1. Heirs of Hinog Bertuldo Hinog v.
v. Melicor ABALOS (2) WON the non-payment of the proper docket fee at the time of the filing of the
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Hinog Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III, Bertuldo
Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo
Hinog, Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita
C. Hinog, Paz H. Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C.
Hinog, Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong,
Arlene Lanasang (All respresented by Bertuldo Hinog III)
Respondent/s: MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO
BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE
Doctrine: After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by
seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental
pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred
by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the
court's jurisdiction in the same case.
Facts: The Balanes, the private respondents in this case, filed a complaint for the
recovery of ownership and possession as well as removal of construction and
damages (moral & exemplary) against Bertuldo Hinog.
It was alleged that the Balanes are the owners of a 1400sqm parcel of land in Bohol,
which they have rented to Bertuldo for 10 years with an annual rental of 100php.
Bertuldo, thereafter, constructed a house of light materials in the said lot.
However, after the expiry of the 10 years, Bertuldo refused to surrender the lot and
even claimed ownership over the same by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed
by one Tomas Pahac, with the alleged conformity of the Balanes.
Trial on the merits ensued but Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
Consequently, Bertuldo III designated Atty. Petalcorin to be his new counsel. The
latter filed a motion to expunge the complaint and nullify all proceedings on the
ground that the amount of damages claimed is not stated so the proper docket fee
was not paid by the Balanes hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Under the
Manchester Ruling, Non- payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.
The trial court granted the motion but later on reinstated the case after the payment of
the correct docket fee.
Instead of filing for an MR, a supplemental pleading was filed by Atty. Petalcorin
appending therein the Deed of Sale of the lot in question. The trial court denied the
supplemental pleading on the ground that the Deed is a new matter, never mentioned
in the original answer prepared by Bertuldo’s original counsel.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition
Issue: (1) WON the petitioners may challenge the court’s jurisdiction? NO
complaint automatically causes the dismissal of the action? NO
Ratio:
(1)
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their
motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are
effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's
jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the
fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did not raise
the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket fees. Instead, he
based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before
the trial court. It was only in September 22, 1998 or more than seven years after filing
the answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised for the first time in the motion to expunge by Bertuldo's heirs.
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial
court and even invoked the trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative
relief, petitioners, considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their
predecessor, are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial
court's jurisdiction. Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless
settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or
estoppel.
(2) The Court has held that the Manchester rule has been modified in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, which defined the following guidelines involving the
payment of docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
XXX
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide
by the rules prescribing such payment.[46] Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention
to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
No costs.
1 | CIVPRO 2D
 2. De la Cruz v Joaquin AVILLON 5. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but
a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated,
Petitioner/s: Spouses Julita de la Cruz and Felipe de la Cruz as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and
Respondent/s: Pedro Joaquin protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules
cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to
Doctrine:
substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves court's decision.
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in
defense of the deceased. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners
Facts:
1. A complaint was filed by Pedro Joaquin for the recovery of possession and
ownership, cancellation of title, and damages against Sps. de la Cruz.
2. Joaquin alleged that he obtained a P9000 loan in 1974 from the Sps.,
payable on 1979. This was secured by a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija in favor of the Sps.
3. The parties also executed another document called “Kasunduan”.
4. Joaquin alleges that:
a. The Deed of Sale is actually an equitable mortgage as seen in the
Kasunduan
5. RTC ruled that the parties entered into a sale with a right of repurchase, and
Joaquin exercised his right to repurchase when he made two valid tender of
payments. The Sps. were required to reconvey the property.
6. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. In a Resolution in 2004, the CA ordered
the substitution by legal representatives, in view of Joaquin’s death in 1988.
7. The Sps. assert that
a. There being no substitution by the heirs after Joaquin died during
the pendency of the case, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
litigation.

Issue: WHETHER the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of
Joaquin - NO

Ratio:
1. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is
specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3 ROC.
2. The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the
appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the
resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction
over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no
judgment was binding.
3. This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not
necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the
case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions
negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
4. The heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case.
The appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and
substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered
correctly.

2 | CIVPRO 2D

3. Limbauan v Acosta - BALAGTAS
Petitioner/s: Charles Limbauan
Respondent/s: Faustino Acosta
Doctrine: A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Facts:
1) In 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate in Kalookan for a
leprosarium.
a) However, the Gov’t only used 1/5th of the property.
b) AND under RA 4085, segregation of those with leprosy is no longer
mandated.
2) In the meantime, the State found it necessary to establish new residential
areas and utilizing inexpensive land in order to serve low-income families
whose housing needs can only be met by the Government.
a) On April 26, 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 843
i) Allocating the property to the Department of Health, the
National Housing Corporation, the PHHC and Department
of Social Welfare and Development
3) It was also decreed that:
a) More precise identities of the parcels of land allocated to the
government will be made only after a final survey shall have been
completed.
4) A joint PHHC-Bureau of Lands team was tasked to undertake the necessary
segregation survey and inquiries on private rights within the Estate.
a) In the Interim, it was decreed that no transfer of title shall be
made until the enactment of a law allowing the use of the site
for purposes other than that of a leprosarium.
5) In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the
Tala Estate and constructed his house.
a) In August, 1982, Faustino Acosta, who was then a Barangay
Councilman, executed a deed styled "Registration of Property",
attested by the Barangay Captain over another vacant portion of
the Estate.
6) Faustino Acosta then took possession of the property, constructed a fence
around the perimeter of the property and planted vegetables thereon.
a) However, in 1984, Paulino Calanday took possession of the said
property without the consent of Faustino, constructed an edifice
thereon and used the same as a beerhouse.
b) When Faustino remonstrated, Paulino led two (2) criminal
complaints against Faustino with the Metropolitan Trial Court for
"Malicious Mischief" and "Unjust Vexation".
i) However the Court issued an Order dismissing the cases
for failure of Paulino to comply with PD 1508.
7) Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita Roces.
a) Juanita and Faustino entered into an oral contract of lease over the
parcel of land for a monthly rental of P60.00.
b) About a year thereafter, Juanita suddenly stopped paying to
Faustino her rentals for the property.
i) It turned out that Juanita conveyed the beerhouse to her
nephew, Charles Limbauan, who assumed the lease from
his aunt and who then paid the monthly rentals for the
property in the amount of P60.00 to Faustino.
c) However, in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying rentals to
Faustino claiming that:
i) Since the property was government property, Faustino
had no right to lease the same and collect the rentals
therefore.
(1) However, Faustino did not file any complaint nor
unlawful detainer against Charles.
8) Congress then approved Republic Act 7999:
a) Under which the State converted a portion of the Estate, with a total
area of 120 hectares, for use as a housing site for residents and
employees of the Department of Health, with the National Housing
Authority as the leading implementing agency.
9) After the passage by Congress of Republic Act 7999, Faustino led a
complaint against Charles with the Lupon for ejectment, for failure of Charles
to pay his rentals from October, 1987.
a) The Lupon issued a "Certification to File Action"
10) On January 2, 1996, Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of Legal Aid
of the University of the Philippines, sent a letter to Charles:
a) Demanding Charles to vacate the property within five days from
notice
i) For his failure to pay the monthly rentals in the amount of
P60.00 a month since October, 1987.
b) Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and refused to vacate the
property.
11) Faustino, then led, on February 7, 1996, a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer"
against Charles with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
a) Praying for the immediate restoration of the premises to Faustino
12) Upon suggestion of the Court, Faustino Acosta sent another letter of
demand to Charles Limbauan, dated March 7, 1996:
a) Demanding Charles to vacate the property this time within 15 days
from notice,
i) Otherwise, Faustino will institute the appropriate action for
his eviction from the property.
ii) Charles Limbauan received the letter, on March 13, 1996,
but refused to vacate the property.
iii) Faustino forthwith led a "Motion to Approve Attached
Amended Complaint" with the Court which was
granted by the Court.
13) Charles Limbauan interposed the defense that:
a) That Faustino had no cause of action against him
i) because the property on which the beerhouse was
constructed is owned by the government since the
government is the owner of the property, Faustino had no
3 | CIVPRO 2D
 right of possession over the property and collect rentals
therefore.
(1) Besides, it was unfair for Faustino, who was
already in possession of the lot at No. 786 B. San
Roque, Barangay 187 to still claim possession
over the subject property.
b) And that the Court had no jurisdiction over the action of the
Faustino
i) As it was one of accion publiciana and not one for unlawful
detainer.
14) The MTC ruled in favor of Faustino.
a) Found that Faustino adduced evidence that Charles Limbauan was
a lessee over the property and, hence, the Charles Limbauan was
estopped from assailing Faustino’s title over the property.
15) Charles Limbauan then led a "Petition for Review" with the CA and posed
the following issues:
a) whether or not the remedy of the Respondent in the Metropolitan
Trial Court for unlawful detainer was proper;
b) the subject property was government property and, hence, cannot
be the lawful subject of a lease contract between the Petitioner and
Respondent and, hence, the latter had no right to have the
Petitioner evicted from the property and to collect rentals from him.
16) The CA dismissed the Petition for Review and affirmed the MTC’s decision.
17) Charles Limbauan argues that there must be a prior demand to vacate the
leased premises and pay the rent and a 15-day period from the time of
demand must have lapsed before a complaint for unlawful detainer may be
commenced pursuant to Section 2, Rule 70. 1
a) According to Charles Limbauan, Faustino’s demand letter gave him
a five-day period only instead of fifteen (15) days within which to
comply with the demand to vacate.
i) A jurisdictional requisite, not having been complied
with, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.
2)
Issue: WoN the MTC erred in allowing the Amendment as its purpose was to
confer jurisdiction of the case upon itself -- NO, the MTC was correct in
allowing the Amendment by Faustino.
Ratio: [Only read #1 and #2 if u really want to understand the case (or if u still have
time), but if ur in a real hurry, proceed to #3 cuz that’s the important part in this case]
1) In re: Section 2, Rule 70 (unlawful detainer)
1 petitioner five (5) days to pay and to vacate the subject
Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated,
such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of
such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises
if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in
the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
a) The demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the action for
unlawful detainer is anchored on the non-payment of rentals, as in
this case.
b) The same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful detainer suit
must be commenced:
i) Only if the lessee fails to comply after the lapse or
expiration of 15 days in case of lands and 5 days in case
of buildings:
(1) From the time the demand is made upon the
lessee.
c) The demand required and contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 70 is
a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose of bringing an
unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay rent.
i) It partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must be
pursued before resorting to judicial action
(1) Such that full compliance with the demand would
render unnecessary a court action.
d) In short, for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two
requisites must concur:
i) There must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the
conditions of the lease; and
ii) There must be demand both to pay or to comply and
vacate within the periods speci ed in Section 2,
particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the
case of buildings.
(1) The first requisite refers to the existence of the
cause of action for unlawful detainer while the
second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of
demand in order that said cause of action may be
pursued.
e) As the subject matter in this case is a parcel of land, the expiration
of the fifteen-day period is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for
unlawful detainer.
In re: Faustino’s observance of the 15 day period:
a) Faustino’s first demand letter dated January 2, 1996 gave petitioner
five (5) days from receipt within which to pay the unpaid rentals and
vacate the premises.
i) Limbauan received the demand letter on January 10, 1996
while Faustino brought the action for unlawful detainer on
February 7, 1996, which was clearly more than 15 days
from the time petitioner received the demand letter on
January 10, 1996 and well within the one-year period
set forth by Section 1, Rule 70.
ii) Thus, the fact that respondent's demand letter granted
property is of no moment
(1) Because what is important and required under
Section 2 of Rule 70 is for the lessor to allow a
period of fifteen (15) days to lapse before
commencing an action for unlawful detainer.
4 | CIVPRO 2D
 iii) Evidently, Faustino actually complied with this i) As earlier discussed, Faustino’s original complaint was
requirement. free from any jurisdictional flaw and the MTC had
(1) Hence, MTC did not err for assuming jurisdiction jurisdiction over the case to begin with.
over Faustino’s complaint and in not dismissing ii) Thus, the cited cases are not applicable in the instant
the same. case.
3) In re: Amendment iii) Hence, the MTC was correct in allowing the
a) Upon the advice of the MTC, Faustino sent another demand letter amendment.
dated March 7, 1996 to Limbauan, this time giving the latter fifteen e) Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that what determines the nature
(15) days within which to vacate the subject property. of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
i) When Limbauan still refused, Faustino was compelled to allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
file a Motion to Approve Attached Amended Complaint. sought.
(1) The said motion was rightly granted by the MTC f) A complaint for unlawful detainer is deemed sufficient if it alleges
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 102 that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is
(a) Under this provision, a party has the unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
absolute right to amend his pleading i) Here, Faustino alleged that he acquired possessory rights
whether a new cause of action or over the subject property by virtue of a government grant.
change in theory is introduced, at any (1) He leased the property to Limbauan for a monthly
time before the filing of any responsive rental of P60.00.
pleading. (2) When Limbauan failed to pay the rentals,
(b) Undoubtedly, when Faustino led his Faustino eventually sent two demand letters
Amended Complaint on May 16, 1996, asking petitioner to pay and vacate the premises.
no responsive pleading had yet been (3) Limbauan refused, thereby depriving Faustino of
filed by Limbauan, thus, the MTC validly possession of the subject property.
admitted the said amended complaint. (4) Clearly, the complaint alleges the basic
b) It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored and should elements of an unlawful detainer case, which
be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to are sufficient for the purpose of vesting
determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
to technicalities. g) Likewise, Limbauan’s allegation in his petition that he received
i) This principle is generally recognized in order that the real Faustino’s second demand letter on May 8, 1996 was belied by the
controversies between the parties are presented, their records of this case, the truth being that, the said demand letter
rights determined and the case decided on the merits dated March 7, 1996 was received by petitioner on March 13, 1996.
without unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action i) The letter granted Limbauan fifteen (15) days within which
and needless expense. to pay and vacate the subject property.
c) Limbauan also contends that the MTC's purpose for admitting the ii) Faustino’s Amended Complaint was led on May 16, 1996
amended complaint was to eliminate the jurisdictional defect of the which was obviously two (2) months from the time
original complaint. petitioner had notice of the demand, and again more
i) Limbauan cites cases which declared that: than 15 days as required by Section 2, Rule 70.
(1) The amendment of the complaint could not be h) In sum, Faustino clearly satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of
allowed when its purpose is to confer jurisdiction prior demand to vacate within the period set by the rules.
upon the court, since the court must first acquire i) The MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over both the original
jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly complaint and the amended complaint.
therein.
d) Limbauan’s contention is devoid of merit.
Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144 is hereby AFFIRMED.
2
Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any SO ORDERED.
time within ten (10) days after it is served.

5 | CIVPRO 2D
 4. BORNALES
Petitioner: Spouses Anthony and Percita Oco
Respondents: Victor Limbaring
DOCTRINE: In an action on a contract, only the parties involved in such
contract are real parties in interest. Absent any stipulation that such
contract would involve third persons (Contracts pour artrui) or that such
transaction would result into a trust relationship (which would make a
trustor a real party in interest) would deem a third person NOT A REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.
FACTS:
1. A certain Sabas Limbaring subdivided his lot covered by TCT 5628 into
two lots. He then executed a part of such lot in favor of Jennifer
Limbaring through a deed of sale and another in favor of Sarah Jane
Limbaring. Accordingly, the original TCT was cancelled and a TCT was
issued each to Sabas and Jane.
2. Sensing some irregularities, Sabas’s daughter Percita Oco filed a case
of perjury and falsification of documents against her uncle Victor
Limbaring, the father of Sarah and Jennifer.
3. During the pre-litigation conference called by the City Prosecutor, the
parties agreed that the two parcels of land should be reconveyed to
Percita who was to pay respondent all the expenses that had been
incurred and would be incurred due to the transfer of the titles to her
name.
4. Victor demanded P30,000 for the estimates expenses for
documentation, capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and other
registration fees.
5. Percita succeeded in lowering the amount to P25,000 for which she
executed an undertaking.
6. Pursuant to their agreement, Victor facilitated the transfer of the titles to
Percita from his daughters. Percita left without paying the P25,000.
7. Thus, Victor filed a complaint of rescission of the sales contracts with
recovery of possession and ownership of the two parcels of land.
8. Oco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Victor was not the
real party in interest.
9. Victor contended that he was trustor, whose property was being held in
trust by his daughters. He averred that on the assumption that he was
not the real party in interest, he was entitled to an amendment of the
pleadings.
10. RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
11. Oco filed an Answer with counterclaim alleging that:
a. Respondent had tried to secure a DAR clearance and to have
a certificate of title issued in his name but failed because
RA6657 prohibited the acquisition of more than five hectares.
b. Through deceit and manipulation respondent was able to
convince Sabas to execute the two deeds of sale
c. Sabas informed Percita that the agricultural land had never
been sold
d. She refused to pay the P25,000 because the suspensive
conditions stated in the promissory note had never been
complied with.
e. She paid for all the expenses incurred in their transaction
f. Her alleged failure to pay the P25,000 and for other deceits,
Victor filed a criminal complaint, resulting for the Victor to be
guilty of forum shopping.
g. Victor was not the real party in interest and had no legal
standing to sue
h. The lots were acquired without paying any consideration, thus
should be returned to Percita without consideration as well.
i. Deeds of Sale reconveying the lots acknowledged receipt of
consideration.
j. Oco filed a Demurrer to evidence
k. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim
l. Court of Appeals: A trust relationship was created when Victor
purchased the lot in favor of his daughters thus, he is a real
party in interest
m. Oco appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUE/S:
1. Is Victor Limbaring a real party in interest? - NO
RATIO:
1. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that “a real party in
interest is the party who stands to party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest”
2. The abovementioned rule has 2 requirements: (a) to institute an action,
the plaintiff must be the real party in interest and (2) the action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
3. The purposes of these provisions are (a) Prevent the prosecution of
actions by persons without any right, title, or interest in the case (b)
require that the actual party entitled to local legal relief be the one to
prosecute the action (c) avoid multiplicity of suits and (d) discourage
litigation and keep it within certain bounds pursuant to sound public
policy.
4. Interest – within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an
interest in the issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.
5. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
6. Not a real party in interest = case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action
7. Parties to a contract are the real parties in interest in an action upon it,
as consistently held by the Court. Thus, third parties to be involved must
6 | CIVPRO 2D
 be stated expressly (such as contracts pour artrui). A mere incidental
benefit is not enough.
8. In this case, the action involved is an action on a contract which clearly
show that Jennifer and Sarah Limbaring were the vendors and Percitaa
Oco was the vendee. As a rule these three should the only be real
parties in interest.
9. An argument that a trust relationship was formed is untenable. In this
case, there was no trust relationship that was established. Victor only
presented bare assertions ta trust was created. Respondent failed to
rebut the presumption that it is a gift in favor of the child. Failure to rebut
that the land given to the daughters were actually not gifts but
constitutes a trust relationship does not create a trust relationship at all.
This scenario is the exemption of implied trusts in Art. 1448 of the Civil
Code.
10. Absent any clear proof that a trust was created, Victor cannot be
deemed a real party in interest.

