Journal of Management History

Rebuilding Lisbon in the aftermath of the 1755 earthquake: Max Weber revisited
Miguel Pereira Lopes,
Article information:
To cite this document:
Miguel Pereira Lopes, (2014) "Rebuilding Lisbon in the aftermath of the 1755 earthquake: Max Weber
revisited", Journal of Management History, Vol. 20 Issue: 3, pp.278-291, https://doi.org/10.1108/
JMH-07-2013-0032
Permanent link to this document:
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

https://doi.org/10.1108/JMH-07-2013-0032
Downloaded on: 21 January 2018, At: 12:42 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 51 other documents.
To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 266 times since 2014*
Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
(2010),"Does Max Weber's notion of authority still hold in the twenty-first century?", Journal of Management
History, Vol. 16 Iss 4 pp. 449-453 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/17511341011073933">https://
doi.org/10.1108/17511341011073933</a>
(2013),"Historic horizons of Frederick Taylor's scientific management", Journal of Management History,
Vol. 19 Iss 4 pp. 512-527 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/JMH-05-2012-0043">https://doi.org/10.1108/
JMH-05-2012-0043</a>

Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by emerald-srm:439472 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for
Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines
are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company
manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as
providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee
on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive
preservation.
 *Related content and download information correct at time of download.
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)
 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1751-1348.htm

JMH
20,3
Rebuilding Lisbon in the
aftermath of the 1755
earthquake
278 Max Weber revisited
Miguel Pereira Lopes
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lisbon,
Lisbon, Portugal
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to draw on available data regarding the historical event of the
major Lisbon earthquake of 1755 in order to understand the governance structure that was set to rebuild
the city of Lisbon, as well as to elaborate on Max Weber’s theory of authority.
Design/methodology/approach – The present study aims to extend our knowledge on the role of
leadership in organizational transformation, by examining the authority structure of governance in the
aftermath of a major catastrophic event, using the study of an extreme case to generate new
management theory.
Findings – The study founded evidence that the successful rebuilding of Lisbon after the earthquake
was accompanied by a certain kind of governance structure that included an authority structure that
simultaneously incorporated Weber’s authority types of charisma, tradition and rationality; and there
was a clear distinction between the roles of each kind of authority, as well as the inviolable respect and
sacredness of each other’s terrain that seems to lead to that effectiveness.
Research limitations/implications – It is possible that the historical conditions in which this social
transformation took place might not be repeatable in today’s context, but the analysis of such an
extreme case of destruction and rebuilding evidences that the “atomistic” approach of Max Weber on
authority can be enriched with a “molecular” approach that, at the same time, helps to further develop
the concept of “shared leadership” by analyzing it from a Weberian point of view.
Practical implications – Today’s organizations should analyze their governance structure and
management staff from a “molecular” Weberian perspective, if they want to achieve major
transformations.
Originality/value – The study further develops Max Weber’s theory of authority and discusses it
regarding a “shared leadership” perspective.
Keywords Leadership, Corporate governance, Management history, Administration, Government
and public administration, Management structure
Paper type Research paper

Journal of Management History
Vol. 20 No. 3, 2014
pp. 278-291
© Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1751-1348
DOI 10.1108/JMH-07-2013-0032
1. Introduction
This study analyzes the authority structure that successfully rebuilt the city of Lisbon
after the major 1755 earthquake, using Max Weber’s (1947) tripartite authority theory.
The role of authority in social and organizational transformation is at the core of a
tradition in literature in management and organization studies (Houghton, 2010; Nelson,
1993), particularly based on the work of Max Weber. However, there has so far been no
critical analysis of an effective authority structure after a catastrophic event such as a
 destructive earthquake. This is a relevant task, given that leading authors have Rebuilding
indicated the study of extreme cases as fundamental to theory building in management
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
Lisbon in the
At the same time, management history research can be particularly useful in aftermath of the
studying rare, extreme events where the phenomenon in question is extraordinarily 1755 earthquake
revealed, an argument in line with the recent plea in management and organization
research to incorporate historical research into the field of management and 279
organization studies (Booth and Rowlinson, 2005; Burrell, 1997).
This study thus extends our knowledge of the role of authority and leadership in
organizational transformation by examining the governance structure that ruled
Portugal after the most catastrophic earthquake in the European history (Boer and
Sanders, 2005).
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

The paper unfolds as follows. We first describe the large-scale destruction of the
earthquake and its impact at economic, political and cultural levels. We then examine
the role of the main actors in the governance structure, who were regarded as crucial in
the famous rebuilding of Lisbon. Then, we synthesize the governance characteristics
that made the rebuilding of the city possible and end by revisiting Weber’s (1947)
archetype organizing principles and discussing them in relation to the relatively recent
approach of shared leadership in management research.

