G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904
)
ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for appellant.
The court erred in holding that all legal formalities
had been complied with in the execution of the
will of Doña Juana Moreno, as the proof shows
that the said will was not written in the presence
of under the express direction of the testratrix as
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Antonio V. Herrero for appellee.
The grounds upon which a will may be disallowed
are limited to those mentioned in section 634 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
WILLARD, J.:
(1) The evidence in this case shows to our
satisfaction that the will of Doña Juana Moreno
was duly signed by herself in the presence of
three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the
presence of the testratrix and of each other. It
was therefore executed in conformity with law.
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the
claim of the appellants that the will must be
written by the testator himself or by someone else
in his presence and under his express direction.
That section requires (1) that the will be in writing
and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if
he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in
his presence and by his express direction. Who
does the mechanical work of writing the will is a
matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in
this case the will was typewritten in the office of
the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.
The English text of section 618 is very plain. The
mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish
edition of the code have been corrected in the
second.
(2) To establish conclusively as against
everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
was executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator was in a condition to make a
will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under
the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.
The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of
any provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
for example, that a certain legacy is void and
another one valid. It could not in this case make
any decision upon the question whether the
testratrix had the power to appoint by will a
guardian for the property of her children by her
first husband, or whether the person so appointed
was or was not a suitable person to discharge
such trust.
All such questions must be decided in some other
proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be
disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one
of those grounds appears the will must be
allowed. They all have to do with the personal
condition of the testator at the time of its
execution and the formalities connected
therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the
court below has any jurisdiction in his
proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by
the appellants by the assignment of error relating
to the appointment of a guardian for the children
of the deceased.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no
testimony in the court below to show that the will
executed by the deceased was the same will
presented to the court and concerning which this
hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does
not show that the document in court was
presented to the witnesses and identified by
them, as should have been done. But we think
that we are justified in saying that it was assumed
by all the parties during the trial in the court below
that the will about which the witnesses were
testifying was the document then in court. No
suggestion of any kind was then made by the
counsel for the appellants that it was not the
same instrument. In the last question put to the
witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by
the counsel for the appellants. In their argument
in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they
treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring
to the will probate they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed,
eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el
cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en
todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will
be charged against the appellants.
1
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa,
McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals,[3] dated December 23, 1993, in
CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court
in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-
appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No.
1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and
Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as
a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that
parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained
the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property
owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of
141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name
according to the records of the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me,
the aforementioned property and the rights which
I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited
and acknowledged by the children and spouse of
Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition
(Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla
shall have already received the ownership of the
said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease
of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall
expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom
he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to
still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the
Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the
Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I
have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later
sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation
to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED
(100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and
TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until
Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have
respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my
heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to
my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall
then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria
2
Marlina shall die. I further command in this my
addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this
Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that
should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they
cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was
transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto
issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was
survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela
y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch
52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject
Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to
sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of
sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985
up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by
the Codicil, despite repeated demands for
compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th
paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs
of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of
TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were
declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the
Order of Default was lifted, with respect to
defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his
Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private
respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law
of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the
property and acting as attorney-in-fact of
defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity
mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489
will be delivered not later than January of 1989,
more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar,
or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose
Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during
December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar
Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance
of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same
manner will compliance of the annuity be in the
next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-
86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in
cash equivalent of the number of piculs as
mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed
upon, taking into consideration the composite
price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which
is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or
delivered on a staggered cash installment,
payable on or before the end of December of
every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
3
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the
aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for
a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came
out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing
findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against
the defendants has as yet arose in favor of
plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance
of the command as mandated exaction from them
simply because they are the children of Jorge
Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the
present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall.
Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of
the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate
the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the
heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full
meaning and semblance to her claim under the
Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the
Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having
established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive
100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of
Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation
under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such
amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance
with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and
the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its
reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of
such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper
to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No.
1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the
estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-
appellant must institute separate proceedings to
re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the
appointment of an administrator, and distribute
Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order
to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil,
to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per
year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she
dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion
of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja
Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil,
and in ruling that the testamentary institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within
the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with
Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions and in deviating from the sole issue
raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article
882 does not find application as there was no
modal institution and the testatrix intended a
mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the
testatrix's "near descendants" should the
obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the
testatrix died single and without issue, there can
4
be no valid substitution and such testamentary
provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be
no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the
substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or
reference as to who are the "near descendants"
and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of
the New Civil Code, the substitution should be
deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable.
Contrary to his supposition that the Court of
Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it,
which was the propriety of the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause
of action, there was no such deviation. The Court
of Appeals found that the private respondent had
a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was,
precisely, to stress that the private respondent
had a legally demandable right against the
petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which
issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance
with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession
that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent[10] and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded
the latter by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the successional rights
were transmitted to them from the moment of
death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code,
inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil
on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised
Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the
lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent
over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance
of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
action against petitioner and the trial court erred
in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the
New Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended
was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants
should there be noncompliance with the
obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private
respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a
person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in
general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property
shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to
one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as
in a fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. [14] In the
case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease,
incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the
5
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions
imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to
shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution
here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
strictly mandated to preserve the property and
to transmit the same later to the second
heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil
to alienate the property provided the negotiation
is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission
to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his
will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right
to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The
property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to
whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the
fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all
related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and
therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of
the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the
institution or the application of the property left by
the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall
not be considered as a condition unless it
appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be
claimed at once provided that the instituted heir
or his heirs give security for compliance with the
wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard
this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an
institution referred to in the preceding article
cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by
the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner
most analogous to and in conformity with his
wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed
in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a
modal institution. In a modal institution, the
testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2)
the purpose or application of the property left by
the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession.[19] On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition
suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some
extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon,
it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein
private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as
a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall
be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
6
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are
generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a
condition unless it clearly appears from the Will
itself that such was the intention of the testator. In
case of doubt, the institution should be
considered as modal and not conditional.[22]
obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent,
and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent
is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of
subject property.

Neither is there tenability in the other contention Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn,
of petitioner that the private respondent has only revocable and free act by which a person
a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the disposes of his property, to take effect after his
property itself from the instituted heir because the death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in
right to seize was expressly limited to violations which a person intends how his properties be
by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee. disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty the subject of a compromise agreement which
arises on the face of the Will, as to the application would thereby defeat the very purpose of making
of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is a Will.
to be ascertained from the words of the Will,
taking into consideration the circumstances WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
under which it was made.[23] Such construction as DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R.
be adopted.[24] No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is
under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) SO ORDERED.
piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and
their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they
sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the
property involved. The Codicil further provides
that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza
Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over
to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion
thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since
the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on
his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed
by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said
obligation should equally apply to the instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission

that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the Codicil has been
assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27,
lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a 2006
substantial and constructive compliance of his

7
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO
and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21,
Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D.
SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY
D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the
nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999
and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in
the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al."
and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio,
Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying
for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio–Santos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy
and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is
the most competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of Segundo because
she is a certified public accountant; and, 4)
Segundo left a holographic will, dated September
20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view
of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to
be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners
before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the
probate proceedings should take precedence
over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as
Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila
at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at
disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko
ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong
anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging
lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng
sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid
niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama
ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako
nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako
nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni
Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los
Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito
ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at
ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at
ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin
si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si
Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi
siya makoha mana.
8
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995
sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP.
Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396
were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code. According to private respondents, the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally
the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from
delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate
when on the face of the will it is clear that it
contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a
determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2)
private respondents question the intrinsic and not
the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not
apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute
a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed
order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only
heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia.
[T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the
New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as
the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article
854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory
heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this
petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the
case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court
[155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position
clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the
probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when, on its face, the will appears to be
intrinsically void … would have been an exercise
in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved(underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion
to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396
is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14,
1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN
EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS,
9
DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER
1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
CONSIDERING THAT:
I general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN
COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON
THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY
BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS
LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E.,
THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED
BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE
TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON
EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH
INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID;
AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO
SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS
A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the
time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such time and place
to be published three weeks successively
previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of
the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any
institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will
and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory
heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike,
with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his
estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic
will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the
face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent
judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the
intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of
Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that
was presented by petitioners was dated, signed
and written by him in his own handwriting. Except
on the ground of preterition, private respondents
did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity
of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as
an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the
Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause
therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by
Segundo in his document, the Court believes that
10
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient
causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found
guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator,
his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been
convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support
the parents or ascendant who disinherit such
child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed,
by the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a
dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is
whether the document executed by Segundo can
be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810
of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It
is subject to no other form, and may be made in
or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially
come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the
intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must
be recognized as the supreme law in succession.
All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals,
or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually
prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be
construed more liberally than the ones drawn by
an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and
the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated,13 the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the
Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs,
with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo
did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his
other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was included plainly as
a witness to the altercation between Segundo
and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is
Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law
favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the
will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the
11
Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore,
should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October
14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is
directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-
93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of
Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private
respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided
by this Court 1 involving the probate of the two
wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who
died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10,
1980, naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision,
we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as
co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate
with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner
Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a
motion asking for authority from the probate court
to sell certain shares of stock and real properties
belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of
P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed
were personal funds. As found by the Court of
Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of
P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax,
P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and
P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According
to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of
P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings
account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America,
Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the
motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038
were conjugal partnership properties and part of
the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no
ground for reimbursement. She also sought his
ouster for failure to include the sums in question
for inventory and for "concealment of funds
belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive
property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late
wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The
agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the
BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to
as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the
BANK in our joint savings current account shall
be the property of all or both of us and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by
either or any of us during our lifetime, and after
the death of either or any of us shall belong to and
be the sole property of the survivor or survivors,
and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK
that the receipt or check of either, any or all of us
during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the
survivor or survivors, for any payment or
withdrawal made for our above-mentioned
account shall be valid and sufficient release and
12
discharge of the BANK for such payment or
withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this
agreement and granted "the motion to sell some
of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of
which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66
... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the
petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted
survivorship agreement constitutes a ... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the
conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply
with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by
Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly,
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it
is a prohibited donation under the provisions of
Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge
dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is
hereby set aside insofar as it granted private
respondent's motion to sell certain properties of
the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement
of his alleged advances to the estate, but the
same order is sustained in all other respects. In
addition, respondent Judge is directed to include
provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No.
35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in
the inventory of actual properties possessed by
the spouses at the time of the decedent's death.
With costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails
the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust
Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we
sustained the validity of "survivorship
agreements" and considering them as aleatory
contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one
of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will has been defined as "a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and
rights and declares or complies with duties to take
effect after his death." 14 In other words, the
bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of
savings account No. 35342-038 were in the
nature of conjugal funds In the case relied
on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we
rejected claims that a survivorship agreement
purports to deliver one party's separate
properties in favor of the other, but simply, their
joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which
assumption was in turn based on the facts (1) that
the account was originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera
"served only as housemaid of the deceased." But
it not infrequently happens that a person deposits
money in the bank in the name of another; and in
the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera
served her master for about nineteen years
without actually receiving her salary from him.
The fact that subsequently Stephenson
transferred the account to the name of himself
and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter
the survivorship agreement in question although
there was no relation of kinship between them but
only that of master and servant, nullifies the
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the bank account. In the absence, then,
of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full
faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which
recites in effect that the funds in question
belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera;
that they were joint (and several) owners thereof;
and that either of them could withdraw any part or
the whole of said account during the lifetime of
both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of
either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an
aleatory contract whereby, according to article
1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both
reciprocally bind themselves to give or do
something as an equivalent for that which the
13
other party is to give or do in case of the
occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will
happen at an indeterminate time. As already
stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and
Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the
furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would
become the owner of the house in case Leonarda
died first, and Leonarda would become the owner
of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were
to die first. In this manner Leonarda and Juana
reciprocally assigned their respective property to
one another conditioned upon who might die first,
the time of death determining the event upon
which the acquisition of such right by the one or
the other depended. This contract, as any other
contract, is binding upon the parties thereto.
Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana,
the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the
house, in the same manner as Leonarda would
have acquired the ownership of the automobile
and of the furniture if Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively
belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired
during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a
donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of
one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between
the spouses because it involved no conveyance
of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves
no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of
Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is
no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not
prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say,
by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as
an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the
spouses Vitug opened savings account No.
35342-038, they merely put what rightfully
belonged to them in a money-making venture.
