EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
C.   Testimonial Evidence
          1.   Qualification of witnesses
Sec. 20.  Witnesses;  their qualifications
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y
RAMIREZ, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 138471. October 10,
2002.] ->
FACTS: On 27 January 1995, an information for rape was filed against
accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez
for sexually violating Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor, on
January 3, 1995. Pruna denied the charge against him and interposed
the defense of alibi.  perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating
TRIAL COURT RULING: Gave credence to the testimony of the
complainant and rejected Pruna's defense. It convicted Pruna of rape in
its qualified form and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether Lizette is a qualified witness?
RULING: YES, Lizette is a qualified witness. In this case, appellant
questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the
ground of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing
her mental immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be
gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication34 and that she could discern the
consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain the trial court
in admitting her testimony and according it great weight. In a
string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim
who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves full
credit, especially where no motive is attributed to the victim that
would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl
of such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration;
allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo the
Page 1 of 34
expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial
unless she was in fact raped.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must
consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred
such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to
comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly
to the court at the time he is offered as a witness.The examination
should show that the child has some understanding of the punishment
which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of
consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it
is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or
that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be
sent to hell for false swearing. 30 A child can be disqualified only if it
can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of
them truthfully.
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on
ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The court
cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency.
The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the competency of
a witness to establish the ground of incompetency. 
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the
persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified
are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and relating them truthfully."
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be
excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child
is the test of the competency as a witness.  It is settled that a child,
regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and,
in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is
capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined. 
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
We are not persuaded by appellant's assertion that LIZETTE should not
be allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape "when the
interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of earlier
years." It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which
the crime was committed and the identity of the person responsible
therefor.   neighbors when he brought her to the cemetery. Finally, Banzuela
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FERDINAND BANZUELA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
202060. December 11, 2013.] -> 



FACTS: On July 25, 2003, Banzuela was charged with Rape
and Attempted Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 2 before Branch 209,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City.  testimonies of the witnesses to be credible. Furthermore, this
RTC RULING: Convicted Banzuela of the crimes of rape of AAA
and attempted rape of BBB.
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA said that Banzuela
failed to destroy the victims' credibility or taint their straightforward and
categorical testimonies.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Banzuela is attacking the credibility
of the witnesses for being "highly inconsistent, unusual, doubtful and
thus insufficient to sustain a conviction". Banzuela claimed that AAA's
testimony was full of inconsistencies and contradictions, such as how
she managed to remove his hand from her mouth and yet she did not
shout for help, how Banzuela managed to blindfold BBB while still
carrying her, and more importantly, how confused she was as to
whether his penis actually penetrated her or simply touched her groin
area. Banzuela argued that the fact that AAA was still a virgin was
confirmed by the medico- legal examination, and as the medico legal
officer said during his testimony, although the consensus was that it is
possible for a woman to remain a virgin physically despite penetration,
he himself has had no personal encounter of such a case. Moreover,
Page 2 of 34
Banzuela said, even BBB's actions were highly unusual, considering
the circumstances of her situation. First, Banzuela said, BBB continued
to follow him and AAA despite being blindfolded, instead of turning back
and calling for help. Second, in view of what BBB witnessed happened
to AAA earlier that month, it was contrary to human nature, Banzuela
averred, that she did not resist or try to attract the attention of her
reasoned, the prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of his
defense in light of their failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, he said, he should be acquitted of the charges against
him.
ISSUE: Whether AAA and BBB are qualified as witnesses?
RULING: YES, AAA and BBB are qualified as witnesses. In the
case at bar, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the
Court's own independent examination of the records leads us to
the same conclusion. As the Court of Appeals said, both AAA's
and BBB's testimonies were straightforward, detailed, and
consistent. Their credibility is further strengthened by their clear
lack of ill motive to falsify such a charge against their cousin, who
shattered their youth and innocence. The inconsistencies in AAA's
testimony, as catalogued by Banzuela in his brief, have no bearing
in the determination of his guilt or innocence, and are too trivial in
character to damage AAA's credibility. The material details of the
rape were clearly established, and BBB corroborated AAA's
testimony on every relevant point. As this Court stated in People v.
Saludo: Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a
person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling
or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep
psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim,
scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim
cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she
had undergone. (Citation omitted.) BBB was likewise candid,
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
straightforward, and detailed in her narration of not only how AAA
was raped, but also of how she almost suffered the same fate. Her
alleged unusual actions during AAA's ordeal, and later hers, are
not enough to discredit her. It has been established that a victim
of a heinous crime such as rape cannot be expected to act with
reason or in conformity with society's expectations. This acquires
greater significance where the victim is a child of tender age. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress cannot
be predicted; and people cannot be expected to act as usual in an
unfamiliar situation. Furthermore, it is not accurate to say that
there is a standard reaction or norm of behavior among rape
victims, as each of them had to deal with different circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03868 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
1. In Criminal Case No. MC03-919-FC-H, we find accused-
appellant Ferdinand Banzuela GUILTY of Rape de ned and
penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua
without the possibility of parole; and isORDERED to pay the
victim, AAA, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment; and
2. In Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H, we find accused-
appellant Ferdinand Banzuela GUILTY of Acts of
Lasciviousness, de ned and penalized under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of 6 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, BBB,
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
Page 3 of 34


 
Sec. 21.  Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JONIE
DOMINGUEZ, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 191065. June 13,
2011.] ->

FACTS: There were nine (9) criminal Informations filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 02- 582 to 02-590. In the Informations, respondent
Jonie Dominguez was accused of committing multiple counts of the
crime of rape — under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 in relation to R.A.
No. 7610 — against two minor female relatives, hereinafter called AAA
and BBB. Dominguez was the grandfather of 12-year-old AAA and 13-
year-old BBB.
RTC RULING: Convicted the accused. It gave credence to the
testimonies of the two child-victims, who had positively identified him
and candidly narrated the sexual acts he had perpetrated against them.
The court observed that he had failed to rebut the said allegations.
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC’s decision.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Another point being raised by
Dominguez concerns the consistency of AAA's testimony. He argues
that the inconsistencies in her testimony taint her credibility. In effect,
he claims that since rape is a traumatic event for the victim, there was
no way AAA could have forgotten or been mistaken about it, including
its place of occurrence, had rape really happened. Specifically,
Dominguez is arguing that since AAA mentioned two places — their
house and the back of the school — her testimony was not credible. 
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: In rebuttal, the Office of the Solicitor
General states that AAA indeed testified that she was violated in their
house and that, immediately prior to that incident, she was playing at
the back of the school when Dominguez called her to come inside the
house. AAA's house, where the second rape was committed, was at the
back of the school. She herself clarified this detail during the redirect
examination.
ISSUE: Whether AAA and BBB should be disqualified as witnesses by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity?
RULING: NO, AAA and BBB should not be disqualified as
witnesses by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The SC
finds that AAA and BBB were able to candidly answer the
questions propounded to them during the examination in court
and to communicate the ordeal they suffered in the hands of the
accused. They were credible witnesses.
Relevant to this, we quote the following discussion by retired Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.: It is thus clear that any child, regardless
of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined.  photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be
In the 1913 decision in United States vs. Buncad, this Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon
this point, says: "But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule
defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance
the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated." (Wigmore on
Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)
While on the same subject, Underhill declares: 257. Children on the
witness stand. — Under the common law, competency of a child under
the age of fourteen years to testify must be shown to the satisfaction of
the court. He is presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown to be
competent it is immaterial how young he may be when he testifies. He
is competent if he possesses mental capacity and memory sufficient to
enable him to give a reasonable and intelligible account of the
transaction he has seen, if he understands and has a just appreciation
Page 4 of 34
of the difference between right and wrong, and comprehends the
character, meaning and obligation of an oath. If the witness fulfills these
requirements, it is immaterial as bearing upon his competency that he
is unable to define the oath or to define testimony. In the wise discretion
of the court, a child four, five, six and for such ages as seven, eight,
nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen or fifteen years of age may be shown
competent to testify. It may not be said that there is any particular age
at which as a matter of law all children are competent or incompetent.
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a)
capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of
communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of su cient
intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that
the trial court is called upon to make such determination. As held in
United States vs. Buncad, quoting from Wheeler vs. United States, and
reiterated in People vs. Raptus and People vs. Libungan: The decision
of (sic) this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the
proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack
of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to
disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of
the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be
disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it
was erroneous. (citations omitted).
 
