OUTLINE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Professor: Atty. Luis A. Vera Cruz, Jr.

Schedule: Monday at 4:30 to 6:30 PM

I. STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS PART OF CURRICULUM

Section 3 (1) and (2), Art. XIV (Education) of the 1987 Constitution

(1) “All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula.”

(2) “They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights… Teach the rights
and duties of citizenship…”

II. SECTION 11, ART. II, 1987 CONSTITUTION

“The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”

1. The Bill of Rights, 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution

2. Universal values of human rights expressed for the first time in the UN Charter in 1945.

3. The concept was broadened in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Article 1 states: “All humans are
born free and equal in dignity xxx”

III. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFINED

1. Human rights is defined generally as those rights inherent in our nature and without which we cannot live as human
beings

2. Civil Rights and Political Rights

Brigido SIMON, JR vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

GR No. 100150 – January 5, 1994
Justice Vitug

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The case is a petition of prohibition filed by petitioner Mayor Simon praying respondent CHR from further hearing
and investigating "demolition cases" on vendors of North EDSA.

FACTS:
In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners), in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor and was
sent and received by the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated).

In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate the premises of North
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park.”

On July 12, 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition.

On July 23, 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and
ordered said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission’s
supervision and again directed the petitioners to “desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of
said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.”

On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners before the CHR questioned CHR’s jurisdiction. It
was stated that the CHR’s authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations
of civil and political rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such rights but privilege to engage in
business.”

On Sept. 25, 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order to desist.” Also, petitioners’ motion to dismiss was denied.
It opined “it was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it should be considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the PH.”

Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights.
 HELD: Yes! The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case filed before it and from implementing the
penalty for contempt.

The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then Pres. Corazon Aquino via EO
163, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee
on Human Rights.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit
not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted
traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable
rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring:

“to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and
are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. It may also refer, in its general sense,
to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.”

Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship.

In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it apparent that the delegates envisioned a CHR that would
focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. One of the delegates, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoner and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvaging and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious.” In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus
seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.”

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by PRson a land which is planned to be developed
into a “People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of QC which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb can not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis-a-vis
the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of
the stalls, sari­sari stores and carinderia of the PRs can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations
involving civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only
to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work.

3. The most basic human rights are life “life, liberty, and right to property”

Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

4. Definition of Liberty - the right to live which is being able to enjoy all the God-given faculties of human being (RUBI et.
al. vs Provincial Board of Mindoro).

RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO (1919)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
run away from the reservation.

FACTS:
 Rubi and other Manguianes residing in the Province of Mindoro alleged that they were being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions were said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one of their fellow tribe, Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for running away from the reservation.

Manguianes, as Non-Christian tribe, were considered as very low in culture, have shown no desire for community
life and have not progressed sufficiently in civilization. That the purpose of containing them in a reservation, as
stated by the Solicitor General, is for their advancement, education, and to introduce civilized custom among
them.

The order was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, which reads as follow:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval
of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.

Hence, the validity of Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code is being questioned.

ISSUE: Whether Manguianes is being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. In
general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free
men.

However, Liberty is not a license. Liberty is regulated by law. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can
do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor
class legislation and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To
go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to
all of a class.”

5. The Basic Characteristics of Human Rights: 5 Is FU

1. Inherent - Human Rights are inherent because they are not granted by any person or authority. Human rights do
not have to be bought, earned or inherited; they belong to people simply because they are human. Human rights
are inherent to each individual.
2. Inalienable - Human rights cannot be taken away; no one has the right to deprive another person of them for any
reason. People still have human rights even when the laws of their countries do not recognize them, or when they
violate them - for example, when slavery is practiced, slaves still have rights even though these rights are being
violated. Human rights are inalienable. Human Rights are inalienable because:
● They cannot be rightfully taken away from a free individual.
● They cannot be given away or be forfeited.
3. Imprescriptible - Human Rights do not prescribe and cannot be lost even if man fails to use or assert them, even
by a long passage of time.
4. Indivisible - To live in dignity, all human beings are entitled to freedom, security and decent standards of living
concurrently. Human rights are indivisible. Human Rights are not capable of being divided. They cannot be denied
even when other rights have already been enjoyed.
5. Interdependent - Human Rights are interdependent because the fulfillment or exercise of one cannot be had
without the realization of the other.
6. Fundamental - Human Rights are fundamental rights because without them, the life and dignity of man will be
meaningless.
7. Universal - Human Rights are universal in application and they apply irrespective of one’s origin, status, or
condition or place where one lives. Human rights are enforceable without national border. Human rights are the
same for all human beings regardless of race, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin. We
are all born free, and equal in dignity and rights— human rights are universal.

IV. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 17, Section 18 and Section 19, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.

Human Rights

SECTION 17.

(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities
of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise
its present functions and powers.

(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 18.

The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims
of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence
is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

SECTION 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority
of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.

Cariño vs CHR (G.R. No. 96681 Dec 2, 1991)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This is a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to review the order of Commission on Human Rights.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies,
etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of
the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90)
days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced. The case eventually resulted in a Decision of
Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits
and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.

ISSUE: WoN the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political
rights

HELD: No, CHR have no power to do so. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try
and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.