They did not dispose of it in favor of the other,
which would have arguably been sanctionable as
a prohibited donation. And since the funds were
conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could
have pressured the other in placing his or her
deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by
reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in
reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation
with a term, the term being death. Such
agreements are permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the
parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to
give or to do something in consideration of what
the other shall give or do upon the happening of
an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur
at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of
an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2)
"which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A
survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake
ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall
under the first category, while a contract for life
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et
sequentia, has been categorized under the
second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is
present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death
of one party and survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se
not contrary to law its operation or effect may be
violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in
a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak
to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer
property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the
legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and
annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has
been imputed and established against the
agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the
survivorship agreement had been executed for
such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the
respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on
wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
14
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that
Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right
over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the
respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that
the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the
estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent
appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its
resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET
ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997]
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO
G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE,
ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA
AGAPE, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS
AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Unless legally flawed, a testators intention in his
last will and testament is its life and soul which
deserves reverential observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a
case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes,
Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites Agape,
Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the
oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the
probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in
this petition for review the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] dated November 29, 1995, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the
will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing
the issuance of Letter Testamentary in favor of
petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without
bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the
declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato
Reyes' last will and testament, including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void for
being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said
paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared
VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."[2]
The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed
his last will and testament declaring therein in
part, to wit:
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning
R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties
consisting among others of jewelries, coins,
antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures
and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or
50% of all the real estates I own in common with
my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of
Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in
Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong,
Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta,
Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis
Oriental.[3]
The will consisted of two pages and was signed
by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three
witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and
Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A.
Vivares was designated the executor and in his
default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S.
Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21,
1992, private respondent filed a petition for
probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court
of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petitioner was set
for hearing and the order was published in the
Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three consecutive
15
weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the
persons named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children
of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely
Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes,
and the deceaseds natural children with Celsa
Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an
opposition with the following allegations: a) that
the last will and testament of Reyes was not
executed and attested in accordance with the
formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes
Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence
upon the testator at the time of the execution of
the will. The opposition further averred that
Reyes was never married to and could never
marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to
be his wife in the will, because the latter was
already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then
alive and their marriage was never
annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a
compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with
Reyes was violative of public morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an
ordering declaring that it had acquired jurisdiction
over the petition and, therefore, allowed the
presentation of evidence. After the presentation
of evidence and submission of the respective
memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on
April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes,
based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was
never married to the deceased Reyes, and,
therefore, their relationship was an adulterous
one. Thus:
The admission in the will by the testator to the
illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION
REYES EBARLE who is somebody elses, wife, is
further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed by
the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and
his two attesting witnesses during the trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the
immoral meretrecious, adulterous and adulterous
and illicit relationship existing between the
testator and the devisee prior to the death of the
testator, which constituted the sole and primary
consideration for the devise or legacy, thus
making the will intrinsically invalid.[4]
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except
for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was
declared null and void for being contrary to law
and morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals with the allegation
that the oppositors failed to present any
competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was
legally married to another person during the
period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed
the trial courts decision admitting the will for
probate but the modification that paragraph II
including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were
declared valid. The appellee court stated:
Considering that the oppositors never showed
any competent, documentary or otherwise during
the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes
marriage to the testator was inexistent or void,
either because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely
erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of
the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for
being contrary to law and morals. Said
declarations are not sufficient to destroy the
presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to
overcome the very declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[5]
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the oppositors filed this petition for
review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and
conclusion of the Court of Appeals was contrary
to law, public policy and evidence on
record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion Oning
Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth
civil degree. Witness Gloria Borromeo testified
that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother
and the latters father were sister and
brother. They were also nieces of the late
Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported marriage of
the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was
void ab initio as it was against public policy
pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family
Code. Petitioners further alleged that Oning
Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the
time she was cohabiting with the testator hence,
she could never contact any valid marriage with
the latter. Petitioners argued that the testimonies
16
of the witnesses as well as the personal
declaration of the testator, himself, were sufficient
to destroy the presumption of marriage. To
further support their contention, petitioners
attached a copy of the marriage certificate of
Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.[6]
The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings
are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity
of the will sought to be probated.[7] Thus, the court
merely inquires on its due execution, whether or
not it complies with the formalities prescribed by
law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the
wills provisions.[8] The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof
usually comes only after the will has been proved
and allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was
first determined as when the defect of the will is
apparent on its face and the probate of the will
may become a useless ceremony if it is
intrinsically invalid.[9] The intrinsic validity of a will
may be passed upon because practical
considerations demanded it as when there is
preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions
are doubtful legality.[10] Where the parties agree
that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the
probate court may also do so.[11] Parenthetically,
the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will.[12]
The case at bar arose from the institution of the
petition for the probate of the will of the late
Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be
settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether
or not the testator had animus testandi; (2)
whether or not vices of consent attended the
execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the
formalities of the will had been complied
with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule
upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration
of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his
wife did not have to be scrutinized during the
probate proceedings. The propriety of the
institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the
wills intrinsic validity and which need not be
inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in
Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA
206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the
testator himself, acknowledged his illicit
relationship with the devisee, to wit:
Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as
man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love
an [sic] affection, for all the things which she has
done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia
J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comfort and represent myself as her
own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the
eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the
holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the
legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing of the properties to a person with whom
he had been living in concubinage.[13] To remand
the case would only be a waste of time and
money since the illegality or defect was already
patent. This case is different from the
Nepomuceno case. Testator Torcuato Reyes
merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing
some of his personal and real properties to his
wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an
open admission of any illicit relationship.In the
case of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that
he was already previously married and that he
had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court relied on uncorroborated testimonial
evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married
to another during the time she cohabited with the
testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were
merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the
whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the
supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:
The foregoing testimony cannot go against the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning
Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government
of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated
that the declaration of the husband is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage.
17
Considering that the oppositors never showed
any competent evidence, documentary or
otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion
Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was
inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing
marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court
gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and
(b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void
for being contrary to law and morals. Said
declarations are not sufficient to destroy the
presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to
overcome the very declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[14]
In the elegant language of Justice Moreland
written decades ago, he said-
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its
provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood
before the court in full life making the declarations
by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That
was the special purpose of the law in the creation
of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were
dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators
having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the
Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy
of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and
Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the said
certificate before the probate court to support
their position that Asuncion Reyes had an
existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver
and the same evidence can no longer be
entertained on appeal, much less in this petition
for review. This Court would no try the case a new
or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is
confined to resolving questions of law which have
been passed upon by the lower courts. The
settled rule is that the factual findings of the
appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown
to be contrary to the evidence on the record,
which petitioners have not shown in this case.[15]
Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain
the findings of the appellate court it appearing
that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing
the challenged decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated
November 29, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED and
the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG,
CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that
portion of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court)
dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the
resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as
null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner
and the resolution dated December 28, 1982
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon,
Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will on page three
and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof
in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C.
Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed
their signatures below the attestation clause and
on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will
in the presence of the testator and of each other
and the Notary Public. The Will was
acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting
witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed
herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole
and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated
in the Will that the testator was legally married to
a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but
since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on
18
December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and
the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of
the Peace. The testator devised to his forced
heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and
his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate
and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs,
namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina
Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter
Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare
and admit to be legally and properly entitled to
inherit from me; that while I have been estranged
from my above-named wife for so many years, I
cannot deny that I was legally married to her or
that we have been separated up to the present
for reasons and justifications known fully well by
them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living,
as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love
and affection, for all the things which she has
done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia
J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comport and represent myself as her
own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the
eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the
holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition
for the probate of the last Will and Testament of
the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City
and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of
the Will was procured by undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the
time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus,
letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the
probate of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on
July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will
be an Idle exercise because on the face of the
Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is
evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-
appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
denying the probate of the will. The respondent
court declared the Will to be valid except that the
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article
1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set
aside, the will in question declared valid except
the devise in favor of the appellant which is
declared null and void. The properties so devised
are instead passed on in intestacy to the
appellant in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and
her children filed a "Motion for Correction of
Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in
the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the
decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read:
"The properties so devised are instead passed on
intestacy to the appellees in equal shares,
without pronouncement as to costs." The motion
was granted by the respondent court on August
10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration. This was denied by the
respondent court in a resolution dated December
28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether
or not the respondent court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the
testamentary provision in her favor cannot be
passed upon and decided in the probate
proceedings but in some other proceedings
19
because the only purpose of the probate of a Will
is to establish conclusively as against everyone
that a Will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator has the
mental capacity to execute the same. The
petitioner further contends that even if the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the
declaration of its nullity could only be made by the
proper court in a separate action brought by the
legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a
declaration of the nullity of the testamentary
provision in the Will in favor of the person with
whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery
or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that
the fact that the last Will and Testament itself
expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator
and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner
herself initiated the presentation of evidence on
her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the
testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence, merits the application of the
doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et
al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon.
Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June
27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit relationship
between him and the petitioner put in issue the
legality of the devise. We agree with the
respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction
when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn,
it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
Will and declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings,
the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity
of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally
and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution
and witnessing of his last Will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid
and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v.
Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will,
the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are
the only questions presented for the resolution of
the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality
of any devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is
one thing; the validity of the testamentary
provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution (Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings under the new
code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The
judgment in such proceedings determines and
can determine nothing more. In them the court
has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another
one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute.
Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the
trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as
universal heir and completely preterited her
surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no
matter how valid it may appear extrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or latter
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the
will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64
20
SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic
provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court
erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will, before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain
unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower
court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become
an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs.
Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21
SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time
over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties
are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was
executed with all the formalities required by law
and that the testator had the mental capacity to
execute his Will. The petitioner states that she
completely agrees with the respondent court
when in resolving the question of whether or not
the probate court correctly denied the probate of
Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn.
(Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the
affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in
toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the
respondent court to declare the testamentary
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and
void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As
stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the record, in the event of probate or if
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we
might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question.
(Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v.
Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served
if we remand the nullified provision to the proper
court in a separate action for that purpose simply
because, in the probate of a will, the court does
not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its
provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of
the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on
August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the
testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo
21
stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his
legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for
so many years." He also declared that
respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo
were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he
stated that he had been living as man and wife
with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo
declared that the petitioner was entitled to his
love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno
represented Jugo as her own husband but "in
truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law,
I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned
previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the
fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo
executed his Will. There is also no dispute that
the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an
ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until
his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin
Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a
marriage before the Justice of the Peace of
Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old
while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now
contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years
in the belief that she was legally married to the
testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence
or good faith. As argued by the private
respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly
admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner,
the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator,
which led private respondents to present contrary
evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the
intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to
petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of
the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator
Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man
and wife, as already married, was an important
and specific issue brought by the parties before
the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of
Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic
validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in
marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner,
TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented
evidence that would refute the testimony of
petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased
testator, testified at length on the meretricious
relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of
August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option
of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to
make a ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin
Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of
adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she
pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made
nonetheless, then private respondents
respectfully offer the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner
with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac
where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If
there was nothing to hide from, why the
concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that
the marriage of the deceased with private
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in
secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina
Gomez was already in the family way at that time
and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo
were not in favor of the marriage so much so that
an action in court was brought concerning the
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of
August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the
deceased testator when they were still both
22
single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo
married respondent Rufina Gomez on November
29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator
only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of
about 30 years in between. During those 30
years, could it be believed that she did not even
wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor
contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts
that should impel her to ask her groom before she
married him in secrecy, especially so when she
was already about 50 years old at the time of
marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from
Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive
demonstration that she new that the man she had
openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a
married man with already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the
children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it
possible that she would not have asked Martin
Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or
legitimate children and by whom? That is un-
Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the
residence of the parents of the deceased testator,
is it possible that she would not have known that
the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and
Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez,
considering that the houses of the parents of
Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years)
and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a
few meters away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno
are unbelievable. They are, to say the least,
inherently improbable, for they are against the
experience in common life and the ordinary
instincts and promptings of human nature that a
woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was already
married to another, knowing that her groom had
children. It would be a story that would strain
human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not
know that Martin Jugo was already a married man
in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely
his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that
led petitioner to break off with the deceased
during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil
Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot give even assuming that
the recipient may receive. The very wordings of
the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE
VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial
Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for
defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law
is the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing
plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally owned by
the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and
which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y
posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas
nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October
9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish
in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno,
one-half of all his real and personal properties,
giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto
Villaflor.
