QRA Report for New Mangalore Port Analyzes Risks

Private & Confidential
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
For
Berth No: 13 & 14
At
New Mangalore Port
Panambur,
Mangalore - 575010
Prepared by
Telos Consultancy Services (P) Ltd., Mumbai
TELOS CONSULTANCY SERVICES (P) LTD.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
Report for For
New Mangalore Port Petroleum Oil Lubricants

Trust (POL) products at Berth No
Panambur 13 & General Cargo
Mangalore - 575010 Handled at Berth No14
July - 2008
Prepared by:
Telos Consultancy Services (P)
Ltd.
61, Udyog Bhavan, Sonawala Lane
……………………………… Goregaon (East)
Mumbai – 400063
Venugopal Kadri
India
Email: venugopal@telosrisk.com Tel: +9122 – 66987701/02/03/ 26864506
Fax: +9122 – 66987703
Reviewed by: Website: www.telosrisk.com
……………………………….
R.E. Abrahams
E-mail:
reuben.abrahams@telosrisk.com
I
QRA Report for Berth No 13 & 14 at New Mangalore Port Panambur Mangalore
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 2

2.1 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................................ 2
2.2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................... 2
2.3 RISK ASSESSMENT AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................... 2
2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: ................................................................................................. 3
2.4.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13............................................................................................................ 4
2.4.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve .................................................................................................................. 5
3 FACILITY DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 6
3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
3.1.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................... 6
3.1.2 Location - Latitude : 12o 55' N, Longitude : 74o 48' E ............................................................................... 7
3.1.3 Metrological Data.......................................................................................................................................... 8
3.2 IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE PORT ...................................................................................................................11
3.2.1 Port Area ......................................................................................................................................................11
3.2.2 Entrance Channel ........................................................................................................................................12
3.2.3 Berth Particulars..........................................................................................................................................12
3.2.4 Details of Storage Tanks containing Hazardous Chemicals .....................................................................13
3.2.5 Open Stack Yard...........................................................................................................................................13
3.3 POPULATION DATA (APPROXIMATE) ...................................................................................................................14
3.4 DATA SUPPLIED BY NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST FOR THE STUDY............................................................... 15
3.4.1 Details of Proposed Berth No: 13 ...............................................................................................................15
3.4.2 Berth No: 14 .................................................................................................................................................16
4 DOW’S FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX & NFPA RANKING............................................................................17
4.1 RANKING OF CHEMICAL HAZARDS ......................................................................................................................18
4.1.1 Health Hazard Factor (Nh) ..........................................................................................................................19
4.1.2 Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf) ...............................................................................................................19
4.1.3 Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nr) ....................................................................................................................20
4.1.4 Special Notes – White ..................................................................................................................................20
4.1.5 Material Factor Determination Guide........................................................................................................21
4.2 SUMMARY OF DOW’S INDEX FOR VARIOUS OPERATIONS AT THE PORT FACILITY............................................21
4.2.1 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Coal.....................................................................................................23
4.2.2 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Motor Spirit / Naphtha.......................................................................24
4.2.3 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Kerosene / Diesel ...............................................................................25
4.2.4 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Fuel Oil # 1 to # 6 ..............................................................................26
4.2.5 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Crude ..................................................................................................27
5 RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................28
5.1 OVERALL METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................................28
5.2 COMPONENTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................................................28
5.3 DATA REQUIREMENT ............................................................................................................................................29
5.4 FAILURE CASE IDENTIFICATION & DEFINITION ...................................................................................................30
5.5 PRESENTATION OF RISK ........................................................................................................................................31
5.5.1 Consequences Risk Exposure ......................................................................................................................31
5.5.2 Individual Risk Criteria ............................................................................................................................... 33
5.5.3 Existing Individual Risk Criteria for Members of the Public.....................................................................35
5.5.4 Societal Risk Criteria ...................................................................................................................................36
5.5.5 Criteria for Acceptable Risk ........................................................................................................................37
5.5.6 Framework of Risk Criteria.........................................................................................................................38
6 FAILURE RATE DATA ...........................................................................................................................................41
6.1 FAILURE DATA CONSIDERED FOR THE PROBABILITY ESTIMATION ....................................................................41
6.1.1 Frequencies for Transfer Piping .................................................................................................................41
6.1.2 Causes of Pipeline Failure ..........................................................................................................................41
I
6.1.3 Transfer Spills while unloading from ships ................................................................................................ 42

6.1.4 Reliability Data Valves (Failure to close on Demand) ..............................................................................43
6.1.5 Over ground Piping .....................................................................................................................................43
7 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................48
7.1 OBJECTIVES ...........................................................................................................................................................48
7.2 MODELS USED .......................................................................................................................................................48
7.2.1 Source Models ..............................................................................................................................................48
7.2.2 Dispersion Models .......................................................................................................................................48
7.2.3 Explosion and Fires .....................................................................................................................................49
7.3 TERMS RELEVANT FOR INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .........................................50
7.3.1 Concentration...............................................................................................................................................50
7.3.2 Flash Fire .....................................................................................................................................................50
7.3.3 Late Ignition Explosion................................................................................................................................ 51
7.3.4 Radiation Radii for Pool Fire......................................................................................................................51
7.3.5 Radiation Radii for Jet Flame .....................................................................................................................51
7.3.6 Averaging Time ............................................................................................................................................51
7.3.7 Toxic Effects .................................................................................................................................................51
7.3.8 Flammable Effects .......................................................................................................................................51
7.3.9 Explosion Effects ..........................................................................................................................................52
7.4 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LOSS SCENARIOS ..............................................................................................................52
7.5 COAL STORAGE AT BERTH NO: 14 OPEN YARD ..................................................................................................54
7.5.1 General Characteristics of Coal .................................................................................................................54
7.5.2 Effects of Coal Burning................................................................................................................................ 55
7.5.3 Spontaneous Combustion in Coal ...............................................................................................................55
7.5.4 Causes of Spontaneous Coal Fires .............................................................................................................55
7.5.5 Recommendations for Coal Storage ...........................................................................................................56
7.5.6 Roll Packing .................................................................................................................................................57
7.5.7 Checking Temperature.................................................................................................................................57
7.6 RISK ANALYSIS FOR COAL FIRES IN STORAGE YARD BERTH 14 ........................................................................57
7.6.1 Formula used for Calculation of Impact Distance (D) =

FQ 4 K .......................................57
7.6.2 Summary: .....................................................................................................................................................59
7.7 IMPACT DISTANCES FOR MCLS ...........................................................................................................................59
7.8 GENERAL COMMENTS OF THE MCLS TABLE ......................................................................................................66
7.9 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................................67
7.9.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13..........................................................................................................67
7.9.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve ................................................................................................................69
8 PROBABILITY OF SHIP COLLISION / STRIKING ........................................................................................71
8.1 SHIP FAILURE ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................................71
8.1.1 General Approach........................................................................................................................................71
8.1.2 Traffic Levels ................................................................................................................................................74
8.1.3 Collisions ......................................................................................................................................................74
8.1.4 Strikings ........................................................................................................................................................76
8.2 RESULTS OF RELEASE FREQUENCIES ARISING OUT COLLISIONS / STRIKINGS OF SHIPS AT NMPT ...................77
9 ANNEXURES .............................................................................................................................................................. 78
9.1 COMMODITY WISE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS – APRIL 07 TO MARCH 08 PROVIDED BY TRAFFIC
DEPARTMENT .....................................................................................................................................................................78
9.2 NAPHTHA – MSDS................................................................................................................................................79
9.3 KEROSENE – MSDS ..............................................................................................................................................80
9.4 HIGH SPEED DIESEL OIL – MSDS ........................................................................................................................81
9.5 FURNACE OIL – MSDS .........................................................................................................................................82
9.6 MOTOR SPIRIT (PETROL) – MSDS........................................................................................................................83
9.7 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS – MSDS .................................................................................................................84
II
FIGURES
Figure 1 – Over view of New Mangalore Port ................................................................................................... 7

Figure 2 – Storms / Cyclones ............................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 3 – Earthquake ......................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 4 – Lightning ........................................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 5 – Tsunami ............................................................................................................................................ 10
Figure 6 - Classical Risk Assessment Procedure ............................................................................................ 29
Figure 7 – ALARP TRAINGLE......................................................................................................................... 39
Figure 8 – Hole Size Distribution for Process Piping ..................................................................................... 45
TABLES
Table 1 – NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port................................................................................................... 18

Table 2 – Explanation of NFPA Classification ................................................................................................ 18
Table 3 – Summary of Dow’s Index .................................................................................................................. 21
Table 4 – Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensity ................................................................................ 31
Table 5 – Overpressure Effect of Explosion ..................................................................................................... 32
Table 6 – Selected Individual Risks of Death in the UK................................................................................ 34
Table 7 – Official Individual Risk Criteria for the Public .............................................................................. 35
Table 8 – Official Societal Risk Criteria ........................................................................................................... 37
Table 9 – Published Acceptable Values of Risk............................................................................................... 40
Table 10 – Frequency Factors for Inter unit Transfer Piping ....................................................................... 41
Table 11 – Comparison of Failure rate Frequencies (Per 1000 Km year). .................................................. 41
Table 12 – Transfer Spill Frequency Components ......................................................................................... 42
Table 13– Failure to close on Demand ............................................................................................................. 43
Table 14 – Historical Pipe Leak Frequencies .................................................................................................. 43
Table 15 – Failure Rates for Process Piping .................................................................................................... 44
Table 16 – Hole Size Distribution for Pipe Leaks ........................................................................................... 45
Table 17 – Pipe Failure Frequencies by Hole Size.......................................................................................... 46
Table 18 – Various MCLS considered for the Study ...................................................................................... 52
Table 19 – Impact Distances for MCLS – Berth No 13 .................................................................................. 59
Table 20 – Accident Frequencies by Port Type ............................................................................................... 71
Table 21 – Accident Frequencies by Cargo Group .......................................................................................... 72
Table 22 – Accident Frequencies & Release Probabilities by Ship Type ..................................................... 73
III
ACRONYMS USED
ALARP : As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Cu.M : Cubic Metre
Dia : Diameter
E : East
ERC : Emergency Release Coupling
ERS : Emergency Release System
F : Frequency
F & EI : Fire and Explosion Index
FO : Furnace Oil
GPH : General Process Hazard
HAZIDS : Hazard Identification and Development
IRC : Individual Risk Criteria
IRPA : Individual Risk Per Annum
JF : Jet Fire
KL : Kilo Litre
km : Kilometre
LDO : Light Diesel Oil
LFL : Lower Flammable Limit
LPF : Late Pool Fire
m : Metre(s)
MCLS : Maximum Credible Loss Scenario
MF : Material Factor
MS : Motor Spirit
N : North
Nf : Flammability Factor
NFPA : National Fire Protection Association, USA
Nh : Health Factor
IV
NMPT : New Mangalore Port Trust

Nr : Reactivity Factor
Phast : Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool
PLL : Potential Loss of Life
POL : Petroleum Oil Liquid
QRA : Quantitative Risk Assessment
SAFETI : Software for the Assessment of Flammable
Explosive Toxic Impact
SKO : Superior Kerosene Oil
SPH : Special Process Hazard
SRC : Societal Risk Criteria
SRL : Significant Radiation Level
TLV : Threshold Limit Values
UFL : Upper Flammable Limit.
UHF : Unit Hazard Factor
UVCE : Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
VHF : Very High Frequency
VTMS : Vehicle Traffic Management System
GLOSSARY USED
Acceptance : Defines the level of risk to which an individual is

