#32 General vs Special Retainer

1. General retainer – the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as “general counsel” for
any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the ordinary business of the client and referred to him
for legal action. The client pays fixed retainer fees, which could be monthly or otherwise. The fees
are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer.
2. Special retainer – fee for a specific case or service rendered by the lawyer for the client.

#33 Contingency Fee

1. Contingency Fee- that is conditioned on the securing of a favorable judgment and recovery of
money or property and the amount of which may be on a percentage basis.

2. Suit in Assumpsit- an express or implied promise or contract, the breach of which may be ground
for suit also.

3. Retaining Lien – a right merely to retain the funds, documents, and papers as against the client
until the

attorney is fully paid his fees.

4. Charging Lien - is an equitable right to have the fees and lawful disbursements due a lawyer for his
services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment for the payment of money and executions
issued in pursuance thereof in the particular suit.

Champertous Contract - one where the lawyer stipulateswith his client in the prosecution of the
case that he will bearall of the expenses for the recovery of things or propertybeing claimed by the
client, and the latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the thing or property recovered
ascompensation. It is void for being against public policy.

#34Presumption of Authority

An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears stages
of the litigation and no written authority is required to authorize him to appear.

The presumption is a strong one. A mere denial by a party that he has authorized an attorney to appear
for him, in the absence of compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome the presumption especially
when the denial comes after the rendition of an adverse judgment.

Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
 required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An
attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions.

#35 CHAVEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal
activities made byEnrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle filed a motion to dismiss
and compulsory counter-claim. In thecounter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and
other PCGG officials on the basis that the case filed against him was a “harassment
suit”. The motion to implead Chavez and others was granted bythe Sandiganbayan.
Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they are immune from suit by
virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1.

It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by JovitoSalonga,the there are no proof
linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the
case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez.Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself
by saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot be made a defendant in a counter-
claim.

Ruling:

The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile were based on the
malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit. It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit
is granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on
members of the PCGG and other public officers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith
and in the performance of their duty. If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority
they can be held liable personally for damages. In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his
authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office
does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of another. Thus he is made liable
from his actions in the opinion of the court.

#35 Can a defendant in a suit file a counterclaim against the lawyer of the plaintiff? Why?

No. To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely
their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous
consequences. A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is
kept busy defending himself.

#36

URBANO vs CHAVEZ

FACTS:
There are 2 cases involved here: a criminal action for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct
(RA 3019) and an civil action for damages arising from a felony (defamation through a publishedinterview
whereby Chavez imputed that Nemesio Co was a close associate (crony?) of Marcos), bothagainst Solicitor
General Francisco Chavez (among others)

In the criminal case (filed in the Office of the Ombudsman), the Office of the SolGen (OSG) entered
itsappearance for Chavez and the other accused (DILG Sec and 2 sectoral reps) as far as the
PrelimInvestigation is concerned. Urbanoet. al. filed a special civil action for prohibition in the SC to
enjointheSolGen and his associates from acting as counsel for Chavez in the PI. The contention is in
theevent that an information is filed against the accused, the appearance of the OSG in the PI would bein
conflict with its role as the appellate counsel for the People of the Phils (counsel at the firstinstance is the
provincial/ state prosecutor).

In the action for damages, the OSG likewise acted as counsel for Chavez, who was then the SolGenand
counsel for PCGG, the agency responsible for the investigation of graft and corrupt practices
oftheMarcoses. The OSG filed for extension of time to file required pleading, and afterwards filed amotion
to dismiss on behalf of Chavez. Petitioner Co objected to appearance of OSG as counsel,contending that
he is suing Chavez in his personal capacity.

OSG manifested that it is authorized to represent Chavez or any public official even if the said officialis
sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of PD478 which defines thefunctions
of OSG, as well as EO300 which made OSG an independent agency under the Office of thePresident

RTC denied the petition, thus allowing the appearance of OSG as counsel. It also denied the MFR.Thus,
this petition for review

ISSUE
#36 May a SolGen appear for a public official at any stage of a criminal case. Why?

HELD

1. NO. The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at ANY stage of a criminal case or in a civil
suit fordamages arising from a felony (applies to all public officials and employees in the executive,
legislativeand judicial branches).
PD47811 defines the duties and functions of OSG.