23
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs,
reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me
conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y
acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan
todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando
las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas
expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a
mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba
de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y
muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi
referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso
y posesion mientras viva y no se case en
segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser
propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina
nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however,
that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be
deemed annulled from the moment he bore any
child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said
Clause 12th reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos
6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de
institucion de herederos y los legados que se
haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha
de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados,
pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922,
without begetting any child with his wife Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a
widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding
No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's
estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed
judicial administratrix. In due course of
administration, she submitted a project of
partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of
November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate
court approved the project of partition and
declared the proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the
ownership and possession of a considerable
amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also
of the said project of partition, she received the
use and possession of all the real and personal
properties mentioned and referred to in Clause
7th of the will. The order approving the project of
partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided
that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo
dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de
Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died
without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the
deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now
being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563
in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N.
Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is
admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as
his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present
action against the administrator of the estate of
the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8,
1958, contending that upon the widow's death,
said plaintiff became vested with the ownership
of the real and personal properties bequeathed
by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will,
pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's
position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title
to the properties aforesaid became absolutely
vested in the widow upon her death, on account
of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and
intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of
his testament, was to invest his widow with only a
usufruct or life tenure in the properties described
in the seventh clause, subject to the further
condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the
widow remarried, her rights would thereupon
cease, even during her own lifetime. That the
widow was meant to have no more than a life
interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions
used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive) in which
the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
24
instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces
the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly
did not give his widow the full ownership of these
particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her
lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of
the estate in which she was instituted universal
heir together with the testator's brother (clause
6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me
conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y
acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten
todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando
las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas
expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant
Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause
7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the
expression "mientras viva," and considered the
words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to
"dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court
violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of
the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes
of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give
effect to all provisions. — In the construction of
an instrument where there are several provisions
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible,
to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in
imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of
his testament should not be allowed to obscure
the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are over the primary source in
ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition
the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso
y posesion mientras viva" would have been
unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of
the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in
their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a
clear intention to use them in another sense can
be gathered, and that other can be ascertained."
.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn
solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court
has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon,
26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all
questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and
literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the
Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo
1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y
constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo
voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria
que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus
sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no
ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece
la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece
la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro
criterio de alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco
por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent.
20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in
his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases
where the only condition imposed on the legatee
was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor
25
clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of the
legacies while alive and did not remarry. It
necessarily follows that by the express provisions
of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should
pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant
herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow
never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the
widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is
accountable to the reversionary legatee for their
return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous
event, or for their value should rights of innocent
third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision
appealed from is reversed, and the appellant
Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared
entitled to the ownership and fruits of the
properties described in clause 7 of the will or
testament, from the date of the death of Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin for liquidation,
accounting and further proceedings conformably
to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the will of
Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether
in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the
date of the execution of a will, or the law existing
at the death of the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will
made in the month of January, 1908, in which he
disposed of an estate valued at more than
P35,000. The will was duly executed in
accordance with the law then in force, namely,
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
will was not executed in accordance with Act No.
2645, amendatory of said section 618,
prescribing certain additional formalities for the
signing and attestation of wills, in force on and
after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in
writing, signed by the testator, and attested and
subscribed by three credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other; but
was not signed by the testator and the witnesses
on the left margin of each and every page, nor did
the attestation state these facts. The new law,
therefore, went into effect after the making of the
will and before the death of the testator, without
the testator having left a will that conforms to the
new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the
testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other. The attestation shall state the fact
that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be
signed by some other person, at his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and
that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But
the absence of such form of attestation shall not
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section
provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said
section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as
provided in the preceding section, shall be valid
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge
or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator and
signed by him, or by the testator's name written
by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The testator or
the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
26
also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page
thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall
state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of
three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision
handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will
made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect,
that it must comply with the provisions of this law.
(Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated
March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has
further held in a decision handed down by Justice
Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose
death took place prior to the operative date of Act
No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable.
(Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The
instant appeal presents an entirely different
question. The will was execute prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death
occurred after the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the
cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a
change in the statutes prescribing the formalities
necessary to be observed in the execution of a
will, when such change is made intermediate to
the execution of a will and the death of a testator.
(See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook
on Wills, and Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889],
57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts
in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force
at the testator's death are controlling, and that a
will not executed in conformity with such statutes
is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at
the time it was made. The reasons assigned for
applying the later statute are the following: "As
until the death of the testator the paper executed
by him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a
mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will,
the law in force at the testator's death applies and
controls the proof of the will."
(Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we
to accept the foregoing proposition and the
reasons assigned for it, it would logically result
that the will of Jose Riosa would have to be held
invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is
that the validity of the execution of a will must be
tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
execution and that statutes subsequently
enacted have no retrospective effect. This
doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight
of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs
(or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord
Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the
general rule as to testaments is, that the time of
the testament, and not the testator's death, is
regarded." It is also the modern view, including
among other decisions one of the Supreme Court
of Vermont from which State many of the sections
of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine
Islands relating to wills are taken.
(Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent
tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice
Sharswood (Taylor vs.Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St.,
209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this
opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally
work injustice, and ought to be so construed only
when the mandate of the legislature is imperative.
When a testator makes a will, formally executed
according to the requirements of the law existing
at the time of its execution, it would unjustly
disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply
to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before
his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to
know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to
such a case; for he would have an equal right to
presume that no new law would affect his past
act, and rest satisfied in security on that
presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is
ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the
disposition made by it does not actually take
effect until then. General words apply to the
property of which the testator dies possessed,
and he retains the power of revocation as long as
he lives. The act of bequeathing or devising,
however, takes place when the will is executed,
though to go into effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than
the preceding one, finding support in the States
27
of Alabama and New York, is that statutes
relating to the execution of wills, when they
increase the necessary formalities, should be
construed so as not to impair the validity of a will
already made and, when they lessen the
formalities required, should be construed so as to
aid wills defectively executed according to the law
in force at the time of their making
(Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535;
Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose
between the three rules above described. Our
selection, under such circumstances, should
naturally depend more on reason than on
technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the
fact that the testator has provided in detail for the
disposition of his property and that his desires
should be respected by the courts. Justice is a
powerful pleader for the second and third rules on
the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which
back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious.
The act of bequeathing or devising is something
more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it
becomes a completed act when the will is
executed and attested according to the law,
although it does not take effect on the property
until a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory
construction, as this court has said, that "all
statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In
every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
against the restrospective effect."
(Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
[1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew
Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs
American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.)
Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is
corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws
shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein
otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No.
2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect.
Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on
cases having special application to testamentary
succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio
[1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6
Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter
of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña
[1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the
language of the Will. See also section 617, Code
of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting
the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms,
provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of
five cases, the first being "if not executed and
attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645
has, of course, become part and parcel of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is
admittedly not executed and attested as provided
by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended.
Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the
general principle in the law of wills inserts itself
even within the provisions of said section 634.
Our statute announces a positive rule for the
transference of property which must be complied
with as completed act at the time of the execution,
so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as
to all testaments made subsequent to the
enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as
to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this
decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
particularly as established by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the
Province of Albay of December 29, 1917,
disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed,
and the record shall be returned to the lower court
with direction to admit the said will to probate,
without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased
REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET
AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-
appellants.
28
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A.
Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia,
parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and
Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of
the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in
the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he
was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at
P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed
a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews
who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he
left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses,
the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the
presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho
wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on he left hand margin of the
front page of each of the three folios or sheets of
which the document is composed, and numbered
the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed
his name at the end of his writing at the last page,
all this, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses after telling that it was his last will and
that the said three witnesses signed their names
on the last page after the attestation clause in his
presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit
"A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at
the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the
new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills,
under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention
of the testator which according to the trial court is
the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form, said trial court by order dated January 24,
1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last
Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
The oppositors are appealing from that decision;
and because only questions of law are involved
in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the
Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under
article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated and signed by the testator himself
and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however,
that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in
1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in
1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and
the law at the time imposed certain requirements
for the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in
letters and signing on the left hand margin by the
testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in
Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first
two folios of the will were not signed by any one,
not even by the testator and were not numbered,
and as to the three front pages, they were signed
only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this
Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41
Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the
testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the
testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon
two folios or leaves; three pages having been
written on, the authenticity of all three of them
should be guaranteed by the signature of the
alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700,
referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in
question, it appears that the left margins of the six
pages of the document are signed only by
Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section
2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who
omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin
of each of the five pages of the document alleged
to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect
that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
29
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh.
"A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil
Code which not allows holographic wills, like
Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the
appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower
court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its
form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision
is but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is
to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of
the testator's death or at the time the supposed
will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support
of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of
the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest
then becomes a completed act. This ruling has
been laid down by this court in the case of In re
Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome
doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of
the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and
interpretations should be resorted to in order to
carry out said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and after the
death of the testator lessen the formalities
required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to
validate wills defectively executed according to
the law in force at the time of execution. However,
we should not forget that from the day of the
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of
the legatees and devisees under it becomes a
vested right, protected under the due process
clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would
invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for
failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then
upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs
will then inherit by intestate succession, and no
subsequent law with more liberal requirements or
which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their
vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am.
Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from
is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.
With costs.
G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale
conveying to the defendant, in consideration of
P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land
which previously had been sold, along with the
other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's
grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an
agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of
which are thus summarized in the appealed
decision:
1st. — That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina
Navarro were husband and wife, the former
having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the
surviving spouse and some minor children;
2nd. — hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he
left a parcel of land described under Transfer
Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. — That the above mentioned property was a
conjugal property;
4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the surviving
spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold
30
the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria
Canoy, alleging among other things, that she
needed money for the support of her children;
5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria
Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel
of land to the plaintiff in this case named
Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. — That the two deeds of sale referred to
above were not registered and have never been
registered up to the date;
7th. — That on January 17, 1948 surviving
spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley,
after her appointment as guardian of her children
by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold
one-half of the land mentioned above to
Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case,
which portion belongs to the children of the above
named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for
determination is the validity of the sale to
Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This
question in turn depends upon the validity of the
prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The
rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." in a
slightly different language, this article is
incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil
Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor
when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance, whether such right be pure or
contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long
period of time lapses between the death of the
predecessor and the entry into possession of the
property of the inheritance because the right is
always deemed to be retroactive from the
moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear
that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley
sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-
half of it already belonged to the seller's children.
No formal or judicial declaration being needed to
confirm the children's title, it follows that the first
sale was null and void in so far as it included the
children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant
having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact
that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still
the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his
own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the
reservation, made in said decision, of the right of
the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring
such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley as may be appropriate for such
damages as they may have incurred by reason of
the voiding of the sale in their favor.
G.R. No. L-7385 May 19, 1955
QUIRICO L. SATURNINO, petitioner,
vs.
FELIZA LUZ PAULINO, MAXIMO DALEJA,
JUANA LUCAS, NEMESIO LUCAS, DONATA
GUILLERMO, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Domingo, Valenciano and Aguinaldo for
petitioner.
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz and Ruiz for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of
the Court of Appeals. The pertinent facts are:
Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on
February 10, 1937, he was survived by his
children — Timoteo Esteban, Macario and Feliza,
all surnamed Luz Paulino — and a grandson-
Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his deceased
daughter Antonia Luz Paulino. Among the
properties left by Jaime Luz Paulino is a house
and lot, situated in Barrio No. 13, municipality of
Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, and more
particularly known as Lot No. 11366 of the Laoag
Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his daughter
Feliza Luz Paulino executed a deed of absolute
sale of said property in favor of the spouses
Maxima Daleja and Juana Lucas and Nemesio
Lucas and Donata Guillermo, for the aggregate
31
sum of P1,200.00. In the language of a decision
of the Court of Appeals.