7 | CIVPRO 2D
 5. Caravan Travel v. Abejar - BULATAO
Petitioner/s: CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Respondent/s: ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
Doctrine:
One who exercises substitute parental authority over the victim’s person
suffers actual loss and is considered as a real party in interest.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Facts:
● Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City.
● A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite
Reyes.
● To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes.
● Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and
loaded her in the back of the van.
● Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring
Reyes to the hospital.
● Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a
nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van.
● An unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.
● Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was
Caravan.
● Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and
tours.
● Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service
driver.
● Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.
● Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
● Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the
person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against
Bautista and Caravan.
● Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan
is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
● Summons could not be served on Bautista.
● Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant.
● The Regional Trial Court granted her Motion.
● RTC: found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It
awarded damages in favor of Abejar.
● CA: affirmed with modification.
● Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the CA’s
assailed Resolution.
● Hence, this Petition was filed.
Issue:
1. W/N respondent Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for
damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on
account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death.
2. W/N petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
Ratio:
I.
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss
and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.
● It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of
the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence.
● The article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the
relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the
person who may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in
principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a
relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person
responsible therefor.
II.
Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict
provided in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
● Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
● The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules:
○ First, Article 2180's specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks.”
○ Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered
owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of
their vehicles.
● These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle.
● Article 2180 requires proof of two things:
○ First, an employment relationship between the driver and the
owner;
○ Second, the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned
tasks.
● On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the
vehicle.
● Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that
harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
● In light of this, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish
that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question.
8 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable ● Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. grossly negligent in driving the van and concluded that Bautista's gross
● As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes' death.
no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. ● As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from the
● This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle negligence of its driver.
in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the ● For the same reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is
owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving justified.
forward with the evidence.
● The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public. Dispositive:
● Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is
van that hit Reyes. AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual damages in the amount of
● The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the time it was
● Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van. judicially or extrajudicially demanded from petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours
● Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the International, Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral damages, exemplary damages, and
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. attorney's fees shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
● It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article Regional Trial Court Decision until full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn
2180. interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Court of Appeals Decision
● This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: until full satisfaction.
○ First, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista;
○ Second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned
tasks;
○ Or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Bautista.
● On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of
the accident.
● On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident.
● On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite
diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
● Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate
another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code
● Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it
selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of
law.

Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista

was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious.
● The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.
● It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.
● Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a necessary
party—should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner,
along with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-
defendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party)
could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded actual

damages to respondent.
● Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by the
Certificate, i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Reyes.
Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified to is not hearsay.
9 | CIVPRO 2D
 6. Guy v. Gacott - CAPACITE
Petitioner/s: Michael Guy
Respondent/s: Atty. Glenn Gacott
Doctrine:
A judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and
their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court.
A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does
not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall
be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in
which he is not a party.
Facts:
● Gacott (from Palawan) purchased 2 transreceivers from Quantech Systems
Corp. (in Manila) through its employee, Medestomas.
○ Major defects - Gacott personally returned
○ Medestomas received and promised to replace within 2 weeks.
● Gacott did not receive the replacement units.
○ QSC: there were no available units and that it could not refund the
price.
● Gacott filed for damages.
○ RTC ordered QSC and Medestomas to pay Gacott - became final
so Gacott got a Writ of Execution
● Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but a general partnership
where Guy was the General Manager.
○ Sheriff verified in DOTC-LTO and learned that Guy had vehicles
registered.
○ Gacott instructed sheriff to attach 1 of the motor vehicles, which he
did.
■ Notice of Attachment was served upon the custodian of
DOTC-LTO and Guy.
● Guy filed a Motion to Lift Attachment, saying that he was not a judgment
debtor, and thus, his vehicle could not be attached.
○ RTC denied: Guy should be treated as general partner who may be
held solidarily liable with QSC and Medestomas.
● Guy moved for reconsideration: he was neither impleaded as a defendant
nor validly served with summons and thus, RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person.
○ RTC denied; CA affirmed
Issue:
1. W/N the RTC’s jurisdiction over QSC extended to the person of Guy
a. Flawed service of summons, but voluntary appearance cured the
defect
b. A partner must be separately impleaded before he can be
bound by a judgment - so NO
Ratio:
a.
● Section 11, Rule 14 of Rules of Civil Procedure - when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made
on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
○ Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision
provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to
receive summons for juridical entities.
■ QSC was never shown to have been served with the
summons through any of the enumerated authorized
persons to receive such
○ Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is
not sufficient service of summons.
● Service of summons is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect
in the service of summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive
pleading such as an answer.
○ QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus,
jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary
appearance.
b.
● Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency,
whereby any partner can generally represent the partnership in its business
affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit against the partnership is necessarily a
suit impleading each and every partner.
○ A partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate
personality from the persons composing it.
● In relation to the rules of civil procedure, a judgment of a court is conclusive
and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the
commencement of the action in court.
○ A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding
does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no
person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action
or proceeding in which he is not a party.
■ conforms to the guarantee of due process of law
● Guy was never made a party to the case.
○ He did not have any participation in the entire proceeding until his
vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became QSC's "co-
defendant debtor" during the judgment execution stage.
● Money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly
belonging to the judgment debtor.
○ The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.
○ The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment
debtor, not that of a third person.
● With regard to partnerships, ordinarily, the liability of the partners is not
solidary.
○ The joint liability of the partners is a defense that can be raised by a
partner impleaded in a complaint against the partnership.
10 | CIVPRO 2D
 ○
In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the partners'
liability be solidary in nature.3
■ It was not shown that Guy or the other partners did a
wrongful act or misapplied the money or property he or the
partnership received from Gacott.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision
and the March 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94816
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, is ORDERED TO RELEASE Michael C. Guy's
Suzuki Grand Vitara subject of the Notice of Levy/Attachment upon Personalty.

3
Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss:

(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or
property of a third person and misapplies it; and

(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third
person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership.

Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything chargeable to
the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.
11 | CIVPRO 2D
 7. Tatlonghari v. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank - CASAMA
Petitioner/s: Sps. Tatlonghari & Eugenia Tatlonghari (Sps. Tatlonghari)
Respondent/s: Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank (Bangko)
Doctrine: As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat
motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is
especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of
proceedings or, at least, before trial.
Facts:
● A certain Pedro Ilagan filed a complaint for annulment of SPA, PN, and REM
against Bangko and sheriff of Batangas before the RTC
● He alleged that the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC had posted
and published notices of Sheriffs Sale against him as the attorney-in-fact of
a certain Matilde Valdez (Valdez), married to Crispin Brual (Brual), and
herein petitioners spouses Ernesto and Eugenia Tatlonghari, setting the
auction sale of properties belonging respectively to the said couples
allegedly for the satisfaction of Pedro's indebtedness to Bangko amounting
to P3,000,000.00.
● He denied that he obtained a loan from Bangko and that Sps. Tatlonghari or
Valdez constituted him as an atty-in-fact for the purpose of mortgaging their
respective properties as collateral to Bangko.
● After the original complaint was filed, Pedro convinced Sps. Tatlonghari to
join him in the civil case against Bangko
● Pedro informed Sps. Tatlonghari that Bangko used a falsified SPA and made
it appear that they had authorized him to obtain a loan from it, secured by a
real estate mortgage on their property which was the subject of foreclosure
proceedings
● Sps. Tatlonghari did not issue any SPA in favor of Pedro so they agreed to
join him in the case. They accepted Atty. Castillo (Pedro’s counsel) to
represent them
● Sps. Tatlonghari and Pedro together with Valdez and Brual, as
plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint (First Amended Complaint - FAC)
against defendants.
● Atty. Salva of the Salva Salva & Salva Law office entered the appearance of
the law firm as collaborating counsel for plaintiffs.
● Through Atty. Salva, plaintiffs filed a manifestation and motion for leave to
file a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) to include additional plaintiffs
Sps. Tolentino and Sandoval, who had previously purchased the mortgaged
property of Valdez
● Valdez and Brual had since died so it is also sought to include their estate
and heirs as plaintiffs, as the latter’s consent to substitute their predecessors
could not be secured. Eugenia (Pedro’s spouse) was included as plaintiff
● RTC admitted SAC; While the case is pending, Sps. Tatlonghari
discovered evidence which shows that it was Tolentino, one of the co-
plaintiffs was responsible for the anomalous transaction with Bangko
● As Atty Castillo and Salva, the collaborating counsels of record, were both
hired by Pedro and Tolentino, Sps. Tatlonghari decided to engage the
services of their own counsel which is Atty. Villanueva.
● Atty. Villanueva filed then a motion leave to file for third amended complaint
(TAC) alleging that the title to their property had already been consolidated
in favor of Bangko, and the original and amended complaints contained no
allegations or prayer pertaining specifically to their cause of action against
Bangko, which might bar them from getting the complete relief in the civil
case.
● TAC fully described the property in question and stated that it was an
entirely different property from the one covered by REM in favor of
Bangko. Sps. Tatlonghari prated for the reconveyance of their property
which Bangko maliciously and unlawfully foreclosed.
● RTC denied motion to leave to file TAC. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether the motion for leave to file TAC must be denied? NO
Ratio:
● Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading
as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and
before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be
amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can
only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.
● As long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad
faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant
leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading.
● Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes
binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court
had abused its discretion.
● A meticulous inspection of the records reveal that other than the
allegation that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Pedro
authorizing him to use their property as collateral for his loan with the
bank, the FAC and SAC are bereft of any material allegations pertaining
to their personal involvement in the case against Bangko.
● They contained no cause of action with respect to that of Sps.
Tatlonghari. SAC only contain specific relief for Sps. Sandoval who
purportedly the true and lawful owners of the property previously
registered in the name of deceased Valdez.
● The RTC should have allowed such admission if only to prevent the circuitry
of action and the unnecessary expense of filing another complaint anew.
Although it is true that the RTC exercises discretion in this respect, it should
have been more circumspect and liberal in the exercise of its discretion. With
the admission of the Third Amended Complaint, the ultimate goal of
determining the case on its real facts and affording complete relief to all the
parties involved in this case would then be realized.
● It appears from the records that the inexcusable delay upon which the denial
of Sps. Tatlonghari's motion was grounded was not their fault nor was the
same deliberately caused. Records are bereft of evidence to show that such
delay was attributable to them, or that in filing their motion, they were
impelled by bad faith.
● With respect to the lack of conforme of Atty. Salva on the Sps. Tatlonghari's
motion, there is no rule requiring the written consent of a former
attorney prior to his substitution. (Sec. 26, Rule 138)
● What the rule requires is mere notice to the adverse party. (Sec. 26,
Rule 138)
12 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears. As such, Atty. Villanueva, who has entered his
appearance on behalf of the Sps. Tatlonghari and filed their motion for leave
to file third amended complaint, should be recognized as their new counsel
of record who is fully authorized to act for and on their behalf.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January
29, 2015 and the Resolution dated August 5, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 126390 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7 is directed to ADMIT petitioners' third amended
complaint and continue with the proceedings with utmost dispatch.
Notes:
Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from any action
or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of
the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place,
but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the
dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover
from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney
may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the
payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered
in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client

13 | CIVPRO 2D
 8. Casent Realty v. Philbanking Corporation
CHANG | G.R. No. 150731| September 14, 2007 | VELASCO, JR., J.:
Petitioner/s: Casent Realty Development Corporation
Respondent/s: Philbanking Corporation
Doctrine: Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses
founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it.
It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides
the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the
Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying
it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed admitted
Facts:
● On appeal to this Court through Rule 45 is the Decision and Resolution of the CA in
the case entitled Philbanking Corporation v. Casent Realty Development Corporation.
○ The CA reversed the Order of the Makati City RTC,which granted
petitioners demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint filed by
respondent.
● In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty executed 2 promissory notes (PNs) in favor of Rare
Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) amounting to Php 981K, one would become due on
June 25, the other on June 27, 1985.
● Aug. 8, 1986: the PNs were assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation through
a Deed of Assignment.
● Philbanking alleged that despite demands, Casent failed to pay the PNs upon
maturity such that its obligation already amounted to Php 5.6M as of July 15, 1993.
Philbanking filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the
collection of said amount.
● In its Answer, Casent raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:
1.The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was
barred by estoppel, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, laches, prescription,
payment, and/or release;
2. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which ceded and
conveyed Casent’s property in Iloilo City to Philbanking, with the intention of totally
extinguishing Casent’s outstanding accounts with it.
● Petitioner presented a Confirmation Statement issued by respondent
stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of December 31, 1988.
3. Casent complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the
property since the obligation was fully paid. Philbanking sent confirmation statements
in the latter months of 1989, which showed that Casent had no more outstanding
loan; and
4. Assuming that Casent still owed Philbanking, the latter was already estopped since
in October 1988, it reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a deficit of
PhP 41,265,325.12.
● The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference.
● Thereafter, Philbanking presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits.
● Casent then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, pointing
out Philbanking’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion
and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and
execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated petitioners
obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.
RTC: ruled in favor of Casent and dismissed the complaint.
CA: reversed the decision of the RTC.
● It ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved in a
demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts
presented and the law.
● Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the
Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue.
● The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, Philbanking clearly had the right to
proceed against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty.
● Casent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Argument of Casent:
● when it presented these documents in its Answer, Philbanking should have denied
the same under oath.
● Since Philbanking failed to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution of said
documents were deemed admitted, thus also admitting that the loan was already
paid.
Argument of Philbanking:
● Philbanking states that while it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters were deemed
controverted pursuant to Section 10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
● Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to another loan of petitioner.
Issues:
1. Does respondent’s failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission of the
genuineness and due execution of these documents? YES.
2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to
evidence? If yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant
the dismissal of the complaint? YES.
[Note: Petitioner still lost the case because the Dacion and the confirmation statement
did not prove that Casent’s liability has been extinguished. Read the Notes.]
Ratio:
● Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall
have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
14 | CIVPRO 2D