Criteria exposed, as either tolerable (negligible risk),
intolerable or within the ALARP region.
Consequence : This is the severity associated with an event in
terms of toxic doses, fire or explosion etc., i.e. the
potential effects of a hazardous event.
Catastrophic : The sudden opening up of a specified part of a
Failure containment system resulting in a rapid loss of
contents.
Continuous : The escape of a hazardous substance at a flow rate
Release which is sustained for a prolonged period.
V
Frequency : This is the number of occurrences of an event

expressed per unit time. It is usually expressed as
the likelihood of an event occurring within one year.
Failure Rate : The number of failure events that occur divided by
the total elapsed operating time during which these
events occur or by the total number of demands, as
applicable.
Hazard : A physical situation with the potential for human
injury, damage to property, damage to the
environment or some combination of these.
Individual Risk : The frequency at which an individual may be
expected to sustain a given level of harm from the
realization of specified hazards.
Individual Risk : Individual risk with “harm” measured in terms of
of Fatality fatality. It is calculated at a particular point for a
stationary, unprotected person for 24 hours per day,
365 days per year. Normally measured in chances of
fatality per million years.
Individual Risk : As Individual Risk (IR) is calculated at a point,
Contours calculating the IR at many points allows the plotting
of IR contours, these being lines that indicate
constant levels of risk. Most commonly used are the
1 chance per million-year contour and the 10 chances
per million-year contour.
Probability : The expression for the likelihood of an occurrence of
an event or an event sequence or the likelihood of the
success or failure of an event on test or demand. By
definition, probability must be expressed as a
number between 0 and 1.
Upper : That concentration in air of a flammable material
Flammable Limit above which combustion will not propagate.
Vapour Cloud : The preferred term for an explosion in the open air of
Explosion a cloud made up of a mixture of a flammable vapour
or gas with air.
VI
1 PREFACE
Telos Consultancy Services (P) Ltd., Mumbai (Telos) is appointed by New
Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) Panambur, Mangalore – 575010 for
carrying out Comprehensive Risk Analysis Study and updation of Disaster
Management Plan for the New Mangalore Port – Berth No 13 & 14.
Telos is a company comprised of professional managers including former
employees of Tata AIG Risk Management Services Ltd and Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Ltd.
Telos technical team comprises experienced engineers from various
disciplines such as Chemical, Electrical, Environment, Industrial Safety,
Mechanical etc.
Telos cliental includes Automobile, Cement / Building, Chemical,
Corporate Offices, Design Consultants, Engineering, Hotel, Harbours, IT
Enabled Services, Jetties, Pharmaceutical, Paper Industry, Power,
Petrochemical & Fertilizer, Ports, Terminals, Oil Gas & Energy, Rubber
Industry, Real Estate, Steel, Textile, Telecommunication, etc.
Our team has carried out Rapid Safety Audit for Kandla Port, Risk
Analysis for Customers Terminal at Mumbai Port Trust, Risk Analysis for
Proposed Jetty for handling LSHS and Coal at Pir Pau, Disaster
Management plan for Mangalore District under Tata AIG Risk
Management Services.
It should be noted that the findings and recommendations of the study are
based on the data provided and discussions held during the site visit with
the personnel at the time of study. Telos has exercised all reasonable skill,
care and diligence in carrying out the study. This report is not deemed to
be any undertaking, warranty or certificate.
1
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment
A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a valuable tool for determining
the risk of the use, handling, transport and storage of dangerous
substances. QRA studies are carried out when dangerous substances are
present at the location (e.g. industrial sites and transportation routes) in
amounts that can endanger the environment.
QRA’s are used to demonstrate the risk caused by the activity and to
provide the competent authority with relevant information for assessing
incremental risk and for enabling decisions on the acceptability of risk
related to developments on site of or around the establishment.
2.2 Objective and Scope

The purpose of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is to derive
quantitative measures of the risks enabling comparison to risk level
criteria, with published documents of risk criteria developed by Health &
Safety Executive (HSE) U.K. As presently India has not as such adopted
any tolerable risk values or defined any threshold, the U.K risk
acceptability criteria have been used.
Inputs to the QRA are preliminary design data, statistical frequency of
accidental releases and ignition probability data, meteorological data, and
a set of scenario and consequence modeling assumptions.
2.3 Risk Assessment and Methodology

The Risk Analysis was carried out in five major steps:
Step 1: Involves Hazard Identification and Development (HAZIDS) based
on client supplied data. These HAZIDS carried out in order to identify
major accident scenarios that have potential outside consequences.
New Mangalore Port Trust supplied data and gathered data includes:
1. Description of the Site (i.e. Berth No 13 & 14).
2. Facility / Port Berth layout.
3. Design parameter.
4. Maximum frequency of unloading operations.
5. Metrological data.
Step 2: Involves data search for relevant release frequencies or event
frequencies for each identified major accident event. The failure frequency
of the equipment was determined from historical data base.
2
Step 3: Determination of probabilities for immediate and delayed ignition

of the loss of containment depending on the characteristics of the release.
Step 4: Consists of consequences modelling of the major accident events.
The results of the consequence modelling are maximum impact distance
specific to each type of event. (Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS) /
Catastrophic scenarios)
Step 5: Consists of Risk Assessment of the different events. The risk of
each event is calculated. Risk profile of total risk and risk of types of
events (Late Pool Fire / Jet Fire / Late Explosion effect) are produced in
Impact Distances for MCLS Table and presented in form of risk contour
(Given in the Next Page). These contours are in units of Individual Risks
Per Annum (IRPA) and are compared to risk criteria imposed by Health &
Safety Executive (HSE) U.K.
2.4 Risk Assessment Results and Conclusions:

Results of the QRA are Risk Contours and Maximum Impact Distance at
Berth No 13 which are plotted on the layout and are found within the
range of “As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)” (Ref ALARP
Triangle at (Framework of Risk Criteria - Page 39)
The HSE (Health & Safety Executive, UK) has published documents
outlining their approach to the development of Risk Criteria. In those
documents, HSE has concluded that broadly, the limit of tolerable risk to a
worker or employee is 10-3 fatalities per year. On the basis that the risk to
a member of the public should be at least an order of magnitude lower
than that to a worker / employee, the limit of tolerable risk to a member of
the public is taken as 10-4 fatalities per year.
Maximum Tolerable Risk for : 10-3 fatalities per

Employees year
Public year
Negligible Risk : 10-6 fatalities per
year
The major risk contributor in the accidental scenarios is from the rupture
of unloading arm and 100 mm hole on pipe line is considered to be a worst
case scenario in the report. All the scenarios for POL products worked for
Berth No 13 is within the range of “As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) acceptable range.
3
2.4.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13
1e-009 /AvgeYear
Run Row Status
Individual Risk Contours
Audit No: 13579
Factors: Combination 1
1e-008 /AvgeYear
Outdoor contours
Run Row Selected: 1
Study Folder: NMPT-13-QRA
Risk Level
1e-006 /AvgeYear
1e-007 /AvgeYear
1e-008 /AvgeYear 1e-007 /AvgeYear
1e-009 /AvgeYear
Default Model Selection
1e-006 /AvgeYear
Default Risk Ranking Point Set
Default Population Set
Industrial
Default Ignition Set
scan002
4
2.4.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve
5
3 FACILITY DESCRIPTION
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 General
New Mangalore Port is located on the West Coast of India midway between
Kochi and Mormugao at Panambur which is at a distance of around 15 kms
from Mangalore city. It is an all weather port and the maritime gateway of
Karnataka State. The Port is well connected by road, rail and air.
 The port is connected with 3 National Highways. The national highway
NH 17 is passing near the port. The highway stretches from Kochi to
Mumbai linking many important cities and towns in its route. The NH
48 connects directly Mangalore to Bangalore and NH 13 Mangalore to
Sholapur.
 The port provides a railway siding at its Panambur yard. The railway
links spread into the neighboring states of Maharastra, Kerala and
Tamil Nadu. The rail network extends to major industrial cities like
Bangalore, Chennai, Coimbatore & Mumbai.
 The Mangalore Airport is located at Bajpe which is around 18 kms
away from the Port. There are daily flights to Mumbai, Bangalore and
Chennai & Cochin.
6
3.1.2 Location - Latitude :12o 55' N, Longitude:74o 48' E
Figure 1 – Over view of New Mangalore Port
7
3.1.3 Metrological Data

1) Climate
Temperature Max : 34oC

Temperature Min : 18oC
Annual rainfall : About 3450 mm
Weather : Tropical climate with high humidity
2) Wind
The winds in the monsoon months of June, July and August are
predominantly from South-West and West with a maximum intensity of 5 in
the Beaufort scale (with occasional squall up to force 6).
3) Waves
The predominant direction of waves in the vicinity of New Mangalore Port

during Monsoon months of June, July and August is West and South-West
whereas during the fair months is North-West and North.
Figure 2 – Storms / Cyclones

Even though Mangalore is within the cyclone area of storms originating
in the Arabian Sea and those that enter across the Indian Peninsula from
the Bay of Bengal, cyclones are not as severe or frequent as in the Bay of
Bengal. Historically, there has been no major cyclone in the region for
last many years.
Hence the exposure to this peril is Moderate.
8
Figure 3 – Earthquake
As per Munich Re world map for Natural hazards the Mangalore region
comes under the Zone I of the earthquake classification as per Indian
Standards which is relatively safe. However, seismic experts have opined
that the Indian land mass is being constantly compressed between the
sea and Himalayas and thus the developed stresses are being released in
the form of earthquakes in the least expected areas.
Thus taking the dynamic seismic scenario in to consideration risk
exposure can be considered as Moderate.
9
Figure 4 – Lightning
As per Munich Re World Map for Natural hazards, Mangalore region is
in Zone – I which means on an average there are 2 - 6 lightning strikes
per km2 area per year which signifies moderate risk exposure.
Thus risk exposure can be considered as moderate.
Figure 5 – Tsunami
Tsunami is large submarine earthquake or large submarine land slides,
which are often triggered by earthquakes, and volcanic eruption in the
sea or on the coast. The waves spread out in all directions and at great
speed, which increases with the depth of water. In great ocean basins the
average speed is about 700km/h.
10
Thus risk exposure can be considered as moderate.
4) Currents
The current along the coast during the South-West monsoon (from June to
September) is in general towards south. During the North-East monsoon
(November to February) the current in general is towards North.
5) Tides
The tidal particulars at New Mangalore Port are as follows
Higher High water springs : +1.68 m chart datum

Mean Higher High Water : +1.48 m chart datum
Mean Lower High Water : +1.26 m chart datum
Mean Sea Level : +0.95 m chart datum
Mean Lower Low Water : +0.26 m chart datum
Lower Low Water Springs near : +0.03 m chart datum
solstices
3.2 Important Features of the Port

3.2.1 Port Area
Water Spread : 320 acres (129 hectares)

Land Area : 2030 acres (822 hectares)
Total : 2350 acres (951.04 hectares)
11
3.2.2 Entrance Channel
Length : 7500 meters

Minimum Depth : 15.4 meters
Minimum Width : 245 meters
3.2.3 Berth Particulars

There are total of 13 existing Berths. Apart from these there is a virtual jetty
for handling crude to and POL from Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals
Ltd. which will be dismantled.
Sr Name of Type of Berth Draught Length DWT (In

No Berth (in of Berth Metric
Mtrs) (in Mtrs) Tonnes)
1 Berth No.1 General Cargo 7.00 125 4000
4 Berth No.4 General Cargo, 9.50 198 30000
Liquid
Ammonia,
Phosphoric acid
5 Berth No.5 General Cargo, 9.50 198 30000
Bulk Cement/
Edible Oil
8 Berth No.8 Iron ore (Mech) 13.00 300 60000
(Kudremu
kh Jetty)
9 Berth No.9 POL/LPG 10.50 330 45000
(Tanker
Jetty No.1)
10 Berth Crude /POL 14.00 320 120000
No.10 Products
(Tanker
Jetty No.2)
11 Berth 11 Crude & POL 14.00 320 120000
12 Berth 12 POL & 12.50 320 50000
(Proposed) Chemicals
13 Berth 13 POL Products
(Proposed)
12
14 General General Cargo 14.00 350 90000

Cargo
3.2.4 Details of Storage Tanks containing Hazardous Chemicals
Sr Owner/ Nos. Total Liquid Stored Remarks

No Operator Capacity
1 I.O.C. 25 1,22,452 KL Petroleum Outside
Products port area
2. I.M.C. 19 52,000 KL Chemicals &
POL Products
3. I.P.W.C. 8 52,845 KL Molasses,
Edible Oil &
POL
4. Universal 3 12,792 KL Edible Oil Outside
Agro port area
Exports
5. M.C.F. 1 10,000 Liquid Outside
Tonnes Ammonia port area
6. M.C.F. 2 16,000 Phosphoric Outside
Tonnes Acid port area
7. Mangalore 6 17,000 KL Edible Oil Outside
Impex port area
8. Ultra Tech 3 18,000 KL Bulk Cement Silo
Cement
3.2.5 Open Stack Yard
Sr.No. Area Capacity