As said sale was made without the knowledge or
consent of Quirino L. Saturnino who, according to
him, learned of it in the early morning of October
23, 1945 (Exhs. B and I), and being desirous of
exercising his right of subrogation as co-heir of
the vendor, on October 23, 1945, and again on
the 29th of the month, in the presence and with
the assistance of his lawyer, offered verbally and
in writing to the vendees to return then and there
to them, in actual case, 4/5 of the purchase price
of said property, together with the expenses
incurred by them in the preparation of the
document, and tendered to them in their
respective houses in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, written
copies of the offer and the money in actual cash,
Philippine currency, but defendants Juana Lucas
and Donato Guillermo, for themselves and in
representation of their respective husbands who
were absent, refused acceptance thereof. For this
reason on the following day, October 30, 1945,
Quirino L. Saturnino instituted this action in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the
defendants mentioned in the captain hereof,
depositing with the Clerk of said Court the sum of
P960, Philippine currency, for delivery to the
defendant vendees by way of reimbursement,
together with the amount of P50 Philippine
currency, to cover the expenses incurred in the
preparation of the deed of sale, and stating that
he was ready and willing to deposit other
additional sums that the court may deem just and
necessary. On these averments plaintiff prayed in
the complaint that judgment be rendered in his
favor and against the defendants:
a. Declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza
Luz Paulino to her co-defendants illegal with
respect to one-fifth of the lot and to declare said
one-fifth undivided share of the plaintiff;
b. To order the defendants Maximo Daleja, Juana
Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donato Guillermo to
accept and receive from the clerk of court the sum
of P690 corresponding to reimbursement of the
price paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot
which their co-defendant Feliza Luz Paulino could
legally convey; and the additional sum of P50 to
cover their expenses in the preparation of the
deed of sale;
c. Ordering the defendants Maximo Dalaja, Juana
Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo to
execute a deed of reconveyance of what they
could legally buy from their co-defendant Feliza
Luz Paulino of the lot in question, in favor of the
herein plaintiff; and
d. Ordering the aforesaid defendants to pay
damages in the sum of P1,000 annually to plaintiff
until the reconveyance is effected, and an
additional sum of P1,000 as damages to be paid
by all of the defendants for their malicious acts,
and cost of the suit.
For such other remedies and relief just and
equitable in the premises.
On November 14, 1945, defendants answered
the complaint with counterclaim, which was
amended on December 12 of the same year,
wherein it is alleged, among other things, that on
April 25, 1937, at the municipality of Laoag,
province of Ilocos Norte, all their inheritance from
the deceased Jaime Luz Paulino had been
divided in accordance with Section 596 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and the last verbal wish
of the decedent before his death, giving the
residential lot in question together with the house
of strong materials constructed thereon to Feliza
Luz Paulino as her exclusive and only share, and
leaving her brothers, Timoteo, Esteban and
Macario, and their nephew Quirino Saturnino to
divide all the agricultural lands among
themselves, which division was duly effected.
Defendants Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas,
Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo allege that
they are engaged in business and purposely
bought said lot to erect thereon a "camarin' for a
rice mill and for use as a warehouse of rice,
"bagoong", coconuts and other articles of
commerce and to deposit logs and lumber, and
that because of their inability to realize this plan
due to action of the plaintiff, they will suffer
damages in the sum of P3,000 yearly unit this
case is terminated. Wherefore all the defendants
pray the court:
1. To dismiss the complaint;
2. To declare Feliza Luz Paulino as the exclusive
owner of the whole lot in question;
32
3. To declare the sale made by Feliza Luz Paulino
of the whole lot in question to her co-defendants
valid in full force and effect;
4. To order the plaintiff to pay three thousand
pesos (P3,000) annually until this case is
terminated and the further sum of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) for the malicious acts of the
plaintiff and the costs of this suit; and
5. Any other relief just and equitable. (Roll, pp.
17-20)
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 23 of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L.
Saturnino had filed, with said court, a petition,
which was docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 37, for the probate of the will and testament
of Jaime Luz Paulino. Although, at first, all of the
other heirs objected to said petition, on June 30,
1949, they eventually withdrew their opposition
thereto, and the probate of the will was allowed
by an order dated July 6, 1949. Said will provided
that the property in dispute in Case No. 23, be
distributed, share and share alike among the
heirs of the testator.
On or about March 10, 1950, the defendant in
said Case No. 23 — respondents herein — filed
a supplemental answer alleging the plaintiff —
petitioner herein — has no legal capacity to sue,
because the property in litigation therein is part of
the estate which is the subject matter of Case No.
37, in which an administrator was appointed but
no adjudication had, as yet, been made. In due
course, a decision was rendered in Case No. 23,
on December 2, 1950, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders judgment
declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino to her co-defendants null and void with
respect to one-fifth (1/5) of the lot in question and
the plaintiff is declared owner thereof as his
undivided share; that the defendants are ordered
to receive from the Clerk of Court the sum of P960
corresponding to the reimbursement of the price
paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot in
question which their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino could legally convey to them, and to
execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the
plaintiff. (Roll, pp. 20-21).
On appeal from this decision, that defendants
contended in the Court of Appeals, that the lower
court had erred:
1. In not dismissing the complaint in so far as the
recovery of one-fifth undivided interest in the lot
in question is concerned;
2. In not finding that there was an agreement
between the defendant Feliza Luz Paulino on one
hand and Esteban, Timoteo and Macario Luz
Paulino on the other by virtue of which the house
and lot on question were given and delivered to
Feliza Luz Paulino;
3. In not finding the plaintiff-appellee fully
confirmed the abovementioned agreement;
4. In not upholding the validity of said agreement
duly confirmed by the plaintiff-appellee and in not
giving its effects and efficacy;
5. In declaring the sale of the lot in question
invalid with respect to one-fifth share of the
appellee;
6. In holding that there exists co-ownership in the
lot between the appellee and appellants-
purchasers; and
7. In ordering the appellants-purchaser to let
redemption prayed for by the appellee. (Roll, p.
21).
None of this questions was, however, decided by
the Court of Appeals, which found it necessary to
pass instead, upon what it regarded a "prejudicial
question." Said of the Court of Appeals:
Before delving into the merits of the appeal, we
have first to pass upon a prejudicial question.
There is no dispute in this case that the properties
left by the late Jaime Luz Paulino are in custodia
legis, for they are subject to testate proceedings
in said Civil Case No. 37 which is still pending in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
Although the will of the testator had been allowed,
no settlement of accounts has been effected, no
partition of the properties left by the decedent has
been made, and the heirs have not legally
received or been adjudicated or assigned any
particular piece of the mass of their inheritance.
33
This being the case, and pending such partition,
adjudication or assignment to the heirs of the
residue of the estate of the testator Jaime Luz
Paulino, none of his heirs can properly allege or
claim to have inherited any portion of said
residue, if there may be any, because of his or
her right of inheritance remains to be in the nature
of hope. Consequently, neither Feliza Luz
Paulino, nor any of her co-heirs, can legally
represent the estate of the decedent, or dispose
as his or hers of the property involved in this case,
included as item No. 20 of the inventory (Exh. 4),
or institute any case in court to demand any part
of such estate as his own, or claim any right of
legal redemption as co-heir in the sale of any
piece of the mass of the inheritance that may
have been disposed of by any of the heirs. In the
case at bar, even if it were true that by agreement
of the heirs the property involved herein had been
assigned to Feliza Luz Paulino as her share, that
agreement and subsequent sale are of no legal
effect without the sanction or approval of the court
before which Civil Case No. 37 is pending.
The foregoing conclusion relieves Us from
considering the other points raised in the present
controversy.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and the complaint dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Roll, pp. 21-23.)
The present petition for review by certiorari filed
by Quirico L. Saturnino, is directed against this
decision of the Court of Appeals. It is clear, to our
mind, that said petition must be granted. Pending
"partition, adjudication or assignment to the heirs"
of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance"
is not merely" in the nature of hope," for —
pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain,
which was in force in the Philippines at the time
of the death of Jaime Luz Paulino — "the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from
the moment of his death" and the heirs —
pursuant to Article 661 of the same Code —
"succeed to the deceased in all his rights and
obligations by the mere fact of his death." In other
words, the person concerned is an heir and he
may exercise his rights as such, from the very
moment of the death of the decedent. One of
those rights is that of redemption under Article
1067 of the aforesaid code (Article 1088 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines). What is more, this
right of redemption may be exercised only before
partition, for said provision declares explicitly:
If either of the heirs should sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all
of his co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
purchase price, provided it be done within the
period of one month, to be counted from the time
they were informed thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
With reference to the adjudication, which the
Court of Appeals seemingly considers essential
to the enjoyment of the right of redemption among
co-heirs, it should be noted that a property may
be adjudicated either to one heir only or to several
heirs pro-indiviso. In the first case, the
adjudication partakes, at the same time, of the
nature of a partition. Hence, if the property is sold
by the heir to whom it was adjudicated, the other
heirs are not entitled to redeem the property, for,
as regards, the same, they are neither co-heirs
nor co-owners. In the second case, the heirs to
whom the property was adjudicated pro-indiviso
are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs, but merely co-
owners. Consequently, neither may assert the
right of redemption conferred to co-heirs,
although, in proper cases, they may redeem as
co-owners, under Article 1522 of the Civil Code
of Spain (Article 1620, Civil Code of the
Philippines. Hence, commenting on said Article
1067, Manresa says:
La venta del derecho hereditario ha de hacerse
antes de que sepractique la particion. Esto es
evidente, porque despues al derecho hereditario
en abstracto sustituyen las cosas o derechos
determinados comprendidos en la respectiva
adjudicacion, cesa la comunidad en la herencia,
y podra proceder otro retracto, mas no el retracto
especiala que el art. 1067 se refiere. (7 Manresa
[6th ed. Revised] p. 719.)
Again, the house and lot involved in the case at
bar are not in custodia legis. Said property was
sold by Feliza Luz Paulino to Maximo Daleja,
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata
Guillermo on October 22, 1945, or almost a
month before Special Proceeding Case No. 37
was instituted (November 19, 1945). At that time,
the buyers of said property were in possession
34
thereof. They still held it when the judicial
administrator was appointed in Case No. 37, and
this must have taken place after the probate of
the will on July 6, 1949 (Rule 78, section 4, Rule
79, sections 4 and 6, and Rule 80, section 5,
Rules of Court). Up to the present, said buyers
remain in possession of the property in litigation.
Neither the court, taking cognizance of Case No.
37, nor the judicial administrator therein
appointed, has even tried to divest them of said
possession. In fact, if they were as they are —
unwilling to yield it and the administrator wished
to take the property under his custody, it would be
necessary for him to institute a separate civil
action therefor.
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the
Court of Appeals has not passed upon the issues
raised therein by respondents herein and that the
decision of said court does not state the facts
essential to the determination of those issues,
said decision is hereby reversed, and let the
records of this case be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings, not inconsistent
with this decision. Respondents, except the Court
of Appeals, shall pay the costs of this instance. It
is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H.
JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG
JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others
as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de
Johnson, personally and as guardian,
and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.
STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native
of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will,
dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed
of an estate, the value of which, as estimated by
him, was P231,800. This document is an
holographic instrument, being written in the
testator's own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three
witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by
inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not
have been proved under section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was
presented in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground
that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen
of the State of Illinois, United States of America;
that the will was duly executed in accordance with
the laws of that State; and hence could properly
be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as
follows:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the state or country of
which he is a citizen or subject, and which might
be proved and allowed by the law of his own state
or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded
in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same
effect as if executed according to the laws of
these Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March
6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice
was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due
publication was made pursuant to this order of the
court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were
examined relative to the execution of the will; and
upon March 16th thereafter the document was
declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.
At the same time an order was made nominating
Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett as
administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed.
Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not
to serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole
administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his
brother Victor one hundred shares of the
corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope
Company; to his father and mother in Sweden,
the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
35
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife,
Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if
she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster,
P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of
the property is left to the testator's five children —
Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and
Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased
necessary to an understanding of the case are
these: Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May
25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the
United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from
1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he
was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and
immediately thereafter embarked for the
Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the
United States. As a result of relations between
Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter,
named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months
after their marriage. This child was christened in
Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran
Church upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from
the service of the United States he continued to
live in the Philippine Islands, and on November
20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted
a decree of divorce from him in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of
desertion. A little later Johnson appeared in the
United States on a visit and on January 10, 1903,
procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago.