● Gutib v. Court of Appeals: defined a demurrer to evidence as an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced
is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue.
○ What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts
and the law.
○ The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains
to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to
sue.
● Casent points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which
were submitted in the Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath
by Philbanking in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded
upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be
a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused.
● The facts referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the
Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings.
○ These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations
made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only
exclusion being the defendants evidence.
● Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the
genuineness and due execution of said documents. This judicial admission
should have been considered by the CA in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
● Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
● On appeal to the CA, Philbanking claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all
the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to
Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or
allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the
answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file
such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
● We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses
founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to
file a Reply.
● Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply
specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
● Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion
and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must
be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
● We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that
[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted
because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the
instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an
admitted fact.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of
the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Notes:
Issue: WON the Dacion and Confirmation Statement sufficiently prove that petitioners
liability was extinguished.
Ratio:
● Respondent asserts that in executing the Dacion, the intention of the parties
was to settle only the loans of petitioner with respondent, not the obligation
of petitioner arising from the promissory notes that were assigned by Rare
Realty to respondent.
● Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of evidence
showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, by way
of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion
includes the promissory notes.
● Long story short, Philbanking was able to prove that the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement extinguished Casent’s liability to it, which is different
from Casent’s liability to Rare Realty.
15 | CIVPRO 2D
 8. Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito
Petitioner/s: Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor
Jaime C. Villanueva and the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi,
Respondent/s: Antonio B. Betito
Doctrine: Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the
complaint tenders several issues.
Facts:
● In NPC v. Province of Albay the Court found that NPC is liable for unpaid
real estate taxes on its properties (geothermal plants) located in the
Province of Albay. The properties were previously sold at an auction sale
conducted by Albay to satisfy NPC’s tax liabilities. As the sole bidder, Albay
acquired ownership over said properties.
● The NPC, through its then President Malixi, and Albay, represented by then
Governor Salalima, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where
NPC agreed to settle its tax liabilities estimated at P214M.
● Tiwi Mayor Corral requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax
shares of Tiwi and its barangays where the NPCs properties were located
relative to the payments already made by NPC to Albay. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 12-92 requesting the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay to hold a joint session for the purpose of discussing
the distribution of the NPC payments. Governor Salalima replied that the
request cannot be granted as the initial payment was only an earnest money
and that the total amount to be collected from the NPC was still being
validated.
● Because of the conflict between Tiwi and Albay, NPC requested a
clarification from the Office of the President as to the extent of the shares of
the LGUs in the real estate tax collections.
● The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing
Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi in the recovery of their rightful
share in the realty taxes. Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent
Atty. Antonio B. Betito and Atty. Alberto Lawenko. They entered into a
Contract of Legal Services. The contract provided, among others, that Betito
and Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of
realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts.
● OP, through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio,
opined that the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized and
established NPCs realty taxes. The sharing scheme and those entitled to the
payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under
the law, and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may
remit such share directly to Tiwi.
● NPC President Malixi, through a letter, informed Mayor Corral and Governor
Salalima that starting with the January 1993 installment, NPC will directly
pay Tiwi its share in the payments under the MOA.
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay passed Ordinance No. 09-92 which
authorized the Provincial Treasurer to sell the real properties at a public
auction, and to cause the immediate transfer thereof to the winning bidder;
and declared as forfeited in favor of Albay, all the payments already made by
NPC under the MOA.
● From Albay’s refusal to remit Tiwi’s share stemmed several administrative
complaints and court cases that Atty. Betito allegedly handled on behalf of
Tiwi to recover the latter’s rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes, including
the case of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. In this case, the Court held, among
others, that the elective officials of Albay are administratively liable for abuse
of authority due to their unjustified refusal to remit the rightful share of Tiwi in
the subject realty taxes.
● Betito sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services after rendering legal
services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. In his Complaint for sum of money,
he claims that he handled numerous cases which resulted to the recovery of
Tiwi’s share in the realty taxes, which resulted to the collection of the
amounts of P110.9M and P35.5M from the NPC as well as other amounts.
Under the Contract of Legal Services, he is entitled to 10% of whatever
amount that would be collected from the NPC.
● However, despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass an
appropriate ordinance for the payment of his attorneys fees, the SB refused
to pass the ordinance and to pay what is justly owed him. Betito prayed that
○ Tiwi be ordered to pay P11M in attorneys fees and 10% of the other
amounts to be determined during trial plus interest and damages;
○ that the Sangguniang Bayan be ordered to pass the necessary
appropriation ordinance;
○ that the municipal treasurer surrender all the receipts of payments
made by the NPC to Tiwi from January 1993 to December 1996 for
the examination of the court;
○ and that Tiwi pay P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
● Petitioners, current officials of Tiwi admitted that the Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution No. 15-92 but denied that said resolution authorized then
Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract.
○ Mayor Corral exceeded her authority when she bound Tiwi to 10%
of the amount of realty taxes recovered from NPC.
○ The legal services should have been limited to the execution of the
decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay as per
Resolution No. 15-92.
○ they are not aware of the cases which respondent allegedly
handled on behalf of Tiwi since these cases involved officials of the
previous administration;
○ That the Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective
○ that the realty taxes were recovered by virtue of the opinion
rendered by then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Carpio and not
through the efforts of respondent
○ As to the amount of P110.9M in realty taxes, the same was
received by Albay and not Tiwi
○ the amount of P35.5M is part of the share of Tiwi in the utilization of
the national wealth.
● Betito filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and/or partial
summary judgment
● RTC: the trial court rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of
Betito
16 | CIVPRO 2D
 ○ Petitioners did not specifically deny under oath the Contract of
Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92. Consequently, the
genuineness and due execution of these documents are deemed
admitted pursuant to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
the authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract was
deemed established
○ the authority given to Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer was not only for
the purpose of executing the decision in NPC v. Albay but extended
to representing the interest of Tiwi in other cases as well. Further,
the said resolution did not impose as a condition precedent the
ratification of the subject contract by the Sangguniang Bayan in
order to render it effective. Lastly, the trial court ruled that the
answer admitted, that Tiwi was paid the amounts of P110.9M and
P35.5M, hence, Betito is entitled to 10% thereof as attorney’s fees
under the terms of the contract
● CA affirmed the RTC decision
○ Petitioners cannot claim that the contract required ratification
because this is not a requisite for the enforceability of a contract
against a local government unit under the express terms of the
contract and the provisions of the LGC.
○ petitioners are estopped from questioning the enforceability of the
contract after having collected and enjoyed the benefits derived
therefrom.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or
summary judgment is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the case at bar. – YES
● Preliminarily, it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that the genuineness
and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services was impliedly admitted
by petitioners for failure to make a sworn specific denial thereof as required
by Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. This rule is not applicable when
the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. In the
instant case, the subject contract was executed between Betito and
Lawenko, on the one hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor Corral, on the
other. None of the petitioners, who are the incumbent elective and
appointive officials of Tiwi as of the filing of the Complaint, were parties to
said contract. Nonetheless, in their subsequent pleadings, petitioners
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject contract. We
shall, thus, proceed from the premise that the genuineness and due
execution of the Contract of Legal Services has already been established.
Furthermore, both parties concede the contents and efficacy of Resolution
15-92. As a result of these admissions, the issue, at least as to the coverage
of the subject contract, may be resolved based on the pleadings as it merely
requires the interpretation and application of the provisions of Resolution 15-
92 vis--vis the stipulations in the subject contract.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 19, 2005 Decision and March
10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 79057 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the reasonable amount of attorneys fees which respondent
is entitled to in accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision.

Ratio:
● Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint
tenders several issues.
● A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material
and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on
those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted
in the pleadings. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading.
However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of the
complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied
or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if
proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiffs main cause of action,
judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered.
● In the instant case, records reveal that Betito and Tiwi set-up multiple levels
of claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue
while others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution. The
generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners
answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without
basis. For this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the
interest of justice and in order to expedite the disposition of this case which
was filed with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle the issues that
can be resolved based on the pleadings and remand only those issues that
require a trial on merits as hereunder discussed.
17 | CIVPRO 2D

9. Sps Santos v. Alcazar - CRUZ
Petitioner/s: Sps. Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos
Respondent/s: Lolita Alcazar, represented by her Atty-in-Fact Delfin
Chua
Doctrine: The genuiness of a document must be denied under oath in the
Answer otherwise it will be deemed admitted as evidence.
Facts:
● Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted through
her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaint for sum of money against
spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint and
construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to
₱1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid despite written demand.
● Alcazar’s cause of action is based on a document entitled
"Acknowledgment" apparently executed by hand by petitioner Fernando
● “This is to certify that I acknowledge my obligation in the amount of One
Million Four Hundred Fifty Six Thousand (₱1,456,000), Philippine Currency
with LEGAZPI COLOR CENTER, LEGAZPI CITY.” (only signed by
Fernando and NOT Ma. Elena)
● Alcazar thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Sps to pay her the
sum of ₱1,456,000.00, with interest at the rate of 3% per month; attorney’s
fees in the amount of ₱72,800.00, and ₱1,500.00 per court appearance; and
costs of the suit.
● Alcazar alleged in her Complaint:
4. That as part of the agreement, defendants also obligated themselves to pay
plaintiff at the rate of 3% interest per month based on the unpaid principal, to cover
the cost of money;
5. That as of December, 2000, the total obligation of defendants with plaintiff which
consists of principal and interest was ₱1,456,000.00, a copy of the document where
defendants acknowledged their unpaid obligation is hereto attached as Annex "B";
(referring to the above Acknowledgment)
6. That on January 5, 2001, plaintiff sent a final demand to defendants to pay the
indebtedness, but said demand fell on deaf ears and defendants did not even bother
to communicate with plaintiff, copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex
"C";
● Sps sought the dismissal of the Complaint, alleging among others that –
4. Paragraph 5 is specifically denied as the document which Defendant Fernando T.
Santos signed does not reflect the true contract or intention of the parties, the
actionable document is incorrect and has to be reformed to reflect the real
indebtedness of the defendants;
5. Paragraph 6 of the complaint is specifically denied as the same does not reflect the
correct amount. The defendants[’] computation is that the amount of ₱600,000.00 is
the only amount due and the instrument used as the actionable document does not
reflect the correct substance of the transaction and indicates a reformation of the
actionable document;
6. Paragraph 7 is specifically denied as defendants are willing to pay the correct
amount, not the amount in the complaint as the same does not indicate the correct
amount owing to the plaintiff;
● The trial court essentially held that Sps, in their Answer, admitted that
they entered into transactions with the respondent for the delivery of
paint and construction materials,
● CA affirmed
Issue: W/N Sps failed to deny the authenticity of the “Acknowledgement” in
their Answer thus making such document admissible as evidence.
YESSSSSSSSSSssss
Ratio:
● Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment
during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation
of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the
outcome of the case.
● While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy
thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the
party proponent.
● More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under
oath the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their
Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgment is deemed admitted.
● "By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document]
is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or
that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the
party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the
signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party
charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in
the pleading setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x, are cut
off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution."
● "There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to
documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the
adverse party." With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’
failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with
its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to
mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that
they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment
may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to present receipts
and other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness.
● The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is "valid
and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing
the loan agreement they had entered into."
● The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their
right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence
18 | CIVPRO 2D
 of the transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness
incurred
● However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held
liable for the judgment amount of ₱1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a
signatory to the Acknowledgment.
● She may be held liable only to the extent of ₱600,000.00, as admitted by her
and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may be
proved over and beyond such amount, in the absence of her signature and
an acknowledgment of liability in the Acknowledgment.
● The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under
oath, applies only to parties to the document.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27, 2007

Decision and May 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
87935 are AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Ma. Elena Santos is
held liable for the principal and interest only to the extent of ₱600,000.00.

19 | CIVPRO 2D
 10. CUA North Greenhills Association v Morales
Petitioner/s: North Greenhills Association
Respondent/s: Atty. Narciso Morales
Doctrine: The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive are as follows
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent
the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim
as well as defendant's counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
Failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues or its dismissal if
properly raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate
action to collect it
Facts:
● Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills subdivision in San Juan City
● His house is located alongside club Filipino avenue and adjacent to Mckinley
park, a space operated by North Greenhills Association (NGA)
● He had a personal access door, which he built through a wall separating his
house from the park
● NGA is the undisputed owner of the park acquiring such through a donation
by Ortigas and Co.
● NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of the park
adjacent to the residence
● Part of the design was a restroom to serve the needs of the park
● Atty. Morales objected to the construction of the restroom and filed a
complaint before the HLURB seeking demolition of the pavilion which was
then being built
● In an amended complaint, he alleged that for 33 years he had an open,
continuous, immediate access to the subdivision park and that such access
to the park was one of the considerations in his purchase of the lot
● He also claimed that the construction was illegal because it violated his right
to immediate access to the park
● NGA in its answer with compulsory counterclaim rejected the assertions and
contended the following
○ That as absolute owner of the park, it had the right to fence the
property and impose reasonable conditions for the use thereof
○ The construction was for the benefit of all NGA members including
Atty. Morales and that use of the side entrance for 33 years could
not have ripened into an easement of right of way.
○ It also sought payment of 878,778.40 corresponding to annual
membership dues since 1980
● HLURB arbiter ordered the removal of the pavilion
○ WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering respondents of the removal of the pavilion and
the relocation of the common toilet in a place where it will not be a
nuisance to any resident. Respondents are further directed to
remove the obstruction to the side door of the complainant. All
other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
● NGA appealed and the HLURB Board modified the decision
○ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional
Office is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, respondent NGA is
ordered to relocate the restroom constructed or being constructed
in the McKinley Park away from the walls of any resident and where
it will not block complainant's side door access to the park.
● NGA appealed to the OP and the OP affirmed the decision
● NGA filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of Rules of Court before the
CA
● CA affirmed the decision
○ As to the counterclaim of NGA for association dues, the CA held
that the claim was in the nature of a permissive counterclaim, which
was correctly dismissed by the OP.
● MR denied
Issue:
1.)WON HLURB had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Atty Morales? YES
2.)WON the restroom built is a nuisance per accidens? NO
3.)WON NGA had the right to block Atty. Morales’ access to the park? YES
4.)WON CA correctly ruled that the counterclaim for unpaid association dues
was a permissive counterclaim? YES (RELEVANT ISSUE CAN SKIP TO THE
END)
Ratio:
WON THE RESTROOM WAS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS
● A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be
abated without due hearing in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance
● Proper appreciation of evidence before a court or tribunal is required before
a property is deemed a nuisance per accidens
● Conclusions of the CA were speculative
- “The said toilet, to Our mind, poses sanitary issues which could
adversely affect not only the Respondent but his entire household
as well. Even if there exists a perimeter wall between Respondent's
house and the toilet, the odor emanating from the latter could easily
find its way to the dining area, and the foul and noxious smell would
make it very difficult and annoying for the residents of the house to
eat. Moreover, the proximity of the toilet to Respondent's house
places the people residing therein at greater risk of contracting
diseases both from improperly disposed waste and human
excrements, as well as from flies, mosquitoes, and other insects,
should petitioner NGA fail to maintain the cleanliness in the said
structure. Verily, the determining factor when the toilet is the cause
20 | CIVPRO 2D
 of the complaint is not how much it smells or stinks but where it is whether the restroom constructed by NGA is a nuisance per se. On the other
located as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to hand, the counterclaim is simply concerned with collecting from Atty.
a person of ordinary sensibilities.” Morales his unpaid association dues for the past thirty (30) years.
● By the use of the words "would, should, could," it can be discerned that the ● Payment or non-payment of association dues are distinct matters that do not
CA was not even sure that the restroom has caused such annoyance to Atty. relate to whether the main cause of Atty. Morales against NGA was proper.
Morales or his family. ● WON there was payment is irrelevant to the main issues considering that the
● NO certification by the city health officer was ever submitted pleadings filed essentially reflected an admission of membership of Atty.
Morales in the association.
WON NGA HAD THE RIGHT TO BLOCK ATTY. MORALES’ ACCESS ● Failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues or its dismissal if
● Under the civil code, NGA as owner of the park may exclude others from properly raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate
access to, and enjoyment of its property action to collect it
● NGA’s legal right to block the access door is beyond doubt. Atty. Morales
never introduced any evidence that he had acquired any right by prescription Dispositive:
or by agreement or legal easement to access the park through his side door WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 13, 2015 Decision and
● He also never claimed that the side door was his only access to the park the February 3, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131707,
● A right as a member to use the park, does not allow him to assert his access are REVERSED insofar as it affirmed (1) Atty. Morales' entitlement to an unbridled
to the park through his side door access to the park through his side door; and (2) the order to relocate the restroom to
another area.
WON THE COUNTER CLAIM WAS PERMISSIVE
● The counterclaim for unpaid dues was permissive and therefore the
affirmation of its dismissal was proper
● A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a
defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of
suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaint
● It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction and will be barred in the future if not set up
in the answer to the complaint in the same case
● a counterclaim is compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship
between the main claim and the counterclaim
○ there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of
the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court;
○ when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues;
○ or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties.
● The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive are as follows
○ (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same?
○ (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim
absent the compulsory rule?
○ (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
○ (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counterclaim?
● A positive answer to all four would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory. Otherwise it is permissive
● Here, the main issues in the complaint are limited only to the propriety of
barring Atty. Morales from accessing the park through the side door and
21 | CIVPRO 2D
 11. DE VERA - Padilla vs Globe Asiatique ii. The CTS Facility Agreements were novated by a term
loan. Padilla knew this and with malice, executed a
Petitioner/s: Aida Padilla
“perjured” Affidavit.
Respondent/s: Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp., Filmal Realty
b. They also sought to hold the RTC Judge liable for issuing the writ of
Corp., Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee (Globe et. al.)
preliminary attachment.
c. Padilla filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, praying
Doctrine: A counterclaim arising from an unfounded suit may proceed
for the dismissal of Globe et. al.’s complaint on the ff. grounds:
despite the dismissal of the main complaint pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17. i. Submission of a false certification of non-forum shopping
and blatant commission of forum shopping (failure to
Facts: disclose a criminal complaint)
1. Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into several Contracts to Sell ii. Litis pendentia
(CTS) Facility Agreements with Globe Asiatique Realty and Filmal Realty, iii. Failure to attach the alleged actionable document (term
represented by Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee, President and Vice-President, loan) in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 8
respectively, of the two corporations. iv. Failure to state a cause of action
2. Pursuant to and as a condition for the CTS Facility availments, Globe et. al. v. Cannot be personally held liable for her official acts done
executed Deeds of Assignment covering accounts receivables4 over for and in behalf of PNB
subdivision houses they would sell through Contracts to Sell with their d. Judge Gutierrez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ff. grounds:
buyers. i. No cause of action against him; and
a. They acknowledged the total amount ₱1.3B released. ii. the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and his
3. In 2010, Globe et. al. defaulted. person, movant being of co-equal and concurrent
4. In a letter, PNB made a formal and final demand upon Globe et. al. to settle jurisdiction
the total amount of ₱974,377,159.10. e. The Pasig RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
a. It claimed that it discovered 231 out of 240 Contracts to Sell to have f. It later issued an Order (2012), stating that:
either non-existent addresses of buyers or the names of the buyers i. Acting on [Globe et. al’s] Complaint is a brazen
are non-existent or both. violation of the principle of judicial stability, which
5. PNB filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages with essentially states that the judgment or order of a court of
prayer for writ of preliminary attachment before the Pasay RTC against competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any
Globe et. al. They alleged: court of concurrent jurisdiction for the simple reason that
a. Fraud and misrepresentation committed by Globe et. al. the power to open, modify or vacate the said order is not
b. The Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the
to the complaint was signed by PNB’s SVP of the Remedial judgment or order is rendered
Management Group, Padilla, who likewise executed an "Affidavit ii. The Court would have to pass upon the veracity of Globe
in Support of the Application for the Issuance of the Writ of et. al.’s claims that they were unjustly injured by the orders
Preliminary Attachment”. issued by Pasay RTC
6. Pasay RTC iii. Therefore, upholding once more the principle of
a. Order: granted preliminary attachment after finding that Globe et. judicial stability, this Court is impelled to refuse to
al. are guilty of fraud hear the counterclaims of Padilla.
b. Before the Pasay RTC could act on all the motions, Globe et. al.
filed a complaint for damages in the Pasig RTC against Padilla Issue: WoN the dismissal of the complaint automatically results in the dismissal of
and Judge Gutierrez of the Pasay RTC. counterclaims pleaded by the defendant - NO
7. Pasig RTC
a. Globe et. al. claimed that: Ratio:
i. The malicious unfounded civil action by Padilla wrought 1. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an
havoc to their businesses and lives opposing party.
a. It is in the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and independent
cause of action which, though alleged in the answer, is not part of
the answer.
b. Counterclaims may be either compulsory5 or permissive.
4
Just to clarify: these were Accounts Receivables of Globe and Filmal since they were selling
subdivision houses through Contracts to Sell; they assigned it to PNB so that if the buyers
5
would pay, the proceeds would automatically go to PNB Rule 6, Section 7
22 | CIVPRO 2D
 2. Padilla’s counterclaim for damages in her Answer before the Pasig RTC is 7. Globe et. al. contend that if Padilla is allowed to prove her counterclaims
compulsory. before the Pasay RTC, they have no choice but to justify their action in filing
a. She alleged suffering and injury caused to her as a consequence of their case before the Pasig RTC by going back to the allegations in their
the filing of the baseless complaint. complaint that they are merely vindicating themselves against the perjured
b. The court, however, dismissed her counterclaim upon the same affidavit executed by petitioner which led to the issuance of the illegal orders
ground of lack of jurisdiction as its resolution supposedly would of the Pasay City RTC that resulted to the damage and injury sustained by
entail passing upon the validity of orders and processes still respondents.
pending before the Pasay RTC. a. Obviously, Globe et. al. are invoking judicial stability which we find
3. Before the 1997 Rules, the Court held6 that if a court does not have inapplicable insofar as Padilla’s counterclaim arises from Globe et.
jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the same, al.’s unfounded suit.
then the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal b. Padilla faulted Globe et. al. in prematurely, and in a contumacious
controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for act of forum shopping, filing a separate damage suit when there is
any grant of relief under the counterclaim. no final judicial determination yet of any irregularity in the
4. Under the 1997 Rules, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of attachment proceedings before the Pasay City RTC.
the complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is
"without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.” (Sec. 3, Rule 17) 12, 2012 and May 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in
5. Perkin v Dakila: Civil Case No. 73132 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby
a. Distinction must be made over respondent's complaint and directed to proceed with the presentation of evidence in support of the compulsory
over petitioner's counterclaim — while it may have no counterclaim of petitioner Aida Padilla.
jurisdiction over the former, it may exercise jurisdiction over
the latter. The compulsory counterclaim attached to petitioner's
Answer ad cautelam can be treated as a separate action xxx.
Petitioner could have instituted a separate action for the very same
claims but, for the sake of expediency and to avoid multiplicity
of suits, it chose to demand the same in Civil Case No. MC99-605.
Jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter and the parties in
the counterclaim must thus be determined separately and
independently from the jurisdiction of the same court in the same
case over the subject matter and the parties in respondent's
complaint.
6. In the present case, the Pasig RTC should have allowed Padilla’s
counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of Globe et.
al.’s complaint, the same being compulsory in nature and with its
cause not eliminated by such dismissal.
a. She was hailed to a separate court (Pasig RTC) even while the
dispute in the Pasay RTC was still being litigated, and she already
incurred expenses defending herself, having been sued in her
personal capacity.
b. The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury and
misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support of the
application for writ of attachment before the Pasay RTC) — with
hints at possible criminal prosecution apart from that criminal
complaint already filed.
c. The Pasig RTC clearly erred in refusing to hear the counterclaims
upon the same ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e., lack of
jurisdiction in strict observance of the policy against interference
with the proceedings of a co-equal court.