More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of

(a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law;

(b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and

(c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed
for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no
business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This
would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to
them. This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done. In any event, the investigation by the Commission on
Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by
done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that
Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that
would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

V. THREE CATEGORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. FIRST GENERATION OF RIGHTS (Civil and Political Rights)

● Liberty rights
● During the long development of society
● Serves as the protection of the individuals from the arbitrary exercise of police power

ARTICLE III, 1987 CONSTITUTION – BILL OF RIGHTS

o Section 1: Right to life, liberty, and property. An individual should not be deprived of your life, liberty, and
property
o Section 2: Right against unreasonable searches and seizures
o Section 3: Every person has the right to keep his communication or correspondence a secret.
o Section 4: Freedom of Speech. Right to a Free Press; Freedom of Assembly; the Right of Petition Section
o 5: Freedom of Religion
o Section 6: The liberty of abode & the right to travel.
o Section 7: The right to information.
o Section 8: Right to form associations.
o Section 9: The Right to Just Compensation. Section 10: Non-Impairment Clause.
o Section 11: Free Access to Court
o Section 12: Right of Person under Custodial Investigation
o Section 13: The Right to Bail & against Excessive Bail
o Section 14: Rights of the Accused • Right to Due Process of Law in Criminal Cases • Innocent until
proven guilty • The Right to Confront One’s Accuser • Basis for Trials in Absentia.
o Section 15: Writ of Habeas Corpus
o Section 16: Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases.
o Section 17: Right against self- incrimination
o Section 18: The Right to political beliefs and aspirations.
o Section 19: The prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
o Section 20: Non- Imprisonment for debts
o Section 21: Right against double jeopardy
o Section 22: Ex post facto law and bill of attainder

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

o The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is an international human rights treaty
adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1966. It is one of the two treaties that give legal force to the
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the other being the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, ICESCR).

ICCPR commits the states signed up to it to protect and respect the civil and political rights of individuals. The UK
ratified ICCPR in 1976.

ICCPR rights are fundamental to enabling people to enjoy a broad range of human rights, including those relating
to:

● freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
● freedom from slavery and forced labor
● arrest, detention and imprisonment
● movement into, within and out of a state
● treatment by the judicial process
● privacy, home and family life
● freedom of thought, religion and expression
● peaceful assembly
● freedom of association, including through trade unions
● marriage and the rights of children
● political participation, and
● equality and non-discrimination.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG V. HON. OLALIA JR. (2007)

G.R. NO. 153675 APRIL 19, 2007

Lessons Applicable: generally accepted international law, due process, bill of rights, extradition

FACTS:

June 20, 1997: Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong effect an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons."

July 1, 1997: Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.

Juan Antonio Muñoz charged before the Hong Kong Court of 3 counts in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong

August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999: warrants of arrest were issued against him

September 13, 1999: DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest -
granted and NBI arrested him

Muñoz' Petition for Certiorari w/ the CA questioning the legality of his arrest - order of arrest void

November 22, 1999: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition

DOJ Petition for Certiorari (became final April 10, 2001) - granted; order of arrest valid

October 8, 2001: Judge Bernardo, Jr. denied bail(then judge inhibited himself)

October 30, 2001: Judge Olalia on motion for reconsideration granted bail

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify:

1. December 20, 2001 Order allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz to post bail; and - nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings

2. April 10, 2002 Order denying the motion to vacate December 20, 2001 Order

ISSUE: W/N there is a right to bail in extradition proceedings

HELD: YES. DISMISS the petition. REMANDED to the trial court determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence”

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community.

Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty under Section II, Article II of our Constitution. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail.
Exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.

Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.

the Court relied in Mejoff case upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.

2. SECOND GENERATION OF RIGHTS (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)

● Article XIII, 1987 Constitution, Social Justice and Human Rights

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations
to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their
owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

HELD:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aim of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
 individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
Salus Populi Estsuprema Lex (Let the welfare of the people be the supreme law).

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

MARIANO R. BASA vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-43098 March 30, 1981

FACTS:
Mariano R. Basa, retired municipal judge of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro suffered a heart attack that incapacitated him from
further performing his function as municipal judge, and which forced him on to retire from the service.
Consequently, he filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and was
awarded permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses incurred. After six years,
petitioner suffered his second heart attack which proved to be more severe. He filed with the Workmen's
Compensation Unit a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in connection with his aforesaid
second heart attack; but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover subsequent and further medical expenses for the same permanent and
total disability which had already been the subject of a maximum compensation benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act

RULING:
Yes.
Petitioner's second attack, being causally linked with his first heart attack which was already declared compensable by the
Workmen's Compensation, may be the source of a claim for further compensation benefits. Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury
likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimant's own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow
from the primary injury are compensable.
It must be re-emphasized that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, benefits for disability are of two general types: (1)
Indemnity benefits in the form of cash payments which is designed to compensate the worker for the loss of
wages due to disability sustained or for his death; and (2) medical benefits in the form of medical services,
hospitalization, medicine and other matters related to the treatment of the compensable injury or disease. The
first, indemnity or compensation benefits for loss of wages, is limited both as to time and as to amount; while the
second, medical benefits, is unlimited both as to duration and to amount.

