PART 2

CASES: (Legal Philosophy)

NOTE: Case digests to be submitted on December 7, 2018. To enable you to have enough time, I
will not see you tonight November 23, 2018. Thank You.

1) Jose, Juan Jr.,Simeon, Rodolfo Cesar, Reynaldo, Alma and Elma all surnamed
Menchavez, G.R. No. 153201, January 26, 2005
Appellant enters a contract of lease with the respondent for a fish pond of
More than 10 Ha for 5 years . While still applying for Pres. Decree No. 704 (Lease
of fishponds-Public lands available for fishpond development). The fishpond dikes
constructed by the respondents were demolished by the RTC sheriffs and
transfer the possession to other parties .
As a consequence of these provisions, and the declared public policy of the State under the
Regalian Doctrine, the lease contract between Florentino Teves, Jr. and Juan Menchavez
Sr. and his family is a patent nullity. Being a patent nullity, [petitioners] could not give any
rights to Florentino Teves, Jr. under the principle: ‘NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET’ -
meaning ONE CANNOT GIVE WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE, considering that this property
in litigation belongs to the State and not to [petitioners]. Therefore, the first issue is resolved
in the negative, as the court declares the contract of lease as invalid and void ab-initio.

Why? Because the defendants ought to have known that they cannot lease what
does not belong to them for as a matter of fact, they themselves are still applying
for a lease of the same property under litigation from the government.

On the other hand, Florentino Teves, being fully aware that [petitioners were] not yet the
owner[s], had assumed the risks and under the principle of VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
NEQUES DOLUS - He who voluntarily assumes a risk, does not suffer damage[s] thereby.
As a consequence, when Teves leased the fishpond area from [petitioners]- who were mere
holders or possessors thereof, he took the risk that it may turn out later that his application
for lease may not be approved.
Avoid contract is deemed legally nonexistent. It produces no legal effect. As a
general rule, courts leave parties to such a contract as they are, because they are
in pari delicto or equally at fault. Neither party is entitled to legal protection.

2) Salandanan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127783, June 5, 1998

This case illustrates the application of the legal precept that the law aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non
dormientibus jura subverniunt.

On September 17, 1966, the probate court approved and declared as valid
the transfer of the petitioners shares to their co-heir, respondent Elvira Pandinco,
over the estate of Vicenta Alviar.
 On August 18, 1995, petitioners filed a "Motion To Reopen The Case and
Set Aside Partition with Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court
of Bian, Laguna (Branch XXV). The motion alleged inter alia that petitioners
never signed the project of partition or acknowledged the same before a notary
public; that they never appeared or testified before the probate court to affirm
their agreement to the partition; that they never sold their shares to Elvira
Pandinco( one of the daugthers of the testator); that while Catalina Salandanan
testified in the probate of the will, she did not testify regarding the sale; that they
never received any order from the court approving the project of partition and
the order finding valid and binding the transfer and sale of their shares to
respondent Elvira Pandinco; and that they came to know of the Order of
September 17, 1966 only in 1990 when they secured a copy thereof from the
court.

The motion was opposed by private respondents who are the heirs of Elvira
Pandinco.

There is no showing that movants ever filed a Petition for Review on Appeal of
the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated July 16,1960 dismissing the appeal on the
aforementioned first Order, or an Appeal on the second and third Orders,
thereby making the triple Orders final and executory since twenty nine (29)
years ago.

'It was only in August, 1995 or more than twenty nine (29) years from date of the
above-stated Court Orders that herein movants filed the subject Motion to
Reopen the above-entitled case, to Set Aside the project of partition which was
already implemented in the light of its finality and to NULLIFY the sales and/or
transfers to Elvira Pandinco.

'Jurisprudence on this matter is well-settled. Where a party sleeps on his rights

and allows laches to set in, the same is fatal to his case (Periquet, Jr. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 238 SCRA 697). Laches had been defined as the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it

3) Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Wenceslao Ortega,et.al. G.R.
No. L-33912, September 11, 1980
"Clearly then, there is no showing: that the Solicitor General or his Assistant, has
exercised powers not vested in him by law; that he has not committed any abuse
of discretion in appearing for respondent members of the [Surigao Mineral
 Reservation Board]; and for that reason the petition must fail."[5] The matter was
then elevated to this Court on a certiorari petition.
. In the brief for appellees,[7] in discussing the decisive legal question posed, the
Solicitor General quoted the first sentence of Section 1661 of the Revised
Administrative Code which reads as follows: "As principal law officer of the
Government, the Solicitor General shall have authority to act for and represent
the Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers, and agents in any official
investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer."[8] It is
his submission that by virtue of the above provision, the Solicitor General or his
assistants may "appear at preliminary investigation of respondent public officials
charged with violation of penal statutes for acts in connection with the
performance of their official duties. A preliminary investigation easily falls
within the meaning of the phrase 'official investigation, proceeding or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer.' An 'investigation' is an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning the matter or
matters involved. (Ballentine's Law Dictionary with Pronounciation, 1930 ed., p.
682, definition of 'investigate') A 'proceeding' is 'in its general acceptance, the
form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening
in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments
and of executing.' (Green v. Board of Commission of Lincoln County, 259 Pac.
Rep. 635). It is thus self-evident that preliminary investigation falls within the
ambit of 'official investigation' or 'proceeding.' There can also be no quarrel that
it is a 'matter requir-ing the services of a lawyer' for the purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that
an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that
a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial.' (Rule 112, Sec. 1
of the New Rules of Court) Furthermore, Section 1661 of the Revised
Administrative Code in specifying 'official investigation, pro-ceeding or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer' does not distinguish its nature or character,
i.e., whether civil or criminal. The only qualification is that it must require the
services of a lawyer. Hence, the conclusion is compelling that both criminal
and civil 'official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of
a lawyer' are embraced by the law. This is in line with the maxim, ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus."[9] There is persuasiveness to such a
formulation. The statutory authority of the Solicitor General is thus amply
demonstrated.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

4) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, et.al.,

G.R. No.138570
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general,
in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of
the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement,
valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the
general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of
treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to,
extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to
consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII
further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in
the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if
so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from

contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These
constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are
deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens
with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall not be
allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the
same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional
requirements.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United
States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant
case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of
section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision

or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where
there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one
which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in
the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general
enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language
which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.[26]

In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27] we enunciated:

x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general

legislation must give way to a special legislation on the same subject, and
generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),
that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120
SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil
Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38).

Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to

mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of
structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution
makes no distinction between transient and permanent. Certainly, we find
nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
 It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law,
the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos.

5) Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27,
2004

It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological

incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44
we expounded:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere

showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.

Ejusdem Generis:
Of the same kind, class, or nature.In statutory construction, the “ejusdem generis
rule” is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

6) Hon Alfredo S. Lim vs. Hon. Felipe G. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, Januauary 27,
1995
 DC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent
police power of the State.

The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers
of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex
(the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George
A. Malcolm stated thus:

The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection,

and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be
that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by
the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing
power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go
beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not
arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals
and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and
erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a
vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and
economic development.

PDNo. 771is valid and COnstitutional

7) Fabie vs. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486

n September 21, 1909 the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 124, which is an
amendedment of section107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila,
enacted June 13, 1908 relating to the issuance of permitsfor the erection of
buildings. Sec. 107 of the of the said ordinance provides: "That the building shall
abut or faceupon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has
been officially approved." Ramon Fabie, et al sought to obtain a building permit
authorizing the construction of a small
nipa
house uponthe their property which forms a part of
Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa in the City of
Manila. Theirapplication was denied on the ground that the site of the proposed
building did not conform to the requirementsof section 107.The appellees
contend that the provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the
fundamental rights of theproperty owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by
 the established laws of these Islands and by theConstitution of the United States,
in that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process
oflaw. The lower court ruled in their favor and declared the ordinance null and
void, at least to the extent of theabove-cited provision.
ISSUE: WON the Sec. 107 of the amended Ordinance No. 124 i con tit!tiona".
That i if the requirement set by the City Council of manila is valid
exercise of it police powers on behalf of the public
(E)*:
The court held that purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and
manifestly to protect and secure thehealth, lives and property of the citizens of
Manila against the ravages of fire and disease. The provision thatdenies permits
for the construction of buildings within the city limits unless they "about or
facing upon a publicstreet or alley or on a private street or alley which has been
officially approved," is in our opinion reasonablynecessary to secure the end in
view. There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of
the ordinance under discussion. It ismanifestly intended to subserve the public
health and safety of the citizens of Manila generally and was notconceived in
favor of any class or of particular individuals. Those charged with the public
welfare and safety ofthe city deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to
secure these purposes, and it cannot be doubtedthat if its enactment was
reasonably necessary to that end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the
policepower.The court opined that that the enforcement of its provisions cannot
fail to redound to the public good, and that itshould be sustained on the
principle that "the welfare of the people is the highest law" (salus populi
supremaest lex).We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question
directing: "That the building shall abut or face upon apublic street or alley which
has been officially approved," is valid, and that the judgment of the lower
courtshould be reversed, without special condemnation of costs

8) Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118231, July 5, 1986

Found rubber (Cannot be retrieved as evidence (DR. KHo) in the uterus that
cause the infection after a cesarian procedure

This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."

is a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that

prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
 In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First,
the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of
Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence
as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into
private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless
through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in
private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

9) Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. The Honorable Willelmo C.

Fortun, et.al., G.R. No. L-44959, April 15, 1987

On May 18, 1973, the policy being then in force, Soledad Saura, a waitress
employed by the Ongs in the discount Restaurant and covered by the policy,
died of illness. Her heirs filed against the Ongs and OIC a compensation claim
for her death with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 1 in Dagupan
City. That Office, through the Chief, Workmen's Compensation Unit, found that
Soledad had died from an illness contracted in the course of her employment,
and on July 23, 1974 handed down an award of P6,000.00 in favor of her heirs,
and P61.00 payable to the Workmen's Compensation Commission in fees. 3

OIC having refused, despite demand, to pay the amounts awarded, the Spouses
Ong sued it in the Court of First Instance to compel payment and to recover
moral damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly consequent upon that refusal
to pay. 4 OIC's answer alleged in the main that the complaint stated no cause of
action because the plaintiff's, the Ongs, had not yet paid the award to the
deceased employee's heirs, and hence had sustained no loss; and that when the
complaint was filed, OIC was already under receivership, with Pioneer In.
insurance and Surety Corporation (petitioner herein) as the statutory receiver,
appointed by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to the Insurance Code.

It is immediately evident, without having to distinguish, as petitioner does, between a

statutory receivership under the Insurance Code and one judicially instituted under Rule 59
of the Rules of Court, that the first error assigned by petitioner Pioneer is well taken. The fact
is that the event giving rise to the Ongs' claim against OIC the requirement by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission that they (the Ongs) pay death benefits to the heirs
of Soledad Saura-antedated the appointment of petitioner as OIC's receiver by almost a
 year. 9 Plainly then, petitioner was a complete stranger to this award of death benefits, or the
insurance contract insuring the Ongs' liability therefor, or any of the events giving rise to the
Ongs' claim against OIC. Petitioner cannot therefore be held liable upon such a claim, even
in a subsidiary capacity.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
hable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. 10

Since the amended judgment clearly makes petitioner liable, on its own account,
for the Ongs' claim under the policy issued to it by OIC in the event that the
latter fail to pay the same, it is to that extent erroneous and must be reversed.

10) Vicente Florentino vs. Mariano Cynthia, Adelfa, all surnamed Rivera et.al., G.R.
No. 167968, January 23, 2006

It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a
rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State
that there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the
hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause –
nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the
public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation
of the public tranquility and happiness.29

It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life
of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty
victory for the prevailing party.30 Litigation must end sometime and
somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once
a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts
should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
11) BGen. Jose Comendador et.al. vs. Gen. Renato S. De Villa, et.al.G.R. No. 93177;
August 2, 1991

The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took
place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14
by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that
peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge?

Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to
peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408 (Articles of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other
matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory
challenge.

January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the
termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying
these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge
in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule
embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and
now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle
is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

12) Pacsport Phils.Inc. vs. Niccolo Sports, Inc., G.R. No. 141602, November 22, 2001

On April 28, 1998, petitioner PPI and Niccolo Sports, Inc. (NSI),
respondent, entered into two (2) separate Exclusive Retail Agreements by virtue
of which petitioner supplied respondent, on consignment basis, assorted
Bridgestone and Cross Creek golf products to be sold by the latter in its outlet
 situated at the Second Level, Shangri-La Plaza Shopping Mall, Edsa corner Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong City.
Petitioner PPI claims that after months of operation, respondent's
obligations to it amounted to about P1.5 Million. Despite demand, respondent
failed to pay and eventually, it pre-terminated the contracts. This prompted
petitioner to file, on January 28, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 141,
Makati City, Civil Case No. 99-221 for damages with application for a writ of
replevin against respondent alleging
For its part, respondent NSI, on February 16, 1999, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 91, Quezon City, Civil Case No. Q-99-36797 for "Breach and
Confirmation of Termination of Contracts and Damages" against petitioner.
On January 29, 1999, respondent NSI, citing the pendency of the Quezon
City case, filed with the Makati RTC a motion to dismiss or suspend the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-221.

