Heirs of Roxas v.

CA (two parcels of land notice of initial hearing sent to occupants (Roxas

not named as adjoining owner therefore not sent notice)  publication in OG & Newsweekly 
Roxas previously filed but dismissed month before granted to corpo Roxas filed for fraud for
no notice  claim: lot from husband Pres. + forged signature in deed of sale + intentional
omission; WON fraud? YES.; discrepancy in orig application and petition to review (Roxas name
—to dodge notice); not a newspaper of general circulation)
Adez Realty v. CA (petitioner file to annul order to constitution of a TCT  publication in 2
successive issues of OG + posting in bulletin board of provincial/municipal building; sufficient
compliance? YES.; in rem no need personal notice; OG enough cite Sec. 13 of RA No. 26)
Director of Lands v. CA (petition for og reg  died then sub by heirs LRC dismissed bec no
public notice of initial hearing in newspaper of gen circulation and only did so in OG thus court
no juris (Sec. 23(1) of PD 1529); CA reversed; WN mandatory or directory publication notice of
initial hearing? YES.; “SHALL” denotes an IMPERATIVE; in rem validated through publication //
due process; Sec. 23 of PD 1529 clear)
Republic v. CA (registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land given to Spouses Maxino
decision became final  petition to annul bec unclassified public forest + title only 29 not 885
denied  copy of order to SolGen 1 yr from order Solgen appeal  denied bec final 
appeal; Appeal seasonably made? YES.; 30 day period from SolGen Office apprised NOT time
special counsel/fiscal served; gov’t not estopped by errors of agents)
Republic v. Spouses Sanchez (Sought for reconsti of alleged destroyed (fire) titled based on
duplicate title submitted report signed by chief of reconsti division of LRA stating no overlap
other properties no notice to adjoining owners  RTC granted reconsti  after finality, LRA
submit to court report claiming first report fake + need notice to adj. owners; WON RTC juris?
NO. Source of reconsti is duplicate copies of TCTs; GEN RULE: Sec. 9 and 10 of RA 26 apply
(notice in OG and main entrance of p and m building—no need occupants and owners); THIS
CASE: Sec. 12 and 13 apply bec duplicate challenged notice to all named needed)
SERRA V. CA (FIRST CASE: Hernaez reconsti of lost og cert of titles petition granted then
reconsti titles cancelled (declaration of heirship) and TCTs issued to them  petitioner adverse
claim (possession + CTs)  writ of preliminary injunction issued  denied claim of petitioners +
issued writ of possession to Hernaez

SECOND CASE: While first case pending, petitioner filed against Garygay and SONEDCO for
cut hual and mill his sugarcanes  granted wpi to restrain corpo from issuing the quedans to
Garaygay (said ontained contract to harvest from Hernaez) counter wpi to pet who harvested
and planted sugarcane

WON GAD when CA lifted wpi? YES.

Writ of possession invalid so lifting wpi also invalid bec effected writ of possession; wop cannot
be issued in pet for reconsti of an lost/destroyed COT; reconsti no confirm or adjudicate
ownership over the property; pet not mere possessors but under claim of ownership must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Article 433, New Civil Code), not
summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession; petitioners not served
notice (in petitioner for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the lands
involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition)

WON GAD when lifted wpi so SONEDCO able to deliver sugar quedans in the name of the
private respondents? NO. Not cover already consummated acts;
WON GAD when issued the wpi for recovery of personal property (sugarcane) and damages?
YES. Possession was never put in issue by the parties; The issuance of the writ enjoining
petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane produced from the lots subject of
G.R. No. L-34080 was BEYOND JURIS of the trial court.)

HEIRS OF ROXAS V. CA
Facts:

 Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (private respondent) filed an

Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Brgy. Sungay,
Tagaytay City
 To support Maguesun’s application for registration, they presented a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be
P170,000.00 and that Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from Trinidad de Leon
vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier
o Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas —> Zenaida Melliza —> Meguesun
 Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna,
Jose Gil, and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun’s application of registration (they are
adjoining owners, occupants, or adverse claimants that the person applying for
registration is required to disclose in accordance with Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 which requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners.)
o Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner,
occupant or adverse claimant, she wasn’t sent a notice of the proceedings
 Publication was made in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE and the RECORD NEWSWEEKLY
 Trial Court proceeded to hear the land registration case
 The Land Registration Authority reported that the land had previously been applied for
registration by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon
o But no decision has been rendered thereon
 Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation’s application for registration
o The previous application of Manual A Roxas and Trinidad de Leon was dismissed
a month before
 It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that
petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the
lots in Maguesun Corp.’s name
 Petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to set aside the decree of registration
on the ground that Maguesun Corp. committed actual fraud
 Petitioner alleged that
 o The lots were inherited from her husband, former Pres. Manuel Roxas, who died
on April 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for
more than 30 yrs. before they applied for its registration
o Denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met and
that her signature was forged in the Deed of Sale
o She claimed that Maguesun Corp. intentionally omitted her name as an adverse
claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration such that
the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing
 Trial Court ruled against the petitioner
 CA denied the petition for review

