Administrative and Election Law (ADMELEC) Session 2 Cases:

1. Olsen and Co. v. Aldanese

2. People v. Maceren
3. Land Bank v. CA
4. Ople v. Torres
5. China Banking Corp v. HMDF
6. Edu v. Ericta
7. People v. Joliffe
8. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
9. People v. Rosenthal
10. International Hardwood & Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation
11. Tanada v. Tuvera
12. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres
13. People v. Que Po Lay
14. Evangelista v. Jarencio
15. Guevarra v. COMELEC
16. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board
17. Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago
18. Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa
19. RCPI - Board of Communications
20. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines Inc
21. Ang Tibay v. CIR
22. Vinta Maritime Co Inc v. NLRC
23. UP Board of regents v. CA
24. American Inter-fashion Corp v. Office of the President
25. Pefianco v. Moral
 1) Olsen and Co. Vs. Aldanese (ANNA)
43 Phil 259
G. R. No. L-18740. March 29, 1922
DOCTRINES:
LIMITATION OF POWER. — Under clause (a), section 6, of Act No. 2613, of the Philippine
Legislature, the authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules and
regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for the
classification, marking and packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good quality and
the handling of it under conditions.
STANDARD NOT DEFINED. — The act in question does not define the standard or the type
of leaf or manufactured tobacco which may be exported to the United States, or how or
upon what basis the Collector of Internal Revenue should fix or determine the standard.
POWER CONFERRED. — The authority to make rules and regulations is limited and defined
by the legislative to the making of general and local rules for the classification, marking,
packing, and the type of tobacco which may be exported to the United States, and it is not
confined or limited to tobacco produced in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva
Vizcaya, or any other province.
CANNOT DISCRIMINATE. — Neither the Collector of Internal Revenue nor the Legislature
has any power to discriminate in favor of one province against another it the production
of tobacco, or any other province.
Olsen & Co., the plaintiff, is engaged in the manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco
grown in the Philippine Islands.
The defendant, Vicente Aldanese, is the Insular collector of Customs, and the defendant, W.
Trinidad, is the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands.
As grounds for its petition, Olsen alleges that, under the law of Congress of October 3, 1913,
known as the Tariff Act, it had the legal right to export from the Philippine Islands into the
United States cigars which it manufactured from tobacco grown in the Philippine Islands.
That on February 4, 1916, the Philippine Legislature enacted Law No. 2613 entitled "An Act to
improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to
develop the export trade therein."
The Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as
"Tobacco Inspection Regulations."
It is further alleged that so much of clause B of section 6 of Act No. 2613 empowers the
Collector of Internal Revenue to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which may be exported into the United States, and portion of section
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7 of said Act which provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from
the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall have been in inspected by the Collector
of Internal Revenue, etc.," and all that portion of section 11 of the Act, which requires the
certificate of origin of the Collector of Internal Revenue to show that the tobacco to be
exported is standard, and that portion of section 9 of Administrative Order No. 35, which limits
the exportation into the United States of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long
filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya,
are unconstitutional and void.
AIt is further alleged that, after the elimination of such provisions, Act No. 2613 enjoins it as a
duty of the Internal Revenue Collector to certify to the Insular Collector that any tobacco or
cigars offered for export to the United States, which comply with the Tariff Act, and the growth
and product of the Philippine Islands, to issue a certificate of origin which will insure the speedy
admission of such cigars into the United States free of customs duty, and to permit the
exportation to the United States of all cigars manufactured of material and tobacco, 80 per
cent or more of which is the growth and product of the Philippine Islands.
Olsen & Co. applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for such a certificate to the insular
collector of customs for a consignment of 10,00 cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown
and produced in the Philippine Islands. The consignment was packed and stamped as required
by the regulations contained in Administrative Order No. 35, and in all things and respects
complied with the requirements of the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, and with the Act
NO. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, after the elimination of the void portions of Act No.
2613 and of the Administrative Order.
That the Collector of Internal Revenue wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such
certificate of origin "on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured of long filler
tobacco produced exclusively in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya."
ISSUE:
Was the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certifcate of origin based on the
ground that the cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacoo produced exclusively in
the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya correct & valid? NO.
HELD:
The important question here involved is the construction of section 6, 7, and 11 of Act No.
2613 of the Philippine Legislature, and section 9 of the "Tobacco Inspection Regulations,"
promulgated by Administrative Order No. 35. It must be conceded that the authority of the
Collector of Internal Revenue to make any rules and regulations must be founded upon some
legislative act, and that they must follow and be within the scope and purview of the act.
Clause A of section 6 of Act No. 2613 provides:
"To establish general and local rules respecting the classification, marking, and packing
of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States so far as may be
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 necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and to secure its handling under
sanitary conditions and to the end that leaf tobacco be not mixed, packed, and marked
as of the same quality when it is not of the same class and origin."
The power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules and regulations is confined to
the making of rules and regulations for the classification, making, and packing of tobacco, and
that such power is further limited to the making of such rules for the classification, marking,
and packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and its
handling under sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only that the Collector of Internal
Revenue is authorized to make any rules or regulations. The power is further limited "to the
end that leaf tobacco be not mixed, packed, and marked as of the same quality when it is not
of the same quality when it is not of the same class and origin." It is only for such defined
purposes that he is authorized to make any rules or regulations. Hence, it must follow that any
rules or regulations which are not within the scope of the Act are null and void.
Clause B provides:
"To establish from time to time adequate rules defining the standard and the type of
leaf and manufactured tobacco which may be exported to the United States, as well also
as the manner in which standard tobacco for export, whether it be leaf tobacco or
manufactured tobacco. shall be packed. Before establishing the rules above specified,
the Collector of Internal Revenue shall give due notice of the proposed rules or
amendments to those interested and shall give them an opportunity to present their
objections to such rules or amendments."
Clause B of section 6 should be construed with, and is limited by, the terms and provisions of
clause A.
Here, again, the Legislature has not defined what shall be the standard or the type of leaf or
manufactured tobacco which may be exported to the United States, or even specified how or
upon what basis the Collector of Internal Revenue should fix or determine the standard. All of
that power is delegated to the Collector of Internal Revenue.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature could delegate such power, the "rules and
regulations" promulgated should be confined to, and limited by, the power conferred by the
legislative act. Among other things, section 9 of the rules and regulations, promulgated by
Administrative Order No. 35, provides:
"To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from
good, clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been
harvested at least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper
and with long filler from which must have been removed all stems, dust, scraps, or burnt
tobacco; net weight of cigars to be not less than five kilograms per thousand . . . by color
is meant the color of the wrapper and not the filler . . .
x x x
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"In passing on the quality of cigars, the article will be required to come up to a high
standard as to workmanship, burn, aroma, and taste. The actual price at which the cigars
are sold will also be given due weight, and when it is found that cigars are sold at such
a low price that the cost of production with materials of the quality required in these
regulations leaves no reasonable margin of profits, such fact may be considered as
corroborative evidence in determining whether the cigars in question are standard."
Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that the provisions of the legislative act are not
limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya, or to any province, and that
there is no limitation as to the place where the tobacco should be grown in the Philippine
Islands. The only power conferred is to establish general and local rules for the classification,
marking, and packing of tobacco and the standard and the type of tobacco which may be
exported to the United States.
Neither the Collector of Internal Revenue nor the Legislature itself has any power to
discriminate in favor of one province against another in the production of tobacco or of any
other product of the Islands. The purpose and intent of the Legislator was that a proper
standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined, and that all of those who
produce tobacco of the same standard should have equal rights and opportunities. It was
never intended that a standard should be fixed which would limit the manufacture of cigars
for export to certain provinces of the Islands, or that the tobacco produced in one province
should be measured by another and different standard than the tobacco produced in any other
province. That would amount to discrimination and class legislation, which, even the
Legislature, would not have the power to enact. Again, the legislative Act does not say
anything about "filler," or whether it should be short or long. Neither does it say common
knowledge that standard cigars are of different sizes, weights, and lengths, and that the purity
and standard of the cigar does not depend upon either.
Act No. 2613 is apparently designed to prevent the exporting of a certain class of cigars from
the Philippine Islands into the United States. The law of Congress was designed to regulate
imports to the United States, and Act No. 2613 was designed to regulate the exporting of
tobacco from the Philippine Islands into the United States.
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 2) People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 (RACH)
PETITIONERS: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS: HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA,
GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL
ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
DOCTRINE: SCOPE AND REACH:
• Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it
should conform to the standards that the law prescribes
• Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
• The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
FACTS:
• This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.
• On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, using
Electro-fishing
• They were said to be "using their own motor banca; with a generator and
electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a webbed copper wire on the
tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached
to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish
thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to
the detriment and prejudice of the populace”
• The Municipal Court dismissed the complaint: held that electro fishing cannot be penalize
because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in
section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law
does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful.
• THE LAW IN question:
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- Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law, prohibits the use of any “obnoxious or poisonous”
substance in fishing.
- Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous
substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than
five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five
years.
- Pursuant to this law, Fisheries Administrative Order (AO) No. 84, was issued by the
Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, prohibiting electro-fishing.
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No.
3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro
fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and
guidance of all concerned.
SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as
follows:
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters
of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and
Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight
and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order,
rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric
current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be
battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current.
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro
fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the
Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which
must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources which shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order
shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00)
or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the
Court.
- In 1967, this was later amended by AO No. 84-1 which reduced the prohibition
against electro fishing only to “fresh water fisheries” in the Philippines.
• Because the trial court dismissed the complaint, the prosecution raised the issue based on
the following: (The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries)
(1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries
Law;
(2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the
Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules
and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries
Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No.
3512;
4
 (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing
resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and
(4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the
Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject
the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Administrative Order penalizing electro fishing Valid? NO
The Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded
their authority in issuing AO 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the
Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
• The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
- Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that
effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
- That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in
fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine
molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
- Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No.
84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails
within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for
electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the
penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the
Fisheries Law.
• The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
- While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into
effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact
a criminal statute.
- Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it
should conform to the standards that the law prescribes
- The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a
particular statute
- The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative,
powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law”.
- Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
- The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
• There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule- making
powers.
- Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue
instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to
carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of
Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.
- Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the
force of law. As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body,
it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the
exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in
his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
- Consequently, the IRR must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
• In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with
the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not
expressly punish electro fishing. Thus, what the Secretary did is equivalent to legislating on
the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly
reserved to Congress.
• At present, there is no doubt that electrofishing in both fresh and saltwater areas is
punishable under the new Fisheries Law (PD 704) promulgated in 1975.
- It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize
electro fishing.
- However, the accused cannot be held liable under this law, since it was not yet in effect in
1969.
- Therefore, the SC affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court.
Link to Original Text:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/oct1977/gr_32166_1977.html
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 3) LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP,
HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents. October 6, 1995. (ABBIE)
DOCTRINE: The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of
an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there
is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. It must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power
of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for
settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
FACTS:
 Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
 Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of
RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction.
 Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to
compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to
finally determine the just compensation of their properties
 They likewise wanted Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts for
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
FACTS OF CONSOLIDATED CASES:
 Pedro Yap alleges that in 1992, the TCTs of Yap were totally cancelled by the
Registrar of Deeds and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries
collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the
Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked
for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands, and issued in the names of
listed beneficiaries without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with
the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in
cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.
 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that they are the owners of a parcel of land
located at NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares, registered in the
name of the late Santiago; that without notice, the Landbank required and the
beneficiaries executed Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU) to pay rentals
to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the
net harvest; that the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the
Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust
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fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Santiago, that the beneficiaries stopped paying
rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of
Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank
 Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for
brevity) alleges that the properties in Quezon consist of a parcel of land with an
area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel with an area of 163.6189
hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine
compensation was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to
the landowner; that a decision was fixing the compensation for the parcel of at
P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for
said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account was
established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account. With respect to
AMADCOR's property in Albay, it is alleged that the property is 1,629.4578
hectares; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999
hectares which were registered but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR
to fix the compensation for said land.
 Respondents argue that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the
opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in
an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it
is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.
 Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid
exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the
DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank
was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case
of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
 CA RULED in favor of private respondents
 MR was denied hence this petition
ISSUES: (1) WON the CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990. – NO, AO IS NULL AND VOID. (2) WON they may withdraw the bonds pending
the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties
RULING: (1) Petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account
as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through AC No. 9, DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies
of RA 6657. The contention is untenable.
6
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands — xxx xxx xxx (e) Upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . xxxx
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form.
If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that
should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from
which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity
in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an
error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. It must be stressed
that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for
the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative
agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Administrative
regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule
that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case
there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails.
made fully in money" — the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule
. . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation."
The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It
did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, already been
deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the
use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. To reiterate…within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent
domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the owner r of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss. PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED

DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in
behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in
"LBP bonds".

(2) The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation
under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section
1821 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the
amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the
landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount
deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner
because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the
following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform".

Notably, however, the said case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners'
assertion saying that: …despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned
under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners
in the Phil., to conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always required to be

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 7

 4) Ople v. Torres | Scope and Search (GAB V.)
PETITIONER: Senator Blas F. Ople
RESPONDENTS: Ruben D. Torres, et al.
DOCTRINE: Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign
and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. While
Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. AO 308
establishes for the first time a National Computerized identification Reference System.
Moreover, even assuming that AO 308 need not be the subject of the law, still it cannot
pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially, it violates the
right to privacy. The act of promulgating AO 308 is an act of legislation rather than
enforcement of a law, thus should be struck down as unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power.
FACTS:
 On December 12, 1966, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
308 (AO 308) entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" which has a goal to provide a convenient way to transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities.
 Senator Blas Ople filed a case, seeking to invalidate the AO on two constitutional
grounds:
o That it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate
o It impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
 He contends that the AO is not a mere administrative order but is a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue.
 He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to
serve the people."
 It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the
all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line
that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that
should be covered by law.
 Nor is it correct to argue that AO 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes
no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the
people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no
right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

ISSUES: WN the issuance of the President encroaches upon the legislative powers of Congress,
and is therefore, undue delegation of legislative power.  YES

HELD:
 While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.

 Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix
a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance."

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 8

 5) China Banking Corp v HMDF [G.R. No. 131787. May 19, 1999] (EMILLE)
PETITIONERS: CHINA BANKING CORPORATION (CBC)
CBC PROPERTIES AND COMPUTER CENTER, INC., (CBC-PCCI)
RESPONDENTS: THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT
MUTUAL FUND (HDMF); HDMF PRESIDENT; AND THE HOME MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT
FUND, respondents.
DOCTRINE: RULE MAKING POWER
The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
FACTS:
- Respondent HDMF granted petitioners CBC and CBC-PCCI ( both employers)
certificates of waiver dated July 7, 1995 and January 19, 1996 (covering periods of
July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996 for CBC and January 1 to December 31, 1995 for CBC-
PCCI) both for reason of Superior Retirement Plan pursuant to Section 19 of P. D.
1752 otherwise known as the Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980. Said
law states that employers who have their own existing provident and/or employees-
housing plans may register for annual certification for waiver or suspension from
coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund created under said
law.
- RA 7742, amending P. D. 1752 was approved.
- Respondent HDMF Board issued an Amendment to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. 7742 (The Amendment). Pursuant to said Amendment, the said
board issued HDMF Circular No. 124-B – the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for
filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752
(Guidelines). Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a company must have a
provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG
Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage.
- CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the
year 1996, but the applications were disapproved as their “retirement plan is not
superior to Pag-IBIG Fund”, and “the amended Implementing Rules and &
Regulations of R. A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver, a company must have
retirement/provident and housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG Funds.”
Petitioners sought to annul the Amendment and the Guidelines with the RTC for gadalej,
alleging that in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an
employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of
coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
RTC—sided with HDMF. The denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is
within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its
jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications
Petitioners say it does not question the power of respondent HDMF, as an administrative
agency, to issue rules and regulations to implement P.D. 1752 and R.A. 7742; however, the
subject Amendment and Guidelines issued by it should be set aside and declared null and void
for being irrevocably inconsistent with the enabling law, P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742.
The latter merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption for coverage, the existence of
either a superior provident (retirement) plan or a superior housing plan, and not the
concurrence of both plans.
Respondents contend that there is no question of law. In denying petitioners application
for waiver of coverage under Republic Act No. 7742 the respondent Board was exercising its
quasi-judicial function accorded with finality. The Amendment and the Guidelines are
consistent with the enabling law, which is a piece of social legislation intended to provide both
a savings generation and a house building program.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents acted with GADALEJ in issuing the Amendment and the Guidelines
under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, insofar as said Amendment and Guidelines impose
as a requirement for exemption from coverage or participation in the HDMF the existence
of both a superior housing plan and a provident plan.—YES, thus the issuances are void
HELD:
The assailed Amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer
from a legal infirmity and should be set aside.
The Pag-IBIG Fund, the law pertinent to HDMF, should be revisited:
When the HDMFwas created by PD 1530, the said funds, one for government employees
and another for private employees, were to be established and maintained from contributions
by the employees and counterpart contributions by their employers. PD 1752 amended PD
1530 to make the Home Development Mutual Fund a body corporate and to make its coverage
mandatory upon all employers covered by the SSS and the GSIS. PD No. 1752 provides for
waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the fund, thus:
Section 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plans. - An employer and/or employee-group
who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident and/or
employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes:
(a) For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the
Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension
does not contravene any effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features
of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund or continue to be so; or
(b) For integration with the Fund, either fully or partially.
9
 The establishment of a separate provident and/or housing plan after the effectivity of
this Decree shall not be a ground for waiver of coverage in the Fund; nor shall such
coverage bar any employer and/or employee-group from establishing separate
provident and/or housing plans. (underscoring ours)
Then RA 7742 was approved. It provides that the Board of Trustees of the HDMF shall
promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of (this) Act.
Pursuant to the above authority the board promulgated The IRR of Republic Act 7742
amending PD 1752, EO 35 and 90. Rule VII thereof reads:
RULE VII
WAIVER OR SUSPENSION
SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension-Existing Provident or Retirement Plan.
An employer and/or employee group who has an existing provident or retirement plan as of
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7742, qualified under Republic Act No. 4917 and actuarially
determined to be sound and reasonable by an independent actuary duly accredited by the
Insurance Commission, may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage. Such
waiver or suspension may be granted by the President of the Fund on the basis of verification
that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any effective collective bargaining or other
existing agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund
and continue to be so. xxx
SECTION 2. Waiver or Suspension-Existing Housing Plan.
An employer and/or employee group who has an existing housing plan as of the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7742 may apply with the fund for waiver or suspension of coverage. Such
waiver or suspension of coverage may be granted by the President of the Fund on the basis of
verification that the waiver or suspension of coverage does not contravene any effective
collective bargaining or other existing agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are
superior to the Fund and continue to be so. xxx
Then the HDMF Board adopted Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act 7742. As amended, Rule VII on Waiver or Suspension now reads:
RULE VII
WAIVER OF SUSPENSION
SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing Provident/Retirement and
Housing Plan.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
Any employer with a plan providing both for a provident/retirement and housing
benefits for all his employees and existing as of December 14, 1980, the effectivity
date of Presidential Decree No. 1752, may apply with the Fund for waiver or
suspension of coverage . The provident/retirement aspect of the plan must be
qualified under R.A. 4917 and actuarially determined to be sound and reasonable by
an independent, actuary duly accredited by the Insurance Commission.
The provident/retirement and housing benefits as provided for under the plan must
be superior to the provident/retirement and housing benefits offered by the Fund.
xxx
On October 23, 1995, HDMF Circular No. 124-B entitled Revised Guidelines and
Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No.
1752, as amended by Republic Act No. 7742, was promulgated. The Circular pertinently
provides:
I. GROUNDS FOR WAIVER OR SUSPENSION OF FUND COVERAGE
A. SUPERIOR PROVIDENT/RETIREMENT PLAN AND HOUSING PLAN
ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT, RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN
AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D.
NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or suspension from Fund coverage,
provided, that - -
xxx
Petitioner contends that respondent, in the exercise of its rule making power has
overstepped the bounds and exceeded its limit. The law provides as a condition for exemption
from coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan, and/or a
superior housing plan, and not the existence of both plans.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the use of the words and/or in Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752, which words are diametrically opposed in meaning, can only be used
interchangeably and not together, and the option of making it either both or any one belongs
to the Board of Trustees of HDMF, which has the power and authority to issue rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law, and the guidelines for
the grant of waiver or suspension of coverage.
There is no question that the HDMF Board has rule-making powers. The controversy lies
in the legal signification of the words and/or.
In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary
signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or
eggs.
10
 It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term
and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.

