Constitutional Law Case Digest

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

Title Facts
Gerochi v. DOE RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric
GR No. 159796 Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
17 July 2007 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a
Nachura, J. universal charge on all end-users of
electricity for the purpose of funding
NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted and
took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of
the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of
the universal charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts
to taxation without representation for not
giving the consumers a chance to be heard
and be represented.
Issue/s Ruling
W/N the universal charge is NO. The assailed universal charge is not
a tax. a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of
the State’s police power. That public
welfare is promoted may be gleaned
from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which
enumerates the policies of the State
regarding electrification. Moreover, the
Special Trust Fund feature of the
universal charge reasonably serves and
assures the attainment and perpetuity of
the purposes for which the universal
charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the
viability of the country’s electric power
industry), further boosting the position
that the same is an exaction primarily in
pursuit of the State’s police objectives.
Doctrine
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose
and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition
a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement
of police power.
The theory behind the exercise of the power to
tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of
the people.

Chavez v. Romulo Pursuant to PGMA’s speech stressing the
GR No. 157036 need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
9 June 2004 places, PNP Chief Ebdane issued the
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. “Guidelines in the Implementation of the
Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence.” It revoked all existing
Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR), subject to renewal.
W/N the revocation of the
PTCFORs pursuant to the
Guidelines is a violation of
the people’s right to
property.
NO. The right to bear arms is a mere A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
statutory privilege, not a constitutional privilege is neither a property nor property right.
right. Being a mere statutory creation,
the right to bear arms cannot be
considered an inalienable or absolute
right. A license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right.

Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the DILG to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines.
His request was denied. Thus, he went to
court to challenge the constitutionality of
the Guidelines.
YES. It is apparent from the assailed
Guidelines that the basis for its issuance
was the need for peace and order in the
W/N the issuance of the society. Undeniably, the motivating
assailed Guidelines is a valid factor in the issuance of the Guidelines
exercise of police power. is the interest of the public in general.

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PRC v. de Guzman 79 successful examinees of the Physician
GR No. 144681 Licensure Examination from Fatima
21 June 2004 College obtained unusual and
Tinga, J. exceptionally high scores in the two most
difficult subjects of the exam, which
aroused the suspicion of the Board of
Medicine. They had the results surveyed
by a statistician and investigated by the
NBI.
Subsequently, they adopted a Resolution
which withheld the registration as
physicians of the Fatima examinees. After
the results of the investigation of the NBI
and the survey of Fr. Nebres, the Board
issued another Resolution charging the said
examinees with immorality, dishonest
conduct, fraud, and deceit.
W/N the Board has YES. The practice of medicine is a The power to regulate the exercise of a
discretion to hold in privilege, subject to qualifications and profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
abeyance the administration disqualifications. It must appear that the exercised by the State or its agents in an
of the Hippocratic oath and applicant has fully complied with all the arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner.
the issuance of the conditions and requirements imposed
certificates to successful by the law and the licensing authority.
board examinees. Should doubt taint or mar the
compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not
issue. Until the moral and mental fitness
of de Guzman, et al. could be
ascertained, the Board has discretion to
hold in abeyance the administration of
the Hippocratic oath and the issuance of
the certificates to them. The writ of
mandamus does not lie to compel
performance of an act which is not duly
authorized.

The Fatima examinees, on the other hand,

filed the special civil action of mandamus
against the PRC so that they would be
allowed to take their physician’s oath.
City of Manila v. Laguio Malate Tourist Development Corporation
GR No. 118127 (MTDC) owned a Victoria Court motel in
12 April 2005 the Ermita-Malate area, which was being
Tinga, J. threatened to be closed down by an
Ordinance passed by the City of Manila,
which prohibited the operation of any
business which adversely affected the
social and moral welfare of the community
in the said area. The said ordinance
provided that these said establishments
were to be either closed down, relocated,
or transformed into other wholesome types
of establishments.
W/N the ordinance is an YES. Although the object of the
oppressive exercise of police ordinance was the promotion of the
power. social and moral values of the
community, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
An ordinance which permanently restricts the
use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.
The due process clause is a limitation upon the
exercise of police power.
The police power granted to government units
must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law.