Issue: Whether or not actual fraud was committed by Maguesun Corp. which hindered
the Land Registration Authority from sending Roxas a Notice of Initial Hearing
Held: YES

 In the original application submitted to the Land Registration, the names of the adjoining
owners were typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word
“provincial” typed over correction fluid.
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house
No.)
 However, Maguesun Corp. annexed a differently worded application for the petition to
review case in the trial court:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.
 It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that
“Roxas” was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer,
occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land
Registration Authority in sending out notices of the initial hearing.
 Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration
proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.
 The Court also added something about publication
Sec. 23 of PD 1529: “…the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:
Provided, however, that the publication in the OG shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.”
 While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an
indispensable procedural requirement. Record Newsweekly was not a newspaper of
general circulation. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that
publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant
in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
 The Court ruled that there was never a sale between Trinidad and Zenaida, and that
petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by
the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Adez Realty v. CA (petitioner file to annul order to constitution of a TCT  publication in 2
successive issues of OG + posting in bulletin board of provincial/municipal building; sufficient
compliance? YES.; in rem no need personal notice; OG enough cite Sec. 13 of RA No. 26)
FACTS:

 Petitioner Adez Realty, Incorporated filed a petition before the Court of Appeal seeking to
annul the order of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal allowing there constitution of a
transfer certificate of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the notice of the petition in two (2) successive
issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the accused-
appellant of Morong, Rizal is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A.No. 26.
HELD: YES.

 Land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it
is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to
be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res.
 Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when
the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a
jurisdictional defect.
 Notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the
court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate
claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate
the proceedings.
Notes: Section 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall
state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known,
the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any
interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner
shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA (petition for og reg  died then sub by heirs  LRC
dismissed bec no public notice of initial hearing in newspaper of gen circulation and only did
so in OG thus court no juris (Sec. 23(1) of PD 1529; CA reversed; WN mandatory or
directory publication notice of initial hearing? YES.; “SHALL” denotes an IMPERATIVE; in
rem validated through publication // due process; Sec. 23 of PD 1529 clear)
FACTS:

 On 8 December 1986, private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for

original registration of his title over 648 sq.m. of land under PD 1529 however during
the pendency of the petition, Teodoro died hence his heirs were substituted as
applicants, represented by their aunt, who was appointed as their guardian ad litem.
 The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of jurisdiction stating that
the applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines and was only published in the Official Gazette
and thus the court has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant petition for
want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
 The case was appealed by the private respondents in the CA, which set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is MANDATORY or DIRECTORY in relation to Section 23(1) of PD
1529.
HELD: YES.

 The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is MANDATORY. The law used the
term “SHALL” and denotes an IMPERATIVE and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute, its importance ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, and the Court holds that the present case must be understood in its
normal mandatory meaning.
 Land registration is a proceeding in rem and as such is validated essentially in
publication this being so the process must be strictly complied with, in that the one
who is instituting the action must be able to prove his title against the whole world.
Hence, before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in
the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to
oppose, the reason of which is DUE PROCESS.
 The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication
of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of
the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in
the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
 The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
 room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.
There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after
all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
 In the present case, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. The Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application and there is no alternative. Thus, the case was dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied
with.
REPUBLIC V. CA (registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land given to Spouses
Maxino decision became final  petition to annul bec unclassified public forest + title only 29
not 885 denied  copy of order to SolGen 1 yr from order Solgen appeal  denied bec
final  appeal; Appeal seasonably made? YES.; 30 day period from SolGen Office apprised
NOT time special counsel/fiscal served; gov’t not estopped by errors of agents)
FACTS:

 This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land
aka Lot 1 located in Mulanay, Quezon.
 On March 21, 1961 In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the CFI at Quezon ordered
the registration of said land, Lot 1, in the names of the spouses Maxino. The decision
became final and executory. On June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed an
amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the ground that they are void
because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover,
the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29
hectares of land and not 885 hectares.
 Judge Agana denied the petition and was served upon the assistant provincial fiscal and
on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the Bureau of Forestry. A copy of the order was
transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office only on September 2, 1971 or
nearly one year from the issuance of the order. The Solicitor General appealed from that
order, and was given due course.
 In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court dismissed the petition
because the 1970 order had allegedly long become final and unappealable. The Solicitor
General appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970 order of denial was
seasonably made? YES.
 The Supreme Court held that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be
reckoned from the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order
of denial and not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that
order. These representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide
whether an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter to the
Solicitor General.
 The Solicitor General's Office should be served with the final order disposing of the
petition and should not be bound by the service on his surrogates, the special
counsel and the fiscal.
 In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly because
public forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision void,
the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
2) Whether Spouses Maxino have a right of ownership over the disputed land? NO.
 It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos, is
within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private
appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry on
July 6, 1940. The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May 20,
1948.
  The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title
or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the
Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de
animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks.
 The composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The unreliability or dubiousness
of the composition title is evident from the sale executed by the heirs of Prudencio
Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino. That curious document is not a sale at
all. It is a "quit-claim".
 It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system,
nullifies the title. Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
 Spanish titles are not indefeasible. The instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and
Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an adjustment title
issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was fraudulent and it covered public
forestal land not subject to registration.
 Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February
16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is
dismissed.
REPUBLIC V. SPOUSES SANCHEZ (Sought for reconsti of alleged destroyed titled based on
duplicate title submitted report signed by chief of reconsti division of LRA stating no overlap
other properties no notice to adjoining owners  RTC granted reconsti  after finality, LRA
submit to court report claiming first report fake + need notice to adj. owners; WON RTC juris?
NO. Source of reconsti is duplicate copies of TCTs; GEN RULE: Sec. 9 and 10 of RA 26 apply
(notice in OG and main entrance of p and m building—no need occupants and owners); THIS
CASE: Sec. 12 and 13 apply bec duplicate challenged notice to all named needed)
FACTS:

 Sanchez sought for reconstitution of titles alleged to have been destroyed by a fire which
razed the Office of the ROD in June 1988. The reconstitution of the title is based on
Sanchez’s duplicate title. They submitted to the RTC a Report allegedly signed by the
Chief of the Reconstitution Division of the LRA stating that the technical description of
the lot does not overlap previously plotted properties. Without serving notices of the
petition to adjoining owners, the RTC then granted the petition for reconstitution. After
the decision became final, LRA submitted to the Court another report claiming that the
first report was fake and recommends that the RTC set aside its decision. LRA also
claims that the notice of the petition should have been served on adjoining owners as
one of the jurisdictional requirements since the Authentic LRA Report found Sanchez’s
title to be a fake title.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
HELD: No.

 The source of the petition for reconstitution in the case at bar was petitioner’s duplicate
copies of the TCTs. As a general rule, Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 will apply and not
Sections 12 and 13.
 Section 9 and 10 or RA 26 require that 30 days before the hearing, (1) a notice be
published in 2 successive issues of the OG at the expense of the petitioner, and (2) such
notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal
hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of
the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the
property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must
appear and file such claims as they may have.
 In petitions for reconstitution where the source is the owner’s duplicate copy, notices to
adjoining owners and to actual occupants of the land are not required. But Puzon is not
applicable here. There is no report from a pertinent government agency challenging the
authenticity of the duplicate certificates of title presented in Puzon.
 Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 must apply because the owner’s duplicate is claimed by the
LRA to be spurious. The failure to meet any of the necessary publication, notice of
hearing and mailing requirements did not vest jurisdiction of the case to the court. Thus,
the judgment rendered by the RTC is void and will never become binding or final as it is
a nullity right from the very start. It may be challenged at any time.
SERRA V. CA (FIRST CASE: Hernaez reconsti of lost og cert of titles  petition granted  then
reconsti titles cancelled (declaration of heirship) and TCTs issued to them  petitioner adverse
claim (possession + CTs)  writ of preliminary injunction issued  denied claim of petitioners +
issued writ of possession to Hernaez

SECOND CASE: While first case pending, petitioner filed against Garygay and SONEDCO for
cut hual and mill his sugarcanes  granted wpi to restrain corpo from issuing the quedans to
Garaygay (said ontained contract to harvest from Hernaez) counter wpi to pet who harvested
and planted sugarcane

WON GAD when CA lifted wpi? YES.