6
Metals Engineering vs CA (1988)
23 | CIVPRO 2D
 12. MBTC V. CPR PROMOTIONS -- DOMASIG
Petitioner/s: Metrobank
Respondent/s: CPR Promotions & Sps. Reynoso
Doctrine: A defending party’s compulsory counterclaim must be
interposed at the time he files his answer. Failure to do so will bar
such claim.
Facts:
● CPR promotions obtained a loan from Metrobank covered by 15 promissory
notes all signed by Metrobank’s treasurer, president of CPR and Sps.
Reynoso. Total amount = P12.8M
● As a security, Sps. Reynoso executed 2 deeds of real estate mortgage
(REM) and also a continuing surety agreement binding themselves solidarily
with CPR to pay all loans the latter obtained from Metrobank.
● The loans matured and the respondents defaulted, prompting Metrobank to
file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the properties, which were
subsequently sold at a public sale. Despite the sale, Metrobank alleged that
there is still a deficiency worth P2.6M which the respondents failed to pay
despite repeated demands. Thus, this action for collection of sum of money.
● RTC: in favor of Metrobank
● CA: in favor of respondents. Adjudged that Metrobank should return P722k
representing the remainder of proceeds of the foreclosure sale with 6%
interest per annum FROM THE DATE OF FILING THE ANSWER WITH
COUNTERCLAIM ON MARCH 26, 1999 until paid to respondents.
● A claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due
should be interposed as a COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. (reasons:
both cases, substantially same evidence is needed; adjudication in one will
bar another case; 2 opposing claims arose from the same set of
transactions; the compelling test of compulsoriness was satisfied)
● AS TO THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS (related to civpro), a defending party’s
compulsory counterclaim must be interposed at the time he files his answer.
Failure to do so will bar such claim. Initially, respondents claimed moral and
exemplary damages and atty’s fees. Later on, in their appellate brief filed
before CA, the filed a counterclaim to seek the recovery of excess of bid
price. Their belated assertion is fatal and will not cure their failure to timely
raise such claim; thus, barring their claim.
2. Given MTBC’s conflicting allegations as to the amount due as of the date
of foreclosure, the computation offered by metrobank can’t be accepted at
face value. It also failed to substantiate its claims.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28,
2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91424 and its February 13, 2012 Resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of refund in favor of respondents in the
amount of P722,602.22 with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby
DELETED

Issues:

1. WoN respondents were able to timely set-up their claim for refund. - NO
2. WoN Metrobank was able to prove the amount claimed. - NO

Ratio:

1. WoN respondents were able to timely set-up their claim for refund. - NO.
Metrobank belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim.

Test in determining whether a claim is compulsory or permissive:

1. Are the issues of fact/law raised by the claim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well
as defendant’s claim?
4. In there a logical relation bet. the claim and counterclaim such that it would
result to substantial duplication of effort and time by parties and court if trials
will be conducted separately? (known as THE COMPELLING TEST OF
COMPULSORINESS)

24 | CIVPRO 2D

13. Quintos vs. Nicolas - FADERGUYA
Petitioner/s: Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra
Respondent/s: Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro
Ibarra, David Ibarra
Doctrine: Dismissal with prejudice under the rules of court cannot defeat
the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided there is no
actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Facts:
1. Petitioners Quintos, Dancel, Ibarra, and respondents are siblings. They
inherited a 281 sqm parcel of land in Tarlac, which is now the subject of
dispute between them.
2. The respondents brought an action for partition against petitioners but it was
dismissed for failure of the parties to appear despite due notice. Neither
party appealed, thus, the ruling on the partition proceeding became final.
3. Respondents then resorted to executing a deed of adjudication to transfer
the property in favor of the ten siblings. As a result, new TCT was issued.
4. Respondents then sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor
of co-respondents Candelarios. An agreement of Subdivision was also
entered which resulted to the name of Candelarios inscribed in the TCT.
5. Petitioners then filed a complaint for quieting of title alleging that:
a. During their parent’s lifetime, their properties were distributed to the
siblings, and that the land and house subject of this case was given
to the petitioners as part of their share.
b. They had been in adverse possession of the property for 40 years.
6. Respondents contend that petitioners are already barred by estoppel
because the petitioners offered to buy 7/10 of the share of respondents,
thus, recognizing the respondent’s ownership over the 7/10 share.
7. Moreover, by way of counterclaim, the respondents allege the partition of the
property.
8. RTC dismissed the case finding that Candelarios own the 7/10 share over
the land.
9. Aggrieved, petitioners now contend that respondent’s counterclaim of
partition is already barred by laches or res judicata.
Issue:
1. WoN respondent’s counterclaim for partition is already barred by
laches or res judicata. - NO
Ratio:
1. There is res judicata when the following requisites are present:
a. The judgment or order is final;
b. Judgment must be on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties;
c. Judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
d. There must be, between first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and cause of action.
2. In this case, respondents admit that they filed an action for partition which
was dismissed and has attained finality. The subject property in the partition
case and the present case is the same, and that in both cases, respondents
raise the same action for partition. Lastly, there is identity of parties not only
when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity
with them such as between their successors.
3. According to the rules of court, dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
has the effect of adjudication on the merits and is necessarily understood to
be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided.
4. However, dismissal with prejudice under the rules of court cannot
defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
5. Art. 494 provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
6. The law expressly provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common.
7. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3, and the right
granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner
through promulgation of rules.
8. Art. 496 supports this view as it provides that “Partition shall be governed by
the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with the Civil Code.”
9. This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning
the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of
the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no longer exists.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC,
Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the subject property in
accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.
(Partly granted siya because mali daw CA in saying agreement for subdivision
was valid)
25 | CIVPRO 2D
 14. Go v. Rico, GR No. 140682, April 25, 2006- GARCIA
Petitioner/s: WILSON GO and PETER GO
Respondent/s: ANITA RICO, in substitution of the late Pilar Rico
Doctrine: a certification against forum shopping by counsel and not by
the principal party himself is no certification at all.
The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party
himself is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than anyone
else, whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or
tribunals.
Filing of a belated certification against forum shopping does not cure the
defect since it should have been filed simultaneously with the petition.
(see Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42)
Facts:
● Wilson Go and Peter Go, petitioners, filed a Complaint for Ejectment against
defendants Pilar Rico (now deceased), mother of Anita Rico, respondent
herein, Catalina Pablico, Violeta Medrano, Elmer Molit, Osmando
Pagdanganan, Bobby Marquisas, Alexis Leynes, and all persons claiming
rights under them.
● Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the land with an
existing building in Quezon City
○ The building units were leased to several of the respondents which
is now expired
○ their continued stay in the leased premises is on a month-to-month
basis;
● Petitioners then sent the defendants, a reminder of the termination of their
monthly lease contracts with demand to vacate
○ despite notice, the defendants refused to do so.
● Respondents contend that petitioners do not own the premises
○ Since it was part of the estate of the late Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura, which is now subject of the probate proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court
○ In effect, the defendants allege that they are the lessees of Felisa
Tamiode Buenaventura since 1988; that their lease contracts have
not been terminated
○ Further, the defendants allege that a fictitious sale took place
between Bella A. Guerrero, then special administratrix of the estate,
in her personal capacity, and the petitioners
■ This was done without approval of the probate court and in
conspiracy with the petitioners
○ the probate court removed Bella Guerrero as special administratrix
and appointed in her stead Resurrecion Bihis who renewed the
lease contracts with the defendants
● The MeTC ordered the ejectment of the defendants (for petitioners)
● RTC reversed MeTC- that the determination of ownership is an
indispensable issue (for defendants)
● The CA dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with the
Rule on Certification of Non-Forum shopping (against petitioners)
○ It was the counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, who signed the
same instead of the petitioners themselves
● In MR with CA, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo alleged that she was compelled
to sign the certification against forum shopping because petitioner
Wilson Go left for the United States to attend to his ailing father, while
petitioner Peter Go was in Cebu for an important business commitment
○ that if she waited for any of the petitioners to sign the certification,
the period to file the petition could expire
○ and that she has a Special Power of Attorney wherein petitioners
authorized her to represent them during the pre-trial and hearing
● Petitioners attached to their motion the certification against forum shopping
signed by petitioner Wilson Go (in the MR with CA)
○ But MR still denied
● Petitioners now assert that the court should have applied the Rules on
certification against forum shopping liberally in their favor.
Issue:
W/N the counsel is permitted to sign a Certification against non-forum shopping? -
NO (see Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42)
Ratio:
● The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith (the pleading)
● Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice
● The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency
○ there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency,
● These provisions are mandatory requirements in the filing of the Certification
against forum shoppping
● a certification by counsel and not by the principal party himself is no
certification at all
● The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party himself
is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than anyone else,
whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or tribunals
● petitioners filing of a belated certification against forum shopping did not
cure the defect considering that it should have been filed
simultaneously with the petition.
● Secondly, they failed to show justifiable cause for their failure to
personally sign the certification
○ The explanation is an afterthought as it was not alleged by counsel
in her certification against forum shopping
● The Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioners in favor of their
counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, is merely for the latter to represent them
during the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and is not a substitute for the
26 | CIVPRO 2D
 required certification against forum shopping duly signed by the
petitioners
● While we have ruled time and again that litigants should have the amplest
opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause free, as much as
possible, from the constraints of procedural technicalities however, equally
settled is the rule that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice

Dispositive:
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53342 are AFFIRMED.Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