It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan
superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended
that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to
qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. Notably, paragraph
(a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of
the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously
contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of
an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To
require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for
waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word
or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated
power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative
agency. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute. As aptly observed in People vs. Maceren[11]:

The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of
Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C. J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of
Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs.
Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

While it may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of both plans to
qualify for exemption would strengthen the Home Development Mutual Fund and make it
more effective both as a savings generation and a house building program, the basic law should
prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to
implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions.

Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and HDMF
Circular No. 124-B and the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver
or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, should be
declared invalid insofar as they require that an employer must have both a superior
retirement/provident plan and a superior employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a
certificate of waiver and suspension of coverage from the HDMF.

Link to Original Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/131787.htm

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 11

 6) Edu vs. Ericta (ANNA)
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII,
Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
Doctrine:
Sufficient standard test – The standard is sufficient if it defines legislativepolicy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely
on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition
against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the
enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and
prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such
enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join
such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be decided "once and for
all."
Respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity Reflector Law as an
invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause.
Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, filed his answer explaining why he
restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and urged the court to rule on the
legal questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred on
petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power be
definitely decided.
ISSUES:
Whether the Reflector Law is constitutional. YES.
W/N Administrative Order No.2 is contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power? NO.
HELD:
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
The SC find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. —
Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not
well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every
motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning
devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible
at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the
requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." It is thus obvious that the
challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety.
Police power is the authority of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
"be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.”
The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice.
It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need.
The administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in
effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style,
kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such
reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape
or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at
all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." Then
came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is
provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches
square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped
area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as to how
such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." There is the further
requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four
reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in
front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors,
whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front
part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the
rear shall all be red.
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation
of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. A distinction has rightfully been
made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
12
discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by
which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety.

The Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No.
4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public
safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a
categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse.

Edu, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long
as they do not conflict with its provisions.

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 13

 7) People v. Joliffe, G.R. No. L-9553, May 13, 1959 (RACH)
PETITIONERS: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS: WILLIAM ERNEST JOLLIFFE
DOCTRINE:
Sufficient Standard test: While legislative power may not be delegated except to local
governments, however, there are two instances when it is allowed: (1) to delegate the
power to determine what the law shall be and (2) to delegate the authority to fix the details
in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule
is that:
if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which
"sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may
be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will."
Presumption of Regularity: It is frequently said that a presumption of regularity the
performance of administrative duties. That is, when an act has been completed, it is to be
supposed that the act was done in the manner prescribed and by an officer authorized by
law to do it. The presumption is of course a rebuttable one, but the bare allegation that
there has been a failure to observe statutory requirements has been regarded as a mere
conclusion of the pleader; where the administrative order is accompanied by a statement
that there has been compliance and there is no showing of fact to the contrary, the
presumption of regularity is ordinarily sufficient to support the official act of a public officer.
FACTS:
• This is an appeal taken by defendant William Ernest Jolliffe from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, convicting him of a violation of Republic Act No. 265 (AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFINING ITS POWERS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE MONETARY AND BANKING SYSTEM, AMENDING THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE WITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENCY AND THE
BUREAU OF BANKING, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), and sentencing him to imprisonment
for one (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture,
in favor of the Government, of four (4) pieces of gold bullion valued P35,305.46, and a
travellers' check in the sum of $100.00.
1 Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government
"CIRCULAR NO. 21"
(As amended) October 15, 1952
SECTION 4. Export of gold
Any person desiring to export gold in any form, including jewelry, whether for refining abroad or
otherwise, must obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicants for export license must
present satisfactory evidence that the import of the gold into the country of the importer will not
be in violation of the rules and regulation of such country.
2
SEC. 74. Emergency restrictions on exchange operations.—Notwithstanding the provisions of
the third paragraph of the preceding section, in order to protect the international reserve of the
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
• On Dec. 7, 1953, when appellant was about to board a plane of the Pan American
World Airways, four pieces of gold bullion were found in his body. There was also
found in his possession a $100 traveler’s check. He was charged with and convicted
of violation of RA 265 and sentenced to imprisonment, to pay fine and costs, as well
as decreeing the forfeiture in favor of the Gov’t of the gold bullion and the traveler’s
check.
• He appealed and among others challenged the validity of Circular No. 211 of the Central Bank
on the ground that it is an undue delegation of powers, specifically: That the trial court erred
in not ruling Circular 21 of the Central Bank is not a valid law, because it did not comply with
the provisions of section 742 of Republic Act 265, in that:
(a) It was approved by the President of the Philippines;
(b) In its promulgation, the Monetary Board exceeded the authority granted it by the
Central Bank Act, because the context of the circular does not indicate that it was a
temporary emergency measure;
(c) It can only be issued as an emergency measure or during crisis, and as issued, has
no force and effect, because the emergency it seeks to remedy never existed or no
longer exists;
(d) That the publication of the circular (original and amended) in the November 1951
and October 1952 issues of the Official Gazette are not the adequate publications
required by law, because said publications on their faces showed them to be
incomplete and defective;
(e) That granting, without admitting, that the power to promulgate it was granted to
the Monetary Board by Republic Act 265, and granting without admitting, that the
power to so promulgate was validly exercised, still it is invalid because it constitutes
an invalid delegation of legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Circular no. 21 is valid and if there is undue delegation.
HELD:
(1) There is approval of the circular from the President.
The practice of the Monetary Board was to obtain said approval before the formal enactment
and promulgation of circulars necessitating presidential sanction. Indeed, since it has no
authority to subject transactions in gold to license, unless the President agrees thereto, it is,
in effect, the duty of the Board to obtain the assent of the Executive to the policy of requiring
said license at a particular time, either upon adoption of the resolution of this effect, or prior
time in which to take constructive measures to combat such a crisis, the Monetary Board, with
the concurrence of at least five of its members, and with the approval of the President of the
Philippines, may temporarily suspend or restrict sales of exchange by the Central Bank and may
subject all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to license by the Central Bank. The
adoption of the emergency measures authorized in this section shall be subject to any executive
and international agreements to which the Republic of the Philippines is a party.
14
thereto. As a consequence, it must be presumed — in the absence of proof to the contrary,
which is wanting — that such duty has been fulfilled in the case at bar.
- It is frequently said that a presumption of regularity the performance of
administrative duties. That is, when an act has been completed, it is to be supposed • Referring the case at bar, section 74 of Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary
that the act was done in the manner prescribed and by an officer authorized by law Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign
to do it. exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an
(2) Circular No. 20 is the original circular which provides succeeding circulars to be covered by exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take
presidential approval. constructive measures to combat such crisis."
- The original circular subjecting to licensing by the Central Bank "all transaction in • The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures" to protect
gold and foreign exchange", Circular No. 20, which, as approved and published, the international stability of the peso, "whether the international reserve is falling, as a result
states, that, "pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 265", it had been of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary
adopted by "the Monetary Board, by unanimous vote and with the approval of the to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act No. 265).
President of the Philippines." • These powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law
- What is more, the last paragraph of Circular No. 20, provides that "further creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the
regulations in respect to transactions covered by this circular will be issued Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in
separately." Thus, the President had approved not only the licensing by the Central the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.)
Bank" of "all transactions in gold and foreign exchange," but, also, the issuance, • These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the
subsequently to the promulgation of Circular No. 20, of "further regulations in character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of
respect" of such transactions. Said further regulations were incorporated into said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers
Circular No. 21, which thus bears the stamp of presidential sanction, although this is
not specifically required by law.
- It is only the decision of the Monetary Board to subject to license by the Central Bank URL: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1959/may1959/gr_l-9553_1959.html
all transactions in gold and foreign exchange that needs the approval of the
President. Once the same has been given, the details in the implementation of said
decision may be determined by said Board, through such regulations as may be
promulgated from time to time.
- The assent of the President is not a prerequisite to the validity and effectivity of
these regulations, as distinguished from the aforementioned decision thereby
sought to be enforced or executed.
- The authority of the Monetary Board to make regulations is governed, not by section
74 of Republic Act No. 265, but by section 14 thereof, in the language of which: In
order to exercise the authority granted to it under this Act the Monetary Board shall:
(a) Prepare and issue such rules and regulations as it considers necessary for the
effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the power assigned to
the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank under this Act.

