MARCOS vs.

MANGLAPUS Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare

FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from precidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and forced into exice.
Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic
under a revolutionary government.
Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not
been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in
1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover
of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the
support of “Marcos loyalists” and the unsuccessful plot of
the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the
nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble
even from afar and to the fanatism and blind loyalty of
their followers in the country.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philippines to die.
President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to
the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision
to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
The right to return to one's country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation
of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for
the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the
people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and
pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist
movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab
power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to
mention only a few. The documented history of the
efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize
the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters
the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The President has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away
the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to
total economic collapse. Given what is within our
individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
Considering that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is

right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines,
the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to
consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision.
More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the

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MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,
seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that
he has actual and material legal interest in the subject
matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner
filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189
allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law
empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party
list representatives including the President and
the Vice-President violate the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
HELD:
In resolving the issues , the application of the
rules in Statutory Construction must be applied
1. All laws are presumed to be constitutional
2. The constitution must be construed as a whole
3. In case of doubt in the interpretation of the
provision of the constitution, such meaning must
be deduced from the discussions of the
members of the constitutional commission.
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ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to
Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the
overseas absentee voter may vote for president,
vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. –
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the
delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate
if the outcome of the election will not be affected
by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Commission is empowered to
order the proclamation of winning candidates
despite the fact that the scheduled election has
not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has
been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or
countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or
influence of the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and
Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes
shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.
 Such provison gives the Congress the duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for president and vice-president.

It was held that this provision must be

harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution and should be taken to mean that
COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and
party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-
President.41

The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates,

in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that
it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that the returns of every
election for President and Vice-President shall be
certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC

to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as
aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-
president and the power to proclaim the winners for the
said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence,
the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for president and vice-president for
the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

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MACALINTAL
Vs. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
November 23, 2010
FACTS:
A petition was filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty.
Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is
"authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he
chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal"
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of
personnel and confidential employees, to effect the
constitutional mandate.
Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v.
COMELEC which peripherally declared that "contests
involving the President and the Vice-President fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the
exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner
reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman
and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the
petition
2. Whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the
Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates
Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in
contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
HELD:
1. NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus
standi in filing the instant petition as he was
unmistakably estopped in assailing the
jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he
had ubiquitously appeared and had
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ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004 therefore
making the petitioner’s standing still imperiled by
thee white elephant in the petition (i.e., his
appearance as counsel for former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in
the election protest filed by 2004 presidential
candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal). Judicial inquiry
requires that the constitutional question be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity to
challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s
constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces
an innovation about the Supreme Court’s
independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII.
The judicial power expanded, but it remained
absolute.
2. NO. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority
to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the
same vein, although the method by which the
Supreme Court exercises this authority is not
specified in the provision, the grant of power
does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s
method of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, through the PET,
is actually a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent
directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and
distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that
the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies –
not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The
adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the
nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the
singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a
special electoral court.
3. NO. The issue in Buac v. COMELEC involved
the characterization of the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to the conduct of
a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Elections. However,
petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac
which declared, in an obiter, that "contests
involving the President and the Vice-President
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial powe
 Estrada vs. Desierto
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of
the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit”
Singson, a close friend the President, alleged that he
had personally given Estrada money as payoff from
jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against
Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an
impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada,
pleaded “not guilty”.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had
“strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but
saying he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family
later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the
palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings
in cases filed against him not until his term as president
ends. He also prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner
to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.”
ISSUE:

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing
organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and
Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and other bar associations joined in the
thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first
time since the beginning of the protests and maintains
that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the
impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty
verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling
for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001.
He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat
of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th
president of the Philippines.
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or
justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner
Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from
suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
For the president to be deemed as having
resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is
important to follow the succession of events that struck
petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the
quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries,
detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all
these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as
president despite his questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of
peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had
resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

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ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is
immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no
longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court
added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public
trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot
claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent
actually holds office) and not his term (time during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another).