27 | CIVPRO 2D
 15. GUEVARRA
Petitioner/s: THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY et, al
Respondent/s: ELPIDIO UY
Doctrine: The certification of non-forum shopping may be signed not only
by the petitioners but also any of the principal parties.
There was substantial compliance with the Rules when only the
petitioner signed in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of
non-forum, shared a common interest in them, had a common defense in
the complaint for partition, and filed the petition as a collective, raising
only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
The subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may
call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure
Facts:
● Republic Act No. 7227 and EO no. 40 s 1992 were passed whereby BCDA
was created for the conversion of military reservations and their extension
and to raise fund for the by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military
camps.
● To carry out the Project and other fund generating projects pursuant to RA
7227 and EO 40, the BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with the Public Estates Authority (PEA), designating the latter as
Project Manager.
● Thereafter, the BCDA, PEA, and the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
executed a Pool Formation Trust Agreement (PFTA), creating an asset pool
to generate funds for the development of the Project.
● After the requisite public bidding, the PEA entered into a Landscaping and
Construction Agreement (LCA) with respondent Elpidio Uy, doing business
under the name and style of Edison Development and Construction.
Subsequent to the LCA, the same parties forged a negotiated Construction
Agreement.
● The LCA stipulated that respondent shall fulfill his contractual obligation
within a period of 450 calendar days from its start, reckoned 14 days from
respondent’s receipt of the notice to proceed. Specifically, the scope of
respondent Uy’s work in the LCA was to construct three (3) vertical
structures, the Terrasoleum structures, and the landscaping.
● Aside from respondent, two other contractors were engaged in the Project—
Makati Development Corporation (MDC) and Romago Electric, Inc. (REI)
● The parties presented diametrically opposing versions on its progress.
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that there were delays in the construction and
landscaping under the LCA, and for which several extensions were granted
to respondent Uy by PEA.
● Respondent asserted that the delays were justified and not attributable to
him, as portions of the Project were delivered piecemeal and could not be
worked on immediately pending the completion of work by the other
contractors.
● Petitioners maintained that respondent Uy was in delay with work "slippage"
beyond tolerable levels and that respondent had already pulled out his
equipment and machineries, and stopped working sometime in October
1999.
● Respondent Uy received from PEA a Letter of Termination of the LCA which
prompted him to file a civil case for Injunction and Damages with the
Parañaque RTC against PEA, petitioner BCDA, and private petitioners. The
RTC judge issued a 72–hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining
petitioners from excluding respondent from his contractual obligations under
the LCA. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the same Judge in the said
trial court, who, after the preliminary hearing of the case, extended the TRO
for 17 days.
CA: RTC has jurisdiction to hear the injunctive case and to issue the TRO
Petitioner: under R.a. no. 7227, the implementation of projects for the conversion of
military bases into productive uses shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an
order of the supreme court, hence, the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the civil case.
Respondent:
● petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration from the assailed CA
Decision, an alleged pre-requisite before this Court can entertain petitions
under Rule 45
● the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective as only
one of the petitioners affixed his signature, (Ramon P. Ereneta) and such
sole signatory cannot represent petitioner BCDA as no Board Resolution
was presented conferring such authority
● there is no proper joinder of parties considering that the major issue raised
by petitioner BCDA is its invocation of RA 7227.
Issue:
WON the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective as only
one of the petitioners affixed his signature - NO
WON RTC has jurisdiction to hear an injunctive case and to issue a TRO against the
BCDA. - YES
Ratio:
Signature of a principal party sufficient for verification and certification
● There is compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Dismissal of
appeals that is purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.
● While only petitioner Ramon P. Ereneta signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping such is not fatal to the instant petition.
● In Calo, we agreed with petitioners that the signature of only one petitioner in
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping satisfies the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure. In Calo, we relied on Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc., v. NLRC30
—where we ruled that the certification of non-forum shopping may be signed
not only by the petitioners but also any of the principal parties.
● In the instant case, Mr. Ramon P. Erenta, a member of the Investment
Committee of the Heritage Park Management Corporation, is a principal
28 | CIVPRO 2D
 party in the instant case having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 99-0425
pending in the RTC.
● More so, in Calo, we also cited Cavile, et al. v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, et.
al.31 where the court held that there was substantial compliance with the
Rules when only the petitioner signed in behalf of all the other petitioners of
the certificate of non-forum shopping being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, shared a common interest in them, had a common
defense in the complaint for partition, and filed the petition as a collective,
raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in
question.
● In the same vein, this is also true in the instant case where petitioners have
filed their petition as a collective, sharing a common interest and having a
common single defense.
● Anent the lack of a BCDA Board Resolution authorizing Ramon P. Ereneta,
such defect has been substantially complied with by the subsequent filing of
a Letter of Authority to represent and sign pleadings for and on behalf of
BCDA in the instant case.
● In Jaro v. Court of Appeals, the court held that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules
of procedure." At any rate, this petty technicality deserves scant
consideration where the question at issue is one purely of law and there is
no need to delve into the veracity of the allegations in the petition. As we
have held time and again, imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure are to be disregarded, except where substantial rights would
otherwise be prejudiced.
RTC has jurisdiction over action for injunction
● Firmly established is the doctrine that "jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law." Section 19 of BP 129 shows that a Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Jurisprudence has recognized complaints
for injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction.
● The Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent Uy it
being a case in which the subject of litigation for permanent injunction
against the termination of his contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the July 31, 2000 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The Regional Trial Court,
Parañaque City, Branch 260 is directed to hear without delay Civil Case No. 99-0425
for Injunction and Damages, but is prohibited from issuing TROs and writs of
preliminary injunction.

29 | CIVPRO 2D
 16. Mediserv Inc. vs CA INFANTE
Petitioner/s: Mediserv Inc
Respondent/s: Landheights Development Corporation
Doctrine: It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked
in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence
of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules.
Facts:
● On September 1994, Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage in favor
of China Banking Corporation as security for a loan. The mortgage was
constituted on a 500-square meter lot with improvements located in Manila.
● Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank and the real estate
mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale Landheights
Development Corporation emerged as the highest bidder with a bid price of
P17,617,960.00 for the subject property.
● April 1998, Landheights filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
an Application for Possession of Real Estate Property Purchased at an
Auction Sale under Act No. 3135 and was eventually issued with the TCT.
● On March 2000, Landheights, seeking to recover possession of the subject
property, filed a verified complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
● MeTC of Manilarendered a decision in favor of Landheights. Mediserv
appealed the decision to the RTC of Manila and was granted. MR by
Landheights was also denied. Pet for review with the CA was also
dismissed because the written authority of Dickson Tan to sign the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping, as well as the copies of
the complaint and answer, are not attached to the petition
● Landheights filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently submitted a
Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of Directors affirms the
authority to file the Petition for Review. Hence, the CA reinstated the petition
for review.
● Thus, Mediserv went to the SC invoking Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that failure to comply with
the requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for dismissal of the case. Petitioner thus asserts that the appellate
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in reinstating the petition for review filed by respondent
corporation.
● Landheights seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently
submitted a Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of Directors affirms
the authority of Mr. Dickson Tan to file the Petition for Review. CA then
reinstated the petition for review.
● Mediserv then went to the SC invoking Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that failure to comply with
the requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for dismissal of the case.
● Mediserv asserts that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the
petition for review filed by respondent corporation.
Issue: W/N the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated the
petition.
Ruling: No
Ratio:
● Mediserv cites Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides that failure to comply with the requirements on
certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause
for dismissal of the case.
● Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
● A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records. The party need not sign the
verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
● On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification
under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith,
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.
● In one case, the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the
petitioner corporation’s counsel; hence, the CA dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, as
amended. The motion for reconsideration was denied because the
petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the certification
against forum shopping signed by one of its officers. Neither has it shown
any compelling reason for the SC to disregard strict compliance with the
rules.
● In one case, the SC explained that the requirement regarding verification of
a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a
30 | CIVPRO 2D
 condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served.
● On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is
generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.
Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should
accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping,
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to
certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a
corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
● The SC in numerous relaxed the rule requiring the submission of the
certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under
justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the certification.
● Thus, if the SC has allowed the belated filing of the certification against
forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings, with more reason
should it sanction the timely submission of such certification though the proof
of the signatory’s authority was submitted thereafter.
● Here, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of authority to sign the
verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the
required document was subsequently submitted to the CA.
● It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations
where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After
all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
they are used only to help secure substantial justice.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The September 16, 2003 and November
7, 2003 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is hereby
DIRECTED to take appropriate action thereon in light of the foregoing discussion with
DISPATCH. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

31 | CIVPRO 2D
 17. Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank - JOSEF
Petitioner/s: ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO G.R. No. 151098
GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO,
BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO Present:
ARAHAN CHUA
Respondent/s: TRADERS ROYAL BANK
Doctrine: The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not
automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the
latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be
required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not
deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence
to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment
for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant
may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing
evidence.
Facts:
● In mid 1977 Danilo Chua obtained a loan from the Traders Royal Bank in
the amount of P75,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land.
● The loan was not paid and thus the bank commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the property.
● On the rescheduled auction sale, the Sheriff of Quezon City sold the
property to the bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum of P24,911.30.
● The other petitioners (Gajudo) assailed this because bid price was
shockingly or unconscionably low.
● [Petitioners] filed a complaint in the RTC against [respondent] Traders Royal
Bank, the City Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City seeking the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale
made by [the] city sheriff of Quezon City of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 16711 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the conventional
redemption thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
● The bank, filed its answer with counterclaim, asserting that the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged property was done in accordance with law; that
petitioners slept on their rights when they failed to redeem the property
within the one year statutory period;
● Upon discovering that the foreclosed property was sold by the bank to the
Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated on
the certificate of title of the foreclosed property, had already been cancelled,
the petitioners refiled the complaint and impleaded as additional defendants
the Ceroferr Realty Corporation.
● Summons were served on the bank. Supposing that all the defendants
had filed their answer, the petitioners filed a motion to set case for pretrial,
which motion was, however, denied by the Trial Court in its Order on the
ground that the bank has not yet filed its answer.
● The petitioners filed a motion to declare the bank in default, thereunder
alleging that no answer has been filed despite the service of summons
on it on 26 September 1990.
● The Trial Court declared the motion submitted for resolution upon
submission by petitioners of proof of service of the motion on the bank.
● Upon proof that petitioners had indeed served the bank with a copy of said
motion, the Trial Court issued an Order of default against the bank.
● On petitioner's’ motion, they were by the Court allowed to present evidence
ex parte. Thereafter, the Trial Court rendered the new questioned partial
decision.
● Aggrieved, the bank filed a motion to set aside the partial decision by
default against it.
● The CA ruled in favor of respondent bank. Even if the CA stated that the
erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed before the trial court
was not an excusable negligence by the bank’s counsel and that these were
binding on the bank, the petitioners had not convincingly established
their right to relief as there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged property.
● They stated that an extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not require personal
notice to the mortgagor, that there was no allegation or proof of
noncompliance with the publication requirement and the public posting of the
notice of sale, and that there was no showing of inadequacy of price as no
competent evidence was presented to show the real market value of the
land sold or the readiness of another buyer to offer a price higher than that
at which the property had been sold. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove
that the bank had agreed to sell the property back to them. After pointing out
that the redemption period had long expired, respondent’s written
communications to Petitioner Chua only showed, at most, that the former
had made a proposal for the latter to buy back the property at the current
market price.
● The petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing
from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same as that
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133 (Preponderance of Evidence rule -
which basically states that the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence)
Issues: W/N the CA erred in failing to apply the provisions of Sec 3, Rule 9 ([and in
applying instead] the rule on preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court.) - No
Ratio: No, the CA did not err. Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that
would preclude the application of either one of them. Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the
procedure the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer.
According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on
whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also
sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted.
The party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their
own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
This principle holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to
32 | CIVPRO 2D
present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the
relief that may be
granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant
evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.

Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the
defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after
the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered
and the facts proven by the presenting party. Being declared in default does
not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting
evidence in the trial court.

Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, if the evidence presented
should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed.
While petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule
9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required
quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Moreover, the grant of damages was not sufficiently supported by the evidence for
the following reasons.
1. The petitioners were not deprived of their property without cause. There
has been no allegation or proof of noncompliance with the requirement
of publication and public posting of the notice of sale. Neither has there
been competent evidence to show that the price paid at the foreclosure
sale was inadequate. Thus, there was no ground to invalidate the sale.
2. The petitioners have not convincingly established their right to damages
on the basis of the purported agreement to repurchase. Without
reiterating our prior discussion on this point, we stress that entitlement
to actual and compensatory damages must be proved even under
Section 3 of Rule 9.

In sum, the petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the strength of their
position, notwithstanding the advantage they enjoyed in presenting their
evidence ex parte. Not in every case of default by the defendant is the complainant
entitled to win automatically.

Dispositive: Petition is DENIED.

33 | CIVPRO 2D
 18. Martinez v Republic LOYOLA
Petitioner/s: Jose R. Martinez
Respondent/s: Republic of the Philippines
Doctrine: A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal
from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order
of default.
FACTS:
1. Martinez filed a petition for registration in his name for three parcels of land
located in Cortes, Surigao del Sur with an area of 3,700sqm. He alleged that
a. He had acquired the property in 1952 through purchase from his uncle
whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to 1870s;
b. He had remained in continuous possession of the lotsl
c. The lots remained unencumbered;
d. They became private property through prescription;
e. He had to initiate the proceedings since the Director of Land
Management Services failed to do so despite the completion of the
cadastral survey.
2. RTC of Surigao del Sur set the case for initial hearing and ordered the
publication of the notice.
3. Republic opposed the application on the grounds that:
a. Martinez’ possession was not in accordance with Sec 48 (b) of CA141;
b. His muniments of title were insufficient to prove bonafide acquisition
and possession of the property;
c. The lots formed part of public domain.
4. RTC issued an Order of General Default because no party appeared to
oppose the application during the hearing, and subsequently, decreed the
registration of the lots in the name of Martinez. RTC concluded that Martinez and
his predecessors have been in open, continuous, public possession of the lots for
over 100 years.
5. LRA informed RTC that only 2 lots were referred to in the Notice published
since the other lot was omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan.
6. CA reversed RTC and ordered the dismissal of the application on the
ground that the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient to support his
application.
7. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s: WoN Republic, through OSG, can still appeal the RTC’s decision after it
had been declared in default – YES
RATIO:
1. A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without
need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default.
2. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of
default may be issued if no person appears and answers within the time allowed.
The RTC appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the
premise that no oppositor appeared before it on the hearing, despite the fact that
the Republic had already duly filed its opposition
3. RTC erred in declaring oppositor in default simply because he failed to
appear on the day of the initial hearing.
4. RTC should have accorded the oppositor ample opportunity to establish
its claim. However, the SC cannot decide on the validity of the default
order since Republic did not challenge such.
5. According to Rule 9, Section 3 of the RoC, the effects on the parties of
an order of default are:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time
allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may any time
after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge
may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default.When a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of
whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case
against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented.
6. Under the 1997 RoC and Lina v. Court of Appeals:
a. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery
thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set
aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule
18)
b. If the judgment has already been rendered when the
defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has
become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him
as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been presented by him.
34 | CIVPRO 2D
A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by
default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing
of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine,
denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no
longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court,
and up to this day.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.

35 | CIVPRO 2D

19. Philipping Savings Bank vs Papa- Lim
Petitioner/s: PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK
Respondent/s: JOSEPHINE L. PAPA
Doctrine:
- Filing and service are different from each other, but they go
hand in hand in determining if the pleading, motion or any
other document was filed within the reglementary period
- To prove service a party must attach the affidavit of the
person who mailed the motion or pleading. Otherwise, it is
deemed as not filed
Facts:
● Papa obtained a flexi-loan of P207,600.00, payable in installments from
PSBank.
● For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note.
● On due date, Papa defaulted on her loan. Despite repeated demands, she
was unable to pay her loan.
● PSB filed in the Metc a complaint for collection of sum of money against
Papa. In response, Papa claims that she had already paid the obligation thru
the staggered payments she made to the bank. The metc ruled in favor of
PSB.
● RTC: Ruled in favor of Papa because PSB was unable to prove the
existence of the PN. The RTC decision was rendered on Oct 14, 2009. PSB
received the decision on Oct 26, 2009.
● PSB filed its MR on Nov 10, 2009 to the court while Papa received the MR
on Nov 11, 2009.
● In its opposition to PSB's motion for reconsideration, Papa claims that the
RTC decision had already attained finality. Papa explained that although
PSB filed the motion for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it appears
that service of the said motion was made 1 day late as PSB availed of a
private courier service instead of the modes of service prescribed under the
Rules of Court. As such, the MR is deemed to have been made not on the
date that it was deposited to the private courier but in the date that it was
received by Papa (Nov 11, 2009)
Issue: WON the RTC decision has attained finality due to the service of the MR
to Papa beyond the prescribed period? Yes
Ratio:
● Filing and service is different from each other. Filing is the act of presenting
the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court. On the other hand, service
is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper
concerned.
● However,filing and service go hand in hand when in determining if the
pleading, motion or any other paper was filed within the applicable
reglementary period. The Rules require every motion set for hearing to be
accompanied by proof of service thereof to the other parties concerned;
otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it, effectively making such
motion as not filed.
● The kind of proof of service required will depend on the mode of service
used. Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 13. Proof of Service . — Proof of personal service shall
consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official
return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing
a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the
service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit
of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of
this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made
by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.
● The court considers filing by private courier as the same as filing via ordinary
mail. Thus, to prove service, a party must attach an affidavit of the person
who mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such affidavit must show
compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court which provides that
service shall be made by registered mail. It is only when it is unavailable that
that service may be done by ordinary mail.
● PSB’s service by private courier failed to comply with Rule 13 sec 7 as it did
not explain the reason why it did not use registered mail. Moreover, it was
not accompanied by the affidavit of the person who sent it to the private
messengerial service.
● Since PSB's MR is deemed as not filed, it did not toll the running of the 15-
day reglementary period for the filing of an appeal; and considering that
PSB's appeal was filed only after the expiration of the 15-day period on Nov
10 2009, such appeal has not been validly perfected. As such, the subject
Oct 14 2009 decision of the RTC had already attained finality as early as
Nov 11 2009.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 21 July
2011 Decision and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 112611 are AFFIRMED.
36 | CIVPRO 2D
 20. Pascual v. First Consolidated Rural Bank - LUMBRE
Petitioner/s: Sergio Pascual and Emma Servillion Pascual
Respondent/s: First Consolidated Rural Bank (BOHOL), Inc., Robinsons
Land Corporation, Atty. Antonio Espinosa, Register of Deeds, Butuan City
Doctrine: Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals provide that motions sent through private messengerial
services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the
same
FACTS:
Pascual filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the CA to nullify a decision in a
SpecPro case in the RTC.
receipt (or until December 9, 2011) within which to move for its reconsideration or to
appeal to the Supreme Court.
They dispatched the Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16
November 2011) on December 9, 2011 through private courier (LBC).
The CA actually received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering that
Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed
filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already
filed out of time by December 12, 2011.
Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution
promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed
resolution final and executory by operation of law.

After filing of the responsive pleadings, the CA scheduled the preliminary conference DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the
and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 04020-MIN; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Instead of filing the briefs, Pascual filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a
Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. Pascual wanted the appellate court to resolve
their motions first and hold in abeyance the pre-trial.

The CA resolved the case against Pascual. The appellate court’s reason, among
others, was that:

“It is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be suspended or
dispensed with, or that their motions be resolved first, as the same are discretionary
upon the court taking cognizance of the petition. Furthermore, their failure to furnish
private respondent Robinsons Land Corporation a copy of their Motion for
Reconsideration of our denial of their TRO and/or WPI, and to submit proof of service
thereof to this court is tantamount to failure to obey lawful orders of the court.”

