, for specific performance
and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the telegram generated a contract that is valid and binding
upon the parties?
HELD:
The court a quo also called attention to the unconscionability of the
defendant's charging the attorney's fees, totalling over P35,000.00; and this
point appears well- taken, considering that the foreclosure was merely
extra-judicial, and the attorney's work was limited to requiring the sheriff to
effectuate the foreclosure. However, in view of the parties' agreement to
set the same aside, with the consequential elimination of such incidental
charges, the matter of unreasonableness of the counsel fees need not be
labored further.
Turning now to the plaintiff's separate appeal (Case G. R. No. L-18155): Her
prayer for an award of actual or compensatory damages for P83,333.33 is
predicated on her alleged unrealized pro􏰇ts due to her inability to sell the
compound for the price of P750,000.00 offered by one Vicente Alunan,
which sale was allegedly blocked because the System consolidated the title
to the property in its name. Plaintiff reckons the amount of P83,333.33 by
placing the actual value of the property at P666,666.67, a 􏰇gure arrived at
by assuming that the System's loan of P400,000.00 constitutes 60% of the
actual value of the security. The court a quo correctly refused to award such
actual or compensatory damages because it could not determine with
reasonable certainty the difference between the offered price and the
actual value of the property, for lack of competent evidence. Without proof
we cannot assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that
the practice of lending institutions in the country is to give out as loan 60%
of the actual value of the collateral. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that
the price offered by Alunan was payable in installments covering 􏰇ve years,
so that it may not actually represent true market values.
Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not
only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify
to her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision
holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not
being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code (Ventanilla vs. Centeno, L-
14333, 28 Jan. 1961; Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, 4 March 1959).
There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this
species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which have been allowed in
this case, for reasons hereinbefore discussed (Art. 2234, Civil Code; Velayo
vs. Shell Co. of P.I., L-7817, Res. July 30, 1957; Singson, et al. vs. Aragon and
Lorza, L-5164, Jan. 27, 1953; 49 O.G. No. 2, 515).
As to attorney's fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view of the
absence of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy the
plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the other grounds enumerated in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a recovery. The award
of attorney's fees is essentially discretionary in the trial court, and no abuse
of discretion has been shown.
Award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code is not
warranted if the breach of contract is not malicious or fraudulent. Exemplary
damages are only allowed in addition to moral, temperate liquidated, or
compensatory damages. The award of attorney's fees is essentially
discretionary with the trial court, and no abuse of discretion is committed
when the court refuses to make an award because of the absence of gross
and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy plaintiff's claim, or of
any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
2. Expert Travel & Tours vs. CA
G.R. No. 130030. June 25, 1999
FACTS:
Expertravel & Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), issued to private respondent
Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel
accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that
Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands
to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court
complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages.
Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel
had already been fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted to
Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega, who was
theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel.
The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made
by Lo was valid and binding on petitioner Expertravel. Even on the
assumption that Ms. de Vega had not been speci􏰇cally authorized by
Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the
latter remain(ed) in its possession up to the present, mean(t) that the
amount redounded to the beneFIt of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the
second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the effect that payment
made to a third person shall also be valid in so far as it has redounded to the
benefit of the creditor.
ISSUE:
Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit?
Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not
result to physical injury to the offended party?
HELD:
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate
and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.
Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily
established by the aggrieved party.
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to
wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of
the cases stated in Article 2219.
Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract,
moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or
was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of
breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code,
moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger
results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when
an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is
guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule
also applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa
criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found
guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or
arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. The term
"analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis
rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.
Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a
legal justi􏰇cation for an award of attorney's fees, such 􏰇ling, however, has
almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral
damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person
for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from
the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a
situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral
damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful
plaintiff.
i.UNFOUNDED SUITS
1. Mijares vs. CA
G.R. No. 113558. April 18, 1997
FACTS:
Dioscoro Lamenta, salesman/collector of Metro Manila Drug Inc. The
defendants as owners of Aklan Drug had been buying pharmaceutical
products from Metro Drug since 1976.
It appears that Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan Drug,
was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, Inc. It
was an employees' cooperative and she was its pharmacist and manager.
Obviously, Ospital ng Maynila Cooperative had some transactions with the
plaintiff as supplier of pharmaceutical products. Subsequently, the Board of
Directors of the Cooperative decided to dissolve it and stopped its
operations. Operations stopped in October 1986. In a letter dated October
23, 1986, Solomon Silverio, Jr. offered to lease from the City of Manila, thru
the Mayor, the site previously occupied by the Cooperative. The offer having
been accepted, a Contract of Lease was entered into.
Thereafter, Solomon Silverio as the new lessee, put up a drugstore on the
same area occupied by the Cooperative. On November 26, 1986, delivery of
pharmaceutical products was made by plaintiff thru Dioscoro Lamenta, to
the said store. From the first to the seventh deliveries they were received
by Luz Espares. The 8th delivery was received by Hilda Rodrigona. These two
were never the employees of the defendants.
In partial payment of these receivables, plaintiff received a check. It was paid
to Lamenta. It was drawn by Solomon Silverio, Jr. which check was under
the account name Farmacia delos Remedios. Metro Drug deposited said
check with the FEBTC, it received a notice from the bank that the check was
returned to it on the ground of insufficient fund.
On April 4, 1988, plaintiff filed a telegram addressed to Aklan Drug
demanding full redemption of the dishonored check and full payment of
outstanding account for P27,938.06. About 4 to 5 days after the telegram
was sent, Lamenta was able to talk to Editha Mijares who directed him to a
certain Solomon Silverio to collect the amount. He asked why as she was the
owner of Aklan Drug. But he was told by Editha that Silverio is the one
managing the store.
Editha Mijares and her husband do not acknowledge at all that they have
any outstanding account with the plaintiff. Defendant Glicerio Mijares, as a
doctor, never had anything to do with the drugstore of his wife. It was only
Editha Mijares who operates and manages the Aklan Drug and as far as
Editha is concerned, she never ordered the drugs Lamenta brought to the
Ospital ng Maynila
RTC- The Complaint is ordered dismissed and the plaintiff is ordered to pay
the defendants the sum of P30,000.00 for moral damages P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision, The appellees’ order of the merchandise and the appellant’s
agreement to deliver, as in fact it delivered said merchandise, constitutes a
contract of sale which is perfected.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The trial court however erred when it awarded moral damages in favor of
petitioners. Petitioners have failed to show that private respondent was
motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection below
Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence
of two elements, to wit: a) malice; b) absence of probable cause. Moreover,
there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design
to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing
that the charge was false and baseless). Hence, mere filing of a suit does not
render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot be
recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
faith, or without malice or bad faith. If damage results from the filing of the
complaint, it is damnum absque injuria.
2. De la Peña vs. CA*
G.R. No. L-81827. March 28, 1994
FACTS:
PANTALEON DELA PEÑA claiming preferential right to acquire ownership
over a 3/4-hectare portion of Lot No. 5714-C, imputes fraud and
misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in securing Free
Patent and OCT over the same. The action for reconveyance earlier filed by
de la Peña was denied both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
--
Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale,
Sulop, Davao del Norte designated as Lot No. 5714, for which he filed
Homestead Application with the Bureau of Lands. A certain Potenciano
Nazaret likewise filed an application for the same lot. As a result, a case
arose in the Bureau of Lands wherein Nazaret's application and that of
Ciriaco Reducto were "conflicted."
Prior thereto however, by means of a "Deed of Relinquishment" Ciriaco
transferred his possessory rights over six (6) hectares to petitioner
Pantaleon de la Peña who thereafter entered his appearance in the
administrative case when the portion transferred to him remained included
in the homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret.
After it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better
right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and
cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion
himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his preferential
right thereto." However, no such application was filed.
Meanwhile, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion
to Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights to Ricardo Tan, herein private
respondent's father. The portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on
acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la Peña's land.
A survey was conducted and Subdivision Plan was prepared and approved
by the Bureau of Lands wherein the portion acquired by petitioner was
designated as Lot No. 5714-D, while that bought by Ricardo Tan was
identi􏰇ed as Lot No. 5714-C.
As a result of the survey, it was discovered that the land occupied by
petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and
paid for from Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land ceded to Doble (later
acquired by Tan) was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought.
Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble in
1950, it was petitioner de la Peña who cultivated the same without
objection from Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2
March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but petitioner kept
destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute.
Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C to his son, private
respondent Herotido Tan, by means of "Af􏰇davit of Relinquishment." But
the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued In an effort to resolve
the con􏰇ict, a relocation survey was agreed upon except that the parties
failed to agree on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire
his own. After it was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within
Lot 5714-C of private respondent, the latter built a fence around the
property to prevent petitioner from entering. The sugarcane and bananas
planted by petitioner were destroyed in the process.
Petitioner􏰇filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the
Municipal Trial Court of Sulop. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. 9 It
concluded that petitioner had prior possession of the disputed 3/4-hectare
portion and that he was prevented from entering the same by the fence
constructed by private respondent. The decision was af􏰇rmed on appeal by
the then Court of First Instance
Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently registered the 3/4-
hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former stated in his free
patent application that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by
any other person." In addition, petitioner denied that a survey was
conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it
was discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's actual occupation
exceeded that which he bought from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the 1970 Survey on the
ground that he was already estopped from contesting it when he offered
Subdivision Plan CSD-11- 001883-D in evidence. Therefore, since the
disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for
in 1946 by petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance. Petitioner
was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was "enjoying
freely the use of government property" without even applying for the same
nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for P5,000.00 as actual damages for the
sugarcane and bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied.
Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was granted and petitioner was
ordered to pay P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings.
ISSUE:
HELD:
However, we are inclined to delete the award for attorney's fees, moral
damages and expenses of litigation. As correctly argued by petitioner, an
award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action
later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause
prejudice to the other party is improper. The right to litigate is so precious
that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously
3. J. Marketing vs. Sia
G.R. No. 127823. January 29, 1998
FACTS:
J. Marketing Corporation, received from Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) a brand
new Kawasaki motorcycle. Upon receipt, petitioner's representative placed
the motorcycle in the bodega of YKS Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Tacloban City.
However, (Petitioner) found out that the motorcycle unit was missing in the
bodega and the loss was immediately reported to the police authorities, it
traced the lost motorcycle to one Felicidad Sia, Jr who allegedly who bought
a motorcycle from one Renato Pelande. Allegedly, petitioner's
representative went to the house of the private respondent and examined
the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle and found out that the
chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle in private respondent's
possession have been tampered to jibe with the chassis and motor numbers
of the motorcycle unit previously purchased by Renato Pelande, Jr. from
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with damages. After trial, the lower
Court rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's complaint but awarded
damages and attorney's fees to private respondent. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the court a quo
ISSUE: Whether the award of damages (moral and exemplary) and
attorney's fee is proper?
HELD:
A person's right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for
damages. This is especially true when the 􏰇ling of the case is to enforce what
he believes to be his rightful claim against another although found to be
erroneous. In this case, petitioner precisely instituted the replevin case
against private respondent based on the latter's own challenge to the
former that if they really had a right on the motorcycle, then they should
institute the necessary case in court. When petitioner did sue private
respondent and 􏰇led a third party complaint against the person from whom
private respondent claims to have bought the motorcycle, it cannot be said
that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross and evident
bad faith or was done maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule
private respondent.
Moreover, the adverse result of an action — dismissal of petitioner's
complaint — does not per se make an act unlawful and subject the actor to
the payment of moral damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a
premium on the right to litigate. No damages can be charged on those who
may exercise such precious right in good faith, even if done erroneously.
The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is a
requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner — circumstances which are absent in this
case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite
element of compensatory damages was not present.
4. Cometa vs. Court of Appeals*
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
G.R. No. 124062. January 21, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc., (SITI), is an investment house
engaged in quasi-banking activities. Petitioner Reynaldo Cometa is its
president.
Private respondent Honeycomb Builders, Inc. (HBI), on the other hand, is a
corporation engaged in the business of developing, constructing, and selling
townhouses and condominium units. Private respondent Reynaldo Guevara
is president of HBI and chairman of the board of directors of Guevent
Industrial Development Corp. (GIDC).
Petitioner SITI extended loans in various amounts to GIDC which the latter
failed to pay on the dates they became due. For this reason, a rehabilitation
plan was agreed upon for GIDC under which it mortgaged several parcels of
land to petitioner SITI. Among those mortgaged was a Mandaluyong lot).
However, GIDC again defaulted. Hence, petitioner SITI foreclosed the
mortgages and, in the foreclosure sale, acquired the properties as highest
bidder.
Alleging irregularities in the foreclosure of the mortgages and the sale of
properties to petitioner SITI, GIDC filed a case. The case was eventually
settled through a compromise agreement which became the basis of the
trial court's judgment.
A dispute later arose concerning the interpretation of the compromise
agreement, as respondent HBI offered to purchase from GIDC the lot and
the latter agreed but petitioner SITI (the mortgagee) refused to give its
consent to the sale and release its lien on the property. For this reason, GIDC
asked the trial court for a clarification of its decision
Subsequently, the trial court directed petitioner SITI to accept the offer of
respondent HBI to purchase the property covered by TCT No. 462855
(20510). Petitioner SITI appealed the order to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the same. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed
--
Meanwhile, respondent HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board for a permit to develop the property in question. Its application was
granted, on account of which respondent HBI built a condominium on the
property called "RSG Condominium Gueventville II." When respondent HBI
applied for a license to sell the condominium units it was required by the
HLURB to submit an A􏰇davit of Undertaking which in effect stated that the
mortgagee (SITI) of the property to be developed agrees to release the
mortgage on the said property as soon as the full purchase price of the same
is paid by the buyer. Respondent HBI submitted the required a􏰇davit
purportedly executed by petitioner Cometa as president of SITI
(mortgagee).
Petitioner Cometa denied, however, that he ever executed the a􏰇davit. He
asked the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance to determine the
authenticity of the signature on the affidavit. The NBI found Cometa's
signature on the Affidavit of Undertaking to be a forgery on the basis of
which a complaint for falsification of public document was filed against HBI
president Guevara.
Following the dismissal of the criminal case against him, private respondents
Reynaldo S. Guevara and HBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution
against petitioners Cometa and SITI in the Regional Trial Court
ISSUES:
Whether the facts pleaded and the substantive law entitle plaintiff to a
judgment?
HELD:
The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does
not make one liable for malicious prosecution for generally, it is the
Government or representative of the State that takes charge of the
prosecution of the offense. There must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person for if the rule
were otherwise, every acquitted person can turn against the complainant in
a civil action for damages
????Walang relation sa damages yung case????
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 TORTS AND DAMAGE CASE DIGESTS – ATTY. PATRICK SARMIENTO (SBC-A SOL)
ii. LABOR CASES
1. Triple Integrated Services vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 129584. December 3, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondent Osdana was recruited by petitioner for employment
with the latter's principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original employment contract,
Osdana was engaged to work as "Food Server" for a period of thirty-six
(36) months.
Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a total of eleven
thousand nine hundred fifty pesos (P11,950.00) in placement fees and other
charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise asked to undergo
a medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests System
Subsequently, petitioner asked Osdana to sign another "Contractor-
Employee Agreement" 4 which provided that she would be employed as a
waitress for twelve (12) months. It was this employment agreement which
was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. She
was assigned to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha
University and, contrary to the terms and conditions of the employment
contract, was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform
janitorial work and other tasks which were unrelated to her job designation
as waitress. Making matters worse was the fact that she was made to work
a grueling twelve-hour shift, from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock in
the evening, without overtime pay.
Because of the long hours and the strenuous nature of her work, Osdana
suffered from numbness and pain in her arms. The pain was such that she
had to be confined at the Ladies Villa, during which period, she was not paid
her salaries.
After said confinement, Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as
Food Server and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, where she worked
seven days a week from August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again, she was not
compensated. Osdana was again confined at the Ladies Villa for no apparent
reason. During this period, she was still not paid her salary.
She was re-assigned to the Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other
menial tasks. As with her previous assignment at the said University, Osdana
worked long hours and under harsh conditions. Because of this, she was
diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition
precipitated by activities requiring "repeated flexion, pronation, and
supination of the wrist and characterized by excruciating pain and
numbness in the arms." As the pain became unbearable, Osdana had to be
hospitalized. She underwent two surgical operations.
Between these operations, she was not given any work assignments even if
she was willing and able to do light work in accordance with her doctor's
advice. Again, Osdana was not paid any compensation for the period
between February to April 22, 1994. Four days later, however, she was
dismissed from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given
any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she
was not allowed to work.
Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of petitioner,
but to no avail. She was thus constrained to file a complaint before the POEA
against petitioner, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, salaries for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees, as well as the revocation, cancellation,
suspension and/or imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Osdana The respondent is likewise
ordered to pay the complainant P50,000 moral damages, and P20,000
exemplary damages. The respondent is further ordered to pay the
complainant 10% of the monetary award as attorney's fee.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected
in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
ii. TAKING OF LIFE
1. People vs. Pirame
G.R. No. 121998. March 9, 2000
FACTS:
That in the morning of March 18, 1993 near the house of Demetrio Cleopas,
father of the accused. Cipriano Supero saw the victim while being held by
the accused Florencio Perame (sic) the accused Epifanio Cleopas struck him
with an iron pipe and by Teodorico Cleopas with a piece of wood, hitting the
aforementioned victim Pedro Torrenueva on the forehead, which, as a
consequence, fell on the ground dead.
That to cover the discovery of the commission of the crime the dead body
of the victim Pedro Torrenueva was buried in the well near the house of
Demetrio Cleopas father of the accused Epifanio Cleopas
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding Teodorico Cleopas and
Florencio Pirame guilty of the crime of murder. The accused Teodorico
Cleopas and Florencio Pirame are further ordered to indemnify the surviving
spouse of the deceased victim in the P50,000.00 each and the amount of
P23,214.00 representing burial and incidental expenses and P50,000
representing moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
ISSUE:
HELD:
We concur with the trial court's award of P50,000.00 each from appellant
Florencio Pirame and co-accused Teodorico Cleopas as death indemnity to
the victim's heirs, which is in line with current jurisprudence. We also find
the amount of P23,214.00 awarded by the trial court as "burial and
incidental expenses" supported by the records. 35 The award of P50,000.00
from each accused as moral and exemplary damages, however, is
unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish
or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death.
The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending the crime
likewise precludes the award of exemplary damages.
2. Arcona vs. CA
G.R. No. 134784. December 9, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos Arcona and his brother Benito Arcona were charged with
Murder and Frustrated Murder. In separate information it was alleged
that:
They assault and stab one NAPOLEON ONG with a bladed weapon to wit; a
knife hitting him in vital part of his body and in􏰇icting upon him injury which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
They strike and beat with a bamboo pole one EDGARDO TALANQUINES
hitting him on different parts of his body and inflicting upon him injuries
which would have caused his death thru performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the accused, that is EDGARDO TALANQUINES have parried the blows,
escape away from his assailant and by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that in the evening of June 27, 1986, he
was walking alone when he met Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines.
Without any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and
shouted,"Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but
missed him. Petitioner then drew out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When
he saw Edgardo Talanquines rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of
bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the former on the left
arm. Talanquines ran away.
He maintains that he acted in self- defense when he stabbed Napoleon and
hit Edgardo with a bamboo stick. He contends that Napoleon committed
unlawful aggression when drew an unsheathed bolo and attempted to hack
him with it twice.
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Private respondent contends that the award of damages is too

ISSUE:
HELD:
On the other hand, the award of moral damages in the sum of P10,000.00
must be increased to P50,000.00. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is inherently
human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal
killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life,
deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For
this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering.
Finally, the award of actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00 does not
appear to have been substantiated. Only those expenses which are duly
proven, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection
with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court. 18
Hence, the same must be deleted.
small considering that petitioner, to end the dispute, was willing to
enter into a compromise agreement and offered the amount of
P397,272.41 as settlement. In addition, private respondent assails
petitioner's malicious act of attacking his character by alluding to
his alleged reputation as a "gambler and big time casino player.”
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petitioner's allegation that it is allowed by Sec. 11, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence to impeach the adverse party's witness
"by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad" is undeserving of merit. Petitioner has not
presented adequate evidence to show that private respondent is
indeed a big time gambler. Mere allegations are not equivalent to
proof. Petitioner has besmirched private respondent's reputation
and has considerably caused him undue humiliation. Accordingly,
the moral and exemplary damages awarded to private respondent
are increased by P100,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.

D. FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT

1. PNB vs. CA
G.R. No. 116181. January 6, 1997
FACTS:
This refers to private respondent's motion for reconsideration of
the Court's decision:
1. The award of moral damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to
P100,000.00; and
2. The award of exemplary damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00
to P25,000.00.

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2. Fule vs. CA
G.R. No. 112212. March 2, 1998
FACTS:
Gregorio Fule, a banker by profession and a jeweler at the same time,
acquired a 10-hectare property in Tanay, Rizal. The latter had mortgaged it
earlier to the Rural Bank of Alaminos (the Bank) to secure a loan in the
amount of P10,000.00, but the mortgage was later foreclosed and the
property offered for public auction upon his default.
Petitioner, as corporate secretary of the bank, asked Remelia Dichoso and
Oliva Mendoza to look for a buyer who might be interested in the Tanay
property. The two found one private respondent Dr. Ninevetch Cruz. It so
happened that at the time, petitioner had shown interest in buying a pair of
emerald-cut diamond earrings owned by Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz, however,
declined petitioner's offer to buy the jewelry for P100,000.00. Petitioner
then made another bid to buy them for US$6,000.00 At this point, petitioner
inspected said jewelry at the lobby of the Prudential Bank branch in San
Pablo City and then made a sketch thereof. Having sketched the jewelry for
twenty to thirty minutes, petitioner gave them back to Dr. Cruz who again
refused to sell them.
Subsequently, however, negotiations for the barter of the jewelry and the
Tanay property ensued. Dr. Cruz requested Atty. Juan Belarmino to check
the property who, in turn, found out that no sale or barter was feasible
because the one-year period for redemption of the said property had not
yet expired at the time.
In an effort to cut through any legal impediment, petitioner executed on a
deed of redemption on behalf of Fr. Jacobe and on even date, Fr. Jacobe
sold the property to petitioner for P75,000.00. As Dr. Cruz had already
agreed to the proposed barter, petitioner went to Prudential Bank once
again to take a look at the jewelry.
The following day, petitioner, together with Dichoso and Mendoza, arrived
at the residence of Atty. Belarmino to finally execute a deed of absolute sale.
Petitioner arrived at the residence of Atty. Belarmino complaining that the
jewelry given to him was fake. He filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City against private respondents praying, among other
things, that the contract of sale over the Tanay property be declared null
and void on the ground of fraud and deceit.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary
loss. In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its
discretion. To warrant the award of damages, it must be shown that the
person to whom these are awarded has sustained injury. He must likewise
establish sufficient data upon which the court can properly base its estimate
of the amount of damages. Statements of facts should establish such data
rather than mere conclusions or opinions of witnesses.
As a rule, moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has 􏰇led
a complaint against another in good faith because it is not sound policy to
place a penalty on the right to litigate, the same, however, cannot apply in
the case at bar. The factual findings of the courts a quo to the effect that
petitioner filed this case because he was the victim of fraud; that he could
not have been such a victim because he should have examined the jewelry
in question before accepting delivery thereof, considering his exposure to
the banking and jewelry businesses; and that he filed the action for the
nullification of the contract of sale with unclean hands, all deserve full faith
and credit to support the conclusion that petitioner was motivated more by
ill will than a sincere attempt to protect his rights in commencing suit against
respondents.
3. Philippine Airlines vs. CA
G.R. No. 120262. July 17, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Pantejo, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and
disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting
flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight
to Surigao City was cancelled.
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To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out
cash assistance of P 100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected
stay of two days in Cebu. Respondent Pantejo requested instead that he be
billeted in a hotel at the PAL's expense because he did not have cash with
him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to
seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an engineer named
Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with
the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao.
When the flight for Surigao was resumed, respondent Pantejo came to know
that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers were reimbursed by PAL. At
this point, respondent Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for
Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled
flights, that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It
was only then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00 which,
due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter declined.
The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, rendered judgment in
the action for damages 􏰇led by respondent Pantejo against herein
petitioner, Philippine Airlines, Inc., ordering the latter to pay Pantejo
P300.00 for actual damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00
as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and 6% interest from
the time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been
fully paid, plus costs of suit
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to
provide hotel accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him
for hotel expenses incurred by reason of the cancellation of its connecting
flight to Surigao City due to force majeure?
HELD:
The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the
former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article
2219(10) of the Civil Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al., such
inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the interest of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to
their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the
award of moral damages.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to
obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action
and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. However,
substantial damages do not translate into excessive damages. Except for
attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the Court of Appeals
affirmed point by point the factual 􏰇findings of the lower court upon which
the award of damages had been based. We, therefore, see no reason to
modify the award by the trial court. Under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, we are convinced that the awards for actual, moral and exemplary
damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons
meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and
equitable. It is high time that the travelling public is afforded protection and
that the duties of common carriers, long detailed in our previous laws and
jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically catalogued in our Civil
Code in 1950, be enforced through appropriate sanctions.
4. Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. L-56168. December 22, 1988
FACTS:
Carlos Telosa obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc. and as a
security thereof, he mortgaged a parcel of land. The Rural Bank of Lucena
became a distressed bank. The Acting Governor of the Central Bank apprised
the stockholders of the Lucena Bank, it found that its officers, directors and
employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound
banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, its depositors
and creditors.
The Monetary Board later on decided to liquidate the Lucena Bank. the CFI
issued an order, directing the Lucena Bank to turn over its assets to the
Central Bank's authorized representative.
The Monetary Board in its resolution designated the Superintendent of
Banks Carlota P. Valenzuela or her duly authorized representative to take
charge of the assets of the Lucena bank.
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Among the accounts inventoried by the Central Bank's representative was
the account of Carlos Telosa in the principal amount of P5,000.00. A demand
letter was thus sent to Carlos Telosa. Because Carlos Telosa knew that his
obligation to the rural bank was only P300.00 not P5,000.00, he executed an
affidavit protesting the demand.
Claiming that the payments made did not fully satisfy the whole amount
Napoleon R. Cruz, petitioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Quezon to
extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage and sell the collateral at public
auction.
To restrain the sheriff of Quezon from proceeding with the sale, a complaint
was filed. Meanwhile, as there was no restraining order issued, the
foreclosure sale. The plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, this time
against Carlota P. Valenzuela in her capacity as Superintendent of Banks
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs from the assets of the Rural
Bank of Lucena, Inc., the amount of P2,000.00 as moral damages, P1,500.00
as attorney's fees and P900.00, as litigation expenses.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petitioner further alleges that moral damages should not have been granted
because private respondents did not duly allege the same in the complaint.
The lower court granted the same because of private respondents' prayer
for general relief which includes moral damages. Private respondents had
proven that they suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock
as a consequence of the fraudulent act of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. This
is expressly allowed by Art. 2217 of the New Civil Code.
5. Sumalpong vs. CA
G.R. No. 123404. February 26, 1997
FACTS:
While complainant and his wife were on their way home from their
rice􏰇field, they saw the petitioner standing by the road. When they came
near him, the petitioner inquired from Leonarda if she knew the identity of
the persons who had stoned his house, and when the latter denied any
knowledge thereof, the petitioner told her that the people from the interior
were abusive. To that comment Leonarda retorted that the petitioner
should first identify the persons responsible for stoning his house,
otherwise, she will bring the matter to the attention of the Barangay
Captain. Angered by Leonarda's reply, the petitioner asked, "why are you
angry, are you the wife of that person"?, and simultaneously slapped
Leonarda's face causing the latter to fall to the ground. While Leonarda was
on her hands and knees, the petitioner drew his gun and shot her at the back
of her head. The complainant then rushed towards the petitioner who shot
him twice but missed. The petitioner and the complainant grappled for the
possession of the gun and fell into a nearby canal. In the course of the
struggle, the petitioner bit the complainant's right forearm and left ear
thereby causing a mutilation of the latter.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of
attempted homicide The petitioner was likewise ordered to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of: (a) P16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due to
his failure to attend to his farmwork because of the injuries in􏰇icted upon
him by the petitioner; (b) P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses; and (c)
P5,000.00 by way of moral damages. 8 The petitioner's conviction was
a􏰇rmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, however, modi􏰇ed the
award of damages to the complainant, deleting the awards for loss of crops
and hospitalization expenses, increasing the moral damages to P10,000.00,
and awarding nominal damages in the same amount.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages suffice it to state that
the nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured by
the complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation
of complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These
injuries have left indelible marks on the complainant's body and will serve
as a constant reminder of this traumatic experience.
6. Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways
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G.R. No. L-22415. March 30, 1966
FACTS:
Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight No. 2 of Pan American
World Airways —from Tokyo to San Francisco were made with PAN AM on
by "Your Travel Guide" agency, specifically, by Delfin Faustino, for then
Senator Fernando Lopez, his wife Maria J. Lopez, his son-in-law Alfredo
Montelibano, Jr., and his daughter Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. PAN AM's
San Francisco head office confirmed the reservations. First class tickets for
the abovementioned flight were subsequently issued
As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines. As
soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the
Philippine Embassy to contact PAN AM's Tokyo office regarding their first
class accommodations for that evening's flight. PAN AM's Tokyo office
informed Minister Busuego that PAN AM could not accommodate Senator
Lopez and party in that trip as first class passengers. Senator Lopez
thereupon gave their first class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to show
the same to PAN AM's Tokyo office, but the latter firmly reiterated that
there was no accommodation for them in the first class, stating that they
could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class therein.
Due to pressing engagements awaiting, Senator Lopez and party were
constrained to take PAN AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist
passengers. Senator Lopez however made it clear that they did so "under
protest".
Suit for damages was thereafter filed. The CFI rendered its decision in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, which is accordingly ordered to
pay the plaintiffs the following (a) P100,000.00 as moral damages: (b)
P20,000.00 as exemplary damage; (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the
costs of this action.
Plaintiffs however, on November 21, 1963, moved for reconsideration of
said judgment, asking that moral damages be increased to P400,000 and
that six per cent (6%) interest per annum on the amount of the award be
granted.
ISSUE:
HELD:
As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with
plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious
anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class
tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class.
At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by
those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist
passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully
to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
It is not hard to see that in her condition then a physical discomfort
sustained for thirteen hours may well be considered a physical suffering.
And even without regard to the noise and trepidation inside the plane —
which defendant contends, upon the strength of expert testimony, to be
practically the same in 􏰇rst class and tourist class — the fact that the seating
spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in 􏰇rst class, there being
six seats to a row in the former as against four to a row in the latter, and
that in tourist class there is very little space for reclining in view of the closer
distance between rows (Tsn., p. 24, Nov. 25, 1960), will su􏰇ce to show that
the aforesaid passenger indeed experienced physical suffering during the
trip. Added to this, of course, was the painful thought that she was deprived
by defendant — after having paid for and expected the same — of the most
suitable place for her, the 􏰇rst class, where evidently the best of everything
would have been given her, the best seat, service, food and treatment. Such
difference in comfort between 􏰇rst class and tourist class is too obvious to
be recounted, is in fact the reason for the former's existence, and is
recognized by the airline in charging a higher fare for it and by the
passengers in paying said higher rate. Accordingly, considering the totality
of her suffering and humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J. Lopez of
P50,000.00 for moral damages will be reasonable.
The rationable behind exemplary or corrective rationale is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant
having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court may award exemplary
damages in addition to moral damages. (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil
Code). In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to
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sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by
defendant or other airlines.
A written contract for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. A
consideration of the subject matter of the present controversy, of the
professional standing the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and of the
extent of the service rendered by him, shows that the amount provided for
in the written agreement is reasonable.
7. Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. CA
G.R. No. 111584. September 17, 2001
FACTS:
Salvador Chua was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of petitioner bank,
to transfer his account from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner
Producers Bank of the Philippines. In view of Rojas' assurances of longer loan
terms and lower rates of interest, respondent spouses opened and
maintained substantial savings and current deposits with the Bacolod
branch of petitioner bank. Likewise, private respondents obtained various
loans from petitioner bank, one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which
was secured by a real estate mortgage and payable within a period of three
(3) years
Private respondents deposited with petitioner bank the total sum of
P960,000.00, which was duly entered in private respondents' savings
account passbook. However, petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit in
private respondents' savings account due to the fact that its Branch
Manager, Sixto Castillo, absconded with the money of the bank's depositors.
Also, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn out by private
respondents in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient
funds, despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents'
deposit was in the amount of P1,051,051.19. These events prompted private
respondents to request for copies of their ledgers covering their savings and
current accounts, but petitioner bank refused. Due to petitioner bank's
refusal to furnish private respondents copies of their ledgers, private
respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages against
petitioner bank.
Petitioner applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
including two (2) other loans not covered by the mortgage. With this,
respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages alleging that the
foreclosure was maliciously instituted to harass them. The trial court found
that respondents who were constantly paying their loan were not in default;
that the loan, with a three (3) year period, is not yet due and demandable;
and that the foreclosure proceedings was initiated in evident bad faith.
Judgment was rendered in favor of respondents ordering petitioner to
render an accounting, to allow the off-setting of the obligation and awarding
them moral damages, actual damages on unrealized profits, compensatory,
damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the
findings of the trial court but reduced the amount of damages awarded
respondents. A motion for partial reconsideration having been denied,
ISSUE:
HELD:
Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary
loss. In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its
discretion.