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROLANDO MENDOZA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 113791.
February 22, 1996.] ->
 perceive and make known his perception, he is considered a competent
FACTS: Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young
children, was put to fire in her home in Balasing, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, on 22 November 1989. Maria suffered extensive
second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic
pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns on 30 November
1989. Her husband, respondent Rolando Mendoza, was
charged with the crime of parricide in an information filed on 29
June 1990 with Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan. The accused-appellant and the victim were
married on 30 January 1985 at the Sto. Cristo Parish Church in
Bocaue, Bulacan and lived in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Their union bore three children: Paul Michael, the eldest, who
was born on 7 June 1985, 4 John- John, and Paula, the
youngest. As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul
Michael could testify.
RTC RULING: In favor of People. In giving full credence to the
testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael, the trial court observed that: As
provided by Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a person who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others,
may be a witness. A four-year old boy can already speak clearly, can
understand things happening around him, and ready to study, to read
and to write. For families who can afford, a four-year old child is already
sent to the nursery to begin his/her studies. An intelligent boy is
undoubtedly the best observer to be found. He is little influenced by the
suggestion of others and describes objects and occurrences as he has
really seen them (Pp. vs. Bustos, 45 Phil. 9). Paul Michael was five
months over four years when the incident happened. He could perceive
things happening around him. This was the reason why when his
grandfather and an uncle found him in the house of a neighbor, he was
in a state of shock, or at least dumbfounded (tulala). Because he knew
the implication of what had happened to his mother. He knew that the
burning of his mother might cause her death. If, indeed, he could not
yet perceive things, such happening would pass unnoticed and without
Page 5 of 34
impact on him. Unless a child's testimony is punctured with serious
inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that he was coached, if he can
witness (Pp. vs. Cidro, et al., 56 O.G. 3547). The first time Paul Michael
was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial he testified on
was that his father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On
further questions, he refused to answer anymore. The Court noticed the
reason for such adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the
accused, was directly in his sight and whenever their eyes met, the
child could speak no more. The second time the witness was
presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused.
The Court likewise directed the accused to sit farther away thereby
placing the accused out of the direct sight of the witness. As a result,
the child was able to testify freely and extensively without hesitation.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The accused-appellant's contends
that Paul Michael's testimony could have been in influenced by the
relatives of Gina, who were full of "unwavering anger, hatred, hostility,
resentment, revenge," more so since the child had been in their
custody since after 22 November 1989. He thus asks this Court to
disregard the testimony of Paul Michael for being "open to serious
question and consideration" as it was "often attended [by] unintelligible
answers and punctuated by contrary answers to previously given
answers"; "[b]esides the child's tender age, he suffer[s] from [a] lack or
inadequacy of sense of duty to tell the truth.”
ISSUE: Whether Paul Michael should disqualified as a witness by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity?
RULING: NO, Paul Michael should not be disqualified as a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The trial court has
adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. A close and careful
examination of the testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the
time he testified, he could be deemed a child of above average
intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive answers to the
questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well as recalling
events and relating them to such recollections. We defer to such
observation and explanation. Indeed, there are certain matters that
aid the trial court in assessing the credibility of a witness which
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
are not available to the appellate court, such as emphasis,
gesture, and the inflection of the voice of the witness. The trial
court had the distinct opportunity to make such observations and
to avail of such aids while Paul Michael was on the witness
stand,  thusly, we find no reason to disregard the assessment
made by the trial court. We realize how extremely painful it was for
Paul Michael to reveal that it was his father who burned his
mother. He knew that such a revelation could send his father to jail
and thus brand him a son of a killer or a convict. If he did,
nevertheless, it was to expose the truth and give justice to his
mother who met an excruciatingly painful death. Verily, "from the
mouths of children we get the truth."  not be expected that AAA would have behaved or acted in
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NINOY
ROSALES y ESTO, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 197537.
July 24, 2013.] ->

FACTS: An information for rape was filed against respondent Ninoy
Rosales for raping a 39-year-old mentally retarded who has a
mind of 18 years old AAA.  instinctive, response to a horrible and repulsive stimulus may be
RTC RULING: Rendered judgment finding Rosales guilty of rape and
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered Rosales to
pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Moreover, it found AAA's testimony straightforward,
notwithstanding her mental condition. Lastly, it dismissed Rosales' alibi
as weak and unreliable.
CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the trial court.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Rosales contends that AAA's
testimony is incredible on the lone argument that the latter did not make
an outcry when the alleged lustful advances were made against her.
Page 6 of 34
ISSUE: Whether AAA should be disqualified as witness by reason of
mental incapacity or immaturity?
RULING: NO, AAA should not be disqualified as witness by reason
of mental incapacity or immaturity. The fact of AAA's mental
retardation did not impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental
retardation per se does not affect credibility. A one mentally
retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the
manner she can make them known to the court. In this case where
the victim was proven to be a mental retardate, it could certainly
accordance with what appellant perceived to be as normal. Taking
into consideration the positive and categorical declaration of AAA
and the medical findings to support her claims, we affirm the
lower courts' unanimous nding that AAA, by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, was raped by the appellant.
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or
victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to
the usual expectations of everyone. People may react differently to the
same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even
aggression, while another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it can never
be successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than
the former.
I n People v. Alipio, the Court rebuked appellant therein for raising a
similar argument. The Court went on to state that it is not fair to judge a
mentally-retarded person, one who does not have a good grasp of
information and who lacks the capacity to make a mental calculation of
the events unfolding before her eyes, according to what is natural or
unnatural for normal persons. 19
We have thoroughly examined AAA's testimony and found no reason to
depart from the legal adage that this Court accords the trial judge's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses great respect in the absence
of any attendant of grave abuse of discretion on the account that the
trial court had the advantage of actually examining both real and
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
testimonial pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the
witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. The rule
finds an even greater application when the trial court's findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDGARDO MACEDA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 138805.
February 28, 2001.] ->
 invented the charge.
FACTS: An information for rape of 32-year-old Maribeth Quinto,
a mental retardate was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City against accused-appellant Edgardo Maceda.  testimony is read in parts and the portions thereof are isolated or taken
RTC RULING: Finding the accused Edgardo Maceda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape now penalized under Art. 266-A
and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in accordance with RA 8353,
with the aggravating circumstance that the offender knew of the mental
disability of the complainant Maribeth Quinto at the time of the
commission of the crime, the Court hereby imposes the death penalty
on the said accused. He is also ordered to indemnify the offended party
in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Maceda says that complainant's
mental condition rendered her testimony so vague, uncertain, and
incoherent that it cannot be understood.
ISSUE: Whether Maribeth should be disqualified as a witness by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity?
RULING: NO, Maribeth should not be disqualified as a witness by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The defense and the
prosecution stipulated during pre-trial that complainant is a
mental retardate. But, although the trial court observed that she
had some difficulty expressing herself, she was nonetheless able
to intelligently and clearly make known to the court, beyond
dispute, that she was raped by Maceda. It has been held that the
mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to be
Page 7 of 34
testified to occurred affects only her credibility. As long as the
witness can convey ideas by words or signs and give sufficiently
intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent
witness even if she is a mental retardate. Indeed, it is difficult to
believe that complainant, whose intelligence is admittedly low,
could have concocted so grave a charge against accused-
appellant or that she and her mother would go into the trouble of
having her medically examined and undergo trial had she merely
A reading of complainant's testimony in its entirety shows that she
repeatedly stated what accused-appellant had done to her. Only if such
out of context and no allowance is made for complainant's mental
condition can Maceda's reading of it be justified. Inconsistencies or
lapses in her testimonies do not affect the substance of her statements.
They do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its
material whole nor reflect adversely on complainant's credibility.
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provide:
SECTION 20. Witnesses; their quali cations. — Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to another, may be
witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. — The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental conditions, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
 
 
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROBERTO PANSENSOY, accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
140634. September 12, 2002.] ->
 RULING: NO, Analie should not be disqualified. As the legitimate


