JURIS RENIER C.

MENDOZA LLB – 3
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (THURSDAY CLASS)

TITLE: IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, PETITIONER. IN
RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, PETITIONER.
CITATION: G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
TOPIC: ADOPTION

DOCTRINE: In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use
of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.

FACTS: Petitioner, Monina Lim, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children whose parents were unknown were entrusted to them by Lucia. Being
eager to have a child of their own, they registered the children to make it appear as their parents.
They were named Michelle and Michael Jude respectively. The spouses reared and cared for the
children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the
surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998,
Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married
and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and
Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. The trial court dismissed the
petitions on the basis that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband and further stated that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Hence,
this present petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner can singly adopt?

RULING: No. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 provides that:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

The Supreme Court ruled that the use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

In the present case, the law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario
are not legally separated from each other.
TITLE: ISABELITA S. LAHOM, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (PREVIOUSLY REFERRED
TO AS "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), RESPONDENT.
CITATION: G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
TOPIC: ADOPTION

DOCTRINE: The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of

due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context
of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It
is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for
the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of
the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has
been exercised.

FACTS: Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom were married couple but they were childess. At
the the tender age of two, Isabelita’s nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo was brought to their care and
enjoyed the warmth, love, and support of the couple and treated him like their own. For years, the
spouses fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On May 5, 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the
more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the
court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."

There was a sad turn of events when Mrs. Lahom file in December 1999 a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. She averred that respondent
refused to change his family name from Sibulo to Lahom and that he rarely visited her in Naga
once a year which made her yearn for care and show concern from her son.

Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 was enacted (March 22, 1998), also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act and went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of the
adopters to rescind the decree of adoption. The law however provides a remedy for the adopter
which is to disinherit the adoptee for causes provided under Article 919 of the Civil Code.

The respondent sought for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the trial court. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the adopter has the right to rescind the decree of adoption after the
effectivity of RA 8552?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,
had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand
but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however,
that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by
a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.
TITLE: CECILIO DE LA CRUZ AND EUSTAQUIA DEVIS DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONERS AND
APPELLANTS, VS. MANUEL JESUS DE LA CRUZ, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
CITATION: G.R. No. L-19391, September 29, 1964
TOPIC: ADOPTION

DOCTRINE: Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the decree has
become final the proceeding is terminated and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the
adoption is neither a continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an
entirely new one, dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of adoption. The
venue of this new case, applying Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the
residence of the petitioner. In the present instance petitioners reside in Pangasinan, having moved
there from their former residence in Ilocos Sur.

FACTS: By judgment dated August 16, 1954 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Sp. Proc.
No. 1401) the minor Manuel J. Aquino was declared the legally adopted child of the spouses
Cecilio de la Cruz and Eustaquia Devis de la Cruz. Seven years later the adopting parents filed in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan 1 a petition to have the decree of adoption revoked on
the ground that the adopted minor had definitely repudiated the adoption by open display of
defiance, animosity, revulsion and disobedience to petitioners and had for more than three years
abandoned petitioners' home by living with his natural mother, Felicidad Dasalla, in Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur. A special appearance was entered by counsel for the minor with a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof; (2)
the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the adopted minor; (3) venue was
improperly laid; and (4) the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The motion to dismiss was granted, the trial court stating that since the "Initial proceedings were
totally had in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur," the "expediente in said Case No. 1041 is
still, presumably, open for the herein petitioners to come in and ask f or the revocation of the
decree of adoption." The Court added by implication, that it had no power to interfere with the
judgment of another court of coordinate jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the venue is improperly laid?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the provisions of the Civil Code on revocation of adoption do
not specify the court where the proceedings should be filed. The Rules of Court designate the
venue of proceeding for adoption, which is the place where the petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule
99), but is silent with respect to the venue of proceeding for rescission and revocation of adoption
(Rule 100). It is clear that the two proceedings are separate and distinct from each other. In the
first what is determined is the propriety of establishing the relationship of parent and child
between two persons not so related by nature. For that purpose the court inquires into the
qualifications and disqualifications of the adopter; the personal circumstances of the person to be
adopted; the probable value and character of his estate; the other proceeding either the adopting
parent or the adopted seeks to severe the relationship previously established, and the inquiry
refers to the truth of the grounds upon which the revocation is sought.1awphîl.nèt

Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the decree has become final the
proceeding is terminated and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is
neither a continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely new one,
dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of adoption. The venue of this new
case, applying Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the residence of the petitioner.
In the present instance petitioners reside in Pangasinan, having moved there from their former
residence in Ilocos Sur.

The doctrine relied upon by the lower court, to the effect that no court has the power to interfere
by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of coordinate jurisdiction, is not here
applicable. There is no such interference. The validity or effectiveness of the decree of adoption
issued by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur is not in question. It is not sought to be
enjoined, or its execution restrained. What is sought is its revocation because of circumstances
subsequently supervening which, under the law, render the continuation of the adoptive
relationship unjustified and impractical.

