Civil Law Review II: Cases 1

Civil Law Review II: Cases 2

1. Rabadilla vs CA, et al, GR No. 113725, June 29, 2000

2. G. de Perez vs Garchitorena, 54 Phil 431
3. Phil Com. and Industrial Bank vs Escolin, L-27860, 27936-37 and L-27896, March 29, 1974
4. Moralejo, et al vs Maquiniano, CA 40 OG 227
5. Bahanay Jr. vs Martinez, 64 SCRA 452
6. Adlawan vs Adlawan, 479 SCRA 275 (2006)
7. Natividad vs Gabino, 36 Phil 663
8. Morente vs Dela Santa, 9 Phil 387
9. Rigor vs Rigor, L-22036, April 30, 1979
10. Miciano vs Brimo, 50 Phil 867
11. Leonor Villaflor Vda de Villanueva vs Delfin N. Juico, etc, L-15737, February 28, 1962
12. Guy vs CA, 502 SCRA 151 (2006)
13. Medina and Del Carmen vs CA, L-34760, September 28, 1973
14. Baluyot vs Pano, L-42088, May 7, 1976
15. Mercado vs Vda de Juan, 64 Phil 75
16. Garcia Fule vs CA, L-40502 and L-42670, November 29, 1976
17. Estate of Gelacio Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975
18. De Guzman vs De Guzman-Carillo, L-29276, May 18, 1978
19. Recto vs Dela Rosa, L-42799, February 8, 1977
20. Dalisay vs Consolacion, L-44702, July 30, 1979
21. Del Rosario vs Conanan, L-37903, March 30, 1977
22. Macadangdang vs CA, L-49542, September 12, 1980
23. Noble vs Noble, L-17742, 18 SCRA 1104, December 17, 1966
24. Rosales vs Rosales, L-40789, February 27, 1987

Case 5: Belen vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands

G.R. No. L-14474, 31 October 1960

Institution of Heirs

Facts:

When Benigno Diaz died, his will together with the codicil he executed, giving a legacy to Filomena Diaz, were admitted
to probate. The proceedings were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee bank.
Subsequently, Filomena Diaz died, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros , married with seven legitimate children and Onesima,
single. The latter filed a petition contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should
now be divided equally only between herself and Milagros, to the exclusion of the seven legitimate children of the latter. The court
denied the petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not the property shall be divided equally only between the legitimate children to the exclusion of the
grandchildren.

Ruling:

No. Under Article 846 of the Civil Code, “heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts.” The
meaning of the word ‘descendants’, when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed,
has been frequently considered and decided that it means all persons descending lineally from another, to the remotest degree and
includes persons so descended, even though their parents are living and that such descendants take per capita and not per stirpes.

We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the
testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members therof to succeed per capita, in consonance with Artcile
846. So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.

Case 8: Nuguid vs. Nuguid

G.R. No. L-23445, 23 June 1966

Facts:

Remedios Nuguid filed a petition for the allowance a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid, her sibling, on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. They anchored their opposition on the
ground that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

Issue:

Whether or not the parents of the decedent were preterited?

Ruling:

Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And the will completely omits both of them,
receiving nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition.

The will consisting of one sentence, institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests
are therein provided for. The nullity of the will is complete; Rosario Nuguid died intestate. However, the petitioner insists that the
compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive legitimes, but that the institution of her as the universal heir is not
invalidated, although such inheritance would only have to be reduced. Such contention is not well-taken. With reference to Article
814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein
dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property
undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. Again, institution of heirs cannot be
taken as legacy.

Case 9: Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987

Facts:

Constantitno, herein petitioner, filed for probate of the will of his deceased brother Nemesio and for the issuance to the
same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will bequeathing all his shares from the
conjugal property to his brother Segundo Acain. However, since Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the former’s children are claiming
to be heir, with Constantino as the petitioner. The spouse and adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of
preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissed

Issue:

Whether or not there was preterition of “compulsory heirs in the direct line” thus their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs.

Ruling:

Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or trough mentioned they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the
direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner.
Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results
in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will,
the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.