2. The Lisbon earthquake as the first modern disaster[1]

The disaster that started at 9:40 a.m. on November 1, 1755, can be divided into three
major and subsequent events. The first was an earthquake, followed by two others
within the space of about 2 hours, when most of Lisbon’s inhabitants were at mass in the
city’s churches, given that it was All Saints Day. The second was a tsunami with a tidal
wave that raised the level of the River Tagus by about 20 feet and particularly hit the
city center. Finally, there were fires caused mostly by the candles burning in churches
and the strong winds at the time, in addition to looting and other forms of social disorder
that resulted from the chaos (Mullin, 1992; Murteira, 2004). In the words of Boer and
Sanders (2005, p. 88), “to this day, that earthquake is considered the most catastrophic in
European history”.
About 30,000 Lisbon residents perished in a quake from which the effects were felt in
many other parts of Portugal, as well as in other countries and regions such as Spain,
France, Switzerland, Northern Italy and North Africa (Neto, 2007; Murteira, 2004).
According to Pereira (2009), the 1755 Lisbon earthquake had an estimated direct cost of
32 to 48 per cent of the Portuguese GDP, due to deaths, destruction of buildings and the
loss of diamonds, gold, silver and furniture.
These examples are telling. Of the 148,339 known residents in Lisbon before the
disaster, there were only 104,747-114,391 remaining, a reduction of around one-third as
a result of deaths, injuries and people left homeless. An estimated 86 per cent of the 40
churches, 75 convents and monasteries, 12,000 dwellings, 53 palaces and 9 public
buildings that collapsed containing diamonds, jewelry, libraries and furniture
represented millions and millions of contos (a Portuguese currency). In terms of
diamonds lost in the earthquake and the tsunami that followed, at India House alone, the
losses were about 1,920 contos, corresponding to about 1.5 per cent of the Portuguese
GDP at the time (Pereira, 2009).
 JMH As highlighted by Kendrick (1956), we must not forget that Lisbon was a major,
wealthy international trading center at the time, boasting rich palaces and churches in
20,3 addition to costly merchandise coming into Europe from overseas. These estimates
therefore probably fall short of the real magnitude of the earthquake’s impact.
The social and economic impacts of the Lisbon earthquake can thus be described as
dramatic, but their effect on the ideological and intellectual thinking of the time was the
280 same or greater. Dynes (2000) characterized the Lisbon earthquake as the “first modern
disaster”, considering the event as having a scientific explanation rather than the
previous proto-scientific or religious theories that this kind of natural phenomena
received (Cunha, 2010). This impact on beliefs about the supernatural causes of natural
events also had a global (although mostly in Europe at that time) effect on cultural and
political thought (Araújo, 2006). It included a stimulating intellectual discussion that
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

embraced the ideas of renowned thinkers as important as Jean Jacques-Rousseau or

Voltaire. Rousseau believed that the Lisbon earthquake was a proof that God was
punishing man for not living according to the laws of nature (LeVay and Sieh, 1998),
while Voltaire saw the earthquake as proving that there was no good deity as a default
for humankind, as we can read in his work Candide (Voltaire, 1931). Even Kant
mentioned the Lisbon catastrophe in a small pamphlet on the causes of earthquakes
(Silveira, 1955).
Given all this, there seems to be little doubt that the 1755 Lisbon earthquake was an
extremely destructive event that constitutes a good historical case for understanding
effective leadership for transformational change.

3. Rebuilding Lisbon in the aftermath of the earthquake

Just after the earthquake, the king and his court met in Belém, about three miles away
from the main disaster site in the city centre. It is said that King José asked his Minister,
the Marquis of Pombal, “What is to be done to deal with this infliction of Divine Justice?”
The minister promptly replied “Bury the dead, and feed the living” (Smith, 1845, p. 486).
And so it was, with the King directly giving to Pombal the power to take all the
necessary action to ensure security on the streets and start the reconstruction of the city.
The first measures were implemented quickly. To restore civic order in Lisbon,
Pombal’s first task was the severe punishment of all thieves and outlaws acting in the
deserted city. Right at the beginning of 1756, only a couple of months after the disaster,
it was decided to make a systematic survey of the ruins of the city, and the first
legislation on the reconstruction was issued (Murteira, 2004). A team of military
engineers and planners led by General Manuel da Maia were asked to study the
rebuilding options and draft and submit a plan for the reconstruction of the city.
The rebuilding of Lisbon was remarkable in terms of innovation. A clear example is
the grid-iron layout of the streets, despite the city’s irregular terrain. This option was
totally new in Portuguese cities and was intended to show that man’s reason can use
science to dominate the reality of nature. This gridline landscape still exists in
downtown Lisbon today (Mullin, 1992). In addition, other innovations were introduced
in Lisbon at the time, most of them designed to protect people from other earthquakes or
to speed up reconstruction in the event of a similar catastrophe. These included wide
streets, which contrasted with the foul, narrow streets that existed before the disaster
and would make it easier to escape from buildings (Boer and Sanders, 2005). The new
buildings had three stories, tiled roofs and upturned eave-corners that made the height
 and width of the buildings uniform and allowed for rapid reconstruction. This Rebuilding
architectural style became known as estilo pombalino[2] after the Marquis of Pombal,
who headed the rebuilding of Lisbon (Whitfield, 2005).
Lisbon in the
Finally, as an example of the scientific methods used at the time, the design of the new aftermath of the
buildings included anti-seismic provisions. One of the most important of these was an 1755 earthquake
interior three-dimensional braced timber structure, called gaiola in Portuguese. It was
enclosed in masonry walls above the first floor and provided resistance to horizontal 281
forces (Cardoso, 2002). This building technology was developed and tested to prepare
buildings to absorb the impacts of earthquakes and was ground-breaking at the time.
Despite these new technologies, rebuilding Lisbon took time. The unveiling of King
José’s statue on July 6, 1775, was the glorious symbol of the governance structure’s
ability to rebuild and transform the city (Santos, 2011). Given the magnitude of the
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

