Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:3321

1 David Loy(SBN 229235)

2 ', davidloy~ia aclusandiego.org FILED
CLERK,U.S. DISTRICT COURT
ACLU FOUNDATION QF SA~1 DIEGO ~c
3 IMPERIAL COUNTIES
FEB 28 2oi9
4 ' P.O. Box 87131
San Diego,CA 92138-7131 CE DST LIF R
5 Tel:{619)232-2I21 BY

Fax:(6l9)232-0036
6
7 ' Attorney far Amici Curiae
Ah~ERICAN CIV~.LIBER`T`IES i.)NIO~1;
8 '
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES[JIVION
9 OF SAN DIEGO &IMPERIAL COUNTIES
10
it UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL U~ST~CT OF CAL~F~RNIA
12 '
13 '
iJIVITED STATES ~F AMERICA Na CR 13-0106-DQC
14
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANA
15 AUTHORITIES OF AMICI CURIAE
V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
16 UNION AND AMERICAN CIVIL
Mo~v~a~ ~~~'ION, LIBERTIES UNION QF SAN DIEGO &
17 an unincorpar,~ted association, I~Eiu~.Co[nv'r~s
1$ Defendant. .Date: February 28, 2419
Time: 8:00 a.m.
19 Judge: Hon,David O. Carter
20
2l
22
23
24
25
~6
27
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Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 2 of 23 Page ID #:3322

1 TALE OF CONTENTS
2

3
4 INTRODUCTION .............................................................. ...... .......... .... ......r..... l
5
ARGUMEN~..............................................................~.,..,,..~..,...............,........,,.,....,..3
6

7 I. 'T~-iE UNIQUE NATURE OF A TRADEMARK DOSS NOT FERMIT

THE GOVERNMENT TAD FORFEIT THE MARKS III GROSS OR
8 SUCCEED ~O TIDE CLUB'S RIGHTS IN THE MARKS....................3
9
is A. Like any trademark, a collective membership murk does not exist
independently ofthe organization it symbolizes and confers only
11 limited praperty rights against purely commercial use ofthe mark......3
12
B. Depending on the evidence at trial, the limited property rights
13 conferred by the Marks may not have a sufficient ~tex~us to the alleged
14
offense to justify forfeitux~....................................................................5

15 C. Because ofthe unique nature of a trademark,the government cannot

obtain forfeiture ofthe Marks in gross or exercise tl~e C1ub'~
l6 trademark rights.....................................................................................7
17
~. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROHIBITS ANY ATTEMPT TO SILENCE
18 THE ~LL~B OR ITS MEM~EItS A~1D SUPPa~t7'ERS FROM USING
l9 '~`HE i'Vi~4RKS TO EXPRESS THEMSEL'VES..................................9

20
A. The display ofitems baring the Marks to express identity or
2l . .
association is protected speech..............................................................4
22
B. The government may not exploi# forfeiture law to impose a content-
23 based prior restraint on protected speech that Congress could not
constitutionally enact...........................................................................11
24

25 III. DUE PROCESS WOULD PRGIHIBIT AIVY 5UIUIMARY

CONFISCATION OF ITEMS BEARING THE MARKS FRAM CLUB
26 M~~~ERS OR SUPPORTERS.................,................................~4
27
CONCLUSION...........~.....................................~.................................,.....................15
28

ii
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 3 of 23 Page ID #:3323

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
3 CASES

4 Alexander v. United States,

5 509 U.S. 544(1993)...........................................................................................14
b Anderson v, City of.Hermosa beach,
7 b2i F.3d 1051 (nth Cir. 2010)............................................................................10
8
Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 J.S. 564 {2~?02)...........................................................................................11
to
.~4shcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
11
535 U.S. z34,253(2002)...................................................................................13
12

13 Berg v. City o,fNew Fork,

14 9~ F.3d 689(2d ~Cir. 1996}.................................................................................10
IS Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
1G 4b6 U.S.48S(1984)...........................................................................................10
17
Bosley Medical Ir~.~titute, Inc. v. Kremer,
18
403 F.3d 672(9th Cir. 2005).................................................................. ......4, 9
19
Brandenburg v. Ohio,
z~
39~ U.S. 444(196~}...........................................................................................13
2l

Z2 Canady v. ~vs~ier Par. Sch. Bd.,

23 240 ~.3d 437(nth C r. 2001)..............................................................................10

24 Carefzrst ofMaryla~rd, Inc. v. First Gaye, P.C.,

25 '~, 350 F, S~upp. 2d 714 {E.D. Va. 2004)...................................................................~
2~
Cedric 1~ushner Promotions, Ltd v. King,
27
533 CJ.S. 158 ~(2~U01).............................................................................................6
2~

iii
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 4 of 23 Page ID #:3324

1 Church ofAm. 1~nights ofthe Ku 1~lw~c Klan v. Kerik,

2 3S6 Fad 147 f2d Cir. 2004)...............................................................................10
3 Citizens United v. Fed. Electaon Comm'n,
4 558 U.S. 310(2410).............................................................................................9
5
Cohen v. California,
6
4U3 U.S. 15(1911)............................................................................................t 13
7

8 Collin v, Smith,

9
578 F.2d 1197 {7th Cir. 197$)..................................................................~.,.~.".. ~ 4