From Chicago he appears to have gone to
Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in
evidence in this case, was taken in which he
appeared in a group with his father, mother, and
the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then
living with her grandparents in Sweden. When
this visit was concluded, the deceased returned
to Manila, where he prospered in business and
continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital
relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had
three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31,
1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and
Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other two
children mentioned in the will were borne to the
deceased by Simeona Ibañez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after
the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her
behalf and noted an exception to the other
admitting the will to probate. On October 31,
1916, the same attorneys moved the court to
vacate the order of March 16 and also various
other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917,
this motion was denied, and from this action of
the trial court the present appeal has been
perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the
proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul
the decree of probate and put the estate into
intestate administration, thus preparing the way
for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner
as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to
avoid the probate are four in number and may be
stated, in the same sequence in which they are
set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of
Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at
the time the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real
and personal property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was
made without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of
first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the
probate of wills. The fourth proposition above
stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in
relation with the third and must be considered as
a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover,
both the third and fourth grounds stated take
precedence, by reason of their more fundamental
implications, over the first two; and a logical
exposition of the contentions of the petitioner is
expressed in the two following propositions:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void
because made without notice to the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks
relief should be set aside because the testator
was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the
36
will was not in conformity with the laws of that
State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall
consider the problems arising in this cae in the
order last above indicated. Upon the question,
then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent
from an inspection of the record of the
proceedings in the court below that all the steps
prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate
of a will were complied with in every respect and
that the probate was effected in external
conformity with all legal requirements. This much
is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the
argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner,
that, at the time the court made the order of
publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as
daughter and heir she was necessarily interested
in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted
that the court should have appointed a date for
the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future
to permit the petitioner to be present either in
person or by representation; and it is said that the
failure of the court thus to postpone the probate
of the will constitutes an infringement of that
provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that
property shall not be taken without due process
of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the
proceedings for the probate of the will were
regular and that the publication was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal.,
590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a
will is essentially one in rem, and in the very
nature of things the state is allowed a wide
latitude in determining the character of the
constructive notice to be given to the world in a
proceeding where it has absolute possession of
the res. It would be an exceptional case where a
court would declare a statute void, as depriving a
party of his property without due process of law,
the proceeding being strictly in rem, and
the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was
unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in
the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's
death; and it was impossible, in view of the
distance and means of communication then
existing, for the petitioner to appear and oppose
the probate on the day set for the hearing in
California. It was nevertheless held that
publication in the manner prescribed by statute
constituted due process of law. (See Estate of
Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal.,
363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court
commented upon the fact that, under the laws of
California, the petitioner had a full year within
which she might have instituted a proceeding to
contest the will; and this was stated as one of the
reasons for holding that publication in the manner
provided by statute was sufficient. The same
circumstance was commented upon in
O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided
in the Supreme Court of the United States. This
case arose under the laws of the State of
Washington, and it was alleged that a will had
been there probated without the notice of
application for probate having been given as
required by law. It was insisted that this was an
infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. This contention
was, however, rejected and it was held that the
statutory right to contest the will within a year was
a complete refutation of the argument founded on
the idea of a violation of the due process
provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the
laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the
American Union, contain no special provision,
other than that allowing an appeal in the probate
proceedings, under which relief of any sort can be
obtained from an order of a court of first instance
improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do,
however, have a provision of a general nature
authorizing a court under certain circumstances
to set aside any judgment, order, or other
proceeding whatever. This provision is found in
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a
judgment, order or other proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That
application therefor be made within a reasonable
37
time, but in no case exceeding six months after
such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other
proceeding" in this section indicates an intention
on the part of the Legislature to give a wide
latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our
opinion its operation is not to be restricted to
judgments or orders entered in ordinary
contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a
defendant and brings him into court by personal
service of process. In other words the utility of the
provision is not limited to actions proper but
extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil
Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this
Code shall be liberally construed to promote its
object and to assist the parties in obtaining
speedy justice. We think that the intention thus
exhibited should be applied in the interpretation
of section 113; and we hold that the word "party,"
used in this section, means any person having an
interest in the subject matter of the proceeding
who is in a position to be concluded by the
judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have
applied, under the section cited, at any time within
six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing
that she had been precluded from appearing in
the probate proceedings by conditions over which
she had no control and that the order admitting
the will to probate had been erroneously entered
upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state
of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have
been authorized to set the probate aside and
grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six
months was, under the circumstances, a very
short period of time within which to expect the
petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest
the probate with the proof which she might have
desired to collect from remote countries.
Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the
making of such application was inconveniently
short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of
its use is proved in this case by the circumstance
that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared
in court by her attorneys and excepted to the
order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine
announced in the Davis case, above cited, the
proceedings in the court below were conducted in
such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The law supplied a remedy by which the
petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have
obtained relief from the order by which she is
supposed to have been injured; and though the
period within which the application should have
been made was short, the remedy was both
possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order
of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H.
Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and
void merely because the petitioner was
unavoidably prevented from appearing at the
original hearing upon the matter of the probate of
the will in question. Whether the result would
have been the same if our system of procedure
had contained no such provision as that
expressed in section 113 is a matter which we
need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the
jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which
may be properly discussed at this juncture. This
relates to the interpretation to be placed upon
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
position is taken by the appellant that this section
is applicable only to wills of liens; and in this
connection attention is directed to the fact that the
epigraph of this section speaks only of the will
made here by an alien and to the further fact that
the word "state" in the body of the section is not
capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636
is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the
United States residing in these
Islands.lawphil.net
We consider these suggestions of little weight
and are of the opinion that, by the most
reasonable interpretation of the language used in
the statute, the words "another state or country"
include the United States and the States of the
American Union, and that the operation of the
statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule
of hermeneutics that punctuation and
capitalization are aids of low degree in
interpreting the language of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible meaning of
the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or
heading,, of a section, being nothing more than a
convenient index to the contents of the provision,
cannot have the effect of limiting the operative
38
words contained in the body of the text. It results
that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his
death a citizen of the United States and of the
State of Illinois, his will was provable under this
section in the courts of the Philippine Islands,
provided the instrument was so executed as to be
admissible to probate under the laws of the State
of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second
principal proposition stated at the outset of this
discussion, which raises the question whether the
order f probate can be set aside in this
proceeding on the other ground stated in the
petition, namely, that the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and that the will
was not made in conformity with the laws of that
State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting
the will to probate recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was
executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the
United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois,
County of Cook, and that the will in question was
executed in conformity with the dispositions of the
law f the State of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon
the date of the execution of the will the testator
was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the
will was executed in conformity with the laws of
that State. Upon the last point the finding is
express; and in our opinion the statement that the
testator was a citizen of the United States,
naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken
to imply that he was a citizen of the State of
Illinois, as well as of the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States
require, as a condition precedent to the granting
of the certificate of naturalization, that the
applicant should have resided at least five years
in the United States and for one year within the
State or territory where the court granting the
naturalization papers is held; and in the absence
of clear proof to the contrary it should be
presumed that a person naturalized in a court of
a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that
State as well as of the United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States declares, in its opening words,
that all persons naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is
sought to annul the probate of this will does not
assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois
at the date when the will was executed. The most
that is said on this point is he was "never a
resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898,
but became and was a resident of the city of
Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine
Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois;
and it must be considered that the allegations of
the petition on this point are, considered in their
bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in
Illinois, wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and
that the will was executed in conformity with the
laws of that State, the will was necessarily and
properly admitted to probate. And how is it
possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is
declared that "the allowance by the court of a will
of real or personal property shall be conclusive as
to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions
relating to a number of matters, such as the age
and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of
the document by the testator, or by someone in
his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the
instrument by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses who affix their signatures to
the will to attest the act. The proof of all these
requisites is involved in the probate; and as to
each and all of them the probate is conclusive.
(Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426;
Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong
Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119;
Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395;
Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest
intimation that a will which has been probated
according to law, and without fraud, can be
annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on
account of any supposed irregularity or defect in
the execution of the will or on account of any error
39
in the action of the court upon the proof adduced
before it. This court has never been called upon
to decide whether, in case the probate of a will
should be procured by fraud, relief could be
granted in some other proceeding; and no such
question is now presented. But it is readily seen
that if fraud were alleged, this would introduce an
entirely different factor in the cae. In
Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it
was suggested but not decided that relief might
be granted in case the probate of a will were
procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial
court recites that the will was executed in
conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in
effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State
places the judgment upon an unassailable basis
so far as any supposed error apparent upon the
fact of the judgment is concerned. It is, however,
probable that even if the judgment had not
contained these recitals, there would have been
a presumption from the admission of the will to
probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the
facts were as recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco
Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921),
"There is no principle of law better settled than
that after jurisdiction has once been acquired,
every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be
presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is
applied to every judgment or decree rendered in
the various stages of the proceedings from their
initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United
States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if
the record is silent with respect to any fact which
must have established before the court could
have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such
fact was properly brought to its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original
and general jurisdiction; and there is no
difference in its faculties in this respect whether
exercised in matters of probate or exerted in
ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court
therefore necessarily had the power to determine
the facts upon which the propriety of admitting the
will to probate depended; and the recital of those
facts in the judgment was probably not essential
to its validity. No express ruling is, however,
necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the
petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon
the order of probate for error apparent on the face
of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the
judgment reviewed, it being asserted that the
findings of the trial court — especially on the
question of the citizenship of the testator — are
not supported by the evidence. It needs but a
moment's reflection, however, to show that in
such a proceeding as this it is not possible to
reverse the original order on the ground that the
findings of the trial court are unsupported by the
proof adduced before that court. The only
proceeding in which a review of the evidence can
be secured is by appeal, and the case is not
before us upon appeal from the original order
admitting the will to probate. The present
proceedings by petition to set aside the order of
probate, and the appeal herein is from the order
denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal
from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is
not possible to review the evidence upon which
the original judgment was based. To permit this
would operate unduly to protract the right of
appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just
conception of the case from the point of view of
the petitioner, we propose to examine the
evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in
connection with the allegations of the petition, in
order to see, first, whether the evidence
submitted to the trial court was sufficient to justify
its findings, and, secondly, whether the petition
contains any matter which would justify the court
in setting the judgment, aside. In this connection
we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance
that the petition was filed after the expiration of
the six months allowed by section 113 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship
of the testator. The evidence adduced upon this
point in the trial court consists of the certificate of
naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in
connection with certain biographical facts
contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of
naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that
upon the date stated the testator became a
citizen of the United States, and inferentially also
a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted
to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson
40
first came to the United States as a boy, he took
up his abode in the State of Illinois and there
remained until he came as a soldier in the United
States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although
he remained in these Islands for sometime after
receiving his discharge, no evidence was
adduced showing that at the time he returned to
the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had
then abandoned Illinois as the State of his
permanent domicile, and on the contrary the
certificate of naturalization itself recites that at
that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator
became a citizen of the United States and of the
State of Illinois, how has he lost the character of
citizen with respect to either of these
jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue of
which any person of foreign nativity can become
a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and
it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even
if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the
United States and change his political status from
a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these
Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed that
he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois
along with his status as a citizen of the United
States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans
living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by
living here they lose their citizenship in the State
of their naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a
citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his
abode in another State with no intention of
returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in
the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which says that every citizen of the United
States is a citizen of the State where in he
resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is
that a person transferring his domicile from one
State to another loses his citizenship in the State
of his original above upon acquiring citizenship in
the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the
new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That
situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that
which arises when a citizen of an American State
comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he
cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the mere
change of domicile does he lose that which he
brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must
therefore be taken as showing that, at the time
the will was executed, the testator was, as stated
in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of
Illinois. This, in connection with the circumstance
that the petition does not even so much as deny
such citizenship but only asserts that the testator
was a resident of the Philippine Islands,
demonstrates the impossibility of setting the
probate aside for lack of the necessary
citizenship on the part of the testator. As already
observed, the allegation of the petition on this
point is wholly insufficient to justify any relief
whatever.
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was
executed in conformity with the statutes of the
State of Illinois — we note that it does not
affirmatively appear from the transaction of the
testimony adduced in the trial court that any
witness was examined with reference to the law
of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will.