Case 10: Ventura, et. al vs. Ventura

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

Facts:

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana
Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano the
paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will. Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did
not include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by
the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. On October 22, 1963, Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria
Ventura filed a motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura on the following grounds: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that
she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate
daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and
failed to comply with the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963. Hence, the probate court removed Maria Ventura as executrix
and administratrix of the estate and in her place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are appointed joint administratrix of the
estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00.

Issue:

Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, if no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted: (a) To the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve."

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedents. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate
is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is
the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred." As decided by the lower
court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his
wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura.

Case 1: Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Facts:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-
interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil contained the following provisions:

1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;

2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;

3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to
Maria Belleza;

4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida,
all surnamed Rabadilla.

Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. CA reversed RTC’s
decision.

Issue:

Should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the
obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent?

Ruling:

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.
Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall
pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred
to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated
to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in
fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first
heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by
the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the
usufruct to private respondent.

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject
property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Case 2: Perez vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930

Facts:

P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name, with the La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit
of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his
son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.The la atter held a judgement for P7,872.23 for due execution against the husband of Ana
Maria, Joaquin Perez Alcantara hence the deposited amount in La Urbana was attached. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit
belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the
execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress,
and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.The court held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a fideicommissary substitution.

Ruling:

There is a fideicommissary substitution. All the elements of this kind of substitution are present.

At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to
the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.

An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving
children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in
case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the
disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.

A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X
and in clause XI.

As a consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her
absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the association
known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment
against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano Garchitorena.

Case 8: Morente vs. Dela Santa

G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

Facts:
 The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband
have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two
remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties
belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a
sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in CFI in
which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled.
Objection was made in the court below by the husband.

In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, that the husband having married, he
had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother
of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the court below is
not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will.
It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix.

Issue:

Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will?

Ruling:

No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides
that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower.

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the
third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To
no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first
clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the
building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he
marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property
contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall
pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.

Case 10: Miciano vs. Brimo

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Facts:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and
the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G.
Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

Issue:

Is the condition to apply laws of the Philippines to probate of deceased’s will valid?

Ruling:

No. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10
of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

Case 11: Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962

Facts:

On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor. The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th
and 7th thereof (institution of heirs) would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already
a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was
appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, As the project of partition,
Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable
amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real
and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died
without having contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Plaintiff
Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February
8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on
account of the fact that she never remarried.

Issue:

Is Leonor Villaflor Vda. De Villanueva declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7
of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno?

Ruling:

Yes. The plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with
only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life
interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion
mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these
particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties
bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression
"mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court
violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.

Case 14: Baluyut vs. Pano, et. al.

G.R. NO. L-42088, May 7, 1976

Facts:

Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in
certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining three-fourths were bequeathed to his collateral
relatives named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all surnamed
Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in that will. Alfredo Baluyot, filed in the CFI of
Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion
Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent’s estate.
 Lopez argued and showed proof that the widow was declared an Incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.

The probate court instituted Mrs. Baluyut as the administrator of the estate, the lower court ratiocinated that as the
surviving spouse she has the preferential right to be appointed as administratrix.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it appointed Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix

Ruling:

Yes. While the probate court correctly assumed that the surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of
administration, it does not follow that she should be named administrator without conducting a full-dress hearing on her
competency to discharge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as
executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A
hearing should be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will
was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position. It was held that a hearing is
necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove
his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.

Case 3: Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin

G.R. NO. L-27860, 27936-37 and L-27896, March 29, 1974

Facts:

Mr. and Mrs. Hodges-Texan nationals, both made in their wills provisions that upon their death, their whole estates
should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the
Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who
predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges (Linnie Jane) died first then Mr. Hodges (Charles) died.
Magno, initially admitratrix of both spouses’ estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles’ estate, but since there was no liquidation of
Mrs. Hodges’ estate, her brothers and sisters wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit.

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.In her will, she left all her
estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.In December 1962,
Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina
Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an
iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the
said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that
Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be
respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

Issue:

Whether or not there’s substitution?

Ruling:

No simple or vulgar substitution because no provision for predecease of original designated heir, refusal or incapacity of
designated heir to accept inheritance. Neither fideicommissary substitution because there is no obligation impose on Charles to
preserve the estate.

