II.

THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from
Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it.
A. ELEMENTS ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
BARREDO V GARCIA
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
not reversed
FACTS
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the
Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
employed by Fausto Barredo
subsistence from his father, was already legally married
- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on
HELD
collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro
1. NO
Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil
instant action against him.
action is reserved
-Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal— of fault or
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of
negligence as a source of obligation):
Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed
action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be
Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla
also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
and speeding
employee who was being sued."
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing
negligent acts or omissions punishable by law
the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
- Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot
subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
be held responsible
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent
ISSUE
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code.
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or
making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
employer of Fontanilla
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
HELD
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
YES
case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under
this civil liability arising from his crime.”
the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties
violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed
aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is
by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new
good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the
code provides:
Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer
"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front
sentence.
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
Obiter
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article
1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest
2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.
of indemnification merely repairs the damage
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if
aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
negligence intervenes
distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility
'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of
Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura,
rules of traffic when nobody is hurt
an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
of evidence
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
- Presumptions:
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in
double recovery,"
supervision or both
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted
acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that
- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
of pater familias
observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary
- motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil
ELCANO V HILL
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
77 SCRA 98
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
BARREDO; May 26, 1977
3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more
FACTS
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was
harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article
criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro),
2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
and was acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
2. YES (but…)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.)
- While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it
is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at
the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which
is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons.
- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or
be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions
or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action.
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979
FACTS
- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito.
- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo
Hilot arising from the same accident.
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents
moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the
criminal suit.
- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner’s MFR having been denied, he elevated the matter on
Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition.
Plaintiff’s claims:
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the
jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision.
- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision
- There was a direct causal connection between the damages he
suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Respondents’ Comments:
- They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.
ISSUE
WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action
HELD
YES
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for
in Art 2177 of the Civil Code.
- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases prvided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
- Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The
concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil
Code, is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property. It makes no distinction between
“damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to property”
on the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the
“harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done. And with respect
to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also to
property injuries.
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.
BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993
FACTS
- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married.
**MG’s allegations in the complaint:
- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral character and
respected reputation in her community.
- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an
exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.
- That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. MG accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married. They later
agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had
visited MG’s parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baksh
later forced MG to live with him. A week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her
and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day
before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for payment for
damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus additional costs.
- Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only the personal
circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the
allegations. He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed
to be married; neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her
to live in his apt.; did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming
to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and
passport. He also prayed for 25,000 as moral damages plus misc.
expenses.
- The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral damages and
3,000 pesos atty’s. fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed
this decision to respondent CA, contending that the trial court erred in
not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in
ordering him to pay moral damages, atty’s fees, etc.
- Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto
the trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for
certiorari, raising the single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case.
ISSUE
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of
moral seduction, Art. 21 may be applied.
Reasoning
- Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant
to Art.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
- In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession
of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC because the
private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the
seduction.
- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity
to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless
the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case. Petitioner has
miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts
had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the
result of the case.
**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on
the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
“The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise
to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men...”
- This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
“But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in
the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
“Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”
“An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A'
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above 18 yrs of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has
been committed, and although the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved,
would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes.”
- Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts
or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept.
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art.2176 CC. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Art.21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on
civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts.
DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED
DULAY VS CA
243 SCRA 220
GARCIA V FLORIDO
52 SCRA 420
ANTONIO; AUGUST 31, 1973
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without
prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the
defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court
dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the
Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L.
Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and
boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and
operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent,
Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga
City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government
hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.
- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger
bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a
result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical
injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were
at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip,
in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia,
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971
with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an
action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the
passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary
attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion
to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on
August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for
damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case
No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the
aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent
thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant
to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of
the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the
employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final
judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable
because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the
complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages
on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the
complainants, the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be
determined only after the termination of the criminal case
2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on
quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana
must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the
Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral,
compensatory and exemplary damages.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained
independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based
on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her
right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never
intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said
accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action
for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press
recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private
respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal
action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil
action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has
actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with
Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of
Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code
is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the
general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso,
which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for
recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as
one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of
Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured
party considering that by the institution of the civil action even
before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case,
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene
therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not
be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil
Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the
offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-
delict.
Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when
all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil
Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the
operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala
resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a
result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or
prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties.
Reasoning
- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents
violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in
a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of
the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic
rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted
in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of
traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same
negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of
Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil
action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers'
negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It
should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This
distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73
Phil. 607, 620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in
the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil
Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his
right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that
neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such
reservation shall be made.
SEPARATE OPINION
BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and
different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence
under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is
predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability
imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation
had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of
Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that
the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and
is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even
if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
superseding the Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as
the reservation required, there being no showing that prejudice could
be caused by doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal
of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject
to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the
injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette, Inc)
191 SCRA 195
FERNAN; November 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners
of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man
to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during
rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren
Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land.
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further
hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal
Case. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved.The decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the
Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising
from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order
of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was
denied by the Appellate Court .
ISSUE
WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths,
water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of
the criminal case
HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts,
"(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according
to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it
be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
Reasoning
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All
the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902,
now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who
without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing
loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable
to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured
party.
- While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public
domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned,
the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage
to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection
between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual
obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or
culpa aquiliana.
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner
so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although
we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
- Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence.
- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil
Code. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing
provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-
delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
... In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case,
unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability.
TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC
16 PHIL 8
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries,
instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a
street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The
plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the
boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent
some time in wandering about the company's premises.
- After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling
the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders
and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They are intended for
use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power. they opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel
applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing
more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck.
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in
1 Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
2 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured
his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps
came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been
there when the boys found them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant
company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about
its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the plaintiff, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles
1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-
contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind
of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for
the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
— is of sufficient weight to put in doubt.
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for
with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which
may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.
- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon
his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the
liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these
articles.
ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries
HELD
NO
- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff.
- We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as
under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff
in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his
right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage.
- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of
discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of these
principles to the particular facts developed in the case under
consideration.
- It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the
fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found,
or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have
been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience,
entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not
picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he
found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open
one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which
resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise
to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of
defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where
they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of
the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine
laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the
cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases
based thereon.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657),
wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was
liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from
idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the
principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company
is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers
who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for
injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that
"the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the
same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury
resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
by the circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was
vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. But the
doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction.
- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and
neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own
property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents
or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others
- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's
property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not
have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore
was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs
action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends,
upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of
plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act
of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not
agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss
and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able
to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the
witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with
which he was amusing himself.
- True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise
nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of
the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the
resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or
less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity
and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed
himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was
sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be of reasonable doubt.
held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and - The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an
have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in independent civil action is contrary to law.
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own
act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which B. DISTINCTIONS
inflicted the injury.
1. QUASI-DELICT VS DELICT
TAYAG V ALCANTARA
BARREDO V GARCIA
98 SCRA 723
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980
NATURE
PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing
129 SCRA 558
petition for damages)
GUTIERREZ; [date]
FACTS
NATURE
- Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a
Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals
Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his
FACTS
instantaneous death. Pending the criminal case against the driver, the
- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the public market
heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the
to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of
company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. In turn, the company and
stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. The stall of one
driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that
Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the process
the criminal case was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this
however the stock in trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost
motion.
and destroyed.
- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on reasonable
- The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the
doubt. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case
CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and
on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of
ordered to pay fines.
the acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil
- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the
case.
appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them
ISSUE
to pay P9,600.00 as actual damages. The decision of the CA was
WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground
based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when
of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver
they should have been more appropriately charged with crime against
HELD
person. Hence, the crime of grave coercion was not proved in
1. NO
accordance with the law.
Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict,
- The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of
the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the
actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.
prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict
ISSUE
Reasoning
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to
- Art. 31, NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an
pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
criminal charge
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
HELD
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter”
NO
- Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation
- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and
arising from quasi-delict. The complaint itself shows that the claim was
various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia,
based on quasi-delit, viz:
held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
“6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has failed to
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
in the final judgment that the facts from which the civil action might
supervision of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y
arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty was
Cunanan. Otherwise, the accident in question which resulted in the
based on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used in
death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have
civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a finding
occurred;”
that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature.
All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present:
- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to
(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of
clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a
respondent
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission
the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is
and
not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal
(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if
Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground.
criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that offended party is not allowed to recover
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
damages on both scores
282 SCRA 188
DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside, case
FRANCISCO; 1997
REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.
NATURE
SEPARATE OPINION
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.
AQUINO [concur]
FACTS
- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual
2177 of the Civil Code, under which according to the Code
Help Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was
Commission, "acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
civil action, not for civil liability from criminal negligence, but for
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March
damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana".
22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00
Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent
o'clock in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the
civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein
clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty
embraces death (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and
- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable
the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to
doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their
persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.
complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could
be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two
had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner
told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room
while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo
went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet
ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour
had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to
buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and the same was
brought by the attendant into the operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the
operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the
petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia
was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner
asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as
there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later
transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was
attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen
supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of
the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen.
Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure
dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer
to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a
respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City
District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the
other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only
when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District
Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and
followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was
wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-
operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal
incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles,
head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo
District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was
already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already
0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died.
Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death
and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent
cause.
ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does
or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results
from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard
of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts
to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most
instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony
should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the
courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of
care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing
the same operation. It must be remembered that when the
qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there
is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the
necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill
in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.
This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly
lacking in the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly
imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof
exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus,
the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the
injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless
imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion
of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the
resulting death of his patient.
PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
GR NO.147703
PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay
damages. But in the event the the accused becoems insolvent, Phil.
Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the
accused jumped bail and remained at large.
ISSUE
WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused
HELD
NO
- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise
arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.
While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed to have waived the appeal. In the case before us, the
accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its
right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be
said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:
- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees
in the event of the latter’s insolvency.
- To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to
appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment.
- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE V LIGON
152 SCRA 419
YAP; July 29, 1987
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila
FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed
and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student
who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly
robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more
or less. Rogelio Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is
still at large.
- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978
Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other
accused, Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards
the direction of Quiapo. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and
Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto
Avenue, they stopped. While waiting, Gabat beckoned a cigarette
vendor, Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached
the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this
transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the
Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what
precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial
moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting
versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted,
however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo,
Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his
grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some
bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated
for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on
October 30, 1983.
- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the
incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was traveling on the same
lane in a slightly oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the
victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass,
Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his
horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the
Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in
it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them
"nakaaksidente ng tao." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and
at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able
to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately
blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two
men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the
driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight
from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside
the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear
seat.
- The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police
District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver,
Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. Payuan also prepared
a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat
and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day,
but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's
Office for further investigation.
- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information
against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless
Imprudence.
- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal
officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as
"pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the
head."
- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information
against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide
based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint
affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who
allegedly witnessed the incident . These affidavits were already
prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17,
1984.
- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the
taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales
and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi,
resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement.
- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating
that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the
cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no
reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window.
The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly
removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of
the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having
already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.
- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the
testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box
on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he
was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of
Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette
vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette
box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to
change a peso bill given by a customer.
ISSUE
WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given credence
HELD
NO
- a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and
circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken
into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would
introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal.
- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested
witness with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see
that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not
entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could
have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving
was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-
a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.
- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield
of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying
approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus
making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired
inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These are
circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating
Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and
the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell
down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a
distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially
obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he saw
Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the
latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a
reasonable doubt, specially considering that this occurrence happened
in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were
moving fast in the traffic.
- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with
moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of
proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as
robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore
entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
- However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is
also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The
two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other, One affects the
social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense
also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in
homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz. performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, and physical condition of the
2. QUASI-DELICT VS BREACH OF passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.
CONTRACT
Reasoning
- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff
38 Phil 768
to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they constituted an
FISHER; October 14, 1918
effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows
NATURE
that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased
- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
James P. McElroy.