disaster and the age in which it struck, it constituted a brilliantly successful

transformation in the city and the whole country.
Although the focus of this paper is the rebuilding of Lisbon, the great social and
economic transformations that occurred in the second half of the eighteenth century
were not limited to Portugal’s capital city. All over the country, the governance structure
did a remarkable job in stimulating traditional industries, such as weaving, and the
manufacture of glass, silk and wool. New industries also emerged, including cutlery,
watch-making, pottery, metal foundries, jewelery, millinery and many other valuable
manufactured products (Lara, 1981).
In this paper, we argue that all these major transformations were possible because of
the main actors and their governance-organizing principles that enabled them to rebuild
a modern, totally renewed city and country. We will now describe what historiography
has retained about these characters.

3.1 The role of the Marquis of Pombal

There are opposing views on the merits and positive effects of the Marquis of Pombal’s
work as Prime Minister of Portugal. While some characterize him as a visionary and
transformative leader (Maxwell, 1995; Garcia, 1869), others describe him as a despot
(Azevedo, 2009, Cordeiro, 1890). In any case, there seems to be no doubt that his action
was transformative and his leadership charismatic in Weberian terms (Weber, 1978)[3].
Garcia (1869, p. 31) states that the Marquis of Pombal was indeed “legendary […]. He
was an ideal type that never vanishes, nor will he be removed from the imagination of
our people”. This idealization of a man’s greatness fits the charismatic traits of his
leadership and can certainly be attributed to the perceived magnificence of his work as
prime minister of King José. As Coates (1997, p. 686) states, “Pombal was a man of action,
intense action”. Thanks to his action, there was a deep reform in the education system in
Portugal and a positive economic impulse with the establishment of new royal factories
making rope, hats and silk. One of the best-known achievements was the demarcation
and regulation of the Port wine industry (Coates, 1997, Lara, 1981).
Perhaps the most critical evidence of Pombal’s charisma lay in his moral impact
rather than his material work. His reforms were something that actually changed the
values and cultural artifacts of a society (Schein, 2004), decisive evidence of his
transformative leadership. In the words of Garcia (1869, p. 16), “The intimate
regeneration of man and institutions, and not the formal, superficial organization of the
 JMH governing system, was his firm determination”. He stressed Pombal’s efforts at
changing cultural values above all, a core issue in charismatic leadership.
20,3 It must be acknowledged that Pombal benefited from a context where charismatic
authority would most probably be nurtured. First, he had the opportunity to head the
work of recovering Lisbon and other parts of the country after the catastrophic
earthquake in 1755, as described above. However, in addition, the political, economic
282 and social settings at the time were also perceived as morally negative, with the
disorganization of government affairs and the oppression that some foreign royal courts
exerted over Portugal (Garcia, 1869). The context in which Pombal was a central player
can also help to explain why such a charismatic authority was able to set up such
substantial power, given that these kinds of context are known to be associated with the
emergence of charismatic leaders (Conger and Kanungo, 1998).
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

3.2 Role of the King José

There is scant knowledge about the relationship between the Marquis of Pombal and his
king. Coates (1997, p. 686) claimed that “the mysterious relationship between Pombal
and his king” merited further research and consideration. However, it is generally said
that King José preferred to devote his time to leisure activities such as fishing, hunting
and music rather than to running the kingdom (Santos, 2011). This led some historians
to conclude that the Marquis of Pombal’s willingness to govern the country was a
blessing to the king, who was able to live without the burdens of government (Azevedo,
2009).
Despite this generalized opinion on the character of King José, some evidence runs
counter to this extreme perspective of him as indifferent to government affairs. In the
words of Monteiro (2006), for example:
[…] there are known traits of King José’s personality that allow us to say that many of the
political options taken in his name had his support if indeed they were not on his own initiative
(p. 228).
This explains why there was a very close relationship between the Marquis of Pombal
and his king in which the minister would visit the king on an almost daily basis, often
very late at night (Azevedo, 2009).
This evidence allows us to paint a very different picture of the relationship between
the minister and the king. Although he was not very active in the bottom-line
management of the kingdom, it seems that the king wanted to be updated constantly on
government issues and the most important decisions.
A good example of this was the way that the relationships between the Portuguese
Crown and the Holy See were managed at the time. It is known that during the hostilities
between King José and the Holy See, caused mostly by the Marquis’ efforts to get rid of
the Society of Jesus, he wanted to put an end to the formal relationship between the two
states much before it actually happened in 1760. The rift would last for the next ten
years. However, King José did not support the decision immediately, and the Marquis
had to wait for the monarch to decide on his own if and when it was to be made (Azevedo,
2009).
These examples show that, despite the Marquis of Pombal’s charismatic and
despotic leadership style (Maxwell, 1995), King José’s traditional authority was still
 there, although this traditional authority was probably only used when absolutely Rebuilding
necessary.
Lisbon in the
aftermath of the
3.3 Role of ground planners and engineers 1755 earthquake
The action of the charismatic Pombal and the traditional legitimacy of King José were so
decisive that one might be tempted to give the credit for the relatively quick and modern 283
rebuilding of Lisbon to these two actors alone. However, it seems to be the case that a
number of planners and engineers were the true architects of the so-called “Lisbon Plan
of 1755-56” (Mullin, 1992). These architects of the reconstruction clearly brought
rational-bureaucratic authority into the equation, which would be used to translate the
vision of the monarch and his governor. In the words of Rossa (2004, p. 344), “In 1755,
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