10 Comedy II~C Prods., lrtc. v Gary 5ad~erup, Irt~.,

11 25 Cal. 4th 387 +(20U1)..........................................................................................6
12 Consol. Edisarr Go. of1Vew York v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of1Vew York,
13 447 U.S. 530(1980)...............................................................................~..,......,.1Q
14
Crel4gri, Inc. v. ~,TSANA Health Scis., Inc.,
15
~~~ F.3d 626(9th Cir. Zoo~~................................................................................6
16

17 ,~. 8~c J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,

18
967 F.2d 1280 {9th Cir. 1992j..............................................................................7

19 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., lnc.,

20 33~ F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003)..........................................................................4, 10
21 F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc. v. Roush Bakery ~'roducts C4., Inc.,
22 8.51 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir. 1988)..............................................................................b
z3
FYrst 1Vat. Bank o,~'Bos. v. ~ellatti,
24
435 U.S. 765 {1978)...................... ....................................................................10
25

26 '~
.Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,

27
48'~ U.S. 4b (~98~~ .............................................................................................11

~8

iv
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 5 of 23 Page ID #:3325

1 Healy v. James',
2 4~8 U.S. 169(1972)...........................................................................................12
3 Huber faking Co. v, St`roehmann Bros. Ca.,
4 252 F.2d 945 ~2ci Cir. 195$).................................................................................5
5
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Biseacual Grp. of.~8vs.,
b
515 U.S. 557(1995).................................................a....~...~.........,..,..........,........10
7
8 In rQ Lorillard Tobacco Co.,

9 370 F.3d 982(9th Cir. 2004)..............................................................................15

1Q In re Murphy-Brown, LLC,
11 9~7 F.3d '188(4th Cir. 2018).,..~........................~,.,...........,..................,..............11
12 Int'1 Order o,fJo~i's Daughters ~. Lndehurg & Co.,
13 633 F.2d 912(9th Cr. 19$0)................................................................................4
I4
James a Meow Medta, Irtc.,
]5
30U F.3d 683(6th Cr. 2042)..............................................................................13
16
17 Johansen ~x rel. NLRB v. S'an Diego County Dtsr. Cvuur~cil of

18 Carpenters c~c Joiners ofAm., AFB-CI+O,

t9 745 F.2d I289(9th Cir. 1984)............................................................................11

20 Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc.,

21 802 F. Supp. 278(C.D. Cal. i992)..................................................................... lS
~~~ L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,
23 811 F.2d 2b ~(1 st Cir. 1987)..................................................................................4
24
Marshak v. Green,
25
746 F.2d 927(2d Cir. 1984).................................................................................8
z6
27 Matul v. Tam,

28 137 S. Ct. 1744(2017)..................................................................................3, 13

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Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 6 of 23 Page ID #:3326

1 1~fattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,

2 296 F.3d 894 t9#h Cyr. 2UO2)........ .... ........... ................................................4, 9
3 Money Store v. Harriscarp Fin., lnc.,
4 689 F,2d 6615 7th Cir. 19$2j................................................................................7
5
11TAACP v. Cdaiborn~ Hardware Co.,
6
458 U.S. 886{1982)...........................................................................................12
7
8 Nat'I Assoc.for'Stock Car Auto Racing,lnc. v. Does,

9 584 F. Supp. 2d 824(W.D.N.C.2008)..............................................................15

10 Nebraska Fress Ass'n v. Stuart,

11 427 U.S. 539{1976)...........................................................................................1 ~
12 New Kids on the Block v. 1lrews America Pub., Inc.,
13 X71 F.2d 302 9th Cir. 1992)................................................................................4
14
People ea~c rel. Gallo v. Acurta,
15
14 Cal. 4th 1090(1997)..........................................~.......,..................,............,...12
is
17 PGA v. Bankers Life &Casualty. Cam.,

18 514 F.2d 665,668(Sth Cir. 1975)...................................................,,.........~.........5

19 Phone v. MacMillan, 1"rtc.,

zo 894 F.2d 579(2c~ Cis. 1990)......................................~....E..,......................,.....,.....4
2l Procu~ier v. Martinez,
22 416 U.S. 396(1974}...........................................................................................10
23
Reed u. Town ofGilbert,
24
135 S. Ct. 2218(2015)......~................................................................................11
25
Z6 Riley v.1Vat'1 Federation ofthe Blind aflVorth Carolina, Inc.,

z~ 487 U.S. 781 {1988)...,.....~.......~................................................................~........12

28 Rivera v. Curter', No,2:09-cv-02435-Dad-JC .............................................:passim

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Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 7 of 23 Page ID #:3327

1 ~ Sammartuno v. First Judicial Dist. Court,

2 303 F.3d 959 (9tli Cir. 2002)........................................................................10, 11

3
Sebastian .Int'1, lnc, v. Longs Drug Store Corp.,
4
53 F.3d 107 (9th Cir. 1995)............................................................................5, 9
S
Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMCIr~t'l, Ltd.,
6
96 F.3d 1217(9th Cir. i996)................................................................................5

S
Specht v. Google Inc.,

9 747 F.3d 929(7th Cir. 2014)................................................................................9

10 Sugar Bu$ters LLC v. Brennan,

11 177 F.3d 25$(5th Cir. 1999)..................~..........................,..,........,.,.........,,.....,...7
12 ?'exas v. Johnson,
13
491 [.~.5. 397{1989}...........................................................................................13
1 ~#
United,,drug Ca. v. Theodore Rectar~us Co.,
15
248 i~.S, 90{l 9l8)...............................................................................~......,....,..3
16

17 Unite~Staies v. ~tngiuly,

18 897 F.2d 11 b9(1st Cir. 1990)..........................................................................5,6

19 United Stites a Cianci,

20 21$ F. Supp. 2d 232(D.R.I.2002)..........................:............................................5
21
United Stags v. DeFries,
22 129 ~.3d 1293(D.C. Cir. 1997}...........................................................................5

United States v. Hamilton,

699 F.3d 356(nth Cir. 2012)..............................................................................10

United States v. Sineneng-Smith,

910 F.3d 461("9tih Cir. 2018)...............................................................................13

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Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 8 of 23 Page ID #:3328

