PROJECT WORK

OF

LABOUR LAW 2

ON CASE LAWS OF PAYEMENT OFWAGES ACT

SUBMITTED BY:

SAIBY KHAN

R. No: GU15R0073

7TH SEMESTER

GLOCAL LAW SCHOOL

CASE 1 :AmbikaNathvsChhediNath on 10 March, 1943

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This is an application in revision under Section 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, by the
defendant against whom a decree has been given for Rs. 77 odd on foot of a pronote dated
17th June 1935 for Rs. 42. The rate of interest given in the pro-note is Rs. 2 per cent., per
mensem but the plaintiff's claim was based on a reduced rate of Re. 1-4-0 per cent., per
mensem. The defendant took a number of pleas in regard to the execution of the pronote and
he further pleaded that he was a workman and therefore entitled to the benefits of Section 9,
U. P. Debt Redemption Act. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court found that the
pronote was duly executed by the defendant and upon the plea that the defendant was a
workman as contemplated by Section 2, Clause (20)(a), Debt Redemption Act, he held in the
following terms: "I do not think that a compositor working in a press would be a workman in
the city of Allahabad." Learned Counsel for the applicant has pointed out that in Clause
(20)(a), Debt Redemption Act, workman is defined as a person who earned wages within the
meaning of Sub-section (6) of Section 2, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, within the twelve
months preceding the first day of June 1940, which did not exceed Rs. 600 in the said twelve
months and did not exceed Rs. 60 in any such months.

The Payment of Wages Act, (Indian Act, 4 of 1936), Section 1(4) applies in the first instance
to the payment of wages to persons employed in any factory, etc., etc. Clause (5) of the same
Act provides that:

The Local Government may, after giving three months' notice of its intention of so doing by
notification in the local official Gazette, extend the provisions of the Act or any of them to
the payment of wages to any class of persons employed in any industrial establishment or in
any class or group of industrial establishments.

It appears that by industries Department Notification No. 954/XVIII-889, dated 24th March
1939, the United Provinces Government extended the provisions of the Payment of Wages
Act to all printing presses in the United Provinces wherein or within the precincts of which
ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve
months. The effect of this notification is that a compositor working in a press in Allahabad is
quite evidently a 'potential' workman, provided that he would have also to prove that the
press in which he was working was one to which this notification would have been applicable
and he could further prove that he had earned wages as defined in Sub-section (6) of Section
2, Payment of Wages Act, within the limits prescribed by Clause (20)(a) of Section 2, Debt
Redemption Act. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court was clearly wrong in his very
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general statement that a compositor working in a press in the city of Allahabad could not be a
workman. Be that as it may, it is equally clear upon the record that the defendant-applicant
did not discharge the burden of proof which lay upon him to establish those other facts upon
the proof of which only he could have been held to be a workman and the learned Judge
rightly declined to hold that he was a person who could obtain the benefit of the provisions of
the Debt Redemption Act. It follow's that, subject to the remarks which at the request of
counsel I have made above with the idea of clarifying the situation, there is no force in the
present application which therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.

Before the above judgment was signed, learned Counsel asked me to consider a further
argument. His argument is that the words "who earned wages 'within the meaning of Sub-
section (6) of Section 2, Payment of Wages Act" which find a place in Clause (20)(a)
of Section 2, U.P. Debt Redemption Act, mean nothing more than "who earned wages 'as
defined in' Sub-section (6) of Section 2, Payment of Wages Act, 1936." In my judgment, if
the United Provinces Legislature had intended the meaning suggested, there is no reason why
they should not have used the words "as defined in" instead of the words "within the meaning
of." The words actually used seem to me to connote much more than the proposed alternative
and to carry the meaning that the wages to which reference is made in this clause are wages
of persons who come within the scope of the Payment of Wages Act. I would, however, note
that in any ease so far as this present case is concerned, the question is really academic
because whichever meaning be taken as the correct meaning of this clause the burden of
proof undoubtedly lay upon the defendant to establish that the wages which he had earned
within the twelve months preceding the first day of June 1940, did not exceed Rs. 600 in the
said twelve months and did not exceed Rs. 60 in any such months. The only evidence given
by the defendant with the idea of bringing himself within the scope of the definition was the
statement "I am a compositor." This statement is clearly not sufficient to discharge the burden
of proof which lay upon the defendant in order to attract to himself the benefit of this Act.

CASE 2 :S. Jaipal Singh Others v. Authority Under Payment Of Wages Act Others

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The applicants' case before the Authority was that they were appointed during the period
1985 to 1999 on different dates but the respondents have not paid them their due wages as
admissible to them under thePayment Wages Act. The non-applicants (petitioner herein)
resisted the claim of the applicants on various grounds interalia that the application was not
maintainable as the non-applicants were not empowered to appoint any person on temporary
or regular permanent basis and that the applicants have never served the respondents during
the period as alleged by them. They further stated that the names of the applicants did not
figure in the records of the Department in the statement of daily wagers maintained by the
Department.
Six issues were framed by the Authority in the application which are as under-
1. "Whether the applicant is maintainable in the present form?
2. Whether the application is time barred?
3. Whether the applicants have been employed by Rural Dev. Deptt.?
4. Whether the applicants have received any kind of wages?
5. Whether the applicants have been properly appointed?
6. Whether the documents filed by the applicants are genuine?"
On taking evidence of the applicants the Authority came to the conclusion that the applicants
before it were duly appointed as daily wagers and were entitled to the wages under the Act.
The Authority further found that the petitioners have not paid due wages to the respondents to
the extent shown by the Authority in its order. The Authority allowed the application and
directed as under:-
In the circumstances of the case no order to compensation under Section 15(3) of Payment of
Wages Act."
The present petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking quashment of the said award
passed by the Authority. It is contended that the Authority has acted without jurisdiction, it
has not properly considered the matter and has not gone into actual controversy which arose
in the matter. The controversy, according to the petitioners, is that whether the applicants
before the Authority were validly appointed daily wagers or not. Since the contention
regarding their engagement as daily wagers has specifically been denied by the non-
applicants in their reply to the application before the Authority, the Authority, according to
the petitioners, was required to return a proper finding on this issue. The Authority, as stated
by the petitioners, has taken into consideration the photocopies of the engagement orders and
has accepted claim of the applicants on the basis of fake and forged documents.

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Mr. Jalali, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary plea regarding
maintainability of the present petition, as according to him, alternate and efficacious remedy
is available to the petitioners by way of appeal against the order passed by the Authority but
instead of availing such remedy the petitioners have invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court
which is not permissible in the facts and the circumstances of the case.
Mr. Jalali has cited the following authorities in support of his contention i.e, B.D.O Khag v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act &ors., 2007 SLJ 256 , District Rural Dev. Agency v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act 2008 SLJ 61 and Director Horticulture &anr. v.
Assistant Labour Commissioner &ors . 2009 SLJ 79 . He has also relied upon a Division
Bench judgment of this Court passed in LPA No. 173/2007 titled Western Bus Service v.
Assistant Labour Commissioner &ors .decided on 16.10.2007. All these authorities lay down
that a writ would not lie where an efficacious remedy is available to the party.
Mr. Hilal Akbar Lone, learned counsel for the petitioners has resisted the contentions of Mr.
Jalali on the ground that the order of the Authority being without jurisdiction, there is no bar
to file a writ petition in view of the settled law as laid down by the Supreme Court and this
Court.
On consideration of the main matter, I find due force in the pleas raised in the present
petition. 1 have gone through the record which was summoned from the concerned Authority.
As would appear from the Order impugned, one of the issues for consideration before the
Authority was whether the applicants (respondents herein) were properly appointed. A
specific plea was raised by the petitioners before the Authority that the engagement orders
relied upon by the respondents were not genuine one and that they had not been engaged at
all. It w as in the background of these objections that issue no.5 was framed in the case. The
Authority has recorded evidence on the issue and returned a finding in favour of the
respondents. The issues regarding payment of wages and relief sought by the respondents for
the same was therefore, dependant on the findings on issue no.5. The main dispute thus is
regarding genuineness and validity of the appointment of the respondents and payment of
wages is incidental thereto. Under theprovisions of the Payment of Wages Act, the Authority
can only entertain the application for dealing with in two classes of cases, namely, of
deductions and fine not authorised under section 7 to 13 and of delay in payment of wages
beyond the wage periods fixed under Section 4 and the time of payment laid down in Section.
The finding recorded by the Authority on validity of the appointments of the respondents is
therefore, without jurisdiction. Since the Authority has acted without jurisdiction while
dealing with issue no.5 and all other issues particularly the issue regarding payment of wages
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was dependant on issue no.5,1 find the order impugned cannot stand. The petition is
therefore, allowed. The order passed by the Authority is set aside.
CASE3 :French Motor Car Co. Ltd. Workers ... vs French Motor Car Co.
Ltd. on 6 October, 1988