This (failure to obey lawful orders of the court) the CA ruled, is one ground for
dismissing their petition.

Pascual then moved for reconsideration, (from the ratio, it appeared that such motion
was sent via private messengerial service [LBC]) but was denied for being filed out of
time. Unrelenting, they presented a Respectful Motion for Reconsideration which the
CA also denied.

Hence this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the motions and other papers sent to the CA by private
messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA’s actual receipt - YEST

RATIO:

The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November
24, 2011. Under Section l, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, they had 15 days from

37 | CIVPRO 2D
 21. MANZANO
Petitioner/s: CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN
Respondent/s: BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK)
Doctrine: The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient
of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time,
substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by
publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Facts:
● In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real
property in Valle Verde II, Pasig City.
● In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the
TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property.
● To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that the property covered thereby
was the subject of an execution sale.
● Sps. Borlongan found out that BDO filed a complaint for sum of money against
Tanchom Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the
bank.
● Carmelita was one of those impleaded, who supposedly signed 4 security
agreements to guarantee the obligation of Tancho Corp., amounting to P13.5M
● The Makati RTC issued an order directing the service of summons to all the
defendants at the business address of Tancho Corp - Fumakilla Compound.
● However, such property has already been foreclosed by BDO and its ownership has
already been consolidated in BDO’s name. Thus, the summons were unserved
because the defendants were no longer holding office at the Fumakilla Compound
● There was only a single attempt for the personal service of summons; BDO moved
for leave to serve the summons by publication. It was granted.
● BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the
defendants. It was granted by the Makati RTC.
● The sheriff failed to serve the summons since Carmelita was no longer residing at
the given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per information gathered
from the security guard on duty." The Makati RTC declared the defendants,
including Carmelita, in default.
● The Makati RTC found the defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus 12%
interest; The Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution stating that in the event that the
judgment obligors cannot pay all or part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon
the properties of the defendants to satisfy the award.
● The Sheriff failed to serve the Writ of Execution because the defendants were not
operating in the Fumikilla Compound.
● The property of Sps. Borlongan became the subject of an auction, and BDO was
the highest bidder.
● After such discovery, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment,
Auction Sale and Other Documents, with the Pasig RTC.
● He claims that the property is family home that belong to their conjugal partnership
of gains and that the surety agreements were signed without his consent and did
not redound to the benefit of their family
● BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata and failure to state a cause of
action
● The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because it has
already been decided upon by the Makati RTC and that the husband of a judgment
debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a separate and independent action to
determine the validity of the levy and sale of a property.
● On MR, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification: it could not annul the
surety agreements since Eliseo was not a party to those agreements and the
validity and efficacy of these contracts had already been decided by the Makati
RTC.
● Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA).
● The CA ruled in favor of BDO and ordered the Pasig RTC to cease from hearing the
case commenced by Eliseo. It found that Eliseo is not a stranger who can initiate an
action independent from the case where the attachment and execution sale were
ordered.
● On appeal before the SC, the Court denied Eliseo’s petition
● The Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the issuance of a
new TCT covering the subject property in favor of BDO
● Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, and the issuance of a TRO
before the CA. She claims that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over
her person as the service of summons were defective. It was denied. Hence, this
petition
Issue: WoN the CA erred in not issuing a TRO - YES
Ratio:
● For a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO, it must only inquire into
the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
● In this case, Carmelita has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected.
This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but her
constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived of her
property.
● The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process
and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much
an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
● As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted
service may be resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to
only if the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry.
● The hierarchy and rules in the service of summons are as follows:
(1) Personal service;
38 | CIVPRO 2D
 (2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time; and
(3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
● The rules on the service of summons other than by personal service may be used
only as prescribed and only in the circumstances authorized by statute. The
impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts
have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed
before substituted service may be availed.
● For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period [of one month) which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of
prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at
least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
● The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in
the Return.
● In this case, summons were served via publication, yet such resort was
unjustified:
○ There was only a single attempt by the sheriff to personally serve summons
○ Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her
whereabouts - her address can be found in the General Information Sheet of
Tancho Corporation, a public document

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.

(1) The January 20, 2015 Decision and May 26, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133994 are hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 155 is ordered to continue with the proceedings
and decide Civil Case No. 73761 with reasonable dispatch.
(2) The November 12, 2014 and March 23, 2015 Resolutions of the appellate court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 are REVERSED and SETASIDE.
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining,
prohibiting, and preventing respondent Banco De Oro, its assigns, transferees,
successors, or any and all other persons acting on its behalf from possessing, selling,
transferring, encumbering or otherwise exercising acts of ownership over the property
subject of the controversy. Said TRO shall remain valid and effective until such time
as the rights and interests of the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 shall have been
determined and finally resolved.

39 | CIVPRO 2D
 22. MANOTOC v. CA - MEDEL
Petitioner/s: MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC
Respondent/s: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA
TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
Doctrine: The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to
it.
The Sheriff’s Return must state with particularity the attendant facts and
circumstances which would show impossibility of personal service. It must
also state that the summons was left with a person of suitable age and
discretion residing in defendant’s house or residence.
Facts:
● Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts
judgment rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii,
United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful
death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence
officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority,
supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
● Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons
addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra
Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
● The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon
Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of Manotoc at the condominium
unit mentioned earlier. When Manotoc failed to file her Answer, the trial
court declared her in default through an Order.
● Hence, Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her
person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds
to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular
place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2)
the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure
prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons
was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever
judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
● The trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its
findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra
Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based
on the documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on
the presumption that the sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular
performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
Issue: Whether or not the substituted service is valid. NO.
Ratio:
● Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service
of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When
the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when
there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
● In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served
with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can
be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.
Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements
and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of
due process as of jurisdiction.
● Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to
this case provides: If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant],
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
DISCUSSION ON THE REQUIREMENTS TO EFFECT A VALID SUBSTITUTED
SERVICE
● IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE
○ The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service.
○ Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
reasonable time to serve the summons to the defendant in
person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.
○ Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be
done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,]
to the other party.
○ To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days because at the
end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to
require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to
the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the
Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases
to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the
first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from
the issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time
with regard to personal service on the defendant.
40 | CIVPRO 2D
 ○ For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be
several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. Several attempts means at least three (3) tries, preferably
on at least two different dates.
● SPECIFIC DETAILS IN RETURN
○ The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to
locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though
futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the
Return to justify substituted service.
● A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION
○ If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein.
○ A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons.
○ The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whether said
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or
at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons.
● A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE
○ If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular
place of business, then it should be served on a competent
person in charge of the place.
○ Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made
must be the one managing the office or business of defendant,
such as the president or manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant
in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising
from inaction on the summons.
SHERIFF’S RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons with complaint and annexes issued by
this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the
defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra
Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104
No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of
the day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually
out of her place and/or residence or premises.That on the 15th day of
July, 1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in
accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of
said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la
Cruz, caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto,
Receptionist and Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of
suitable age and discretion, living with the said defendant at the given
address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but
he refused to sign.
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable
Court of origin, duly served for its record and information.
INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE IN THE CASE AT BAR
● A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the
absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons
on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that
personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the
generally couched phrases of on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours during the
day, and to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of
her place and/or residence or premises.
● Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be
assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative
that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of
summons be described with more particularity in the Return or
Certificate of Service.
● It has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who
served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner.
● The court, in another case, ruled that the narration of the efforts made to find
the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will
not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service,
dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be
included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That
such efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and
those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal
service.
● Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is
still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be
left with a person of suitable age and discretion residing in defendants house
or residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1)
recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient
must reside in the house or residence of defendant.
● Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks
information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz,
aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident
caretaker of Manotoc.
41 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society
would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With
Manotoc’s allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or
representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for
the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary
relation of confidence with Manotoc.
● Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted
service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be
annulled.

Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby

GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City,
Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

42 | CIVPRO 2D
 23. Ong v Co - NAVARRO
Petitioner/s: YUK LING ONG
Respondent/s: BENJAMIN T. CO
Doctrine: Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for
annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
● Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent
Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982
● In 2001, Co filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC
○ Co stated that petitioner’s address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo,
Manila
● In 2002, Co filed another petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC
○ Co indicated that Ong’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City
● RTC issued summons
○ Process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that substituted
service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected
after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on
Ong
○ Said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security
officer
● RTC rendered a decision finding respondent’s marriage with petitioner as
void ab initio and stated that:
○ summons was served on petitioner but she failed to file her
responsive pleading within the reglementary period
○ petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations
● In 2008, Ong received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation directing her to appear before the said agency because her
permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings
since her marriage with Co was nullified by the court
● Ong was furnished with the copies of the following documents:
1. 1st petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;
2. 2nd petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;;
3. Decision of the RTC Parañaque on 2nd petition, declaring the
marriage between Ong and Co as void ab initio; and
4. their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon
● Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court before the CA claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed
against her
● Ong alleged that:
1. Co committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a
wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial;
2. jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in the 2nd petition
because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no
sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service,
was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons;
a. the alleged substituted service was made on a security
guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her
household
● CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for annulment of
judgment to be devoid of merit
Issue:
1. W/N the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview
of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court -- NO
2. W/N the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner – NO
Ratio:
● Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a
party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed
into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of
being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with
● Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs
actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions,
and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for
annulment of judgment:
1. extrinsic fraud
2. lack of jurisdiction
ON EXTRINSIC FRAUD (WRONG ADDRESS)
● Ong’s contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud is too unsubstantial to
warrant consideration
ON THE LACK OF JURISDICTION (SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS)
● Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or
final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action (substantive law), or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner (procedural law; involves the service of summons or other
processes on the petitioner)
● Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court.
● If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be
acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
43 | CIVPRO 2D
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place ● Aside from the server’s return, Co failed to indicate any portion of the
of business with some competent person in charge thereof. records which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the
summons
Requirements of a substituted service of summons (MANOTOC V CA): ● Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, there was
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the decision must be
● For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several declared null and void
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility DISPOSITIVE PORTION
of prompt service
● Several attempts = at least three tries preferably on at least two different WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March
dates + sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby
(2) Specific Details in the Return REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
● The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service
○ date and time of the attempts on personal service
○ inquiries made to locate the defendant
○ name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of
defendant
○ all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
● The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends
the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons
● must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons

IN THE CASE AT BAR:

SERVER’S RETURN

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with copy of
petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St.,
Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after several futile attempts to
serve the same personally. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.

● The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken
by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner
● The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to
perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the
corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying
reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there
were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in
the case.
● The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received
the summons, on behalf of petitioner
● It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa
of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat”

44 | CIVPRO 2D
 24. De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation
GR No. 194751, 26 November 2014 -- PEÑALOSA
Petitioner/s: Aurora De Pedro
Respondent/s: Romasan Development Corporation
Doctrine: The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service
of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot
be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation
of the usual method of service.
Facts:
● Romasan Development Corporation (Romasan) filed several complaints for
nullification of free patent and original certificates of title against numerous
defendants. One of them is Aurora de Pedro (De Pedro).
● Romasan said it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo
City, as evidence by its Certificate of Title.
● Mr. Rodrigo Ko, a representative of Romasan, discovered in 1996 that De
Pedro put up fence in the property. Ko confronted De Pedro about it but De
Pedro was able to show a title and documents evidencing her ownership.
Upon investigation by Romasan, it was discovered that the DENR issued
free patents to De Pedro covering a portion of the subject property.
● Romasan is now challenging the grant made to De Pedro and several
others. Romasan filed a complaint and claimed that the issuance by the
DENR was illegal since the property was already released for disposition to
private individuals.
● Attempts were made to personally serve summons on De Pedro but they all
failed. The officer’s return dated Feb 22, 1999 had the following content:
OFFICER’S RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February,
1999, I have served a copy of the summons with complaint and
annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants
in the above-entitled case on the following, to wit;
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that
according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no
person in the said given address.
● Romasan then filed a motion to serve summon and the complaint BY
PUBLICATION. The motion was granted and was published in People’s
Balita.
● Thereafter, Romasan moved to declare all defendants in its complaints,
including De Pedro, in default for failure to file their answers.
● Since none of the defendants filed an answer, the RTC then issued an order
declaring the title and free patents issued to all defendants null and void.
● Shortly after, De Pedro, through her counsel, filed a motion for new trial
claiming that her counsel received the notice of the Jan 7, 2000 decision on
March 16, 2000. De Pedro also asserted that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of
summon, claiming that the Feb 22, 1999 summon was not personally served
upon her. Also, she argued that this present case should have been
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia because the same property was
the subject of a pending civil case in another court.
● The RTC dismissed her motion for new trial and said that a summon was
validly served upon her through publication.
● De Pedro then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the RTC
decision. However, the CA dismissed her petition and affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
● Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Was the service of summon by publication (substituted service) justified? -
- No.
Ratio:
● In this case, the Sheriff’s return shows no detail of his effort to serve the
summon personally. Hence, no substituted service or service by publication
will be allowed based on such defective return.
● As a rule, Personal Service of Summons is the preferred mode of service.
However, other modes of serving summons may be done when justified.
Service of Summons by Publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown
owner or if his whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry.”
● But such defect is cured when the defendant or respondent voluntarily
appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is generally construed as
sufficient service of summons. As in this case, the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance.
● Proper service of summon is needed because failure to serve summons
means that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
○ Jurisdiction over the persons of defendants or respondents is
acquired by the court either through a (1) valid service of
summons; or (2) voluntary submission. Voluntary submission is
made when defendant participates in the trial despite improper
service of summons
○ Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of
action – whether action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Jurisdiction over the person is still needed in action in in rem and
quasi in rem to satisfy the requirements of due process. Due
process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be
notified. Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of
summons is imperative.
● When other modes are availed, the Sheriff’s return must contain
circumstances that warranted the deviation from preferring personal service
of summons. Otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
45 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● A Sheriff’s return enjoys a presumption of regularity if it contains (1) details
of the circumstances of his attempt to serve the summons personally; and
(2) particulars showing the impossibility of serving the same within
reasonable time. No presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro
forma.

● Despite the foregoing, the SC ruled that the CA was correct not to grant De
Pedro’s motion for new trial because “lack of court jurisdiction over her
person” is not one of the grounds to grant a new trial. It should have been
the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment.
● However, De Pedro was barred from filing a petition for annulment of
judgment. Under the Rules, an action for annulment of judgment may be
based only on two grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
● In several cases, the Court has held that such action may NOT be invoked
(1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has
failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or
negligence.".
● In this case, the grounds she asserted for a motion for new trial and the
action for annulment are the same: lack of jurisdiction and litis pendentia.
The Court ruled that her actions raising the same grounds reveals an intent
to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of legal
remedies provided by law.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; The Court of Appeals July 7, 2010
decision in CA G.R. SP. No. 96471 is AFFIRMED.