Lisbon could count on a technically updated, organized and disciplined elite”.

As one reads the plans that these engineers devised to rebuild Lisbon after the
disaster (Ayres, 1910) and looks at the “bureaucratic” structure that was set up, it
becomes clear how rational the mindset was present and how fundamental it was for
implementing the technical plans. First, the organization’s hierarchy included a head of
the reconstruction plans and several top-level engineers, each of them assisted by
several lower-level operational “servants”. Second, these “bureaucrats’” alternative
reconstruction plans were so well thought out that they included both the pros and the
cons of each solution.
Clear evidence of this bureaucratic and rational-legal way of operating in this
rebuilding organization was the submission by the head of this bureaucratic team of
four plans, each one with several hypotheses and alternative options for the
reconstruction (França, 1968, França, 1978). The plans included:
(1) rebuilding the city in the same place, with the same street structure;
(2) rebuilding the city in the same place but with wider streets;
(3) totally demolishing the remaining ruins and rebuilding a brand new city in the
same place with radically different construction standards; or
(4) even rebuilding a new city in a different but nearby place.

These options were deeply examined in technical, social and economic terms, on the
basis of not only known problems such as the occurrence of similar earthquakes but also
the interests of the owners of the devastated land and buildings.
The head of the bureaucrats was General Manuel da Maia, the Royal Engineer-in-Chief
who coordinated the team responsible for submitting the reconstruction plans. He appointed
other operational assistants such as Captain Eugénio dos Santos and Lieutenant Colonel
Carlos Mardel to aid him in his task. Captain Santos ensured the utility of the solutions, while
Colonel Mardel was responsible for the stylish features of the plans. In both cases, they
clearly brought rationality back into an equation where, due to the historical transition from
medievalism to modern times, tradition and innovation were battling each other (Mullin,
1992). Each of these bureaucratic leaders was then aided by lower-level assistants such as
the António Carlos Andreas who worked with Eugénio dos Santos, among many others who
were part of the hierarchical bureaucratic structure that was critical for the rebuilding of the
city (Ayres, 1910).
 JMH 4. Charisma, tradition and rationality as conditions for the rebuilding of
Lisbon
20,3 Having described the impacts of the 1755 earthquake and the main governance actors
responsible for the rebuilding of Lisbon and other parts of the country, we will now turn
to an integrated analysis of the governance structure and organization that was the
basis for the action taken.
284 As highlighted in the previous section, it is clear that the successful rebuilding of
Lisbon after the earthquake was accompanied by a certain kind of governance structure.
This governance structure can be described as containing two major characteristics.
First, the authority structure simultaneously incorporated Weber’s (1947) authority
types of charisma, tradition and rationality. Direct generalization is obviously beyond
the goals of this historical case study, and we do not know whether the presence of each
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

of these types of authority is a sufficient or necessary cause to explain the transformative

social change that occurred, but we might speculate that the joint presence of all these
types of authority was a necessary cause in this case.
Second, the rebuilding of Lisbon also gives insight into the governance dynamics that
allowed each kind of authority to occupy its own legitimate space. In other words, it
might not be the mere simultaneous presence of the three types of authority that
explains the transformative governance in this case but also the dynamics of the
relationships between the actors.
In this respect, the relationship between the Marquis of Pombal (charismatic
authority) and King José (traditional authority) is quite revealing. As mentioned above,
in many situations, such as that of the Jesuits and the tense diplomatic relations between
the Portuguese monarchy and the Holy See, King José exercised his traditional authority
to control Pombal’s charismatic aims. This shows that, despite Pombal’s charisma, the
bounds of each one’s authority were clearly defined and mutually respected.
It is consensual that the Marquis of Pombal was a reformist and not a revolutionary
(Lara, 1981), something that might explain his respect for the traditional authority of the
king. Indeed, some authors have described the action of Pombal as so charismatic that
they argue that he would have been able to implement a political constitution if he
wanted, long before it happened in France or Spain (Garcia, 1869). The fact is that he did
not do it, and each of the parties seemed to respect each other’s type of authority.
Perhaps even more explicative of this clear separation and respect of each player’s
type of authority is the relationship between the Marquis of Pombal (charismatic
authority) and the planners and engineers (rational authority). Despite the common view
that the Marquis of Pombal was a visionary with a singular genius, able to predict the
need for wider streets in the future, for example, historiography tells a somewhat
different story. Pombal’s wisdom lay indeed in his option to establish a generally
modern vision of the future and empower the technicians to work on the solutions as
freely as they wanted, given that they were based on rational scientific grounds, while he
claimed for himself the right to choose the final option[4].
Evidence for this kind of leadership is found in Mullin’s analysis (1993, p. 163), for
instance, when he states that “Maia presented his ideas to Pombal who, after careful
review, selected the “clean slate” option. Maia thus had his orders”. In fact, not only was
the decision-maker limited in his decisions without influencing the available options but
also the only thing that he could do if he disagreed with all of the options was to order a
technical and scientific study of further options. This idea was reproduced down
 through the hierarchy of the bureaucratic machine. An example of this organizational Rebuilding
mechanism is reported in Mullin (1992, p. 165), describing how the Head Engineer
Manuel da Maia dealt with the first plans drawn up by the engineers and planners under
Lisbon in the
his command as follows: aftermath of the
From these three plans Maia was able to grasp increasingly detailed concepts for the city plan.
1755 earthquake
However, none of the three submitted proposals was acceptable. Thus, with the intent of
further stimulating creativity he reconstituted the teams. They were once again prepared […]. 285
Many of the visionary ideas of Pombal or Manuel da Maia seem to have resulted from a
side effect of their charismatic power, while the fact is that their effectiveness came from
their ability to empower technicians and let them work independently, while the
decision-makers “simply” made the final decision on the available proposals. In fact, this
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