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will
was properly executed by examining section
1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as
exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's
Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and
he may have assumed that he could take judicial
notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our
opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the
courts here to take judicial notice, among other
things, of the acts of the legislative department of
the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United
States; and we would hesitate to hold that our
courts can, under this provision, take judicial
notice of the multifarious laws of the various
American States. Nor do we think that any such
authority can be derived from the broader
language, used in the same action, where it is
said that our courts may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge "similar" to those
therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is
to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action litigated
in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court
may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law
of Illinois on the point in question, such error is
not now available to the petitioner, first, because
41
the petition does not state any fact from which it
would appear that the law of Illinois is different
from what the court found, and, secondly,
because the assignment of error and argument
for the appellant in this court raises no question
based on such supposed error. Though the trial
court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to
the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its
judgment could not be set aside, even upon
application made within six months under section
113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it
should be made to appear affirmatively that the
conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true,
states in general terms that the will in question is
invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal
property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely
a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the
petition is accompanied contain no reference to
the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tent to raise a doubt
as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial
court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point
cannot be urged as of serious moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that
the will in question was not properly admissible to
probate because it contains provisions which
cannot be given effect consistently with the laws
of the Philippine Islands; and it is suggested that
as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator
she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which
she is entitled under the law governing
testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon
this point it is sufficient to say that the probate of
the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
provisions, the decree of probate being
conclusive only as regards the due execution of
the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614;
Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347,
349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119,
121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393,
395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it
should appear that any legacy given by the will or
other disposition made therein is contrary to the
law applicable in such case, the will must
necessarily yield upon that point and the law must
prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten
that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this
will must be determined by the law of Illinois and
not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the
general provisions here applicable in such
matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10
of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the
order of succession, as well as to the amount of
the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws
of the nation of the person whose succession is
in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest
that the petition submitted to the court below on
October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to
warrant the setting aside of the other probating
the will in question, whether said petition be
considered as an attack on the validity of the
decree for error apparent, or whether it be
considered as an application for a rehearing
based upon the new evidence submitted in the
affidavits which accompany the petition. And in
this latter aspect the petition is subject to the
further fatal defect that it was not presented within
the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in
denying the relief sought. The order appealed
from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO
MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ and TEODORA
GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the
Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated
March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled
"Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et
42
al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial
District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the
same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3,
1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for
reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual
background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with
an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square
meters of that parcel of residential land situated
in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of
Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A)
issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932
square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin
Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons
named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This
Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father
has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the
entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496
in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia
Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-
indiviso. As a result of the registration case
Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8)
was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names
of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal
shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his
illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also
known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of
the eastern portion of the property consisting of
436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said
436 square meter-portion of the property to
Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora
Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of
Real Properties" whereby the former transferred
said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who
has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez
executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the
other half of the property appertaining to Carlos
Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only
heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued
on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone
over the entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her
husband, instituted the present action for the
recovery of the eastern portion of the property
consisting of 436 square meters occupied by
defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint and holding the
defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of
the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay
to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as
damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the
respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1,
1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision
was rendered by a special division of five (5)
justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego,
dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period
granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed
therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said
motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June 3,
1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals
from the aforequoted decision of the trial court,
herein petitioner raised the following assignments
of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB,
ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT
THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB,
ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO
43
RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN
DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND
IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF
SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS
FAVOR.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID
NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF
EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER
AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT
SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN
QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE
ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA
GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS
THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA
APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-
23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968,
WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE
APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE
SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS
THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was
filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not
declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also
known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of
Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over
the property in question. Respondents failed to
present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia
Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of
argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can
be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no
right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez
and could not have validly acquired, nor legally
transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of
the property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights
to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777,
provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died
with or without a will, before the effectivity of this
Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of
1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half
pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then
covered by Original Certificate of title No. 50933,
died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the
effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
successional rights pertaining to his estate must
be determined in accordance with the Civil Code
of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA
434) wherein this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of
1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos
Jimenez died and which should be the governing
law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate
was concerned), a child must be either a child
legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child — for illegitimate not
natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of
1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born
out of the common-law-relationship between her
44
mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez,
she could not even be considered an
acknowledged natural child because Carlos
Jimenez was then legally married to Susana
Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria
Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab
was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled
to any successional rights in so far as the estate
of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any
voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez
or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the
land could not even legally transfer the parcel of
land to Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly,
could not also legally transfer the same to herein
private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We
can immediately discern another error in the
decision of the respondent court, which is that the
said court sustained and made applicable to the
case at bar the ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al.,
v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31,
1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the
Torrens System may not be acquired by
prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners. They merely claim to have
acquired by succession, their alleged title or
interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein
are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino
case, concluded that respondents had acquired
the property under litigation by prescription. We
cannot agree with such conclusion, because
there is one very marked and important difference
between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino
case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner
Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property
then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos
Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this
Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands
registered under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are
not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in
the said cited case the principle of
imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her
predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing
against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was
the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the
Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land
which includes the portion now in question, from
February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate
of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of
the land covered by said original certificate of
titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner
of the land covered by the certificate of title.
(Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57
SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided
property remained good and continued to be
good when she segregated it into a new title
(T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's
ownership over her one-half of the land and which
is the land in dispute was always covered by
a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount
of possession thereof by the respondents, could
ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is
apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner)
to institute this action to recover possession of the
portion of the land in question based on the
Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No.
82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not
barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason
& Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29,
1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G.
5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and
citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen
v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that,
since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she
lost the right to recover possession of the parcel
of land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches or staleness of demand; each case is to
be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It
would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to
45
deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful
inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief
prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and
absolute owner of the land in question with right
to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle
Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso
share in the properties then owned in co-
ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by
intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because
Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or
the law which established the Torrens System of
Land Registration in the Philippines is that the
stability of the landholding system in the
Philippines depends on the confidence of the
people in the titles covering the properties. And to
this end, this Court has invariably upheld the
indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among
others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong
(6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee
to file an action to recover possession based on
its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred
under the doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No.
L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS,
deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST
COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for
oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-
appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S.
Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B.
Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question
purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of
the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced,
he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy),
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a
will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go
to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
46
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis
died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as
executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form
of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to
time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by
the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares
of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of
P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the
project of partition, the executor — pursuant to
the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes
as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite
notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on
April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda
and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration
having been denied by the lower court on June
11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this
Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
— Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case
on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen
Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they
argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
47
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by
the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17,
paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the
Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
next preceding article" when they incorporated
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have
been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed
is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved in our System
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent
executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate —
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law
to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law
on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is
hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila and NENITA
CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking
to annul the order of the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos,
48
after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by
herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos
died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent
Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and
Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory
heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication
under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the
ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977,
Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate
of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos,
which was allegedly executed in the United
States and for her appointment as administratrix
of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix
was an American citizen at the time of her death
and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that
the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977
while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime,
the testatrix made her last wig and testament on
July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo
Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the
testatrix death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with
the Registry of Wins at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin,
the administrator who was appointed after Dr.
Barzaga had declined and waived his
appointment as executor in favor of the former, is
also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratrix to administer
and eventually distribute the properties of the
estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the
reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things, that he has every
reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are
null and void; and that even if pertinent American
laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same
could not apply inasmuch as they would work
injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner
through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of
Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able
to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of
his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-
partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of
the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge
issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily
established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her
lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of
America with a permanent residence at 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit
D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos
executed a Last Will and Testament in the county
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according
to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that
while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines,
Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila
(Exhibit C) leaving property both in the
Philippines and in the United States of America;
that the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted
probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration
were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all
in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills
(Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would
render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in
the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of
the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted
to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and
Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let
Letters of Administration with the Will annexed
issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing
of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned
under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court.
49
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner
on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his
opposition, acknowledging the same to be his
voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a
petition for relief, praying that the order allowing
the will be set aside on the ground that the
withdrawal of his opposition to the same was
secured through fraudulent means. According to
him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was
inserted among the papers which he signed in
connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales
which he executed with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed
the withdrawal of the opposition was not his
counsel-of-record in the special proceedings
case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the
petitioner failed to appear. He made several
motions for postponement until the hearing was
set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion
entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the
notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for
hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning
for submission for reconsideration and resolution
of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is
resolved, may I also request for the future setting
of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion
to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the
court for June 19, 1980. When the case was
called for hearing on this date, the counsel for
petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate
instead of adducing evidence in support of the
petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the petition for relief
for failure to present evidence in support thereof.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied. In the same order,
respondent judge also denied the motion to
vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which,
incidentally has been questioned by the
respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on
its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his
last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed
a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on
September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes
Campos merged upon his death with the rights of
the respondent and her sisters, only remaining
children and forced heirs was denied on
September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations
that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court
deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing
of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of
rights or interests against the estate of deceased
Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for
the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate
of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or
repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated
instrument), or by way of a petition presented to
the court but by way of a motion presented prior
to an order for the distribution of the estate-the
law especially providing that repudiation of an
inheritance must be presented, within 30 days
after it has issued an order for the distribution of
the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his
legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a
will to probate in which no provision is made for
the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of
Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the
ground that no evidence was adduced to support
the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing
was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of
his petition — a denial of the due process and a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate
case, the fact that the Testator at the time of
50
death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas,
Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case
(De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are
anchored on the allegation that the respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when
he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's
opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced
to support petitioner's contention that the motion
to withdraw was secured through fraudulent
means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that after the
firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a
later date, filed a manifestation wherein he
confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition
was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been
substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn
filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of
record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the
probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other
opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the
provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that
since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate
of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by
the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright,
the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is
the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter
to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will, as provided
for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved in our system
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the
51
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and under the law of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of
hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig
bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled
for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980
was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his
motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979.
There is no reason why the petitioner should have
been led to believe otherwise. The court even
admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce
evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial
of due process. The fact that he requested "for
the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did
not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to
vacate would be heard and given preference in
lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such
request should be embodied in a motion and not
in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to
the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court,
it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of
Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had
an estate since it was alleged and proven that
Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United
States of America and not a "usual resident of
Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover,
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for
relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs.
Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284,
April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN
MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased
Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a
scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court,
however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns
are:
52
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2)
denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition; (4) the approval of
the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and
the failure not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the
receipt of the depositions requested in reference
to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact
that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not
in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the
following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that
said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as
he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what
the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges
it when he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that
he assigns as an error of the court in not having
deferred the approval of the scheme of partition
until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another
opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse
of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator Joseph
G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary
to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition
in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which
deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as
a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law,
I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having
been conferred upon me by conquest and not by
free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other
hand, having resided for a considerable length of
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess,
it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting
all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise,
I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The institution of legatees in this will is
conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in accordance with the
laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and
valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as
the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.
53
The fact is, however, that the said condition is
void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law
or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it
expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered unwritten,
and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of
the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees,
is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all
their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid
and effective it not appearing that said clauses
are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified
and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the
herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-
appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for
oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving
among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-
half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on
March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child,
named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA
HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and
who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to
me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
and who, from all information I have now resides
in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
54
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my
well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney),
now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all
the income from the rest, remainder, and residue
of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have
come to me from any source whatsoever, during
her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted
provisions that the executor in his final account
and project of partition ratified the payment of
only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of
partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime
as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved,
that the forum is the Philippines and even if the
case were decided in California, Section 946 of
the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she
is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance
with which a testator has the right to dispose of
his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77
Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in
page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria
Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as
follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY
IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
55
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen
was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is
also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself
in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to
probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco,
in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to
the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time
he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines
was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928,
he again departed the Philippines for the United
States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation
of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation,
in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945.
Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and
p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned
once more to California shortly after the making
of his last will and testament (now in question
herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of
the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
York, migrated to California and resided there for
nine years, and since he came to the Philippines
in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned
or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately
abandon the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many
shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the
citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to
1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was
a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion
is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
56
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well
be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been
shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place where
he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he
went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with
the place to be called a resident. It is clear,
however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could
not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of
intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence,
however, is a term used with many shades of
meaning, from the merest temporary presence to
the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to
insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar
requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no
other than the private law of the State of
California.
The next question is: What is the law in California
governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place
where personal property is situated, it is deemed
to follow the person of its owner, and is governed
by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in
appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the
case cited in the decision and testified to by a
witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State
of California, the internal law thereof, which is that
given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary
provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question
of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined
by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When
the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the
reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
57
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The
Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws
principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see
why the reference back should not have been to
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references"
which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have
looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why
the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps
the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as
the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their
respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or
both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected
the renvoi, judgment would have been against
the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
judgment would be for the woman. The same
result would happen, though the courts would
switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in
two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict
of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference
goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title
to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce,
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7,
pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The
question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French
court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve
itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the
assumption that this is what a French court would
do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will
follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is
presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws
rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again
to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial
process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign
law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules
as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign
58
law also to be resorted to? This is a question
which, while it has been considered by the courts
in but a few instances, has been the subject of
frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists;
and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send
back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer
to the question postulated and the operation of
the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply
the law to the actual question which the rules of
the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been
defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article
in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that
the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary
or internal law of the foreign state or country, but
its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country
as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the
contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which
disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that
said personal statute shall be determined by the
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place
where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems
of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman
who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
whether the law of Belgium would distribute
personal property upon death in accordance with
the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian
law would make the distribution in accordance
with the law of nationality — that is the English
law — he must accept this reference back to his
own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil
Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law.
If the law on succession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each
in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled
in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in
one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of
the state where he was domiciled at the time of
his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as
the law of situs is consulted in questions about
the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession,
the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the
59
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition
as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property,
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this
age, when business intercourse and the process
of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice
of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California.
But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens,
one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands
that We should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance
with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to
the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country
of which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application
of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not possibly
apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not
appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it
does not appear in each case that there exists in
the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law
similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his
will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
appellees.