1 Open Stack Yard with Bitumen pavement – 18164 Sq.m.
2
2 Open Stack Yard with Bitumen pavement – 11534 Sq.m.
1
3 Open Stack Yard without Bitumen 19693 Sq.m.
pavement – 1
4 Semi – paved for stacking containers 40,000 Sq.m.
5 Semi – paved Stack Yard 9000 Sq. m
13
3.3 Population Data (Approximate)
Sr. No. Location No. of

people
1 General Cargo & Berths 125
2 A.O. Building 500
3 JNC auditorium 1200
4 Hospital / State Bank / Syndicate 190
Bank/CISF office
5 IPWC 14
6 IMC 35
7 MRPL Terminal 8
8 HPCL Terminal 5
9 KIOCL pallet plant & berth 500
10 Transit shed 20
11 VIP Guest House 10
12 STP (Sewage Treatment plant) 5
13 Ware houses (Traffic dept) 100
14 Temple 100
15 Coast guard office 50
16 Central School 1000
17 CISF Colony /Custom Colony + NMPT 4000
Colony
18 MCF 5
19 Signal Station 5
20 Ships crew for avg. 10 ships (@ 30 per 300
ship)
21 POL Products 30
22 Marine Staff & others 150
23 People working at jetty 14
14
3.4 Data Supplied by New Mangalore Port Trust for the Study
3.4.1 Details of Proposed Berth No: 13
SL Product Berth Line Temp in Length of the Unloadin Unloading

No Pipe Line No 13 Pressure Pipe line pipe line from g Arm Arm
Berth to the (6Nos) Capacity
Trestle taken Pipe line (6Nos)
for the study size
01 Crude Oil 48”Dia 18kg/cm2 65Deg C 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr
x 1 No
02 Black Oil 20”Dia 20kg/cm2 Ambient 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr
(Furnace x 2 Nos
Oil, LDO)
03 While Oil 20”Dia 26kg/cm2 Ambient 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr
(MS / x 3 Nos
Naphtha l
Kerosene)
04 Space for 20”Dia 26kg/cm2 Ambient 100 meters 12”Dia 2000m3/hr
future x 1 No
product
lines
The data has been collected from Consulting Engineering Services (I) Pvt Ltd Delhi EIA Study
– January 2008 provided by NMPT during our first visit on 19th & 20th June 2008 and Fax
confirmation on 24th June 2008 by NMPT.
Note: The length of the pipe line considered for the study (Approximately 100 meters) is from
the first isolation valve below the unloading arm till the point at the beginning of the Trestle
15
where the lines go under ground (approximately 2 to 3 meters as mentioned) & at the jetty
unloading arm (App length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)
3.4.1.1 Salient Features of the Proposed Oil Jetty
 Design Ship – 1,50,000DWT

 Length – 350 Meters
 Open Piled Structures
 Approach Trestle (100 x 16.4 Meters)
 Service Platform (46 x 18.6 Meters)
 Breasting Dolphin – 4Nos (13.96 x 13.4 Meters)
 Mooring Dolphin – 6Nos (10.8 x 10.8 Meters)
 Shore Protection Works
 Marine loading / unloading arms & associated pipelines
 De ballasting facilities.
 Pollution Control Facilities.
3.4.2 Berth No: 14

Berth No: 14 are handling coal and Iron ore.
16
4 DOW’S FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX & NFPA

RANKING
In order to rate the fire and explosion hazards within the port facility at Berth
No 13 & 14th, the Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI) is used.
F & EI analysis is a step – by – step evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion
and reactivity potential of processes, equipments and its contents. The F & EI
is used for any operation in which flammable, combustible or reactive
material is stored, handled or processed. The F & EI is calculated by
evaluating the loss potential of chemicals handled in the facility. The F & EI
is a number which indicates, damage potential due to fire and explosion of a
particular unit and comparison is based on numerical value that represent
the relative level of significance of each hazard. It is a product of three
attributes i.e. Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazards (GPH) and
Special Process Hazards (SPH).
The MF is the starting value in computation of F & EI. MF is a measure of
intrinsic rate of potential energy released from fire or explosion produced by
combustion or other chemical reaction. The MF is considered for the most
hazardous material or mixture of materials present in the unit in sufficient
quantity actually to present the hazard. The MF is obtained from
Flammability factor and Reactivity factor i.e. Nf and Nr respectively given for
various chemicals by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).
Process hazards that contribute to the magnitude of losses have been
quantified as penalties, which provide factors for computation. Every penalty
may not be applicable to a specific situation and the same may have to be
modified. The GPH and SPH are taken into account as penalties which are
applied to MF.
The F & EI is defined as:
F & EI = MF x (GPH) (SPH)
Wherein the product of GPH and SPH is termed as the Unit Hazard Factor
(UHF).
The degree of hazard is identified based on F & EI range as per the criteria
given below:
F & EI Range Degree of Hazard

0 – 60 Light
61 – 96 Moderate
97 – 127 Intermediate
128 –158 Heavy
17
> 158 Severe
4.1 Ranking of Chemical Hazards

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ratings of the chemicals handled by the
port are given in Table 3. The explanation of NFPA classification is given in Table 4.
The NFPA classification for a chemical is based on three factors i.e. Health Hazard
Factor (Nh), Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf) and Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nf).
Table 1 – NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port

Chemical Nh Nf Nr
High Speed 0 2 0
Diesel
Crude oil 0 3 1
SKO 0 2 0
Naphtha 1 3 0
Motor Spirit 1 3 0
Coal 1 1 0
Fuel Oil 0 2 0
Table 2 – Explanation of NFPA Classification
18
4.1.1 Health Hazard Factor (Nh)
0 Material which on exposure under fire conditions would

offer no hazard beyond that of ordinary combustible
material.
1 Material which on exposure would cause irritation but
only minor residual injury even if no treatment is given.
2 Material which on intense or continued but not chronic

exposure could cause temporary incapacitation or
possible residual injury unless prompt medical treatment
is given.
3 Material that on short exposure could cause serious
temporary or residual injury even though prompt
medical treatments were given.
4 Material that on very short exposure could cause death
or major residual injury even though prompt medical
treatments were given.
4.1.2 Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf)
0 Materials that will not burn.

1 Material must be pre-heated before ignition can occur.
Flash Point At or Above 200 degree F (93.4 degree C)
2 Material must be moderately heated or exposed to

relatively high ambient temperature before ignition can
occur.
Flash Point at or Above 100 degree F (37.8 degree C)
Below 200 degree F (93.4 degree C)
3 Liquids and solids that can be ignited under almost all
ambient temperature conditions
Flash Point At or Above 73 degree F (22.8 degree C)
Below 100 degree F (37.8 degree C)
Boiling Point At or Above 100 degree F (37.8 degree C)
4 Materials that will rapidly or completely vaporize at
atmospheric pressure and normal ambient temperature,
or that are readily dispersed in air and that will burn
readily.
Flash Point Below 73 degree F (22.8 degree C)
Boiling Point Below 100 degree F (37.8 degree C)
19
4.1.3 Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nr)
0 Material that in itself is normally stable, even under fire

exposure conditions, and is not reactive with water.
1 Material that in itself is normally stable, but which can

become unstable at elevated temperatures and
pressures.
2 Material that readily undergoes violent chemical change
at elevated temperatures and pressures or which reacts
violently with water or which may form explosive
mixtures with water.
3 Material that in itself is capable of detonation or
explosive decomposition or reaction but requires a strong
initiating source or which must be heated under
confinement before initiation or which reacts explosively
with water.
4 Material that in itself is readily capable of detonation or
of explosive decomposition or reaction at normal
temperatures and pressures.
4.1.4 Special Notes – White
The fourth, white, field of the hazard signal can have variable content,
depending on who prepared the signal. The 1990 edition of the National Fire
Codes (section 704, chapter 5) specifies only "TWO" NFPA 704 approved
symbols. Additional symbols are commonly included. The field may also be left
blank if no special hazards are present.
OX Material possesses oxidizing properties. A
chemical which can greatly increase the rate
of combustion/fire.
Unusual reactivity with water. This indicates
a potential hazard using water to fight a fire
involving this material.(i.e. don't put water on
it)
Other symbols, abbreviations, and words that some organizations use in the
white Special Hazards section are shown below. These uses are not compliant
with NFPA 704, but we present them here in case you see them on an MSDS or
container label:
ACID This indicates that the material is an acid, a
corrosive material that has a pH lower than
7.0
ALK This denotes an alkaline material, also called
a base. These caustic materials have a pH
greater than 7.0
COR This denotes a material that is corrosive (it
could be either an acid or a base).
20
The international symbol for radioactivity is

used to denote radioactive hazards;
radioactive materials are extremely hazardous
when inhaled.
This is another symbol used for corrosive.
The skull and crossbones is used to denote a

poison or highly toxic material.
Indicates an explosive material. This symbol

is somewhat redundant because explosives are
easily recognized by their Instability Rating.
4.1.5 Material Factor Determination Guide
Flammability or Reactivity or Instability (Nr)

Combustibility (Nf)
Nr = 0 Nr = 1 Nr = 2 Nr = 3 Nr = 4
Nf = 0 1 14 24 29 40
Nf = 1 4 14 24 29 40
Nf = 2 10 14 24 29 40
Nf = 3 16 16 24 29 40
Nf = 4 21 21 24 29 40
4.2 Summary of DOW’S Index for various operations at the Port

Facility
For the chemicals handled at Berth No 13 & 14, F & EI has been worked out for
chemicals and the ratings are provided in Table given below:
Table 3 – Summary of Dow’s Index

The various chemicals listed below have been worked for Dow Index using the
Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide Sixth Edition –
published by American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Name of Process MF GPH SPH UHF F & EI Rating

Chemical Unit
Coal Storage 14 2.00 2.50 5.00 70.00 Moderate
Naphtha Pipeline 16 1.75 2.61 4.56 73.08 Moderate
/ Motor
Spirit
21
Kerosene Pipeline 10 2.00 1.71 3.71 37.10 Light

/ Diesel
Fuel Oil Pipeline 10 2.00 1.71 3.71 37.10 Light
#1 to #6
Crude Pipeline 16 1.75 2.61 4.56 73.08 Moderate
Details of calculation from the Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index Hazard
Classification Guide Sixth Edition are given below:
Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3)
 F1 = General Process Hazard Factor
 F2 = Special Process Hazards Factor
Fire & Explosion Index = F3 x Material Factor (MF)
Fire & Explosion Index (Ratings)

0 to 60 Light Hazard
61 to 96 Moderate Hazard
97 to 120 Intermediate Hazard
128 to 150 Heavy Hazard
150 to 320 Severe Hazard
22
4.2.1 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Coal

DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX
LOCATION DATE PLANT PROCESS UNIT EVALUATED BY REVIEWED BY
Coal Storage 3rd July 08 Storage - Venugopal K R.E. Abrahams
Yard Yard
MATERIALS AND PROCESS
PROCESS UNIT Coal (Storage)
STATE OF OPERATION BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR
Coal Handling at NMPT Berth No 14 Coal
MATERIAL FACTOR 14
1. General Process Hazards Penalty Penalty
Used
BASE FACTOR 1.00
A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) ---- ----
B. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) ---- ----
C. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) ---- 0.4
D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) ---- ----
E. Access ---- 0.35
F. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50) ---- 0.25
G. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A 2.0
2. Special Process Hazards
BASE FACTOR ---- 1.00
A. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) ---- ----
B. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) ---- ----
C. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted not Inerted ---- ----
1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids ---- ----
2. Process upset or Purge Failure ---- ----
3. Always in Flammable Range ---- ----
D. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 TO 2.00) ----
E. Pressure operating Pressure 4.5 Bar Relief Setting 50 Bar ---- ----
F. Low Temperature (Factor .20 TO .30) ---- ----
G. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity __lbs. hc = ___BTU/lb ---- ----
1. Liquids, Gases & Reactive Materials in Process ---- ----
2. Liquids or Gases in Storage ---- ----
3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process ---- 1.5
4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75) ---- ----
H. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) ---- ----
I. Use of Fire Heaters ---- ----
J. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 TO 1.15) ---- ----
K. Rotating Equipment ---- ----
Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) B 2.5
Unit Hazard Factor (F1 x F2 = F3) F3 5.0
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F3 x MF = F & EI) 70.0
FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS) Moderate
23
4.2.2 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Motor Spirit / Naphtha