Writ of possession invalid so lifting wpi also invalid bec effected writ of possession; wop cannot
be issued in pet for reconsti of an lost/destroyed COT; reconsti no confirm or adjudicate
ownership over the property; pet not mere possessors but under claim of ownership must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Article 433, New Civil Code), not
summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession; petitioners not served
notice (in petitioner for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the lands
involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition)

WON GAD when lifted wpi so SONEDCO able to deliver sugar quedans in the name of the
private respondents? NO. Not cover already consummated acts;
WON GAD when issued the wpi for recovery of personal property (sugarcane) and damages?
YES. Possession was never put in issue by the parties. The issuance of the writ enjoining
petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane produced from the lots subject of
G.R. No. L-34080 was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.
FACTS:

 On December 27, 2967, three people all surnamed Hernaez filed with the CFI a petition
for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, Eleuterio Hernaez, covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan
Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, all in the Province of Negros
Occidental.
o Supported by a certification from the Register of Deeds, Bacolod, Negros
Occidental, that no certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties.
 On April 6, 1968, the petition was granted and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental issued on May 6, 1969 reconstituted original certificates of title
 On May 29, 1969, these reconstituted original certificates of title were cancelled upon
presentation by the Hernaezes of a "declaration of heirship" and in lieu thereof, TCT
Nos. T-51546, T-51547 and T-51548 were issued in their names.
 Upon learning of the existence of the above transfer certificates of title, Salvador Serra
Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs (Serras, for brevity), filed with the Registry of
 Deeds an adverse claim against the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the
Hernaezes.
o also filed a motion for cancellation of said certificates of title claiming that they
are holders of valid existing certificates of titles and that they are in actual
possession of the properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of titles
since before the war
 Judge Abiera denied the motion for cancellation without conducting a formal hearing.
o Moved for a reconsideration of the denial.
o Hernaezes filed a motion with the trial court for execution of the order of the
Bacolod court in the cadastral case granting the petition for reconstitution. The
motion prayed that they be placed in possession of the subject properties.
 The trial court denied Serras' motion for reconsideration of the denial of
their motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title +
issued the writ of possession prayed for
 Serras challenged the legality of the issuance of the writ of possession before the Court
of Appeals
o Alleged that
 Respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it set
aside the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued thereby giving
effect to the writ of possession issued by the trial court.
 The questioned dissolution of the writ was tantamount to an adjudication
on the merits of the main petition which involves the issue of possession.
The lifting of the writ was allegedly premature.
 The order of the trial court for the issuance of a writ of possession over
the disputed lots in favor of private respondents is void because a writ of
possession in a cadastral proceeding can only be issued pursuant to a
final decree of registration and not, on the basis of an order denying a
motion to cancel certificates of title.
 While G.R. L-34080 was pending in this Court, the Serras filed with the Court of First
Instance Garaygay and SONEDCO (Southern Negros Development Corp.).
o The complaint alleged that Garaygay cut, hauled and milled with SONEDCO's
sugar central, sugarcanes owned by the plaintiffs. The complaint also prayed for
the delivery of sugar quedans covering several truckloads of sugarcane
harvested by Garaygay on Field 17, Lot. No. 4726 of the Kabankalan Cadastre
that were entrusted by him to the corporation for milling; and for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the corporation from issuing the quedans
to Garaygay. The prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was granted
 Garaygay, who claimed that he obtained from the Hernaezes a contract to
harvest and dispose of the sugar canes produced from the disputed lots,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
 Garaygay filed an urgent motion dated December 17, 1971 for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against the Serras who allegedly
harvested and thereafter planted sugarcane on the lots disputed contrary
to the intention of this Court in its resolution of September 28, 1971 that
the parties maintain the status quo.
 Petitioners challenged both orders (November 29, 1971 and December 29, 1971) before
this Court thru G.R. No. L-34693. They assailed that both orders of respondent Judge
Alampay were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
 o Claimed that the writ of injunction issued by respondent judge on October 12,
1971 was aimed to preserve their rights pending determination by this Court in
G.R. No. L-34080 of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. The dissolution of the said writ disturbed the status quo
and allowed private respondent Garaygay to obtain possession of the sugar
quedans from SONEDCO. Petitioners also asserted that the December 29, 1981
order of respondent judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against them and their representative blatantly defied the resolution of this Court
dated September 28, 1971 in G.R. No. L-34080 which enjoined private
respondents Hernaezes, their representatives and/or agents from executing
further acts of dispossessing them of the lots in questions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued? YES.