THE IMPORTANT PART

• the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue
the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
• While legislative power may not be delegated except to local governments, however, there
are two instances when it is allowed: (1) to delegate the power to determine what the
law shall be and (2) to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that:
if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently
marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether
he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United Sates, 88 L.
ed. 848.)

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 15

  In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759
8) RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
 vs.
 THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,
defendant. March 7, 1919 (ABBIE)
DOCTRINE: Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an
 Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when
the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines.
FACTS:
 Case is application for habeas corpus of Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It
is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on
the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos
is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan
for having run away form the reservation.
 On February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 (to
control the Mangyans) which "Resolved, that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject
to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior.
 On December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order
No. 2 which says: "…pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised
Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917. "Any Mangyan who
shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed
in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
 That the resolution of the provincial board, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests
in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
 Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759
of Act No. 2711.
 The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917. Petitioners, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: SEC. 2145.
Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province
in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
of the same Code, which read as follows: SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to
take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with
the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the
Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the Philippines with reference to the
uncivilized elements, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude
towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the
subject. (HISTORY BELOW)
o During the Spanish colonization, LAW I: THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED
INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES.
o LAW VIII:
 THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
o LAW IX:
 THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF
THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
o LAW XIII: THE SAME AS ABOVE.
 THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT
REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
o LAW XV:
 THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE
"REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
o LAW XXI: THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO
SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
o AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES: Organic
Law – In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization
and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however,
be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
o Philippine Bill – The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the
Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
o Jones Law. – The law established a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of
non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public
affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives.
16
  The Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to
religious belief, but, in a way, to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.
 The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and
have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of
municipal government.
ISSUE: (1) WON there was valid delegation of legislative power to the provincial board – YES.
(2) WON they were deprived of liberty – NO.
RULING: (1) Delegation was valid. "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The Philippine
Legislature has conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board. Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of the law
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state? Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation
of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
(2) There was no deprivation of liberty or involuntary servitude in the issuance of Sec 2145.
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws." The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the
Christian.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province;
and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live
in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life,
making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of
civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the
Government wished to do by bringing them into a reservation was to gather together the
children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in fine, to
begin the process of civilization. This method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the
bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to
the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be
improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint
in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people.
Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all
the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the
progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain.
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they
will leave the country. Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and
destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State
but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people
with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court?
They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance
they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization.
The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that
they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a
school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order
that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their
living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to
do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore,
no involuntary servitude.
17
This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which
they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to
the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not
make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught.

CONCLUSION OF THE SC:

In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government
renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course,
on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which
the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and
for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say
that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that
power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. Further, one cannot hold that
the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines.

Section 2145 is valid. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated,
and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in
order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.

If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must
take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation
of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no
narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does
not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the
equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court.

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 18


9) People v. Rosenthal | Sufficient Standard Test (GAB V.)
PETITIONERS: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmena
DOCTRINE:
“Public Interest” as a standard: The term “public interest” is not without a settled meaning.
“Appellant insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the
stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption
that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations, the purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the
provision in question show the contrary.
FACTS:
 Two consolidated criminal cases were filed against Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio
Osmena regarding the violation of Act. 2851 or the “Blue Sky Law”.
 Rosenthal and Osmena were promoters, organizers, founders, and
incorporators of O.R.O. Oil Co. Inc., and South Cebu Oil Co., Inc., which is built
to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, petroleum, natural gas and
other oil products and are dependent on promise of future promotion and
development of the companies.
 In this law:
o Sec. 1b defines speculative securities as “all securities the value of
which materially depend upon proposed or promised future
promotion or development rather than on present tangible assets and
conditions.”
o The law gives the insular treasurer the prerogative to issue
certificates/permits to “person, partnership, association or
corporation” that complied with the provisions of the law upon
submission of pertinent documents.
o The Insular treasurer may revoke or cancel existing certificates that
violated the law based on the standard of public interest.
o The decision of the insular treasurer is appealable to the secretary of
finance within 30 days.
 The RTC held that Rosenthal and Osmeña were found to be guilty violating the
Blue Sky Law for selling their assets based on non-tangible assets.
 The assets they sold were merely speculative and based on future gains. This is
in violation of Sec. 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581 that states that “any person,
partnership and business that plans to sell speculative securities are
required to file to the Insular Treasurer various documents and a fine of 20
pesos.”
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
o Under Sec. 5 it simply states that if the Insular Treasurer is satisfied
with the showing of documents of the mentioned agents he will issue
a certificate that will allow its business, and its agents to sell the
speculative securities. The Insular Treasurer may rescind such
certificate for public interest and that the said rescinded business may
file a motion to appeal within 30 days to the Secretary of Finance.
 They appealed to the CA. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional,
vague, and uncertain, because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can
guide said officials in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit
ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter
of its issuance. However, upon the motion of the OSG, the case was forwarded
to the SC.
ISSUES: WN there is undue delegation of power to the insular treasurer given that “public
interest” was the standard to determine the revocation of an existing certificate.  NO!
HELD:
 The court held that the standards set by Sec 2 and 5 are sufficient to determine
the mandate of the Insular Treasurer since Act No. 2581 is clear and lawful as it
narrates a clear decision process.
 The Court ruled that public interest as the standard is certain. This is because the
law itself defined what speculative securities are. It is also clear that the intent
of the law is to safeguard the public against speculative schemes. Public Interest
is an accepted standard of delegation of power.
 For the power to rescind or the issuance of cancellation. The court believes that
the term “public interest” construed at the face of mandate of Insular Treasurer
is clear as it pertains to actions against fly-by-night securities seller, fraudulent
exploiters and etc. Thus, there is no ambiguity and that the discretion is already
clear.
o It also allows a system of checks and balances through an appeal to the
Secretary of Finance, in case of cancellation.
 The theory of the separation of powers (between executive and legislative) is
designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over
action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and
thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism.
 Thereby, the “rule of law” (referring to Act No. 2851) was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by
certain legal devices. The maxim “delegatus non potest delegare or delegata
potestas non potest delegare” has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation”, in practically all
19
 modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the
authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the
safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in
mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
10) International Hardwood & Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation
[G.R. No. 47178. November 25, 1940.]
PETITIONERS: THE INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY
RESPONDENTS: THE PANGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR
DOCTRINE: power of CIR; subordinate legislation
The Court of Industrial Relations has the power to determine minimum wages for an
individual employee in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take
cognizance of under the provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and such
grant of power is constitutional.
One thing is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that
is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari,
has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of ’subordinate legislation’
Delegation of legislative powers
Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under
this Act, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Assembly has by this section
furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion
in the determination of any question or controversy before it. The discretionary power thus
conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of
powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
FACTS:
The Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) that an industrial
dispute existed between the petitioner and certain of its employees who are members of
respondent union, and that the controversy was a proper one to be dealt with by said Court
in the public interest under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103.
The industrial dispute mentioned above referred to certain demands made by the
respondent on the petitioner, among which were the following:
"2. Set the minimum daily wages of common laborers at one peso.
"3. Devise a proper schedule of rate of wages for all laborers.
"4. The rate of wages for the mountain camps should be higher by 20 per cent over
those given in the town."
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
For some years prior June 1939, the minimum wage paid by the petitioner to its employees
was P0.70 a day regardless of whether the laborer was employed in the poblaciones of the
towns of Pangil and Famy, or in the mountain camps.
In deciding demands Nos. 2 and 4 made by the respondent on the petitioner as above set
forth, the Honorable Leopoldo Rovira, one of the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,
rendered the following adjudication in his decision in favour of the union’s demand.
The petitioner filed a motion with the CIR in banc praying for the reconsideration. Filed a
motion praying that said Court hold itself without jurisdiction to decide the question relating
to demands Nos. 2 and 4 alleging:
- (1) that the CIR has no authority to determine minimum wages for an individual
employer in connection with a particular and specific industrial dispute under the
provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103;
- (2) that such authority would constitute an undue delegation of legislative power
to the Court of Industrial Relations and would deny the petitioner the equal
protection of the laws, thus rendering said section unconstitutional and void.
CIR denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in
connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance of under the
provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
and if it has, WON such grant of power is unconstitutional and void.—YES it has the power;
NO, the grant of power is not unconstitutional.
HELD:
The petitioner contends that "the National Assembly, in granting the CIR general power to
decide any industrial dispute under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, could not have
granted, within such general power, authority to decide a matter which has been made
determinable in another specific manner," and asserts that "the determination of minimum
wages for each and every employer in a given locality or given industry has been specifically
provided for in section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 103" (p. 9 of the petition).
- Section 5- this section however, does not contemplate the arbitration and
settlement of industrial or agricultural disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, and is designed merely to provide for a workable device whereby a
scheme of minimum wage or share for laborers or tenants in a given industry or
locality may be evolved, whenever conditions therein warrant. virtua1aw library
On the other hand, section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, together with the other sections
complementing it, is designed to provide for compulsory arbitration in order to prevent non-
pacific methods in the determination of industrial and agricultural disputes. Commonwealth
Act No. 103, in various sections thereof, has provided the means towards its realization. Thus
in section 4, the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered to "take cognizance for purposes
of prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
20
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regard wages, shares In harmony with such growing tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case of Compania
or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspensions of employees or laborers, tenants or General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136, relied
farm-laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the ’delegation of
and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers." and by greater powers by the legislature.’"
section 13, it is provided that "in making an award, order or decision, under the provisions of
section four of this Act, the court shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or Link to Original Text:
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1940novemberdecisions.php?id=214
award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural dispute."