NMPT Berth 3rd July 08 Motor Spirit / - Venugopal K R.E. Abrahams
13 Naphtha Pipeline
PROCESS UNIT – Motor Spirit
Motor Spirit Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No 13 Motor Spirit / Naphtha
MATERIAL FACTOR 16
Used
BASE FACTOR 1.00 ----
A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) ---- ----
B. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) ---- ----
C. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) 0.50 ----
D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) ---- ----
E. Access ---- ----
F. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50) 0.25 ----
G. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A 1.75
L. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) 0.20 ----
M. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) ---- ----
N. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerter not Inerted ---- ----
3. Always in Flammable Range 0.30 ----
O. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) ---- ----
P. Pressure operating Pressure ------ Bar Relief Setting ------ Bar 0.10 ----
Q. Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) ---- ----
R. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity 600 m3/hour ---- ----
2. Liquids or Gases in Storage 0.11 ----
3. Combustible Solids in Storage, dust in process ---- ----
4. Corrosion & Erosion (Factor .10 To .75) 0.10 ----
S. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) 0.30 ----
T. Use of Fire Heaters ---- ----
U. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) ---- ----
V. Rotating Equipment 0.50 ----
24
4.2.3 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Kerosene / Diesel

NMPT 3rd July 08 Kerosene / Diesel - Venugopal K R.E. Abrahams
Berth 13 Pipeline
PROCESS UNIT – Kerosene / Diesel
Kerosene / Diesel Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth Kerosene / Diesel
No 13
MATERIAL FACTOR 10
Used
H. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) ---- ----
I. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) ---- ----
J. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) 0.50 ----
K. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) ----
L. Access 0.00 ----
M. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50) 0.50 ----
N. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A 2.00
W. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) 0.00 ----
X. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) ---- ----
Y. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted not Inerted ---- ----
1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 0.00 ----
Z. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) ---- ----
AA. Pressure operating Pressure 4.5 Bar Relief Setting 50 Bar 0.20 ----
BB. Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) ---- ----
CC. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity __lbs. hc = ___BTU/lb ---- ----
DD. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) 0.10 ----
EE. Use of Fire Heaters 0.00 ----
FF. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) 0.00 ----
GG. Rotating Equipment 0.50 ----
FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS) Light
25
4.2.4 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Fuel Oil # 1 to # 6

NMPT 3rd July 08 Fuel Oil #1 to #6 - Venugopal K R.E. Abrahams
Berth 13
PROCESS UNIT – Fuel Oil #1 to #6
Fuel Oil #1 to #6 Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No Fuel Oil #1 to # 6
13
MATERIAL FACTOR 10
Used
O. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) ---- ----
P. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) ---- ----
Q. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) 0.50 ----
R. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) ----
S. Access 0.00 ----
T. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50) 0.50 ----
U. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A 2.00
HH. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) 0.00 ----
II. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) ---- ----
JJ. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted not Inerted ---- ----
1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 0.00 ----
KK. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) ---- ----
LL. Pressure operating Pressure 4.5 Bar Relief Setting 50 Bar 0.20 ----
MM.Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) ---- ----
NN. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity __lbs. hc = ___BTU/lb ---- ----
OO. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) 0.10 ----
PP. Use of Fire Heaters 0.00 ----
QQ. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) 0.00 ----
RR. Rotating Equipment 0.50 ----
FIRE & EXPLOSIVE INDEX (RATINGS) Light
26
4.2.5 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Crude

NMPT Berth 3rd July 08 Crude (Naphtha) - Venugopal K R.E. Abrahams
13
PROCESS UNIT – Crude (Naphtha)
Crude Handling at NMPT Proposed Berth No 13 Crude (Naphtha)
MATERIAL FACTOR 16
Used
V. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor .30 To 1.25) ---- ----
W. Exothermic Chemical Reactions (Factor.20 To .40) ---- ----
X. Material Handling & Transfer (Factor .25 To 1.05) 0.50 ----
Y. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unites (Factor .25 To.30) ---- ----
Z. Access ---- ----
AA. Drainage & Spill Control (Factor .25 To.50) 0.25 ----
BB. General Process Hazards (Factor F1) A 1.75
SS. Toxic Material (S) (Factor 0.20 To 0.80) 0.20 ----
TT. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure (500 mm Hg) ---- ----
UU. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerter not Inerted ---- ----
3. Always in Flammable Range 0.30 ----
VV. Dust Explosion (Factor .25 To 2.00) ---- ----
WW.Pressure operating Pressure ------ Bar Relief Setting ------ Bar 0.10 ----
XX. Low Temperature (Factor .20 To .30) ---- ----
YY. Qty of Flammable Unstable Material Quantity 600 m3/hour ---- ----
ZZ. Leakage – Joints & Packing (Factor .10 To 1.50) 0.30 ----
AAA. Use of Fire Heaters ---- ----
BBB. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System (Factor .15 To 1.15) ---- ----
CCC. Rotating Equipment 0.50 ----
27
5 RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

5.1 Overall Methodology
In order to undertake this study TELOS has used PHAST (Process Hazard
Analysis Software Tool) and SAFETI (Software for the Assessment of
Flammable Explosive Toxic Impact) software packages.
PHAST Professional is a software product designed to provide a total service
for chemical process hazard analysis. PHAST Professional provides the most
advanced collection of consequence models available for hazard analysis.
Regular updates make the latest technical developments available in a
practical format. PHAST Professional represents the best technology in loss
prevention engineering available in the world today.
PHAST Professional is a set of software tools that calculates the consequences
of accidental or emergency atmospheric releases of toxic or flammable
chemicals. It uses mathematical models of discharge, dispersion, fire and
explosion to predict toxic and flammable effects. The results are presented in
a tabular as well as graphical form.
PHAST Professional allows engineers to examine the progress of a potential
incident from initial release, through the formation of a cloud and/or pool, to
its dispersion. The program automatically applies the correct entrainment
and dispersion models as the conditions change. PHAST Professional
integrates these models such that the transition from one behavior pattern to
another is smooth and continuous. From these results, it calculates any
possible effects of ignition, such as jet flames and explosions, where
applicable. For the experienced hazard analyst, PHAST Professional provides
an extremely powerful tool which aids in quantifying the consequences of
accidental releases of hazardous chemicals.
Real benefits can be obtained when engineers consider safety aspects from the
start of a design. PHAST Professional allows analysis of the designs for
potential hazards at the conceptual stage which can eliminate the need for
costly modifications at the final stage. The program can also be used to
investigate proposed plant layouts and site locations to ensure that hazardous
incidents do not affect emergency escape routes or surrounding housing.
SAFETI is software used for estimating Societal Risk and Individual Risk. It
integrates ignition probability data and population in the vicinity along with
the consequence results and probability of hazardous events. It represents
results in graphical forms.
5.2 Components of Risk Assessment

The normal components of a Risk Assessment Study are:
28
 Hazard identification and specification (Identification of Maximum

Credible Loss Scenarios).
 Consequence calculations.
 Failure frequency estimation.
 Risk review.
 Estimation of Societal Risk.
 Estimation of Individual Risk.
 Recommendations on risk reducing measures.
5.3 Data Requirement

Following data are collected and used for risk assessment study:
 Storages and pipeline data refer Chapter 7.
 Population data refer Chapter 3.
 Meteorological data refer Chapter 3.
 Generic failure rate data refer Chapter 6.
The applicability of these data and procedure of carrying out risk assessment
is explained by Figure given below:.
Figure 6 - Classical Risk Assessment Procedure
Port Data
Generic Failure Derive Failure Cases Metrological Data

Rate Data
Calculate Calculate
Frequencies Consequences
Safety
Management
Factor
Population Data Risk Review
Risk Reduction
Measures
29
5.4 Failure Case Identification & Definition

The first stage in any risk assessment study is to identify the potential
accidents that could result in the release of the hazardous material from its
normal containment. This is achieved by a systematic review of the port
facilities together with an effective screening process.
Chemical hazards are generally considered to be of three types:
 Flammable
 Reactive
 Toxic
Where there is the potential for confined gas releases, there is also the
potential for explosions. These often produce overpressures which can cause
fatalities, both through direct action on the body or through building or
structural damage.
Potential accidents associated with any section of a terminal / facility or
pipeline can be divided into two categories:
 There is a possibility of failure associated with each mechanical
component of the facility / terminal (vessels, pipes, pumps or
compressors). There are generic failures and can be caused by such
mechanisms as corrosion, vibration or external impact (mechanical or
overpressure). A small event (such as a leak) may escalate to a bigger
event, by itself causing a larger failure.
 There is also a likelihood of failures caused by specific operating
circumstances. The prime example of this is human error; however it
can also include other accidents, for example, due to runaway reaction
or the possibility of ignition of leaking tank gases due to hot work.
The first class of accident requires consideration of each component under its
normal operating conditions. Both classes may also require consideration of
some components under abnormal conditions. In principle, an essential first
stage in failure case identification of such a facility is therefore every
significant mechanical component in the port which could fail, together with
its operating conditions, contents and inventory.
The range of possible releases for a given component covers a wide spectrum,
from a pinhole leak up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore
rupture (of a pipe). It is both time-consuming and unnecessary to consider
every part of the range; instead, representative failure cases are generated.
For a given component these should represent fully both the range of possible
releases and their total frequency.
In general, the following typical types of failures are considered:
30
For Pipelines:
 Full bore rupture – 100 mm hole is considered.
 Medium – 25 mm hole is considered.
 Small leaks – 5 mm hole is considered.
Failures of other components are dealt with in a similar manner giving
releases which are representative of accidents to that type of component.
Leak sizes are specified in terms of equivalent hole diameter rather than flow
rate. This approach is adopted for the following reasons:
 The failure rate data are presented in terms of hole diameters, and use
of set flow rates would require calculation of the corresponding hole
sizes.
 The PHAST software being used explicitly models consequences for
each release case defined, so there is no saving of analysis effort
through using fixed flow rates.
 Consequence information (i.e. hazard zone dimensions and plots) can
easily be obtained from PHAST for any desired release.
For each identified failure case, the appropriate data required to define that
case is input into the PHAST software. When the appropriate inputs are
defined, PHAST calculates the source terms of each release, such as the
release rate, release velocity, release phase and drop size. These source term
parameters then become inputs to the consequence modeling.
5.5 Presentation of Risk

5.5.1 Consequences Risk Exposure
Consequential risk zones which show the geographical distribution of affected
area. The criteria’s for radiation in case of fire and overpressure effect in case
of explosion have been given in Tables below.
Table 4 – Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensity
Incident : Type of Damage

Radiation
Intensity
(kW/m2)
37.5 : Sufficient to cause damage to process
equipments unless the equipment is fully
thermally fire protected (insulation, fire
proofing, sprinkler protection etc.).
25.0 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood at
31
infinitely long exposure (non-piloted) and

would damage thermally unprotected tanks,
equipment, etc.
12.5 : Minimum energy required for piloted ignition
of wood, melting plastic tubing, etc.
4.5 : Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable
to reach cover within 20 seconds, blistering of
skin (1st degree burns) is likely.
1.6 : Will cause no discomfort to long exposure.
0.7 : Equivalent to solar radiation.
Table 5 – Overpressure Effect of Explosion
Pressure : Damage
(psig)
0.02 : Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency 10-
15 Hz)
0.03 : Occasional breaking of large glass windows
already under strain
0.04 : Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom glass failure
0.1 : Breakage of small windows under strain
0.15 : Typical pressure for glass breakage
0.3 : “Safe distance” (probability 0.95 no serious
damage beyond this value); projectile limit;
some damage to house ceiling; 10% window
glass broken
0.4 : Limited minor structural damage
0.5 – 1.0 : Large and small windows usually shattered;
occasional damage to window frames
0.7 : Minor damage to house structures
1.0 : Partial demolition of houses, made
uninhabitable
1–2 : Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated
steel or aluminum panels, fastenings fail
followed by buckling wood panels (standard
housing) fastening fail, panels blown in
1.3 : Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
2 : Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
2–3 : Concrete or cinder black walls, not reinforced,
shattered
32
2.3 : Lower limit of serious structural damage

2.5 : 50% destruction of brickwork of houses
3 : Heavy machines (3000lb) in industrial building
suffered little damage; steel frame building
distorted and pulled away from foundations
3– 4 : Frameless, self-framing steel panel building
demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks
4 : Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
5 : Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic
press (40,000lb) in building slightly damaged
5–7 : Nearly complete destruction of houses
7 : Loaded train wagons overturned
7–8 : Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail
by shearing or flexure
9 : Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
10 : Probable total destruction of buildings, heavy
machines tools (7000lb) moved and badly
damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000lb)
survived
300 : Limit of crater lip
5.5.2 Individual Risk Criteria

5.5.2.1 Purpose
Individual Risk Criteria (IRC) is used to ensure that individuals living or

working near a hazardous activity do not bear an excessive risk. They may
also be used for land – use planning, and to help protect buildings which are
difficult to evacuate in an emergency.
5.5.2.2 Definition of Individual Risk
Individual risk may be defined in various ways, leading to different results

from a risk analysis. It is important that the calculations and criteria use the
same definitions. Individual risk is defined by the I. Chem. E (1992) as the
frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of
harm from the realization of specified hazards. It is usually taken to be the
risk of death, and usually expressed as a risk per year.
The main types of individual risk in common use area:
 Average Individual Risk. This is usually calculated from historical data
as:
Individual Risk = Number of fatalities per year
Number of people at risk
33
5.5.2.3 Background Individual Risks
Historical individual risks may be helpful in setting individual risk criteria.

