Hungary vs Slovakia

Facts:
 Hungary and Slovakia signed a treaty concerning the construction and operation of the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of locks (The 1977 Treaty). It provides for the construction and operation
of a system of locks designed to utilize the natural resources of the Bratislava-Budapest section of the
Danube river for the development of water resources, energy, transport, agriculture and other sectors of
national economy of the contracting parties.

 The joint investment was essentially aimed at the production of hydroelectricity, improvement of
navigation on the section of Danube and the protection of the areas along the banks against flooding.

 The 1977 treaty provides for the building of two series (one at Gacikovo in Czechoslovak territory, and the
other at Nagymaros in Hungarian territory) of locks to constitute a single and indivisible operational
system of works.Technical specifications for the construction and financing and management of the
works on a joint basis to be participated by the parties equally were included in the “Joint Contractual
Plan”.

 The schedule of work was fixed at the same time as the Treaty itself, on 1978.

 On Hungary’s initiative, agreed by the two parties, on 1983, they agreed to slow the work down and to
postpone putting into operation the power plants, and then on 1989 to accelerate the project.

 However, in 1989, the Hungarian Government decided to suspend the works at Nagymaros and later on
decided to abandon the works and to maintain status quo at Dunakitili.

 Negotiations took place between the parties. Czechoslovakia started investigating for alternative
solutions and then came up with the so called “Variant C”, entailed a unilateral diversion of the Danube
by Czech on its territory 10km upstream of Dunakiliti and the construction of an overflow dam at the
Cunovo.

 In 1991, the Slovak Govt decided to begin construction and put the Gabcikovo project into operation by
the provisional solution.

 In 1992, the Hungarian Govt. Transmitted to the Czechoslovak Govt a Note Verbale terminating the 1977
Treaty but Czechoslovakia began work and proceeded to the damming of the river.
First Issue: Whether the Republic of Hungary was entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon the works in
Nagymaros Project which the Treaty attributed responsibility to the Republice of Hungary?

 Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon the works. There was no “State of
Necessity” which would have permitted Hungary, without incurring international responsibility, to
suspend and abandon works that it was committed to perform. The state of necessity is a ground
recognized by customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity
with the international obligation.

Conditions in applying:
Article 33 of the Draft Article on the International Responsibility of States by the International
Law Commission:
(1) It must have been occasioned by an “essential interest”of the State which is the author of the
act conflicting with one of its international obligations
(2) That interest must have been threatened by a “grave and imminent peril”
(3) The act being challenged must have been the “only means” of safeguarding that interest
(4) That act must have not have “seriously impaired an essential interest of the State towards
which the obligation existed
(5) And the State which is the author of the act must not have “contributed to the occurrence of
the sate of necessity

 Hungary claimes that they were concerned for its natural environment in the region affected by the
project relates to an “essential interest” of the State. The Court however viewed that the perils invoked
by Hungary were not sufficiently established nor were they “imminent”; and that Hungary had available
to it the means of responding to those perils other than suspending and abandoning the works.

Second Issue: Whether the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was entitled to proceed to the “provisional
solution” and to put into operation the system?

 Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed the “Variant C”insofar as it then confined itself to undertake the
works but NOT ENTITLED to put that Variant into operation.
 The basic characteristic of the the 1977 Treaty as a joint investment constitute a SINGLE and INDIVISIBLE
operational system of works. By then, all this could not be carried out by unilateral action. The Variant C,
although similar to the original project still differed sharply from its legal characteristics.
 The Czech, in putting Variant C into operation, was not applying the 1977 Treaty and violated certain
provision committing an internationally wrongful act.

Third Issue: What are the legal effects of the notification of the termination of the Treaty by the Republic of
Hungary?

 Hungary raised 5 grounds invoking the lawfulness and effectiveness of its notification and termination:

(1) State of Necessity: not a ground for the termination of a treaty. ONLY to be invoked to exonerate
responsibility a State which has failed to implement a treaty.

(2) Impossibility of Performance: particular Articles of the 1977 Treaty made available to the parties the
necessary means to proceed, by negotiation, to the required readjustments between economic and ecological
imperatives.

(3) Fundamental change of circumstances: The prevalent political conditions were no so closely linked to
the object and purpose of the Treaty that they constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties in
changing, radically altered the extent of the obligations still to be performed.

(4) Material Breach of the Treaty: No breach of of the Treaty by Czechoslovakia for the notification of the
termination by Hungary was premature consequently Hungary was not entitled to invoke any such breach as
a ground for terminating.

(5) Development of new norms of International Environment Law: infinitesimal

Reservations to the Convention on Genocide

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A reservation to the U.N. Convention on Genocide may be effected by a state and still
be considered a signatory thereto.

Facts. The convention on Genocide was unanimously adopted by the United Nations in 1951. Several states
made reservations to one or more of its provisions. An opinion as to whether a party could express reservations
and still be considered a signatory was laid before the International Court of Justice.
Issue. May a reservation to the U.N. Convention on Genocide be made by a state and still be considered a
signatory thereto?

Held. Yes. A reservation to the U.N. Convention on Genocide may be effected by a state and still be considered
a signatory thereto. In a multilateral treaty, as long as the reservation does not defeat the purpose of the treaty, a
reservation is permitted. By virtue of its sovereignty, it has been argued that a state may effect any reservation. In
this case, the validity of each reservation must be examined on a case-by-case basis since numerous reservations
were made by different states. (The court held that the state objecting to a reservation could if it desired, consider
the reserving state not to be a party to the Convention.

Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Whenever reference is been made to general principles of law in the international
arbitration context, it is always held to be a sufficient criterion for the internationalization of a contract.

Facts. A decree to nationalize all Texaco’s (P) rights, interest and property in Libya was promulgated by Libya
(D). This action of the Libyan Government led Texaco (P) to request for arbitration, but it was refused by Libya
(D). A sole arbitrator was however appointed by the International Court of Justice on Texaco’s request, and Libya
(D) was found to have breached its obligations under the Deeds of Concessions and was also legally bound to
perform in accordance with their terms.

Issue. Whenever reference is being made to general principles of law in the International arbitration context, can
this be held to be a sufficient criterion for the internationalization of a contract?

Held. Yes. Whenever reference is been made to general principles of law in the international arbitration context,
it is always held to be a sufficient criterion for the internationalization of a contract. The lack of adequate law in
the state considered and the need to protect the private contracting party against unilateral and abrupt
modifications of law in the contracting state is a justification to the recourse to general principles. Though
international law involves subjects of a diversified nature, legal international capacity is not solely attributable to
a state. A private contracting party, unlike a state, has only a limited capacity and is limited to invoke only those
rights that he derives from his contract.

Abbas v. COMELEC
Facts. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the
following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary
to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such
region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that “[t]here is
hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting
favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.”
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute,
such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Held. Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall compromise it.

It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote
in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they
could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose.”
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in
individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as
in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the
plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the
Constitution.

GUERRERO'S TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. vs.

BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION

FACTS. In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the
right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding was won by
Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion
Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport Services
Blayblock. Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).

When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed
a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the
RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerrero’s MTD on jurisdictional grounds,
there being no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the
case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to “absorb all complainants who filed their
applications on or before the deadline” set by Guerrero, except those who may have derogatory records w/ the US
Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.

Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC
Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who failed to submit
themselves for processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The
Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasn’t appealed so it was declared final &
executory

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor
the determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final.
The agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the
absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.

ISSUE

Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero.

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/
military requirements, "to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out,
the US Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected
employees for employment.

A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement between states, and as municipal law for the people of
each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the treaty enters into and forms part
of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new
contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the employment of the qualified employees of the
previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the
aforementioned Compromise Agreement.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who
of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such determination shall be
considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de
los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's Transport Services, subject to the
following conditions:

a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its concession expired;
and
b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base
concerned.

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval
Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the members of the Union.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the force and
effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is settled that a
compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon
approval by the court.

AGUSTIN V. EDU

FACTS. Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early
warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing
rules and regulations of the said instruction.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve
as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as
well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission,"
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set
of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part
of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."
This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without
appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the
Philippine Government under PD 207.

ISSUE. WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.

HELD. NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful
delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this
case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which
it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said
Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .
The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the
principle of international morality.
Petition dismissed.

Pimentel vs Executive Secretary

Facts. This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to require
the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International
Criminal Court for the Senate’s concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function
of the Senate. That under the treaty law and customary international law, Philippines has a ministerial duty to
ratify the Rome Statute. Respondents on the other hand, questioned the legal standing of herein petitioners and
argued that executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

Issue. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit. Whether or not the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by the Philippine Member to the United Nations even without the signature of the
President.
Ruling. Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power as member of Congress. Other
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct injury from the non-transmittal and that they can seek
redress in our domestic courts.
Petitioners’ interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not belong
to the Senate. Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the ratification papers and
forward the signed copy to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the
same to the Senate for concurrence. The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that
“no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.” The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty
-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. It
should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the President subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify a treaty. The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that
binds the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective. Senate is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is within the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence
of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus, Thus, the petition is
DISMISSED.