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MTDC sought to have the ordinance
declared unconstitutional. The Court
agreed with MTDC, and enjoined the City
of Manila from implementing the
ordinance.
MMDA v. Viron PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for
Transportation the establishment of a Mass Transport
GR No. 170656 System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this
15 August 2007 EO, the Metro Manila Council of the
MMDA cited the need to remove the bus
terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Viron, and later Mencorp, both provincial
bus operators who had bus terminals that
were threatened to be removed, filed
petitions alleging that the EO should be
declared unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of
owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective
terminals.
Exec. Secretary v. EO 156 was issued by PGMA in 2002,
Southwing Heavy prohibiting the importation into the country
Industries of used motor vehicles, subject to a few
GR Nos. 164171-2, exceptions. Article 2, Section 3.1
Constitutional Law Case Digest
Individual rights may be adversely affected only
to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Obiter: There are no pure places where there
are impure men. –Justice Tinga
Nyahahaha. 
W/N the EO is a valid NO. As to the alleged confiscatory Police power rests primarily with the legislature,
exercise of police power. character of the EO, it need only be but it may be delegated.
stated that the respondents’ certificates
of public convenience confer no Measures calculated to promote the safety and
property right, and are mere licenses or convenience of the people using the
privileges. As such, they must yield to thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular
legislation safeguarding the people’s traffic present a proper subject for the exercise
interest. However, although the of police power.
authority of the President over the
implementation of the Project cannot be
questioned, the designation of the
MMDA as the implementing agency for
the Project may not be sustained.
MMDA has no police power, let alone
legislative power. In light of the
administrative nature of its powers and
functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the EO; hence, it could
not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It
follows that the MMDA cannot validly
order the elimination of the
respondents’ terminals.
W/N EO 156 is a valid EO 156 is VALID insofar as it applies For an administrative issuance to be valid, it
exercise of police power. to the Philippine territory outside the must comply with the following:
presently fenced-in former Subic 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by
because the legislature;
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168741 enumerates the vehicles
20 February 2006 excluded/exempted from the prohibition.
Ynares-Santiago, J. Three separate actions for declaratory
relief were filed before an Olongapo RTC,
asserting that Article 2, Section 3.1 is
unconstitutional and illegal. The RTC
granted all the petitions and declared the
EO unconstitutional.
Lucero v. City The brothers Lucero and one Tenorio were
Government of Pasig granted lease contracts to occupy stalls in
GR No. 132834 the public market if Pasig in 1983. In 1993,
24 November 2006 Pasig renovated its market facilities and
Corona, J. passed Municipal Ordinance No. 56 which
mandated all stall occupants to fill up and
submit application forms which would
serve as their lease contracts if approved.
The Luceros and Tenorio, however, refused
to apply for a new lease on their stalls. The
Pasig government filed a case for
ejectment against them.
Constitutional Law Case Digest
W/N the Luceros may claim
a vested right to the market
stalls they were occupying.
W/N the Municipal virtue of a license is always subject to
Ordinance was a valid the police power of a city government.
exercise of police power.
1. Its promulgation is actually 2. It must be promulgated in accordance
authorized by the legislature with the prescribed procedure;
(Tariff and Customs Code, 3. It must be within the scope of the
Omnibus Investment Code, authority given by the legislature; and
Safeguard Measures Act); and 4. It must be reasonable.
2. It is presumed that the EO duly
complied with the procedures
and limitations imposed by law,
absent any strong evidence to
the contrary.
However, the proscription in the
importation of used motor vehicles
should be operative only outside the
Freeport and he inclusion of said zone
within the ambit of prohibition is an
invalid modification of RA 7227 (Bases
Conversion and Development Act of
1992). When the application of an
administrative issuance modifies
existing laws or exceeds the intended
scope, the issuance becomes void, not
only for being ultra vires but also for
being unreasonable.
NO. The 1983 lease contracts did not A public market is one dedicated to the service
give petitioners irrefutable rights to the of the general public and operated under
market stalls. They were mere grantees government control and supervision as a public
of a privilege to occupy and operate utility. Hence, the operation of a public market
such booths. and its facilities is imbued with public interest.
YES. The operation of a market stall by
An application for this privilege may be
granted or refused for reasons of public
policy and sound public administration.
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The MTC ruled in favor of the Luceros,
but was reversed by the RTC and the CA.
Apo Fruits Corp. v. CA AFC and HPI owned agricultural lands
GR No. 164195 which they voluntarily offered to sell to the
6 February 2007 government. However, they did not agree
Chico-Nazario, J. to the LBP’s valuation of the land, stating
that the valuations were unreasonably low
and inadequate as just compensation for
the properties.
DAR then requested LBP to deposit the
amounts equivalent to the LBP valuations
in the names of both AFC and HPI. The
latter both withdrew several millions from
the said accounts. Thereafter, new TCTs
over the lands were issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, and
CLOAs were subsequently issued to
farmer-beneficiaries.
AFC and HPI both filed complaints for
determination of just compensation.
Agan v. PIATCO PIATCO won the bid for the construction
GR Nos. 155001, and development of the NAIA IPT III
155547, and 155661 under a build-operate-transfer
21 January 2004 arrangement. A Concession Agreement was
Puno, J. then entered into. Subsequently, the ARCA
and Supplement contracts were entered
into as well, modifying the original terms
of the Concession Agreement.
Various petitions were filed to annul the
CA, ARCA, and the Supplements; and to
prohibit the DOTC, and MIAA from
implementing them.
Constitutional Law Case Digest
W/N LBP may determine the NO. The valuation of property in
amount of just eminent domain is essentially a judicial
compensation. function which is vested with the RTC
acting as a Special Agrarian Court.
NO. In the determination of
compensation, all the facts as to
If so, W/N it correctly condition of the property and
determined the value of the surroundings, its improvements
lands in question. capabilities, may be shown
considered in estimating its value.
W/N the temporary takeover NO. The section which provides that
clause is constitutional. PIATCO shall be entitled to reasonable
compensation for the duration of the
temporary takeover by the government
clearly obligates the government in the
exercise of its police power to
compensate PIATCO and this obligation
is offensive to the Constitution.
NO. The PIATCO contracts run afoul of
the Constitution. This is because the
W/N the PIATCO Contracts ARCA provides for a direct government
themselves are guaranty in the form of taking over of
The determination of just compensation is
essentially a judicial function.
The determination of just compensation cannot
be made to the prejudice of the sellers or of the
just government.
the
its Requirements for a proper exercise of eminent
and domain:
and 1. Public use
2. Just compensation
The police power of the State cannot be negated
by any party nor should its exercise be a source
of obligation for the State.
Police power cannot be diminished, let alone
defeated by any contract for its paramount
consideration is public welfare and interest.
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constitutional. the loans of PIATCO should they

