RAWLSIAN RESOURCES FOR ANIMAL ETHICS! RUTH ABBEY ABSTRACT ‘This arcicle considers what contribution che work of John Ravels can make to questions about animal ethics, Irargues chat there ate more nor= mative resources in A Theory of Justice for a concern with animal welfare than some of Ravs's critics acknowledge. However, the move from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism sees a depletion of not= ‘mative resources in Rawlsian thought for addressing animal ethies. The article canclides by endorsing the implication of A Theory of Justice that we look for ways other than rights discourse to respect and protect the well-being of animals INTRODUCTION ‘The late John Rawls is widely considered to be the most influential political philosopher of the twentieth century in the English-speaking ‘world.? For many, his work represents a watershed in political theory,’ for he is typically scen to have instituted a new era in political thought by combining a normative outlook with a highly systematic and architec- tonic approach to polities. As Peter Jones observes, “Even those who are ‘out of sympathy with Rawls’s work recognize how much the discipline of political philosophy owes him” (Jones 1995, $15), This article considers LEVHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 121 20719 6-613 (Glia Uniery Pres Al ight freqetion i any Fo end Direc corepence Journals Manage ana Unversity Pres, 601 N. Morton Se Hlocmiagoa, 847404 USA nprderOindns abwhat contribution, if any, Rawls’s work ean make to the thinking of those concerned with the welfare of animals. While not proposing that Raw!- sian thought offers a wealth of normative resources for animal eth there is more porental in his thought than his crtis typically permit. Or rather, in recognition of the fact that Rawls’ ocuvre is not monolithie, the argument is twofold: firstly, that there is more potential in A Theory of Justice for a concern with animal welfare than some of Rawls’s critics acknowledge, and secondly, that there is more in this first major work, A ‘Theory of Justice, than in his next book, Political Liberalisms. Examina- tions thus far of Rawls’ value for animal ethics have, by contrast, failed to make any distinction between his two major works. In distinguishing between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism in this way, the cur- rent discussion also contributes to the ongoing debate about whether the shift from the former to the latter represents progress in Rawls’ thinking. ‘When viewed with questions of animal ethies i decline and a deterioration; the move from A Theory of Justice to Politi- cal Liberalism sees a depletion of the normative resources in Rawlsian thought for addressing these issues. ind, this shife marks a CRITICAL VIEWS The relationship between animal ethies and Rawlsian thought has been debated for a quarter of a century,* but one of the most recent, most robust and more thoroughgoing, critiques of Rawlsian thought from the perspective of animal ethics is mounted by Robert Garner in “Animals, Politics and Justice: Rawlsian Liberalism and the Plight of Non- Humans.” Reflecting on the status of animals in Rawls's theory of justice, Garner finds the approach to be “incomplete and, in some places, flawed” and concludes that “we should probably look elsewhere in a search for the most appropriate ideological location for animal protection” (Garner 2003a: 3, 20). Echoing an carlier critique of Rawls mounted by Tom Regan (Regan 1988, 163-74; see also Elliot 1984), Garner’s major com- plaint is that Rawls excludes animals from considerations of justice, for the Rawlsian sphere of justice is populated by persons alone. Persons are defined by Rawls as having two key characteristics: they are capable of having (i) a conception of the good which is manifested in “a rational plan of life” and (ji) at least a minimal sense of, and willingness to act, "upon, principles of justice (Rawls 1971, 505). These prerequisites clearly ennics & THE ENVIRONMENI, 121) 2007preclude animals and chey effectively exclude many humans roo (Row: lands 1997, 237; Garner 2003a: 5, 13).° Both Regan and Garner propose thar this exclusion of animals from the sphere of justice is arbitrary: just because animals lack the uniquely (but not universal) human capacities for rationality and justice, it need not follow that they cannot be accorded any status in considerations of justice, Rawls offers no compelling reason why animals could not be incorporated “as beneficiaries of decisions taken in the original position [which] would . .. result in prineiples of jus tice being applied to animals” (Garner 2003a: 43 Cf. 5. CF. Garner 2003b, 235; Regan 1988 171-72). The problem of animals not being accorded any status as subjects of justice is, for Garner, compounded by Rawls's promotion of pluralism. Garner fears that the combination of animals’ inferior mocal status with Rawls’ liberal reluctance to interfere with individuals’ free choices about hhow to live their lives means that respect for pluralism will necessarily trump any concern with animal welfare in Rawlsian liberalism. As Gar- ner sees it, “the way in which they [animals] are treated becomes a matter of personal preference rather than moral obligation” (Garner 2003a, 143 CEA, 17, 19; Garner 2003b, 238). An earlier critique of Rawls thinking from the perspective of animal welfare by Michael Pritchard and Wade Robison would seen to buttress Garner's conclusion about the need to seek elsewhere for normative re- sources for animal ethics. The focus of their disquiet is the self-interest Rawls imputes to the parties to the social contract, because this means that occupants of the original position need give no consideration to the needs or interests of those outside the contract, As animals are outside the social contract, their treatment is contingent upon the self-interest of hu: mans: should it fall within the interests of humans to treat animals well, they might; if nor; they need nor. Pritchard and Robison thus arrive at the same conclusion as Garner, viz. that Rawls effectively licences humans to treat animals as they wish: “Like other natural resources, animals are sim ply there to be used” (Pritchard and Robison 1981, $75 Cf. 58). They eon- clude that Rawls’ contract doctrine does nothing to prevent needless cru- elty to animals (Pritchard and Robison 1981, 57-8) and argue more generally that because his framework allows for the possibility of animal ‘welfare considerations clashing directly with the demands of justiee, it rust be seen as seriously flawed (Pritchard and Robison 1981, 56, 59}. AUTH ABBEY RAWLSIAN RESOURCES FOR ANIMAL ETHICS