The present petitioner is a Workers' Union and represents the workmen of M/s. French Motor
Car Company Limited, Dispur, Guwahati. The petitioner tiled a petition before the learned
Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Guwahati, an authority appointed under
the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, for short the Act, on behalf of 29 workmen claiming pay
from 13th May, 1974 to 31st May, 1975 and also variable D.A.for the year 1973 payable in
1974. The petition was allowed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner and an
appeal as provided under the Act was filed before the learned District Judge. Guwahati who
is an appellate authority under the Act. The appeal was allowed by the learned District Judge
and hence the present application. Being conscious of the legal position that power of this
Revisional Court is limited as this Court can only examine whether there was any
jurisdictional error, Mr. Barua, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged only one point
that the appellate judgment is liable to be quashed as it is perverse and based on wrong
interpretation of the law. Mr. Phukan, learned counsel for the respondent, has submitted that
there is no jurisdictional error, and as such, the judgment of the appellate Court is not liable
to be disturbed. It was faintly urged that the appellate Court constituted under Section 17 of
the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court as
the said appellate Court is a Court constituted under the Special Act. A Division Bench of
this Court in Sailendra Kumar Dutta v. General Manager, Gauhati Refinery, 1983 Lab IC 383
set aside the order of the District Judge passed under Section 17(1-A) of the Payment of
Wages Act by exercising powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though
the question of exercising revisional power by the High Court over the appellate Court under
the Payment of Wages Act did not come up specifically before the said Division Bench but
from the final order passed by the Court it follows that the said appellate Court is amenable to
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. According to Section 17 of the Payment of Wages
Act, Small Cause Court in a Presidency Town, and elsewhere the District Court, are the
appellate Authority. Both the Courts are subordinate to the High Court, and as such, I am of
the firm opinion that High Court by exercising revisional powers under Section 115, C.P.C.
can correct any error of jurisdiction committed by the said appellate Court.

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There is no dispute that on 13th, 14th and 15th May, 1974 the employees, that is the members
of the present petitioner adopted the principle of "go slow" and also resorted to strike. In
other words, they did not work and on the principle of "no work, no pay", the management
was justified in deducting their pay for the aforesaid period of three days. Mr. Barua has
urged that as the "go slow" principle or the strike was not illegal, the employees are entitled
to get their wages for the said period. This contention of Mr. Barua is not acceptable,
inasmuch as, the Court constituted under the Payment of Wages Act is not competent to
examine whether the 'go slow' policy or the strike was illegal or not. On the other hand, their
wages can be deducted as they were absent from duty in view of the provisions contained in
Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of S.7 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the finding
of the learned lower Court on this count is legal and proper.

The petitioners are claiming variable D.A. for the year 1973 payable in April, 1974. From the
judgment of the authority, namely, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, I find that variable
D.A. was payable after the end of the year. From the judgment of both the Courts it is clear
that there was a dispute regarding payment of such variable D.A. as the alleged agreement
has been denied by the management. That apart this matter was also referred to conciliation
proceeding and the management ultimately did not appear before the said proceeding. The
Wages Court is not at all competent to determine whether variable D.A. under the agreement
is payable to any workman, this being a subject-matter for the Court constituted
under IndustriaL Disputes Act. In Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal
Mehta (1969-I-LJ-762) the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction of the Wage Court is to
entertain application only in two items of cases, namely, of deductions and fines not
authorised under Sections 7 to 32 and of delay in payment of wages beyond the wage periods
fixed under Section 4 and the time of payment laid down in Section 5. The question whether
the employees are entitled to get variable D.A or not cannot be treated as deductions, and as
such, the Wage Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this claim. So the finding of the learned
lower appellate Court does not suffer from any infirmity.

Now let me consider non-payment of wages for 16 days. The following facts are not
disputed: The workmen reported for duty but they were asked to execute a guarentee bond
before they could be allowed to resume their duties by the management. In the guarantee
bond it was stated that after resumption of duty the employees would not resort to strike of
any sort. On the face of it asking for such an undertaking before allowing any employee to

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resume his work is clearly an unfair labour practice. So the employees were justified in
refusing to give this undertaking. An employer can deduct the wages under section 7(2)(b) of
the Act for absence from duty. Absence from duty by an employee must be of his own
volition and it cannot cover his absence when he is forced by circumstances created by the
employer from carrying out his duty. In the case in hand as the absence of the employees was
not voluntary, inasmuch as they were not allowed to resume their work without signing the
guarantee bond, no deduction can be made under the Act.

The learned District Judge while considering this question has taken note of extraneous
mailer not relevant for the present issue. Learned District Judge has observed, "Even if such
an undertaking is given that will be against the statute and in this sense such undertaking also
cannot help the employer to avoid strike. 1 mink the Union of the workmen was quite
enlightened to such things and under no circumstances such guarantee bond could be a clog
against the resuming of the duties by the workmen". In my opinion, this is not at all relevant
as the employer refused to allow the workmen to resume their duties. I, therefore, hold that
the present workmen numbering 29 shall be entitled to pay for 16 (sixteen) days and
accordingly the order of the learned District Judge stands modified.

In the result. I hold that the present petition is liable to be allowed to the extent the 29
workmen belonging to the petitioners' Union shall be entitled (to) gel wages for 16 (sixteen)
days. The petition is partly allowed.