1 United States v. Stev~rts,

2 559 U.S. 460(2Q10)..................................................................~........e,......,.....,.12
3
Universal City Studios, lnc. v. Nintendo Co.,
4
578 F. Supp. 91 Z (S.D.N.Y. 1983).......................................................................4
5
Yirgrnfa v. Black,
6
538 U.S. 343(2UU3)................................................................................... .......13
7

8 Il~sa, U.~S:A., Inc. v. Birmingham Tr. Nat. Bank,

9 596 F.2d 1371 (fed. Cir. 1982)............................................................................7

10 R''hite v. Lee,
11 227 F.3d 1214(9th Cir. 2000j............................................................................13
12 '
Whittaker Cor,~. v. Execuair Corp.,
13 953 F.2d 510 {9th Cir. 1992)..............................................................................15
14 STATUTES
15 15 U.S.C. § 1054.................................................................................~.,...,...........,..5
16
15 U`.5.C. § 11 I6(d){i)(A).....................................................................................15
17

1$
15 U.S.C. § 1118....................................................................................................15

19 15 U.S.C. § 1127..................................................................................................4, 5
2~ 1 S U.5.C. § 1963(aj........... .. .... ..........................................................................~
21
18 U.S.C. ~ 163{~}............................................................~............~..,,..............,....,9
z~ RULES
23
Fed. R. brim. P. 32.2(b)~l)~A)......_.~.~............................................................. ....5
24

25

2fi

27

28

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Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 9 of 23 Page ID #:3329

1NTRODUCTI~I'~i
2 fiver ten years ago,the government launched a campaign.to destroy the
identity of an association by depriving its members and supporters ofthe free
4 speech right to identify themselves with distinctive insignia. Targeting the Mongols
5 Motorcycle Club ("Club")by prosecuting certain members,the government
6 obtained an ex parte restraining order and declared that any officer who saw any
7 Club member "wearing his patch" could "literally take the jacket right off his
8 back." ATF Undercover Investigation Leads to Federal Racketeering Indictment,
9 https;//www,iusti~ce.gav/archive/u~ac~/cac/Pressroornlpr204$/142.htm1(Oct. 21,
to 2UQ8). Although this Court halted the government's original attack, the government
11 has resumed its war on free expression by again seeking forfeiture ofthe Tub's
12 collective membership marks(".Marks") after indicting the Club.
13 The government is now doubling down on its novel theory that farfeitu~-e
~4 justifies censorship of persons using the Marks to identify or express themselves.
15 it admitted the I+~arks aye the "unity symbol" at the "core" ofthe Club's "identity"
Ib yet effectively acknowledged it wi11 attempt to "seize additional items bearing the
17 name and logo from individual members" oftie Club. Federal Jury fJrders
18 ~tYlong~ls Motorcycle Gang to Forfeit Logos, https:l/wwwiustic+~,govlusao-
19 c~dcafpr/federal-iury-vrders~mongols-mvtorc~le-gang-forfeit-loos (Jan.. 11, 2019}.
20 It goes without saying tha# Congress could not prohibit a private association
2~ or its members from using parti+~ular insignia to express membership in or support
22 for that association. This Court previously held th$ government cannot accomplish
23 that result through abuse ofits forfeiture power. For similar reasons, the
24 government may not now prohibit the Club and its members or supporters from
25 identifying themselves, A properly convicted person or organisation may be
26 subjected to appropriate punishment, but that punishment may not include the form
27 ofcivil death sought by the government.
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Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 10 of 23 Page ID #:3330

Even assuming the Ctub's RICA convictions are valid, the government's
2 novel forfeiture theory remains "creative tv a fault." Rivera a Carter, No. 2:09-cv-
3 0243S-DOC-JC, Order Granting Summary Judgment at 13(ECF No.9Q){C.D. dal
4 Jan, 4,2~11)("Rivera ~~mm. J~dg. Order"~. Unlike other intellectual property, a
5 trademark is not a mc~nopol~ ri~,ht. The purpose ofa trademark is to prevent
6 consumer confusion about the origin o~ goods yr servaces bearing the mark. As a
7 result, a trademark ct~nfers only limited property rights to prohibit certain purely
8 cammercial uses ofthe mark. Depending on the evidence at trial, the limited rights
9 conferred by the 1Nlarks may not have a sufFicient nexus to the RICO offense found
10 by the jury to justafy forfeiture.
11 In any event, the law prohibits any transfer, voluntary ox involuntary, ofa
12 trademark in gross, independent ofthe underlying business or organization that it
l3 symbolizes. Thy Marks symbolize the Club's identity. The government cannot
d4 assura~e the identity ofthe Club itself. Instead, it is improperly attempting to strip
15 the Marks ,as if they were flowing rights independent ~fthe organisation they
l6 symbolize, in violation ofsettled trademark law.
17 At best, even ifthe Marks are technically forfeitable, they would expire and
18 return to the public domain, because they are not exercisable by or transferable for
]9 value to the United States. In that case, perhaps the Club would lose the limited
20 right to sue third parties for purely corr~mercial infringement Qr dilution, but the
21 government would enjoy no right to control alI use or display ofiterris bearing the
22 Marks. given if the government could succeed to the Club's trademark rig~.ts, it
23 could not prevent use o~the Marks to express support for the Club.
24 Any attempt to do so would also violate the First,Amendment. As collective
25 membership m ks,the Marks exist to express the Club's identity and the fact of
26 membership and support for the Club. Such expression ofidentity and association
27 rests at the core ofthe First Arne~dinent. While convi~ti~n may lead to ~et•t~in
2$