leadership style of the Marquis of Pombal has been acknowledged in other areas of
government as education and medicine (Garcia, 1869), although the present study
focuses only on the case of the rebuilding of the city.
In short, this kind of dynamic relationship between the three types of authority
shows that, in addition to the need to simultaneously involve all kinds of authority, it is
a certain way of organizing governance between those types that seems to explain the
effectiveness of transformative social change. Specifically, it seems to be the clear
distinction between the roles of each kind of authority and respect for inviolability of
each other’s territory that seems to lead to this effectiveness.

5. Weberian archetypes revisited (and extended)

Given the emergence of a triumvirate of authority figures in this case study, in line with
Max Weber’s theory of social organization, in this section, we discuss the main findings
of this research and its implications for organization theory.
As introduced at the beginning of this paper, the main goal of this study was to use
a historical event to build management theory (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and
Graebner, 2007). Although this is just a stream of research linking history and
management studies, this kind of research can benefit management historians by
enlarging their pool of cases (Kipping and Üsdiken, 2008).
In addition, there is also a legitimate merit of its own in using historical analysis to
develop management and organization theory (Smith, 2007, Lawrence, 1984)[5]. Indeed,
as these authors highlight, using management history might prove as critical for
expanding research horizons and outlining new ways of studying old questions.
This is precisely the value of reading this historic event in light of Max Weber’s
theory and possibly expanding it on the basis of the case analysis. His important
contribution to the science of organization and management is hardly questioned by
anyone in this area of study. Indeed, Weber is an unavoidable landmark in management
history reviews, as recently exemplified by an article in the Harvard Business Review
examining the history of management in the twentieth century (Kiechel, 2012). Indeed,
bureaucracy seems to be alive and well and far from its end (Clegg, 2012).
One of Weber’s most striking assumptions is the conceptualization of pure types of
organization and authority. The so-called “ideal types” or “archetypes” of organization
epitomize the cornerstone of Weber’s analysis of social organization and have received
some criticism for not describing real-world organizations where such pure types do not
 JMH seem to exist. Weber (1947) argues that the fact that those ideal types are not found
historically does not mean that they cannot be considered for conceptual purposes.
20,3 Some authors have seen this option of Weber’s as the result of his own historical
context. Nelson (1993), for instance, stated that Weber’s option for an archetype kind of
analysis could have been due to:
• the fact that the societies analyzed by Weber were not as complex as today’s
286 organizations and could indeed be explained mostly by one kind of organizational
logic; and
• the fact that Weber, at least implicitly, wanted to make the apology of a certain
kind of organization, the rational-legal bureaucracy[6].
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

