US vs.

Jesus Castaneda (2012)

Facts: Appellant Jorge de Jesus-Casteneda appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine. The evidence at trial showed that Appellant drove a car, for a
fee, to an undercover warehouse and delivered a bag containing ten pounds of methamphetamine from
that car to the warehouse, where undercover agents were conducting a drug-weapons deal with various
drug trafficking suspects. Before the confidential informant (“CI”) testified at trial on the government’s
behalf, the government asked the court if the CI could wear a wig, sunglasses, and mustache during his
testimony to “help disguise some of his features” due to the “inherent dangers involved in this particular
case.” The government said the CI was involved in investigations with the “dangerous” Sinaloa Cartel,
and that a disguise would “accommodate the public nature of this courtroom and yet hopefully protect
[his] identity.” Defense counsel objected, contending the CI’s sunglasses might conceal facial
expressions going towards his credibility, and suggesting the court instead “mak[e] sure he comes in
through a secure location, secure door, and seal the courtroom.” Appellant contends this disguise
violated the Confrontation Clause and denied him due process.(APPELLANT ALREADY MET THE WITNESS
BEFORE DURING THE OPERATION)

Ruling: The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” There is no Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court authority addressing whether a
witness’s testimony in disguise violates the Confrontation Clause. However, we are assisted by the rule
various state courts have derived from Supreme Court precedent which addresses the constitutionality
of analogous arrangements which preclude the normal face-to-face confrontation that occurs when a
witness testifies in the unobstructed view of the defendant. Applying that rule here, the CI’s disguise in
the form of a wig and mustache was necessary to further an important state interest, namely a witness’s
safety. The government offered reasons for protecting the CI’s identity, given his continuing
involvement in Sinaloa Cartel drug investigations as an undercover agent. Second, the reliability of the
CI’s testimony was otherwise assured, because (1) he was physically present in the courtroom, (2) he
testified under oath, thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and the possibility of
penalty for perjury, (3) he was subject to cross-examination while Appellant could see him, (4) despite
his disguise, the jury was able to hear his 5 voice, see his entire face including his eyes and facial
reactions to questions, and observe his body language. These are all key elements of one’s demeanor
that shed light on credibility. Thus, we hold that in this case, the disguise in 6 the form of a wig and
mustache did not violate the Confrontation Clause.7

Romero vs. State

Facts: Appellant was indicted for aggravated assault. On the morning of trial, Cesar Hiran Vasquez, one
of the State’s key witnesses arrived at the courthouse but refuse to enter the courtroom to testify.
Vasquez, who had been subpoenaed by the State, notified the State that he would rather go to jail than
testify in this case because of his fear to the appellant. Vasquez entered the courtroom wearing dark
sunglasses, a baseball cap pulled down over his forehead, and a long-sleeved jacket with his collar
turned up and fastened so as to obscure Vasquez’s mouth, jaw, and the lower half of his nose. The net
effect and apparent purpose of Vasquez’ disguise was to hide almost all of his face from view. Appellant
objected to the disguise on the basis of his right to confrontation and his right to a fair trial. (APPELLANT
KNOWS THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE WITNESS)

Ruling: An encroachment upon face to face confrontation is permitted only when necessary to further
an important public interest and when the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. Sunglasses
only minimally impair a jury’s ability to assess credibility and that the testimony of the witness was
cumulative. An important interest is implicated in this case. On this record, the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that Vasquez’s disguise was necessary to further the important state interest in
protecting the physical well being of the witness who have a well-founded fear of retaliation on the part
of the defendant. In the absence of face to face confrontation, a defendant’s right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied if (1) denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an
important state interest and the (2) reliability of the testimony is assured. The reliability of Vasquez’s
testimony was otherwise assured because (1) both parties were aware of his name and residence
address; (2) he testified in the courtroom and under oath, thus impressing him with the seriousness of
the matter and the possibility of the penalty of perjury; (3) he was able to see appellant’s face in the
courtroom, thus reducing the risk that he would wrongfully implicate an innocent person; (4) he was
subject to cross-examination; (5) the jury was able to hear his voice and observe his over all demeanor.

Palermo vs. United States (1969)

Facts: Defendants were indicted for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by interfering with commerce
by extorting money from a builder and in so doing, interfering with interstate shipments of construction
materials. The jury found all defendants guilty and from these convictions they appeal. Riley mgt
company was building various apartment building complexes. Melrose Mark plumbing was a
subcontractor on Riley’s first construction project. Nick Palermo, defendant, and the owner of Melrose
Park plumbing wanted to be sure that Riley would use his company on all of Riley’s building projects.
Paermo and Joe Shine conspired together with others to force Riley into using Melrose Park Plumbing
as a subcontractor and at the same time having Riley pay them extra money for their work. In essence,
Joe Shine and Palermo and others agreed to obtain as much money as possible from Riley by
threatening him with work stoppages and physical violence.

Ruling: The decision to disclose a witness’ address and place of employment cannot be made in a
vacuum. This court is not unaware of the problem that the government has in obtaining witnesses in
cases where a witness’s life may be in jeopardy if he testifies. This court agrees with Justice White that
where there is a threat to the life of the witness, the right of the defendant to have the witness’ true
name, and address and place of employment is not absolute. Here, the trial judge having been
requested to order riley to disclose his address and present employment, refused to order him to
answer. There was an adequate showing of the threat to life of Riley.