2
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 11 of 23 Page ID #:3331

restraints on conduct, it cannot deprive persons, natural or artificial, ofthe

z fundamental right to express their identity through chosen words and images.
3 The forfeiture of a collective membership mark also implicates due process.
4 While members may not own collective membership marks, they retain ownership
5 rights in iteans bearing yr displaying the Marksa of which they cannot be deprived
absent notice and hearing in a proper tra~dernark action.
7 ARGi~MENT
I. THE 11NI~UE I~iATURE Qk'~'~'RADE~A~tK ~O~S 1~tUT PEI~IV~~T
THE GOV RN.MENT Ta ~'~~~'~~"I"~I~E M~,~tKS IN GROSS OR
9 SUCCEED TQ THE CLUB'S RIGHTS Ili T IE MARKS.
10 A. Like any trademark,a collective ~embershi~ mark does not exist
independenfly of the organization it symbolizes and comers only►
i1 limited pr+ope~~y rights against purely commercial use o~the m~ar~.
12 The government's forfeiture theory founders on first princip~~s of trademark
l3 law. "The principle underlying trademark protection is tk~at distinctive marks--~
14 wards, names, symbols, end the like--can helg distinguish a parkicula~- artisan's
15 goods" o~ person's services "from those of others." Matal v. Tam, 13'7 S. Ct. 1744,
1C l751 (2017 .Over 100 years ago, the Supreme Court condemned "the fundamental
l7 error of supposing that atrade-mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a
l8 statutory copyright or a patent for an invention." United drug Co. v. Theodore
]9 Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918). As the Court explained, "There is no such
20 thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an ~stablishet~
2] business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed," and xhe "owner
22 of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a
23 negative and merely prohibitive use o~ it as a monopoly." Id, at 9798.
24 As a result, "[a] trademark is a very unique type of property" and is "not
25 property in the ordinary sense, but only a word or symbol indicating the origin or
26 source of a product [or service]. The owner of the mark acquires the right to prevent
2? his goods [o~ services] from being confused with t~i~~~ of others and to prevent his
28 own trade from being diverted to competitors through their use of misleading

3
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 12 of 23 Page ID #:3332

1 marks. There are no rights in a trade-mark beyond these." Pirone v. Macl~Vlillan,

2 Inc., $94 F.2d 579,5$1 {2d Cir. 1990)(citation and quotation marks omitted).
3 "Trademark rights do not exist in the abstract,to be bought and sold as a distinct
4 asset. They exist only in connection with a business or a product and can be
5 transferred only along with that product or business or its goodwill" Universal City
C.i Studios, lnc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911,922 ~S.~.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 746
7 F.2d 1 Z 2{2d Cir. 19$~)."[T]he `property right° ar protection accorded a trademark
8 owner can only be undet~stood in the context oftrademark la1uv and its purposes.
9 A trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent
1U consumer canfusion as to who produced the goods [~r services) and to facilitate
11 differentiation ofthe trademark owner's goods [or services]." Irrt'1 Order ofJob's
l2 Daughters v. Lindehurg d~c Co.,633 F.2d 912,9~9{9th Cir. 1980.
13 A trademark is only a "limited property right in a particular word, phrase or
I4 symbol." 1V'ew Kids on the Block v. News America Puh., Inc., 9'11 F.2d 302,
1S 306 9th Cir. 1992). A "trademark, unlike a copyright or patent, is not a `right in
i6 gxoss' that enables a bolder to enjoin all reproductions." ET~Y ~vrp. v..Iireh Pub.,
17 Inc,, 332 F.3d 915,922{6th C r. 2003), The "sweep ofa trademark owner's rights
18 extends only to injurious, unauthorized commercial uses o~the mark by another."
19 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, lnc., 811 F.2d 26,29(1st Cir. 1987).
20 Trademarks confer only the limited right to prevent third parties from engaging in
21 purely commercial infringement or dilution. Bosley lyledical Institute, lnc. v.
22 Kremer,403 F.3d 672,676-79(9th Cir. 2005);.Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
23 Inc., 29~ F.3d 894,905-06(9th fir. 2002).
24 The same is true fora "collective mark," which is a type of"trademark .:.
25 used by the members of... an association ... and includes marks indicating
2b membership in ... an association." 15 U.S.C. § 1127. t"~ "collective mark denotes
27 mermbership in an organization,",lob's Daughters, b33 F.Zd at 914 n.2, and
2g functions as the "symbol" of a "group or association" that owns it, Huber Baking

4
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 13 of 23 Page ID #:3333

1 Co. v. Str~oehmanrr Bros. Co., 2S2 F.2d 945,952(2d Cir. i 958). °The holder of a
2 collective mark enjoys no greater enforcement rights than any other trademark
3 holder. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1054, 1127; Sebastian Intl, Inc. v. Longs Drug Store Corp.,
4 53 F.3d 1073, 1075(9th Cr. 1995}; PCTA v. Bunkers Life cg Casualty. Co.,514 F.2d
5 665,6b8(5th Cir. 1975); Carefirst of11~aryland, Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 35~ F,
6 Supp. 2d 714,724 n.9(E.D. Va. 2U04), aff'd, 434 F.3d 263(4th Cir. 2046).
~ B. Depending on the evidence at trial, the limited property rights
conferred-by the Marks may not have a sufficient nexus to the
8 alleged offe~s~ t+a justify forf~i#ure.
9 Given the limited prepexty rights provided by trademark law, it is not clear
14 "the government has established tl~e requisite nexus betv~reen the property and the
11 offense." Fed. fit. Crim. P. 3~.2{b)~1 j(~~. It is not enough to say intangible property
12 may in theory be forfeitable under ~I~O. To justify forfeiture in this case, the
13 government must show the property rights conferred by the Marks were acquired or
14 maintained as a result ofthe RECD offense; derived firarn that offense; formed ~
1S interest in, claim of, or security against the enterprise; or afforded a source of
16 influence over the enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(x). I~iere, the offense found by the
17 jury has no obvious nexus to the existence er exercise oflimited trademark rights
8 against commercial infringement or dilution.
9 Trademarks are acquired by frst use. Sengoku YYorks Ltd,. v. RMC Ir~t'1,
20 Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 9th Cir. I996). The Marks were not acquired as a result
21 ~fthe offense ifthe "earliest predicate act" in ~OOb commenced "after the time of ~,
22 acquisition" ofthe Marks by first use in 1969. United States v. Angiulo, 8~7 F.2d j
23 1169, 1213 (1st Cir. 1990). For the same reason, the Marks did not derive from the
24 RICO offense. See United ~'tates v. De~'ries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1313(D.C. Cir. 1997};
25 United States v. Cianci, 2l8 F. Su p. 2d 232, 237(D.RI. 2002).
26 Property is not "maintained" in violation ofRICA if it would not have been
27 "maintained but for the defendant's racketeering activities.." A»giulo,897 F.2d at
28 1213. It is not clear how the "racketeering activities" fond by the jury were "a