Under the view suggested by the petitioner, if an industrial dispute between an employer and
its employees causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout arises from differences as regards a
minimum wage, the Court of Industrial Relations would be without authority to take
cognizance of the dispute for arbitration and settlement unless the President of the PH directs
it to investigate, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum
wage which shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in such industry.
- To adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at naught the plenary powers
conferred upon the Court and to frustrate the very objective of the law, namely, to
create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the Government could
be made effective in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of
industrial or agricultural disputes. It is fundamental that the intention and policy of
the National Assembly, as expressed in the enactment, should be effectuated, and
the Act should receive a construction that will lead to this result.

Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under
this Act, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Assembly has by this section
furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in
the determination of any question or controversy before it, and we have already ruled that the
discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function,
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

We find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time
American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be
exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into
the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however,
is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the
maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of ’subordinate legislation’ not only in the United States
and England but in practically all modern governments. (People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R.
46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939).

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11) Tanada vs. Tuvera.(ANNA)
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Doctrine:
Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. For the publication requirement, “laws” refer to all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws. This does not cover internal regulations issued by
administrative agencies, which are governed by the Local Government Code. Publication
must be full, or there is none at all.
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are moved for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
ISSUES:
Whether publication in Official Gazette is required before any law or statute takes effect. YES.
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2
“unless otherwise provided”. YES.
HELD:
The Supreme Court concluded, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest.
SC hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
22
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing
of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by
the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly.
The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by
existing law.

Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified
by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SC also declared that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible,
to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.

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12) Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 101279, August 6,
1992 (RACH)
PETITIONERS: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,
RESPONDENTS: HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor &
Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
DOCTRINE: Publicatiion and effectivity
HELD IN in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
• . . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
• Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
• We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the laws.
FACTS:
• This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine
Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
3 contracts which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies
is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and
deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for
said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's
regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool
of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.
4 processing of DHs shall be allowed.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for
Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing
and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the
POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
• PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies
duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, engaged in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
• As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.
163, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies
of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over
the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also
issued Memorandum Circular No. 374, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment
contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
• PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars
and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave
abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of
the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the police power as delegated
to the executive branch of Government. YES
HELD:
• The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society". More and more administrative bodies are necessary to
help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch
than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice”.
• The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino land-based workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of
the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991
only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall
recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache,
Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter,
those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA
Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the
cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will
be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
24
 "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon
the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate
conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. To "restrict"
means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons
Pertinent laws supporting the legality of the power
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the
coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is
hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by
Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment
functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment
Services was the power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to
regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of
workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied).
(p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power
and duty:
“3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract
workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other
sectors as policy may dictate . . .” (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
“2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of
shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and
secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers
and secure compliance therewith.” (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the
executive branch of Government.
THE IMPORTANT PART
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article
2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its
parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules
and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their
adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as
amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date
of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter
be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in
the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence
of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall
take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be
affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
• Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. (p. 448.)
• We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced
and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory
requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.
URL: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_101279_1992.html
25
 Civil Code equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

13) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
 QUE PO LAY, defendant-
appellant. March 29, 1954
DOCTRINE: It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but
being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and
effect of law. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No.
20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before
the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
FACTS:
 Que Po Lay is appealing the decision of the CFI, finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000.
 The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange
consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about
$7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day
following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20.
 He claims that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to
the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular
had no force and effect.
 He contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability.
 The Solicitor General answering says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do
not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for
the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound
by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949,
it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not
have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after
November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was
not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his
possession thereof.
Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily,
one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below
and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. But the question of non-
publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been
published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no
such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the
circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction.
This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court
below.
In view of the foregoing, we REVERSE THE DECISION APPEALED FROM AND ACQUIT the
appellant.

ISSUE: WON publication of circular no. 20 is needed for it to be effective – YES. APPELANT
CANNOT BE CONVICTED.

RULING: We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the
publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become
binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force
and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the
Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after
the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new

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14) Evangelista v. Jarencio | Quasi-judicial Function: Subpoenas; Contempt (GAB V.)
PETITIONER: Sec. Quirico P. Evangelista
RESPONDENT: Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio
SUMMARY: The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO),
created by the President pursuant to his special powers duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code to forestall nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil
service and vested with the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and
580 of the same Code, issued to respondent Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service
Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS . . . then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending
therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena respondent Manalastas assailed its validity and
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition praying for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against the PARGO and/or other persons acting in its behalf from
further issuing subpoenas to Respondent. When the respondent court granted the petition,
the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, set respondent court’s
order aside and held that the disputed subpoena is well within the legal competence of the
Agency to issue.
DOCTRINE:
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose
is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be
taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. The agency draws
its subpoena power from legislation.
FACTS:
 This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled
"Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc
 Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No.
4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions
and responsibilities:
o To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft
and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness,
subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the
President of the Philippines.
o To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts
Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima
facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth.
o To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of
sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public
official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
 For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all
the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.
 Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of
the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public
Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and
appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."
ISSUES: WN the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.  YES
HELD:
 It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are
useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining
general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific
than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.
 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of
a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations
for actions.
 We recognize that in the case before us, petitioner agency draws its subpoena power
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it
to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the
27
 investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions
and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such
subpoena power operates in extents to all the functions of the agency as laid out in
the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely
exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
under sub-paragraph (b).

 The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or
intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of
the creation of the agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and
anomalies in the civil service.

 To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its
investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the
enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when
and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, we see no
reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law
itself makes none.

 There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency
upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of
Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and
that the information sought to be.