60
[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000]
NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, petitioner,
vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding
Judge of 5th Sharia District Court, Cotabato
City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS
MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU
MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA
MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA
KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and
MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special civil action
of certiorari is the issue of whether or not the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relationship of two Muslims who
contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(hereafter, P.D. 1083 or Muslim Code). The
question is raised in connection with the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
husband.
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted
marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They
begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad
Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and
a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula
Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land
that was Aidas dowry (mahr or
majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in
Sousa, Cotabato.Hadji Abdula and Aida already
had two children when he married for the second
time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in
Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child
was born out of Hadji Abdulas second
marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant
with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim,
Nayo H. Omar but they were
childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted
marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in
Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon
they had a daughter named Fatima
(Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in
that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in
the business of buying and selling of rice, corn
and other agricultural products. Not long after,
Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women
named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he
eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where,
in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui
Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the
wives he had divorced. They established
residence in Cotabato City but they were
childless. For a living, they relied on farming and
on the business of buying and selling of
agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast
tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato
City, some of which were cultivated by
tenants. He deposited money in such banks as
United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with
petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died
without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994,
petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in
Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his
estate with a prayer that letters of administration
be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata
Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the
wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are
his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto
Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven
(7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled in
Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang,
and a pick-up jeepney.
On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court
ordered the publication of the petition.[1] After
such publication[2] or on March 16, 1994, Hadji
Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji Mohammad,
for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed
his opposition to the petition. He alleged among
other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are
as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving
spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c)
Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner
Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor
Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also
known as Teng Abdula, son; (f) Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula,
son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known as Kueng
Malang, daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and
(i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji
Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he
and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang,
61
had helped their father in his business, then they
were more competent to be administrators of his
estate.[3]
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael
Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang,
Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai
Malang filed an opposition to the petition,
adopting as their own the written opposition of
Hadji Mohammad.[4]
On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued
an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad
administrator of his fathers properties outside
Cotabato City. The same order named petitioner
and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang as joint
administrators of the estate in Cotabato
City. Each administrator was required to post a
bond in the amount of P100,000.00.[5] On April
13, 1994, letters of administration were issued to
Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the
required bond. He took his oath on the same
day.[6] The following day, Hadji Ismael and
petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and
hence, they were allowed to take their oath as
administrators.[7]
On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner
filed two motions informing the court that Hadji
Abdula had outstanding deposits with nine (9)
major banks.[8] Petitioner prayed that the
managers of each of those banks be ordered to
submit a bank statement of the outstanding
deposit of Hadji Abdula.[9] The Sharia District
Court having granted the motions,[10] Assistant
Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of United
Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as
of April 24, 1994, the outstanding deposit of Hadji
Abdula amounted to one million five hundred
twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-
eight centavos (P1,520,400.48).[11] The Senior
Manager of the Cotabato branch of Metrobank
also certified that as of December 18, 1993, Hadji
Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang had on
savings deposit the balance of three hundred
seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three
pesos and 32/100 centavos
(P378,493.32).[12] PCIB likewise issued a
certification that Hadji Abdula had a balance of
eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current
account as of August 11, 1994.[13]
During the pendency of the case, petitioner
suffered a congestive heart failure that required
immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994,
she filed a motion praying that on account of her
ailment, she be allowed to withdraw from UCPB
the amount of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) that shall constitute her advance
share in the estate of Hadji Abdula.[14]After due
hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed
petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P250,000.00).[15]
On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court
required petitioner and Hadji Ismael as joint
administrators to submit an inventory and
appraisal of all properties of Hadji Abdula.[16] In
compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted an
inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji
Abdula had seven (7) residential lots with
assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to
P25,800.00, an agricultural land with assessed
value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential
buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential
building.[17] All these properties were declared for
taxation purposes in Hadji Abdulas name.
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory
showing that Hadji Abdula married to Neng
Malang had seven (7) residential lots with a total
assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City,
an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at P30,000.00
and bank deposits.[18]
In the Memorandum that she filed with the
Sharia District Court, petitioner asserted that all
the properties located in Cotabato City, including
the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal
properties in accordance with Article 160 of the
Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code
while properties located outside of Cotabato City
were exclusive properties of the decedent.[19]
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in
their own Memorandum that all the properties left
by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for
various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no
conjugal partnership with petitioner because his
having contracted eight (8) marriages with
different Muslim women was in violation of the
Civil Code that provided for a monogamous
marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a
valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a
common-law relationship. Second, the decedent
62
adopted a complete separation of property
regime in his marital relations; while his wives
Jubaida
Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji
Adzis contributed to the decedents properties,
there is no evidence that petitioner had
contributed funds for the acquisition of such
properties. Third, the presumption that properties
acquired during the marriage are conjugal
properties is inapplicable because at the time he
acquired the properties, the decedent was
married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties
are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that
some of these properties were titled in the name
of the decedent married to Neng Malang because
such description is not conclusive of the conjugal
nature of the property. Furthermore, because
petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the
properties belonged to the estate of decedent,
she was estopped from claiming, after formal
offer of evidence, that the properties were
conjugal in nature just because some of the
properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name
married to Neng Malang. Fifth, if it is true that the
properties were conjugal properties, then these
should have been registered in the names of both
petitioner and the decedent.[20]
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the
Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy
D. Moson held that there was no conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and the
decedent primarily because the latter married
eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal
partnership cannot be applied if there is more
than one wife because conjugal partnership
presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural
marriage or a common-law relationship. The
court further found that the decedent was the
chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families
and that petitioner did not contribute to the
properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida,
Nayo and Mabay. The description married to
Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties is
no more than that -- the description of the
relationship between petitioner and the decedent.
Such description is insufficient to prove that the
properties belong to the conjugal partnership of
gains. The court stated:
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives
at the time he acquired the properties in
question. To sustain the contention of the
petitioner that the properties are her conjugal
property with the decedent is doing violence to
the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that
at the time of the marriage of the petitioner with
the decedent, there were already three (3)
existing marriages. Assuming for the moment
that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that
the property regime between them will be
governed by the regime of conjugal partnership
property, that agreement is null and void for it is
against the law, public policy, public order, good
moral(s) and customs.
Under Islamic law, the regime of property
relationship is complete separation of property, in
the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in
the marriage settlements or any other contract
(Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no evidence
of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court
concludes as it had begun, that the properties in
question, both real and personal, are not
conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the
decedent.[21]
Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the
Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of
the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
orders the following:
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding
estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the
amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses
in the amount of P2,040.80;
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and
personal properties, located in Talayan,
Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby
ordered to be distributed and adjudicated as
follows:
a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64
of the estate
b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 -
do -
c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 -
do -
d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang ------------------
- 2/64 - do -
63
e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang------------------------
-14/64 - do -
f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------
14/64 - do -
g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do
- complete separation of property, in the absence
h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 -
do -
i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------
- 7/64 - do -
Total------------------------ 64/64
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng
Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of advance be
charged against her share and if her share is not
sufficient, to return the excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to
this court their Project of Partition for approval,
not later than three (3) months from receipt of this
order.
SO ORDERED.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for
the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors
objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the
Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[22] Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal.[23] However, on January 19,
1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing the
notice of appeal on the strength of the following
provisions of P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of
the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from
the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final.
Nothing herein contained shall affect the original
and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she
would be filing an original action of certiorari with
the Supreme Court.[24]
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. She contends that the
Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling
that when she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the
latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida
Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay
Ganap Malang and therefore the properties
acquired during her marriage could not be
considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said
properties are not conjugal because under
Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is
of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage
settlement or any other contract.[25]
As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues
of marriage and property regime is the New Civil
Code, under which all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile,
viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal
partnership as incompatible with plural marriage,
which is permitted under Muslim law, and held the
applicable property regime to be complete
separation of property under P.D. 1083.
Owing to the complexity of the issue presented,
and the fact that the case is one of first impression
--- this is a singular situation where the issue on
what law governs the property regime of a Muslim
marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the
Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia
court for the Courts resolution --- the Court
decided to solicit the opinions of two amici curiae,
Justice Ricardo C. Puno[26] and former
Congressman Michael O. Mastura[27]. The Court
extends its warmest thanks to the amici curiae for
their valuable inputs in their written
memoranda[28] and in the hearing of June 27,
2000.
Resolution of the instant case is made more
difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent
dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are
established by the record. This is because,
traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events
or judicial decrees affecting civil status.[29] It also
explains why the evidence in the instant case
consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula
contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the
three which terminated in divorce; all eight
marriages were celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the
Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives -
-- namely, Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai ---
all divorces of which took place before the
64
enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula
died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim
Code and Family Code took effect, survived by
four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and
five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and
one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following
laws were in force, at some point or other, during
the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code,
which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic
Act No. 394 (R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim
divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949
to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took
effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code,
effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has
concluded that the record of the case is simply
inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and
complete resolution of the petition. To our mind,
any attempt at this point to dispense with the
basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence
before us could result in grave injustice to the
parties in this case, as well as cast profound
implications on Muslim families similarly or
analogously situated to the parties herein. Justice
and accountability dictate a remand; trial must
reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in
Congressman Masturas words, missing links,
that would be the bases for judgment and
accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve the
instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take
it as an imperative on our part to set out certain
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent
court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue
presented by the petition --- concerning the
property regime applicable to two Muslims
married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code
--- was interposed in relation to the settlement of
the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement
of estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the
enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result
in the application of the Civil Code and other
personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it is
but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely
presented and identify such collateral issues as
are required to be resolved in a settlement of
estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman
Mastura puts it, the Court does not often come by
a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will
be greatly enriched by a discussion of the
watershed of collateral issues that this case
presents.[30]
The Court has identified the following collateral
issues, which we hereby present in question
form: (1) What law governs the validity of a
Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites
before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (2) Are
multiple marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code valid? (3) How do
the Courts pronouncements in People vs.
Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs.
Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim
marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the
Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the property
relationship of Muslim multiple marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law
governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim
who died after the Muslim Code and the Family
Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the
dissolution of property regimes in the cases of
multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim
Code but dissolved (by the husbands death) after
the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are
Muslim divorces effected before the enactment of
the Muslim Code valid?
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly
from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice
Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the
reference of respondent court, and for the
direction of the bench and bar:
First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages
Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
The time frame in which all eight marriages of
Hadji Abdula were
celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil
Code which, accordingly, governs the
marriages. Article 78 of the Civil
Code[31] recognized the right of Muslims to
contract marriage in accordance with their
customs and rites, by providing that ---
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans
who live in the non-Christian provinces may be
performed in accordance with their customs, rites
or practices. No marriage license or formal
requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the
persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged
to comply with article 92.
65
However, thirty years after the approval of this
Code, all marriages performed between Muslims
or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.But
the President of the Philippines, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner of
National Integration, may at any time before the
expiration of said period, by proclamation, make
any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims
and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-
Christian provinces.
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year
period after which Muslims are enjoined to
solemnize their marriages in accordance with the
Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was
passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim
Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the
second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code
which provides that marriages between Muslims
thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code
shall be solemnized in accordance with said
Code.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple
Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs.
Subano and People vs. Dumpo
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no
law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple
marriages.[32] It is also not to be disputed that the
only law in force governing marriage relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the
Civil Code of 1950.
The Muslim Code, which is the first
comprehensive codification[33] of Muslim
[34]
personal laws, also provides in respect of acts
that transpired prior to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts
executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at the time of
their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the
principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly
and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied;[35] accordingly, every case of doubt will
be resolved against the retroactive opertion of
laws.[36] Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly
upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing
body of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in
respect of civil acts that took place before the
Muslim Codes enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when
we consider that what the provisions of the Civil
Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous
marriage. Bigamous or polygamous marriages
are considered void and inexistent from the time
of their performance.[37] The Family Code which
superseded the Civil Code provisions on
marriage emphasizes that a subsequent
marriage celebrated before the registration of the
judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall
likewise be void.[38] These provisions illustrate
that the marital relation perceived by the Civil
Code is one that is monogamous, and that
subsequent marriages entered into by a person
with others while the first one is subsisting is by
no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural
marriages celebrated before the enactment of the
Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal
cases, the Court applied the perspective in the
Civil Code that only one valid marriage can exist
at any given time.
In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted
the accused of homicide, not parricide, since ---
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the
deceased, it appears that the defendant has three
wives and that the deceased was the last in point
of time. Although the practice of polygamy is
approved by custom among these non-
Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned
by the Marriage Law[39], which merely recognizes
tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our
law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant
and this precludes conviction for the crime of
parricide.