SEC1. The OSG shall represent the Gov’t of the Phils, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
andagents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. TheOSG
submits that since there is no qualification, it can represent any public official without anyqualification or
distinction in any litigation.

Same argument seems to apply to a similar provision in the Rev Admin Code (Sec. 1661: As principal law
officer of the Gov’t, the SolGen shall have the authority to act for and represent the Gov’t , its officers and
agents in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer). In
Anti-Graft League v Ortega
, SC interpreted Sec. 1661 to embrace PI. However, should an info be filed after, then OSGcan no longer
act as counsel. The rationale given was that public officials are subjected to numerous suits, and threats of
criminal prosecution could stay the hand of the public official. OSG provides assurance against timidity in
that they will be duly represented by counsel in the PI.

However, the court declared this ruling abandoned in this case. The anomaly in this ruling becomes
obvious when, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate
courts. The OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People, is expected to take a stand against the accused.
More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here and one which smacks of
ethical considerations, where the OSG, as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the PI stage
of the criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines,
represents the prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have
been contemplated and allowed by the law, its unconditional terms and provisions notwithstanding. It is a
situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court.

The Court is aware of the possibility of public officials being haled to court in an endless array of civil suits.
With or without this pronouncement, and considering the nature of a public office in the Philippines vis-a-
vis the litigious character of most Filipinos as demonstrated by the number of cases filed in the courts daily,
this scenario is a fact that must be accepted. The possibility of being brought to court is an occupational
hazard of both the public officer and the citizen, in the same way that every occupation has its own hazards
to reckon with. This grim reality notwithstanding, public officials should know that nobody is above the law.

#37 Concept of attorney’s fees

Two Concepts of Attorney’s Fees

1. Ordinary- it is the reasonable compensation paid to the lawyer for the legal services he had rendered the
client. The basis of this compensation is the fact of employment by the client.

2. Extraordinary- an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party to the
prevailing party in litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases authorized by law and is payable not to the
lawyer but to the client unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.

#38 Rosario vs De Guzman

Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the
legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against
them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages
involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City. Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their
case at all levels. While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular
accident. Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani
de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees

before the RTC. He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de
Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them
by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents
refused his written demand for payment of the contracted

attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent

of the value of the subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Attorney’s fees.

HELD:

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts ofattorney’s fees –

ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful
litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.

Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from each other, as further explained
below:

The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment of the
subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s fee is
an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his cause in
court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the instances authorized by law. On
the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the compensation for the latter’s
services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound
by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The
amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the
amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.
 The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of
his judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that
whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his
compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing party
to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.

The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a
prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a
client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too
may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his
rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control and
modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in one as
in the other.

HELD: Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee based on quantum
meruit.

Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an
attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees on
the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the
fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of
the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in
pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.

#39 BASIS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which
he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
 h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

#40 Is a written contract between a lawyer and a client a must entered into before payment
of his fees?

No. While a written agreement for professional services is the best evidence to
show the relation, formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The absence
of a written contract will not preclude a finding that there is a professional relationship.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied.

#41 Is a lawyer entitled to the full amount of fees even if dismissed by a client?

Section 26. Change of attorneys.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between
client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable
cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract.

Without Just Cause

→And no expresswrittenagreementastofeesreasonable value of his services up to thedateofhis

dismissal(quantummeruit)

→ And thefeestipulatediscontingent:
→ Ifdismissedbefore theconclusionoftheaction− reasonablevalue ofhisservices(quantummeruit)
→ If contingency occurs or clientpreventsitsoccurrence− fullamount
(Note: lawyer shouldquestion hisdischarge,otherwisehewillbeallowed torecover
onquantummeruitbasis.)

#42 CAMACHO vs CA

Facts:

Aurora Fe Camacho (Petitioner) and Respondent Atty. Angelino Banzon (Respondent) entered into
a contract for legal services under a written Contract of Attorney’s Fee. Indicated therein that Petitioner
shall pay Respondent 5,000 square meters of Lot. No. 261, in case he succeeds in negotiating with the
Municipality of Balanga in transferring the projected new public market. Eventually Lot No. 261 became the
site of the new public market. Meanwhile Silvestre Tuazon (Tuazon) the tenant of Lot.No 261 who
surrendered his tenancy refused to vacate the property and a civil case was filed against him. While the
case is pending petitioner terminated the services of respondent and retaining another counsel via a
manifestation in Civil Case No. 3512 . Respondent then filed a Complaint-in –Intervention in said civil case
against alleging that petitioner engaged his services. He alleged that Camacho had engaged his services
as counsel in CAR Case No. 59 B65 (where a favorable decision was rendered) and in Civil Case No.
3512. Under the Contract of Attorneys Fee which they had both signed, Camacho would compensate him
with a 5,000-sq-m portion of Lot 261 in case he succeeds in negotiating with the Municipality of Balanga in
transferring the projected new public market which had been set for construction at the Doa Francisca
Subdivision, all legal requirements having been approved by a municipal resolution, the Development Bank
of the Philippines, and the National Urban Planning Commission. Atty. Banzon further claimed that as a
consequence of the seven cases filed by/against Camacho, she further bound herself orally to give him a
1,000-sq-m portion of Lot 261 as attorneys fee. He had also acquired from Camacho by purchase an 80-
sq-m portion of the subject lot as evidenced by a Provisional Deed of Sale ]and from third parties an 800-
sq-m portion. He further declared that his requests for Camacho to deliver the portions of the subject lot
remained unheeded, and that of the seven cases he had handled for Camacho, four had been decided in
her favor while three are pending. Camacho opposed Atty. Banzon’s motion on the ground that the
admission of the complaint-in-intervention would merely serve to delay the case. She also claimed that his
interest could be fully ventilated in a separate case for recovery of property or for damages. On April 5,
1974, the RTC granted] the motion and subsequently admitted the complaint-in-intervention. On December
31, 1973, Atty. Banzon and Tuazon entered into an amicable settlement.

The CA held that all the elements of a valid contract were present: Camacho (a dentistry graduate and an
experienced businesswoman conversant in English) cannot plead that she did not understand the
undertaking she had entered into; the object of the contract is certain since the genus of the object was
expressed although there was no determination of the individual specie; and the cause of the obligation to
negotiate and offer a site where the public market will be constructed is not unlawful and cannot be
considered as influence peddling. As to the alleged violation of the terms of the special power of attorney,
the court held that Camacho was estopped from claiming damages by reason thereof.

The CA likewise found the award of moral damages to be in order; that the discharge of Atty. Banzon as
counsel for Camacho was not justified and his discharge does not in any way deprive him of his right to
attorneys fees. Lastly, the CA held that the RTC erred in requiring Camacho to deliver Lot 261-B-1, since
Atty. Banzon cannot demand a portion of superior quality in the same way that appellant cannot transfer an
inferior quality.
It must be understood that a retainer contract is the law that governs the relationship between a client and a
lawyer. Unless expressly stipulated, rendition of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or
compensation and is not gratuitous. Whether the lawyers services were solicited or they were offered to the
client for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must
consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, and thus gives
rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor. Lawyers
are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are
against abuses on the part of the counsel. The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a
proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fee .If lawyers are
entitled to fees even if there is no written contract, with more reason that they are entitled thereto if their
relationship is governed by a written contract of attorneys fee.

#43 DMCI vs NLRC

#44 BAUTISTA VS GONZALES

The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, on the 50%
contingent fee, provided that the respondent defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees is
contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should
be subject to reimbursement.

The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, do not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous. Such agreements are
against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his
own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The execution of these
contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must
incur administrative sanctions.

#45 If he files a assumpsit will he be paying a filing fee?

Anent docket fees, it has been held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of
the prescribed docket fee.

Although the rule has since been tempered, that is, there must be a clear showing that the party had
intended to evade payment and to cheat the courts, it does not excuse him from paying docket fees as
soon as it becomes apparent that docket fees are indeed payable.

In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's fees" was clearly in the nature of an action commenced by a
lawyer against his clients for attorney's fees.

In that event, the parties should have known, the respondent court in particular, that docket fees should
have been priorly paid before the court could lawfully act on the case, and decide it.

It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape
valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether separate or as an offshoot of a
pending proceeding, the payment of docket fees is mandatory.
#46 May an executor or administrator recover attorney’s fees for the services to the estate?

An administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as
such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such
compensation is in the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees. In
one case, The SC held that "a greater sum [other than that established by the rule] may be allowed 'in any
special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator.'" It is also left to the sound
discretion of the court.