FACTS: An Information was filed charging Robertp Pansensoy with the
crime of murder. Pansensoy shot the victim, Hilario Reyes, who is
allegedly the lover of Pansensoy’s wife, Analie.  case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
RTC RULING: The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the
testimony of Analie and rejected the version of Pansensoy that he acted
in self-defense. It found the testimony of Analie credible and observed
that she remained unperturbed during the cross-examination. The trial
court also noted that Pansensoy, who was then a security guard, was
charged by his employer with the crime of qualified theft for the loss of
a .38 caliber revolver. Pansensoy allegedly committed the theft on May
8, 1994, the very same day the shooting incident happened. The gun
used in shooting Hilario was not found at the scene of the crime but the
slug recovered was that of a .38 caliber revolver. Although Pansensoy
was subsequently acquitted of the charge, the trial court considered this
as "evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime." The trial
court further noted that Pansensoy went into hiding from the time the
shooting incident happened until the case was filed in court on August
24, 1994.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Undeterred, Pansensoy's first
assignment of error is focused on the sufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution, questioning in particular the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness, Analie. According to him,
Analie's testimony is flawed as she insisted that she and Pansensoy
had been separated for more than three years but this is belied by the
fact that their youngest daughter is barely a year old. He also points out
that his version when he dragged his wife outside by pulling her hair
was more believable and in accord with human behavior rather than
Analie's version that Pansensoy took time to interrogate the victim
regarding how much the latter loved his wife and other personal
circumstances before shooting him.
Page 8 of 34
ISSUE: Whether Analie should be disqualified as a witness?
wife of Pansensoy, Analie's testimony would have been
disregarded had appellant timely objected to her competency to
testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the
competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal
prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of
other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the
spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a
witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's
failure to make a timely objection to the admission of Analie's
testimony. From Analie's testimony, it is all too apparent that the
rst requisite of self-defense is absent. The unlawful aggression did
not come from the victim but from appellant himself. The
aggression not having come from the victim, appellant's claim of
self-defense cannot prosper. The trial court relied on Analie's
testimony to convict appellant and we find that her testimony is
sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant
ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE as de ned and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor
minimum, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The award of actual
damages of P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
loss of earning capacity in the amount of P3,379,200.00.
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
117401. October 1, 1998.]->
 or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case
FACTS: On January 17, 1989, accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato Jr
was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court
of Davao for killing his father, Bernardo Quidato Sr using a bolo.
The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its
witnesses accused-appellant's brother Leo Quidato, appellant's wife
Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the
prosecution offered in evidence a davits containing the extrajudicial
confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers
were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand.
Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were
assisted by counsel when they made their confessions. Similarly, the
prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who attested to the
due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita
brothers.
According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September
17, 1988, accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba
at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-
law's house to get money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as
to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10:00
p.m. Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the
ground that the same was prohibited by the marital disquali cation rule
found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The judge,
acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said
testimony only against accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and
Eddie.
ISSUE: Whether Gina should be disqualified as witness?
RULING: YES, Gina should be disqualified as witness. With regard
to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded,
accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the
Page 9 of 34
marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a
quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties
against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-
appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against
accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial
notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the
marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the a
davits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were,
however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their
extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these a
davits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the a
ants themselves take the witness stand to a rm the averments in their a
davits, the a davits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding,
being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused
made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-
accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him.
The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn
statements of the Malita brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." The
inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The confessions
were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation
of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the a davits
were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence.
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the
police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were
voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It
is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to
Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the
same in the presence of counsel the next day.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated
March 2, 1994, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Bernardo Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. Consequently, let the accused be immediately released from his
place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for
any other legal or valid cause. With costs de oficio.
• MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ,
respondent. [G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005.]  ->
FACTS: Respondent Susan Ramirez, is the complaining witness in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is petitioner Maximo
Alvarez. Maximo is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of
Susan.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to
the witness stand as the first witness against Maximo, her husband.
Maximo and his counsel raised no objection.
In the course of Esperanza's direct testimony against Maximo, the latter
showed "uncontrolled emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend
the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, Maximo, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Page 10 of 34
Ramirez filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the
motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of the other witnesses.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Issued the questioned Order disqualifying
Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony
from the records.
CA RULING: rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court
ISSUE: Whether Esperanza should be disqualified as witness?
RULING: NO, should not be disqualified as witness. Obviously, the
offense of arson attributed to Maximo, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. Maximo's
act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes. It should be stressed that as
shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between Maximo and Esperanza was already strained.
In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the
incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between Maximo and Esperanza is no
longer an interest the State aims to protect. At this point, it bears
emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before
the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent
exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of
Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco 14 ), "it was the latter himself
who gave rise to its necessity.” Thus, Esperanza Alvarez can
testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. 
 Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disquali cation by reason of marriage. — During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of
private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice,
and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its
own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the
rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and con dences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan, this Court held:
"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this
jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac.
64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
'The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or
Page 11 of 34
indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too
broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or
directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one
against the other.'"
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: "The act of private
respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in- law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the
alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony
and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily
seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the
fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more
harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has
held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect
are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus,
there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The
trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow
Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal
Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
Sec. 22.  Disqualification by reason of marriage
Sec. 23.  Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
party
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
• HEIRS OF VENANCIO BAJENTING and FELISA S.
BAJENTING, NAMELY: Teresita A. Bajenting, Ruel A.
Bajenting, Gilbert A. Bajenting, Cresilda B. Puebla, Imelda
B. Salac, Benedictina B. Ravina, Margarita B. Reusora,
Renato A. Bajenting, Lorena A. Bajenting, Elizalde A.
Bajenting, Francisco Malda, Jr., B. Selecio Bajenting,
Trinidad M. Antinola, Roland B. Malda, Luisa B. Malda,
Arsenia C. Ramirez, Angelina Ricarte, Editha Esteban,
Lourdes M. Garcia, Nora M. Alivio, Francisca B. Espina,
Francisco Malda, Sr., and Venencio A. Bajenting,
represented by VENENCIO A. BAJENTING, Attorney-in-
Fact, petitioners, vs. ROMEO F. BAÑEZ, SPOUSES
JONATHAN and SONIA LUZ ALFAFARA, respondents. [G.R.
No. 166190. September 20, 2006.] -> 
 by her husband, Francisco Malda, and children: Lee B. Malda, Angelina


FACTS: Venancio Bajenting applied for a free patent over a
parcel of land, Lot 23 (Sgs. 546 D), Davao Cadastre, located in
Langub, Davao City, with an area of 104,140 square meters.
The application was docketed as Free Patent Application No.
IV-45340. In the meantime, Venancio planted fruit trees in the
property 3 such as mango, lanzones, coconut and santol. He
and his wife, Felisa Bajenting, along with their children, also
resided in a house which stood on the property.
On February 18, 1974, Venancio died intestate. His application for a
free patent was thereafter approved, and on December 18, 1975, Free
Patent No. 577244 was issued in his favor. On February 6, 1976, the
Register of Deeds issued Original Certi cate of Title (OCT) No. P-5677
over the property in the name of "Venancio Bajenting, married to Felisa
Sultan." Selecio Bajenting continued cultivating the land.  the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglunsod approved City
Ordinance No. 263, Series of 1982 and Resolution No. 10254 declaring
the properties in Langub as a low density residential zone.
Page 12 of 34
On May 31, 1993, Felisa and the other heirs of Venancio (Heirs, for
brevity),9 executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Deed of Absolute
Sale over Lot 23. They alleged therein that when Venancio died
intestate, they had agreed to adjudicate unto themselves as heirs of the
deceased the aforesaid property, as follows:
TO: FELISA S. BAJENTING, One half (1/2) share of the whole of Oct.
No. P-5677, as her conjugal share; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
OCT No. P-5677.
TO: FELISA S. BAJENTING, MARGARITA BAJENTING, FRANCISCA
BAJENTING, SILVERIO BAJENTING (Deceased) represented by his
wife and children: Teresita Apas-Bajenting, Renato Bajenting, Gilbert
Bajenting, Criselda Bejenting, Imelda Bajenting, Venancio Bajenting
and Elizalde Bajenting; MAXIMA BAJENTING (Deceased) represented
B. Malda, Milagros B. Malda, Editha B. Malda and Susana B. Malda;
BENEDICTINA BAJENTING, ARSENIA BAJENTING; and CELECISO
BAJENTING, in equal share pro-indiviso. 
In the same deed, a 50,000 square meter portion of the property was
sold to the spouses Sonia Luz Alfafara; and the 54,140 square meter
portion to Engr. Romeo F. Bañez. The share of Felisa was included in
the portion sold to Engr. Bañez. However, the deed was not notarized;
neither was the sale approved by the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources. In the Agreement/Receipt executed by Felisa
Bajenting and Romeo Bañez, the parties declared that the price of
property was P500,000.00; P350,000.00 was paid by the vendees, the
balance of P150,000.00 to be due and payable on or before December
31, 1993 at the residence of the vendors. The owner's duplicate of title
was turned over to the vendees. However, the deed was not led with
The Heirs, including Felisa, tried to repurchase the property as provided
under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, but Romeo Bañez
and Sonia Alfafara did not allow them to exercise their right.
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
On May 31, 1995, the Heirs, through Venencio Bajenting, filed a
Complaint for recovery of title against Romeo Bañez and the spouses
Alfafara in the Office of the Barangay Captain. When no settlement was
reached, the Heirs led a complaint for Quieting of Title, Repurchase of
Property, Recovery of Title plus Damages with the Regional Trial Court,
claiming that they had tried to repurchase the property from the
defendants and that the latter had ignored the summons from the
Barangay Captain for an amicable settlement of the case.
TRIAL COURT RULING: On March 1, 2002, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the Heirs. The RTC ruled that while there is
evidence that first-class subdivisions are being developed in the vicinity,
no budget had been appropriated for the plans to construct the
government center and the sports complex. However, it declared that
the defendants failed to present any evidence that the plaintiffs were
repurchasing the property for and in behalf of a financier. Ordering the
defendants to vacate subject property covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. T-5677 and deliver said Certificate of Title to plaintiffs within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, is hereby ordered to release the
amount of P350,000.00 deposited by plaintiffs in favor of defendants,
representing the repurchase money of subject property, evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 6547953, dated October 11, 1996. Further, the
compulsory counter-claim filed by defendants against plaintiffs is
hereby DISMISSED.
CA RULING: On February 27, 2004, the CA rendered judgment
granting the appeal, and reversed the Decision of the trial court. The
CA ruled that as gleaned from the evidence on record and the
pleadings of the Heirs, the property was sought to be repurchased for
profit, and not to preserve it for themselves and their families.  Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: As found by the CA, the testimonies
of Reyes and Oyco were credible and deserving of full probative
weight. Indeed, their testimonies are buttressed by the trial court's
Order dated January 19, 1998. They add that the  findings of the CA
are binding on this Court, and that the dead man's statute does not
Page 13 of 34
apply to the testimonies of Reyes and Oyco, being as they were, mere
witnesses not parties to the case.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The collective testimonies of Reyes
and Oyco were hearsay and inadmissible in evidence under the dead
man's statute, Margarita Reusora having died on August 24, 1997
before the witnesses had even testi ed. Neither Margarita nor Venencio
Bajenting could have informed Reyes and Oyco that the petitioners
were selling the property for P10,000,000.00 because petitioners,
through Venencio Bajenting, had led a case against the respondents in
the Office of the Barangay Captain. 
ISSUE: Whether Reyes and Oyco should be disqualified as witnesses?
RULING: NO, Reyes and Oyco should not be disqualified as
witnesses. Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, the collective
testimonies of Reyes and Oyco are admissible in evidence despite
the fact that when they testified, Margarita Reusora was already
dead. Section 20(a), Rule 130 applies only to parties to a case, or
assignors of parties to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. Reyes and Oyco were mere witnesses for
respondents, not parties in the court a quo, nor assignors of any
of the parties in whose behalf the case was prosecuted. Their
testimonies were presented only to prove that the petitioners
intended to repurchase the property for profit, and not for the
purpose of preserving it for their and their families' use and
enjoyment.
Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are
interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
or before such became of unsound mind.
 
• Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS,
deceased. MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO, administrator-appellee,
vs. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA,
claimant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-2016. August 23, 1949.]
 CFI RULING: Denying appellant's claim of P63,868.67 against the
FACTS: The appellant Atlantic, Gulf & Paci c Company of Manila is a
foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to do business in the
Philippines, with its office and principal place of business in the City of
Manila.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest
stockholders of said company when the Paci c war broke out on
December 8, 1941.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santo Tomas
internment camp, and special proceeding No. 70139 was subsequently
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of
his estate.
The Atlantic, Gulf & Paci c Company of Manila resumed business
operations in March, 1945.
In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of
Richard T. Fitzsimmons totalling to P63,868.67 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
In the same claim the company offered to reacquire the 545 shares
sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the
amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize the
Page 14 of 34
setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of
P64,500 returnable to the estate.
In his answer to the amended claim the administrator denied the
alleged indebtedness of the deceased to the claimant, expressed his
conformity to the refund of P64,500 by the claimant to the estate and
the retransfer by the latter to the former of the 545 shares of stock, and
set up a counterclaim of P90,000 for salaries allegedly due the
deceased from the claimant corresponding to the years 1942, 1943,
and the first half of 1944, at P36,000 per annum.
estate of the deceased Richard T. Fitzsimmons, and granting appellee's
counterclaim of P90,000 against the appellant. It rejected the
testimonies of the witnesses Mr. Henry J. Belden (Vice-President-
Treasurer) and Mr. Samuel Garmezy (President) of Atlantic Gulf &
Pacific Company of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether Belden and Garmezy should be disqualified as
witnesses?
RULING: NO, Belden and Garmezy should not be disqualified as
witness. As officers of a corporation (Belden and Garmezy) which
is a party to an action against an executor or administrator (Atty
Lichuaco) of a deceased person (Fitzsimmons), they are not
disqualified from testifying as to any matter occurring before the
death of such deceased person.  Inasmuch as section 26(c) of
Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are
constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the
corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
It results that the trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of
Messrs. Belden and Garmezy. It is not necessary, however, to remand
the case for the purpose of taking the testimony of said witnesses
because it would be merely corroborative, if at all, and in any event
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
what said witnesses would have testified, if permitted, already appears
in the record as hereinabove set forth, and we can consider it together
with the testimony of the chief accountant and the assistant accountant
who, according to the appellant itself, were "the only ones in the best of
position to testify on the status of the personal account" of the
deceased Fitzsimmons.
Under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
or before such person became of unsound mind."
This provision was taken from section 383, paragraph 7, of our former
Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn was derived from section 1880 of
the Code of Civil Procedure of California.
In the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal., 167; 67 Pac., 52,
55, the Supreme Court of California, interpreting said article 1880,
said:". . . The provision applies only to parties or assignors of parties,
and Haslam was neither the one nor the other. If he was a stockholder,
which it is claimed he was, that fact would make no difference, for
interest no longer disqualifies under our law, Civ. Code Proc. sec. 1879.
Appellant cites section 14, Civ. Code, to the effect that the word
'person' includes a corporation; and claims that, as the corporation can
only speak through its officers, the section must be held to apply to all
who are officially related to the corporation. A corporation may be
conceded to be a person, but the concession does not help appellant.
To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are
officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation. Plainly the law
disqualifies only 'parties or assignors of parties,' and does not apply to
persons who are merely employed by such parties or assignors of
parties."
Page 15 of 34
The same view is sustained in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol.
9, pages 535-538; in Jones on Evidence, 1938 Ed. Vol. 3, page 1448;
and in Moran on the Law of Evidence in the Philippines, 1939 Ed.
pages 141-142.
The appellee admits in his brief that in those states where the "dead
man's statute" disqualifies only parties to an action, officers and
stockholders of a corporation have been allowed to testify in favor of
the corporation, while in those states where "parties and persons
interested in the outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under the
statute, officers and stockholders of the corporation have been held to
be incompetent to testify against the estate of a deceased person. 
  
• ONG CHUA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD CARR ET AL.,
defendants- appellants. [G.R. No. 29512. January 17, 1929.]
-> 

FACTS: Lots Nos. 136 and 137 and the house on lot No. 132 originally
belonged to one Henry E. Teck, and lot No. 135 was the property of
Teck's wife, Magdalena Lim. Sometime prior to June 20, 1923, it seems
that the spouses sold the property in question to petitioner Ong Chua,
and on June 17, 1923, Chua executed a public document granting to
Magdalena Lim the right to repurchase lot 135 for the sum of P6,500
within four years from that date, and on the 20th of the same month,
Chua executed another public document in which he agreed to sell lots
Nos. 136, 137, and the house on lot 132 to Henry E. Teck for the sum
of P13,500 at any time within four years from date. Neither one of the
documents was placed on record with the register of deeds. Later on,
respondent Edward Carr came to Zamboanga, bringing with him letters
of introduction addressed to P. J. Moore, a practicing attorney in that
town. Carr became interested in buying the aforementioned lots., he
was told by Moore that Teck and his wife had the right to repurchase
the property in question from Ong Chua and that such rights would
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
expire in June, 1927, to which he agreed and later on December 14,
1925, the draft for the deed of sale of property was prepared and Ong
Chua stated to Moore that he consented to sell the properties to Carr
on the condition that the sale should be subject to the rights of Teck and
Lim to have the property reconveyed to them and that said rights were
to be respected by the vendee, Carr still agreed. During the drafting of
the Deed, Carr’s money was insufficient, so he applied for loans with
several banks.After the deed was prepared and signed, Ong Chua told
Carr and Moore that lot No. 137 was mortgaged by him to the Bank of
the Philippine Islands for P6,500, the rate of interest being 10 per cent
per annum. Moore stated that the Zamboanga Building and Loan
Association could not lend money at less than 13 per cent per annum.
Ong Chua then stated that he was willing to let the mortgage on the lot
given to the bank stand until the expiration of the term for the
repurchases. As this arrangement would save Carr a considerable sum
of money, he agreed to the proposition and paid only P13,500 in cash
and promised, in writing, to pay to the vendor the balance of the
purchase price, P6,500, with interest at 10 per cent per annum, on or
before July 1, 1927. The loan from the Building and Loan Association
thus became unnecessary, but instead of redrafting the deed, it was
agreed that Moore would keep the deed and the other documents in his
custody and would not deliver them to any one until the expiration of
the period for repurchase.
In September, 1926, Moore was taken critically ill, and while he was
under medical treatment in the Zamboanga Hospital, Carr came to him
on various occasions and demanded that the documents be delivered
to him. At first Moore refused to make the delivery on the ground that it
was contrary to their agreement and might result to the prejudice of the
rights of Teck and Lim, but Carr continued to molest Moore with his
demand for the delivery of the papers, and nally, in order to escape
further annoyances and insinuations of Carr, he surrendered the deed
to the latter, who almost immediately presented it to the register of
deeds for registration.
In July, 1926, Teck offered to repurchase the property in question from
Ong Chua who thereupon demanded of Carr the reconveyance of the
property to the spouses, Teck and Lim, but Carr refused to do so,
claiming that he had an absolute title to said property, and Ong Chua
Page 16 of 34
then learned, for the first time, that the deed in question contained no
reference to the rights of Teck and Lim to repurchase the property. On
July 23, 1926, this action was brought, the plaintiff alleging in substance
the principal facts hereinbefore stated and demanding that the deed in
question be reformed in accordance therewith. The defendant
demurred, but the demurrer was overruled. The defendant thereupon
filed an answer pleading the general issue and setting up as special
defenses that the deed in question contained no stipulation as to rights
of repurchase and that if there was any agreement or promise on the
part of the defendant to convey the property to Henry E. Teck and
Magdalena Lim or to the plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint, such
agreement and promise was for the sale of real property, or an interest
therein, and that neither said agreement or promise, nor any note or
memorandum was made in writing or subscribed by the defendant or by
any authorized person for him. Subsequent to the  filing of the answer,
Carr died, and the administrator of his estate, Manuel Igual, was
substituted as defendant.
TRIAL COURT RULING: No evidence was offered by Carr, and,
consequently, the facts hereinbefore stated stand uncontradicted. Upon
such facts the court below ordered the reformation of the deed, Exhibit
A, in accordance with the Chua's demand.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The court erred in permitting the
plaintiff, Ong Chua, to testify, over the defendant's objections, to facts
occurring prior to the death of the defendant Carr,
ISSUE: Whether Ong Chua should be disqualified to be a witness?
RULING: NO, Ong Chua should not be disqualified to be a
witness. In this case a number of credible witnesses testified to
facts which conclusively showed that Carr's conduct was tainted
with fraud. Chua did not take the witness stand until after the
existence of fraud on the part of Carr had been established
beyond a doubt and not by a mere preponderance of evidence. In
these circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in
not excluding Chua's testimony.
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
The first proposition rests on subsection 7 of section 383 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which bars parties to an action or proceeding against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person.
Similar provisions are to be found in the statutes of practically all of the
states of the Union, and the rule thus laid down is now unquestioned.
But it has generally been given a liberal construction to promote justice,
and it is held that it never was intended to serve as a shield for fraud.
As stated in Jones on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 774:
"The evidence of an adverse party is absolutely excluded by an
independent, affirmative enactment making him incompetent as to
transactions or communications with a deceased or incompetent
person. These statutes, however, do not render the adverse party
incompetent to testify to fraudulent transactions of the deceased, as the
statutes are not designed to shield wrongdoers but the courts compel
the adverse party to clearly establish the alleged fraudulent acts before
admitting such testimony."
And in the case of Tongco vs. Vianzon (50 Phil., 698, 702) this court
said: "Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and
purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule
that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth."


Page 17 of 34
• GO CHI GUN alias CHIPBUN GOCHECO, GO AWAY alias
LIM KOC and FEDERICO M. CHUA HIONG, plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. CO CHO, GO TECSON, DONATO GO TIAK
GIAP, CESAREO GO TEK HONG, ALFONSO GO TEK BIO,
MARIANO GO TEK LIONG, DOMINGO GO TEK LUNG, GO
GIOK TE, GO CHUN TE AND PACIFICO YAP, defendants-
appellants. [G.R. No. L-5208. February 28, 1955.] ->



FACTS: Go Checo, a chinaman, died in Saigon, Indo China, on
February 19, 1914, leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines. On March 7, 1914, his son Paulino Gocheco instituted
judicial proceedings for the distribution of his estate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The intestate left children by two marriages. The
estate left by the intestate was, according to assessments made by the
commissioners on appraisal, valued at P44,017.00. Each of his 8
children received properties or cash amounting to P3,995.56. The
project of partition is signed by one Joaquin A. Go Cuay as guardian ad
litem of the minors and was approved by the court on May 11, 1916.
Upon the termination of the intestate proceedings, Paulino Gocheco
instituted guardianship proceedings for his minor brothers and sisters,
and he was appointed guardian for their persons and properties on May
20, 1916. These guardianship proceedings continued until September
15, 1931 when all the wards had become of age. The proceedings were
closed on said date and the guardian relieved of liability as such.
Paulino Gocheco died on April 24, 1943, and on January 10, 1944 his
eldest son instituted intestate proceedings for the settlement of his
estate. These were terminated on March 23, 1947. Later on,
an action was instituted by Go Chi Gun and Go Away on July 31, 1948.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Annulled the project of partition in the
intestate proceedings of the deceased Gocheco, as the same was
found to have been procured through fraud, collusion and connivance
to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; declared that the properties obtained by
the deceased Paulino Gocheco in the said partition proceedings are the
common properties of plaintiffs Go Chi Gun and Go Away and the
deceased Paulino Gocheco in the proportion of 1/3 for each of them;
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
and ordered defendants to render a correct and detailed accounting of
the said properties and business interest of said deceased Paulino
Gocheco to the plaintiffs from 1916 up to the present. It also dismissed
the defendants' counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether Go Chi Gun and Go Away should be disqualified as
witnesses?
RULING: YES, Go Chi Gun and Go Away should be disqualified as
witnesses. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the plaintiffs as to
the alleged statements of the deceased to him are well within the
purpose and intent of the prohibition. The reason for the rule is
that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased
or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed
statements made by him (deceased person), many would be
tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the
latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting
their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco vs. Vianzon,
50 Phil., 698.) The administration of the properties of plaintiffs'
father was judicially made, and the existence thereof and of the
properties he left were in public records. For 40 years during
which Paulino Gocheco was living, plaintiffs herein had remained
silent and had done nothing to check the truth of the supposed
statements of their deceased brother, which could easily be done
because the facts they had interest in were in public records. It
was only after Go Checo had died, such that he can no longer
deny their statements, and after all possible witnesses or papers
or circumstances have already gone beyond recall because of the
destruction of the public records, that the supposed statement is
now brought forth and made the basis of the plaintiffs' action. We
cannot help but induced to believe that it is the death of the
decedent, and the latter's inability to deny the supposed statement
made by him, as well as the destruction of the records of the
judicial proceedings, that must have tempted plaintiffs to bring the
action. The case clearly falls within the spirit and terms of the
Page 18 of 34
prohibition contained in the rule. We find, therefore, that the trial
court committed an error in allowing the plaintiffs- appellees, over
the objections of the attorneys for the defendants-appellants, to
testify as to the supposed statements made to them by the
deceased Paulino Gocheco.
Section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 26. Persons who cannot testify generally, or because of certain
relations to parties the following persons cannot be witnesses:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
or before such person became of unsound mind;"
 
• Intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by
JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendant-appellee.  [G.R. No.
27498. September 20, 1927. 1 ]->
FACTS: Marcelino Tongco and respondent Anastacia Vianzon
contracted marriage on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on July 8, 1925,
leaving Anastacia as a widower. The niece of Marcelino, petitioner
Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It appears that
shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in
a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in
the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife,
and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
of the conjugal partnership not long after his death, to which the judge
in that case ruled in favor of Anastasia.  While the appellant’s counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing
On July 19, 1926, Josefa began an action against Anastacia Vianzon
for the recovery of specified property and for damages. The issue was
practically the same as in the cadastral case.  question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however,
(Note: 1st case = cadastral proceedings, which ruled in favor of
Anastacia; and 2nd case = recovery of specified property which is the
subject of the cadastral proceedings and for damages, which again
ruled in favor or Anastacia)
CFI RULING: Judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in the
following language: "Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving
the defendant from the complaint in this case, and only declares that
one-half of the value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de
Credito Rural de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to the
intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must
appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased
Marcelino Tongco." The motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor,
the trial judge.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The Estate of Marcelino attacks the
ruling of the trial judge to the effect that the widow was competent to
testify. Counsel for the appellant, asserts that if the testimony of the
widow be discarded, as it should be, then the presumption of the Civil
Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises,
which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured.
Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as provides that "Partied or assignors of parties to an action
or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person .
. .” 
ISSUE: Whether Anastacia should be disqualified as a witness?
Page 19 of 34
RULING:  NO, Anastacia should not be disqualified as a witness.
that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to
aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the
truth. The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions
were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor
were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first
case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce a
demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same
analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral
proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is
no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the
adverse party undertook to cross-examination the interested
person with respect to the prohibited matter. We are of the opinion
that the witness was competent. It is true that by reason of the
provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that
all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the
absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think
that the widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner
that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it
would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. No
reversible error was committed in the denial of the motion for a
new trial for it is not at all certain that it rested on a legal
foundation, or that if it had been granted it would have changed
the result.  
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
• LEONOR MENDEZONA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ENCARNACION C. VIUDA DE GOITIA, administratrix of the
estate of Benigno Goitia, defendant- appellant. [G.R. No.
31739. March 11, 1930.] ->
FACTS: Petitioners Leonor Mendezona and Valentina Izaguirre y
Nazabal, filed separate claims with the committee of claims and
appraisal against the intestate estate of Benigno Goitia y Lazaga with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Respondent Encarnacion C. Viuda
De Goitia was appointed as judicial administratrix of Benigno Goitia’s
estate.
LOWER COURT RULING: Ordered Encarnacion as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Benigno Goitia, to pay
plaintiff Leonor Mendezona the sum of P13,140 with legal interest from
the date of the ling of the complaint, and to pay the plaintiff Valentina
Izaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint, and moreover, to pay the costs of both instances
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The fourth assignment of error
relates to Exhibits A and B, being the Mendezona and Izaguirre's
depositions made before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in
accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel
for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he
did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of
the committee. When these depositions were read in court,
Encarnacion objected to their admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to the
following questions:
"1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your partnership in
the "Tren de Aguadas?' — Yes, until the year 1914.
"2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any report or
money on account of pro ts upon your shares? — He sent me nothing,
nor did he answer, my letters.
Page 20 of 34
"3. Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account? —
Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an answer.”
ISSUE: Whether Mendezona and Izaguirre should be disqualified as
witnesses?
RULING: NO, Mendezona and Izaguirre should not be disqualified
as witnesses. In the case before us there has been no such
liquidation between the plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They
testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the rule that
"if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals
those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim
against the testamentary estate. We do not believe that this was
the legislator's intention. We are of the opinion that the claimants'
denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their
attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia does not come within the legal
prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law
prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate
of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took
place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle
of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from ctitious
claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute
bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the
decedent's estate.
The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the
principals and their attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914.
Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would not be
reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by several exhibits.
As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that deponents deny
having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money on
account of profits on their shares, since 1915. 
The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before
their representative's death, but on the contrary denied that a
liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their
shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It
was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
affirmative proposition was true, either by bringing into court the books
which attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing
copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was the
decedent's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar
evidence.  of Antamok Central Group which was later sold to Big Wedge Mining
• In the matter of the estate of George M. Icard, deceased,
JOSEPH K. ICARD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLARO MASIGAN,
as special administrator of the estate of George M. Icard;
and EFFIE CARLAND ICARD, defendants-appellants. [G.R.
No. 47442. April 8, 1941.]-?
FACTS: For services rendered in connection with the development and
location of certain mining claims, petitioner Joseph K. Icard filed a claim
of P2,000 against the estate of his deceased father, George M. Icard.
The claim having been allowed by the commissioners on claims, the
administrator, respondent Claro Masigan appealed to the Court of First
Instance, where it was likewise allowed. Masigan's appeal to this Court
rests mainly on the theory that the probate court erred in allowing the
Joseph to testify to the services rendered by him in favor of his father,
because the action being one against the administrator of a deceased
person, Joseph cannot be allowed to testify as to any matter of fact
which occurred before the death of such deceased person, under
section 383, paragraph 7, of Act No. 190, now Rule 123, section 26
paragraph (c), of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether Joseph Icard should be disqualified as witness?
RULING: NO, Joseph Icard should not be disqualified as
witness. Section 383, par. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
is now Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, is
designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has
closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the
surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of
fictitious claims against the deceased. Where, as in the instant
case the purpose of the oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim
than what might be warranted by clear written evidence, to avoid
Page 21 of 34
prejudice to the estate of the deceased, the law has certainly no
reason for its application Ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex.
It is thus clear that Joseph K. Icard had an interest in the mining claims
Company, as evidenced by the deed of sale executed in favor of the
Big Wedge Mining Company and the compromise agreement approved
by the court in civil case No. 48186 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The amount of this interest being undetermined, Joseph K.
Icard may, if he wishes to, properly claim one-half of P39,478.16, under
the legal provision that "the interest of the coowners shall be presumed
to be equal until the contrary is prove." (Art. 393, C. C.). Instead, he
claims P2,000 only, and it is this reduced claim which he seeks to
establish by his oral testimony.  
• GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P.
VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P.
VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P.
VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P.
VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P.
VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA , petitioners-appellants, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-
appellees. [G.R. No. L-27434. September 23, 1986.] ->
FACTS: Sometime in 1949, petitioner Paredes Villanueva negotiated
with TABACALERA for the purchase of three haciendas situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental. However, as Villanueva did not
have sufficient funds to pay the price, with the consent of
TABACALERA, Villanueva offered to sell one of the haciendas to a
Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction
between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private respondent
Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of
TABACALERA. Either because the amount realized from the
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the
purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva
contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. Private
respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his
account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the
purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was
actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount
was debited from private respondent's account. The difference was
supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt
evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed
by petitioners.
Later on, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and
damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
against petitioner Gerardo Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the
intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 2990, Vicente sought to recover eld no. 3 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the
contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his
favor on October 24, 1949.
TRIAL COURT RULING: In favor of Vicente. Rendered a decision
ordering therein defendants- heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente  field no
3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering  fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in
favor of Vicente, to pay the latter actual or compensatory damages in
the amount of P81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross income
of field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-59, and such other
amounts as may be due from said eld for the crop years subsequent to
crop-year 1958-59, until the eld is delivered to Vicente, and to pay the
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs. Therein defendant Goñi
was relieved of any civil liability for damages, either personally or as
administrator of the estate.
CA RULING: Affirming that of the lower court, with the modification that
the amount of damages to be paid by defendant-heirs to the plaintiff
should be the total net income from field no. 3 from the crop year
1950-51 until said field is finally delivered to the plaintiff plus interest
thereon at the legal rate per annum
Page 22 of 34
ISSUE: Whether Vicente should be disqualified as a witness?
RULING: NO, Vicente should not be disqualified as a witness. The
case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes
Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to
them, remains within the ambit of the protection, The reason is
that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the
deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's
right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because
they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend
which they have obtained from the deceased and make the
defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to
establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to
establish, if living. Such protection, however, was effectively
waived when counsel for petitioners cross- examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition
is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for
the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime.” It must further be observed
that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private
respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it
was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of
property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and
surrender of  fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters
of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said
action not having been brought against, but by the estate or
representatives of the estate/deceased person. Likewise, under a
great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify
to transactions or communications with the deceased or
incompetent person which were made with an agent of such
person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to
testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be con ned to
those transactions or communications which were had with the
agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was
signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of
Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice
sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of
the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut
the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed
the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the
reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding
effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the
existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi
testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria.   REYES, administrator of the intestate estate of Filomeno
We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the
admissibility in evidence of private respondent Vicente's testimony.
Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be
disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead
Man Statute, which provides as follows:
"Section 20. Disquali cation by reason of interest or relationship. — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are
interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
"(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part
of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon
terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is
Page 23 of 34
designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed
the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving
party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims
against the deceased.


• GLICERIA MARELLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE
Encarnacion, and JOSE T. PATERNO, defendants-
appellees. [G.R. No. 4389. November 10, 1908.] ->
FACTS: In the inventory of the estate of Filomeno Encarnacion there
were included the four parcels of land which are the subject of this
action, which is brought against his administrator respondent Vicente
Reyes to have them excluded from the inventory as being the property
of the petitioner Gliceria Marella. On his part, Reyes did not oppose
the relief asked for, but private respondent Jose T. Paterno, who was a
creditor of the deceased for a claim allowed by the commissioners in
the amount of P51,595.02, made two motions — one to be substituted
in the administrator's place as defendant, and the other to be allowed to
intervene as a co-defendant. The intervention was allowed and
judgment was rendered in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
adverse to Marella.
CFI RULING: The evidence given by Marella in this suit can not be
considered. (See subdivision 7 of section 383, Act No. 190.) All of the
acts sworn to by her took place before the death of Filomeno
Encarnacion, and the fact that his wife was present and is still living is
not sufficient to render the plaintiff a competent witness, because it has
not been shown that the widow of the deceased herself took part in the
liquidation of accounts or was a party to the transaction, inasmuch as
the money which the plaintiff lent she lent to the deceased and not his
Wife, Andrea Goco.
ISSUE: Whether Gliceria Marella should be disqualified as witness?
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
RULING: NO, Gliceria Marella should not be disqualified as
witness. Had either Reyes or Paterno interposed an objection to
Marella being a witness on the ground of incompetency, Marella’s
testimony could not have been received. Paterno’s omission to
object to her operated as a waiver. The acceptance of
an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the
allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on
the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He
may assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it, either
expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with him.
Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is-worth
and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that
it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to
strike it out on his own motion. The disqualification of witnesses
found in rules of evidence of this character, is one not founded on
public policy but for the protection and convenience of litigants,
and which consequently lies within their control.
 