"An employee, whether temporarily or permanently disabled, is entitled (1) to continuous hospital, medical and/or surgical
services to relieve the painful effects of his disability; (2) to relief from, or alleviation of the humiliating effects of
his injury, like plastic surgery after the first operation that may leave an ugly scar or deformity; (3) to be provided
with such facilities, supplies or equipment that will restore the normal use of his senses, faculties, or limbs, such
as improved models of wheelchairs, crutches, artificial limbs or hearing or visual aids; and (4) to rehabilitation of
his morale and spirit by eliminating the psychological effects of the trauma caused by the ailment or injury so that
he can join, and be accepted by, the mainstream of society and lead a normal life.

"After the disability benefits have been paid, the disabled employee may remain to be the main support of his family.
Denial to him of further hospital, medical or surgical services would be aggravating the economic distress his
family is suffering.

"Because society does not seem to accept him (like a cured leper) his feeling of depression may drive him to commit
suicide or may infect the other members of the family who may, in desperation, commit anti-social acts, which
would engender a more serious tragedy for the family.

"Then again, to abandon one who is permanently disabled after the first medical treatment, is virtually to consign him to
the scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human derelicts, no longer entitled to the concern and solicitude of the
State. Nothing would be more inhuman, repugnant to the central core of our democratic welfare state as
envisioned by our Constitution and shocking to a compassionate society. As heretofore emphasized, the
Government should be the last to give up hope on the recovery and rehabilitation of those who are now
considered permanently disabled. Laboratories all over the world are continuously testing and searching for the
panacea for all ailments that plague humanity. There is greater possibility that such a cure may be discovered in
 our time. The right to life rank second to none in the hierarchy of human rights. The entire world is witness to the
amazing survival of Karen Quinlan for the last two years (over 4 years now) after the life-giving apparatus was
disconnected from her body.

"The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp the Government with claims for continuing medical,
hospital and surgical services and as a consequence unduly drain the National Treasury, is no argument against
it; because the Republic of the Philippines as a welfare State, in providing for the social justice guarantee in our
Constitution, assumes such risk. This assumption of such a noble responsibility is, as heretofore stated, only just
and equitable since the employees to be benefitted thereby precisely became permanently injured or sick while
invariably devoting the greater portion of their lives to the service of our country and people. Human beings
constitute the most valuable natural resources, of the nation and therefore should merit the highest solicitude and
the greatest protection from the State to relieve them from unbearable agony. They have a right to entertain the
hope that during the few remaining years of their life some dedicated institution or gifted indi-vidual may produce
a remedy or cure to relieve them from the painful or crippling or debilitating or humiliating effects of their injury or
ailment, to fully and completely rehabilitate them and develop their 'mental, vocational and social potentials°, so
that they will remain useful and productive citizens.

● Universal Declaration of Human Rights

● International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

3. THIRD GENERATION OF RIGHTS (Solidarity/Collective Rights)

SECTION 15, 16, ARTICLE II, 1987 CONSTITUTION

SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

574 SCRA 661 – Political Law – Ministerial vs Discretionary Functions – Mandamus

Constitutional Law – Right to a Healthful Ecology

FACTS: In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to compel the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean up the Manila Bay. CROMB
argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their health and the inaction of MMDA and
the other concerned government agencies violates their rights to life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the
Constitution. CROMB also averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up the Manila Bay.

The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the decision on
the ground that MMDA’s duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary duty hence it cannot be compelled
by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was for a general clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the
Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive
clean up such as that ordered by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the process of implementing
usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not mean that their function or
mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s function to alleviate the problem on solid and
liquid waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not
alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay area. While the implementation of
the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing
what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental Code involves a general clean up, the Supreme
Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the Environmental Code is to perform cleaning in general and not just to attend
to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with the other government agencies, must act to clean up the
Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.

PT&T Co. v. NLRC, GR No. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS:

Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker for a fixed period from November 21, 1990
until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement signed by
Grace, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. From June 10, 1991 to
July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, PT&T again engaged the services of Grace as reliever for Erlinda
F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. On September 2, 1991, Grace was asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee. In the job application form furnished to Grace, she indicated in the civil status that she was single
although she had in fact contracted marriage on May 26, 1991. This meant she was not single, as she had represented
herself, when she signed the reliever agreements on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner dismissed Grace from the
company after learning about Grace’s real civil status and being unconvinced of Grace’s explanation for the discrepancy.
Grace immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
(COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. At
the preliminary conference, Grace volunteered the information that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her
collections, and executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally
dismissed by petitioner and ordered her reinstatement plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA. On
appeal, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter but modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision with the qualification that Grace de
Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months due to the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be
condoned.

ISSUE: Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the services of an employee?

HELD:

No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life. Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that “The State recognizes
the role of women in nation-building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.”
Corollary to this is Article XIII Section 3 which states that “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all” and
Article XIII Section 14 which states that “The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare
and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.” Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1,
1974, corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years. Two of these
are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, promotion, and training opportunities; and Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation
Building Act which, among others, affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts. In the
Labor Code, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. The
private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as
willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a
stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting
her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet
unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for
the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of the government.

ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

VI. VIOLATION / REMEDIES / PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

INTERNATIONAL

1. REMEDIES UNDER UN TREATIES

a. The optional protocol to the international covenant on Civil and Political Rights

i. Exhaust local remedies

ii. UN Human Rights Committee

b. The international covenant on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination

i. Exhaust local remedies

ii. Committee on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination

c. Convention against torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

i. Committee against torture

2. THE “1503” SYSTEM

Even in those cases not covered by any UN Treaty, an individual or group of persons prevented from exercising their
human rights may take their complaint to the UN. Under this procedure, copy of the Complaint is forwarded to the
Government concerned which may file a Reply. A copy is also furnished to UN Commission on Human Rights (with the
power to inquire into violation of human rights and make recommendations).

Complaint- information procedure

Type of Mechanism

Consistent patterns of gross human rights violations/ situations that affect a

Scope of the large number of people over a protracted period of time
Procedure

Individuals or NGOs; not necessarily the victim of the violation but with
Who can Submit a “direct and reliable” knowledge.�
Complaint?

NGOs can initiate a complaint and can later offer supplementary

Role of Advocates information.

No individual remedies, but the procedure may lead to a decision that gross
Available Remedies human rights violations have occurred and should be remedied.

There is no formal procedure for submitting a complaint under the 1503

How to Submit a Procedure, however, the communication must meet a number of
Complaint admissibility criteria to be considered:

The complaint must be in writing.

The names of the authors of the complaint (individuals or an NGO) should
be included.� If the author chooses to remain anonymous, this must be
stated in the complaint.�
The complaint must show the existence of a consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested human rights violations.� Thus, the complaint should
include a detailed description of the facts, evidence of the violation and
state which rights have been violated.�
The complaint should include a statement of purpose, which explains the
reasons for the submission.
The complaint should contain information about the exhaustion of domestic
remedies.
The complaint should not contain abusive language, be politically motivated
or be based solely on information from the mass media.
The United Nations Fact Sheet 7 includes general information about the
submitting a complaint under the 1503 Procedure and the criteria of
admissibility.
 Commission/Sub-Commission Team (1503 Procedure)
Where to Send
Support Services Branch
Communications
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
United Nations
1211 Gen�ve 10
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 917 9000
Fax: + 41 22 917 9011
Email:� 1503.hchr@unog.ch

After receiving a communication, the Centre for Human Rights will contact
How the Complaint the State against which the complaint was made.� The State has 12 weeks
Procedure Works in which to submit as response on the admissibility of the complaint.� The
Centre for Human Rights summarizes the communications for the Human
Rights Commission and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights.

Before a meeting of the Sub-Commission, a smaller five-person working

group meets once a year to review the communications and the States’
replies.� At this stage, cases in which there is no evidence of a “consistent
pattern of gross violations of human rights” are screened out.� The working
group will forward a small number of cases for further consideration to the
Sub-Commission.
The Sub-Commission can reject the case, refer the case for further
investigation to a working group or refer the case to the Human Rights
Commission.� First the case is reviewed by a five-person group of the
Commission and, if necessary, then by the full Commission.� The
Commission can: (1) end consideration of the case, if no human rights
violations occurred; (2) postpone consideration of the case; (3) initiate a
study of the situation or (4) create an ad hoc committee to investigate the
situation.� Although the 1503 Procedure is confidential, in its annual report,
the Commission publishes the names the countries that were under
consideration and the recommended actions to be taken.

NGOs can submit complaints, although participation in the review process

Advantages/ is extremely limited.� The 1503 Procedure is useful for drawing attention to
Disadvantages serious underlying problem but not for cases of violations of individuals’
human rights.� The procedure if useful if a victim wants the UN to
investigate the situation in her country, but not her particular case.� The
strict confidentiality of the procedure protects victims but does not allow the
procedure to be used for publicity or for advocacy purposes.

3. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

[ The Dusko Tadic case for crimes against humanity, breaches of the Geneva rules of way.]

PROSECUTOR V. TADIC

BRIEF FACT SUMMARY. For committing war crimes at a Serb-run concentration camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tadic (D)
was prosecuted in court.

SYNOPSIS OF RULE OF LAW. Plea against the International Tribunal jurisdiction can be examined by the International
Tribunal based on the invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council.

FACTS.

For committing war crimes at a Serb-run concentration camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tadic (D) was prosecuted in Court.
The jurisdiction of the tribunal was however challenged by Tadic (D) on the ground that it exceeded the authority of the
U.N. Security Council. This argument of Tadic (D) was dismissed by the trial court but Tadic (D) appealed.

ISSUE. Can plea against the International Tribunal jurisdiction be examined by the International Tribunal based on the
invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council?

Held. Yes. Plea against the International Tribunal jurisdiction can be examined by the International Tribunal based on the
invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council. The criteria for establishing an International Tribunal includes the
establishment in accordance with the proper international standards, the provision of guarantees of fairness, justice, and
evenhandedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments. Hence, a tribunal like the
one created in this case must be endowed with primacy over national courts.
Discussion. The authority of the Security Council to establish a tribunal for the determination of a criminal charge was
attacked by Tadic (D). So long as it is “established by law”, the tribunal is authorized to be established for the
determination of these charges. The Council requires that it be “set up by a competent organ in keeping with relevant
legal procedures and that it observes the requirements of procedural fairness.”

4. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) ROME STATUTE

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court. It was
adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on 17 July 1998 and it entered into force on 1 July 2002. As of October 2017,
123 states are party to the statute.Wikipedia
Signatories: 139
Drafted: 17 July 1998
Effective: 1 July 2002
Condition: 60 ratifications
Signed: 17 July 1998

A. Distinguished from International Court of Justice (which deals with the state) the ICC deals with and has power to
investigate, prosecute, and convict individuals. It has international jurisdiction over acts constituting Genocide (violence
against members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group with the intent to destroy the entire group), Crime Against
Humanity, War Crimes and Aggression. Investigation by ICC may be initiated by

● State Party
● Security Council
● Prosecutor (motu propio)

ICC DECISION on THOMAS LUBANGA DYILO OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, JULY 10, 2012

SUMMARY
The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo opposed numerous tribes of different ethnicities in their
struggle to gain power and territory, particularly over the Ituri provence in the north-eastern part of the DRC, an
area rich in natural resources such as gold and diamonds. One such group, the Union Patriotique des Congolais,
was established in 2000 and appointed as its chairman, the Accused, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. He was also the
commander in chief of the armed wing of the UPC, the Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo. This armed
group was well-known for its use of young children to participate in the hostilities, from fighting, to cooking,
cleaning, spying, and being used as sexual slaves.

Trial Chamber I, in the International Criminal Court’s first verdict, convicted Thomas Lubanga of the offense of
conscripting, enlisting or using children to actively participate in hostilities. In defining active participation, the
Chamber adopted a broad definition so as to include children involved even indirectly, so long as their contribution
placed them in real danger as a potential target. Unfortunately, the Chamber did not discuss whether sexual
violence against these children also fell within the scope of the offense.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2004, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) referred the situation in the State to the
Prosecutor of the ICC.

On 10 February 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Lubanga for committing, as co-perpetrator, the
war crime of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate in hostilities as
members of the armed group, the Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo.

On 16 March 2006, Lubanga was transferred to the ICC. The charges against him were confirmed on 29 January 2007
and the trial commenced on 26 January 2009.

Trial Chamber I delivered its verdict on 14 March 2012.

COURT'S HOLDING AND ANALYSIS

Although conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers are separate offenses under the Statute (para. 609), in the
circumstances of the present case conscription and enlistment are dealt with together. The offense is committed
at the moment a child under 15 joins an armed group, with or without compulsion (para. 618). Consent is not a
valid defense but the manner in which the child was recruited – whether voluntarily or with compulsion – may be
taken into account at sentencing (para. 617).

Active participation is a broader term that includes a greater number of activities than the notion of direct participation in
international humanitarian law (para. 627). Active participation includes direct and indirect participation; the
decisive factor is whether the support provided by the child exposed him/her to real danger as a potential target.
Whether a particular activity constitutes active participation is to be decided on a case-by-case basis (para. 628).

The majority refused to consider whether sexual violence against children can be included in the scope of using children
to actively participate in hostilities due to the failure of the Prosecution to include it in the charges against the
Accused and the Trial and Appeals Chamber’s decisions not to change the legal characterization of the facts to
include crimes associated with sexual violence (para. 630). Judge Odio Benito dissented (paras. 16-20, Separate
and Dissenting Opinion)
B. PROCEDURE
● Prosecutor submits to the Pre-trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with material
evidence collected.
● If after preliminary examination, there is no finding of a reasonable basis for investigation, he shall notify the
parties.

C. JURISDICTION OVER SPECIFIC CRIMES

1. Article 6 (Genocide)

2. Article 7 - Crimes against humanity

3. Article 8 (War Crimes)

4. Article 5 (Aggression: to be defined and adopted by State parties)

PART 2. JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY AND APPLICABLE LAW

Article 5
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court

1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:

(a) The crime of genocide;

(b) Crimes against humanity;

(c) War crimes;

(d) The crime of aggression.

2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.

Article 6
Genocide

For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 7
Crimes against humanity

1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

(a) Murder;

(b) Extermination;

(c) Enslavement;

(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law;
 (f) Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;

(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court;

(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;

(j) The crime of apartheid;

(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
to mental or physical health.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:

(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack;

(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to
food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population;

(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a
person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children;

(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under
international law;

(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a
person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;

(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;

(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international
law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;

(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1,
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;

(i) "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention
of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" refers to the two sexes, male and female,
within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from the above.

Article 8
War crimes

1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy
or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.

2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:

(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against
persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(i) Wilful killing;

(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;

(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;

(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried
out unlawfully and wantonly;
 (v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power;

(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;

(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;

(viii) Taking of hostages.

(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the
established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities;

(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military
objectives;

(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international
law of armed conflict;

(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life
or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;

(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are
undefended and which are not military objectives;

(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of
defence, has surrendered at discretion;

(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the
enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions,
resulting in death or serious personal injury;

(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory;

(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not military objectives;

(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or
scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of
the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously
endanger the health of such person or persons;

(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;

(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war;

(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the
nationals of the hostile party;

(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against
their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war;

(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;

(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or
devices;

(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard
envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions;
 (xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the
international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an
amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;

(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7,
paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions;

(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or
military forces immune from military operations;

(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;

(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects
indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva
Conventions;

(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or
using them to participate actively in hostilities.