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was
prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to
Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second
marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court
acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly
proved that the alleged second marriage had all
the essential requisites to make it valid were it not
66
for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it
appears that the consent of the brides father is an
indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim
marriage, and as Mora Dumpos father
categorically affirmed that he did not give his
consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the
Court held that such union could not be a
marriage otherwise valid were it not for the
existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit
her of the charge of bigamy.
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been
proven as a fact that the second marriage
contained all the essential requisites to make it
valid, a conviction for bigamy would have
prospered. [40]
Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim
Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
This is the main issue presented by the instant
petition. In keeping with our holding that the
validity of the marriages in the instant case is
determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is
the same Code that determines and governs the
property relations of the marriages in this case,
for the reason that at the time of the celebration
of the marriages in question the Civil Code was
the only law on marriage relations, including
property relations between spouses, whether
Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family
Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil
Code provisions on property relations, some of its
provisions are also material, particularly to
property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when
the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties
lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when
and how the subject properties were acquired.
Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the
marriage, as well as all property she acquires
during the marriage, in accordance with article
148, is paraphernal.
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the
paraphernal property.
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership
of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife.
The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:
When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted
the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the
Civil Code to require that the man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must
not in any way be incapacitated to
marry.[41] Situating these rulings to the instant
case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated
in Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to
Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent
to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from
the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is
not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in
such marriages are not precluded from proving
that property acquired during their cohabitation
with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property,
respectively.[42] Absent such proof, however, the
presumption is that property acquired during the
subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil
Code, there can only be one validly existing
marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property
of such subsisting marriage. [43]
67
With the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code
are pertinent:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by
acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of the cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default or of
waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely
requires that the parties live together as husband
and wife the Family Code in Article 147 specifies
that they live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. Also, in contrast to Article 144
of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence,
Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-
ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for
instance, one party has a pre-existing valid
marriage, provided that the parties prove their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry and only to the extent of their
proportionate interest therein. The rulings
in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA
306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055,
and related cases are embodied in the second
paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the
share of the party validly married to another shall
accrue to the property regime of such existing
marriage.
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of
Property Regimes
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16,
1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should
determine the identification of the heirs in the
order of intestate succession and the respective
shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on
the part of the individual parties who entered into
each and every marriage ceremony will depend
upon the law in force at the time of the
performance of the marriage rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the
children will depend upon the law in force at the
time of conception or birth of the child. If the child
was conceived or born during the period covered
by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil
Code provisions on the determination of the
68
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would
appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were
living separately, in such a way that access was
not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate,
although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the
period covered by the governance of the Muslim
Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death
of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the
Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. ---
Legitimacy of filiation is established by the
evidence of valid marriage between the father
and the mother at the time of the conception of
the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be
presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims
illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must
prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the
consummation of marriage or within two years
after the dissolution of the marriage shall be
presumed to be legitimate. Against this
presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of physical impossibility of access
between the parents at or about the time of the
conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. ---
Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife
contracts another marriage after the expiration of
her idda, the child born within six months from the
dissolution of the prior marriage shall be
presumed to have been conceived during the
former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the
latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after
the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that
she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall,
within thirty days from the time she became
aware of her pregnancy, notify the former
husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or
his heirs may ask the court to take measures to
prevent a simulation of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to
succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the
provisions on legal succession in the Muslim
Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said
Code, the sharers to an inheritance include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the
grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the
direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the
uterine sister and the uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or
a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to
one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the
absence of such descendants, she shall inherit
one-fourth of the estate.[44] The respective shares
of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110
abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122
of P.D. 1083.
Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the
Muslim Code
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among
Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in
accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of
69
20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval
of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.[45] Thus, a Muslim
divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from
June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
From the seven collateral issues that we
discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to
further situate the points of controversy in the
instant case for the guidance of the lower
court.Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and
legally existing at the time of the opening of the
succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in
1993? The validly and legally existing marriage
would be that marriage which was celebrated at
a time when there was no other subsisting
marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce
or by death. This is because all of the marriages
were celebrated during the governance of the
Civil Code, under the rules of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved
by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame
and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under
R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18,
1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place
from June 14, 1969. [46]
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner
and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the
children begotten from different marriages, who
among the surviving children are legitimate and
who are illegitimate? The children conceived and
born of a validly existing marriage as determined
by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact
and time of conception or birth may be
determined by proof or presumption depending
upon the time frame and the applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji
Abdula at the time of his death on December 18,
1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the
following:
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a
valid marriage as determined by the first corollary
issue are conjugal properties and should be
liquidated and divided between the spouses
under the Muslim Code, this being the law in force
at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.
b. Properties acquired under the conditions
prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during
the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are
conjugal properties and should be liquidated and
divided between the spouses under the Muslim
Code. However, the wives other than the lawful
wife as determined under the first corollary issue
may submit their respective evidence to prove
that any of such property is theirs exclusively.
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set
out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
during the period from and after August 3, 1988
are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
d. Properties acquired under conditions not
covered by the preceding paragraphs and
obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of
Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and
what are their shares in intestacy? The following
are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife,
as determined under the first corollary issue, and
(2) the children, as determined under the second
corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was
already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas
death, will govern the determination of their
respective shares.
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in
this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety
the main, collateral and corollary issues herein
presented and a remand to the lower court is in
order. Accordingly, evidence should be received
to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates
of the marriages performed in accordance with
Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of
the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by
death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim
rites and practices, thus indicating which
marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under
the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and
third collateral issues and the first corollary issue;
(3) the exact periods of actual cohabitation
(common life under a common roof) of each of the
marriages during which time the parties lived
together; (4) the identification of specific
properties acquired during each of the periods of
cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above,
and the manner and source of acquisition,
indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing
the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in
70
co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the
children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from
the several unions, the dates of their respective
conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1
and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as
lawful heirs.
Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees
that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent
took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law
applicable on the issue of marriage
settlement, [47] but espouses that customs or
established practices among Muslims in
Mindanao must also be applied with the force of
law to the instant case.[48] Congressman
Masturas disquisition has proven extremely
helpful in impressing upon us the background in
which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to
be interpreted, particularly the
interconnectedness of law and religion for
Muslims[49] and the impracticability of a strict
application of the Civil Code to plural marriages
recognized under Muslim law.[50] Regrettably, the
Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant case
applying such laws and rights as are in existence
at the time the pertinent civil acts took
place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant
governing law with customs, albeit how widely
observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply
a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning the
distribution of property between divorced
spouses upon one of the spouses death.51
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September
26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of
Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is
SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is
REMANDED for the reception of additional
evidence and the resolution of the issues of the
case based on the guidelines set out in this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision
of the Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F.
Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-
owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together
as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an
enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner
Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula)
were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to
United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his
favor by the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the
American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his
wife and he visited the Philippines.[7] He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua
as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating
that the child was not legitimate and the line for
the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with
her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew
a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the
71
family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other
obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4)
Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas
father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree
became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the
Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F.
Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they
resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived
together as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-
five (25) year union produced three children,
Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will
and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R.
FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and
lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that
may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife
Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente,
in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever
and wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio
Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto
my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties
located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and
my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and
165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-
mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold
and conveyed to any other persons, but could
only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of
by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to
be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the
latter to act, any of my children in the order of age,
if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein
or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills,
codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no
relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes
Side should ever bother and disturb in any
manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato
72
and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue of this
Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last
will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the
motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo
was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was
duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could
be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same
court a petition[22] for letters of administration over
Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1)
that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that
the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate
proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the
testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-
888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was
published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued
a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so
found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at
Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition
of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not
entitled to receive any share from the estate even
if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour
which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of
Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of
Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void
and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and
entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties,
and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal
shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal
administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding
letters of administration issue in her favor upon
her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return
to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights,
and credits, and estate which shall at any time
come to her possession or to the possession of
any other person for her, and from the proceeds
to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon
as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court
and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective
petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied
Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise
of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
73
him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987,
the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the
only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of
the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of
Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting
through the various arguments raised,[36] the
issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from
the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of
Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for
ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became
an American citizen long before and at the time
of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is
duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession,
both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was
pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial
court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the
law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine
law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within
the State. It can therefore refer to no other than
the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically
invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
74
Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz,
with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It
declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired
during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the
formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in
light of the factual and legal circumstances
here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing
to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita
v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when
he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the
divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision
of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We
hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall
be observed in their execution. (underscoring
ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall
inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note
that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights
to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass
upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision
of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of
75
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the
court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA,
for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of
VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate
but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect?
This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children
of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The
latter died in 1969 without her estate being
settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in
1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who
claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he
died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of
the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the
court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from
said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted
the motion and issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is
hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the
wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions
of the last will and testament of Alejandro
Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and
Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes, whose respective estates shall be
liquidated and distributed according to the laws
on intestacy upon payment of estate and other
taxes due to the government.[1]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that
she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although
she admitted that they were not married to each
other.Upon denial of her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for
failure to file appellants brief within the extended
period granted.[2] This dismissal became final and
executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16,
1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower
court to implement the final and executory
Order. Consequently, private respondents filed
several motions including a motion to compel
petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner
refused to surrender the TCTs, private
respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said
titles and for issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by
Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well
as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of
execution, on the ground that the order was
merely interlocutory, hence not final in
character. The court added that the dispositive
portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order
dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders
dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
76
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for
review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a
petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the
two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said
to have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the
case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the
Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
January 30, 1986 Order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was
earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as
executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and
to maintain the status quo or lease of the
premises thereon to third parties.[3] Private
respondents opposed the motion on the ground
that petitioner has no interest in the estate since
she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory
decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In
setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has
attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the
entry of judgment made by the Court of
Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court
cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of
a superior court, for to do so would be to negate
the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of
review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on
probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the
whole world.[4]
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is
taken in due time from a judgment or order of the
trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse
of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became
final and the question determined by the court in
such order can no longer be raised anew, either
in the same proceedings or in a different
motion. The matters of due execution of the will
and the capacity of the testator acquired the
character of res judicata and cannot again be
brought into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and forever
closed.[5] Such final order makes the will
conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.[6]
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals
generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated,[7] particularly on three
aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the
decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the
execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
and the due execution of the last will and
testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a
determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its
execution, that he had freely executed the will
and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace
or undue influence and that the will is genuine
and not a forgery,[10] that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and
questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been
authenticated.[12] Thus, it does not necessarily
follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the
will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession,[13] the
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot
be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically
void. Such determination having attained that
character of finality is binding on this Court which
will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court
finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final
and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies
provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the
party does not avail of other remedies despite its
belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and
is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as
1918, it has been declared that public policy and
77
sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts must at
some point of time fixed by law[14]become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes
rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of
which the courts were constituted was to put an
end to controversies.[15] To fulfill this purpose and
to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less
arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful.[16] The only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence,[17] which circumstances do not
concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the
declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as
she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory
Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private
respondents were declared as the only heirs do
not bind those who are not parties thereto such
as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the
same constitutes res judicatawith respect to
those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would
amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs
when the same issue had already been resolved
adversely by some other court.[18] It is clear from
the executory order that the estates of Alejandro
and his spouse should be distributed according to
the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order
is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set
aside by the trial court. In support thereof,
petitioner argues that an order merely declaring
who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs
is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to
require delivery of shares from one person to
another particularly when no project of partition
has been filed.[19] The trial court declared in the
January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the
legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and
at the same time it nullified the will.But it should
be noted that in the same Order, the trial court
also said that the estate of the late spouses be
distributed according to the laws of
intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to
implement that order of intestate distribution and
not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic
provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the
Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that
testacy is preferred to intestacy.[20] But before
there could be testate distribution, the will must
pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards
provided by law considering that the deceased
testator is no longer available to prove the
voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact
that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous
in nature and that no one is presumed to give
- Nemo praesumitur donare.[21] No intestate
distribution of the estate can be done until and
unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic
and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void,
the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the
intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid,
the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity
that is whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions
thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy
apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of
the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his
late spouse, whom he described as his only
beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a
final and executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging
exclusively to the testator or properties which are
part of the conjugal regime cannot be given
effect. Matters with respect to who owns the
properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in
the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the
settlement of his and that of his late spouses
estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as
administratrix is rendered moot considering that
she was not married to the late Alejandro and,
therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
78
79