5
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 14 of 23 Page ID #:3334

cause in fact" ofthe Club's ``maintenance" ofits limited trademark rights. Id.
~~ There is no obvious nexus between commercial trademark rights and the predicate
3 acts found by the jury. It would be "anomalous" for the government to ar,~ue
4 "tradernaxk protection" is related to actions taken "gin violation ofthat govennm~nt's
5 own laws" such as alleged drug crimes, murder,and attempted murder. ~reAgri,
6 Inc. v. USANA ~lealth Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626,63n (9th Cir. 2007)(holding that
7 "only lawful use in catnmerc~ can give rise to trademark priority").
8 l~ior is it clear how the 1V~arks are an interes# in, security of, or claim against
9 the enterprise. The Marks belong fio the Club,F.R. Lepage Bakery,Inc. v. Roush
1Q Bakery Products Co., Inc., 85 I F,2d 351,353, modified on unrelated issue, 863
11 F.2d 43 Fed. Cir. 1988), which must b~ distinct fmm the alleged "enterprise,"
1~ Cedric Kushner Promotions, ltd. v. King, S33 U.~. 1 S8, 161(200]).
l3 It is not clear hvw ~e ~Clu~i exercised its commercial trademark rights as a
i~ source ofinfluence over the enterprise. ~'he evidence may show unlawful conduct
15 such as threats or in#imidation. But that does not necessarily rmean th+e limited
iC~ property rights conferred by the Marks were "used to further tie affairs ofthe
17 enterprise."i A~agiulo, 897 F.2d at X214. By analogy, an individual has a "right of
18 publicity" against unauthorized use ofone's likeness, which is "a form of
19 intellectual property," Comed,~ 111 Proms., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 CaL 4th
20 387,399(2001), but the extralegal exploitation of a reputation for violence or other
21 unlawful conduct does not necessarily mean the defendant's commercial right of
22 publicity ~s forfeitable absent some nexus ofthat parkicular right to the offense.
23