We do not intend here to question Weber’s legitimacy in choosing to conceptually

analyze social organization from a pure ideal-type standpoint. However, the case study
analyzed in this paper shows evidence in defense of an approach that combines all the
three original archetypes proposed by Weber. Using chemistry as an analogy, instead of
relying on the Weberian atomistic view, it sets the challenge for looking from a molecular
standpoint in understanding how a combination of the three pure archetypes can
produce transformative organizational outcomes. Indeed, one could conceptually see
this as a composite archetype, where the analysis does not focus solely on the authority
individual but on the authority structure.
The idea of a shared or complementary leadership is today a productive research
stream in different fields of social sciences, including management studies and
international relations (Miles and Watkins, 2007), and organizational behavior and
leadership studies (Pearce et al., 2007; Pitcher and Smith, 2001). These studies have
investigated the determinants and performance effects of a distributed leadership, but
the complementary relationships between different leadership roles are yet to be
examined. This study advances this research stream by outlining some of the conditions
under which shared leadership can become effective for social change, such as the
inviolable respect for each leadership role within a governance structure. In addition,
this study develops a theory of governance for an effective social transformation that is
in line with previous organization theory as important as that of Max Weber, thereby
ensuring continuity of theory development while incorporating the novel trend of
shared leadership.
Despite these contributions, there is much more to study to better understand
leadership effectiveness for social transformation. A key question for future
research on this topic is whether the triumvirate structure of traditional, charismatic
and rational-legal authority is a consequence of contextual conditions or a result of
action by some of the players. The case analyzed in this study leaves open the
question of whether this whole governance structure was enacted by one or several
of the players in the governance structure. The Marquis of Pombal, for instance,
seems to have chosen to form a productive partnership with King José and
“maintain” him as the sole symbol of traditional authority. However, one might
interpret the case differently, with the king being wise in letting Pombal take a
charismatic, despotic role. The vested interests of each of the characters and the role
they played in the governance design that successfully implemented social change
should be analyzed better in future research.
 As a final limitation of this study, it is possible that the historical conditions in which Rebuilding
this social transformation took place might not be repeatable. Indeed, this episode can be
regarded as a by-product of the transition from the ancien regime that lasted up to the
Lisbon in the
eighteenth century and revealed a confrontation of different kinds of authority. We do aftermath of the
not know how and if it can be reproduced again in the future. This temporal issue is, in 1755 earthquake
fact, a core feature of management history studies. Booth and Rowlinson (2006)
exemplify this management history research by referring to the Flintstones approach to 287
history. Everybody remembers in the Flintstones that the characters live in the Stone
Age in a town called Bedrock, while also living in a society identical to that of the
Western world in the mid-twentieth century (e.g. celebrating Christmas before Christ
was born). As in the case analyzed in this study, directly generalizing these findings as
the best governance approach to our days would result in viewing primitive characters
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

living in today’s world.

In any case, as pointed out by O’Brien et al. (2004), history probably evolves in a
continuum and, although the future might not resemble the past in some respect, the
present or the future could (and should) be informed by that past. In addition, in the
words of these same authors, “historiography is unlikely to produce a rigorous academic
theory but it will facilitate the development of such theories” (O’Brien et al., 2004, p. 141).
The authority structure for transformative change proposed in this study should be
regarded as a proposal to look into current and future organizations from a new
perspective that focuses on the joint presence and interrelationships between
charismatic, traditional and rational authorities as necessary to produce effective social
change. By achieving this result, and in line with Sayer’s (2000) requirements for reliable
social research, this study offers both a historical narrative and an explanatory analysis
of social structure and mechanisms.
This study’s reliance on a particular event should not be regarded as pure
historiography. This means that the use of a catastrophic seismologic event is not
intended to develop specific theory on how management authorities should be
structured in case of natural disasters, but rather to contribute to the development of
Weber’s work on authority. This does not mean that some practical implications
might not be derived for cases of social rebuilding after a major natural disaster,
such as modern catastrophes like Katrina or the 2004 South Asian tsunami, but the
goal of this study was primarily to use a historical account to engage in theory
development. In any case, the study does offer potential practical implications for
managing social and organizational transformation in these contexts also, as
discussed above.

6. Conclusion
In short, the aim of this study was to use an historical standpoint to analyze the
authority structure that was set up for social transformation after a major destructive
event. Research on the role of an authority structure has been profuse in recent decades,
but little of it analyzed such a stressful and threatening event as that used in this case,
normally accessible only on historical grounds. The social facts discussed in this paper
can be interpreted in such a way as to conclude that an effective transformation can best
be undertaken by combining the three different types of authority outlined by Max
Weber, namely, tradition, charisma and rational-legal.
 JMH Further research on authority and leadership should thus better understand how the
interrelationship between these types of authority works to become effective, which
20,3 would simultaneously lead to an improvement in both our understanding of effective
leadership and the refinement and development of Weber’s sociological theory on
authority. As Houghton (2010, p. 452) stated:
[…] the field of leadership was to a large extent rejuvenated by the influence of Max Weber
288 as leadership scholars looked to the ideas of the past to create the leadership theory and
practice of the present and future.
We believe there is still room to aim for this goal in the future.