become due and unpaid.
Southern Cross Cement v. Philcemcor filed a petition seeking the W/N the DTI Secretary is YES. The DTI Secretary cannot impose It is Congress, not the President, which
Cement Manufacturers imposition of safeguard measures on gray barred from imposing a a general safeguard measure without a possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and
Assoc. Portland cement with the DTI. The DTI general safeguard measure positive final determination rendered by imposts. Without legislative authorization
GR No. 158540 Secretary then issued a provisional absent a positive final the Tariff Commission because it is a through statute, the President has no power,
3 August 2005 safeguard measure and referred the petition determination rendered by constitutional limitation imposed on the authority or right to impose such safeguard
Tinga, J. to the Tariff Commission. the Tariff Commission. delegation of legislative power to measures because taxation is inherently
impose tariffs and imposts to the legislative, not executive.
After the Tariff Commission’s President. The authorization to the
investigation, it reported that there was no President can be exercised only within Section 28(2) Article VI of the Constitution
need for definitive safeguard measures. the specified limits set in the law and is shields the delegation of the taxing power to the
The DTI Secretary then denied further subject to limitations and President by the Legislature from constitutional
Philcemcor’s petition but expressed his restrictions which Congress may infirmity, and should be recognized as an
opinion that he disagreed with the Tariff impose. exceptional grant of legislative power to the
Commission’s findings. President, rather than the affirmation of an
inherent executive power.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision in the
CA. The CA ruled that the DTI Secretary
was not bound by the Tariff Commission’s
report since it was merely
recommendatory. Based on this decision,
the DTI Secretary then imposed a
definitive safeguard measure on the
importation of gray Portland cement for 3
years.