• TIMOTEO ARROYO, claimant-appellant, vs. ANDREA AZUR,
administrator of the intestate of Eleuterio Dura, LEONCIA
DURAY AND OTHERS, opponents-appellees. [C.A. No. 9320.
April 13, 1946.] ->

FACTS: Eleuterio Dura died on December 31, 1932 leaving a widow,
respondent Andrea Azur, and some collateral relatives as heirs. On the
occasion of his death, the proceedings on his intestacy were initiated
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, having been
appointed the widow administrator of the assets. The corresponding
appraisal and claims commission was formed before which petitioner
Timoteo Arroyo presented a claim for services rendered as a domestic
servant to the aforementioned spouses for a period of 12 years counted
from the year 1921 until the aforementioned Eleuterio Dura died. The
appraisal and claims commission proceeded to consider Arroyo's claim
at its session of January 16, 1939, and after the hearing issued a
payment order in favor of the claimant in the amount of P1,200,
rejecting the opposition presented by the collateral relatives of the
Page 24 of 34
deceased. Opponents, not in agreement with the judgment issued by
the appraisal and claims commission, appealed against it to the First
Instance Court of Camarines Sur. 
However, the testimonies of Timoteo and Andrea are rejected on the
grounds that, according to the law, they could not testify against the
intestate; and it is argued that if both testimonies were eliminated, there
is no evidence in the record in favor of the claim. 
The objection against the widow's testimony is based on rule 123,
article 26, subsection (d), Rules of the Courts, which reads as follows:
"the husband can not be examined for or against his wife  without
the  the wife's  consent  can not be examined in favor or against her
husband without his consent . “ 
There is now the objection against the plaintiff's testimony, based on
rule 123, article 26, subsection (c), previously article 383, par. 7, Code
of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the following: "the parties or the
cause of these in a trial or action, or the persons in whose favor said
trial or action is followed against the executor or administrator or
representative of a deceased person mentally incapacitated, about the
claim or claim against the property of said deceased or mentally
incapacitated person,
ISSUE: Whether both Timoteo and Andrea should be disqualified from
being witnesses?
RULING: NO, both Timoteo and Andrea should not be disqualified
from being witnesses. 
As to Andrea being disqualified, obviously,  rule 123, article 26,
subsection (d), Rules of the Courts is not applicable in the present
case, because the husband having died, the conjugal relationship
no longer exists, "the widow is not the wife and, therefore, can
testify like any other witness either in favor, well against the
intestate of her husband "(Williams vs. Moore [Mo. App.], 203 SW,
824, 835.). (Sec. 151) (c) Death of one spouse . - As a general rule,
after the death of one spouse, the other is held a competent
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
witness for or against the decedent's interest in any litigation
concerning the decedent's estate, except his or her jurisdiction
was affected by the rules against the disclosure of confidential
communications, or testimony as to communications or
transactions with persons since deceased. (Corpus Juris, Vol. 70,
p.124.).
As to Timoteo, as things are now, the main evidence in favor of the
claim is the testimony of the administrator or legal representative
of the deceased who is Andrea, at the same time spouse
superstite.  In fact, the testimony of Timoteo is no more than a
corroboration and can be perfectly suppressed, without suffering,
in its absence, the substantivity and effectiveness of the right of
action of Timoteo.


Sec. 24.  Disqualification by reason of privileged communication
• JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and
Pairing Judge, Branch 30, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELLIS F.
JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO- JACOBA,
respondents.  [A.C. No. 5921. March 10, 2006.]->
 questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and
FACTS: This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22
October 2001 by petitioner Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge
Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 30, against respondent-spouses respondent Atty. Ellis F.
Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco- Jacoba. Judge Lacurom charged Attys
Jacobas with violation of Rules 11.03, 1 11.04, 2 and 19.01 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro
R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer
against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos”). The Municipal
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of
Page 25 of 34
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The
case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as
pairing judge.
Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request
for Inhibition)  dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent
portions of which read: 
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is
entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! . . . HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The
mistakes are very patent and glaring! . . .
xxx xxx xxx III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in
Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court
Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:
. . . The defendant led a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very
SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon.
Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in
favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious,
hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. CTAIDE
xxx xxx xxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and
presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in
favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an
INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial
Process. Need we say more?
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
xxx xxx xxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding
That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential
LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the
Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? . . . This
HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxx xxx xxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in
Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took
Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the
Subject-Matter:
AnotherHORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that
JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT
and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany
of Cases!
xxx xxx xxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously
ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As
Payment for Plaintiff's HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the
Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court
Judge.
xxx xxx xxx

This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00
best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS
conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the
proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on
sight! 
Page 26 of 34
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself
"in order to give plaintiff a ghting chance" and (2) the Resolution be
reconsidered and set aside. On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered
Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should
not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her Explanation,
Comments and Answer, 11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor
knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records
will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively
participate in this case.” Velasco- Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or
deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable
Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all
courts of justice.”
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on
behalf of the Jacoba- Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm. Velasco-Jacoba
moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She
recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing,
Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na
ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it
might not be led on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her
without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years
with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading
turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but
could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law. 
On Jacoba’s part: His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba's statement
pointing to him as the author of the motion. Firstly, his Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife's
account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he "trained his guns and red at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."
ISSUE: Whether the marital privilege rule should be enforced in this
case?
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
RULING: NO, the marital privilege rule should not be enforced in
this case. Jacoba is not disqualified as a witness. The marital
privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of
the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct
that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to
Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001
motion.
 

• JESUS P. DISINI , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), respondents. [G.R. No.
180564. June 22, 2010.] ->
FACTS: In 1989 respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in
this case by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), wanted petitioner Jesus P. Disini to testify for his government
in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1 (Westinghouse)
before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the
arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and
others led against the Republic 2 before the International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin,
Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an executive in the latter's companies
from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse
contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminio's companies, had been attended by
anomalies.
On February 16, 1989 respondent Republic and petitioner Disini
entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini undertook to
testify for his government and provide its lawyers with the information, a
davits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the two cases. 3
Acknowledging Disini's concern that the Republic could become a party
to yet other proceedings relating to the matters subject of his testimony,
Page 27 of 34
the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it shall not
compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding
brought by the Republic against Herminio.
Later on, Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later or on
February 27, 2007, upon application of respondent Republic,
respondent Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce
documents before that court on March 6 and 30, 2007 in an action that
the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, invoking his immunity agreement with the Republic, but
respondent Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new
subpoena, directing him to testify before it on May 6 and 23, 2007.
On July 19, 2007 the PCGG issued Resolution 2007-031, revoking and
nullifying the Immunity Agreement between petitioner Disini and
respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the latter from requiring
Disini to testify against Herminio. On August 16, 2007 respondent
Sandiganbayan denied Disini's motion to quash subpoena, prompting
the latter to take recourse to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether Disini should be disqualified as a witness in the case
filed against Herminio by reason of his immunity agreement?
RULING: YES, Disini should be disqualified as a witness in the
case filed against Herminio by reason of his immunity
agreement. A contract is the law between the parties. It cannot be
withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with more
reason in this case where petitioner Disini had already complied
with the terms and conditions of the Immunity Agreement. To
allow the Republic to revoke the Agreement at this late stage will
run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a
rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The grant of immunity
in paragraph 3 of the agreement quoted above to petitioner Disini
against being compelled to testify in "other cases" against
Herminio is quite clear and does not need any interpretation.
Where a stipulation in an agreement is clear, its literal meaning
controls. Besides, Disini undertook to testify for the Republic in its
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
two foreign cases and provide its lawyers all the information and
testimony they needed to prosecute the same. The last sentence
in the paragraph that enjoins Disini to "provide truthful
information or testimony," despite the guarantee not to be
compelled to testify against Herminio, merely emphasizes the fact
that such concessions does not affect his obligation to "provide
truthful information or testimony" in the two cases mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs. The Court should not allow respondent
Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross petitioner Disini. The
Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of
negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions
out of it. The Republic did not have to enter that agreement. It was
free not to. But when it did, it needs to fulfill its obligations
honorably as Disini did. More than any one, the government
should be fair.
• TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V.
CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First
Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents. [G.R. No.
105938. September 20, 1996.] ->


FACTS: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil
Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus
Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
 Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Page 28 of 34
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law rm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law O ces (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and
incidental services where its members acted as incorporators,
or simply, as stockholders. More speci cally, in the performance
of these services, the members of the law rm delivered to its
client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings,
i.e., stock certi cates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings
with their clients, the members of the law rm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 



On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on
Good government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG)
led a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul
S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant. 3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he
will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
No. 33.



party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable
treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 29 of 34
the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law rm. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, blood.

they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
under their sworn mandate and duciary duty as lawyers to client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
uphold at all times the con dentiality of information obtained privilege does not attach until there is a client. 

during such lawyer-client relationship. cdasia
 Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' the relationship.

contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client con dentiality party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He
assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

status.
 