Notes
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

1. The goal of this paper is to generate new theoretical possibilities from a historical account.
The authors are organization theory specialists rather than historians. The method used
in the study therefore relied on credible secondary sources. The authors are aware that
rigorous historical research should seek primary sources of data, as one of the reviewers
highlighted. However, in this case, the authors claim that this methodological option should
not be considered a critical issue. First, there are no journals or newspaper clippings available
from the time of the event. Second, available sources closest to the date of the event are cited
in this study ( Smith, 1845). Finally, a possibility would have been to rely on the primary
sources cited in those consulted for this study but that would hide the credits of the historians
that first found or considered them. We therefore follow the argument of Cunha, Rego and
Clegg (2011) who claimed that relying on secondary sources should not be enough to prevent
management researchers from writing about organization history. In their very words:
“Organization theory has in the past been written from secondary sources in historical and
anthropological terms; one thinks of Mann’s accounts of social power (Mann 1986), Weber’s
(1963) accounts of the sociological organization of the world’s great religions, or Elias’ (1969)
account of the civilizing process. If historians (Roberts 2003a) can draw from the business
books that use major historical figures such as Churchill as examples of exemplary
leadership, we would argue that organization theorists should be able to draw on public
histories of other leaders who can be presented as exemplary” (Cunha et al., 2011, p. 271).
2. Pombal Style.
3. It should be noted that the Weberian perspective of “charisma” adopted here goes beyond the
reductionist interpretation of charisma as necessarily “divine” in origin. It follows Houghton’s
(2010, p. 451) perspective when he stated, “When Weber redefined the term “charisma” from
its original ecclesiastical meaning of “divinely bestowed power or talent” to mean “a special
quality of an individual capable of inspiring and influencing others” he laid the foundation for
the concept of charismatic leadership”. We thank an anonymous reviewer for noticing the
need to make this explicit.
4. We are grateful to Professor Albino Lopes for his insight on the merits of distinguishing the
proposal from the decision. Further information on this idea can be found in Lopes (2012).
5. We thank an anonymous reviewer for noticing the importance of making this epistemological
point clearer. A deep discussion on these issues is beyond the scope and goal of this paper.
6. Nelson’s (1993) idea that Weber is somewhat more apologetic about the rational-legal
archetype than the other archetypes is disputable. As an anonymous reviewer noticed, Weber
also criticized rationalization and bureaucracy as “dehumanizing”. Although this argument
 does not fully contradict that there was some apologetic accent in Weber’s words concerning Rebuilding
other aspects, some authors do attribute these differences to a misinterpretation in the
translation of Weber’s work into English by Talcott Parsons (Weber, 1947). Given that this Lisbon in the
discussion is beyond the scope of this study and further information on this issue can be found aftermath of the
elsewhere (Weiss, 1983), this paper takes the normative perspective that, at least in some 1755 earthquake
terms, Weber saw bureaucracy as a better organizational archetype, even accepting “The
plain fact that Weber’s work is difficult to understand” (Bendix, 1960, p. xlvii). 289
References
Araújo, A.C. (2006), “The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 – public distress and political propaganda”,
E-Journal of Portuguese History, Vol. 4.
Ayres, C. (1910), Manuel da Maya e os engenheiros militares portugueses no Terramoto de 1755,
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa.

Azevedo, J.L. (2009), O Marquês de Pombal e a sua Época, Alfarrabário, Lisboa.
Bendix, R. (1960), Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Boer, J.Z. and Sanders, D.T. (2005), Earthquakes in Human History: The Far-Reaching Effects of
Seismic Disruptions, Princeton University Press, NJ.
Booth, C. and Rowlinson, M. (2006), “Management and organizational history: prospects”,
Management and Organizational History, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 5-30.
Burrell, G. (1997), Pandemonium: Towards a Retro-Organization Theory, Sage, London.
Cardoso, R. (2002), Seismic Vulnerability of Old Masonry Structures: Application to a “Pombalino”
Building, Master Science Dissertation in Structural Engineering, Instituto Superior
Técnico, Lisbon.
Clegg, S.T. (2012), “The end of bureaucracy?”, in Diefenbach, T. and By, R.T. (Eds), Reinventing
Hierarchy and Bureaucracy – from the Bureau to Network Organizations (Research in the
Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 35), Emerald Group Publishing, pp. 59-84.
Coates, T.J. (1997), “Review of the book Pombal: paradox of the enlightenment’, by Kenneth
Maxwell”, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 77 No. 4, pp. 686-687.
Conger, J.A. and Kanungo, R.N. (1998), Charismatic Leadership in Organizations, Sage, Thousand
Oaks, CA.
Cordeiro, M.C. (1890), O Marquez de Pombal (folheto para poucos), Typographia de A. J. da Silva
Teixeira, Porto.
Cunha, A.M. (2010), “Police science and cameralism in Portuguese enlightened reformism:
economic ideas and the administration of the state during the second half of the 18th
century”, E-Journal of Portuguese History, Vol. 8 No. 1, p 1.
Cunha, M.P., Rego, A. and Clegg, S. (2011), “Pol Pot, alias brother number one: leaders as
instruments of history”, Management and Organizational History, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 268-286.
Dynes, R.R. (2000), “The lisbon earthquake in 1755: contested meanings in the first modern
disaster”, TsuInfo Alert, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 10-18.
Eisenhardt, K. (1989), “Building theories from case study research”, Academy of Management
Review, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 532-550.
Eisenhardt, K. and Graebner, M. (2007), “Theory building from cases: opportunities and
challenges”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 25-32.
França, J.A. (1968), “Lisbon of 1750-1850, the significance of its structural evolution”, in Sayers, R.
(Ed), Portugal and Brazil in Transition, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
pp. 266-268.
 JMH França, J.A. (1978), A Reconstrução e a Arquitectura Pombalina, Instituto da Cultura Portuguesa,
Lisboa.
20,3 Garcia, M.E. (1869), O Marquez de Pombal: Lance d’Olhos Sobre a Sua Sciencia; Politica e Systema
de Administração; Ideias Liberaes Que o Dominavam, Imprensa da Universidade, Coimbra.
Houghton, J.D. (2010), “Does Max Weber’s notion of authority still hold in the twenty-first
century?”, Journal of Management History, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 449-453.
290 Kendrick, T.D. (1956), The Lisbon Earthquake, Methuen and Co, London.
Kiechel, W. (2012), “The management century (the evolution of management as a science)”,
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 90 No. 11, pp. 62-67.
Kipping, M. and Üsdiken, B. (2008), “Business history and management studies”, in Jones, G. and
Zeitlin, J. (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business History, Oxford University Press, New
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

York, NY, pp. 96-119.