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Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s

FACTS: understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio
R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino hold in addition to their primary position to not more than
on July 25, 1987. 2 positions in the government and government
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
and assistant secretaries to hold other than government the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII
other than those provided in the constitution. According
to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of
justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987

Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the

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FUNA vs Ermita
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista)
as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R.
Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport of the department under Special
Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of
then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his
capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of
Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed
by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants to hold any other office or employment.On
January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition,
Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA
vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties
and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent
Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position
of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which
she had been appointed, violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants
Held:
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’
theory that being just a “designation,” and temporary at
that, respondent Bautista was never really “appointed”
as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In
Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., we distinguished between the
terms appointment and designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by
the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation,
the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on
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ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law
of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where,
in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in
nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the naming
of a particular person to a specified public office. That
is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that
he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered
only an acting or temporary appointment, which does
not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Clearly, respondents’ reliance on the foregoing
definitions is misplaced considering that the above-cited
case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein
acquired valid title to the disputed position and so had
the right to security of tenure. It must be stressed
though that while the designation was in the nature of an
acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the
office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to
both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and
functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,
words which were not even found in Section 13, Article
VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold”
an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to
be in possession and administration,” which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office.
The petition is GRANTED. The designation of
respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority,
in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.
Funa vs Agra
FACTS
 March 1, 2010 – Arroyo appointed Hon. Alberto
C. Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice
 March 5, 2010 – Arroyo appointed him as Acting
Solicitor General
 April 7, 2010 – Petitioner filed a case as a
taxpayer, alleging that the appointments were
prohibited under Section 13 Art VII of the 1987
Constitution (…prohibits the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution), and
 Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive
official from holding any other office or
employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position.
 August 5, 2010 – During the pendency of the
suit, Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Atty.
Jose Cadiz as Solicitor General and the latter
commenced his duties
 (Agra says: he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in
place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had
been appointed as the Secretary of Justice;
 That on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated him also as the Acting Secretary of
Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had
meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to
run for Congress representing a district in
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that
he then relinquished his position as the
Government Corporate Counsel; and that
pending the appointment of his successor, Agra
continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General.)
 Respondents contend that Agra’s concurrent
designations were only in a temporary capacity,
the only effect of which was to confer additional
duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor
General and Acting Secretary of Justice, Agra
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ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
was not “holding” both offices in the strict
constitutional sense (which must be regular and
permanent and not a mere designation)
 Respondents further contend that, even on the
assumption that Agra’s concurrent designation
constituted “holding of multiple offices,” his
continued service as the Acting Solicitor General
was akin to a hold-over; that upon Agra’s
designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
his term as the Acting Solicitor General expired
in view of the constitutional prohibition against
holding of multiple offices by the Members of the
Cabinet; that under the principle of hold-over,
Agra continued his service as the Acting Solicitor
General “until his successor is elected and
qualified”10 to “prevent a hiatus in the
government pending the time when a successor
may be chosen and inducted into office;”
 And that during his continued service as the
Acting Solicitor General, he did not receive any
salaries and emoluments from the OSG after
becoming the Acting Secretary of Justice
 Petitioner counters that there was no “prevailing
special circumstance” that justified the non-
application to Agra of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution;
 And that Agra’s invocation of the principle of
hold-over is misplaced for being predicated upon
an erroneous presentation of a material fact as
to the time of his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice
ISSUE
Whether or not the designation of Agra as the
Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General, violated the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple
offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants
HELD
Yes:
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General
was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13,
Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to *** Ex officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official
be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other office or employment during his tenure as the any other appointment or authority other than that
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has conferred by the office.” The ex officio position being
not otherwise so provided. actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
o In this regard, to hold an office means to office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to
possess or to occupy the office, or to be receive additional compensation for his services in the
in possession and administration of the said position. The reason is that these services are
office, which implies nothing less than already paid for and covered by the compensation
the actual discharge of the functions and attached to his principal office.
duties of the office.
o To be sure, Agra’s concurrent
designations as Acting Secretary of
Justice and Acting Solicitor General did
not come within the definition of an ex
officio capacity***. Had either of his
concurrent designations been in an ex
officio capacity in relation to the other,
the Court might now be ruling in his
favor.
o The OSG are neither required by the
primary functions nor included by the
powers of the DOJ—MEANING, one
position was not derived from the other.