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 28


15) Guevarra v. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958]
PETITIONER: JOSE L. GUEVARA
RESPONDENTS: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DOCTRINE:
While the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the
elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is
bound to perform, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated
in the law
The Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of
the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body,
may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express
provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what question may come within this
category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely
provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of
polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while
the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it for determination.
But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in
nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of election.
The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is
administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call
for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may
intervene when a controversy should arise.
FACTS:
Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article entitled "Ballot
Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its
members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination
before said body, “awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot
boxes to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and the
respective answers of the latter two corporations to said petitions; and which article likewise
tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function
of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the
administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections."
Petitioner, answering the summons, filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the
alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the
Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for should Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 180, vesting the Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for
in Rule of the Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein," be applied to the case at hand, said provision would be unconstitutional.
b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same
cannot be applied to the instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely
administrative function for purchasing ballot boxes.
c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power
cannot apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes
was already a closed case when the article in question was published.
d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article
in question was a fair report because it could be assumed that the news report of
the respondent was based on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel
where there was an allegation of fraud, etc.
The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The COMELEC awarded
to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME),
and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the
Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00, and P17.00 each,
respectively.
- On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of
the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the
NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to
the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957.
- Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the
resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against
petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection
with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times— NO.
HELD:
The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by
our Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free, orderly,
and honest elections. Its powers are defined in the Constitution.
29
The Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be Link to Original Text:
submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1958/jul1958/gr_l-12596_1958.html
punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission,
although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution
(Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista
Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions
in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to
what question may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised
Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction,
saving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election
inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be
brought it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions
should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line
between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is
justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much
depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not
have been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the
Government

Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all
the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing
of election forms and ballots, appoinments of members of the board of inspectors,
appointment of precincts and designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters, so
as to as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably
said that the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the
elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound
to perform if the elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt
case before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the
necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding it provoked
a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job.

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between
several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has
performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our
Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not
exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this
Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of
justice"
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 30

16) Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (ANNA)
G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA
LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
Doctrines:
The State has inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. This power is exercised by the
President.
The President may deport only according to grounds enumerated by law, otherwise it
would be unreasonable and undemocratic.
Chapter 3, Book III, of the Admin. Code of 1987
Sec. 8. Power to Deport. - The President shall have the power to deport aliens subject to
the requirements of due process.
Qua Chee Gan et al. were charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation Board,
with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary
license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same
to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King,
with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments
(Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak
of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S.
dollars.
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was
issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board.
Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against them in
the Deportation Board for the reason, that the same do not constitute legal ground for
deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain
such charges.
The Deportation Board maintained that, as an agent of the President, it has jurisdiction over
the charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the
delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations
for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious
to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of
the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix
the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to
deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the
petitioners instituted the present appeal. .
Petitioners-appellants contested that for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be
a legislation authorizing the same.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of
Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor
(Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or
concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone,
because in its Section 52, it provides:.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the
entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation
therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:
Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated
to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such
action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the
charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel,
to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."
Petitioners contend, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport,
still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an
alien may be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the
unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive.
ISSUE:
W/N the President may order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they
are shown to have committed the act charged? YES.
Whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained
of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may
be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board. YES after investigation - due process, and
there must be an order of deportation.
HELD:
31
Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in
two ways:
1. by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and
2. by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
The charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding
or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic
sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503
amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore
order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have
committed the act charged.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This
is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a
"prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent."
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into
effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order
of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power
to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not
indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order
of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers
the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an
alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said
aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of
arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

As regards the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such
authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated
to the respondent Deportation Board.

Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act
No. 613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among
others, to make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised
in connection with such investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the
first time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing
—

For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation
Board created under Executive Order No. 37, … I, Manuel Roxas, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order that all
respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of
Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may prescribe. .

xxx xxx xxx

Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the
alien under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.

It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by
virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the
filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the
arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation
unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as
may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.

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17) Harvey v Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988 (RACH)
PETITIONERS: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW
HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT,
RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION.
DOCTRINE: Quasi-judicial function: Administrative search and seizure, warrant of arrest
• Deportation proceedings are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never
construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
• It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal
action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the return to
his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue
to reside within our borders.
• The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as
it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens
is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a
police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the
right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
• Deportation proceedings first before warrant of arrest
FACTS:
• Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both
American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old,
is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were apprehended by agents of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID, for being suspected
pedophiles.
• On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being
undesirable aliens under Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code
• On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for
violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial
against petitioners.
5 said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides:
Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his
own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
• On 4 April 1988, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, questioning
the validity of their detention on the following grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any
authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the
activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other
suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless
they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by
any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
ISSUE:
Whether deportation proceedings and warrants of arrest issued are valid. YES
HELD:
1. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with
Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien;
xxx xxx xxx
• The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and
indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation
proceeding would be defeated.
• Deportation proceedings are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never
construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
- It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal
action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the return to
his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue
to reside within our borders.
• The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is
an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and
he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have
the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses.
33
 measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this
case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.
morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).
URL: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jun1988/gr_82544_1988.html

2. As to the warrant of arrest issued by CID being violative of Sec2 of Art 3 of the Constitution,
the SC said: Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not
order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were
issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been
commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step
preliminary to their possible deportation.
- Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of
Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional.
The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the
condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 562).
- To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory
to the detriment of the State.

• MOREOVER: The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which
gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien
temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required
for the stay, is not unconstitutional.
xxx xxx xxx
... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his
deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation
would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).

• The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure
of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. The articles were
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences.
- One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as
referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant
that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof. In this case, probable cause has been determined upfront.

3. As to the aliens not being caught in the act and pedophilia not punishable in PH: That
petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were
found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked.
Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving
children”. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public

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18) BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION) et.
al., petitioners, vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,
respondents. May 31, 1991
DOCTRINE: It is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants
of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of
executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for
being unconstitutional.
FACTS:
 Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his
natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board,
Santiago testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely:
Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and
Benjamin Gatchalian
 William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson Gatchalian. They had with them
Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria
and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while
William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
 The Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision, admitting William Gatchalian
and his companions as Filipino citizens. William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961.
 January 24, 1962, then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside
all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The
same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among
those cases was that of William and others.
 July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the
proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter
and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian.
 Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July
6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.
 August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo
and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond
 William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the RTC, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
respondent judge dela Rosa issued the order denying the motion to dismiss.
 Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the RTC, presided by respondent
judge Capulong for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint
alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day,
respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order, restraining
petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against William
Gatchalian.
ISSUES: (1) WON respondent judges have jurisdiction over petitioners and the subject matter
of the case – YES. (2) WON the warrant of arrest issued was valid – NO. (3) WON respondent
is a citizen of the Philippines – YES.
RULING: (1) Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective regions,..." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
— (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or
commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the
third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
extends to all quasi- judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are
exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act
No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows: Sec. 1. Appeals from specified
agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of
Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under
Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal
therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided,
35
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions
of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative
bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial
Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies
specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court
of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25,
Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as follows: Sec. 25. Judicial
Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
chapter and applicable laws. xxx (6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified
in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. xxx
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus
modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration
should be subject to review by the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it
is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions
on venue of the Rules of Court. B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to
the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as
aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be
appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also
their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings. However, the rule admits of an
exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim
to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be
allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding?
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation
proceedings is, therefore, not without exception. Judicial intervention, however, should be
granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only
on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. It appearing from the records
that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial
intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the
proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial
Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case
at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence
presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course
of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded
to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there
to this Court.
(2) According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court
in the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue
resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board
of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962
it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was superimposed the figure
"6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961
within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question
of citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The
said cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by
Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party
to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter
of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the
Arocha and Vivo cases, the Court finds the same devoid of merit. Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, , otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads: Sec. 37. (a) The
following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of
any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
It is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens
are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation
as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration,
clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects,
William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to: xxx 1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative
Code; xxx 3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial
36
interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to
counsel; . . . Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly,
on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission
order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order
of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be
validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate
of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting
Commissioner Nituda.
Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings should
be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for
violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and
imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." The Court,
therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself
provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights
of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of
the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence
after the lapse of a certain time

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6,
1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent
William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed.
Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted
after ten (10) years .

(3) As records indicate, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the
1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry
sometime in 1973. On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order
which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting
respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of
arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The above order admitting respondent
as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent
William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.

WHEREFORE, case is DISMISSED for lack of merit; respondent William Gatchalian is declared a
Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the
deportation proceedings for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino
citizen.