46 | CIVPRO 2D
 25. CARSON REALTY v. RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY, GR No. 225035,
2017-02-08 || Regado || Velasco Jr., J:.
Petitioner/s: Carson Realty & Management Corp
Respondent/s: Red Robin Security Agency and Monina Santos
Doctrine:
● Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the
parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal
service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that
the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in
charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant.
● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
This, however, is tempered only by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a
special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority
Facts:
● On March 2007, respondent Santos filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioner Carson with the RTC. As per the Officer's
Return dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server Pajila, a copy of the
Summons dated April 11, 2007, together with the Complaint and its
annexes, was served upon Carson at its business address through its
"corporate secretary," Precilla S. Serrano.
● Thereafter, the appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of Carson,
Atty. Roxas filed an Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 with the
court wherein the latter entered his appearance and acknowledged that the
Summons was served and received by one of the staff assistants of Carson.
● Atty. Roxas prayed for an extension of 15 days from April 27, 2007
within which to file a responsive pleading.
● The RTC noted the appearance of Atty. Roxas and granted his request for
extension of time to file a responsive pleading.
● Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that the Summons dated April 11, 2007 was not served
on any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive summons under
the Rules of Court.
● In her Comment, Santos countered that while the Summons was initially
received by Serrano, who as it turned out was a staff assistant and not the
corporate secretary of Carson, the corporation acknowledged receipt of the
Summons when Atty. Roxas alleged in his Appearance and Motion that he
may not be able to comply with the 15-day prescribed period.Thus, when
Carson sought for an affirmative relief of a 15-day extension from April 27,
2007 to file its pleading, it already voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
● On November 9, 2007, Process Server Pajila submitted his Officer's Report
stating in essence that he attempted to serve the alias Summons dated
September 24, 2007 on the President and General Manager of Carson, as
well as on the Board of Directors and Corporate Secretary, but they were not
around.
● Hence, he was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez, the '"secretary" of the
company, to bring the alias Summons to the law office of Atty. Roxas but to
no avail
● This prompted him (process server) to resort to substituted service of the
alias Summons by leaving a copy thereof with a certain Mr. JR
Taganila, but the latter also refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias
Summons
● Atty. Roxas filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons was again
improperly and invalidly served as his law office was not empowered to
receive summons on behalf of Carson.
● the RTC denied the motion filed by Santos to declare Carson in default due
to improper service of summons.
● Thereafter, Santos requested the RTC for the issuance of another alias
Summons. The RTC granted this request and issued an alias Summons
dated September 9, 2008.Santos filed a second Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default in January 2009. The RTC granted the motion and
allowed her to present her evidence ex-parte in its Order dated June 29,
2009.
● On August 27, 2009, Carson filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of
Default.The RTC denied the same.
● Carson filed an urgent Motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, Santos
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set for Hearing and for Reception of Evidence
Before the Branch Clerk of Court
RTC Ruling: Denied Carson’s urgent MR and granted Santos’ Ex-Parte Motion to set
case for hearing and for reception of evidence before the branch clerk
CA Ruling: Denied the petition filed by Carson and ruled that the RTC had properly
acquired jurisdiction over Carson due to its voluntary appearance in court.
Issues:
(1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson -YES
(2) Whether Carson was properly declared in default - YES
Ruling:
RTC Acquired jurisdiction over Carson .The substituted service of summons is
valid
● In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted
service of summons.
● However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
of service and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted
service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of
summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the
parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon
a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
47 | CIVPRO 2D
 address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 20, 2015 and
of the defendant. Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA¬ G.R. SP No. 121983
● We find that resort to substituted service was warranted since the are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
impossibility of personal service is clearly apparent.
● The foregoing requirements for a valid substituted service of summons were
substantially complied with.
● Indeed, the Return established the impossibility of personal service to
Carson's officers, as shown by the efforts made by Process Server Pajila to
serve the September 8, 2008 alias Summons on Carson's President/General
Manager. In particular, several attempts to serve the summons on these
officers were made on four separate occasions: October 2, 2008, October
16, 2008, October 27, 2008, and October 28, 2008, but to no avail.
● On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server Pajila served the summons
on Fernandez, Carson's receptionist, due to the unavailability and difficulty to
locate the company's corporate officers.
● The pertinent portion of the Return states: Substituted service of summons
was resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's
office through its employee, MS. LORIE FERNANDEZ, however, she
refused to acknowledge receipt of the process.
● Based on the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its officers
not to receive the Summons.
In any event, even if We concede the invalidity of the substituted service, such
is of little significance in view of the fact that the RTC had already acquired
jurisdiction over Carson early on due to its voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
● Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority.
● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This,
however, is tempered only by the concept of conditional appearance, such
that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others,
the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.
● Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it
filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April 25,
2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons dated April 11,
2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading. As
noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and
Motion was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the
regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief
of additional time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Carson was properly declared in default
● It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems from Carson's
failure to file its responsive pleading despite its voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court reckoned from its filing of the Appearance and
Motion, and not due to its failure to file its answer to the September 8, 2008
alias Summons

48 | CIVPRO 2D
49 | CIVPRO 2D
 26. Robinson v. Miralles - Rodriguez
Petitioner/s: Remelita M. Robinson
Respondent/s: Celita B. Miralles
Doctrine: For substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of
summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were
exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or
upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of
business. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.
Facts:
● Celita Miralles filed with the RTC of Paranaque City a complaint for sum of
money against Remelita Robinson. Allegedly, Remelita borrowed
US$20,054.00 from Miralles as shown by a Memorandum of Agreement they
both executed.
● Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However, per
return of service of Sheriff Maximo Potente, she no longer resides at such
address.
● The trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19 Baguio St.,
Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa City, Robinson’s new address. Again, the
summons could not be served.
● According to the Sheriff: “The Security Guard assigned at the gate of
Alabang Hills refused to let me go inside the subdivision so that I could effect
the service of the summons to Robinson. The security guard alleged that
Robinson had given them instructions not to let anybody proceed to her
house if she is not around.
○ I explained to the Security Guard that I am a sheriff serving the
summons to Robinson, and if she is not around, summons can be
received by any person of suitable age and discretion living in the
same house. Despite all the explanation, the security guard by the
name of A.H. Geroche still refused to let me go inside the
subdivision and served the summons to Robinson. The same thing
happened when I attempted to serve the summons previously.
● Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a copy thereof together with
the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche,
who refused to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be
the one to give the same to Robinson.
● Miralles then filed a motion to declare Robinson in default for her failure to
file an answer seasonably despite service of summons. The Trial court
allowed her to present her evidence ex parte.
● The trial court ruled in favor of Miralles. A copy of the order was sent to
Robinson by registered mail at her new address. Upon motion of Miralles,
the trial court issued a writ of execution.
● Robinson then filed a petition for relief from judgment by default, claiming
that she was not properly served summons. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether the substituted service of summons was valid. YES.
Ratio:
● Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him or her. In a civil action, service of summons is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any
judgment without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and
void.
● Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the
service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in
the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure, as amended, thus:
○ SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant – Whenever practicable,
the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
○ SEC. 7. Substituted service – If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by
leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
● Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over
substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary
in character.
● Robinson contends that the security guard is not the proper party to receive
summons:
○ We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of
the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural
rules, that governs.
○ In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by
the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him
that Robinson prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to
her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for
the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons
upon Robinson.
○ We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor
did she deny having received the summons through the security
guard.
○ Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must
bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trail court that
summons has been properly served upon Robinson and that it has
acquired jurisdiction over her.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and we AFFIRM the assailed
Orders of the RTC, Branch 274, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 00-0372. Costs
against petitioner.
50 | CIVPRO 2D
 27. Orion Security Corporation vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., - SAN DIEGO
Petitioner/s: ORION SECURITY CORPORATION
Respondent/s: KALFAM ENTERPRISES, INC.
Doctrine:
1. in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that
the person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was
one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring
that the latter would actually receive the summons
2. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Facts:
● Orion Security Corporation is engaged in the business of providing security
services. One of its clients is Kalfam Enterprises, Inc.
● Kalfam was not able to pay Orion for services rendered. Orion thus filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money.
● The sheriff tried to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint on the
secretary of Kalfam's manager. However, Kalfam's representatives allegedly
refused to acknowledge their receipt.
● When Kalfam failed to file an Answer, Orion filed a motion to declare Kalfam in
default.The trial court, however, denied the motion on the ground that there was
no proper service of summons on Kalfam
● Orion then filed a motion for alias summons, which the trial court granted.
● The process server again left the summons and a copy of the complaint through
Kalfam's security guard, who allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt.
● Again, Kalfam failed to file an Answer and Kalfam was declared in default.
● Thereafter, Orion was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte
● According to Orion, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Kalfam due to the its
voluntary appearance. Orion insists substituted service of summons on Kalfam's
security guard is substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, in
view of the exceptional circumstances in the present case.
● Kalfam however, counters that the special appearance of its counsel does not
constitute voluntary appearance.
● Kalfam maintains that its filing of an opposition to Orion's motion to declare
Kalfam in default and other subsequent pleadings questioning the trial courts
jurisdiction over it does not amount to voluntary appearance.
● Kalfam stresses it was not properly served with summons via substituted service
since the security guard on whom it was purportedly served was not the
competent person contemplated by Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
● TC ruled in favor of Orion. CA reversed it saying that summons was not validly
served on Kalfam
Issue:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent either by (1) valid
substituted service of summons on respondent; or (2) respondents voluntary
appearance in the trial court and submission to its authority. - NO for both.
Ratio:
● Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either
through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority
● As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant.
● It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period
of time that substituted service may be resorted to.
● Kalfam's president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel never received the summons against respondent,
either in person or by substituted service.
● Note that in case of substituted service7, there should be a report indicating
that the person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was
one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that
the latter would actually receive the summons
● Orion failed to show that the security guard who received the summons in
respondents behalf shared such relation of confidence that respondent would
surely receive the summons.
● The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Kalfam by the its voluntary
appearance in court proceedings.
● A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.
● Kalfam, in its special appearance, precisely questioned the jurisdiction of the trial
court on the ground of invalid service of summons. Thus, it cannot be deemed to
have submitted to said courts authority.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 17,
2004 and Resolution dated April 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
70565 are AFFIRMED. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings upon valid service of summons to respondent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
7
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
51 | CIVPRO 2D
 28. TORIO- B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc. v. R.S. Ameploquio Reality
Petitioner/s: B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc.
Respondent/s: R.S. Ameploquio Reality
Doctrine: If the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally
within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be
resorted to. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service
must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The
statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized
by statute is considered ineffective.
Facts:
1. BD Long Span Builders and R.S Ampeloquio Realty entered into a contract where
BD Long Span agreed to render “rip rapping” construction services at Ampeloquio
International Resort in Cavite for Php50M. They entered into another contract for
Php30M. To secure performance, BD Long Span deposited a cash bond (Php800K).
2. R.S Ampeloquio failed to comply with its obligations under the Agreements,
resulting in the cancellation of the project. BD Long Span demanded the return of the
cash bond but RS Ampeloquio refused.
3. BD Long Span filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and
damages against respondent. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served
on respondent, through its staff member, Romel Dolahoy.
4. RS Ampeloquio failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the
complaint. Upon motion of BD Long Span, RTC declared RS Ameploquio in default.
RTC ruled in favor of BD Long Span. CA reversed. BD Long Span appealed to the
SC, hence the case at bar.
Issue:
Did the CA err in ruling that there was invalid service of summons upon respondent,
and hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over RS Ampeloquio?-- NO
Ratio:
1. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through
the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court
and their submission to its authority. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been
validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a
judgment rendered against them is null and void.
2. Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.' When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines
with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
3. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a
domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an
officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel), otherwise, the service
is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons
be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will
know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
4. However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a
reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7 of
Rule 14 provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.' If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.
5. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating
that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts
have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be
used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and
any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
6. In this case, the Return by Process Server provides:
This is to certify that:
On October 17, 2002 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, undersigned tried to
cause the service of the Summons together with the attached complaint & its annexes
in the above-entitled case to the defendant at his given address on record. Mr Romel
Dalahoy, a staff of said Realty received the said Summons with the attached
complaint & its annexes as evidenced by the former's signature as appearing on the
original copy of the aforesaid Summons.
Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes to Atty.
Evangeline V. Tiongson, Clerk of Court V, this Court, is respectfully returned, DULY
SERVED, by substituted service.
October 17, 2002, Muntinlupa City
Angelito C. Reyes
Process Server
52 | CIVPRO 2D
7.Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent)
through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons
was served by substituted service on the defendant's staff member, Romel Dolahoy.
Substituted service was resorted to on the server's first attempt at service of
summons, and there was no indication that prior efforts were made to render prompt
personal service on the defendant.

Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who
received the summons in respondent's behalf, shared such relation of confidence
ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following our
ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioner's contention that service on Romel
Dolahoy constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.

8. Petitioner's contention that respondent's filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured

any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is well-settled that a
defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: (1) he
may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion,
under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a
meritorious defense; (2) if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered
the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he discovered the default
after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 of Rule 38; and (4) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside
the order of default has been presented by him.19 Thus, respondent, which had been
declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial
court's judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial court's
authority.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of

Appeals' Decision dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution dated 30 September 2005 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings upon valid service of summons to respondent.

53 | CIVPRO 2D
 29. ZABALA - Wong v Factor-Koyama
Petitioner/s: ALEXANDER TAM WONG
Respondent/s: CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA
Doctrine: Before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to
try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on the defendant. Resorting to substituted
service, after merely trying to serve the summons at the defendant’s
residence on three different dates while he was in his office, is improper.
Facts:
A Complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages was filed with the
RTC by private respondent Koyama against Wong.
● Koyama alleged in her Complaint that Wong deliberately refused to execute
and deliver a deed of absolute sale, and to surrender the TCT of a
condominium in California Garden Square, Mandaluyong City, which she
had already bought from him.
● Koyama further averred that she had been renting out the subject property to
foreign tourists, but Wong padlocked the same while she was in Japan
attending to her business. When she requested him to open the subject
property, he reportedly mauled her, causing her physical injuries, and also
took her personal belongings.
The RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence in Quezon City.
However, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its
Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff Baloloy.
● In his Return, he indicated that the summons should already be deemed
DULY SERVED.
● According to him, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the
summons at Wongs residential address on three different dates, but Wong
was always not around according to the latters housemaids. Sheriff Baloloy
then attempted to leave the summons with Mira, Wong’s caretaker, who is of
legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but
Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same.
After the lapseof the 15-day reglementary periodand upon motion of Koyama, the
RTC declared Wong in default and allowed Koyama to present her evidence ex parte.
Wong, by special appearance of counsel,then filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss
asserting that there was no service of summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not given the opportunity to
oppose Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default.
RTC denied, CA dismissed Wong’s petition for Certiorari (improper remedy). Hence,
Wong filed the instant petition.
IN THE MEANTIME, since the neither the CA nor the SC issued a TRO, the RTC
continued the hearing of the case. It allowed Wong to cross-examine Koyama, which
Wong’s counsel extensively did, even though the previous order of default had not
been lifted. The RTC allowed this in the interest of justice and fair play.
Issues:
1. WON the Sheriff properly resorted to substituted service of summons -
-- NO
2. WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
Wong --- YES
Ratio:
1. The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloy’s Return, finds that he
improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons.
Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or
liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and
the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
personal or substituted service in the manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally
preferred over substituted service.
● Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is
an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the
defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is
served not upon him but upon another to whom the law could only presume
would notify him of the pending proceedings.
The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show the
impracticability or hopelessness of personal service. Proof of service of summons
must:
(a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant.
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in
the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and
fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of
summons ineffective.
Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs residence on three
different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing else in
the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to
locate Wong.
● During his visits to Wongs residence, Sheriff Baloloy was informed by the
housemaids that Wong was at his office.
● There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know
Wongs office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve
the summons upon him at his office.
54 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to serve the
summons at the formers residence on one of the dates, there was no
indication that Wongs absence was other than temporary or that he would
not soon return.

Sheriff Baloloys three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on his part to
locate Wong; and Wongs absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys visits,
since Wong was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote impossibility of
personal service of summons upon him.
● It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is
enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the
defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade
service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny,
and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.

2.The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary

appearance before it.
Even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.

The Court here noted that the RTC acquired jurisdiction NOT when Wong filed a
motion to dismiss, BUT when he, through counsel, extensively cross-examined
Koyana, despite knowledge that the order of default had not yet been lifted.

By actively participating in the hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the

RTC over the case and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus, deemed
to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court.

The Court further stressed the fact that the RTC already rendered a Decision and
Wong filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. Given these developments, the Court
deems it unnecessary to still address the issue of whether Wong was improperly
declared in default by the RTC in its Order.

Dispositive:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

55 | CIVPRO 2D
 30. Cezar vs. Ricafort-Bautista ABALOS
Petitioner/s: Virgilio P CEZAR
Respondent/s: HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 260, City of Parañaque and
SPECIFIED MATERIALS, CO
Doctrine: A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal
notice. An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person
Facts: Specified Materials Corp. filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money
against petitioner arising from the latter's failure to pay the construction materials it
purportedly purchased under a credit line extended by private respondent. As
petitioner failed to pay for the construction materials
private respondent sent two letters to petitioner and his brother, Perfecto, reminding
them of their obligation. Private respondent's representatives met with petitioner in
order to reconcile their conflicting records. During said meeting, petitioner allegedly
admitted that he failed to take into account some deliveries. Petitioner then requested
that they meet again after two days so that he could verify his documents but he
failed to show up for the subsequent meetings.
Thereafter, private respondent sent a final demand letter to petitioner.
After the filing of the complaint, summons was issued to petitioner and this was
served by the Sheriff Marquez, stating in his return that it was served to petitioner thru
Mr. Arsenio Robles, an employee of the former who is authorized to transact
business, as per his signature appearing below summons.
Petitioner failed to file his Answer. Thus, private respondent moved that he be
declared in default which was granted by the court. Private respondent was able to
present its evidence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Decision arguing that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. This motion was denied.
Following the denial of its Motion to Set Aside Decision, petitioner filed before the CA
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for TRO.
This petition was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a MR but this was denied. Hence,
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC which denied the
same for failure to comply with procedural requirements.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution before the trial court. The
scheduled hearing of this motion was ordered reset after petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing. The records also disclose that the rescheduled
hearing did not push through and in fact, it was rescheduled a couple of more times
per agreement of the parties. Finally, public respondent granted private respondent's
Motion for Execution. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: WON the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of substituted service of summons effected by sheriff Juan
C. Marquez.
Ratio:
There are two ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is
acquired – either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court.
The Rules of Court requires that, whenever practicable, summons must be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person. In case the defendant refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering the summons to him or her. However, in the event
that summons cannot be served within a reasonable time, the Rules permit that
substituted service may be resorted to.
In this case, the sheriff employed the substituted service of summons. It must be
emphasized that laws providing for modes other than the personal service of
summons must be strictly followed in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondent or defendant. Compliance therewith should appear
affirmatively on the return.
As the sheriff's return in the present case does not contain any statement with regard
to the impossibility of personal service the same is patently defective and so the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions will not lie.
Nevertheless, we still hold that jurisdiction was validly acquired by the trial court.
Although the substituted service upon him of summons was defective, said defect
was cured by his voluntary appearance.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An
appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person.
While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts
is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the
person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal
motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He
may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and
unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he
thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
As the records of this case disclose, after private respondent moved for the execution
of the trial court's decision, petitioner filed a motion for a re-setting of the court's
hearing thereon.
Hence, in this case, petitioner's filing of a Motion for Re-setting of the Hearing
effectively cured the defect of the substituted service of summons. Petitioner's
insistence of lack of jurisdiction over his person is utterly lacking in any legal basis.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated 9 September 1997 rendered by the Regional Trial
56 | CIVPRO 2D
Court of Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 96-0473 is hereby AFFIRMED and the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 16 June 1999 is hereby LIFTED