24

25
~~~ 'The Marks represent in~angibl~ rights independent ofany physical items bearing
27
the Marks that the Club owned or said. Perhaps such items or their proceeds may
have furthered ~h~ enterprise, but that would result at best in forfeiture ofthose
28 items or proceeds, not the Maarks themselves,

C~
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 15 of 23 Page ID #:3335

I C. Because of the unique nature ofa trademark,the government

cannot obtain forfeiture of the ~Vlarks in gro$s or exerc~~ the
2 Ciub's trademark rights.
3 Whatever the evidence sowed as t~ any potential nexus, the government's
novel forfeiture theory stumbles on the fundamental prohibition against transferring
S a trademark in gross."Unlike patents or copyrights,trademarks are not separate
6 property rights. They are integral and inseparable elements ofthe goodwill ofthe
7 business or services to which they pertain,... "the consequence is that a mark naay
8 be transferred c~n~y in contlectian with the transfer ofthe goadwill of which it is a
9 part. A naked transfer ofthe mark alone—known as a transfer in gross—is invalid."
10 Pisa, U:S.~., Inc. v. Birmingham Tr. Vat. Bank,696 F,~d 1~7I, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1l 1982), see also, e.g., Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 ~'.3d X58,2b5-6+6(5th
12 Gir. 1999).("The sale or assignment ofa trademark without the goodwill that the
l3 mark represents is characterized as in gross and is invalid."); E. & J. Gallo ~Yinery
14 v. Galla Wattle Co.,967 ~.2d 1280, 12 9{9th Cir. 1992)("[T]he law is well settled
]3 that there are no rights in a trademark alone and that no rights can be transferred
16 apart from the business with which the mark has been associated.").
17 Such assigt~rnent in gross undermines the core p~upose oftrademark law,
18 which is to preven# consumer confusion. As one court has explained,"[i]f one
l9 obtains a trademark through an assignment in gross, divorced from the good will of
20 the assignor, the assignee obtains the symbol, but not the reality. Any subsequent
21 use ofthe rr~ark by the assignee will necessarily be in corulection with a different
22 business, a different good will and a different type of product. The continuity ofthe
23 things symbolized by the mark is broken." Money Store v. Harrrscorp F'in., lnc.,
24 689 F.Zd b66, fi76 ('7'th Cir. 1982).
25 In the context ofgoods and services,"[u]se ofthe mark by the assignee in
z6 connection with. a different goodwill and different product would result in a fraud
27 on the purchasing public who reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same
28 thing, whether used by ane person or another." Mar~shcrk v. Green,746 F.~d 927,

7
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 16 of 23 Page ID #:3336

929{2d C r. 1984). The same is true for a collective membership mark: Any use or
Z control ofthe Marks by the government would necessarily signify something
3 different from symbolizing the identity ofthe Club and membership therein.
4 It vriould create confusion in the public mind and violate settled trademark law.
5 These principles apply equally to involuntary #ransfer of a mark.Id. at 93~.
b In Marshuk,the court reversed an "order directing a levy of execution and. sale" of
a trademark, agreeing that"a trade name or mark per ~e is not a type of praperiy
8 which can be attached or sold at execution auction." Id. at 929,93]. A judgcn.ent
9 creditor attempted to force the sale ofa trade name associated with "musical groups
1~ for entertainrnen~" but did not have any right to take over managerr~ent ar operation
ri ofthose gx-oups.Id, at 928. The court rejected that ~~tempt because "[t]here are no
12 rights in a trademark apart from the business with which the mark has been
13 associated; they are inseparable." Id. at 929. Accordingly, whether by "forced sale"
1~4 or voluntary assignment, a "safe ofa trade name or mark divorced ~rvm its
15 goodwill" is an invalid "assignment in gross." Id.
l6 Like execution and sale to satisfy a judgment, a criminal forfeiture is a forced
1~ transfer. Any transfer ofa mark in gross, forced ar o#herwise, is invalid. The Marks
l8 symbolize the identity Qfand mernbers~iip in tie Club. The government cannot
l9 assume the identity ofthe Cluh, which exists only as an association ofits members.
2t~ As this Court previously found,"[t]he marks are a collective use mark,the rights to
21 which could not have been assigned in gross." Rivera Summ. Judg. Order at 13.
22 Therefore, the government cannot exploit forfeiture powers to force transfer ire
23 gross ofthe Club's collective membership marks.
24 Even ifthe 1Vlarks are somehow forfeitable, the RICt} forfeiture statute does
25 not permit the government to retain forfeited assets or exercise tradernarl~ rights in
2G gross."Following the seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the
27 Attorrrney General shall direct the disposition ofthe property by sale or any other
2$ commercially feasible means .... Any property right or interest not exercisable by,

8
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 17 of 23 Page ID #:3337

or transferable for value to, the United Mates shall expire ..." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(t~"j.
2 Because a trademark is not transferable in gross, the government could not dispose
3 of the Marks by "sale or any other commercially feasible mans." Id. For the same
►~ reason, the Marks are "not exercisable by, or t~ans~erable for value to, the United
States." Id. At best, therefore, they would expire upon forfeiture and return to the
6 public domain, as they would incase of abandonment. Specht u. Google Inc., 747
7 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2014).1n that case, the Club might nat retain the previous
8 right to sue fox infringement or dilution, but neither could the government prohibit
9 the Club or its members or supporters from using the Marks to express themselves.
1Q Eves if the government could somehow succeed to and retain the Tub's
11 limited trademark rights, it could not summarily confiscate items bearing t ae Marks
12 from Club members or supporter. Once individuals acquired those items, the "first
13 sale" doctrine provides that use, display, or even resale vfthe items does nQt violate
14 trademark rights. Sebastian Intl, 53 F.3d at 1075-76. In addition, the gvv~rnment
l5 would enjoy Only limited trademark rights against purely commercial infringement
16 and dilution, which cannot preclude all expressive use of the Marks to demonstrate
17 support for the Club or opposition t~ abuse of power. Bosley, 403 F.3d .at 67fi, b79;
18 Mattel, 29fi F.3d at 906-07.
f~~ II. SHE FIRST AMENDMEN"I' PR4HI~ITS ANY' AT'TE11~PT TO
SI~.ENCE THE CLUB OR STS MEIV~BERS AND SUPPORTERS
20 FROM USING THE MARKS TO E7~CPRESS THEMSELVES.
2l A. The dis~lay.of i#ems bearing the marks to express iden#ity or
as~oci~ ion is protected speech.
22
23 The government's forfeiture str~.tegy conflicts with the First Amendment