We hold that venue was properly laid in the case; and with respect to the objection that the court
does not have jurisdiction over the adopted minor, we note that petitioners-appellants filed a
motion below for the appointment of the minor's natural mother, Felicidad Dasalla, as his guardian
ad litem, although the court did not think it necessary to grant the same in view of its order of
dismissal.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, AND
WRIT OF AMPARO

HABEAS CORPUS AMPARO HABEAS DATA

Literal You have the body To protect You have the data
interpretation
Description Writ directed to the person Remedy Remedy available to any
detaining another, available to any person whose right to privacy
commanding him to produce person whose in life, liberty or security is
the body of the prisoner at a right to life, violated or threatened by an
designated time and place, liberty, and unlawful act or omission of a
with the day and cause of his security is public official or employee, or
capture and detention, to violated or of a private individual or
do, submit to, and threatened entity engaged in the
receive whatsoever the court gathering, collecting, or
or judge awarding the writ with violation storing of data or information
shall consider in that by an unlawful regarding the person, family,
behalf. act or omission home and correspondence of
of a public the aggrieved party.
official or
employee, or of
a private
individual or
entity.

Office of the To direct the person detaining To direct the To order the disclosure or
Remedy another to produce the body of public officers destruction of data relating to
the person being detained involved to the right to life, liberty or
and show the cause of conduct ansecurity of a person.
detention. investigation as
to the
whereabouts

and legality of
the detention of
a missing
person.
Coverage Involves the right to liberty of Involves the It protects the image,
and rightful custody by the right to life, privacy, honor,
aggrieved party. liberty, and information, self-
security of the determination and
aggrieved party freedom of information of a
and covers person.
extralegal killings
and
enfo
rced
disappearances.
Where to file RTC or any judge thereof, CA RTC of the place RTC where the petitioner or
or any member thereof in where the respondent resides, or that
instances authorized by law; threat, act or which has jurisdiction over
Sandiganbayan in aid of its omission the place where the data or
appellate jurisdiction, or SC or information is gathered,
any member thereof. was committed collected or stored, at the
or any of its option of the petitioner; or
elements with SC, CA or SB when the
occurred; SB or action concerns public data
any justice files or government offices.
thereof; CA or
any justice
thereof; SC or
any justice
thereof.
Who may file 1. Party for whose relief it is In the following 1. Any aggrieved party;
a petition intended; or order: 2. However, in cases of
1. Any extralegal killings and
2. Any person on his behalf member of enforced disappearances:
the a. Any member of the
immediate immediate family
family b. Any ascendant,
2. Any descendant, or
ascendant, collateral relative of
descendant, the aggrieved
or collateral party
relative of the aggrieved par
consanguinity within the 4th civil
degree of
or affinity consanguinity or
3. Any affinity
concerned
citizen,
organization
, association or institution
Respondent May or may not be an officer. Public official or Public official or employee or
employee or a a private individual or entity
private engaged in the gathering,
individual or collecting or storing of data
entity. or information regarding the
person, family, home and
correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
Enforceability If granted by SC or CA: Enforceable Enforceable anywhere in the
of the writ enforceable anywhere In the anywhere in Philippines
Philippines; the Philippines
regardless of
If granted by RTC: who issued the
enforceable only within the same
judicial
district

Docket fees Payment is required Petitioner Payment is required.

NOTE: Rule on indigent is NOTE: Rule on

petitioner applies. indigent petitioner
exempted from applies.
payment

Service of Served upon the person to Served upon Served upon the respondent
writ whom it is directed, and if not the respondent personally; or substituted
found or has not the prisoner personally; or service
in his custody, to the other substituted
person having or exercising service
such
custody