#47 LACSON VS REYES

FACTS:
Atty. Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita
Farlin. He also petitioned the court in his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
executor under the will. The will was unopposed and the court issued a certificate of allowance. Later on,
Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a “motion for attorney's fees" against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs
had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the sum of P68,000.00. Thereafter summonses
were served upon the heirs "as if it were a complaint against said heirs" directing them to answer the
motion. Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the sum
agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.RTC Judge Reyes ordered the
heirs to pay Atty. Serquina. The heirs appealed but the court denied their notice of appeal for failure of the
heirs to file a record on appeal. Atty.Serquina then moved for execution, which was granted by Judge
Reyes.

ISSUES & HELD:

Whether or not Atty. Serquina should have paid docket fees before filing the "motion for attorney's
fees.”

Payment of docket fees is mandatory.

It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape
valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether separate or as an offshoot of a
pending proceeding, the payment of docket fees is mandatory. Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti,
that Atty. Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina,
should have paid the fees in question before the respondent court could validly try his "motion

The respondent court also gravely abused its discretion in awarding attorney's feescontrary to the
provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.GR:

Under Rule 85, Sec. 7 an attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will is barred from recovering
attorney's fees from the estate.
 An administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such,
but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a
compensation is in the nature of executor’s or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees.
Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge
the estate for his fees, but rather, his client.

Attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved. They are also subject
to certain standards, to wit:1. they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the
importance of the subject matter in controversy;2.the extent of the services rendered; and 3.the
professional standing of the lawyer. In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the
bare word of the parties. And always, they are subject to the moderating hand of the courts. The court held
that Atty. Serquina is entitled to P15,000.00 for his efforts on a quantum meruit basis.

#48 AZUCARERA vs CA

ATTORNEY’S FEES; MAY BE AWARDED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION; REASON THEREFOR

MUST BE STATED IN THE DECISION; CASE AT BAR. — On the matter of attorney’s fees, it is an
accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and
counsel’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.

The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of
the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees. It
is undeniable and evident that both the respondent appellate court and the trial court completely violated
the aforestated doctrinal rule.

In awarding attorney’s fees as damages, no justification therefor is advanced either in the decision
of the trial court or of respondent appellate court which affirmed the former. Even for this reason alone, the
award must be deleted and any advertence we would make herein to petitioner’s alleged bad faith or good
faith, as discussed in the exchanges of the parties but disregarded in the aforesaid decisions of both lower
courts, would be unnecessary and pointless.

#54

Nature of charging lien?

"(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money
judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the
instant case."

Where to file?

An enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main
case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. There is certainly no valid reason why the trial
court cannot pass upon a petition to determine attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be
activated. These decisional rules, however, apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable
under the rules.

Is it enforceable by a writ of execution?

The Court had the occasion to rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the
property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution."

#55

Pacific Mills vs CA

Whenever a government-owned and controlled corporation, or corporation the majority stock of which is
owned or controlled by the Government, or an instrumentality of the Government performing proprietary
functions, is awarded attorney's fees in a judicial proceeding handled by the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, one-half of said attorney's fees shall be paid directly to the General Fund

The Court considers that there is, as a matter of principle, no reason why a government-owned or -
controlled corporation, or any other government agency or entity for that matter, which is compelled to bring
suit against a private person or entity in order to protect its rights and interests, should not be granted an
award of attorney's fees, where such an award would be proper if the suit had been brought by a private
entity. While such a corporation, agency or entity may be represented by government lawyers, clearly,
costs are incurred either by the plaintiff-corporation or entity directly or by the general tax-paying public
indirectly, by reason of the default or other breach of contract or violation of law committed by the
defendant. Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, an award of attorney's fees is proper either because of a
contractual stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees or because of the existence of one or more of the
circumstances listed in Article 2208. In the instant case, the promissory notes on which Philcotton sued
contained, as already noted, a stipulation for payment of attorney's fees in case judicial enforcement
thereof became necessary. There can be no dispute that the petitioners' failure to comply with their
obligations under the promissory notes compelled Philcotton to resort to enforcement of its rights under
those notes through the judicial process. Finally, the reduction by the Court of Appeals of the attorney's
fees stipulated under the relevant promissory notes from twenty-five percent (25%) to ten percent (10%) of
the principal amount recoverable, appears to the Court to be more than reasonable.