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There being no showing that any substantial right of the accused would have been unduly prejudiced by

the postponement, respondent Judge should have granted the motion to afford the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case. As it is, his precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to denying
the State due process. In People vs. Navarro 20 this Court held that:

A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution
for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to
reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to
prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice,
especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby.

The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement of scheduled hearings of
the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so
as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. 21 As held in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:

. . . (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition
of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. 22

he records do not disclose that at any time the petitioners themselves moved for the setting of the case
for trial in assertion of such right. This they could not have done, with their attack against the validity and
constitutionality of the existence of the Commission itself. Hence, if there has been any delay in the filing
of the action, or in the trial of the case itself, petitioners are not entirely without blame.

6. In the cases in which denial of the right to speedy trial resulted in the dismissal of the case, the
prosecution, after arraignment and in the trial set for the case, failed to enter into trial or otherwise to
present its evidence without valid excuse, and instead asked for postponement repeatedly. Trial could
not, therefore, proceed notwithstanding the insistence of the accused or the Court. This could give rise to
the reasonable presumption that the prosecution counts with no evidence to support conviction. Dismissal
of the case must reasonably follow if the accused's right to speedy trial is not to be violated. There is,
however, no such presumption nor violation in the instant case.

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xcessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the
Constitution and by various legislations inutile.15G.R. No. 181851 March 9, 2010

CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, Petitioner,


vs.
THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
TRIBUNAL (ADT) OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B. DOCENA; EDEN PERDIDO;
ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS OF THE
ADT; and IMELDA O. ABUTAL,

citing: Matias v. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, 3 August 1998,


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The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

G.R. No. 139456 July 7, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
ADONES ABATAYO
Citing Vertudes v. Buenaflor, petitioners also cry denial of due process when they were allegedly
denied the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by RCBC. It is true that in Vertudes,
we stated: "The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process."68

It is, however, equally true that:

[T]he right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has
had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.69
(Emphasis supplied.)

G.R. No. 182248 December 18, 2008

EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION,1 GEORGE L. GO, PATRICK D. GO,


GENEVIEVE W.J. GO, FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, OSCAR P. LOPEZ-
DEE, RENE J. BUENAVENTURA, GLORIA L. TAN-CLIMACO, ROGELIO S. CHUA,
FEDERICO C. PASCUAL, LEOPOLDO S. VEROY, WILFRIDO V. VERGARA,
EDILBERTO V. JAVIER, ANTHONY F. CONWAY, ROMULAD U. DY TANG,
WALTER C. WESSMER, and ANTONIO N. COTOCO, petitioners,
vs.
RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Citing: G.R. No. 153166, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 226.

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The proceedings in the trial court in this civil case were adversarial in nature insofar as the parties, in the
process of attaining justice, were made to advocate their respective positions in order to ascertain the
truth.136 The truth-seeking function of the judicial system is best served by giving an opportunity to all
parties to fully present their case, subject to procedural and evidentiary rules. Absent any blatant
neglect or willful delay, both parties should be afforded equal latitude in presenting the evidence and
the testimonies of their witnesses in favor of their respective positions, as well as in testing the
credibility and the veracity of the opposing party’s claims through cross-examination.

G.R. No. 149193 April 4, 2011

RICARDO B. BANGAYAN, Petitioner,


vs.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND PHILIP SARIA

"While our litigation is adversarial in nature, its purpose is always to ascertain the truth for justice is not
justice unless predicated on truth." (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117624, 04 December 1997, 282
SCRA 387)

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