24 because the government may not prevent the Club or its members or supporters
25 from using the Marks to express themselves,2 To wear or display items bearing the
26 Marks is the essence of protected speech for at least three reasons.
27
2 The First Amendment protects speech of both organizations and individuals.
2~ ~'itizens +United v. Fed. Election C~mm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010); FirstlVut.

D
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 18 of 23 Page ID #:3338

1 First, the display of words or images is pine speech. Anderson v. City of

z Hermosa Beach,621 F.3d 1 US 1, l OGl (9th Cir. 2010); Canady v. Bossier Par. Sch.
3 Bd., 240 F.3d 437,440(5th Cir. 2001); Bery v. City ofNew York,97 F.3d 6$9,
4 696(2d Cir. 199b). One need not create words or images to enjoy full First
S Amendment protection in their display. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian ~
6 Bisexual Grp. ofBos., S 15 L7.~. 557,574(1995),~TYY Gvrp., 332 F.3d at 925.
7 Second,"[f~reedam of spe+~ch also protects the individual's interest in self-
8 expression" of identity, Consol. Edison Co. ofNew York v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
9 11~'ew York,447 U.S. 530,534 n,2(190}."The First Am~ndm~ent serves nflt only the
lQ needs ofthe polity but also those ofthe human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
ti expression.... To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire far
12 recognition and affront the individual's self worth and dignity." United States v.
13 Hamilton, b99 F.3d 356,37b-77(4th Cir. 2U12) quoting Proc~nier v. ]I~lartinez,
]4 416 U.S. 39b,427(1974)(~ars~all, J,, concurring)), The Fiat Amendr~e~t
15 "presupposes that the freedom t~ speak one's mind," to ider~ti~y oneself or
16 otherwise, is "an aspect ofindividual liberty—and thus ~ good unto itself"Bose
17 Corp. v. Consumers Union ofLAS, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,543(l ~84j.
18 Third, the First Amendment protects the right to wear distinctive clothia~g or
19 insignia to proclairai association or affinity with an organization. Church vf.4m.
zo Knights ofthe Ku Ktuac Klan v. Kerzk, 35b F.3d 19~,2.06(2d Cir. 2404).
21 The display cif insignia by motorcycle members "cvmmunicate[s] the fact oftheir
22 association with this particular kind oforganization." Sammartar~o v. First Judicial
23 Dist. Cpurt,3Q3 F.3d 959,972(9th C r. 2002). Here,the "collective membership
24 nark acts as a symbol #hat corn~n~nicates a person's association with the Mongol
25 Nation, and his or her support for their views." Rivera v. Carter,loo. 2.09-CV-
26 2435-FMC,2009 WL 8753486, at *11 (C.D. Ca1. July 31, 2009).
27

28 Bank of~'os. v. Bell~tti, 435 LJ.S. 7b5,77b {1978).

1~
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 19 of 23 Page ID #:3339

B. The government may not exploit forfeiture law to impose a

content-based ~riar restrain# +on protected speech th~it ~~ngres~
could not cons#i#utionally enact.
The First Amendment prohibits the government from exploiting forfeiture
4 law to silence that expression. The seizure ofexpressive materials,including items
5 bearing the Marks, is a prior restraint on speech. Fort Wayne Books, lnc. v. Iridiana~,
6 ~$9 U.S.46,63-64(1989);Rivera,2009 WL $75348b at *11. It is settled that
7 "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most se~iuus and the least
tolerable infringement on first Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Assn v. Stuart,
9 427 U.S. 539,559(197b). Apart from narrow exceptions not present here, the ~i~rst
14 Amendment prohibits prior restraints on speec~t,.Jahanser~ ex rel NLRB v. Sari
li Diego County List. Council ofCurnerttQrs &Joiners ofAm., A~`L-CIOa 745 F.2d
12 1289, 1294(9th Cir. 1984).
13 In addition, to target items bearing the Marks would improperly attack
14 speech based on its content or viewpoint. The "government has no power eta restrict
15 expression because ofits message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its +content."
1 ~i Ashcroft v. ,~CIaU, 535 U.S, 564,573(2C1~~)(quotation marks omiited).
17 Thy targeting remains content based regardless ofthe gavernrnent's motive. Reed v.
18 Town ofGilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218,2228(20l Sj. An attack on symbols associated
19 with the Club is unconstitutional be~aus~ "rr~otorcycle enthusiasts are targeted with
20 a regulation that applies to them solely because they choos+~ to communicate the
21 fact oftheir association with this particular kind oforganization." Sammartano, 30~
22 F.3d at 971-72;see also Rivera, 2009 V1~L $753485 at *11 ("Prohibiting speech of
23 this nature constitutes an attack on a particular viewpoint."). Accordingly, the
24 confiscation ofitems bearing the ~Vlarks would "rest at the intersection oftwo
25 disfavored forms o~ expressive limitations; prior restraints and content-based
~s restrictions." In re Murphy-Brown, LLC,907 F.3d 78$,796-97(4th Cir. 2018).
27 It is no a,~swer to suggest that certain individuals committed violent acts
28 while displaying items bearing the Marks, While perhaps persons may be subjected

11
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 20 of 23 Page ID #:3340

to certain restrictions if convicted, the- First Amendment does not permit restrictions
2 on the speech of others "merely because an individual belongs]to a group, some
3 members df which committed acts of violence." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
4 Co., 458 U.S. 886,920{1982), cf. Healy v. Jams,408 U.S. 169, 186(1972}(First
5 Amendment rights cannot be infringed based on "guilt by association"},
6 The government may not bootstrap a conviction ofthe Club into censorship
7 of uncharged members and supporters. The Club is a "separate legal entity" from
8 members and supporters. Rivera, 2009 WL 87534$6 at *5. An individual r~a~+ not
9 be punished fox the crime of other person, natural or a~tific~al. Any punishment cif
14 the Club cannotjustify restricting the speech of members or supporters..
11 Likewise, the Club cannot be prohibited from exercising the right xo ideantify
t2 itself with the Marks. V~hi~e perhaps certain restrictions on conduct might be
13 appropriate conditions ofsentence, the Club cannot be deprived ofthe fundamental
l4 right to identify itself, any more than conviction can strip individuals oftheir
15 names.3 It is no answer to suggest the Club may express i#selfthrough ether
15 insignia."The First Amendment mandates that we presurr~e that speakers, got the
17 gove3-nment, know best bot~i what they want to say and how to say it."Riley v,
l$ Nat'l Federation ofthe~8lind vfNorth Carolina, Inc., 4$~ U.S. 781, 790-91 (1988).
19 Nor should the Cou~E credit any protestation that the govem~ment would not misuse
20 forfeiture powers."~7`Jhe First Amendment prQt+ects against the Government; it
21 does not leave us at the mercy ~frra~lesse o~l~ge" or any promise to use power
22 "responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 559 U,S. 460,480(2010).
23
24