As bone out by the record of this case; private respondents are engaged in
several businesses, such as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and
gasoline proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents' checks and
the foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing
as well as the business dealings of private respondents as their suppliers
discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse of their businesses. In the
case of Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America (40 SCRA 144 [1971]), we held
that: Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury." Obviously, petitioner bank's
wrongful act caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to
private respondents for which they are entitled to recover moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be reasonable.
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The award of exemplary damages is in order in view of the malicious and
unwarranted application for extrajudicial foreclosure by petitioner which
was obviously done to harass, embarrass, annoy, or ridicule private
respondents. Likewise, petitioner, in its application for extrajudicial
foreclosure, included the other loans of private respondents which were not
covered by the real estate mortgage agreement, such as the loan of
P175,000.00 which was a time loan, and the amount of P400,000.00 which
was a clean loan. Moreover, petitioner unjustifiably refused to give private
respondents copies of their account ledgers which would show the deposits
made by them. Also, petitioner bank's failure to credit the deposit in the
account of private respondents constituted gross negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation which amounts to evident bad
faith. Verily, all these acts of petitioner were accompanied by bad faith and
done in wanton, fraudulent and malevolent manner warranting the award
of exemplary damages in favor of private respondents, in accordance with
Article 2232 of the Civil Code.
Of course, a plaintiff need not prove the actual extent of exemplary
damages, for its determination is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court upon proof of the plaintiff's entitlement to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages (Article 2234, Civil Code). In the instant case,
exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00 are proper.
Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are
designed to repair the wrong that has been done. There are two kinds of
actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses, and the other is the failure to receive as a bene􏰇t that which
would have pertained to him (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. V, 1992
ed., pp. 633-636). In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages
consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as "ganacias frustradas"
or lucrum cessans," are not to be granted on the basis of mere speculation,
conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference to some reasonably definite
standard such as market value, established experienced, or direct inference
from known circumstances (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de
Agricultores de Talisay- Silay, Inc., 247 SCRA 361 [1995]).
Anent the award of actual damages, the Court of Appeals granted private
respondents the amount of P18,000.00 per month representing private
respondents' unrealized profits from his gasoline station business, to
commence from October 16, 1984. In the case at bar, actual damages in the
form of unrealized profits were awarded on the basis of the sole testimony
of private respondent Salvador Chua. However, other than the testimony of
Salvador Chua, private respondents failed to present documentary evidence
which is necessary to substantiate their claim for actual or compensatory
damages. In order to recover this kind of damages, the injured party must
prove his case. Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, the Court
finds the evidence of private respondents insufficient to be considered
within the purview of "best evidence." The bare assertion of private
respondent Salvador Chua that he lost an average of P18,000.00 per month
is inadequate if not speculative and should be admitted with extreme
caution especially because it is not supported by independent evidence.
Private respondents could have presented such evidence as reports on the
average actual profits earned by their gasoline business, their 􏰇financial
statements, and other evidence of profitability which could aid the court in
arriving with reasonable certainty at the amount of profits which private
respondents failed to earn. Private respondents did not even present any
instrument or deed evidencing their claim that they have transferred their
right to operate their gasoline station to their relatives. We cannot,
therefore, sustain the award of P18,000.00 a month as unrealized profits
commencing from October 16, 1984 because this amount is not amply
justified by the evidence on record. Further, well-settled is the rule that even
if the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure 􏰇led by petitioner against private
respondents is clearly unfounded, this does not necessarily mean, in the
absence of specific facts proving damages, that actual damage has been
sustained. The Court cannot rely on speculations as to the fact and amount
of damages. It must depend on actual proof of the damages alleged to have
been suffered (Perfecto vs. Gonzales, 128 SCRA 635 [1984])
E. WHO MAY RECOVER
1. Strebel vs. Figueras
G.R. No. L-4722. December 29, 1954
FACTS:
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The complaint purports to set forth three causes of action:
1. As lessee of a lot, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to the
Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter constructed thereon a
Mobilgas Station which was operated by Eustaquio & Co., a partnership
organized by said plaintiff and one Primo Eustaquio, that, "out of spite
and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the said property for
himself and his men," defendant Jose Figueras "tried all he could to built
a drainage through" the aforementioned property; that, in order to
accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and political influence,
defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor, caused his co-
defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, to
prepare an opinion, dated June 18, 1949, which was signed by the City
Fiscal, holding that the City of Manila has a right to construct said
drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary excavations, of about
70 centimeters in width, at the boundary line of said lot leased to
Strebel and the lot belonging to Figueras.
2. Defendant Figueras "by making use of his o􏰇cial and political
connections," was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer
temporarily, from the Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons,
one Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's step daughter
3. Defendant Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against
plaintiff Strebel, and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No.
11005 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling
several employees to work more than eight (8) hours a day, in violation
of Commonwealth Act
4. Defendant Cornelio Ruperto, in connivance with his co- defendant Jose
Figueras, had secured the dismissal of two criminal cases against the
"bodyguards and cohorts" of the latter
It is further alleged in the complaint that, through the foregoing series of
acts, the defendants have "caused moral and mental suffering to the . . .
plaintiff, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to his business in the
amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in the amount of P1,500.00
paid to his attorney in defending himself from the malicious charge," which
sums plaintiff prays that the defendants be sentenced to pay jointly and
severally.
ISSUE:
HELD:
As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from
bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt,
and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's
suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish
of mind arising as to safety of others who may be in personal peril from the
same cause cannot be taken into consideration." "In law, mental anguish is
restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury
or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental
suffering which the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's
suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the
person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot
recover for mental suffering caused by his sympathy for the other's suffering
By specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, moral
damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results
or causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar. Although
the same article permits recovery of said damages in cases of malicious
prosecution, this feature of said provision may not be availed of by the
plaintiff herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in
1949, or before said code became effective.
The news item in question mentions, neither the number of the cases
referred to, nor the names of the persons accused therein. Moreover, it
merely contains a criticism of the action taken by the court. The reference,
therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the 􏰇agrant violation of the
eight-hour labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the theory of
the Bureau of Labor, which the prosecution had adopted by 􏰇ling the
information in said o􏰇ce. Being a matter of court record, which had been
taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a decision already
promulgated, said theory was open for public consumption, and hence, an
allusion thereto or statement thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is not
actionable.
2. ABS-CBN vs CA
G.R. No. 128690. January 21, 1999
FACTS: (read full text for detailed facts)
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ABS-CBN and VIVA executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby the latter
gave the former an exclusive right to exhibit 24 VIVA Films for TV telecast.
Later, VIVA, through respondent Vincent del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN a list
of 3 film packages (36 titles) from which the latter may exercise its right of
first refusal under their agreement. ABS-CBN ticked off 10 titles therefrom.
Thereafter, in February 1992, Del Rosario offered ABS-CBN airing rights over
a package of 104 movies for P60 million.
In April, 1992, Del Rosario, and Eugenio Lopez of ABS-CBN, met at a
restaurant to discuss the package proposal. According to Lopez, however,
what they agreed upon was ABS-CBN's exclusive film rights to 14 films for
P36 million. Del Rosario denied the same. He insisted that the discussion
was on VIVA's offer of 104 films for P60 million, to which ABS-CBN later
made a counter proposal but rejected by VIVA's Board of Directors. Hence,
VIVA later granted RBS the exclusive right to air the 104 VIVA films, including
the 14 films supposedly granted to ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN then filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for
injunction. The RTC granted the prayer and required ABS-CBN post a P35
million bond, but while ABS-CBN was moving for reduction of the bond, RBS
offered to put up a counterbond and was allowed to post P30 million. Later,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA, ordering ABS-CBN to
pay RBS the amount it paid for the print advertisement and premium on the
counterbond, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fee. ABS-
CBN appealed to the Court of Appeals. Viva and Del Rosario also appealed
seeking moral and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals a􏰇rmed the RTC decision and sustained the monetary
awards, VIVA's and Del Rosario's appeals were denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was a perfected contract between VIVA and ABS-CBN;
and
2. Whether RBS is entitled to damages and attorney's fees.
HELD:
As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of
the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof de􏰇nes what are included in moral
damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be
recovered. Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he
has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.
RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of
Article 2219, thereof which reads: (10) Acts and actions referred to in
Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. However, the award of moral
damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
arti􏰇cial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no
feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having
a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has
a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter
dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since
RBS is a corporation.
3. NAPOCOR vs. CA
G.R. No. 126204. November 20, 2001
FACTS:
NAPOCOR issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000
metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant
in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified
and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public
bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted.
PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plague
Australia, the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously hamper
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PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO again apprised
NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter that
the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free"
clause is incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage. In
order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that
they equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused.
PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit.
Instead of delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of
the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,
PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987.
NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal
plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On November
24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification
to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry,
PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported
failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay in the
delivery of the first coal shipment.
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for
injunction against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial Court In its complaint,
PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October 1987
bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad
faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in Australia could not be
invoked as reason for the delay in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself
admitted that as of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And, even
assuming that the strikes were still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered
the burden of a "strike-free" clause
Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBRO's failure to deliver the
coal on time, it was compelled to purchase coal from ASEA at a higher price.
NAPOCOR claimed for actual damages in the amount of P12,436,185.73,
representing the increase in the price of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as
litigation expenses
Whether NAPOCOR rejected the bid of PHIBRO with bad faith, the Court
ruled in the negative. NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO
had a seriously impaired track record based on its experience in the previous
contract. This policy is necessary to protect the interest of the awarding body
against irresponsible bidders. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
modified. The award of damages in favor of PHIBRO was deleted
ISSUE:
HELD:
One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that another willfully
committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the government cannot be
considered to have acted in bad faith. Bad faith has always been a question
of intention. It is that corrupt motive that operates in the mind. As
understood in law, it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill-will or for
ulterior purpose. While con􏰇ned in the realm of thought, its presence may
be ascertained through the party's actuation or through circumstantial
evidence. The circumstances under which NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's
pre-qualification to bid do not show an intention to cause damage to the
latter. The measure it adopted was one of self-protection. Consequently, we
cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the course of action it took. NAPOCOR cannot
be made liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
The award of moral damages is improper. NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith.
Moreover, moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a
corporation. While it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moral
damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case
of a natural person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an
individual has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to
suffer mental anguish.
3.NOMINAL DAMAGES
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Art. 2221 NCC. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222 NCC. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where
any property right has been invaded.
Art. 2223 NCC. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
1. Ventanilla vs. Centeno
G.R. No. L-14333. January 28, 1961
FACTS:
This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by the
plaintiff due to the defendant's neglect in perfecting within the
reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment After trial, the
Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P200 as nominal damages
and the costs
In a civil case plaintiff retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to
represent him and prosecute the case. The case was an action for the
recovery of P4,000.00 together with damages. Decision unfavorable to the
plaintiff was received by Atty. Gregorio Centeno on July 21, 1955, and a
notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno on July 25, 1955.
On July 30, 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter enclosing
copies of the decision and that notice of appeal, and stating that he was not
conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to 􏰇le the notice of
appeal. Atty. Centeno informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff
agreed. Plaintiff, however, did not have with Atty. Centeno at that time the
amount for the appeal bond. About the middle of August 1955, Atty.
Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal
bond. The plaintiff Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal
bond, and because of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal bond,
decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00.
Plaintiff then issued the check for P60.00 as appeal bond, and delivered
the same to Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty.
Centeno upon his arrival.
On August 17, Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to
file the record on appeal which was filed only on August 20, 1955. Atty.
Centeno returned to Manila and went to his office at about 10 o'clock in the
morning of August 22. He cashed the check, Exhibit 1, with the Marvel
Building Corporation, and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to 􏰇le
the appeal bond. According to Atty. Centeno it was not accepted because
the period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that time
he came to know that the period of appeal had expired.
The appellant claims that the trial court erred in not ordering the appellee
to pay him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and
exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the appellee to pay the
appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in
not ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's
fee.
ISSUE:
HELD:
He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove
by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss
Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury are the proximate result
of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries, seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal
search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious
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prosecution, disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference with funerals,
violation of specific provisions of the Civil code on human relations, and
willful injury to property.
Where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being
transported by a common carrier the spouse, descendants and ascendants
of the deceased passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death.
When the claimant is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but
has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes
the recovery of temperate or moderate damages.
Exemplary or corrective damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right
and the Court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if the
defendants acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
2. Robes-Francisco Realty vs. CFI
FACTS:
Petitioner corporation questions the award for nominal damages of
P20,000.00 and attorney's fee of P5,000.00 which are allegedly excessive
and unjustified.
Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation agreed to sell to private
respondent Lolita Millan for and in consideration of the sum of P3,864.00,
payable in installments, a parcel of land situated in Barrio Camarin, Caloocan
City, known as Lot No. 20, Block No. 11 of its Franville Subdivision.
Millan complied with her obligation under the contract and paid the
installments stipulated therein. The parties executed a deed of absolute sale
of the aforementioned parcel of land. Notwithstanding the lapse of the
above-mentioned stipulated period of six (6) months, the corporation failed
to cause the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title over
the lot sold to Millan, hence, the latter filed on August 14, 1974 a complaint
for specific performance and damages against Robes-Francisco Realty &
Development Corporation.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Under Articles 2221 and 2222 of the New Civil Code, nominal damages are
not intended as indemnification for the loss suffered but for the vindication
or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where
some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show,
the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court. Nominal
damages are by their very nature small sums fixed by the court without
regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party. A nominal
damage is a substantial claim if based upon the violation of a legal right; in
such case the law presumes a damage, although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven; in truth, nominal damages are damages in name
only, and not in fact and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a wrong
inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. It
cannot co-exist with compensatory or exemplary damages.
The Circumstances of a particular case determine whether or not the
amount assessed as nominal damages is within the scope or intention of
Article 2221 of the Civil Code.
Bad faith is not to be presumed. Thus, the fact that the realty corporation
failed to convey a transfer certificate of title to the buyer because the
subdivision property was mortgaged does not itself show that there was bad
faith or fraud; especially where the vendor expected that arrangements
were possible from the mortgagee to make partial releases of the
subdivision lots from the overall real estate mortgage but the vendor did not
simply succeed in that regard.
The amount of P20,000 awarded as nominal damages against realty
corporation for failure to convey a transfer certificate of title to the buyer
who had fully paid the purchase price of the lot is excessive. Nor may such
award be considered in the nature of exemplary damages where the failure
to convey the transfer certificate of title was not attended by fraud or bad
faith, because in breach of a contract exemplary damages are awarded if the
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guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good only if the injured party has shown that he
is entitled to recover moral, temperate or compensatory damages.
3. People vs. Gopio
G.R. No. 133925. November 29, 2000
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC􏰇finding accused-appellant
Agustin Gopio guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P3,727.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00, as moral damages, and
to pay the costs of the suit.
At that time, the barangay was celebrating its fiesta. The victim stepped out
of their house to buy cooking oil from accused-appellant's store. However,
it was closed. As she was about to leave the store, accused-appellant called
her. When she came near him, he suddenly seized her and brought her
inside the house. There was nobody inside the house when the victim was
taken by accused-appellant to the bedroom. The victim resisted and
screamed but accused-appellant threatened to hurt her and her family.
Accused-appellant laid the victim on the bed in such a way that her feet
were dangling on the floor. Then, he removed her underwear, bent over the
victim, and started licking her vagina. Later on, accused-appellant removed
his briefs, knelt on the floor, and placed his penis in the victim's vagina. The
victim cried in pain as accused-appellant penetrated her. As the victim
would not stop crying, accused-appellant let her go.
The victim immediately went outside accused-appellant's house and rushed
home. On the way to her house, she felt intense pain in her vagina and
noticed that she was bleeding. As soon as she reached home, she changed
her clothes. She was confused and afraid her mother would get angry
because of what happened to her. When her mother saw her inside the
house and asked her if she was able to buy cooking oil, the victim told her
mother that the store was closed. So, she was again sent out to buy cooking
oil from another store.
The victim related that on two other occasions after the incident she was
again molested by accused-appellant. On one occasion, the victim stated
that she went to the house of her godsister, Rachel, to invite the latter to
play, but Rachel was not around. Inside the house were several men playing
tong-its. Among them was accused-appellant. When the victim was about
to leave, she saw Rachel's younger brother inside the bedroom crying, so
she went there and picked him up. To the victim's surprise, accused-
appellant went to the bedroom and closed the door behind him. The victim
tried to cry out for help but accused-appellant tightly covered her mouth
and ordered her to put the child down. When she did so, he lowered her
shorts and panty and started caressing her vagina.