Thereupon, petitioner PPI also filed with the Quezon City RTC a motion
to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-99-36797 on the ground of pendency of the Makati
City case.

On April 20, 1999, the Makati RTC issued an order denying respondent's
motion to dismiss. In the same order, the Makati Court granted petitioner's
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied on May 6, 1999.

Meanwhile, the Quezon City RTC has not resolved petitioner's motion to
dismiss.
The CA ruled in that the Makati brach decision should be dismissed and Wait
for the decision in Quezon City Court. Because The Quezon City case involves a
broader scope of inquiry as it goes to the pith of the controversy, which is the pre-
termination of the agreement.

ISSUE: 1) Which of the two cases should be dismissed by reason of litis

pendentia - the Makati City case which was filed earlier or the Quezon City case
which was filed later; and

As to the first issue, the parties concede that the Makati City case and the Quezon City
case involve the same parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, being founded on
the same facts; and that judgment in one would constitute res judicata on the other.
Because of the concurrence of these similarities, petitioner and respondent sought the
abatement of each other's suit on the ground of litis pendentia.

The firmly established rule[1] is that one of two actions will be dismissed on ground of
litis pendentia if the following requisites concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2)
cases should be such that judgment in one would amount to res judicata in the other.

This Court held in several cases[2] that when the elements of litis pendentia exist, the
action filed later should be abated to avoid multiplicity of suits. This is based on the
maxim Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure (He who is before in time is the better in
right).

The Appellate Court did not explain why the Quezon City case is broader in scope than
the Makati case. In fact, it did not point out the issues in the Quezon City case that are
not involved in the Makati case. It bears stressing that the only basic issue between the
parties in both cases is whether the pre-termination of the agreements is valid as
claimed by respondent or invalid as claimed by petitioner. As crafted, the complaints
differ from each other in some details but such details are mere incidents to the basic
issue of the validity of the pre-termination of the exclusive retail agreements. Clearly,
the Quezon City RTC's deviation from the general rule can not be sustained on the
ground that the case before it involves a broader scope of inquiry.

13) Ramon Rallos, Administrator of the Estate of Concepcion Rallos vs. Felix Go
Chan & Sons Realty Corporation and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24332,
January 31, 1978

Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered co-
owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of
Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu.
On April 21, 1954, the sisters executed a special power of attorney in favor of
their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell for and in their behalf lot
5983. On March 3, 1955, Concepcion Rallos died. On September 12, 1955, Simeon
Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia in lot
5983 to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. The
deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Cebu, TCT No. 11118 was
cancelled, and a new transfer certificate of Title No. 12989 was issued in the
named of the vendee.

The petitioner is the administrator of the estate of conception.

Respondents defense is that they made the Purchase in good faith.
RTC rule in favor of rallos , CA Ruled in favor Feli GO
Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature. The
authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers granted to him by his
principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the
authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He who acts through another acts
himself".
 Paragraph 3 of Art. 1919 of the Civil Code
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished.

xxx xxx xxx

3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of

the agent; ... (Emphasis supplied)
Exception:
ART. 1931. Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the
principal or of any other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall
be fully effective with respect to third persons who may have contracted with
him in good. faith.

On the basis of the established knowledge of Simon Rallos concerning the death
of his principal Concepcion Rallos, Article 1931 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
The law expressly requires for its application lack of knowledge on the part of
the agent of the death of his principal; it is not enough that the third person acted
in good faith.
14) Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and then Governor Rene Espina
for reinstatement and backwages. 1 Herein petitioner, Raul H. Sesbreño, replaced
the employees' former counsel Atty. Catalino Pacquiao.They won in Trial Court.

A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties below in April 1979
whereby the former employees waived their right to reinstatement among
others. Likewise, pursuant to said compromise agreement, the Province of Cebu
released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through petitioner as "Partial
Satisfaction of Judgment." The amount represented back salaries, terminal leave
pay and gratuity pay due to the employees.

Sometime November and December 1979, ten employees, herein private

respondents, filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed
to pay petitioner 40% to be taken only from their back salaries.

The Trial Court awrded 60% then back to 50% after reconsideration.
Sebreno filed an appeal to CA
The appellate court noted that in this jurisdiction, attorney 's fees are always
subject to judicial control and deemed the award of 20% of the back salaries
awarded to private respondents as a fair, equitable and reasonable amount of
attorney's fee.
Courts may always ascertain, if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive,
what is reasonable under the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much
 as he deserves," is used as the basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees
in the absence of a contract. Factors such as the time spent and extent of services
rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the
subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the proffered case; customary charges for similar services;
amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client;
certainty of compensation; character of employment; and professional standing
of the lawyer, are considered in determining his fees

15) Leonardo Acabal and Ramon Nicolas vs. Villaner, Eduardo, Solomon,, Grace,
Melba, Evelyn, Armin, Ramil, and Byron all surnamed Acabal, G.R. No.
148376, March 31, 2005

In dispute is the exact nature of the document[3] which respondent Villaner

Acabal (Villaner) executed in favor of his godson-nephew-petitioner Leonardo
Acabal (Leonardo) on April 19, 1990.

Villaners parents, Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel of

land situated in Barrio Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, containing an area
of 18.15 hectares more or less, described in Tax Declaration No. 15856.[4] By a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971,[5] his parents transferred for P2,000.00
ownership of the said land to him, who was then married to Justiniana
Lipajan.[6]

Sometime after the foregoing transfer, it appears that Villaner became a

widower.

Subsequently, he executed on April 19, 1990 a deed[7] conveying the same

property[8] in favor of Leonardo.

Villaner was later to claim that while the April 19, 1990 document he executed
now appears to be a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly witnessed by a Bais City
trial court clerk Carmelo Cadalin and his wife Lacorte, what he signed was a
document captioned Lease Contract[9] (modeled after a July 1976 lease
agreement[10] he had previously executed with previous lessee, Maria Luisa
Montenegro[11]) wherein he leased for 3 years the property to Leonardo at
P1,000.00 per hectare[12] and which was witnessed by two women employees of
one Judge Villegas of Bais City.

Villaner thus filed on October 11, 1993 a complaint[13] before the Dumaguete
RTC against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed
the property, for annulment of the deeds of sale.
 RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner and CA ruled in Favor of Villaner
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations[32] ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum
per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit.[33] If he claims a right
granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.

In the case at bar, it was incumbent on the plaintiff-herein respondent Villaner to

prove that he was deceived into executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. Except for
his bare allegation that the transaction was one of lease, he failed to adduce
evidence in support thereof. His conjecture that perhaps those copies of the deed
of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin under the documents which I signed the
contract of lease,[36] must fail, for facts not conjectures decide cases.

As for Villaners argument that the sale of the property to Leonardo and the
subsequent sale thereof to Nicolas are void for being violative of the retention
limits imposed by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
It is thus gathered that the property was not suitable for agricultural purposes. In
any event, since the area devoted to the planting of sugarcane, hence, suitable for
agricultural purposes, comprises only 4 hectares at the most, it is less than the
maximum retention limit prescribed by law. There was then no violation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Even assuming that the disposition of the property by Villaner was contrary to law,
he would still have no remedy under the law as he and Leonardo were in pari delicto,
hence, he is not entitled to afirmative relief one who seeks equity and justice must
come to court with clean hands. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.
The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio.[67] No court
will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an
illegal act. If, from the plaintiffs own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to
arise ex turpi causa,[68] or the transgression of a positive law of this country,
there the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes;
not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a
plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and the defendant were to change sides, and the defendant
was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of
it; for where both are equally in fault potior est conditio defendentis.[

Thus, every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the co-
owned property and is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest except as
to purely personal rights. While a co-owner has the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, nevertheless, as a co-owner, he cannot
alienate the shares of his other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet.
 Villaner, however, sold the entire property without obtaining the consent of the
other co-owners. Following the well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do
so quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest[87] the
disposition affects only Villaners share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only
what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals February 15, 2001
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 56148 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is
rendered declaring the sale in favor of petitioner Leonardo Acabal and the subsequent
sale in favor of petitioner Ramon Nicolas valid but only insofar as five-ninths (5/9) of the
subject property is concerned.

16) Potenciana M. Evangelista vs. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 108135-36, August 14, 2000
The Information against petitioner and her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 14209
alleges in fine that they caused undue injury to the Government and gave
unwarranted benefits to Tanduay when they endorsed approval of the claim for tax
credit by preparing, signing and submitting false memoranda, certification and/or
official communications stating that Tanduay paid ad valorem taxes when it was not
liable for such because its products are distilled spirits on which specific taxes are
paid, by reason of which false memoranda, certification and/or official
communications the BIR approved the application for tax credit, thus defrauding the
Government of the sum of P107,087,394.80, representing the difference between the
amount claimed as tax credit and the amount of ad valorem taxes paid by Tanduay
to the BIR.[5] According to petitioner, instead of convicting her of the acts described
in the Information, she was convicted of issuing the certification without identifying
the kinds of tax for which the TNCs stand and without indicating whether Tanduay
was really entitled to tax credit or not.

Petitioners 1st Indorsement dated September 25, 1987 lists down the confirmation
receipts covering tax payments by Tanduay for the period January 1, 1986 to August 31,
1987, during which Tanduay alleges that it made erroneous ad valorem tax payments,
classified according to TNC numbers. The tax payments therein are described only as
falling under TNC No. 3011-0001, i.e., specific tax, and TNC No. 0000-0000, i.e.,
unclassified taxes. There are no tax payments classified as falling under TNC No. 3023-
2001, the code for ad valorem taxes. The import of this, simply, is that Tanduay did not
make any ad valorem tax payments during the said period and is, therefore, not entitled
to any tax credit.

Further, petitioner contends that she was convicted of a supposed crime not punishable
by law.[8] She was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
 It is well-settled that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation
of this constitutional right.[12] In the case at bar, we find merit in petitioners
contention that the acts for which she was convicted are different from those alleged
in the Information. More importantly, as we have discussed above, petitioners act of
issuing the certification did not constitute corrupt practices as defined in Section 3
(e) of R.A. 3019.
Employees of the BIR were expected to know what the TNCs stand for. If they do not,
there is a "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of Revenue Sources" which they can
consult. With this, petitioner should not be required to describe in words the kinds of
tax for which each TNC used stands for. Precisely, the purpose of introducing the use of
tax numeric codes in the Bureau was to do away with these descriptive words, in order
to expedite and facilitate communications among the different divisions therein. We
find that petitioners omission to indicate what kind of taxes TNC Nos. 3011-0001 and
0000-0000 stand for was not a criminal act. Applicable here is the familiar maxim in
criminal law: Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is no
law punishing it.

On the whole, therefore, we find that petitioner was not guilty of any criminal offense.
The prosecutions evidence failed to establish that petitioner committed the acts
described in the Information which constitute corrupt practices. Her conviction must,
therefore, be set aside. For conviction must rest no less than on hard evidence showing
that the accused, with moral certainty, is guilty of the crime charged. Short of these
constitutional mandate and statutory safeguard --- that a person is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved --- the Court is then left without discretion and is duty
bound to render a judgment of acquittal.

17) Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120652, February 11, 1998
A positive act of the gov’t is needed to reclassify land and until such
reclassification, property remains part of the forest reserve incapable of
alienation and cannot be acquired by prescription.

FACTS:
In 1973, the subject lot, a 407 sq. m. residential lot was the subject of an
application under the Land Registration Act by the Ramos bros. Eugenio de la
Cruz [petitioner] opposed. After trial, the application was dismissed on the
ground that the land was not yet reclassified and remains part of the forest
reserve. The Ramos bros. pursued the reclassification of the land and were
subsequently awarded ownership of it. Cristina Villanueva, the private
 respondent, subsequently purchased the same lot from the brothers. Upon
learning of the said sale, petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance claiming
ownership of the said land having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly,
notoriously and adversely against the whole world and in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years. His complaint was dismissed. The CA affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court thus the case at bar.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the residential lot to
which he possessed and devoted time, effort and resources

HELD: NO
Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it was declared by the Gov’t as
part of the forest zone. Forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into
private property.
A positive act by the government is needed to declassify land and to convert it to
alienable or disposable land. And until such declassification, there is no
disposable land to speak of.

Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which iterate that forest lands or
forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property.[15] Possession of the
residential lot by petitioner, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never
ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim
(d)ura lex, sed lex

18) Wright vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for

indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed against him
which ordered the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the
Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came herein by way of review on certiorari,
to set aside the order of deportation, contending that the provision of the Treaty
giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law
which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Can extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

RULING:

NO. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of
retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes.

As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are

1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an
offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses,
aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater
punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of
evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant.

“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition
applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the
accused.” This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention
that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application
with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force and
effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. “It merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which
offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty
was ratified.”