RULING:
The Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and
prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS the
designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the
Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent
capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor
General for being unconstitutional and
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution; and DECLARES that l-Ion. Alberto
C. Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure
as Acting Secretary of Justice.

In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds

that all official actions of Agra as a de facto
Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was
his later designation, were presumed valid,
binding and effective as if he was the officer
legally appointed and qualified for the office. 54
This clarification is necessary in order to protect
the sanctity of the dealings by the public with
persons whose ostensible authority emanates
from the State.
NOTES

10 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
Bitonio vs COA
Facts:
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. DOLE Acting
Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the
DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA.
As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA,
Bitonio was receiving a per diem for every board
meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZA's disbursement
transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling
in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where
Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to
hold multiple positions in government was declared
unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are
prohibited to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases where the
Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an MR but
the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the
payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and
categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for
the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors
at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that
this law is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law
is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and
binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law
be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere
memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-
038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A.
No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an
administrative directive and the former cannot just be
repealed or amended by the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4)
years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was
promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the
legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior
holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the
validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged, the
provision on the payment of per diems remains in force
notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case.
Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is
not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to
receive additional compensation as clarified in the
Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is
still entitled to receive the per diems.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per
diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the
11 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of
the Secretary of Labor.
Held:
Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio
capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited
from receiving any compensation for this additional
office, because his services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA
Board merely as representative of the Secretary of
Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any
compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative
would have a better right than his principal, and the fact
that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not
covered by the ruling in the CivilLiberties Union case is
of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the board
meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary
of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for
such designation, the petitioner would not have been in
the Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation that the
legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by
the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years
after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The
payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in
favor of the members of the Board of Directors which the
petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not
be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the
Constitution. No law can render nugatory the
Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to
a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the
fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify
its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it
that the law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the
flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later
amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the
members of the Board of Directors was increased from 8
to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of
the different Departments who should sit as board
members of the PEZA. The option of designating his
representative to the Board by the different Cabinet
Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as
to the payment of per diems to the members of the
Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that
such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the
proscription set by the Constitution
Public Interest vs. Elma
Facts:
For consideration is the omnibus motion, dated 14
august 2006, where respondent Magdangal Elma sought
the following:
1. the reconsideration of the decision in the case
Public Interest Center Inc., et al. vs. Magdangal
Elma, et.al ( GR. NO. 138965), promulgated on
30 June 2006;
2. The clarification of the dispositive part of the
decision ; and
3. The elevation of the case to the court en banc.
The solicitor general, in behalf of the respondent,
filed an omnibus motion, dated 11 august 2006 with
substantially the same allegation.
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of
The Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) ON 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his
tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential legal counsel (CPLC). He accepted the
second appointment, but waived any renumiration that
he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have
both appointments declared as unconstitutional and
therefore, null and void.
In its decision, the court declared that the concurrent
appointments of the respondents as PCGG chairman
and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the
concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of
section 7(2) OF ARTICLE ix-b of the 1987 constitution,
since these are incompatible offices. The duties of CPLC
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on
the action of the heads of various executive departments
and agencies and reviewing investigations involving
heads of executive depart6mnets. Since the actions of
the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency,
are subject to the review of the CPLC, such
appointments would be incompatible.
The court also decreed that the strict prohibition
under section 13 Article VII of the 1987 constitution
would not apply to the present case, since neither the
PCGG chairman nor CPLC is a secretary, under sectary
12 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
or assistant secretary. However, had the rule hereunder
been applicable to the case, the defect of these two
incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The
said section allows the concurrent holding of position
only when second post is required by the primary
function of the first appointments and is exercised in an
ex-officio capacity. Although respondent Elma waived
receiving remuneration for the second appointment, the
primary functions of the PCGG chairman do not require
his appointment as CPLC.
Ruling
1. After reviewing the arguments propounded in
respondents’ omnibus motion, we find that the
basic issues that were raised have already been
passed upon. No substantial arguments were
presented. Thus, the court denies the
respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
2. In response to the respondents’ request for
clarification, the court ruled that respondents
Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG
Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for
being incompatible offices. This ruling does not
render both appointments void. Following the
common-law rule on incompatibility of offices,
respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his
office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the
second office as CPLC.
3. There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion
to refer the case to court en banc. What are in
question in the present case are the
constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent
appointments, and not the constitutionality of
any treaty, law or agreement. The mere
application of the constitutional provisions does
not require the case to be heard and decided en
banc. Contrary to the allegations of the
respondent, the decision of the court in this case
does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union
vs. Executive Secretary. It should be noted that
Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89,
dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the
court en banc is not an appellate court to which
decisions or resolutions of a division may be
appealed.
The respondents’ motion for consideration and for
elevation of this case of court en banc is hereby
DENIED.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC)
Facts:
On January 18, 2010, the JBC passed a Resolution to
process for the filling up of the position of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.
On January 20, 2010, the JBC formally announced the
opening, for application or recommendation, of the
position of Chief Justice of this Court, thus
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the
opening for application or recommendation, of the
position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT, which will be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, HON.
REYNATO S. PUNO.In its February 8, 2010 meeting,
the JBC decided to proceed with the process of
announcing to the public the names of the candidates for
the position. Included in the list of applicants are: (1)
Brion, Arturo D.; (2) Carpio, Antonio T.; (3) Corona,
Renato C.; (4) Carpio Morales, Conchita; (5) Leonardo-
de Castro, Teresita J.; and (6) Sandoval, Edilberto G.
Petitioner Arturo de Castro entreats the Court to issue a
writ of mandamus to compel the JBC to send the list of
nominees for Chief Justice to the incumbent President
when the position becomes vacant upon the retirement
of Chief Justice Puno.
Petitions were filed by several interested parties and the
Court consolidated the petitions and required the JBC
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their
respective comments.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Section 15 of Article VII applies to
appointments in the Judiciary.
Ruling:
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from
Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the
ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban
applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba
legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.Another
instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read
into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the
13 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article
VII during the period provided therein, despite the
silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction
cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally
constitute an encroachment upon the field of the
Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and
Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their
meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be
interpolated in them. Interpolation of words is
unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail
to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In
other words, the addition of new words may alter the
thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the
meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or
without the omitted word or words, interpolation is
improper, because the primary source of the legislative
intent is in the language of the law itself. Thus, the
decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had
the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article
VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court. It cannot permit the meaning of the
Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in
order to suit the purposes of any quarter.The Members
of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience
and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary
proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the
outgoing President nor the present Members of the
Court had arranged the current situation to happen and
to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court
could have prevented the Members composing the Court
when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago
from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for
their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left
with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up
the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements
within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty
she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked
by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO JR., (IBP Governor - Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief
Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.
Governor - Eastern Visayas) v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC),
FACTS:
If the framers of the Constitution intends that the
This is a consolidated case which assails the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief
constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the
Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE
after the Presidential election in 2010. DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the
vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII appointments made in the Executive Department.
of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List
of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for
every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was
also taken into consideration which prohibits the
President or the Acting President from making
appointments within two (2) months immediately before
the next Presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled

and there were five (5) candidates for the position from
the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of
them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was
chosen by the President and was appointed for the
position of Chief Justice.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the

incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice
since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme
Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the
prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should
have expressly stated it in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the

successor of the Chief Justice..