After more or less one month had elapsed, accused-appellant once again
molested the victim when she went to her grandfather's abandoned house
to get the pail requested by her aunt. She did not know that accused-
appellant followed her to the house and she was too afraid to resist the
sexual advances by accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The award of damages by the trial court in favor of the victim should,
however, be modified. The award of actual damages, in the sum of
P3,727.00, must be deleted in the absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of
the Civil Code. To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there
must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount
thereof, such as receipts showing the expenses incurred on account of the
rape incident. In this case, only the laboratory fee issued by Our Lady of
Salambao Hospital in Bulacan amounting to P350.00 was duly receipted. The
rest of the documents, which the prosecution presented to prove the actual
expenses incurred by the victim, were merely a doctor's prescription and a
handwritten list of food expenses.
U]nder Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that the right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As has been held,
"whenever there has been a violation of an ascertained legal right, although
no actual damages resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal
damages is proper." In this case, the victim's family clearly incurred medical
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expenses due to the rape committed by accused-appellant. The victim
suffered from pains in her navel which required her physical examination.
An award of P2,000.00 as nominal damages is thus appropriate under the
circumstances.
4. Armovit vs. CA
G.R. No. 88561. April 20, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and
friends in the Philippines, so they purchased from private respondent,
(Northwest Airlines, Inc.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the U.S. to
Manila and back, plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the children
On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982,
petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private respondent at the
Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one (1)
hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled flight time
recited in their tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot
be accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was
already taking off and the 10:30 A.M. flight time entered in their plane
tickets was erroneous.
Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their
reservations through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally
presented the three (3) tickets at the private respondent's Roxas Boulevard
office. 2 The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was not
changed when re-confirmed.
Herein petitioner Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because
of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with his
patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and
serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the morning of January
18th when they were finally informed that seats will be available for them
on the flight that day.
Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated
demands of the petitioners for compensatory damages arising from the
aforesaid breach of their air- transport contracts, 4 petitioners were
compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
ISSUE:
HELD:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages. "Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have the right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages against the carrier." The gross negligence
committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with entries
as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and
the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were
bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that
private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages.
Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is
well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages
cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.
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4.TEMPERATE DAMAGES
Art. 2224 NCC. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can
not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225 NCC. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
1. Pleno vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 56505. May 9, 1988
FACTS:
Plaintiff commenced an action for damages against defendants Philippine
Paper Products, Inc., and Florante de Luna.
The Philippine Paper Products, Inc., is the owner of a delivery truck (Ford
Stake). Florante de Luna who, was in charge of and driving said delivery truck
(Ford Stake) on the right lane of the South Super Highway in Taguig, Rizal, in
a careless, reckless and imprudent manner, as a consequence of defendant
Philippine Paper Products, Inc., hit, bumped and sideswiped plaintiff's
Volkswagen Delivery Van as a result of the vehicular accident, plaintiff
suffered various serious injuries, was hospitalized, and because he suffered
injuries affecting his brain, he acted beyond normalcy at times, that as a
consequence he suffered actual and compensatory damages of
approximately P100,000.00; moral damages of P500,000.00 for suffering
from bodily pain, mental anguish, serious anxiety; for Florante de Luna's
wanton and brazen disregard of traffic laws and regulations aggravated by
his running away from the scene of the accident, without rendering aid to
the victim, plaintiff should be adjudged as exemplary or corrective damages
of P300,000.00 as an example to all, owners, operators and drivers of motor
vehicles and in the interest of public safety and welfare, as well as the sum
of P100,000.00 for the payment of attorney's fees.
The Court a quo rendered its decision sentencing jointly and severally
defendants to pay plaintiff (1) P48,244.08 actual damages: (2) temperate or
moderate damage of P200,000.00; (3) moral damages of P200,000.00; (4)
exemplary damages of P50,000.00; (5) attorney's fees of P30,000.00; and (6)
costs of suit.
.
A snub-nosed volkswagen kombi was cruising towards Manila along the
asphalt pavement of the service road of the South Super Highway. The
kombi had two passengers, Maximo Pleno who was at the wheel, and, a New
Zealander, James Arthur Longley, who was sitting beside Mr. Pleno on the
front seat. The volkswagen was suddenly and without warning hit on its left
rear corner by a red colored cargo truck. Due to the impact, the volkswagen
moved faster veering to the right and smashing unto the right rear portion
of a truck parked along the shoulder of the road in front of the National
Manpower Building. The parked truck was also moved forward when it was
hit on its back by the Volkswagen and the driver of the parked truck, Ruben
Rivera who was at that time standing in front of his parked truck urinating
was bumped by his own truck. Witness to all these was Diego Orca, a
gardener, who at such time, was watering his plants in front of the National
Manpower Building.
Having been hit from behind by the red colored cargo truck and having
smashed into the rear portion of the parked truck, the right front portion of
the volkswagen on the driver's side was reduced to a pulp. At impact, the
front door on the right side burst open and Longley, who was seated on that
side, was thrown out of the vehicle and landed on a ditch. Pleno, the driver
of the volkswagen was crushed in the driver's seat since the Kombi's front
portion offered no protection, being the snub-nosed type, with the motor
at the back. His legs were trapped in the wreckage. The red cargo truck
stopped for a while and then sped away. Ruben Rivera, the driver of the
parked truck, was brought by a passing jeepney to the hospital. Longley who
was thrown out of the volkswagen but was not seriously hurt, with the help
of a few persons nearby, extricated Pleno from the volkswagen after
pushing the truck away and thereafter took him to the Makati Medical
Center. Pleno suffered extensive injuries on his head and legs and affected
his eyesight and stayed in the hospital for almost five (5) months.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate court reduced the amount of
temperate and moral damages as well as the amount of attorney's fees on
the ground that the awards were "too high." The award of temperate
damages was reduced by the appellate court on the ground that the amount
of P200,000.00 is rather "too high" especially considering the fact that the
driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-appellant Corporation is only
subsidiarily liable thereof. The award was reduced to P100,000.00.
The petitioner now assails the reduction of the damages as without
justification. It specifically mentions the findings of the trial court which
were affirmed by the appellate court regarding the gravity of the injuries
suffered by the petitioner, the effect of the injuries upon him as a person,
and his business as well as his standing in society. And yet, it reduced the
amount of damages.
As stated earlier, the employer's liability in quasi-delict is primary and
solidary. The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees lies upon the discretion of the court based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The court's discretion is, of course, subject to
the condition that the award for damages is not excessive under the
attendant facts and circumstance of the case.
Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory
damages. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be
awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that: ". . . There are cases
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot
be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss.
For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a
business firm is often hard to show certainty in terms of money. Should
damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to
calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff
should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act."
2. People vs. Singh
G.R. No. 129782. June 29, 2001
FACTS:
Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all surnamed Singh, were convicted
of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh,
and Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682 for stabbing Dilbag Singh
Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No.
8682, recounts that on November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning
while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of the Mendiola Apartment.
Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip — all
surnamed Singh- Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived,
shouting foul remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder
Singh to come out of the apartment.
When Surinder Singh came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab
him but Surinder Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his
companions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him. Dalvir Singh then
stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, and
causing him to fall on the ground. Dial Singh remarked that Surinder Singh
failed to give money and if others will likewise refuse, the same fate will
befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to get up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and
Jarnail Singh started hitting him with lead pipes all over his body, while
Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder. Amarjit Singh,
who was holding a gun, warned everyone not to help Surinder Singh or else
he will shoot. Thereat, when all these things were going on, private
complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed
him on the left side of his back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a
bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the
ten (10) accused Indians left.
Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought to the
Perpetual Help Hospital, Biñan, Laguna, by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh
Gill, Balwinder Singh Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment. There, Surinder
Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE:
HELD:
In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the trial court awarded
private complainant Dilbag Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representing his
hospitalization and medical expenses, and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. For
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his hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to support
said claim amounted only to P370.50. Hence, private complainant Dilbag
Singh is entitled only to the said amount. The award of attorney's fees is
hereby deleted.
Nonetheless, private complainant is entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for the suffering he endured from appellants'
felonious acts.
The best evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the
Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Absent such proof, bare allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering
that the definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact of
loss has been established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh
temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00.
HELD:
The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity.
However, the award of actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was
based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the victim. The Court
can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts.
In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu
of actual damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code
may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim's family suffered
some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty. We find the award of P15,000.00 as temperate damages
reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of any
evidence to support its award.

3. People vs. Plazo

G.R. No. 120547. January 29, 2001
FACTS:
Leonor Fabula went out of her house to buy sugar at a nearby store. When
she reached the store, she saw appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and
banging his head on the post of the store, while asking him why he told the
police about his brother and the location of appellant's house. When Leonor
sought to intervene, appellant got angry at her. She became afraid and
asked for help but nobody went near them. Romeo freed himself from the
hold of appellant and ran away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo.