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which
FACTS
plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason
- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk.
of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant
- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the
railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office
Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care
in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
charge.
contractual obligations
- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his
- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the
daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the
difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took his position upon
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly
the steps of the coach.
connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the
- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo
performance of an obligation already existing . . .."
station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate
- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to
gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends
rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to
along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length
acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger,
- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with
Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the
respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to
same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise
persons to whom they are not bound by contract, such is not based
from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or
upon the principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle
both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the
announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by
result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn
good the damage caused.
under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon
lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master
- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit
who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking
dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the
into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the
platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern,
discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and
especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third
- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary
persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no
season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought
liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even
to the station for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was so
within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer
placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the
damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption is
sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the
refutable.
fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of
- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the
these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His
theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for
statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily
the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting
to be credited.
within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last
- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1) That when an
condition, and with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated.
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the
(2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
with the process of his curation.
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so
contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon
the company's trains. At the hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found
its members, or which arise from these relations, other than
the facts substantially as above stated, and although negligence was
contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of
melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from
society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, which
the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due
the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from
society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent
recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation
defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
ISSUE
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the
HELD
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum
NO
juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the
parties when entering into the contractual relation.
- The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even
granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct
and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own
contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was caused
by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant,
whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages
should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this
subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty
of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that
of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined
to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use
under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
- In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of
the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps
of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his
feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
incident to stepping off. The cement platform also assured to the
passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff
was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was
by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving
as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The
place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to
get on and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. It is the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and
judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for
the costs of both instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord,
namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had
come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him
could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a
passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord,
namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se."
Adding these two points together, we have the logical result - the
Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and
judgment affirmed.
FORES V MIRANDA
105 PHIL 266
REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by
Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge
at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it
to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the
morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured,
including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right
humerus. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for
treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the first on
May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken bones
and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and
a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears that
respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
- The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was
sentenced accordingly.
ISSUE
WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages
HELD
NO.
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions
predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as
follows:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstance, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith."
Reasoning
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation)
proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
description term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only
because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are
caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict
in Act. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisting contractual relation between the parties."
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pro-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provision of this Chapter."
- In sum the rule is:
Delict (breach of contract)
Gen. Rule: no moral damages
- Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for
breach of the contract of transportation explains, to some extent, the
limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery.
The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a
presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger; that
latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier, or of
his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it
was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in
suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees
- Exception: with moral damages if:
 defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
 result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764
makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of
the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased"
- The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal
concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence,
compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions
quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of
contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by
eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damages
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA
241 SCRA 671 VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE: Petition for review
FACTS
- In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a
FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust
Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank
also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna.
- In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith
informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit
of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures
and policy would appear to be- to meanwhile so record the lost card,
along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its
master file.
- On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close
friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of
the Hotel Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his
FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified
through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since
the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill
amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this
incident.
- In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through counsel,
demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a
VP of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter
which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost,
FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its
unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. However, it failed to inform
him about its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of
the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that
it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for
which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred).
- Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop
Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of
FEBTC. William Anthony King, F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote
back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question." A
copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
- Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint for damages
with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.
- On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00
exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this
petition for review.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
HELD
NO
- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the
breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
- Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also
allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which
is presumed ) of the common carrier.
- Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally
inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the
trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate
any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice
or bad faith.
- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different
from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or ill will.
- Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
- Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a
conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the
provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application
can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his
contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of
misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in
human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific
provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of
moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to
fraud or bad faith.
- Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that
we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the
same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral
damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a
breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and
2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately
becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof
of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because
Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused
contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art.
2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."
- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is
a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article
1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art.
1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger
does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved
that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that
the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute
or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier;
and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to
support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To
award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof
of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art.