Person who Officer by whom the prisoner Respondent Respondent

makes the is
return imprisoned or the person in
whose custody the prisoner
is found
When to file a On the day specified in the Within 5 The respondent shall file a
return writ working days verified written return
after service of together with supporting
the writ, the affidavits within 5 working
respondent days from service of the writ,
shall file a which period may be
verified written reasonably extended by the
return together Court for justifiable reasons.
with supporting
affidavits.
Return If granted by the SC or CA: If issued by RTC: If issued by RTC: returnable
returnable before the court returnable before such court;
or any member or before before such
RTC or any judge thereof; court; If issued by SB or CA or any of
their justices: returnable
If granted by RTC: returnable If issued by SB before such court or to any
before such court or CA or any of RTC of the place where the
their justices: petitioner or respondent
In writ of habeas corpus in returnable resides or that which has
relation to custody of minors, before such jurisdiction over the place
the writ may be made court or to any where the data or
returnable to a Family Court RTC of the information is gathered,
or to any regular court within place where the collected or stored;
the region where the threat, act or
petitioner resides or where omission was If issued by SC or any of its
the minor may be found for committed or justices: returnable before
hearing and decision on the any of its such court, or before SB, CA, or
merits (Sec. 20, A.M. No. 03- elements to any RTC of the place
04-04-SC). occurred; where the petitioner or
respondent resides or that
If issued by SC which has jurisdiction over
or any of its the place where the data or
justices: information is gathered,
returnable collected or stored
before such
court, or before
SB, CA, or to
any RTC of the
place where the
threat, act or
omission was
committed or
any of its
elements
occurred
General Not prohibited. Not allowed. Not allowed.
denial
Liability of Forfeit to the Imprisonment or Imprisonment or fine for
the fine for
person to aggrieved party the committing committing contempt.
whom contempt.
the writ is sum of P1000, and
directed if he may also be punished
refuses to for contempt.
make a
return
Hearing Date and time of Summary Summary hearing shall be
hearing shall be
hearing is specified in conducted not conducted not later than 10
later than 7
the writ. days from the working days from the date
date of
issuance of the of issuance of the writ.
writ.

Period of Within 48 hours from 5 working days 5 working days from the
appeal from the
notice of the date of notice of date of notice of the
the
judgment or final adverse judgment or final order.
judgment.
order appealed from.

HABEAS AMPARO HABEAS DATA

CORPUS
Prohibited None 1. Motion to dismiss;
pleadings 2. Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit, position
paper and other pleadings;

NOTE: In writ of amparo, a motion for extension of time to file

the return is no longer a prohibited pleading, as it may be
granted by the court on highly meritorious cases.

3. Dilatory motion for postponement;

4. Motion for a bill of particulars;
5. Counterclaim or cross - claim;
6. Third - party complaint;
7. Reply;
8. Motion to declare respondent in default;
9. Intervention;
10. Memorandum;
11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim
relief orders; and
12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CUSTODY OF MINOR UNDER AM 03-04-04 AND UNDER RULE
102

Rule on Custody and Habeas Corpus

Habeas Corpus [Rule 102]
for
Minors [A.M. 03-04-04]
Right to liberty
Rights Involved Petition for the rightful custody of a
Rightful custody of the aggrieved minor
party
Unlawful deprivation of
Actual violation of the aggrieved rightful custody, or
party’s right to liberty, or rightful A minor is being kept from a parent
Situations Applicable custody [Sec. 1] by
the other parent (e.g. which parent
shall have the care and custody of
a
minor, when such parent is in the
midst of nullity or legal separation
proceedings). [Herrera; Secs. 2 &
20]

Any person claiming rightful custody

– this covers:
Party Authorized to File Party for whose relief it is intended or (1) Unlawful deprivation of
by some person in his behalf [Sec. 1] the custody of a minor
(2) Which parent shall have the care
and custody of a minor [Herrera]
Respondents May or may not be an officer

(1) RTC or any judge thereof
(2) CA or any member thereof in
instances authorized by law
(3) SC or any member thereof [Sec.
2]
(4) First level courts in the absence
Before which court or of RTC judges in a province or
judicial authority filed city [Sec. 35, BP 129]
(5) Sandiganbayan, in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan [RA 8249 further
expanding its
jurisdiction]
Signed, verified either by the party for
whose relief it is intended, or by some
person in his behalf and shall set
forth:
(1) That the person in whose behalf
the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained on his
liberty;
(1) Family Court, writ enforceable
within its judicial region
(2) Regular court in the absence of
the presiding judge of the
Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court
shall refer the case to the Family
Court as soon as its presiding
judge returns to duty.
(3) Appropriate regular courts in
places where there are no
Family
Courts. [Sec. 20]
The verified petition shall allege the
following:
(1) The personal circumstances of
the petitioner and of the
 (2) The officer or name of the
person by whom he is so
imprisoned or restrained or, if
Contents of the petition both are unknown or uncertain,
such officer or person may be
described by an assumed
appellation, and the person who
is served with the writ shall be
deemed the person intended;
(3) The place where he is so
imprisoned or restrained, if
known;
(4) A copy of the commitment or
cause of detention of such
person, if it can be procured
without impairing the efficiency
of the remedy or, if the
imprisonment or restraint is
without any legal authority, such
fact shall appear.
[Sec. 3]
respondent
(2) The name, age and present
whereabouts of the minor and
his or her relationship to the
petitioner and the respondent
(3) The material operative facts
constituting deprivation of
custody and
(4) Such other matters which are
relevant to the custody of the
minor.
The verified petition shall be
accompanied by a certificate against
forum shopping, which the
petitioner must sign personally.
[Sec. 4]