Southern Cross challenges both the CA and

DTI Secretary decisions.
ATO v. Gopuco Gopuco owned a parcel of land which was
GR No. 158563 subjected to expropriation proceedings for
30 June 2005 the purpose of the expansion of the Lahug
Chico-Nazario, J. Airport in Cebu.
Subsequently, the Mactan International
Airport commenced operations, and Lahug
Airport was shut down. Gopuco sought the
When private land is
expropriated for a particular
public use, and that
particular public use is
abandoned, does the land so
expropriated return to its
former owner?
IT DEPENDS. If the land is
expropriated for a particular purpose,
with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the
property shall return to its former
owner, then when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former
Eminent domain is generally described as “the
highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government” that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the
State. It is a right to reassert dominion over
property within the State for public use or to

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reconveyance of his lot and offered to pay owner reacquires the property so
for the value of his former land. He expropriated. On the other hand, when
maintained that the original purpose for land has been acquired for public use in
which the property was expropriated had fee simple, unconditionally, either by
ceased, and title to the property should the exercise of eminent domain or by
therefore revert to him. purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use
may be abandoned or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner. In this case, the terms of
judgment regarding the expropriation of
the property granted title in fee simple
to the Republic of the Philippines.
Therefore, no rights either express or
implied, have been retained by Gopuco.
meet a public exigency and is said to be an
essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the
eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea
of property, remains in the government, or in the
aggregate body of people in their sovereign
capacity; and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public
interest so requires it.

NO. In expropriation proceedings, the

Palileo v. NIA The Palileos collectively own three parcels
GR No. 148574 of land, on certain portions of which NIA
11 October 2005 had built a canal in 1956, and an access
Chico-Nazario, J. road in 1983. The canal appears to have
been expropriated by virtue of a court
order as early as 1958. However, it does
condemnor merely serves notice that it
is taking title and possession of the
property, and the defendant asserts title
or interest in the property, not to prove a
right to possession, but to prove a right
W/N in cases of to compensation for the taking. Thus,
expropriation, an “implied no such contract exists.
contract” that the properties
will be used only for the
public purpose for which
they were acquired.
W/N the Palileos could NO. NIA has occupied, utilized, and for The unpaid landowner cannot recover
claim compensation for the all intents and purposes, exercised possession of property taken for public use even
affected portions of their dominion over the property. Further, it while no requisite expropriation proceedings
property or recover the said is undisputed that the access road was were first instituted.
property from NIA. taken for public use. Hence, such taking
even in the absence of an order of The right of eminent domain is usually

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not appear whether payment of just
compensation had been made.
In 1994, NIA assessed the Palileos an
irrigation service fee. Shortly thereafter,
the Palileos demanded reasonable rentals
from NIA for occupying their property.
When NIA refused to pay, the Palileos
sued for recovery of possession, arguing
that there was no payment of just
compensation, nor was there expropriation
proceedings filed with respect to the
acquisition of the property used as an
access road.
expropriation or memorandum of understood to be an ultimate right of the
agreement, shall not entitle the owner to sovereign power to appropriate any property
the recovery of possession but only to within its territorial sovereignty for a public
just compensation, following existing purpose.
case law. However, with respect to the
claim of just compensation, PD 552 has
barred their claims. With respect to the
irrigation canal, the action accrued 18
years prior to the PD’s approval. The
PD provides that actions for recovery of
compensation and damages against NIA
which have accrued for 10 or more
years prior to the decree’s approval are
deemed to have prescribed and are
barred forever. As for the access road,
the action was commenced only after 12
years. The PD also provides that claims
should be taken within 5 years from the
time the property was taken. Thus, the
actions of the Palileos have already
prescribed. They cannot recover just
compensation anymore.