 The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal

 advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case
ISSUE: Whether ACCRA Law’s duty may be asserted in at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
at bar by reason of attorney-client priviliege? petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede
thereto:


 (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

RULING: NO, ACCRA Law’s duty may be asserted in (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the relationship; and

case at bar by reason of attorney-client priviliege. The (c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case shareholdings.

falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their
establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue capacity as lawyers, regarding the nancial and corporate
of the case, which is privileged information, because the structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question.
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
the substance (without which there would be no attorney- among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
client relationship).
 covering their client's shareholdings.

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
shrouded in mystery. 30 Under this premise, the general rule in documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate
identity of his client. 31
 fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 30 of 34
activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
 • NELLY LIM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales,
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, respondents. [G.R.
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]->
the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime."
 FACTS: Petitioner Nelly Lim urges this Court to strike down as being
An important distinction must be made between a case where a violative thereof the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals in
client takes on the services of an attorney, for illicit purposes, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to annul the
seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental
of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending
he might have previously committed something illegal and physician of Lim. On 25 November 1987, private
consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall respondent Juan Sim filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the
purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness
because whether or not the act for which the client sought called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or present.” One of the witnesses presented was Dr. Lydia Acampado, a
disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action Lim's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony
against him.
 sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had

 examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act,
as in the rst example; while the prosecution may not have a ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado should be disqualified as witness by
case against the client in the second example and cannot use reason of physician-patient privilege?
the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the
latter. The reason for the rst rule is that it is not within the RULING: NO, Dr Acampado should not be disqualified as witness
professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the by reason of physician-patient privilege. Our careful evaluation of
commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but
stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the to agree with the respondent Court's observation that the
same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
general, exists.
 Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As

 correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose

 anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and

 treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that
Dr. Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her
relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her
expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she
had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be
excluded.  authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
The rule on this point is summarized as follows: "The predominating
view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory
physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by
permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a
strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his
opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding
and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have
concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-
patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must
base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question,
excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient
acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or
does not exclude from consideration his personal professional
knowledge of the patient's condition he should not be permitted to
testify as to his expert opinion."
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and
make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician
of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form
a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his
patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community.  4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
Page 31 of 34
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be
waived if no timely objection is made to the physician's testimony. 
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and

5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."

These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
certain communications, to wit:
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.”
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional
capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or
palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been
made to the physician to enable him "safely and ef caciously to treat his
patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is
the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the
number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure,
so long as the subject communicated is not stated.” One who claims
this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites.
 

• BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner, vs. MONETARY BOARD, ET
AL., respondents. [G.R. No. L-70054. July 8, 1986.]  ->
 resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious.  If
FACTS: On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed in the
instant case, a "Motion to Pay Back Salaries to All BF Officers and
Employees from February to August 29, 1985" in connection with its
"Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration or for
Clarification of the Resolution of the Court En Banc of October 8,
1985." On November 7, 1985, this Court referred said motion to pay
back salaries to Branch 136 (Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which this Court had earlier directed under
our Resolution of October 8, 1985 issued in G.R. No. 70054, to conduct
hearings on the matter of the closure of petitioner Bank and its alleged
pre-planned liquidation.
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of
Court which states:
"Section 21.  - Privileged Communications.  - The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
Page 32 of 34
x x x    x x x     x x x   x x x
(e)        A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence,
when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure."
ISSUE: Whether the Monetary Board officers may invoke the privilege
communication rule as to disqualify them from testifying?
RULING: NO,  the Monetary Board officers may not invoke the
privilege communication rule as to disqualify them from testifying.
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that
public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and
documents sought by petitioner.  Considering that petitioner bank
was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the
aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose
no danger or peril to our economy.  Neither will it trigger any bank
run nor compromise state secrets.  Respondent's reason for their
the respondents public official acted rightfully and prudently in
the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that
would provoke fear of disclosure.
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of
the documents.  Not only the banks and its employees but also its
numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to
whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the
petitioner's bank closure.  It will be well to consider that - "Public
interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in
which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest
by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected" (State vs.
Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection
of public officers but for the protection of public interest (Vogel vs.
Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211).  Where there is no public interest that would
be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable. "The rule that a
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in
official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question.  xxx",
(Agnew vs. Agnew, 52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the
Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 198).
 
        2.  Testimonial privilege
Sec. 25.  Parental and filial privilege
        3.  Admissions and confessions
Sec. 26.  Admissions of a party
• Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmonet
Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, 21 April 2014.  4. Previous conduct as evidence
• Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, 15 March 2016
Sec. 27.  Offer of compromise not admissible
Sec. 28.  Admission by third party
Sec. 29.  Admission by co-partner or agent
Sec. 30.  Admission by conspirator
• Tamargo v. Antiporda, G.R. No. 1777727, 19 January 2010
• People v. Serrano, G.R. No. L-7973, 27 April 1959
Sec. 31.  Admission by privies
Sec. 32.  Admission by silence
• People v. Ciobal, G.R. No. 86220, 20 April 1990
• People v. Ranario, 49 Phil 220
• U.S. v. Dela Cruz 12 Phil 87
Page 33 of 34
• People v. Fong, G.R. No. L-7615, 14 March 1956
• Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, 23 June 2009
Sec. 33.  Confession
• People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, 11 May 1999
• People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 180762, 4 March 2009
• People v. Garcia, 99 Phil 381
• People v. Sasota 91 Phil 111
• People v. Moro Ansang, 93 Phil 44
• People v. Niem, 75 Phil 668
• People v. Nocum, 77 Phil 1018
• Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, 19 January 2010
• People v. Condemna, L-22426, 29 May 1968
• People v. Victor, G.R. No. 75154-55, 6 February 1990
• People v. Velarde, G.R. No. 139333, 18 July 2002
• People v. Tampus, G.R. No. L-44690, 28 March 1980.
• People v. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, 20 July 1999


Sec. 34.  Similar acts as evidence
Sec. 35.  Unaccepted offer
5. Testimonial knowledge
Sec.  36.  Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay  excluded
• Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, G.R.
No. L-38964, 31 January 1975
• People v. Parungao, G.R. No. 125812, 28 November 1996
• Mollaneda v. Umacob, G.R. No. 140128, 6 June 2001
• Republic v. Heirs of Alejega, G.R. No. 146030, 3 December
2002 
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT
• Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January
2015.  184971, 19 April 2010
6. Exceptions to the hearsay rule
Sec. 37.  Dying Declaration
• People v. Serenas, G.R. No. 188124, 29 June 2010
• People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 111149, 5 September 1997
• People v. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022, 7 April 2014
• People v. Tanaman, et al., G.R. No. 71768, 28 July 1987
• People v. Ola, G.R. No. L-47147, 3 July 1987
Sec. 38.  Declaration against interest
• Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111692, 9 February 1996
• Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, 19 April 2006
• Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, 16 April 2009
• Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, 15 April 2010
Sec. 39.  Act or declaration about pedigree
• People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 154278, 27 December 2002
Sec. 40.  Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
Sec. 41.  Common reputation
Sec. 42.  Part of the res gestae
• Capila v. People, G.R. No. 146161, 17 July 2006
• Maturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, 18 April 2006
• People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 196735, 5 May 2014
• Talidano v. Falcom Maritime & Allied Services, Inc., G.R. No.
172031, 14 July 2008.
• People v. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, 26 November 2014
Sec. 43.  Entries in the course of business
• Jose, Jr. v. Michaelmar Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 169606, 27
November 2009
Page 34 of 34
• LBP v. Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corp., G.R. No.
Sec. 44.  Entries in official records
• Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, G.R. No. 162243, 3 December
2009
• Africa v. Caltex, 123 Phil 272
• Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alberto, G.R. No. 194320, 1
February 2012
Sec. 45.  Commercial lists and the like
• PNOC Shipping v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, 8
October 1998
Sec. 46.  Learned treatises
Sec. 47.  Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 16 December
2011
7. Opinion rule
Sec. 48.  General rule
Sec. 49.  Opinion of expert witness
• Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, 20 July 2011
• Casumpang, et al. v. Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, 11 March 2015
• Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, 14 January 2015
• Rosit v. Davao Doctors Hospital, et al., G.R. No. 210445, 7
December 2015 


Sec. 50.  Opinion of ordinary witnesses
8. Character evidence
Sec. 51.  Character evidence not generally admissible;  exceptions