Example data from the UK is presented here.
Some historical risks of death from accidents, averaged over the ages, are
given in the table given below.
Table 6 – Selected Individual Risks of Death in the UK
Cause of Death Risk Per Source of Reference

Year Estimate
All accidents 3.8 X10-4 Eng / Wales Henderson
1984 (1987)
Accidents at home 1.0 X10-4 Eng / Wales Henderson
1984 (1987)
Accidents on the 1.0 X10-4 Eng / Wales Henderson
road 1984 (1987)
Run over by 4.5 X10-5 Carruthers
vehicle (1987)
Accidents at work 2.3 X10-5 Henderson
(1987)
Fire 1.3 X10-5 Eng / Wales Henderson
1984 (1987)
Drowning 6.1 X10-6 Eng / Wales Henderson
1984 (1987)
Homicide 6.9 X10-6 Eng / Wales Henderson
1984 (1987)
Electrocution 2.4 X10-6 Carruthers
(1987)
Accident on 1.7 X10-6 Eng / Wales Henderson
railway 1984 (1987)
Death due to 9.0 X10-7 GB Data 1986 – HSE (1992)
domestic gas 90
Struck by lightning 1.0 X10-7 HSE (1992)
Struck by falling 2.0 X10-8 Lees (1980)
aircraft
Transport of petrol 2.0 X10-8 Lees (1980)
& Chemical
34
5.5.3 Existing Individual Risk Criteria for Members of the Public

Summary of Individual Risk Criteria for members of the public used by
various authorities around the world is given below. They all refer to risk of
death, except the HSE criteria for new housing developments near existing
installations, which refer to a dangerous dose rather than risk of death. They
are roughly equivalent to risks of death a factor of 3 lower.
The Dutch criteria are recognized to be quite strict, and have caused their
industry considerable difficulty in meeting them. Many plants probably fall
only just inside the maximum tolerable criterion. The UK HSE criteria are
probably the most lenient, particularly since their risk calculations take
account of people being indoors and of escape action which may reduce the
risks by an order of magnitude. However, the HSE also apply the ALARP
principle, which ensures that very few plants approach the maximum
tolerable criterion.
Table 7 – Official Individual Risk Criteria for the Public
Authority & Application Maximum Negligible

Tolerance Risk (per
Risk (per year)
year)
VROM, The Netherlands (New Plants) 10-6 10-8
VROM, The Netherlands (Existing 10-5 10-8
plants or combined new plants)
Health & Safety Executive, UK 10-4 10-6
(Existing Hazardous Industry)
Health & Safety Executive, UK (New 10-5 10-6
Nuclear Power Stations)
Health & Safety Executive, UK 10-4 10-6
(Existing Dangerous substances
transport)
Health & Safety Executive, UK 3 x 10-6 3 x 10-7
(New Housing near Existing Plants)
Hong Kong Government 10-5 Not Used
(New Plants)
Department of Planning – New South 10-6 Not Used
Wales (New plants and housing)
Environmental Protection Authority – 10-6 Not Used
Western Australia (New Plants)
Santa Barbara County, California USA 10-5 10-7
(New Plants)
35
5.5.3.1 Suggested Individual Risk Criteria
The most comprehensive and widely – used criteria for Individual Risks are
the ones proposed by the UK HSE as follows for existing plants.
Maximum tolerable risk for workers : 10-3 per year

Maximum tolerable risk for members : 10-4 per year
of the public
Negligible risk : 10-6 per year
5.5.4 Societal Risk Criteria

5.5.4.1 Purpose
Societal Risk Criteria (SRC) is used to limit the risks to local communities or
to the society as a whole form the hazardous activity. In particular, they are
used to limit the risks of catastrophes affecting many people at once. Societal
risks include the risk to every exposed person, even if they are only exposed
on one brief occasion.
5.5.4.2 Definition of Societal Risk
Societal risk is defined by the IChemE (1992) as the relationship between the
frequency and the number of people suffering a given level of harm from the
realization of specified hazards. It is usually taken to refer to the risk of
death, and usually expressed as a risk per year.
The term societal risk is sometimes taken to refer to members of the public.
Societal risks may be expressed in the form of:
 FN Curves, showing explicitly the relationship between the cumulative
frequency (F) and number of fatalities (N)
 Potential Loss of Life (PLL) or annual fatality rates, in which the
frequency and fatality data is combined into a convenient single
measure of societal risk.
The use of FN curves as criteria allows control not only of the average number
of fatalities but also of the risks of catastrophic accidents killing many people
at once. These attempts to balance the public fear of a major accident with the
benefits received from the hazardous activity.
5.5.4.3 Existing Societal Risk Criteria
Societal Risk Criteria have not been as widely used as Individual Risk
Criteria because the concepts and calculations involved are much more
difficult. However, their value is becoming recognized, especially for transport
activities, but also as complementary to Individual Risk Criteria in general.
36
The UK HSE has used modified Individual Risk Criteria to account for
Societal Risk Considerations (HSE, 1989b), but more recently has moved
towards the use of Societal Risk Criteria.
Summary of the few existing official societal risk criteria is given in the table
below.
Table 8 – Official Societal Risk Criteria
Authority FN Maximum Negligible Limit

Curve Tolerable Intercept on N
Slope Intercept with N =
with N = 1 1
VROM, The -2 10-3 10-5 ----
Netherlands
(New Plants)
Hong Kong -1 10-3 10-5 1000
Government
(New Plants)
Health & Safety -1 10-1 10-4 ----
Commission, UK
(Existing Ports)
5.5.5 Criteria for Acceptable Risk

The earliest studies of risk used the term 'Acceptable Risk'. The adoption of
quantitative techniques enabled hazards to be ranked numerically in order or
priority. The question immediately arose whether any or all of these hazards
were 'acceptable', or of sufficient magnitude to require expenditure on
potentially expensive safety measures. This required some form of guidance
on criteria against which the acceptability of estimated risk levels may be
judged.
The search for acceptable levels of risk for industrial activities generated a
considerable volume of literature. Various criteria were put forward for
specific applications in a number of countries, but no clear consensus
emerged. This reflects the contentious nature of the essentially political value
judgments involved. It was slowly appreciated that the relative importance of
different risk parameters for making decisions on safety varied considerably
from case to case, depending on the numerical results of the specific analysis
to be evaluated; for example individual versus societal risk, or public versus
occupational risk.
The predicted risks (individual, societal or occupational) from the activity
were shown to be lower than 'background' levels of risk already present and
apparently acceptable to society. Following early applications of Quantified
Risk Assessment or QRA in the 1970s, extensive tables of such comparative
37
risk data were compiled for this purpose relating to natural hazards such as
lightning and flooding, every day activities such as car driving and use of
domestic appliances, and occupational hazards in different industries. Whilst
the simplicity of its approach was attractive; it was open to severe criticisms
for failure to distinguish between acceptable risks and those which were
merely tolerated. It also fell into disrepute when it emerged that deaths were
occurring from radiation long after the Wind scale accident of 1957 occurred
in the nuclear industry (in which radioactive material was released following
a fire in the air-cooled nuclear reactor). To this day the episode is seen by
many as a deliberate cover-up by the UK Government.
It is clear that in the past many industrial hazards were accepted in
ignorance by public and employees. This was a function of the technological,
social and economic conditions of the time. It is now argued that the risk
comparisons failed to address the 'benefits' from hazardous activities. Where
'benefits' are not recognized by an affected individual or community, no finite
level of risk - no matter how small - may be judged as tolerable by them. So
while comparative risk studies provide a useful perspective on numerical risk
results, they offer little to justify such risks in 'absolute' terms of acceptability.
In contrast to this simple risk comparison approach, extensive research
undertaken by psychologists and other social scientists over recent years has
revealed a complex series of factors, values and beliefs which in practice
underlie the public's perception of the risk of industrial activities. In
particular, it has been shown that perceived risks cannot be readily correlated
with those 'objective' risk estimates which may be statistically derived. Rather
they are influenced by qualitative characteristics, such as the level of free will
associated with the risks involved, their catastrophic potential and their
relative unfamiliarity. The perceived importance or benefits of industrial
activities have also been demonstrated to play a significant role in
conditioning public attitudes.
The reconciliation of the public view as based on perceived risks with
estimates of objective risk is now recognized to be an issue of considerable
political importance - as, for example, reflected in many national debates
concerning the acceptability of nuclear power. However, as acceptability
criteria are intended solely for the evaluation of QRA results, they should be
based primarily on objective risk estimates. Risk perception by public or trade
unions, for example, may then influence decisions on the control of major
hazards as separate political factors, considered in a subsequent step.
5.5.6 Framework of Risk Criteria
An approach is being widely promulgated in the UK that the general form or
framework for acceptability criteria should be represented as the three-tier
system illustrated in Figure given below.
It involves the definition of the following elements:
38
 An upper-bound on individual (and possibly, societal) risk levels,

beyond which risks are deemed unacceptable;
 A lower-bound on individual (and possibly, societal) risk levels, below
which risks are deemed not to warrant regulatory concern;
 An intermediate region between the upper and lower bounds, where
further individual and societal risk reduction are required to achieve a
level deemed 'as low as reasonably practicable' (the ALARP principle).
Figure 7 – ALARP TRAINGLE
ALARP
TRIANGLE
Potential loss of
INTOLERABLE
REGION
life > 1 in 1000
years
Tolerable only if
GENERALLY
TOLERABLE TARGET ALARP the cost of risk
reduction is
REGION FOR REGION grossly
INSTALLATIONS
disproportionate
BROADLY Potential loss of

TOLERABLE TARGET
REGION FOR THIRD
life < 1 in 1,000,000
PARTIES years
Levels of Risks and ALARP. (Source: Health and Safety Executive, 1992)
The risk levels of the boundaries will vary according to the number of people
at risk. Table given below shows some early published values of acceptable
risk.
39
Table 9 – Published Acceptable Values of Risk
Canvey Island report, UK (1978) 35 x 10-6/year

Netherlands N = 10 1 x 10-5/year unacceptable
1 x 10-7/year acceptable
N = 100 1 x 10-7/year unacceptable
1 x 10-9/year acceptable
Health and Safety Executive, Royal Society, 1 x 10-5/year upper level
UK (1983) 1 x 10-6/year acceptable
1 x 10-7/year sensitive
population
Du Pont 0.3 x 10-6/year
BNFL (Thorp reprocessing plant, UK) 0.01 x 10-6/year
UK Central Electricity Generating Board 1 x 10-6/year upper level
nuclear power
Sizewell B, UK (1987) 0.04 x 10-6/year design
0.3 x 10-6/year normal
The numerical values which have been suggested for upper and lower bounds
show significant variation, not only in the values themselves but also in the
extent to which these concepts are applied to societal risk. The values also
vary between industries, reflecting considerable differences in philosophy and
value judgments as expressed by individual authorities. From a practical
point of view they also have a profound effect on the use of QRA as a means of
demonstrating compliance. For instance, where the difference between upper
and lower levels is smaller than the uncertainty band typically associated
with a risk assessment, the practicality of applying the criteria is called into
question. Also if the numerical values of the levels are very low, the technical
uncertainties inherent in all risk assessments may make it questionable
whether compliance can be demonstrated.
40
6 FAILURE RATE DATA

Failure frequency and reliability data for the study are presented below in the
various tables.
Risk is a product of severity and probability of an undesirable event. The
severities (affected zones) for all Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios and
Worse Case Scenarios have been covered in the study. In this chapter, the
scenarios are reviewed with probability of their occurrences.
6.1 Failure Data Considered for the Probability Estimation