Leonor shouted at appellant to stop but the latter did not heed her pleas

Appellant caught up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causing
Romeo to fall on the ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the
upper and lower chest area.

When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the scene of
the crime, they saw the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded
on his chest and the detached handle of the bolo on the ground near his
body. Appellant was charged with the crime of murder

ISSUE:
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5. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Art. 2226 NCC. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties
to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227 NCC. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or
a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Art. 2228 NCC. When the breach of the contract committed by the
defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon
the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of
damages, and not the stipulation.
6. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Art. 2229 NCC. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230 NCC. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Art. 2231 NCC. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Art. 2232 NCC. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Art. 2233 NCC. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.
Art. 2234 NCC. While the amount of the exemplary damages need
not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon,
although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not
for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Art. 2235 NCC. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are
renounced in advance shall be null and void.
1. PNB vs. CA
G.R. No. 108630. April 2, 1996
FACTS:
Loreto Tan (Tan) is the owner of a parcel of land abutting the national
highway in Mandalagan, Bacolod City. Expropriation proceedings were
instituted by the government against private respondent Tan and other
property owners before the then CFI, docketed as Civil Case No. 12924.
Tan filed a motion requesting issuance of an order for the release to him of
the expropriation price of P32,480.00. Petitioner PNB (Bacolod Branch) was
required by the trial court to release to Tan the said amount.
Petitioner, through its Assistant Branch Manager Juan Tagamolila, issued a
manager's check and delivered the same to one Sonia Gonzaga without
Tan's knowledge, consent or authority. Sonia Gonzaga deposited it in her
account with Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) and later on withdrew the
said amount.
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Private respondent Tan subsequently demanded payment but the same was
refused on the ground that petitioner had already paid and delivered the
amount to Sonia Gonzaga on the strength of SPA allegedly executed in her
favor by Tan.
Tan executed an affidavit before petitioner's lawyer, Alejandro S. Somo,
stating that: 1) he had never executed any Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Sonia S. Gonzaga; 2) he had never authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive
the sum of P32,480.00 from petitioner;
ISSUE: Whether or not the SPA ever existed?
HELD:
Regarding the award of attorney's fees, we hold that private respondent Tan
is entitled to the same. Art. 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney's fees to
be awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or
omission of the party from whom it is sought.
Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if a
party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. However, they cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court
has yet to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Jurisprudence has set down the requirements for exemplary damages to be
awarded: 1. they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has
been established; 2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant; 3. the act must be accompanied by bad
faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
As for the award of exemplary damages, we agree with the appellate court
that the same should be deleted. In the case at bench, while there is a clear
breach of petitioner's obligation to pay private respondents, there is no
evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive
manner. Furthermore, there is no award of compensatory damages which
is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be awarded. Therefore, the
award by the trial court of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages is baseless.
2. Del Rosario vs. CA
G.R. No. 118325. January 29, 1997
FACTS:
The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed on November 21, 1990, charged MFC with
violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, An Act to Penalize Fraudulent
Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc.:
Alleges that in selling to the public roof materials known 'Banawe' shingles
(MFC) made representations on the durability of the product and sturdiness
of its installation and that these representation characterizing the shingles
as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG " and that the BANAWE METAL TILE
structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the
strong hook action on its overlaps"— prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the
Banawe shingles and have them installed at their residence; but (b)arely
two (2) months after completion of the installation, portions of the roof
were blown away by strong wind brought about by typhoon "Ruping."
After due proceedings, the DTI rendered judgment declaring that MCF had
indeed misrepresented its product. MFC was accordingly sentenced to pay
an "administrative fine of P10,000.00" (within ten [10] days from finality of
the decision), otherwise its "business name and registration . . . would be
deemed suspended and its establishment closed until the fine was fully
paid."
The decision of the DTI was, on appeal, affirmed in toto by the Office of the
President; and the latter judgment was in turn affirmed by this Court on with
a modification solely as to the fine, which was reduced to P5,000.00.
It appears that MFC replaced and repaired the roof free of charge, evidently
acknowledging that the damage was covered by one-year warranty on the
materials and the installation. MFC however declined to concede liability for
the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to have been caused
to the interior of their home. This prompted the latter to commence a civil
action against MFC the spouses sought to recover from MFC damages
resulting from the events just narrated, contending that aside from the
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destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical
wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and
furniture. The plaintiff spouses reckoned their actual damages at
P1,008,003.00 — "representing the estimated cost of the repair, restoration
and/or replacement damaged areas and items in plaintiffs' house and the
cost of the inspection conducted by the independent adjuster (engaged by
them), with legal interests thereon from 21 February 1990 when defendant
(MFL) received the formal demand from plaintiffs until fully paid." They also
prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the sum of P3,000,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and attorney's fees in
the sum of P1,000,000.00.
MFC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. It stated
that it had no contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the
contract for the purchase and installation of the roofing, upon which the
latter's claims were based, was actually entered into between it and
another person, Jesus M. Puno.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Turning now to the matter of damages, it is the Del Rosarios' contention that
the pecuniary detriment to their home amounted to P1,008,003.00,
covering not only the destruction of the roof, but also substantial harm to
the electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wallpaper, wood parquet
flooring and furniture. They rely on the Report of the Esteban Adjusters and
Valuers, Inc, to which the Regional Trial Court accorded full credit. But that
report contains no statement whatever of the amount of the damage.
Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the representative of the Esteban
Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to
determine the cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it. A similar
aridity as to the amount of the damage, unfortunately characterizes the
testimony of Atty. Virgilio Del Rosario and the rest of the spouses' proofs.
There is therefore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an award of
actual damages. The Trial Court's grant thereof must be struck down.
Lufthansa German Airlines vs. CA, et al. promulgated on April 21, 1995, inter
alia ruled that: "Actual or Compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but
must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.
hat MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express
warranties made to the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights
of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately
demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory
evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the
Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a
period of about a month, they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness,
fear, embarrassment and anger. "As declared by this Court in Makabili v.
Court of Appeals, among other precedents: It is essential . . . in the award of
damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial
the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection
to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of
pecuniary estimation are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974]) and
are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint (San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968]). As reflected in the records of
the case, the Court of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial
court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental
sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its obligation
to petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent acted
in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay
the basis and justification for this Court to award petitioners moral and
exemplary damages."
This Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are
properly flexigible of MFC, "Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded."
"Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
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another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb accordingly reduces the moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00,
socially deleterious actions." However, the same statutory and and the exemplary damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00.
jurisprudential standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts
of moral and exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. There is, to be Like the adjudication of actual or compensatory damages, the award of
sure, no hard and fast rule for determining what would be a fair amount of attorney's fees must be deleted. The matter was dealt with only in the
moral (or exemplary) damages, each case having to be governed by its dispositive portion of the Trial Court's decision. Since the judgment does not
attendant particulars. Generally, the amount of moral damages should be say why attorney's fees are awarded, there is no basis for such award which
commensurate with the actual loss or injury suffered. In the case of PNB v. should consequently be removed. So did this Court rule, for instance, in
C.A just cited, this Court quoted with approval the following observation Scott Consultants and Resource Development Corp., Inc. vs. CA, et al.: "It is
from RCPI v. Rodriguez, viz.: ". . . Nevertheless, we find the award of settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
P100,000.00 as moral damages in favor of respondent Rodriguez excessive rule and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins. The
and unconscionable. In the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil
System, Inc., (148 SCRA 440 [1987]) we said: '. . . [I]t is undisputed that the Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be
trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly
(Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion
modify or change the amount awarded when they are palpably and thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney's fees.
scandalously excessive' so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner
Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G.[4] 7347, 7358; Saddie v. Bacharach Motors Co.,
57 O.G. [4] 636 and Adone v. Bacharach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in
more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
far too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved
party this Court ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable
amounts . . ." "In other words, the moral damages awarded must be
commensurate with the loss or injury suffered." In the same case (PNB v.
CA), this Court found the amount of exemplary damages required to be paid
(P1,000,000.00) "too excessive" and reduced it to an "equitable
level''(P25,000.00) . . . (T)he award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages is
also far too excessive and should likewise be reduced to an equitable level.
Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions." In another case involving strikingly analogous
facts decided in 1994, Geraldez vs. C.A., where no actual damages were
adjudicated but moral and exemplary damages in similar amounts
(P500,000.00 and P300,000.00, respectively) were awarded by the Trial
Court, as in this case, and of exemplary damages to P50,000.00. The Court
sees no reason to adopt a different treatment in the case at bar, and

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