Lara, A.S. (1981), “A política económica do Marquês de Pombal”, Separata da Revista Economia e
Gestão, Vol. 26, pp. 3-16.
Lawrence, B. (1984), “Historical perspective: using the past to study the present”, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 307-312.
LeVay, S. and Sieh, K. (1998), The Earth in Turmoil: Earthquakes, Volcanoes, and their Impact on
Humankind, W. H. Freeman and Company, New York, NY.
Lopes, A. (2012), Fundamentos da Gestão de Pessoas, Sílabo, Lisboa.
Maxwell, K. (1995), Pombal: Paradox of the Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press.
Miles, S.A. and Watkins, M.D. (2007), “The leadership team: complementary strengths or
conflicting agendas?”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 85 No. 4, pp. 90-98.
Monteiro, N.G. (2006), D. José: na Sombra de Pombal, Círculo de Leitores, Lisboa.
Mullin, J.R. (1992), “The reconstruction of lisbon following the earthquake of 1755: a study in
despotic planning”, Planning Perspectives, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 157-179.
Murteira, H. (2004), “The Lisbon earthquake of 1755: the catastrophe and its European
repercussions”, Global Economics and Management, Vol. 10, pp. 79-99.
Nelson, R.E. (1993), “Authority, organization and societal context in multinational churches”,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 653-682.
Neto, J.P. (2007), “A resposta da Administração Pública ao Terramoto de 1755”, Paper Presented
at the Inter-Academy Colloquium, Academy of Sciences, Lisbon.
O’Brien, J., Remenyi, D. and Keaney, A. (2004), “Historiography – A neglected research method in
business and management studies”, Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods,
Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 135-144.
Pearce, C.L., Conger, J.A. and Locke, E.A. (2007), “Shared leadership theory”, Leadership
Quarterly, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 281-288.
Pereira, A.S. (2009), “The opportunity of a disaster: the economic impact of the 1755 Lisbon
earthquake”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69 No. 2, pp. 466-499.
Pitcher, P. and Smith, A.D. (2001), “Top management team heterogeneity: personality, power, and
proxies”, Organization Science, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-18.
Rossa, W. (2004), “Do plano de 1755-1758 para a Baixa-Chiado”, Monumentos, Vol. 21, pp. 22-43.
Santos, A.C.A. (2011), “Luzes em Portugal: do terramoto à inauguração da estátua equestre do
Reformador”, Topoi, Vol. 12 No. 22, pp. 75-95.
Sayer, A. (2000), Realism and Social Science, Sage, London.
 Schein, E.H. (2004), Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed, Jossey-Bass, San Rebuilding
Francisco, CA.
Silveira, L. (1955), Ensaios de Kant a Propósito do Terramoto de 1755, Camara Municipal de
Lisbon in the
Lisboa, Lisboa. aftermath of the
Smith, G. (2007), “Management history and historical context: potential benefits of its inclusion in 1755 earthquake
the management curriculum”, Academy of Management Learning and Education, Vol. 6
No. 4, pp. 522-533. 291
Smith, J. (1845), “Memoirs of the marquis of Pombal: with extracts from his writings, and from
dispatches in the state-paper office, never before published by Marquis of Pombal”, The
North American Review, Vol. 60, pp. 478-488.
Voltaire (1931), Candide: ou, L’optimisme (édition critique avec une introd. et un commentaire par
André Morize).
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)

Weber, M. (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, in Parsons, T. (Ed), Oxford
University Press, New York, NY.
Weber, M. (1978), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, U. California Press,
Berkley, CA.
Weiss, R.M. (1983), “Weber on bureaucracy: management consultant or political theorist?”,
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 242-248.
Whitfield, P. (2005), “Lisbon”, in Cities of the World: A History in Maps, University of California
Press, Berkeley.

About the author

Miguel Pereira Lopes is an Assistant Professor at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the
Technical University of Lisbon. He holds a PhD in Applied Psychology and a Post-doc in
Economics from the New University of Lisbon. His work has been published in journals such as
Journal of Socio-Economics, Organization, Public Management Review and Social Indicators
Research. Miguel Pereira Lopes can be contacted at: mplopes@iscsp.utl.pt

To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com

Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
 This article has been cited by:

1. Miguel Pereira Lopes. 2017. Leading by fear and by love: Niccolò Machiavelli and the enlightened
despotism of the Marquis of Pombal in the eighteenth century Portugal. Management & Organizational
History 12:4, 374-390. [Crossref]
2. Colleen Schwarz. 2015. A review of management history from 2010-2014 utilizing a thematic analysis
approach. Journal of Management History 21:4, 494-504. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Downloaded by UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA At 12:42 21 January 2018 (PT)