6.1.1 Frequencies for Transfer Piping
Transfer piping is defined to be piping within the port or terminal wherein
chemical is transferred between two equipment / tank or from berth to
terminal or from a terminal to neighboring installations. The pipe routing
plays significant role in failure frequencies. The pipelines at ground level are
more vulnerable for impact with respect to pipelines on the pipe rack at a safe
elevation. Hence, corrective factors suggested in Table needs to be applied.
Table 10 – Frequency Factors for Inter unit Transfer Piping
Type of piping Factor for failure

frequencies relative to
process piping
Inter unit 0.885
Run down lines (pipe rack at elevation) 0.768
Rundown lines (ground level) 0.809
6.1.2 Causes of Pipeline Failure

Causes of failure of pipelines are generally due to design/erection defects,
corrosion, impact, poor maintenance, operational factors etc. Various world
wide agencies have carried out extensive study on determining the
predominant causes of pipeline failure. Table below shows the comparison of
failure rate frequencies (per 1000 Km year).
Table 11 – Comparison of Failure rate Frequencies (Per

1000 Km year).
Pipeline system USA Gas UK gas HSE NGL European oil

failure mode line Data 1969-77 Risk Study and gas lines
1970-80 (HSE) (Derived 1974 – 84
Raw Data from (CONCAWE
41
(Note 1) CONCAWE Unmodified

Data) Data)
Defect 0.13 0.07 007 0.16
Corrosion 0.20 0.16 0 0.23
External 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.22
impact
Environmental 0.11 0.007 0.007 0.05
Total (Note 2) 0.79 0.56 0.23 0.69
6.1.3 Transfer Spills while unloading from ships

Berth specific transfer spill frequency can be built up from the various
component frequencies by selecting appropriate values from Table given
below.
Table 12 – Transfer Spill Frequency Components
Cause of Category Failure Full Bore

Failure Frequency Probability
(per visit)
Connection
Failure
Failure of hose Arm 5.1 X10-5 0.1
or arm 0.5
Hose 6.8 X10-5
Failure of 1987 5.1 X10-6 1.0
quick release specification
connection Pre – 1987 5.1 X10-5 1.0
specification
Failure of Liquefied gas 5.4 X10-6 0.1
ships pipe
Liquid cargo 7.2 X10-6 0.1
work etc
Operator Error Liquefied gas 5.4 X10-6 0.1
Ranging
Failures
Mooring Fault Liquefied gas 3.0 X10-6 1.0
without
ranging alarm
Liquefied gas 6.0 X10-7 1.0
with ranging
alarm
42

Passing Ships Liquefied gas 1.0 X10-6 1.0
without
ranging alarm
Liquefied gas 2.0 X10-7 1.0
with ranging
alarm
Overflow Liquefied gas 2.4 X10-5 0.0
loading without
vapour return
loading
6.1.4 Reliability Data Valves (Failure to close on Demand)
Table 13– Failure to close on Demand
Valve Type Failure to Source

Close on
Demand
ESD Valve 0.005 DNV Technica (1994
Hlll)
Excess flow valve 0.013 COVO (1982)
Check (non return) 0.05 DNV Technica (1993 C3
valve 105. Addendum B1
Revision A)
6.1.5 Over ground Piping

For welded piping, a confidential Technica source (LO56, 1980 –
unpublished data from a major chemical company) gives general pipe leak
frequency data as shown in Table below. This is considered to be the best
data on pipe failures which has been identified.
Table 14 – Historical Pipe Leak Frequencies
Type % of Cross Frequency (per

Sectional Area year)
Small Leaks <1 2.8 X 10- 7 L /D
Big Leaks 5 1.2 X 10- 7 L /D
43
Catastrophic 20 5.0 X 10- 8 L /D

Leaks
Rupture 100 2.2 X 10- 8 L /D
Total 4.72 X 10- 7 L /D
Based on this table, leak frequencies for varying pipe sizes can be
calculated for a section of pipe. The resulting leak frequencies calculated
are given in the table below
Table 15 – Failure Rates for Process Piping
Pipe Diameter Mean Failure Rate

(inches) (mm) (per m-year)
0.5 13 3.7 x 10-5
0.75 19 2.5 x 10-5
1 25 1.9 x 10-5
1.5 40 1.2 x 10-5
2 50 9.3 x 10-6
3 80 6.3 x 10-6
4 100 4.6 x 10-6
6 150 3.1 x 10-6
8 200 2.3 x 10-6
10 250 1.9 x 10-6
12 300 1.5 x 10-6
14 350 1.3 x 10-6
16 400 1.2 x 10-6
18 450 1.0 x 10-6
20 500 9.3 x 10-7
24 610 7.7 x 10-7
36 900 5.2 x 10-7
48 1200 3.9 x 10-7
The hole size distribution for pipe failures with respect to cross sectional
area and pipe diameter is presented in the table given below. For the
purpose of this study, small leaks are considered to have a representative
hole size of 1% of the pipe cross sectional area.
44
Table 16 – Hole Size Distribution for Pipe Leaks
Hole Size as a % of Proportion of

Cross – Pipe Diameter (d / Failures (%)
Sectional Area D)
(a / A)
1 10 60
5 22 25
20 45 10
100 100 5
This hole size distribution is shown graphically in Figure given below. It is

used for all pipes upto 10 inch diameter. Above that the distribution for
pressure vessels have been used because this is considered appropriate
where the lines are large; these large pipes are more easily seen and suffer
failures which are similar to those experienced by pressure vessels rather
than the special experience of small pipes.
Figure 8 – Hole Size Distribution for Process Piping
The resulting frequencies for generic pipe failure are calculated for the
different hole size ranges by using the graph shown above, to measure the
fraction of failures that occur over the given hole size range. This is then
simply multiplied b the total frequency of failure given in Table 16 for each
pipe size. These resulting frequencies are given in the Table below:
It should be noted that all large holes relative to the pipe diameter are
considered to be full bore ruptures of the pipe. This is a valid assumption
45
because most larger holes will tend to propagate to full bore ruptures due
to stresses in the pipe work.
Table 17 – Pipe Failure Frequencies by Hole Size
Pipe Diameter Hole Size Frequency

Inches (mm) Capacity (per m – yr)
0.5 12 5 (0 – 10) 3.6 x 10-5
Full Bore (10+) 7.8 x 10-7
0.75 20 5 (0 – 10) 2.4 x 10-5
Full Bore (10+) 1.1 x 10-6
1 25 5 (0 – 10) 1.7 x 10-5
Full Bore (10+) 1.4 x 10-6
1.5 38 5 (0 – 10) 1.1 x 10-5
Full Bore (10+) 1.5 x 10-6
2 50 5 (0 – 10) 7.5 x 10-6
Full Bore (10+) 1.7 x 10-6
3 75 5 (0 – 10) 4.2 x 10-6
25 (10 – 50) 1.7 x 10-6
Full Bore (50 +) 2.0 x 10-7
4 100 5 (0 – 10) 2.8 x 10-6
25 (10 – 50) 1.7 x 10-6
Full Bore (50 +) 2.2 x 10-7
6 150 5 (0 – 10) 1.4 x 10-6
25 (10 – 50) 1.4 x 10-6
Full Bore (50 +) 2.4 x 10-7
8 200 5 (0 – 10) 9.0 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 1.1 x 10-6
100 ( 50 – 150) 2.5 x 10-7
Full Bore (150 +) 5.6 x 10-8
10 250 5 (0 – 10) 5.9 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 9.2 x 10-7
100 ( 50 – 150) 2.7 x 10-7
46
Full Bore (150 +) 7.2 x 10-8

12 300 5 (0 – 10) 3.8 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 1.0 x 10-6
100 ( 50 – 150) 1.0 x 10-7
Full Bore (150 +) 6.7 x 10-8
14 350 5 (0 – 10) 3.3 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 8.5 x 10-7
100 ( 50 – 150) 8.7 x 10-8
Full Bore (150 +) 5.8 x 10-8
16 400 5 (0 – 10) 2.9 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 7.5 x 10-7
100 ( 50 – 150) 7.6 x 10-8
Full Bore (150 +) 5.0 x 10-8
18 450 5 (0 – 10) 2.6 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 6.6 x 10-7
100 ( 50 – 150) 6.7 x 10-8
Full Bore (150 +) 4.5 x 10-8
20 500 5 (0 – 10) 2.3 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 6.0 x 10-7
100 ( 50 – 150) 6.1 x 10-8
Full Bore (150 +) 4.0 x 10-8
24 600 5 (0 – 10) 1.9 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 5.0 x 10-7
100 ( 50 – 150) 5.0 x 10-8
Full Bore (150 +) 3.4 x 10-8
36 900 5 (0 – 10) 1.3 x 10-7
25 (10 – 50) 3.3 x 10-7
47
7 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
7.1 Objectives
Consequence Analysis is a measure of the expected effects of an incident
outcome. An incident is the loss of containment of material or energy. The
Primary component in Consequence Analysis is to identify various incident
/ hazards.
The three major hazards in a facility are fire, explosion and toxic release.
These usually involve the emission of material from containment followed
by vaporization and dispersion of material. The analysis would involve
leakage of liquid chemicals / gas mixing of material with air, formation of a
flammable vapour cloud, dispersing of the cloud and finding of a source of
an ignition. The cloud when in contact with a source of ignition would lead
to a fire and/or unconfined vapour cloud explosion.
7.2 Models Used

7.2.1 Source Models
Source models quantitatively define the release scenarios by estimating
the discharge rate and extent of flash and evaporation from a liquid pool.
The subsequent “dispersion” models convert the source “outputs” to
concentration fields downwind from the source.
7.2.2 Dispersion Models
Dispersion modelling aims at estimating the distances likely to be affected
due to release of certain quantity of flammable gas / vapour within an
acceptable concentration limit. Depending upon the properties of the
material released and the release conditions, dense gas dispersion or a
buoyant gas release model is used for estimating the affected areas. Both
the models describe the behaviour of material subsequent to its release in
the predominant downwind direction, at a particular wind speed and at
the existing meteorological conditions such as humidity, temperature, etc.
It should be noted that the release rate would depend on release conditions
(temperature and pressure), the release / failure point, intervention time,
the release area and other factors.
Wind speed and turbulence are significant factors as the amount of air
entrainment into the released gas would depend on the velocity at which
the cloud is travelling and also turbulence in the surroundings. Varying
terrain contours in the area would affect the dispersion. The atmospheric
stability class takes into account atmospheric turbulence and is another
important consideration in modelling. This in turn depends on several
factors such as wind speed, insulation, cloud cover and the time period i.e.
day or night. Stable atmospheric conditions lead to the least amount of
48
mixing thus resulting in larger areas for gas dispersion and unstable
conditions result in maximum mixing of gas with air leading to the
dilution of the gas.
Two such parameters used in gas dispersion programs are:-
1. Pasquill Stability Category
2. Surface Roughness Value.
Pasquill Stability Categories are related to the Richardson number and
hence give an indication of thermal stratification, i.e. the magnitude of
buoyancy forces which enhance or diminish turbulence and mixing.
Therefore, “A” corresponds to a large negative Richardson Number and F
to a large positive number i.e. night time with little cloud cover and low
wind speeds stability, category ‘D’ is used for moderate to high wind
speeds and overcast conditions.
The surface roughness value determines the vertical profile of the wind
and mechanical maintenance of turbulence in the boundary layer. It is a
function of the terrain over which the wind flows in its approach to the
vapour release point. In value it ranges from 0.03 for say closely mown
grass up to 0.1 for forests and urban areas. Surrounding areas including
building and other structures also have a marked effect on the dispersion
of released gas. The dispersion would vary with the size and position of the
building relative to the source of release, along with the other factors
already discussed above.
7.2.3 Explosion and Fires
Explosions are considered as a rapid equilibration of high pressure gas
with the environment. The equilibration must be rapid enough so that the
energy contained in the high pressure gas is dissipated as a shock wave.
Explosion can arise out of strictly physical phenomena (e.g. catastrophic
rupture of a pressurized containment) or from a chemical reaction such as
the combustion of a flammable gas in air. These reactions can occur both
in a confined space (e.g. within a vessel, within a building etc) or in an
unconfined state (UVCE) Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion). When the
shock wave propagation velocity is less or more than sonic velocity, the
explosions are categorized as either deflagrations or Detonations
respectively. The consequences of concern for explosion are shock wave
overpressure effects and projectile effects. For fires, the consequence of
concern is thermal radiation effects. When explosions arise from
combustion reactions, thermal radiation effects are small (and ignored)
compared to the overpressure shock wave effects.
UVCE and Flash fires occur when a large amount of volatile flammable
material is rapidly dispersed to the atmosphere, forms a vapour cloud
which disperses and meets a source of ignition before the cloud is diluted
49
to below LFL (Lower Flammability Limit). However, a vapour cloud