57 | CIVPRO 2D
 31. Belen v. Chavez - AVILLON
Petitioner/s: Sps. Domingo M. Belen and Dominga P. Belen herein
represented by their atty-in-fact Nery B. Avecilla
Respondent/s: Hon. Pablo R. Chavez, presiding Judge, RTC branch 87,
Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting under his orders and Sps.
Silvestre and N. Pacleb and Patricia A. PACLEB, represented therein by
the attorney in fact Joselito Rioveros
Doctrine: The Court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
case by means of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance
and submission to the authority of the Court.
Facts:
1. The instant petition originated from the action of Sps Pacleb, represented by
their atty in fact Rioveros, for the enforcement of a foreign judgement against
Sps Belen.
2. Sps Pacleb argue that they secured a judgement by default in a case
rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California. This judgement
ordered Sps. Belen to pay $56,204.69 representing loan repayment.
3. The summons was served on Sps Belen’s address in San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna and was received by a certain Marcelo.
4. The counsel for Sps Belen, Atty Alcantara, filed an answer arguing that Sps
Belen were actually residents of California, USA.
5. In view of Sps Belen’s failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC
ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for Sps Pacleb.
6. Before the presentation of evidence, Atty Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss.
The RTC held the ex parte presentation of evidence in abeyance. But the
motion was eventually denied by the RTC.
7. During the pendency of the proceedings, Atty Alcantara died without the
RTC being informed.
8. The RTC promulgated a decision against Sps Belen. A copy of the decision
intended for Atty Alcantara was returned with the notation “Addressee
Deceased”. Another copy of the decision was sent to the Laguna address of
Sps. Belen.
9. Sps. Pacleb obtained a writ of execution which lead to Sps Belen’s property
being levied.
10. Atty Culvera entered his appearance for Sps. Belen and he subsequently
filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. This was denied.
11. Atty Culvera also filed on Jan 6, 2004 a Notice of Appeal from the RTC
decision arguing that he only received a copy of the decision on Dec 29,
2003.
12. Sps. Belen elevated the case via Rule 65 to the CA, imputing grave abuse of
discretion. This was dismissed by the CA.
Issue:
WHETHER the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Sps Belen thru either
the proper service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara - YES,
service to Sps Belen were defective but by virtue of Atty. Alcantara’s
appearance, the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
Ratio:
SUMMONS
1. The action in the instant case is in the nature of an action in personam
because Sps. Pacleb are suing to enforce their personal rights under the
foreign judgment.
a. In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-
resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority
of the court, personal service of summons is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. If he is not found in the
state, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
b. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a
non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was
a resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and
attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him.
2. It has been consistently maintained that Sps Belen were not physically
present in the Philippines. Atty. Alcantara had already averred that Sps
Belen were residents of California, U.S.A. and that he was appearing only
upon the instance of petitioners' relatives.
3. The service of summons on Sps Belen's purported address in San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court
jurisdiction over their persons.
4. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appearance
of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient
to vest jurisdiction over the persons of Sps Belen. Through certain acts,
Atty. Alcantara was impliedly authorized by Sps Belen to appear on their
behalf. Atty. Alcantara attached in the motion to dismiss a duly authenticated
copy of the judgment of dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page
of petitioner Domingo Belen's U.S. passport. These documents could have
been supplied only by petitioners, indicating that they have consented to the
appearance of Atty. Alcantara on their behalf. In sum, petitioners
voluntarily submitted themselves through Atty. Alcantara to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
COPY OF THE RTC DECISION
5. Upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between
him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on
him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners.
6. The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known address" by
registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the
requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by
registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present
address of the party and not at any other address of the party.
7. Therefore, the running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not
commence upon the service of the RTC decision to Atty. Alcantara or at
the Laguna address. It is deemed served on Sps Belen only upon its
receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29 December 2003. Therefore, the filing of the
Notice of Appeal on 06 January 2004 is within the reglementary period
and should be given due course.
58 | CIVPRO 2D
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED
and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88731
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the orders dated 7 July 2004 and 2
February 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87 are SET
ASIDE. The RTC is also ordered to GIVE DUE COURSE to the Notice of Appeal filed
by Atty. Culvera on 06 January 2004. Costs against private respondents. aD

59 | CIVPRO 2D
Motefalcon v Vasquez - BALAGTAS
Petitioner/s: Dolores Motefalcon & Laurence Montefalcon
Respondent/s: Ronnie Vasquez
Doctrine: Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent
resident may be by substituted service.
A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence,
office or regular business place. It is immaterial that defendant does
not receive actual notice.
Facts:
1) In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for
acknowledgment and support
a) Against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez
i) Before the RTC of Naga City.
2) Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez:
a) She prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner
Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as
father.
b) According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as
support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993.
c) Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school
allowance despite repeated demands.
d) Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally
married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
3) A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-
aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
a) Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila.
b) Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who
informed the court of the non-service of summons.
4) Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default.
a) The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons.
5) In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int. President
Garcia St., Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila" upon petitioners'
motion.
a) Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on
Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly
stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname.
6) Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer.
7) On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure
to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons.
a) Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the
proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as
he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new
address.
8) In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers:
a) Explaining that they had no ill- motive and that Dolores gave a
truthful testimony.
b) The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the
allegations by his silence.
c) It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a
public document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate
filiation.
9) In the same year, Vasquez surfaced.
a) He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed.
b) Appeal was granted by the court.
c) Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in
trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction
over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month
support, which was allegedly "excessive and exorbitant."
10) The appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was
"defective" as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal
service and an attempt to effect personal service.
11) Petitioner’s Arguments:
a) Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had
left as overseas seafarer when the sheriff served the summons on
July 19, 2000 in Taguig.
b) Noting that Vasquez's seaman's book indicated that he left the
country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000,
they criticize the appellate court for anchoring its rulings on
mere technicality.
c) Petitioners insist that a substituted service is the normal method if
one is temporarily away from the country as personal service
abroad or by publication are not ordinary means of service.
12) Vasquez’ Arguments:
a) Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of
summons should have been personal or by publication
i) As substituted service is proper only if a defendant is
in the country.
b) Vasquez also added that the sheriff's return did not state that he
exerted efforts to personally serve the summons.
Issue: WoN there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the
trial court with jurisdiction over his person.
Ratio:
1) To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons
must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by
substituted service.
2) It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual
employees.
a) They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait
for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning
agency and principal if they wish.
b) It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often
has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro
Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside
from his home address in the province where he originates.
60 | CIVPRO 2D
3) In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived
in Taguig City when the complaint was filed.
a) Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in
either place.
4) Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living
at the time when the service was made, even though he was
temporarily abroad at the time.
a) As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident
temporarily out of the country.
b) Hence, service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14,
Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When
any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily
resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section
6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in
any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less
than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer.
5) Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also", it is not
mandatory.
a) Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules
may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-
seaman.
6) Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons.
a) But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely,
was substituted service of summons justified?
7) Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since the
defendant was temporarily out of the country.
a) To proceed with personal service of summons on a defendant-
seaman who went on overseas contract work — would not only be
impractical and futile — it would also be absurd.
8) The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the
Naga City-based sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to
serve the summons personally on Vasquez.
a) When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the
whereabouts of Vasquez.
b) Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga court
commissioned a Taguig City-based sheriff to serve the summons.
c) Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez's
whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort to
substituted service.
d) There was no undue haste in effecting substituted service.
e) The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to
locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there was
indeed no precipitate haste in serving the summons.
9) In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and
justified because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the
summons, but to no avail.
a) Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the
concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty.
b) Also, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable
age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling.
c) There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as
evidenced by his employment contract, executed under the
supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
d) Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment and
seafarer's information sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead, his
address in Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the
alias summons that Bejer received.
i) She must have informed Vasquez one way or another of
the suit upon his return in October 2000 after finishing his
nine-month contract with Fathom Ship Management.
e) Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have
the default order set aside.
i) The default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001.
ii) He also had enough time to file a motion for
reconsideration.
(1) But he did nothing.
10) The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at personal service by
the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in Camarines Sur to the final
substituted service in Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight
months, a reasonable time long enough to conclude that personal service
had failed and was futile.
11) Montalban v Maximo discussion by the SC:
a) We held in said case that the normal method of service of
summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service
because personal service abroad and service by publication are not
ordinary means of summoning defendants.
b) Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent
resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State
are always amenable to suits in personam therein.
c) "Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons
is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may
be temporarily out of the country at the time.
i) A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's
residence, office or regular business place.
61 | CIVPRO 2D
 ii) He need not know where a resident defendant actually is
at the very moment of filing suit.
iii) He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon
whom service was actually made delivers the summons to
the defendant or informs him about it.
iv) The law presumes that for him.
v) It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual
notice.
d) More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit.
i) The absence in the final sheriff's return of a statement
about the impossibility of personal service does not
conclusively prove that the service is invalid.
ii) Such failure should not unduly prejudice petitioners if what
was undisclosed was in fact done.
iii) Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been
submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident
assailing the validity of the substituted service had
Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard.
iv) In fact, he was declared in default.
(1) It was only when a judgment against him was
rendered by the trial court that he questioned the
validity of service of summons before the
appellate court.
(2) Such failure to appear, and then later to
question the court's jurisdiction over his
person, should not be taken against herein
petitioners.
e) Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to
know of the case when his mother told him about the trial court's
decision and the sheriff's return on the substituted service which
carries a presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly
deserving of more faith and credit.
i) The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is prima
facie evidence of the facts set out in it.
ii) Only clear and convincing evidence may overcome its
presumption of regularity.
iii) Given the circumstances in the present case, we agree
that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty on the part of the sheriff stands.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September
29, 2003 and Resolution dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71944 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 28, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby
REINSTATED.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

62 | CIVPRO 2D
 32. Palma v. Galvez BORNALES
Petitioner: Leah Palma
Respondents: HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as
PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO
CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO
DOCTRINE: A dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
The service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left
with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is
as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between
the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore,
assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some
way give him notice thereof
FACTS:
· Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the
Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz,
alleging that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence and
omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same
and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery.
· Although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful
and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of
somebody else.
· Respondents filed their respective answers.
· Palma subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses
at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent
Agudo.
· Summons were subsequently issued to them.
· RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the
alias summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes,
were served upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who
received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the country.
· Counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Answer 4 stating that he was just engaged by
private respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was
already due.
· The Counsel of Private Respondent asked for another extentsion stating
that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to
private respondent for her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate
in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.
· Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground that the RTC
had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with
summons, since she was temporarily out of the country; that service of summons
on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
· Petitioner opposed this arguing that a substituted service of summons on
private respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of
summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by
other modes of service, i.e., by personal or substituted service.
· RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent'smotion to
dismiss. It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's
house and received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a
valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the
summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons
· Petitioner is now before the Court alleging that the public respondent
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
(Rule 65 Certiorari)
ISSUE/S: Did Judge Galvez committed a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he ruled for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
improper service of summons - YES/NO
RATIO:
· In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the former.
· Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the
Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on
her is governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court:
Ø Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When
an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily
resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis
supplied)
Ø SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent,
or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the
property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or
in any other manner the court may deem su􀁊cient. Any order
63 | CIVPRO 2D
 granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which
shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which
the defendant must answer.

Ø SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justi􀁊able causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.

· The Court held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place
where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
· The service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left
with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
· The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between
the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes
that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
notice thereof.
· In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of
the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her
husband,Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and,
therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's
behalf.
· RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private
respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private
respondent's behalf, without qualification and without questioning the propriety of
the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File
Answer.
· In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the
RTC's jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of
time to file answer be granted.
· Filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

64 | CIVPRO 2D
33. Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading
Petitioner/s: PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD.
Respondent/s: DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION
Doctrine: Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of
the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner
required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.
Facts:
● Respondent Dakila Trading entered into a Distribution Agreement in 1990
with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of Singapore and engaged in the
business of manufacturing, producing, selling or distributing various
laboratory/analytical instruments. In the agreement, PEIA appointed the
respondent as the sole distributor of its products in the Philippines.
○ Dakila Trading was also granted the right to purchase and sell the
products of PEIA subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
Distribution Agreement.
○ PEIA, on the other hand, shall give respondent a commission for
the sale of its products in the Philippines.
● Under the same agreement, respondent shall order the products of PEIA,
which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from Perkin-
Elmer Instruments (Philippines) Corporation (PEIP), an affiliate of PEIA.
○ PEIP is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws, and involved in the business of wholesale trading of all kinds
of scientific, biotechnological, and analytical instruments and
appliances.
○ PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP.
● In 1997, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement. prompting
respondent to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong, a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ
of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.
● RTC ruled denying the prayer for attachment.
● Dakila filed for Ex Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of
Court to Deputize Dakila’s General Manager to serve summons outside of
the Philippines. This was granted by the RTC. An alias summons was
served to Perkinelmer Asia (Singapore based sole proprietorship owned by
PERKIN, allegedly distinct from PEIA).
● PEIP moved to dismiss, stating that there is no cause of action. PERKIN
alleged that Service of summons was erroneous.
● Dakila filed a motion to admit amended complaint, which sought to change
name of PEIA to PERKIN. It claims that PEIA became a sole proprietorship
owned by PERKIN and changed its name to Perkinelmer Asia.
● RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss of PEIP, compelling PEIP to file Answer
to Amended Complaint.
● Dakila now alleges that PERKIN’s ownership over personal property in the
form of shares of stocks in PEIP. The allegations, being mainly for damages,
relates to a property which PERKIN has claim or interest or lien, thus, falling
under the requisites of extraterritorial service under Rule 14. Thus, summons
was validly served.
Issue: W/N the service of summons was proper - No.
Ratio:
● There can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon it,
because the case before the court a quo involving collection of a sum of
money and damages is, indeed, an action in personam, as it deals with the
personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of the alleged
unilateral termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement.
● The cause of action is anchored on the claim that petitioner unilaterally
terminated the Distribution Agreement. Thus, the action instituted by
respondent affects the parties alone. It is an action in personam: any
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
● Being an action in personam, personal service of summons within the
Philippines is necessary in order for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.
○ This is not possible in the present case because the petitioner is a
non-resident and is not found within the Philippines.
○ The allegation in the Amended Complaint that petitioner had
personal property (shares of stock) in PEIP which is within the
Philippines did not make the case fall under the instances under
Sec 15 Rule 14.
● Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
there are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and
is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial
service:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property,
within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an
interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident’s property has been attached
within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may
be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
● Also, mere allegations of personal property within the Philippines does not
necessarily make the property subject of an action.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 4 April 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78981,
affirming the Orders, dated 4 November 2002 and 20 June 2003, of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in Civil Case No. MC99-605, is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent’s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
65 | CIVPRO 2D
MC99-605 as against the petitioner is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and all the
proceedings against petitioner in the court a quo by virtue thereof are hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
212, is DIRECTED to proceed without further delay with the resolution of
respondent’s Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to defendant PEIP, as well as
petitioner’s counterclaim. No costs.

66 | CIVPRO 2D
 33. Macasaet v. Co - RELUCIO
Petitioner/s: ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR.,
ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND
RANDY HAGOS
Respondent/s: FRANCISCO R. CO, JR
Doctrine: The service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists
either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if
the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him.
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within
a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected
either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Facts:
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer sued Abante Tonite, a daily
tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director
Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay,
Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes
(petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners
published.
The RTC in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including
Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305
3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street,
Intramuros, Manila.
In the morning of Sept 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated
address to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his
efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the
defendants were then out of the office and unavailable.
He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the
summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided
to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff's
return.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging lack of jurisdiction over
their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed petitioners to file their answers to
the complaint within the remaining period allowed by the Rules of Court. MR denied.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue: W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners. —YES
Ratio:
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam — the power of the court to
render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the
judgment and other rulings rendered in the action — is an element of due process
that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or
quasi in rem.
Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and
the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over
the res that is the subject matter of the action.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant,
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the
summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.
The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in
the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the
defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the
former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the
proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the
ensuing trial and judgment are void.
The service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself
whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the
summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign
for it, in tendering it to him.
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by
leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of
service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the
defendant is made through his substitute
Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in
person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the
second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and
Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always
roving outside and gathering news."
After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt
that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the
business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve
them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully
warranted his conclusion.
67 | CIVPRO 2D
He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time.

In reality, petitioners' insistence on personal service by the serving officer was

demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served
through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC.
They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the
Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 8, 2002; and
ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

(Note: Issue regarding Abante Tonite being neither a natural or a juridical person and
therefore could not be sued —CA categorized Abante as a corporation by estoppel,
having represented itself to the public as a corp)

68 | CIVPRO 2D