RULING:

14 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
CALDERON V. CARALE
(Please Take note Bes!)
Article VII of the Constitution
Section 16. xx xx xx xx
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
FACTS:
1. In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law
amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA.
2. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al
as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was
not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.
3. Calderon questioned the appointment saying
that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment
on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution,
as Congress may, by law, require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President additional to
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16
of Article 7 of the Constitution.
4. The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
contends that RA 6715 which amended the
Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII
by expanding the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without
constitutional basis. Mison and Bautista laid the
issue to rest.
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the CoA.
HELD: No. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by
RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of appointments of the
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all
other officers of the government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall
within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, more specifically under the "third
groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those
whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the
NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of
the National Labor Relations Commission, it is
unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with
the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law,

require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers

15 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
Tarrosa v. Singson

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by

petitioner as a “taxpayer,” questioning the appointment
of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

Petitioner argues that respondent Singson’s

appointment is null and void since it was not submitted
for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.
The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of
R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as
the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines.
Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers

and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised
by the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter
referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven
(7) members appointed by the President of the
Philippines for a term of six (6) years.

The seven (7) members are:

(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be

the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of
the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and
his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor
is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall
designate a Deputy Governor to act as his alternate:
Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall
designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . .
(Emphasis supplied).

Issue:

whether or not the appointment as Governor of

the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas requires the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments

Held:

No. Congress cannot by law expand the

confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of
other government officials not expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution. (refer to Mison case)

16 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
ELPIDIO SORIANO III V. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.

DOCTRINE: Because PCG is not part of Philippine

Navy and AFP, the appointments and/or promotions of
its officers do not require anymore the confirmation of
CA, as the enumeration in Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Const. is
exclusive.

CASE SUMMARY: Bes, Read the facts. Short lang

naman. 

FACTS:

 PGMA appointed/promoted the public

respondents to different positions in the
Philippine Coast Guards (PCG) and their
subsequent assumption of office without
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (CA).
 Despite the lack of confirmation by the CA,
respondents had assumed their duties and
functions.
 Petitioners assails the said appointments
precisely because of the failure to undergo the
confirmation process by CA; hence, they should
be prohibited from discharging their duties and
functions. Likewise, the petitioners avers the
disbursement of the salaries and emoluments of
the said PCG officers.

ISSUE: W/N the permanent appointments of the

respondents (e.g., Lista, Estera, Tabares, Gosingan,
etc.) made by PGMA are legal and constitutional? YES

RULING:

 The history of the PCG would show that it used

to be administered and maintained by the
Philippine Navy as a separate unit. It was then
placed under the direct supervision and control
of the Secretary of National Defense. It was then
integrated in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
as a major subordinate unit. However, in March
1998, the President issued EO 475 transferring
the PCG from DND to the Office of the
President. He later on transferred the PCG from
the
17 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE,
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN ,

FACTS: Pursuant to the second sentence in

Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Comm ission on
Appointm ents becaus e the y are am ong the
officers of governm ent "whom he (the
President) m ay be authorized b y law to appoint
and Section 2(c), Executive Or der No. 163, 5
Ma y 1987, authorizes the Pres ident to appoint
the Chairm an and Mem bers of the Comm ission
on Hum an Rights O n 27 August 1987, the
President of the Philippines des ignated herein
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as" A c t i n
g Chairm an, Comm ission on Hum an Rights."
Subsequentl y, on 17 Decem ber 1988, extended
the petitioner to a perm anent appointm ent as
Chairm an of the Com m ission subm itting such
appointm ent (m ore accurately, nom ination) to
the Comm ission on Appointm ents for
confirm ation.

On 20 January 1989, or even before the

respondent Comm ission on Appointm ents had
acted on her " a d interim appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights"
petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorar i with a prayer for
the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to
declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and
without any legal force and effect any action of
the Comm ission on Appointm ents as well as of
the Comm ittee on Justice, Judicial and Bar
Council and Hum an Rights, on the lawfull y
extended appointm ent of the petitioner as
Chairm an of the Com m ission on Human Rights,
on the ground that they have no lawful and
constitutional authority to confirm and to review
her appointm ent."

I S S U E : Whether or not the presidents

appointment of the petitioner’s ad interim
appointment needs confirmation by the CA.

HELD: Under the Constitutional design, an ad

interim appointm ent does not appl y to
appointm ents solel y for the Pres ident to m ake.
Ad interim appointm ents, b y their ver y nature
under the 1987 Constitution, extend onl y to
appointm ents where the review of the

18 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
Ramon P. BINAMIRA v Peter D. GARRUCHO
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P.
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which
he claims to have been removed without just cause in
violation of his security of tenure.
FACTS
April 7, 1986, Binamira, through a memorandum,
was designated as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) by Jose Antonio Gonzales,
Minister of Tourism and Chairman, P.T.A Board. Minister
Gonzales sought approval from President Corazon
Aquino of the Board of Directors of the PTA including
Binamira as Vice President.
But on January 2, 1990, his resignation was
demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new
Secretary of Tourism. Binamira's demurrer led to an
unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a complaint
against the Secretary with the Commission on Human
Rights.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent
Garrucho a memorandum, copy furnished Binamira
which states:
“It appearing from the records you have
submitted to this Office that the present
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority was designated not by the
President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as
amended, but only by the Secretary of
Tourism, such designation is invalid.
Accordingly, you (Garrucho) are hereby
designated concurrently as General
Manager, effective immediately, until I can
appoint a person to serve in the said office
in a permanent capacity.”
Garrucho having taken over as General
Manager of the PTA in accordance with this
memorandum, Binamira filed this action against him to
question his title.
Subsequently, while his original petition was
pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging
that on April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines
appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority.
ISSUE:
19 | P a g e
ART VII CASE DIGESTS SEC 1-16
W.O.N power of appointment of a General
Manager can be delegated.
RULING: NO
Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office BUT it
cannot be construed to have the same meaning.
DESIGNATION connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official and an
implication that he shall hold the office only in temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority while APPOINTMENT is defines as the
selection, by authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office, when completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person
chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of
the nature of his office.
Sec. 23-A of P.D 564 states that “The General
Manager shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines and shall serve for the period of six years
unless sooner removed for cause; provided, that upon
the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his
successor shall have been appointed and qualified.”
Appointment involves discretion, which because of its
nature cannot be delegated. An office to whom
discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because he was
deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion.
Binamira was not appointed by the President but
only designated by the Minister of Tourism. It was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of
that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The
appointment (designation) of Binamira was not merely a
mechanical or ministerial act that could be performed by
a subordinate even if he happened to be a member of
the Cabinet.
Matibag vs. Benipayo,
FACTS:
COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting
Director IV” of the EID. Such appointment was renewed
in “temporary” capacity twice, first by Chairperson
Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later,
PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took
their oaths of office and assumed their positions.
However, since the Commission on Appointments did
not act on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad
interim appointments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President
amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C
Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and
the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their
ad interim appointments and subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate
the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX-C
RULING:
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of
Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until
such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
xxx
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...the term “ad interim appointment”… means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the
text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed
office becomes at that moment a government employee
and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the
constitution protection that “[n]o officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law.” Thus, an ad interim
appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once
the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or
revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only
if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment
he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter
is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee
has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which
is protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after
notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of
due process.
How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two
causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is
the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
Appointments acting on his appointment. These two
causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by
the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These
resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of
Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No
one, however, can complain because it is the
Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles
over the heads of the ad interim appointees.
Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and
irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment
or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy
any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC xxx
Was the renewal of appointment valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can
no longer be extended a new appointment. The
disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on
the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal
by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent
after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee.
Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal
from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding
on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In
this instance, the President can no longer renew the
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition
on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to
the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of

lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-
passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article

IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved
nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved
ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad
interim appointment because the disapproval is final
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not
because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
appointment because there is no final disapproval under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving
beyond the fixed term of seven years.

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Pimentel vs Ermita
Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the
appointmentsissued by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) through Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”)
to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael
T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez,
Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap
(“respondents”) as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23
September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in
an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents
as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive
in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments
is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a
Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary.”
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of
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a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy
in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since
a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have
the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of
the office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee
will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is
a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The

absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.

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