explosion is not generally expected if the explosive mass is below 5 MT. If
the mass is below 5 MT a flash fire is more likely. If the ignition source is
reached when concentrations are between LFL and UFL, damage due to
both fire and blast effects may take place. Flammable vapour clouds may
ignite from a number of ignition sources which may be continuous (e.g.
pilot flames / flare, etc) or intermittent (e.g. from smoking, vehicles, non-
spark proof type tools, etc). The main concern for a UVCE is the
shockwave that causes damage whereas for a flash fire the main concerns
are the thermal radiation effects. It is believed that the transition from
flash fire to UVCE could be a function of the flammable mass, presence of
confinement obstacles (for UVCE), burning velocity of the material (higher
velocity has higher chance of a UVCE) and other factors. Peak
overpressures are much less with UVCE’S compared to Detonations
(UVCE’S are usually deflagrations) typically 1 Bar or less and positive
phase duration’s (20-100 ms).Ignition of flammable vapour clouds are a
function of the pressure of ignition sources (e.g. open flame smoking
vehicles etc). The clouds are thought to often be ignited at the edge as they
drift. The effect of ignition is that further spread of the cloud in that
direction is halted. A site with many ignition sources is expected to have
smaller explosions as the ignitions source would be reached before the
cloud reaches its full destructive mass. However, it would also be true that
such clouds would have a low chance of diluting to Safety upon release
(many ignition sources).
Pool / jet fires generally tend to be localized in effect and are of concern
mainly in establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety
zones. Issues relating to spacing of critical equipment, etc. can be
addressed on the basis of specific consequence analysis for a range of
possible pool / jet fires. The effects of a pool / jet fire depends upon factors
such as flammability, combustibility, amount of material released,
temperature, humidity and flame length.
7.3 Terms relevant for interpreting the findings of Consequence

Analysis
7.3.1 Concentration
Concentration is calculated as a function of the three distances of interest
100m, 200m & 300m. The concentration values are reported for three
weather category.
7.3.2 Flash Fire
The furthest extended of a ground level flash fire is reported for three
weather categories. This extend of the flash fire is the distance to LFL
fraction.
50
7.3.3 Late Ignition Explosion

Late ignition results report the effects when the cloud has been allowed to
drift to the fraction of the LFL level before the ignition occurs. The late
ignition location is the horizontal distance from the release at which the
explosion centre is located.
7.3.4 Radiation Radii for Pool Fire
The pool fire produces radiation levels at down wind distances. Three
radiation levels are considered. 4kW/m2, 12.5kW/m2, 37.5kW/m2
A pool fire may be affected by wind speed and there fore may tilt.
7.3.5 Radiation Radii for Jet Flame
The jet flame will produce radiation levels at downward distances. Three
radiation levels are used. The jet flame may be affected by wind speed and
the orientation of the jet.
7.3.6 Averaging Time
Averaging time is used to determine the concentration of a flammable
material at a point down wind of the release point. The base averaging
time parameter is 10 seconds. This is because for flammable effects it is
the concentration in the cloud at any instant which is more important than
the average over a long duration as the cloud meanders.
7.3.7 Toxic Effects
The effect of a release of a toxic material at a given distance downward is
determined by its concentration and duration.
7.3.8 Flammable Effects
A Cloud containing a flammable material may not be immediately
explosive. If the initial release is above the materials UFL it cannot ignite
until it has become diluted and a source of ignition is required. A
flammable propagates from the point of ignition through the region of the
cloud which is above its LFL. The burn rate and flame velocity determines
the type of fire.
For a large dilute cloud, the material may burn faster than the release
rate, and a flash fire occurs. The radiation from this type of fire is only
significant within the burning cloud.
Jet flame results when a gas, liquid or two phase jet is ignited. Phast
calculates the maximum radiation that will be experienced directly in line
with the jet to establish the distances to the Significant Radiation Levels
(SRLs). If the released material is not ignited immediately, a flammable
plume or cloud may develop. On ignition this will ‘flash’ or burn back to
form a jet flame.
51
Pool fires are caused by the ignition of pools. The distances to SRLs are
measured from the centre of the pool which is assumed to be circular. Once
the lower flammable limit is reached the cloud can no longer ignite.
7.3.9 Explosion Effects
In certain instances, a flame front may travel very quickly causing a
pressure wave ahead of the front. If the frame speed reaches the speed of
sound, a detonation occurs. The distances calculated to the significant over
pressure levels are measured from the edge of the exploding cloud.
7.4 Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios

The Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS) give the possible failure
scenarios, which takes into account the maximum inventory that can get
released at the time of such a failure considering the intervention time
based on safety systems provided at the facility.
Table 18 – Various MCLS considered for the Study

Fuel Sl Scenario Description
No
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during Naphtha
loading. (App length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)
B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 20” Dia Naphtha pipeline from
jetty to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where
Naphtha
the lines go under ground.

C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 20” Dia Naphtha pipeline from
D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 20” Dia Naphtha pipeline from
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during Motor Spirit

loading. (App length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)
B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 20” Dia Motor Spirit pipeline from
Motor Spirit

C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 20” Dia Motor Spirit pipeline
from jetty to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters)
where the lines go under ground.
D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 20” Dia Motor Spirit pipeline
K
K
O
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during SKO loading.

S
n
o
e
s
r
)
i
l
52
(App length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)

B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 20” Dia SKO pipeline from jetty to
the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the lines
go under ground.
C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 20” Dia SKO pipeline from
D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 20” Dia SKO pipeline from jetty
to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the
lines go under ground.
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during Diesel (App

length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)
B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 20” Dia Diesel pipeline from jetty
Diesel
C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 20” Dia Diesel pipeline from

D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 20” Dia Diesel pipeline from
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during Crude (App

B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 48” Dia Crude pipeline from jetty
Crude
C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 48” Dia Crude pipeline from

D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 48” Dia Crude pipeline from
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during Furnace Oil

(App length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)
B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 20” Dia Furnace Oil pipeline from
Furnace Oil

C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 20” Dia Furnace Oil pipeline
D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 20” Dia Furnace Oil pipeline
53
A Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch during LPG (App

Liquefied Petroleum Gas
B 5mm hole (Small Leak) on 20” Dia LPG pipeline from jetty to
the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the lines
go under ground.
(LPG)
C 25mm hole (Medium Leak) on 20” Dia LPG pipeline from

D 100 mm hole (Large Leak) on 20” Dia LPG pipeline from jetty
7.5 Coal Storage at Berth No: 14 Open Yard

7.5.1 General Characteristics of Coal
Coal is a fossil fuel extracted from the ground by underground mining or
open pit mining. It is a readily combustible, black or brownish – black
sedimentary rock. It is composed primarily of carbon along with assorted
other elements.
Carbon forms more than 50% by weight and more than 70% by volume of
coal.
Coal usually contains a considerable amount of incidental moisture, which
is the water trapped within the coal in between the coal particles. The
structure of a coal molecule is represented as follows:
Methane gas is another component of coal. Methane in coal is dangerous

as it can cause explosion and may cause the coal to spontaneously
combust.
54
7.5.2 Effects of Coal Burning

Combustion of coal, like any other compound containing carbon, produces
CO2, along with minor amount of SO2.
Coal can be set on fire by spontaneous combustion
7.5.3 Spontaneous Combustion in Coal
The risk from fire exists where significant amounts of coal are in use of
storage. Coal is a combustible material, making it susceptible to a variety
of ignition scenarios. One of the most frequent and serious causes of coal
fires is spontaneous combustion, which has been responsible for a number
of incidents within the department in recent years.
Preventing spontaneous combustion coal fires involves attention to many
different factors. Among the most critical are the type, age and
composition of coal, how it is stored and how it is used. Given the right
kind of coal, oxygen, and a certain temperature and moisture content, coal
will burn by itself.
Spontaneous combustion has long been recognized as a fire hazard in
stored coal. Spontaneous combustion fires usually begin as “hot spots”
deep within the reserve of coal. The hot spots appear when coal absorbs
oxygen from the air. Heat generated by the oxidation can initiate the fire.
Such fires can be very stubborn to extinguish because of the amount of coal
involved (often hundreds of tons) and the difficulty of getting to the seat of
the problem. Moreover, coal in either the smouldering of flaming stage
may produce copious amounts of methane and carbon monoxide gases. In
addition to their toxicity, these gases are highly explosive in certain
concentrations, and can further complicate efforts to fight this type of coal
fire.
Even the most universal fire fighting substance, water, cannot be used
indiscriminately, because of the remote possibility of a steam explosion; it
is advisable that water be applied carefully and from a safe distance.
Certain chemicals such as carbon dioxide or nitrogen may mitigate fire
effects, but their use has had mixed success from a DOE (Department of
Energy) perspective. The above information suggests that coal fires
require awareness and prior planning to extinguish efficiently, completely,
and safely.
7.5.4 Causes of Spontaneous Coal Fires
The following general factors have been mentioned as contributing causes:
 Coal handling procedures allowed for long-time retention of coal,
which increases the possibility of heating
 New coal added on top of old coal created segregation of particle
sizes, which is a major cause of heating
55
 Too few temperature probes installed in the coal bunker resulted in

an excessive period of time before the fire was detected.
 Failure of equipment needed to fight the fire
 Ineffective capability and use of carbon dioxide fire suppression
system
 Delay in the application of water
7.5.4.1 Preventing Spontaneous Combustion in Stored Coal
High quantities of coal are stored in bunkers, silos, hoppers and open air
stockpiles. How susceptible such stocks of coal are to fire from spontaneous
combustion depends on a number of factors, from how new the coal is to
how it is piled.
7.5.5 Recommendations for Coal Storage
 Storing coal with low sulphur content is helpful. Sulphur compounds
in coal liberate considerable heat as they oxidize.
 Air circulating within a coal pile should be restricted as it
contributes to heating; compacting helps seal air out.
 Moisture in coal contributes to spontaneous heating because it
assists the oxidation process. Moisture content should be limited to 3
%; sulphur content should be limited to 1 %, “as mined.” Coal having
high moisture content should be segregated and used as quickly as
possible. Efforts should be made to keep stored coal from being
exposed to moisture.
 Following the “First in, First out” rule of using stock reduces the
chance for hot spots by helping preclude heat build up for portions of
stock which remain undisturbed for a long term. The design of coal
storage bins is important in this regard.
 A high ambient temperature aids the spontaneous heating process.
Use coal as quickly as possible. The longer large coal piles are
allowed to sit, the more time the spontaneous process has, to work.
 The shape and composition of open stock piles can help prevent fires.
Dumping coal into a big pile with a trestle or grab bucket can lead to
problems. Rather, coal should be packed in horizontal layers
(opinions range from 1 ½’ to 3’ high) which are then levelled by
scraping and compacted by rolling. This method helps distribute the
coal evenly and thus avoids breakage and segregation if fine coal.
Segregation of coal particles by size should be avoided, as it may
allow more air to enter the pile and subsequent heating of finer
sizes.
 The height of the coal pile/stock is also important; limit un - layered,
un - compacted high grade coal to a height of 15’ maximum height.
56
 Properly inspect, test and maintain installed fire protection

equipment.
 Maintain an updated pre-fire plan and encourage regular visits to
coal facilities by the site or local emergency response force.
7.5.6 Roll Packing
Roll packing helps to exclude O2 and thus to prevent fires by discouraging
spontaneous combustion. Coal is distributed by a grab bucket or by other
means in a uniform layer. The layer is then levelled by scraping and
compacted by rolling. Distributing the coal evenly avoids breakage and
segregation of the coal. The firm packing helps shed water.
7.5.7 Checking Temperature
Steam rising from a pile or the odour of burning coal is an indication of
spontaneous heating, but an earlier or more reliable indication is obtained
by checking the temperature/ hot spots/CO detection.
Rise of temperature can be noted by use of thermocouples. Hot spots can
be detected by use of IR coal fire monitors. CO detectors can indicate that
coal combustion has started.
7.6 Risk Analysis for Coal Fires in Storage Yard Berth 14

Data used for calculation of impact distance for coal fires. Type of coal –
Bituminous (Medium Volatile)
Emissivity Constant (ε) = 0.9 for Bituminous Coal

Stefan Boatmen constant = 5.6 x 10-8 KW/m2K4
7.6.1 Formula used for Calculation of Impact Distance (D) =

FQ 4 K
Where D = Distance from flame centre to receiving point.