2~ 3 The wholesale confiscation of expressive items bearing the Marks would g~o far
beyond narrowly tailored rest~-~ctiQns on non-~~cpressive "social intercourse" with
2fi certain gang members in a particular neighborhood or "intimidating" residents of
za that neighborhood. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 CaI. 4th 1090, 1121-22
(1997). Nothing in Acuna supports an effective ban on mere expression ofidentity
28 and support for the Club at any time or place.

12
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 21 of 23 Page ID #:3341

1 Nor is it any answer to suggest that display ofthe Marks endorses or

2 advocates illegal activity."The mere tendency ofspeech to encourage unlawful acts
3 is nvt a sufficient reason for banning it." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
4 U.S, 234, 2S3(2002). A "person's speech ... is not removed frvrn the ambit of First
S Amendment protection simply because it advocates an unlawful act." White v.
6 Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227(9th ~Cir. 2000)."The government may n~vt `proscribe
advocacy ofthe use offorce or oflaw violation except where such advocacy i~
8 directed to inciting or producing irr~minent lawless action and is likely to incite or
9 produce such action,"' United States v. Sineneng-Smith,914 F.3d 461,4$0(9th Cir.
10 2018)(quoting Brandenburg v. Qhio, 395 U.S. 444,447(1469)).
11 This principle does not apply "only to political discowse"; rather, "all
12 expression, advocacy yr not," must"m~~t the Brandenburg test" before it can be
13 regulated, James v. Meow 11~tedia, I~tc., 3U0 F.3d 6$3, fi99(6~h C r. 20U2). Although
1a the symbols embodied inn the Marks "~aay at times function as a mouthpiece for
15 unlawful or violent behaviors t~-►is is not sufficient tv strip speech of its First
16 Amendment protection." Rivera, 2~0~9 WL 875 486 at * 1l.
l7 Likewise, speech may not be silenced on the allegation that i# is unorthodox
18 or offensive. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); Texas v. Johnson, 491
19 U.S. 397, 414 {1989). 1t "strikes at the heart of the First Amendment" to suggest the
20 government may prevent "speech expressing ideas that offend." Matal, 137 S. Ct. at
21 1764 (plurality o~inian); id. at i765 {Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he government
~~a may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas ~r
23 perspectives the speech conveys."). loo matter how "distasteful" it anight.be, "one
24 man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1'471).
25 Nor can the government justify censorship merely because it would allegedly
25 promote the interests of law enforcement. "That tl~e effective exercise of Firs#
27 Am~ntlrr~ent rights may undercut a given. government's policy on some issue is,
28 indeed, one of the purposes of those rights. No distinction is constitutionally

13
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 22 of 23 Page ID #:3342

ac~missi6le that toms an the intrinsic justice cifthe p~rti~ular policy in issue." Collin
~a v. Smith,578 F.zd 1197, 12nS (7th Cir. 1978).
3 The government can fnd n~ help in AlexQnder v. United States, S(}9 U.S. 544
4 {I993). In that case, a defendant in the "adult entertainment" business was
5 convicted ofobsceni~ violations and "RICO offenses that were predicated on the
b obscenity convictions." Id. at 547. The jury found defendant "had an interest in 10
7 pieces ofcommercial real estate and 31 current or for~r►er businesses, all of which
S had been used to conduct his racketeering enterprise," and defendant was ordered
9 "to forfeit his wholesale and retail businesses including all the assets ofthose
to businesses} and almost $9 million in moneys acquired t~►rough racketeering
li activity." Id. at 548. The Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that the
12 forfeiture was a prior restraint, because "the RICO forfeiture order in this case [did]
13 not forbidpetitioner from engaging in any expressive activities in the future, nor
14 tdtd] it require him to obtain prior approval far any expressive activities." Id. at
15 55 51. Instead, it dep~iv~ed him of specific tangible "assets that were found to be
1G related to his previous racketeering violations," such as real estate, businesses, and
t7 money. ld at 551. The order "impose[d] no legal impediment ta—no prior restraint
l$ on—petitioner's ability to engage in ar~y ~expressrve activity he chooses." Id.
19 Here, by contrast, the government is seeking forfeiture for the purpose of
zo preventing the Club aid its members and supporters from engaging in protected
21 speech by identifying themselves through display oaf items bearing the Marks. As it
22 has previously done, the government seeks to confiscate expressive items bearing
23 the Marks. That is a classic prior restraint which remains no less unconstitutional
24 no~v thaw when this Court previously enjoined it.
25 III. DUE PROCESS WOULD PROHIBYT ANY SUMMARY
C~NFISCAT~ON OF ITEIV~S BEARING THE MARKS FROM CLUB
26 MEMBERS U~t 5UPPU~tTERS.
27 Aside from the First Amendment, and assuming the government could
2$ exercise the Club's trademark rights, due process does not allow the government to

14
Case 2:13-cr-00106-DOC Document 388 Filed 02/28/19 Page 23 of 23 Page ID #:3343

confiscate items bearing the Marks without native and hearing to prove purely
2 commercial infringement or d~~ut on. Consistent with due process, a court may
K~ allow confiscation ofsuch items only if a trademark violation "shall have been
4 established" in an adversary proceeding. 15 U.S.G. § 111 S. A "final judgment
5 against the in personam defendants is a necessary precondition to the ultimate
b forfeiture and destruction ofthe seized merchandise." 11/at'1 Assoc.for Stock Car
7 Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does,584 F. Supp. 2d 824,829(W.fl.1~+1.C. 2008)
8 ("NASCAR"). Confiscation and destruction are allowed only for those goods that
]
C actually infringe a trademark, Whittaker Corp, v. Exeeuair Corp.,953 ~.2d 5l D,
10 5l9(9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, confiscation is unnecessary if an injunction against
infringennent is sufficient. Kelly Blue Boar v. far-Smarts, Ins., 802 F. Supp. 278,
12 293{C.D. Cal. ~ 942). Ex parte canfiscati~n is allowed only in limited
13 circumstances involving alleged counterfeiting, which is not at issue hers. 15
14 U.S,C. § 1116(d)(1)(A);1WASCAR, 584 F, Supp. 2d at $28 {citing In re ~oridlard
15 Tobacco Co., 374 F.3d 982,987(9th Cir. 2 04). As a result, summary confiscation
16 ofitems bearing the Marks would violate due process without a full adversary
17 hearing and findings of purely commercial. infringement or dilution.
18 CONCLUSION
19 For the fflregoing reasons,the Court should consider whether the Marks are
20 forfeitable, deny the x forfeiture in gross, and prevent the gove~ament from.
21 viola#ing the First Amendment and due process by summarily confscati~ag items
22 bearing the Masks.
23 Dated: August 8, 2019 Respectfull fitted,
24 By:
25 David Loy
Attorney for Amici Curiae
26

27
28

1S