 We hold that the issuance of the writ of possession by Judge Abiera after the motion for
cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title filed by petitioners was dismissed and
under the circumstances obtaining in this case, was not proper.
o Consequently, the lifting of the previously issued writ of preliminary injunction by
the respondent appellate court, resulting in the enforcement of the writ of
possession issued by the trial court and the dispossession of the petitioners of
the subject properties was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction.
 In the case of Mabale v. Apalisok, L-46942, February 6, 1979, 88 SCRA 247, this Court
enumerated the cases where a writ of possession may be issued:
1) in a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem
2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage
3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided that the
mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party
to the foreclosure suit, had intervened
4) in execution sales
 In a land registration case, a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree
of registration in an original land registration proceedings "not only against the person
who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the proceedings up to the issuance of
the decree."
o It cannot however, be issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or
destroyed certificate of title. Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate
ownership over the property covered by the reconstituted title as in original land
registration proceedings where, in the latter, a writ of possession may be issued
to place the applicant-owner in possession.
 The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same
reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were
when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be
made, as just stated, in the same form and exactly as they were at the time they were
lost or destroyed
o A person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he
does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion of the issuance of a writ of
 possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants of
possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be
threshed out in a separate proceeding.
 It should be noted also, that the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles filed by
the petitioners in the cadastral case, contained serious charge against the reconstitution
proceeding which if proven would result in the nullity of the reconstituted titles.
 Moreover, petitioners were not mere possessors of the properties covered by the
reconstituted titles. They are possessors under claim of ownership.
 The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Article
433, New Civil Code), not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
 Furthermore, petitioners were holders of existing certificates of titles to the same
properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of title of private respondents.
 Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the order granting
reconstitution because the reconstitution proceedings was heard after notices were sent
to alleged boundary owners and the petition was published in the Official Gazette.
However, the petitioner who were in actual possession of the properties were not
notified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as regards actual possessors of the
property.
o In petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the lands
involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
 In re proceedings for reconstituted titles being final: Republic Act No. 26, pursuant to
which the "titles" of private respondents were reconstituted provides in its Sections 18
and 19, thus:
o Sec. 18. In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found
or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title…
o Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and
subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in
whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the register of
deeds should bring the matter to the attention of the proper Court of First
Instance, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the
reconstituted certificates of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of
new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the reconstituted certificate of title,
after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity my require
 Thus, if no such original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the order
for its reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering the order has
not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if in fact
there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the possession of another
person/s.
 In G.R. No. L-34693, We do not believe that respondent Judge Alampay abused his
discretion or acted without jurisdiction when he lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by then Judge Kintanar enjoining SONEDCO from issuing and delivering sugar
quedans in the name of the private respondents. Private respondents, by virtue of the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP-00139 by the Court of Appeals,
took possession over the subject properties. It was not until September 29, 1971 when
We issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against private respondents
ordering them to desist from committing further acts of dispossession against petitioners.
 It did not cover already consummated acts of possession by private respondents such
as the cutting and hauling of sugar cane and the delivery thereof to SONEDCO before
September 30, 1971, the date of receipt by private respondent's counsel of the writ of
injunction in G.R. L-34080. There was also no order yet from Us in G.R. 34090
commanding the return of whatever the private respondents may have received by virtue
of their possession of the premises.
o The writ issued in G.R. No. L-34080 has reference only to and enjoins further
acts of dispossession of the subject lots, obviously to maintain the status quo
with respect to said lands between the petitioners Serra and private respondents,
Hernaezes, pending ultimate and final determination of their ownership rights
over such properties. On the other hand, the writ issued in the present case is
restricted to the defendant SONEDCO directing it to refrain from issuing to
defendant Felipe Garaygay the sugar quedans corresponding to the sugar
cane(s) delivered by and milled for the latter.
o A reading of the writ issued in G.R. L-34080 (Exh. 5-Garaygay) persuades this
Court to conclude that the same was not intended to affect or relate to the sugar
crops on the quedans that would be issued for the value thereof,
 But respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of
preliminary injunction dated December 29, 1971. Civil Case No. 10040 was a complaint
for recovery of personal property (sugarcane) and damages. Possession was never put
in issue by the parties. The issuance of the writ enjoining petitioners from harvesting,
hauling and selling sugarcane produced from the lots subject of G.R. No. L-34080 was
beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. It should be noted that the issue of possession
was then pending in the Court of Appeals
o he issue of possession of the disputed properties should have been presented in
the said case and not in the Civil Case No. 10040. Moreover, in G.R. L-34080,
this Court already issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in G.R. L-
34080 enjoining the private respondents from further dispossessing the
petitioners of the subject premises. The issuance of the questioned writ by
respondent Judge enjoining petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling
sugarcane produced from the subject premises directly contravened the
injunction of this Court.