(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(iii) Taking of hostages;

(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally
recognized as indispensable.

(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts
of a similar nature.

(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities;

(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel
using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;

(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international
law of armed conflict;

(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not military objectives;

(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7,
paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;

(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or
using them to participate actively in hostilities;
 (viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the
security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;

(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;

(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;

(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict;

(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts
of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-
establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate
means.

D. LAW TO BE APPLIED

● Statute
● Applicable treaties
● Principle and International Law
● General principles of law and principles interpreted in previous decisions (i.e. Nuremberg judgment, Tokyo War
Crime Tribunal etc.)

Article 21
Applicable law

1. The Court shall apply:

(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;

(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law,
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;

(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally
recognized norms and standards.

2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.

3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined
in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or
social origin, wealth, birth or other status.

LOCAL REMEDIES AND PROTECTION

1. National Human Rights Institution – Commission on Human Rights

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is an independent National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) created under the
1987 Philippine Constitution, established on 05 May 1987 by virtue of Executive Order No. 163.

The Commission is mandated to conduct investigations on human rights violations against marginalized and vulnerable
sectors of the society, involving civil and political rights.

2. Article 32, Civil Code

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense,
the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by
a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.

Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by
various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by
General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view
of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,”

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in
most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants
issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed
threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in
order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to
forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said
plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging
among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts
can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties.
ISSUE:

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution?

2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of respondeat superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated?
HELD:

1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondeat superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may,
however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or
employee or person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates,
secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February
1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the
rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
https://allthingslegalandfun.wordpress.com/2012/10/10/aberca-vs-ver-case-digest/

Lim vs. Ponce de Leon 66 SCRA 299

Facts: On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor launch. A year
later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the CFI of
Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. On June
15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote
the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound and
take custody of the motor launch. On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial
Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Consequently, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the
motor launch from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI
of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Ponce de Leon and
Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962, Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then
and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent.

Issue: Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by
them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

Held: Defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiff-appellants. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. A person whose constitutional rights have
been impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In
addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, Delfin Lim’s claims were amply supported by
evidence that he should be awarded damages. However, with respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover
any damage which he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had already
transferred 52 the ownership and possession of the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he
has no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure

FESTEJO V FERNANDO

FACTS: Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of Public Works, for taking
possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be constructed thereon without obtaining
first a right of way, without her consent and knowledge , and against her express objection. Festejo demanded the return
of the land and its restoration to its former condition.

ISSUE:
Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

HELD:
Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way
upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly
departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly
of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk
highway before construction began.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen
and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act.

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter
himself under the plea that he is a public agent.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a
civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent
acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or
in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (Festejo vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March
11, 1954)

3. Revised Penal Code

Ex. Art. 128 (Violation of Domicile) Art. 129 (Search Warrant Maliciously Obtained) Art. 130 (Searching Domicile Without
Witness) Art 131 (Prohibition, Interruption/ Disruption of Peaceful Meetings ) Art 132 (Interruption of Religious Worship)
Art 133 (Offending Religious Feelings)
4. Writ of Habeas Corpus RULE 102 Habeas Corpus SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.

G.R. No. L-117376 December 8, 1994

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF OSCAR DE GUZMAN, CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A.
ORDOÑEZ, DIRECTOR EMMANUEL C. NERI AND THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez, who
was tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City — Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742, "People of the
Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in
particular the fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.
Upon review by this Court, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus
payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed with costs against accused-
appellant.
Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which became effective on
December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by this Court in the case of People v. Simon,1 if the quantity of the marijuana
involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within
the range of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years). Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law.
Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more than ten (10) years now,
his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that, therefore, he should
be released from prison without further delay. In aid of judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all
prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from prison.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:
1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;
2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;
3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and
4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of
Court).
It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit in the petition, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately.
The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's discharge from
confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to submit a
complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further
confinement. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
MANGILA V PANGILINAN GR No. 160739 July 17, 2013
Facts: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of
Article 315 of the RPC, in relation to PD No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of RA 8042 were filed in the MTCC
in Puerto Princesa City. he complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others
to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing
fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). On the following day, Judge Pangilinan , Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants,
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire
records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for
further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules. As a consequence, Mangila was
arrested and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the NBI. Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack
of merit
Issue: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from
detention?
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s finding. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of
error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.
The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose
of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into
and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian
has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled thereto ex merito justicias. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention,
and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the
writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. There is no
question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge
Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all
crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity
of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule,
Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied
Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her
arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so. It is relevant to point out at
this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only
effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by
virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve
her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not
be inquired into through habeas corpus. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the
conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City
Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant
of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree with the
CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy

5. Writ of Amparo

The writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

SEC OF NATL DEFENSE V MANALO

FACTS:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that
they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August
13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security.
xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has
been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection
by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Castillo vs Cruz
GR 182165

Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of
land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor
Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent case among the filed
cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for
TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain
the possession of the property,” entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause
their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

Held:
On the 1st issue:

Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or
omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.”