There’s simultaneous institution of heirs subject to resolutory condition of Charle’s death. Charles was to enjoy the whole
estate but he can’t dispose of property mortis causa (because it’s already subject to the will made by his wife, which he agreed in
the provision of his will). Charles didn’t get mere usufruct; he exercises full ownership.

Case 9: Rigor vs. Rigor

G.R. NO. L-22036, April 30, 1979

FACTS

Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, left a will executed and was probated by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, his three sisters. In
addition, the will provided that it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall
take the priesthood.

ISSUE

Whether or not the bequest in question be declared inoperative.

HELD

In the law of contracts and statutory construction, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which
is the law of the case. What is no clear is on how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew who
would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. The SC held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must
be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged
in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

1Case 7: Sonia Ana T. Solano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO. L-11971, November 29, 1983

FACTS

Meliton Solano executed a will where he instituted as only heir, Sonia Solano, his acknowledged natural child, but omitted
(preterited) two spurious children who were able to obtain compulsory recognition. Meliton also devised certain parcels of land in
usufruct in favor of a devisee.

ISSUE

How will the three compulsory heirs (Sonia and the two spurios children) inherit?

HELD

The devise is valid BUT the institution of Sonia is void because of the preterition. However, instead of the three heirs
sharing in the intestate estate (after removing the devise), said balance or remainder will all go to Sonia after subtracting the
legitimes of the other two, since this was the clear intent of the testator.

2Case 4: Moralejo, et. al. v. Maquiniano

CA, 40 G.G. 227

FACTS

Matea, in her will, gave Benvenuto a parcel of land with the condition that he must not alienate it but preserve it instead
for his children. Matea then died, and Benvenuto inherited the land. Benvenuto disregarded the will and sold the land to Catalino
who did not know of the existence of the condition. Afterwards, Benvenuto died. His children now brought this action to recover the
land from Catalino.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is a fideicommissary substitution in this case and the subject land will go to Benvenuto’s children as
the second heir?

HELD

Yes, there is a fideicommissary substitution in this case and the subject land will go to Benvenuto’s children as the second
heir. All the elements in a fideicommissary substitution is present here. Benvenuto as the first heir and his children as the second
heirs both are living at the time of Matea’s death. There’s also an obligation imposed to Benvenuto to preserve the land and
transmit it to his children upon his death. They are one degree apart. This is true, notwithstanding Catalino’s good faith, for he
acquired merely Benvenuto’s right. Hence, applying the principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), we can that the sale to
him was valid, but it was subject to the testamentary reservation, namely, that upon Benvenuto’s death his children would become
full owners of the property.
2 Case 3 : PCIB vs. Escolin

Facts:

In the case, the spouses executed reciprocal wills. It provided that the share in the conjugal assets will pass to the
surviving spouse and that the surviving spouse can do whatever he or she wants to the inheritance, even sell it, and if there is any
residue from the inheritance from the other spouse upon the death of the surviving spouse, it shall pass to the brothers and sisters
of the spouse who first died. The wife died first. The husband did not liquidate the conjugal assets because he was the sole heir of
his wife. Upon the husband’s death, it is now questioned whether there is any residue from the wife’s estate that could pass to her
brothers and sisters. PCIB and the administratix of the husband claims that: (1) there was no fideicommissary substitution because
there was no obligation upon the husband to preserve and transmit the property to the brothers and sisters of the wife as seen in
his authority to sell the property and (2) since there was an invalid attempt to make a substitution, then the testamentary
disposition is void and there can be no transmission of rights to the brothers and sisters.

Issue:

Whether or not there’s fideicommissary substitution?

Held:

The SC agreed with contention no. 1 on the same ground. The second requisite was absent and there could be no
fidiecommissary substitution. The institution of the husband was subject to a resolutory condition while the institution of the
brothers and sisters was subject to a suspensive condition. Both conditions are one and the same. It is the existence in the
husband‟s estate of assets he received from his wife at the time of his death. If there is, the husband‟s right to the residue is
extinguished upon his death while the right of the brothers and sisters vests at the same time.
2 CASE 6: ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN- Co-ownership & Ejectment

A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is
presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.

FACTS:

A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house
and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when
asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.

His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was
registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said house
and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their
parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a
simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.

The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the
accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The
RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which
was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.

The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them
from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:

NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was
his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives
by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.

Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is
presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be
dismissed.

Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the
instant petition should be dismissed.

2 CASE 7: NATIVIDAD VS. GABINO

G.R. No. L-11386 March 31, 1917

Doctrine: A person is entirely free to make his
conform to law and meet its requirements. He
the designation of legatees, and, when the
those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs
conditional obligations.
will in such manner as may best please him, provided the testamentary provisions
may impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to
conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of
and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for

FACTS: Tiburcio Salvador executed a notarial will and instituted his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion as sole heirs. However,
clause six is as follows: “I bequeath to Basilia Gabino, the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a house and
lot in Calle Lavezares... If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver the same to my grandson Emilio,
upon payment of the latter to the former P4,000.00. Executor Emilio presented a project of partition wherein it was stated therein
that the clause six should be interpreted as giving the right of usufruct only to Basilia, and a general legacy in favor of
Lorenzo Salvador of P4,000 whenever Basilia should die, but that the ownership belongs to Emilio. Basilia, through
counsel, opposed claiming ownership over the legacy. The trial judge decided ownership and dominion should be given
to legatee Basilia, subject to reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo and Emilio.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a testator can validly imposed a condition on the legacy.

2. Whether or not the testator meant to bequeath to Basilia Gabino the mere usufruct of the property.

HELD: 1. YES. A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the
testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the
institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not
fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules
therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.). In the sixth clause of the will executed
by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to BasiliaGabino the ownership and dominion of the property therein
specified as to its location and other circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be
obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the
latter.The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event
constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee BasiliaGabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article
1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided
in article 1116 of said code. The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to
deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the
sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the
voluntary reservation to BasiliaGabinoof the ownership of the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy of P4,000
to Lorenzo Salvador.

2. NO. If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the testator meant to
bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language employed in the said
sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said property —language which expresses without the
slightest doubt his wishes whichshould be complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last
wills and testaments the testator's will is the law.

2 CASE 8: ELENA MORENTE vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA

G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MODAL INSTITUTION

FACTS: The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me
shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he
shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by
me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children
should he have any.3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of
the properties belonging to me. Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the
testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo
Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo
de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband
to the procedure followed by the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the will of Consuelo contained modal institution

HELD: Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a
prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But the question in
this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the
will? It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the
third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry
again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given
to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not
continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it
anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss We are bound to construe the will with reference
to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and
after such consideration we cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit
the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second
marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary provision
conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will

2 CASE 9: Parish Priest ofRoman Catholic vs Rigor

89 SCRA 493

FACTS: This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
with a total area of around forty-four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria
Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to
be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of
the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan,
Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest
relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The
testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence of the qualified
devisee?

HELD: It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's
nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in
the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that
after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he wasstudying for
the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his
nearest male relative belonging to the Rigor family(pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her
own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father
told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for
reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the
San Jose Seminary.

Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that
reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is
tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion
that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was
opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of
the will. Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica"
would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relativesborn after his death, he could have so specified in his will He
must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"? The
reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would
like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the Riceland before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew
entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the Riceland and receive the fruits thereof. In that event,
the trusteeship would be terminated. Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor
died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31,
1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who
became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the rice land by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise
inoperative. The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor assumes
that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions
regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute
devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest. It should be understood that the
parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to
become a priest, had not yet]entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888
of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be
merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier
causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").This case
is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes
place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said
rice land the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said rice land. The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham
vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

2 CASE 10: MICIANO vs. BRIMO

GR No. 22595 November 1, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY OF.—If the condition
imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator’s order that his property be distributed in accordance with the laws of
the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article
10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten,
thus making the institution unconditional.

Facts: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial administrator of
this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it. The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) the
denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition;
(4) the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the deceased’s business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of
the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased’s business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws. The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish
laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires
to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not
having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws
on the matter. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error, It is
discretionary with the trial court. and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no
evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force must be complied with.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in approving the scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph G. Brimo?

Held: No. The approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous. In regard to the first assignment of
error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as
such in the will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the
will. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator’s will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented
from receiving his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil
Code. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator’s national law when, according to article 10 of
the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said
condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. Gomez vs. North Negros Sugar
Co.It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed
upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s
national laws.The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner
as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs