1. G.R. No.

97239 May 12, 1993

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a
crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the Philippine
government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal
character. In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI
Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:

C. Conviction and Previous Separation

l. . . .

2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude may
be dismissed from the service.1

On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna.

On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the criminal
case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on January 9,
1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's
application for separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess. 2

On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating,
however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b)
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.

On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was
confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who
"may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine
Labor Code.3

On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign
from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide.

On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office
found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess desirable social
antecedents in his life."4

On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI.

On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted
involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of
the Institute's Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987
arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral
turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation,
which the trial court granted to him.
On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who recommended to the
Director General, his continued employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa
that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa
illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby entered:

1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;

2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant Nestor B.

Micosa to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appurtenant,
thereto immediately upon receipt hereof;

3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant Nestor B.

Micosa his full backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to actual
reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.

4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay complainant's counsel the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's fees; and.

5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the findings and
conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31, 1991, it affirmed the appealed
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification deleting the award of
attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.6

Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues:

1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER
CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE OF THE
LABOR CODE.

2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE
CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.7

The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving
moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment
Policy Regulations.

In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning
employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner justifies
its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's interests — in his employment and means
of livelihood — are adversely affected; that a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that he
should be given the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow citizens but claims that at times, one's
right is deemed superior than that of another. In this case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to
maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any internal problem hampering operations but
also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur considering that it is an
international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating disturbance or
give occasion for such disturbance.

It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's
Director General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as
defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code." 8 Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his
job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an
employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes.
Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach
by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative under Article
282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him
absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the
breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee's function. 9 On the other hand, the
commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes
must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article 282. Clearly
lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex,
having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction
of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was
not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of
its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It
did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he
posed a clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that
Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was involved in any incident
similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the
IRRI's Director General expressed his confidence in him when he disapproved his application for special
separation in a letter dated January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to
the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a letter dated February
1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying that they were mere pro-
forma communications which it had given to numerous other workers. But whether or not such letters were
"form letters, they expressed the message that were meant to be conveyed,i.e., that Micosa is fit for continued
employment. In addition, the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of
Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his conviction showing that the very employees which
IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing their very own lives in danger with Micosa's
retention.

Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of
probation. This means that all the information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as his
mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it was
found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation
and that his being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.

In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination. Certainly, said
termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis as well.

Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of his
conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual mentions
of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that
conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to
this view.
Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa11 and Tak Ng v. Republic12 as everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to

determine.13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense
from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is
conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa
stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that Micosa
was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim
then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket
of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had
stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to
defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and
intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. 14 Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances.15While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by classifying a crime as malum in seor as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala
in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only.16 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term,
the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations
Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed.
For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of
the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common traditions. 17 The abuse of
discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically.18

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 2. A.C. No. 6968 August 9, 2006

ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Respondent. ATTY. MARICHU C.
LAMBINO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating
student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew
the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).

Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations
Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP
Security Force on December 12, 1994.

As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in
the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal
Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizons move, however,
he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest.

Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office
of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latters
claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.

The suspects lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what
appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go
back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following
morning.

The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.

Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
docketed as CBD Case No. 346.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with
Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of
P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenses.

Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule
8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.
 The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as follows:

1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the
group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD
Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she acted within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights of the
students in accordance with the schools substitute parental authority and within the bounds of the law as the
NBI agents had no warrants of arrest.

With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in recklessly tr[ying] to arrest the suspects without
warrant.

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and approved the
Commissioners Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution, together with the
records of the cases which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006.

As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons of Professional
Ethics in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon.

When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor
Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court addressing in the negative
the two issues raised therein, to wit:

(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly
made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner
for violation of P.D. No. 1829. x x x,[1]

held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation
of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional, [2]they having a right to prevent the arrest [of
the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.[3]

Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the suspects to
Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizons administrative complaint
against her must then be dismissed.

Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that [f]or
the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements, . . . their attempt
to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a warrant was illegal. [4]

In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the
NBI to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own
initiative and as public interest may require[5] and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section
does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly qualifies the power to
make arrests to be in accordance with existing laws and rules.

Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers,
and as such have the following powers:

(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules.[6]

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule
1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

xxxx

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).

WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED.

Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the National Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Justice.

SO ORDERED.
 3. A.C. No. 6296 November 22, 2005 ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant, vs.

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:

Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva
Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial
chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over
a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled,
complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San
Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5,
2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the
latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the
response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a
lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered
that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that
respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos
Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her complaint: [2]

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the
complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that [complainants
brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . .
returned to the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached
as Annex A

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the
assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent]
averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only her statements
were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent]
wanted to be put on record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay dated
December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a
copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket added.)
 In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed the
respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be
considered as in default.[3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who
admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in
default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4]

In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of
the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio
Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this
premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan
pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but
only as an attorney-in-fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated that the charge of complainant has
been established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that basis, recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of
Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating
commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235, [6] a lighter penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits
the presence and representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang

pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the
counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the
personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the
facts and issues,[8] the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no
quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves
without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate
and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills
and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
 The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be
sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since
complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded
to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with
the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the
barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section
412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall
go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what
happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the
conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that
respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended
penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine
the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was when
respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay
conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that
commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 4. G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T.
SANTOS, SECRETARY, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his
profession while employed in the Government.

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989,
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for
oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required
by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case
against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil
cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 which provides:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38

TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS, KLGCD REGIONAL

DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON SANGGUNIAN

SESSIONS, PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local Government
Personnel Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to
amend said Memorandum Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of
Circular No. 9-A.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Practice of Profession

The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter alia that
"members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not
keep regular office hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial board or
the city or municipal council" and that provincial board members are not even required "to have
an office in the provincial building." Consequently, they are not therefore to required to report
daily as other regular government employees do, except when they are delegated to perform
certain administrative functions in the interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as
the case may be. For this reason, they may, therefore, be allowed to practice their professions
provided that in so doing an authority . . . first be secured from the Regional Directors pursuant
to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58, provided, however, that no government personnel,
property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their professions. While being
authorized to practice their professions, they should as much as possible attend regularly any
and all sessions, which are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which they were elected as
members by their constituents except in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon
to save a life. For this purpose it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the
 sessions, regular or special of their Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the
case of lawyers and Sanggunian sessions can be avoided.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall always
be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the
practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a
body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis
ours, pp. 28-30, Rollo.)

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant,
Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law
for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:

1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990

Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated
September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons therein
stated, with this information that, as represented and consistent with law, we interpose no
objection thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions.

LUIS T.
SANTO
S
Secret
ary.

(p. 60, Rollo.)

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth
guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials as follows:

TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional Directors and
All Concerned.

SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local Elective Officials

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees), states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public officials . . . and are hereby declared to be unlawful: . . . (b) Public
Officials . . . during their incumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4,
1986, the authority to grant any permission, to accept private employment in any capacity and
to exercise profession, to any government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry
(Department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules, which provides, in part, that:
 No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . . without a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, that this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers . . . whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office should be fixed
by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in anyway the
efficiency of the officer or employee . . . subject to any additional conditions
which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the
interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service
Commission.

Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant of
permission to the practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment of local
elective officials, to wit:

1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;

2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and

responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
government in conformity with Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local
Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to engage in the practice of their
profession and to accept private employment during their incumbency:

3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession or

engage in private employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the
Secretary of Local Government, subject to existing laws and to the following
conditions:

a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed

by the local chief executive concerned to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officials concerned;

b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be

utilized in the pursuit of one's profession or private employment;

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession

or engagement in private employment and the official duties of
the concerned official shall arise thereby;

d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems necessary to

impose on each particular case, in the interest of public service.
(Emphasis supplied, pp. 31-32, Rollo.)

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground
mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme
Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.

Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law,
Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.
 (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of
the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana thereupon filed
this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the
new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because:

(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.

(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only
sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while
dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec.
90 [b-1]).

In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner submitted a Reply. After
deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative
authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction
(Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to
the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of
their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office
is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which
petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting
them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in
the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor
the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law.
The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for
public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides
that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of
all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public
service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 5. Adm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent
Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a
false marriage contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications
from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National Statistics Office (NSO) [3] prove that no record of marriage
exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates
of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the birth certificates of their two
other children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio, [7] another date and place of marriage are indicated,
namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination
to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent
would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality
of Councilor Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1)
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her;
and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka
lang to deter them from divulging respondents illegal activities and transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she
declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City. [8] Her
husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the dissemination
of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who
caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers
who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondents
good name and reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business Name.[9] Hence, she
has no partners in her law office.As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the
Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. [10] The respondent
likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get
even with her. She terminated complainants employment after receiving numerous complaints that the
complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing their passports and
marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically
motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this
complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she
had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then
prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a Reply
to respondents Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed
that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct testimonies
of the parties and the affiants.[11]

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal practice
of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the name of
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification
card[13]signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr. She added that respondents husband even appeared in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor
allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in
court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false
reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when
confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named
as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[14]

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in
Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late
registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by
the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth
certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight. [15]

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this
disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice
of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of
Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 20734, whereinFelicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the
private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San
Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification
consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for six months with
a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted with
modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed
by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant

does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether,
on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not substantiated.
In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing evidence.
[17]
With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when the
criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
 Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer
for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a lawyer
may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
[19]
Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the
respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that
the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior
partners because they have investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent assisted
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card
stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the
Group.

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of
the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. [21]

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorios record as attorney in this Court
and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

6. A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law

Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to

transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and expeditious collection on

their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that

Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents

services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said

calling card.[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, [9] found that

respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other

canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting

cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules of

Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any

repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended

penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional

practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said

misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers

services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,
FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers

should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his

talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and

impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY
TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid

agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY
SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,

personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure to protect the community from

barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons

coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business

as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the

mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to

transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable

result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon

3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal

another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or

reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in

his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection

to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot

escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule

16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest

of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of

stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his

judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling

as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in

connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or

an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own

recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the

verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause. [24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for the exercise of the

Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating

contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. [26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to

uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending

money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The

proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a

well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.
[27]
For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or

use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to

entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their

legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of

their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar

and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his

culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the

printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3

of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of

this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt

with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of

the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court

Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
PART III. 1. A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine
Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total
stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over
the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00;
(b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for
the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3)
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt
of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks
which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a
fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant
in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in
addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as
follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic)
which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law
and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the
Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a
Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and
declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of
the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found
that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal
instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower
court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits
at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause
damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals
or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further
action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws
of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg.
22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded
to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
2. A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007

ROSA YAP-PARAS, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment [1] dated April 11, 2005, filed by
herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latters
alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion
alleges:

4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of
law and in fact filed pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the
ground that the alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or
interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal, and prays that for his violation
of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and be
disbarred.

Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:

On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition [2] praying for the
disbarment of her estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit,
malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer
committed by the latter.

On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution [3] finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus,
the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18,
2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.[4]

During the pendency of Atty. Paras motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with
the Court the instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia,
that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his continued
practice of law.

In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,[5] denying for lack of merit Atty.
Paras motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Acting
on the respondents motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the
resolution of February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.

The Court further Resolves to NOTE:

 a. the complainants opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for
reconsideration with leave of Court;

b. the respondents motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the
motion for reconsideration; and

c. the complainants motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11,
2005, praying that respondent be declared in contempt of court and
ordered disbarred and to REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon,
within ten (10) days from notice.

In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-movants
Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment.

After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a
Manifestation[6], stating that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received the denial
resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.
It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or
Disbarment, the Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty.
Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for such failure and to
comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.

Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File
Required Comment[7] was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movants
Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never done nor
made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the pertinent
causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer
disbarment or to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Courts resolutions.

In a number of cases,[8] we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of
disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is
rather intended to protect the courts and the public from members of the bar who have
become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession.Likewise, the
purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the
court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible
for the orderly administration of justice.

We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movants allegation that Atty. Paras violated
the Courts suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to
inform the lower courts of his one- year suspension from law practice.[9]
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme
Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the
orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are
themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme
Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.[10] Court orders are to be respected not because the justices or
judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that
should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our
government is to be a government of laws and not of men. [11]

Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his
obligation to follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court
contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to his deteriorating health condition which
required him to undergo a coronary angiogram and bypass graft [12]. He likewise expressed
his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the
Courts order.

Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as
well petitioner-movants counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of
administrative cases against each other. An examination of the records reveals a pervasive
atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioners counsels as evidenced by the
number of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and
unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession
and will not receive sympathy from this Court. [13] Lawyers should treat each other with
courtesy, fairness, candor and civility.[14]

All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras
failure to promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present
case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so
much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering
the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. [15]
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo
Paras is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not
promptly complying with this Courts resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic
punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the same act.

SO ORDERED.
3. A.M. No. CA-03-35 July 24, 2003

ATTY. ROSALIO DE LA ROSA, complainant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES JOSE L. SABIO, JR., PERLITA TRIA-
TIRONA, OSWALDO AGCAOILI, MARIANO DEL CASTILLO, MeTC JUDGE EUGENIO MENDINUETO, ATTYS.
GILBERT REYES, DEOGRACIAS FELLONE and ANTONIO HERNANDEZ, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On August 14, 2002, a letter-complaint1 addressed to the Chief Justice was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator, charging respondents with deliberately causing the delay of the prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 59354 for Estafa entitled, "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Ferdinand Santos, Robert John
Sobrepeña, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon, and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr., Accused" pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 72. Complainant is the private prosecutor in the said criminal
case.

During the preliminary investigation of the case, the City Prosecutor of Pasig City dismissed the complaint for
estafa on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. On appeal to the Secretary of Justice, the said Resolution
was set aside and the City Prosecutor of Pasig City was directed to file the necessary Information for Estafa
under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code against the five accused. 2 The case was raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 72, presided by respondent Judge Eugenio C. Mendinueto.

Accused Polo S. Pantaleon and Federico O. Campos filed a "Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause".3On the other hand, accused Ferdinand Santos, Robert John Sobrepeña, and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr.
filed a "Petition for Review with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction" before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.

Meanwhile, a hearing was conducted by the trial court to determine the existence of probable cause. It
appeared from the evidence presented therein that accused Pantaleon and Campos were not connected with
the Fil-Estate Properties Properties, Inc. when the transaction complained of occurred. Consequently, the
criminal case against them was dismissed.4 As to the other three accused, respondent Judge suspended the
proceedings pending the outcome of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.

On November 8, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through the Special Sixteenth Division, composed of respondent
Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Perlita J. Tirona and Mariano C. Del Castillo, issued a Temporary Restraining
Order directing the trial court and the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to refrain from conducting any further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 59354 until further orders. 5 The Court of Appeals further directed
complainant to file his comment to the petition for review. Instead of filing the required comment,
complainant filed a motion to quash the Temporary Restraining Order. 6 The three accused (petitioners therein),
through their respective counsel, respondent Attys. Gilbert Reyes, Deogracias Fellone and Antonio Hernandez,
filed written oppositions to the motion.7

Meanwhile, the Temporary Restraining Order expired after the period of sixty days without a writ of
preliminary injunction being issued. Hence, complainant filed with the trial court a "Motion to Commence
Proceedings", which was denied on the ground that it would be practical as well as procedurally appropriate to
await the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in order to avoid the possibility of conflicting resolutions.
The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was likewise denied. 8

On September 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals, through its Fourteenth Division, denied due course and dismissed
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.9

Thus, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.,
Oswaldo Agcaoili, Perlita Tria-Tirona and Mariano Del Castillo for ignorance of the law and inexcusable
negligence when they issued the Temporary Restraining Order without basis. Complainant alleged that
respondent Justices deliberately delayed the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354 by issuing the Temporary
Restraining Order despite the fact that respondent Judge Mendinueto was mandated by the Constitution and
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to act within ten days from receipt of the Information; and that
respondent Justices failed to resolve the Motion to Quash despite the lapse of more than ten months.
Complainant further charged that respondent Judge was likewise guilty of deliberately delaying Criminal Case
No. 59354, when he refused to commence proceedings despite the lapse of the Temporary Restraining Order.
Complainant also charged respondent lawyers, Attys. Gilbert Reyes, Deogracias Fellone and Antonio
Hernandez, for having masterminded the scheme to frustrate the prosecution of the case against their three
clients through the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals.

In their joint comment10 filed on October 1, 2002, respondent Justices Sabio, Tria-Tirona, Del Castillo and
Agcaoili denied that there was delay in the disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. They alleged that the petition
was resolved relatively early considering the pendency of other cases of equal importance and the heavy
caseload of the Justices concerned. Specifically, the petition, which was filed on October 26, 2001, was
resolved on September 2, 2002. In addition, respondent Justice Sabio, to whom CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 was
raffled, was designated by the Presiding Justice, together with other Court of Appeals Justices, to help expedite
the disposition of cases of "1997 and below" vintage under the Zero Backlog Project of the Court of Appeals.

In his comment11 filed on October 7, 2002, respondent Judge Mendinueto explained that he refused to
proceed with Criminal Case No. 59354 notwithstanding the lapse of the sixty-day effectivity of the Temporary
Restraining Order in deference to the final outcome of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 and in order to avoid the absurd
possibility of two conflicting resolutions by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

In their joint comment,12 respondent lawyers averred that their filing of the petition before the appellate court
was a legitimate move to protect the interests of their clients. They contended that while the Secretary of
Justice is not among the quasi-judicial agencies whose orders or judgments may be the subject of a petition for
review, the enumeration in Rule 43, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is not exclusive, as held in the case of
Carpio v. Sulu Resources Development Corporation.13 They further alleged that any error in the remedy they
chose did not render them administratively liable considering that they did not act in bad faith.

After several exchanges of various pleadings between complainant and the three-lawyer respondents, 14 the
Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation.15 However, considering that some of the respondents are incumbent Justices of the Court of
Appeals, the case was subsequently referred to Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant of the Office of
the Court Administrator,16pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14017 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-
8-10-SC, dated September 11, 2001.

On June 5, 2003, Justice Quimbo submitted his report with the recommendation that the administrative case
against all the respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Investigating Justice found that respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals did not commit error in
requiring complainant (respondent therein) to comment and in granting the prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order so as not to frustrate or prejudice whatever action the said court may take relative to the petition. While
the petition was eventually dismissed on the ground that Rule 43 was inapplicable, respondent Justices cannot
be held administratively liable for not dismissing the petition outright since such omission did not amount to a
flagrant disregard of the facts, jurisprudence and applicable law. Likewise, there is no showing that respondent
Justices knowingly issued an unjust and baseless Temporary Restraining Order. Moreover, the length of time
the petition remained pending before the Court of Appeals was justified by the heavy caseload of the Justices
concerned.

Similarly, there were no grounds to impose administrative sanctions on respondent Judge Eugenio C.
Mendinueto. His decision to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case even after the expiration of the
Temporary Restraining Order showed a becoming modesty and deference to a higher court. There was also no
showing that respondent Judge connived and confederated to frustrate justice in said criminal case.

In the same way, the complaint against respondent lawyers was found to be unsubstantiated. There was no
evidence that they misused the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice; or that they deliberately
delayed the case, impeded the execution of a judgment, or misused court processes. Rather, the action of the
three respondent lawyers was well within the bounds of the fair and honorable conduct referred to in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Justice, however, took note of the allusion by complainant in his pleadings to the three
respondent lawyers as "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen" or "sages," which he said amounted to sarcasm.

We agree with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.

No evidence was presented to show that all the respondents, either individually or collectively, adopted a
schematic plan to delay the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354. Apparently, the conspiracy theory
advanced by complainant was formulated after the respondent Justices granted the Temporary Restraining
Order and required complainant to comment on the petition filed by the three respondent lawyers, instead of
dismissing the petition outright.

As held in the recent case of Sacmar v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 18 a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust and
baseless order will prosper, only if it is shown that the issuance of the order was indeed unjust and the
respondents did not merely commit an error of judgment or took the unpopular side of a controversial point of
law. Their failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render them administratively liable.19 Magistrates are not expected to be infallible in their
judgments.

In the case at bar, the records fail to show that the respondent Justices and respondent Judge were guilty of
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or, at the very least, bad faith. To merit disciplinary action from this Court, there
should be a showing that the complained judicial acts of respondent Judge, more so of respondent Justices of
the Court of Appeals, were attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.20 There being none, there is
no cogent ground to hold them administratively liable.

Furthermore, the legal remedy taken by respondent lawyers, which was later found to be erroneous, does not
constitute proof that they deliberately and knowingly intended to forestall the hearing of Criminal Case No.
59354. There was no evidence that they have overstepped the norms of their Lawyer’s Oath in advocating the
interest of their clients. To be sure, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires them to
represent their clients with zeal within the bounds of law. Accordingly, in the judicial forum, their clients were
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and the
three respondent lawyers were expected to avail of such remedy or defense. Indeed, complainant failed to
show adequate proof that the three respondent lawyers deliberately and knowingly "hatched a scheme and
toyed with the law"21 when they filed the said petition before the Court of Appeals.

It bears stressing that it is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues.22 As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to conduct themselves honorably,
fairly and candidly toward each other. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. Obviously, complainant’s use of
sarcasm in calling the three respondent lawyers "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen" and "sages" fell short of
this mandate. It served no useful purpose. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions have no
place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition
that must at no time be lost to it.23

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the complaint against all the respondents is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

4. A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s
attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate
floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,

debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of
her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring
out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred
that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which,
after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination.
She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court,
like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the
Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected
from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense."1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to
the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives. 2

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of
the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its
citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of
the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. 5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used
in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she
wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and
calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that
she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international
law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator
Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers
of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice.7Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on
the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We
quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,

debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal
anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks
were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be
allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity
is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and
offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust
act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC
functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as
the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position
of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate
assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec.
5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that
the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults
that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;

xxxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of
the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote
in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney’s
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice."13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a
lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, 15 a good character being an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them. 16

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice,
attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or,
worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator
Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in
Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members.
The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign
of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator
or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee
for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. 20 The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing
their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings
must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that
the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear
violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. 21

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in
question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such
statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is
good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

5. A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007 JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA,
Respondent.
 DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers
oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann)
Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I
miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love You on
its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:

My ever dearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you’ll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what you’re about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there’s a bigger plan for the two
of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in
me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]

Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001,
the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B
of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his apparent abandoning
or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit
to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage,
calling it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants
bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her until we are together
again, as now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special
friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer,
has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainants marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
[11]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, [12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as
Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth [13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as the father
of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS [14] dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit

[16]
and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. Respondents counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.[17]

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied), and

Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28,
2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 CBD Case No. 02-936 Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
139[22] of the Rules of Court. The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
 Respondent contends, in his Comment [23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news
item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove
that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainants wife, there are
other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through
counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the
allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances
the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed
a special relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together
with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1)
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and
Irene which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make
any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void. [26] (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.

In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38
years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate [28] with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate [29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the
father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate
of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer. [31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven
by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other [32] which is the quantum
of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly
preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances.Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who
is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances. [35] The case at
bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:[36]

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.[37](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law.

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation [41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for
nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene based
on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may
withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall
stand as though no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. [43] As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying on an
extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the
law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted
to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair

estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery
on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant
that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had
once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving
both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent relocation in No.
71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where
she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially
since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she
came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for
the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her
separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is
the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information
that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of
the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the
birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
 denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene
Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case [47] (Italics in the original),

This Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 6. A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar
decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with supporting documents[2] against respondent
Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3] The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5
May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No.
784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been
remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted
that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.

Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true
copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals
Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?
Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the
party you claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified me of the said
requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never
bothered to notify me. Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.

Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?
Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the
Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam
yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the
office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by
the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.[4]

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and
shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you
are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents
words but still managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed
by complainants window, he again shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and
still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting
doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.[6]

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit[7] signed by
employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same
incident as witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was
filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.[8]

On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint.
Respondent submitted his Compliance[10] dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed
with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to
the office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the
complainant reassured him of the same.

Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003.
However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003,
twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that
these records were returned to the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The
latter also moved that the case be submitted for resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating
that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that
he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August
2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.[12]

Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view
of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.[13]

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any
other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely. [14] The IBP submitted to
this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.[15]

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784.
Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the
decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or
certified true copy of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted
to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the
parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
 Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784,
respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not
matter whether he did so in good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted
rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most
vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a
woman and in front of her subordinates.

As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
[17]
These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold
the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and
otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the
charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of
the incident on 5 May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not
an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy
Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court. [19] We, however, cannot
acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that
effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say
and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered
cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and
thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the
honorable performance of professional duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 7. A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon
against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced
to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps.
Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986
before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter 2 dated August 11, 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees
amounting to 17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter 3 dated
July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees
from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission 4 which respondent ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in
money-lending business5without the required authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and
advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps.
Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty.
Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint. 6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent
be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-453 9 dated August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration 10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated
October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above
standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995
letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's
commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, 12 Canon 9
of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral
fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital
vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated
the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to
whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single person without
showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed
asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the
power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar, 16 or the
misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance, 17 which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine
Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.