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out
of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety
of petitioners’ entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life,
liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo.
No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.

On the 2nd issue:

Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter
is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.

Razon vs Tagitis

FACTS:

The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket
for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room
key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who
did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007,
Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with
the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch,
Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men.
According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve
and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find
her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with another
woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband

Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in
Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City
but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for
financial help from friends and relatives

She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the
illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human
and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on
January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the
writ.

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or
knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not
constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to
investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.

THE CA RULING

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the
CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the
disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever
came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory
that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that
Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the
latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu
Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the
military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual
modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the
CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col.
Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same
time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 9, 2008.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:

The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo applies.

Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;

(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;

(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that
Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor
heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the
police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the
petitioners cite):

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may
not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those
who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the
petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private
party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.

The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by
agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information
about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any
failure in its statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of
the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the
petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be
used as the affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily
leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially
complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held
on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this
point, the petition cannot be faulted.

The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und
Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy,
was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany
where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited
government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons.

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases were recorded
during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127
were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and
of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead.
The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were
reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a
local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193
victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on
Human Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number,
406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.Currently, the United
Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or
involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.

Under Philippine Law

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal
that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance:

Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are
not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. ”

Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the
legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural
standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when
the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional
rights.

The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from
this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by
the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by
the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.

During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France on
February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for
human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.

Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families,
and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.

Rodriguez vs Arroyo

FACTS: This case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the April 12, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
granting the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data by petitioner Noriel Rodriguez, who is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Petitioner was then abducted, tortured and forced
to confess to being a member of the New People's Army (NPA). Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production
of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, and five
others. The writs were granted but the CA dropped President Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any
case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency as part of her presidential immunity. Also, the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order was denied by the CA. The respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the decision of the CA but before such motion could be resolved petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration raising that the CA erred in not granting the interim relief for temporary protection order and in dropping
President Arroyo as party-respondent.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by petitioner may be granted even after the writs of amparo and
habeas data have been granted. 2. Whether or not President Arroyo should be dropped as respondent because of her
presidential immunity. 3. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases
4. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents

HELD: 1. The interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo clearly provides that interim reliefs may only be availed of upon filing of the petition or at anytime
before final judgment. Given that there has already been a final judgment in the given case, petitioner may no longer avail
of the interim relief of temporary protection order. 2. No, President Arroyo should not be dropped. There is no
determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings as courts can only go as
far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As it was held in
the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during
the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. Also, the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated that the
presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency. Given these, former Pres.
GMA cannot use presidential immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez. 3. Yes, As we
explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict.” Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has
also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. Precisely in the given case, the doctrine of command
responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Nothing precludes
this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 4. Yes, the rights to life, liberty and property of
Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents. The SC held that there was no reason to depart from the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence following the doctrine of totality of
evidence in amparo cases which is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. The sworn affidavit of the petitioner and the medical examinations conducted on him are sufficient evidence
proving that the military personnel involved in the case indeed abducted Rodriguez on September 6, 2009 and then
detained and tortured him.

DE LIMA VS GATDULA
TOPIC: WRIT OF AMPARO

FACTS
● February 2012, respondent Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in
the RTC Manila against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy
Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation.
● Respondent wanted petitioners to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing
bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident.
● RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing to determine whether a temporary
protection order may be issued.
● During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for
Amparo cases
● RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer. The
judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.
● Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he
ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days
● RTC DECISION: granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for,
namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders in relation to the evidence and reports involving
an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda.
● RTC denied herein petitioners’ MR.
● Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) via Rule 45.

ISSUE
● Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in the present case?

HELD.
● No. the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order
contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at
this time.
 ● The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is
appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive
portion of the "Decision" which merely directs the issuance and service of the Writ of Amparo.
● The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and
inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection
orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered.
● The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC
✓ First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer
is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy
✓ Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule. It is clear from this rule that this type of summary
procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to
certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding.
✓ second was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a
Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
✓ third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
✓ The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this court GRANTS
the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
✓ Court directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached
affidavits.

RATIO
WHAT IS A WRIT OF AMPARO?
● It is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
● The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
● Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but
decisive relief.

HOW IS IT AVAILED OF
1. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court.
2. The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluationof the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits
submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed".
3. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal
is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security
is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner.
4. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.
5. The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return
serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from
identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
6. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether
interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.
7. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should contain detailed measures which the judge
views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case.
✓ These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions
taken by the respondents.
✓ It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.
✓ After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied.
✓ In Amparo cases, judgment is satisfied when: (1) the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security
cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment; and (2) through consolidation should
a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil.
✓ Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial
monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.

IF THE RESPONDENTS ARE PUBLIC OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYEES

● they are also required to state the actions they had taken to:
(i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition;
(iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance;
(iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may
have brought about the death or disappearance; and
(vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
● Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be
required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO VS THE WRIT OF AMPARO

● PRIVILEGE: includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
● WRIT: After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

NAVIA ET. AL. VS. PARDICO (G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012)

Facts of the Case:

At 8:30 of March 31, 2008, a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore (Lolita) in Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas
son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where
they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go
with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision.

Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand
Royale Subdivision. The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.

The version of Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a
certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post
in said subdivision. The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners (Asian Land
security guards) Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising). Following their departments standard operating
procedure, Dio and Buising entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there
where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong
and Ben were staying to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them. At the security
office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben who admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only
transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. Since complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation
hence no complainant will be filed, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the
effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. His mother Lolita also signed the logbook
below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left
the security office. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the reported
loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben
also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed
and without any injury. Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the
logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation from
the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia)
about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police
Station. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.
They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband.

Respondent’s version however stated otherwise. According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They
were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation and
suffered physical abuse from Navia, his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si
Ben. Bong allegedly admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house is
located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to
illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in the
subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he
reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an
entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore and that they released
her son Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latter ’s case will be forwarded to the barangay. The following
morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had
already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.
Virginia then filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the amparo court issued an Order directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the
production of the body of Ben before it. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO

RULING

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the same person
summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso
facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains
that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command
against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginia’s petition and proved
during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and
relevant laws.

It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof

rom the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons
subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.

In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and that he
slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time,
his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be taken lightly. It
unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to
establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain
any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated
in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or
proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence in investigating his case, the Supreme Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.

The Supreme Court further ruled that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private
individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the
Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or
connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental
involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of
a missing person.

Hence, the Decision of the RTC of Malolos City was reversed and the Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico
was dismissed.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner, vs. Atty.
MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s
child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the
child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina
City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily
surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for
Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then
commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking
for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary
Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on
November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her
parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to
obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a
minor child.

HELD:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced
disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating
that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even
admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing.
There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody
over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ

GR NO. 191805 | NOVEMBER 15, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in
the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition
was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent,
as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue:

(1) Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit
(2) Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
(3) Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
(4) Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or
accountable for his abduction.

Held:

(1) No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and
habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for
acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from
suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA
cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of
amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

(2) Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the
use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally
extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find
application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the
doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the
superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of
the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of
course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.

Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing
definitions.

(3) Yes. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
 (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
(b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
(c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof.
(d) The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

(4) Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the
"Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have
known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even
attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue
military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced
disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former
President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments,
there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was
there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or
security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

SALCEDO vs BOLLOZOS (no digest)

In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth O. Ladaga vs. Maj. Gen.
Reynaldo Mapagu

G.R. No. 189689-91, November 13, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners share the common names included in what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle
Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division(10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their
names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal
killings–a real threat to their life, liberty and security. ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty.Ladaga), first came to know of
the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the
ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO OUST PGMAON 30 NOV 2007.

Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The Commission on Human Rights, for
its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the matter. According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course
of the performance of her duties and functions, she has not committed any act against national security that would justify
the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her
vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house.

Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB List. In his petition, he
alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public interest or human rights
lawyer. The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have
already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List.

A case was filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate
Writs of Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written return. In the return of the respondents, they denied
authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show that they were responsible for the alleged threats.
After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC finding no substantial evidence to show that the
perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents.
Thus, petition for writ was denied.

Issues:

WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Writ of Amparo.

Held:

No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was
promulgated pursuant in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and
extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty
or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds
but only upon reasonable certainty.

The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

The Petitioners were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty
and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo.

R.A. NO. 10353 An Act Defining And Penalizing Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance

R.A. No. 9745 An Act Penalizing Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Or Punishment And
Prescribing Penalties.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial
Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents

G.R. No. 193636; July 24, 2012 (SERENO, J.:EN BANC)

FACTS

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275),
"Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body,
which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to
the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission
Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance
operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

Thru local TV news (July 2010) and print media, Gamboa’s name had been tagged as one of those politicians alleged to
be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. As a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the
Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and
police surveillance operations.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her
Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database;
(b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d)
ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from
making baseless reports.

ISSUE: Whether the forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is an
intrusion to Gamboa’s right to privacy, thus, rendering the remedy of writ of habeas data proper.

HELD: NO.

PRINCIPLE: The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must
be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

GAMBOA’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED

It is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs
with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as
the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information
on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals
is herein petitioner Gamboa. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the
Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding
of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for
the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request
assistance from the latter.

The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and
without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy
since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally,
Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place
to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

REMEDY OF WRIT OF HABEAS DATA NOT PROPER

Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other
reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Disposition of the Case: Instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial CourtOF Laoag
City, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, vs ST. THERESA’S
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

PREFATORY:

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set
by the society in which he lives.– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS:

Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures
were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their
black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining the commencement
exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC
dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:

Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.

The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way.
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s
policies and rules on discipline.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the latter part)

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.”

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

(1) The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

(2) An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)

Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically
the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or
her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her
family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature
of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ
from getting to said person or entity.

As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Several commentators
regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol
better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs?

Facebook Privacy Tools

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat:
“Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings
are not foolproof.”

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of
his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words,
Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when
and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.”

LONE ISSUE:

NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set
at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors
nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.