2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute
unwarranted judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
- The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of
deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere
carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-
1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
- Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation,
and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
- In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall
be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation.
- It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the
contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in
Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of
contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so
gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence,
and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding
that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's
employees.
- The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a
quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might
thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private
respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or
omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be
deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly:
Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or
omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the
fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application
of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents'
damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship;
without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by
itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.
- Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an
example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code.
In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime
is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230,
Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the
defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to
approximate malice. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art.
2232, Civil Code).
- Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here
obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary
damages granted by the courts below.
- Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor
its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to
recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the
Civil Code providing thusly:
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may
be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
- Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems
such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see
no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in
allowing the award thereof by the trial court.
DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the
award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its
stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an
amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other respects,
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other
Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL, issued plaintiff a “first class”
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first
class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager
alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to vacate his
'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist
class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white
man; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane."
- both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it, and if such, WON the Court could review
the questions of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he claims, as
proved by written documents (tickets…)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages, when his action is
planted upon breach of contract and thus, there must be an averment
of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find
4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France, granted
that their employee was accused of the tortuous act
5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account
made by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees
9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive
HELD
1. NO, NO
Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity,
if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of
Appeals, contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of
facts with respect to the evidence for the defense"."The mere failure to
specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution"; "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Obiter.
- Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of
the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals
shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly
raised before".xxx The law, however, solely insists that a decision
state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn.
- FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as
found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment
rendered thereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with
respect to the determinative facts in issue"
- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties
2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without
any reservation whatever.
Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken
word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so
issued is desirable.
Reasoning
- Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent
knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that
he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats. However, CA held that Air France should
know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. The
trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted
by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees
attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled
to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in
the hollow of the hands of an airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok, he
was granted the “first class” seat. If there had been no seat, and if the
“white man” had a better right to the seat, then why did they confirm
Carrasco his seat?
3. YES
Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not
there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for
moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not
even required.
Reasoning
- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth
"after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
- Air France did not present evidence that the “white man” made a prior
reservation, nor proved that the “white man” had “better right” over the
seat; also, if the manager’s actions could be justified, they should have
presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so
- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to
go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this
is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates
a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes
4. YES
- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees
need not. be essayed. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
5. YES
- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. (note:
it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a
breach of contract)
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation.43 And is, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages.
Reasoning
- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier.
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae
Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of
the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
- also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and
physical condition of the declarant".
Reasoning
- Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in
his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene".
The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence, as it
was only hearsay. However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but
the ouster incident. Also, the said entry was made outside the
Philippines and by an employee of petitioner. It would have been easy
for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if they had
presented the purser.
7. YES
Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary
damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner".
Reasoning
- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
class seat fits into this legal precept
8. YES
Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for
attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt
that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\
9. NO
Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.
The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur
thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the
reasonableness thereof.
DISPOSITION On balance, we, say that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. We accordingly vote to
affirm the same. Costs against petitioner.
PSBA V CA
PADILLA; February 4, 1992
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused the death of
Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file
suit in the Manila RTC. It was established that his assailants were not
members of the school’s academic community but were outsiders.
- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure, Chief of
Security and Assistant Chief of Security. It sought to adjudge them
liable for the victim’s death due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions.
- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them since
academic institutions, like PSBA, are beyond the ambit of that rule.
- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. And the MFR
was similarly dealt with. Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s
dispositions before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the
trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case
HELD
Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. 2180 on quasi-
delicts, it may still be liable under the law on contracts.
Reasoning
- The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent court’s
premise is incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in Art. 2180 that the
liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution. In
this sense, PSBA is not liable. But when an academic institution
accepts students for enrollment, the school makes itself responsible in
providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for
learning. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or
explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.
DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue
proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court. Costs against the
petitioners.
SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family’s complaint
for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla
Memorial)
FACTS
- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, authorized and
instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased.
- After about a month, preparatory to transferring the remains to a
newly purchased family plot also at the same cemetery, the concrete
vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche
underground. As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface,
the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. in
diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the
hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, they caused the opening of the concrete vault and
discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the
wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located
directly above the head and torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and the exposed
parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled.
- SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on
either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete
vault;
(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA MEMORIAL is
deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead.
Trial Court’s Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault
would be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or
negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation
between the Syquias and Mla Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing
that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the
grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault.
- The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent
the vault from floating away.
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also denied.
ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners,
or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law
between them. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than
what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by
implication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v CA)
Reasoning
- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box
to be sent in the interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides
that: “Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box,
or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of
which shall be made by the employees of the Association.” Pursuant to
this, a concrete vault was installed and after the burial, the vault was
covered by a cement lid.
- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was
stated in the brochures that “lot may hold single or double internment
underground in sealed concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of
various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture
and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the
diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that
which is expected of a good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does
not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, circumstances of the
case do not show negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole
was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that:
“When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the
vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining
heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the
grave would be filled with water.”
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which
would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding
no evidence of negligence, there is no reason to award damages.
Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
CALALAS VS MENDOZA
GR 122039| 31 May 2000
FACTS
-At 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then
a collegefreshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney wasfilled to capacity of about 24 passengers,
Sunga was given by the conductor an“extension seat,” a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of thevehicle. On the way to
Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepneystopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle,Sunga
gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an
Isuzutruck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the leftrear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. She sustained afracture of the “distal third of the left tibia-fibula
with severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under
sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to
September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
3 months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
-On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas before the RTC of Dumaguete City (Branch 36), alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment,
against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil
Case 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-
delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver
Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
-On appeal to the Court of Appeals, and on 31 March 1991, the ruling
of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under
the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to
Sunga. The Court ordered Calalas tro pay Sunga (1) P50,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (4) P1,000.00 as
expenses of litigation; and (5) to pay the costs. Calalas’ motion for
reconsideration was denied 11 September 1995. Hence, the petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N The CA erred in reversing the TC’s ruling?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
The Supreme Court affirmed the 31 March 1991 decision and the 11
September 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals, with the
modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.
1. Res Judicata does not apply
Sunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3490, which found the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict, as she was
never a party to that case. Further, the issues in Civil Case 3490 and
in the present case are not the same. The issue in Civil Case 3490 was
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to Calalas’ jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in
the present case is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of
carriage. The principle of res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
2. Distinction between culpa aquiliana or culpa
extracontractual, and culpa contractual Quasi-delict, also known as
culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. On the other hand, breach of
contract or culpa contractual is premised upon the negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation. In quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis
of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination.
3. Common carriers presumed at fault unless they
observed extraordinary diligence; Burden of proof
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
Code. The provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof.
4. Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict,
not in breach of contract
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine
is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
5. Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCC
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required
of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as
the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that “Common
carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in articles 1755 and 1756. “ On the other hand, Article 1755 of
the Civil Code provides that “ A common carrier is bound to
carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances.” Article 1756 provides that “In case of death
of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and
1755.”
6. In violation of traffic rules; Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic)
Herein, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about 2 meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a
violation of the RA 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides in Section 54
(Obstruction of Traffic) that “No person shall drive his motor vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle,
nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading
freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway. “
7. In violation of traffic rules; Section 32(a) (Exceeding
registered capacity)
Herein,the driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of Section 32(a) of the
same law. Section 32 [a] (Exceeding registered capacity) provides
that “No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more
passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered
capacity.” The fact that Sunga was seated in an “extension seat”
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers
were exposed.
8. Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very
cautious persons
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it
became the duty of Calalas to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga
“safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances” as required by Article 1755.
Not only was Calalas unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the
injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.
9. Taking of “Extension seat” cannot be considered an implied
assumption of risk Sunga’s taking an “extension seat” did not amount
to an implied assumption of risk. Otherwise, iIt is akin to arguing that
the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not
be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater
risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
CIVIL CODE
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
CHAPTER 2: QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also
applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
RPC
Title Fourteen: QUASI-OFFENSES
Sole Chapter: CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower
than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in
which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree
than that which should be imposed in the period which they may
deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which
case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice,
doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957