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 37


19) RCPI v. Board of Communications |Quasi-judicial Function; Administrative functions;
fines and penalties (GAB V.)
PETITIONER: Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)
RESPONDENTS: Board of Communications, Diego Morales
DOCTRINE: The Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a
court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary
implication, conferred upon it by statute". As successor in interest of the Public Service
Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and
functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission
FACTS:
 These are two cases involving complaints of inconvenience or injuries brought about
by the failure of the RCPI to transmit telegrams informing complainants of the deaths
of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual
obligation through negligence under the Civil Code.
 In one case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him
a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death
of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales.
 The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to
be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial
of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela.
 In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was
transmitted from Santiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but
when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the
copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the
failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered
inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages.
 Meanwhile in another case, Pacifi co Innocencio claim that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes
Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner
RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about
the death of their father.
 The tele gram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non - receipt
and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lourdes
Innocencio has not been notified about its non - delivery, as a consequence Pacifica
Innocencio was not ab le to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac.
Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was
"shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his
hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 1 4, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish
and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
ISSUES: WN the Board of Communications has jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of
complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence
covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under
Art. 2176 of the CC which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice 
NO!
HELD:
 The Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court,
can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary
implication, conferred upon it by statute". The functions of the Public Service
Commission, now Board of Communications, are necessary implication conferred
upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the
Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as
that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission.
 One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act
governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate
of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does
not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to
the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in
a manner suitable to promote public interest.
 There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board
of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two
petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio
companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for
negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in
these two petitions lacked the impress of validity.
 In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service
Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is
nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a
different conclusion.
38

20) Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines Inc [G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006]
(EMILLE)
PETITIONER: The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary
of the Department of Energy
RESPONDENTS: LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
DOCTRINE:
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal
law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating
statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
FACTS:
BP 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of
adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.
The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum
of P50,000.
Eventually , Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement said BP.
It provided offenses and specific fines or recommending for business closure, for LPG
Marketers, dealers, and retail outlets for various violations such as: having no price display
board (sec 4), no weighing scale (sec 5), no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings (sec
6), no appropriate or authorized lpg seal (sec 7), no trade name, unbranded lpg cylinders, no
serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder or
distinctive collar or design (sec 8), underfilled lpg cylinders (sec 9), tampering, altering, or
modifying of lpg cylinder thru any means (sec 10), unauthorized decanting or refilling of lpg
cylinders (sec 11), hoarding of petroleum products including liquefied petroleum gas (sec 12),
refusal to allow or cooperate with duly authorized inspectors of the energy industry
administration bureau (eiab) of the department of energy in the conduct of their
inspection/investigation, whether regular and routinary or complaint-initiated, (sec
13), refusal or failure to pay fine (sec 14).
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the
Circular for being contrary to law.
The DOE denied the request for lack of merit.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court.
RTC: nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the
law, and in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the
maximum penalty under the law. The RTC declared it null and void.
ISSUE:
WON the Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular null
and void, and prohibiting the Circular’s implementation.—YES.
HELD:
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal
law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating
statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal
trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under
this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the
Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated,
namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight
markings, ETC. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of
the law which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, the Circular is in harmony the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is
limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the
maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed
by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any
maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of
the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. That the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder
basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the
minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving
petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding
penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum
pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes
the law.
To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect
the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG
traders.
39
Link to Original Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/G.R.%20No.%20159149.htm
21) Ang Tibay vs. CIR (ANNA)
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Doctrine:
Due Process in Administrative Proceedings:
(1) Right to a hearing to present own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) Decision rendered must have support.
(4) Evidence which supports the finding or conclusion is substantial (such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion).
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or any of its judges, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decision rendered.
Summary: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off
of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned
the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of
NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB)
were laid off.
Respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and avers among others:
That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,1938, there was shortage of leather
soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work.
That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
Etc…
Ang Tibay filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in
Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
ISSUE:
What are the cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in administrative
proceedings (requisites of due process in administrative proceedings)?
HELD:
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
40
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) The tribunal must have something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter
under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice
of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions
as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered.

The SC have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp
the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 41


22) Vinta Maritime Co Inc v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113911. January 23, 1998 (RACH)
PETITIONERS: VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC
RESPONDENTS: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C. BASCONCILLO
DOCTRINE: Administrative Procedure: cardinal rights
• Deportation proceedings are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never
construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be co
• 1. Rendering the assailed resolution and decisions without a full-blown trial on the merits, and
• LABOR DOCTRINE: To justify an employees dismissal, the employer has the burden of
proving the presence of just cause and due process. An illegally dismissed worker whose
employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of his contract.
FACTS:
• This case is about the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Leonides O. Basconcillo against
petitioner companies, Vinta Maritime Company and the El Kano Ship Management before
the POEA Adjudication Office.
- On February 13, 1987, private respondent, a licensed Marine Engineer since 1970,
was hired as Chief Engineer for M.V. Boracay by the shipping company, Vinta
Maritime thru its accredited manning agent, the Elkano Ship Management.
- The crew contract for his employment was effective for a fixed duration of one (1)
year, with a stipulated monthly basic pay of $1,375.00 U.S. Dollars, and fixed
overtime pay of $402.50 U.S. Dollars a month, or a total of $1,787.50 U.S. Dollars per
month, with an additional 2 days leave a month. So on February 18, 1987, private
respondent joined the vessel at the port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and
assumed his duties and responsibilities as Chief Engineer.
- On April 2, 1987, or barely three (3) months after boarding the vessel, private
respondent was informed by Captain Jose B. Orquinaza, the ships Master, that he
was relieved of his duties per recommendation of the Marine Superintendent, Mr.
Peter Robinson, due to his poor performance. He was in effect terminated from the
service. This came after private respondent had a verbal altercation with Robinson,
a British national, regarding the discipline or lack thereof of the Filipino crew under
private respondents supervision. No inquiry or investigation, however, regarding his
supposed incompetence or negligence was ever conducted; neither was private
respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause of his
dismissal.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
- Private respondent was made to disembark at the port of Oslo, Norway, and
immediately repatriated to the country. Contrary to his perceived incompetence,
private respondents Seamens Book contained the following entries:
Conduct - Very good
Ability - Very good
Remarks - Highly Recommended
• The POEA ruled in favor of the private respondent stating that he was illegally dismissed. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion by:
2. Disregarding the evidence for the petitioners and ruling that the company illegally dismissed
Basconcillo
HELD:
1. NO, the NLRC did not abuse its power to adjudicate without a full-blown trial. Trial is Not
Indispensable in Administrative Due Process.
• Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements. As applied to these proceedings, due process requires
only an opportunity to explain one’s side.
• In labor cases, due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are
deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor
arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. More often than not,
a litigant may be heard more creditably through pleadings than through oral
arguments.
• In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense. Due process was designed to afford an opportunity to be
heard, and an actual verbal hearing need not always be held. The necessity of
conducting a hearing is addressed to the sound discretion of the labor arbiter.
• These rules equally apply to cases filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Adjudication Office. Section 6 of Rule III, Book VII of the POEA Rules
and Regulations of 1991 categorically states that proceedings before a POEA
hearing officer is non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of
due process. Under the POEA Rules in force at the time the complaint was filed,
summary judgments in which the pleadings, affidavits and evidence submitted are
sufficient to render a decision -- are allowed under Section 4. Where the parties fail
to agree on an amicable settlement and summary judgment is not appropriate, a
judgment based on position papers may be resorted to under Section 5. Where there
are complicated factual issues involved which cannot be resolved through such
42
 means, the hearing officer may direct the parties to submit suggested written
clarificatory questions to be propounded to the party concerned.
In this case: petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position paper and
supporting documents had become parts of the records and were considered accordingly by
the POEA administrator and by the Respondent Commission in rendering their respective
decisions. Also, petitioners did not deem it necessary to ask the POEA Adjudication Office to
conduct a hearing. It was the private respondent who moved for a full-blown trial. Although
they did not oppose the motion, they did not concur with it either. Their silence was not an
assent to the motion or an argument showing its necessity. Rather, it was an eloquent
statement that the position paper they submitted sufficiently covered all the issues.
for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee
of the employers decision to dismiss him. The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be
eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.
• Using these legal criteria, we hold that private respondent was illegally dismissed. No notice
was ever given to him prior to his dismissal. This fact alone disproves petitioners allegation
that private respondent was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side
[regarding] the incidents that led to his dismissal. These requisites cannot be replaced as
they are not mere technicalities, but requirements of due process to which every employee
is entitled to ensure that the employers prerogative to dismiss is not exercised arbitrarily.

2. Basconcillo was illegally dismissed.

• Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Verily, the burden is on
the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. For an
employees dismissal to be valid, • Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the
(1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite
(2) the employee must be afforded due process. period.[37] Conformably, the administrator and the Respondent Commission properly
awarded private respondent salaries for the period beginning April 9, 1987, the date of his
Article 282 of the Labor Code lists the following causes for termination of employment by illegal dismissal, until February 18, 1988, the expiration of his contract.
the employer: (1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful orders in connection
with his or her work, (2) gross and habitual neglect of duties, (3) fraud or willful breach of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The challenged Decision and Resolution
trust, (4) commission of a crime or an offense against the person of the employer or his are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
immediate family member or representative, and (5) analogous cases.
URL: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jan1998/113911.htm
• The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is patent.
- Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence,
enumerating incidents in proof thereof.
- This is contrary to evidence shown: private respondents seamans book which states that
his discharge was due to an emergency leave; his alleged incompetence is belied by the
remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private respondents services were
highly recommended and that his conduct and ability were rated very good. Petitioners
allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an
accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to
such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant
misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such
(mis)representation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known
its possible repercussions. They cannot be allowed to turn against their representation.
• Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing.
- Before the employee can be dismissed under Article 282, the Code requires the service of
a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) of termination and giving said
employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in
writing is further required if the employees dismissal is decided upon. The employer must
furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 43


23) UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, et.al, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents. August 31, 1999
DOCTRINE: Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his
position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private
respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities
to refute them. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice
FACTS:
 Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of
a Philippine visitors visa.
 Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the
University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in
Diliman, Quezon City.
 On December 22, 1992, Dr. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of
Anthropology, wrote a letter to the CSSP Associate Dean, certifying that private
respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense.
 After going over respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean that
there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without
proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and
Southern Asia sand from John Edyes article.
 Nonetheless, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four (4) out of the
five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by
affixing their signatures on the approval form.
 CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents graduation pending
submission of final copies of her dissertation.
 Respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation. Petitioners
maintain, that respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel
members in the final copies.
 Dean Paz then accepted respondent’s dissertation in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the doctorate degree.
 In a letter to Dean Paz the respondent expressed concern over matters related to
her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not
affixed to the revision approval form.
 On 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation
for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list included private
respondents name.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
 Dean Paz sent a letter to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the
exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for graduation,
pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation.
 The letter did not reach the Board on time, because the next day, the Board
approved the recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including
private respondent. Respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Anthropology.
 Dean Paz wrote a letter to respondent, saying that she would not be granted an
academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations against her.
 Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
 Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, to investigate the plagiarism charge against
respondent. She recommended to U.P. Chancellor, that the Ph.D. degree conferred
on private respondent be withdrawn.
 Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.
 The Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances
or portions in private respondents thesis which were lifted from sources without
proper or due acknowledgment.
 The College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw
private respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the
University Council who in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation
to the Board of Regents.
 Meanwhile, U.P. Diliman Chancellor summoned respondent to a meeting on the
same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against
her.
 Respondent wrote to the U.P. President, alleging that some members of the U.P.
administration were playing politics in her case. She sent another letter to the
Chairman of the Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due
process and claiming that U.P. could no longer withdraw her degree since her
dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP.
 The Chancellor issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special
committee to review the University Councils recommendation to withdraw private
respondents degree. The members of the Zafaralla committee and private
respondent met at U.P. Los Banos. The Zafaralla Committees report, signed by its
chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondents doctorate degree.
o There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source
word for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any
acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. These
form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances. These instances
involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct
lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper
documentation and substitution of terms or words from an acknowledged
source in support of her thesis .Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of
being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism.
 The Committee strongly supported the recommendation to withdraw the doctoral
degree of Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William. On the basis of the report, the
University Council, recommended to the Board of Regents that respondent be
44
 barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an
employee.
 Respondent wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
asking the commissions intervention. She likewise asked for a reinvestigation of her
case. She also sought an audience with the BOR and/or the U.P. President, which was
denied.
 Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleged that petitioners had
unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process.
 RTC DISMISSED for lack of merit
 CA REVERSED and ordered restoration of degree.
 PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully
excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so
as to justify the writ of mandamus.
 RESPONDENT ARGUMENT: petitioners acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of
discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying the truth of the
plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not been
forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the
opportunity to comment or refute their findings.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision. – YES.
RULING: Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the
act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this Court ruled that the writ
was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. Mandamus is
never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.
In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of
academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was
denied due process. As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various
committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had
committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed,
if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was
finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual
investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed
dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the
Ph.D. degree.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot
tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private respondent was informed
in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. Due process
in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice.
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. In Garcia: it is a
freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning
can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can
confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a
committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent
committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The
Board of Regents decision to withdraw private respondents doctorate was based on
documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense. On the other
hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but
failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to
the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered its
decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the
performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary. WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED.
45
 ISSUES:
1. WN the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case on the ground
that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits.  NO
2. WN Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB decision.  NO

HELD:
24) American Inter-fashion Corp v. Office of the President | Administrative Procedure;
Cardinal Rights (GAB V.)
DOCTRINE: It is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of
discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on
matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. Specifically with
respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters
falling under their jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are
not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or
collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when
palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or
capriciousness is manifest."
FACTS:
 Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by GTEB of dollar salting and misdeclaration
of importations. As a result, its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB rendered
its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
contending that its right to due process of law was violated and that GTEB decision
was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court then issued a resolution
ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings. However, on July 25, 1984, Glorious
filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition. The Court granted the
motion for withdrawal. Glorious filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice
which the Court duly noted.
 After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for restitution of its export quota
allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27,
1984. Glorious once again alleged that the charges against them were not supported
by evidence. Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling its export quota
was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence
exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious export
quotas to “Marcos crony-owned” corporations. Glorious further alleged that it was
coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to
enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of De Soleil
Apparel and AIFC.
 On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of Glorious. An appeal was then taken on
Oct. 5, 1987 to the Office of the President. AIFC filed its opposition to Glorious’
appeal claiming that the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 has long been final. The
Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to GTEB for
further proceedings. The motion for reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently
denied. Hence, this petition.
 The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private respondent
Glorious, the Office of the President “had unwittingly made itself a tool in a cunning
move to resurrect a decision which had become final and executory more than three
years earlier. The petitioner asseverates resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was
res judicata on the matter.
 The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to be a bar to
a subsequent case is that the it must be a judgment on the merits. A judgment is
upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective
rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts
disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery
depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objection or contentions.
Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a judgment on
the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact, when the court heard
the parties during the oral arguments, GTEB was not able to present any showing of
mis-declaration if imports. The motion to withdraw te petition arose from the fears
of Mr. Nemesio Co that not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be
destroyed by the martial law regime. The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was
based solely on the notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal of
the petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of the
petition. Hence, it cannot constitute res judicata.
 With regards to the second issue, the Petitioner contend that Glorious Sun was not
denied due process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to
disclose to Glorious vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that
Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in
1987, where relevant documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was given
an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect. This contention by AIFC, the
court holds, is MISLEADING. The SC recognized that the instant petition involves the
1984 resolution of the GTEB. AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure
of the evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB
resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed
to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious. Moreover,
the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that the
former was denied due process.
 Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the Chairman of the
Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry admitted that he
was pressured by Minister Ongpin to look for ways and means to remove the quotas
from Glorious. AIFC claims that it is an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 46

 did not give credence to it and also, none of the members of the committee would
agree that there was any pressure or instruction from Minister Ongpin.

 The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not agree that
there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno was not telling the truth.
Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He did not state that the members of the
investigating panel were pressured. Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Investigating
Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his position he was the one pressured by
Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was
investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their
administration had already been made.

 The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be disregarded if
they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.

 Contrary to the petitioners’ posture, the record clearly manifests that in cancelling
the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the private respondent’s
constitutional right to due process. Before the cancellation in 1984, Glorious had
been enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In effect, the private
respondent’s export quota allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into
some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and
without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another.
 The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED.

BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019) 47


25) Pefianco v. Moral [G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000]
PETITIONER: HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports
RESPONDENTS: MARIA LUISA C. MORAL
DOCTRINE:
a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against
him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of
record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against
her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
FACTS:
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as
well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration thereof.
Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C.
Moral, then Chief Librarian of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent
Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and
Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as
Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some
forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the
National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint.
Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent “guilty of the administrative offenses
of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for
the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice of
the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered dismissed from
the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement
benefits and other remunerations.
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
Respondent received a copy of the resolution. (and another correcting the typographical errors
found on the first resolution). She did not appeal the judgment.
- Later on she filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate
to take under the circumstances."—denied. -ikx
- Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution
dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied.
- Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted". As
earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dismissing her. Instead, she
instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against
Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order
of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action,
but the trial court denied his motion.
Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court. The appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed
Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding that -
FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before
filing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural
infirmity x x x x SECOND. Even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to
be disregarded, the petition at hand, nevertheless, must fail. The denial of
the motion to dismiss is an option available to the respondent judge. Such
order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the
aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the
objection(s) raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the
trial and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal
in due course.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January 1998,
Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter
substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.—YES
48
RULING:
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily
requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor -
After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion
or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that
the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor (underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to
dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise
on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements
prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the
trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating
the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied.
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein
on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack
of cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The order only confused petitioner
and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the proper subject of her motion
for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly
and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full
understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order,
to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts
on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise
and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict
compliance with the rules was justified.
On the issue of mandamus, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of
discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie
to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must
be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must
nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not
BALLESTEROS. JALANDONI. LLORENTE. NERI. VENTURINA (2019)
his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command
to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear
legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of
petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled
to the writ prayed for.
- Respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution
dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS
resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful
purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held
in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of
the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and
the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication
between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee. As correctly ruled by Secretary
Gloria in his Order of 2 October 1996 “Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the
Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x x
[t]he report is an internal communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS
Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in
making his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in
the Decision he may make”.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon
which respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the
investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to
pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the
investigation report.
In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is not a
mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity
for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not
49
entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her
from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to
furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.

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