Where F = Fraction of heat radiation = 0.15 (Conservative)
Where Q = Total Heat Generated /Emitted by Coal
Where K = Thermal Radiation level
Maximum temperature attained by flame of Coal Tf = 900DegC = 1173K
Ambient surrounding temperature Ta= 27DegC to 35DegC = 300K – 308K
Q =  A ε (T f 4– Ta4)
 = 5.68 x 10 -8 kW/m2K4
Tf4 = (1173)4 K
57
Ta4 = (300)4 K
For active coal burning area = 10m2
Q = 5.6 x 10-8 x 0.9 x 10 (11734 – 3004)

Q = 950 kW
For Heat radiation 4 kW/m2 impact distance D
D= 950  0.15 4  3.14  4 = 1.68 = 1.7m
For Heat radiation 12.5 kW/m2 impact distance D
D= 950  0.15 4  3.14  12.5 = 0.9527 = 1 m
For Heat radiation 37.5 kW/m2 impact distance D
D= 950  0.15 4  3.14  37.5 = 0.55m
For active coal burning area – 100 m2
Q = 5.6 x 10-8 x 0.9 x 100 (11734 – 3004)

= 9500 kW/m2
For Heat radiation 4 kW/m2 impact distance D
9500  0.15 4  3.14  4

D= = 5.32 m
For Heat radiation 12.5 KW/m2 impact distance D
D= 9500  0.15 4  3.14  12.5 = 3.012 m

For Heat radiations 37.5 KW/m2 impact distance D
9500  0.15 4  3.14  37.5

D= = 1.74 m
The Damage Effects Due to Thermal Radiation of Varying Intensity
Incident Type of Damage

Radiation
Intensity
(kW/m2)
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment unless the
equipment is fully thermally fire protected (Insulation, fire
proofing, sprinkler protection etc)
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood,
melting plastic tubing, etc.
58
4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach

within 20 seconds, blistering of skin (1st degree burns) is
likely.
7.6.2 Summary:
Heat Radiation Active Burning Coal Area

Impact distance for
10 m2 100 m2
4 kW/m2 1.7 m 5.3 m
12.5 kW/m2 1.0 m 3.0 m
37.5 kW/m2 0.5 m 1.74 m
Assuming that 100m2 surface area of the coal stack is smouldering no

person should approach the stock within 6 m distance.
All fire fighting should be done from more than 5.3 m away from the
affected coal stack unless the fire fighter is fully clothed with fire
protective clothing and respiratory protection
Please note that CO could also be emitted during a coal fire due to
incomplete combustion. Hence adequate respiratory protection should be
used like canister gas mask or Self Contained Breathing Apparatus –
SCBA
7.7 Impact Distances for MCLS

The frequencies (per year) of the various failure incidents for the
Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS) are selected from FAILURE
RATE DATA Chapter 6.
Table 19 – Impact Distances for MCLS – Berth No 13
59
Scenario Wind
velocity
Stabili
ty
Jet Fire (JF) / Late Pool Fire (LPF)
Explosion effect (Late
Radiation dist. in Meter
m/s Class Ignition) in Meter
Fuel
Over pressure Level

4.5 12.5 37.5 0.0207 0.1379 0.2068
kW/m2 kW/m2 kWm2 bar(g) bar(g) bar(g)
Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch line 1 D JF – 799 JF – 636 JF – 523
226 162 157
during Naphtha unloading. (i.e. 10 meters) LPF – 79 LPF – 63 LPF – 56
Rupture of unloading hose / arm 12 Inch line 3 C JF – 721 JF – 557 JF – 444
388 246 238
379 232 223
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 1 D JF – 19 JF – 16 JF – 13
69 47 45
pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters)
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 3 C JF – 17 JF – 14 JF – 11
38 24 23
Naphtha
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 5 D JF – 17 JF – 13 JF – 10

26 14 13
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 1 D JF – 84 JF – 68 JF – 57
445 260 253
pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters) LPF – 48 LPF – 36 LPF – 27
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 3 C JF – 76 JF – 60 JF – 48
290 178 170
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 5 D JF – 73 JF – 56 JF – 44
241 143 136
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 1 D JF – 289 JF – 233 JF – 193
768 702 697
pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters) LPF – 75 LPF – 53
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 3 C JF – 264 JF – 205 JF – 164
533 401 396
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Naphtha 20 Inch 5 D JF – 256 JF – 194 JF – 152
467 316 313
60
Scenario Wind
velocity
Stabili
ty
Fuel
Over pressure Level

4.5 12.5 37.5 0.0207 0.1379 0.2068
226 162 157
during Motor Spirit unloading. (i.e. 10 meters) LPF – 79 LPF – 63 LPF – 56
388 246 238
379 232 223
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 1 D JF – 19 JF – 16 JF – 13
69 47 45
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 3 C JF – 17 JF – 14 JF – 11
38 24 23
Motor Spirit
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 5 D JF – 17 JF – 13 JF – 10

26 14 13
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 1 D JF – 84 JF – 68 JF – 57
445 260 253
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 3 C JF – 76 JF – 60 JF – 48
290 178 170
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 5 D JF – 73 JF – 56 JF – 44
241 143 136
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 1 D JF – 289 JF – 233 JF – 193
768 702 697
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 3 C JF – 264 JF – 205 JF – 164
533 401 396
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Motor Spirit 20 Inch 5 D JF – 256 JF – 194 JF – 152
467 316 313
61
Scenario Wind
velocity
Stabili
ty
Fuel
Over pressure Level

4.5 12.5 37.5 0.0207 0.1379 0.2068
120 97 95
during SKO unloading. (i.e. 10 meters) LPF – 70 LPF – 55 LPF – 48
123 96 95
113 87 86
5mm hole (Small Leak) on SKO 20 Inch pipeline 1 D JF – 19 JF – 16 JF – 13
45 26 25
from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters) LPF – 39 LPF – 25 LPF – 17
5mm hole (Small Leak) on SKO 20 Inch pipeline 3 C JF – 24 JF – 22 JF – 20
27 14 13
5mm hole (Small Leak) on SKO 20 Inch pipeline 5 D JF – 32 JF – 30 JF – 28
25 13 13
SKO
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on SKO 20 Inch 1 D JF – 80 JF – 65 JF – 54
165 109 105
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on SKO 20 Inch 3 C JF – 76 JF – 59 JF – 48
193 124 118
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on SKO 20 Inch 5 D JF – 73 JF – 56 JF – 44
147 82 77
100mm hole (Large Leak) on SKO 20 Inch pipeline 1 D JF – 165 JF – 132 JF – 110
202 133 129
from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters) LPF – 73 LPF – 51
100mm hole (Large Leak) on SKO 20 Inch pipeline 3 C JF – 181 JF – 140 JF – 112
263 183 180
100mm hole (Large Leak) on SKO 20 Inch pipeline 5 D JF – 154 JF – 117 JF – 91
244 174 169
62
Scenario Wind
velocity
Stabili
ty
Fuel
Over pressure Level

4.5 12.5 37.5 0.0207 0.1379 0.2068
120 97 95
during Diesel unloading. (i.e. 10 meters) LPF – 70 LPF – 55 LPF – 48
123 96 95
113 87 86
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch pipeline 1 D JF – 19 JF – 16 JF – 13
45 26 25
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch pipeline 3 C JF – 24 JF – 22 JF – 20
27 14 13
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch pipeline 5 D JF – 32 JF – 30 JF – 28
Diesel
25 13 13
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch 1 D JF – 80 JF – 65 JF – 54
165 109 105
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch 3 C JF – 76 JF – 59 JF – 48
193 124 118
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch 5 D JF – 73 JF – 56 JF – 44
147 82 77
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch 1 D JF – 165 JF – 132 JF – 110
202 133 129
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch 3 C JF – 181 JF – 140 JF – 112
263 183 180
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Diesel 20 Inch 5 D JF – 154 JF – 117 JF – 91
244 174 169
63
Scenario Wind
velocity
Stabili
ty
Fuel
Over pressure Level

4.5 12.5 37.5 0.0207 0.1379 0.2068
100 55 52
during Crude unloading. (i.e. 10 meters) LPF – 59 LPF – 43 LPF – 36
337 188 179
316 171 162
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Crude 48 Inch pipeline 1 D JF – 22 JF – 18 JF – 15
70 47 46
from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters)
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Crude 48 Inch pipeline 3 C JF – 20 JF – 15 JF – 12
41 25 24
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Crude 48 Inch pipeline 5 D JF – 19 JF – 14 JF – 11
Crude
28 14 13
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Crude 48 Inch 1 D JF – 82 JF – 68 JF – 58
218 145 139
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Crude 48 Inch 3 C JF – 72 JF – 58 JF – 48
216 152 147
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Crude 48 Inch 5 D JF – 69 JF – 54 JF – 44
205 142 137
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Crude 48 Inch 1 D JF – 155 JF – 86 JF – 26
372 247 246
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Crude 48 Inch 3 C JF – 153 JF – 84 JF – 25
383 277 273
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Crude 48 Inch 5 D JF – 158 JF – 88 JF – 28
392 298 296
Scenario Wind Stabili Jet Fire (JF) / Late Pool Fire (LPF)
el
F
u
velocity ty Radiation dist. in Meter Explosion effect (Late
64

Over pressure Level
4.5 12.5 37.5 0.0207 0.1379 0.2068
29 22 21
during Furnace Oil unloading. (i.e. 10 meters) LPF – 52 LPF – 37 NR
43 33 32
43 33 32
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 1 D JF – 7 JF – 5 NR
20 12 12
pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100 meters) LPF – 45 LPF – 28 NR
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 3 C JF – 9 JF – 7 JF – 5
17 12 11
Furnace Oil
5mm hole (Small Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 5 D JF – 7 JF – 5 JF – 4

15 11 11
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 1 D JF – 23 JF – 19 JF – 15
46 26 25
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 3 C JF – 25 JF – 20 JF – 16
67 39 37
25mm hole (Medium Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 5 D JF – 20 JF – 15 JF – 11
77 49 47
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 1 D JF – 64 JF – 51 JF – 43
77 49 47
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 3 C JF – 66 JF – 51 JF – 40
101 63 62
100mm hole (Large Leak) on Furnace Oil 20 Inch 5 D JF – 55 JF – 42 JF – 33
98 62 59
NR - Not Reached
65
7.8 General Comments of the MCLS Table

Naphtha is the most highly flammable POL products that is proposed to be
handled at New Mangalore Port Berth No 13.
Crude Oil & Motor Spirit can be considered as flammable as Naphtha. As
the impact distances worked out for Naphtha are maximum they would
automatically cover the impact distances of other POL products proposed
to be handled at Berth No 13.
Although MCLS have been considered for various leak sizes ranging from
5mm hole to 100 mm hole, the hole would not develop overnight, but would
initially be small (5mm) except in the case of an external impact in which
case it is assumed that the hole created would be 100 mm dia which would
cause a large flow of Naphtha and can be considered to be a worst case
scenario. In such an event all personnel not equipped with fire protection
suits should be moved to a distance of more than 289 meters from the
scene of fire.
All fire fighting personnel adequately equipped needs to keep a distance of
more than 193 meters at which distance 37.5kW /m2 heat radiation is
envisaged. In such an event fixed water monitors and water curtains
would be useful for fire fighting.
All though the distances indicated for unloading arm / hose failure are
high it should be noted that loading / unloading operations would be
instantaneously stopped as the operation would be continuously
monitored.
The explosion effect due to over pressure is possible if the flammable
vapour cloud formed due to the leakage is within the explosive range and
ignites on encountering a source of ignition. In such an eventuality some
equipment / structures could be affected upto a distance of about 768
meters at the most, but the probability of such an explosion mixture being
formed is low due to high wind speed in the area.
All the impact distances worked out above and the contours plotted gives
the management an idea of the extent to which the damage can occur.
66
7.9 Quantitative Risk Assessment

7.9.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13
1e-009 /AvgeYear
Run Row Status
Individual Risk Contours
Audit No: 13579
Factors: Combination 1
1e-008 /AvgeYear
Outdoor contours
Run Row Selected: 1
Study Folder: NMPT-13-QRA
Risk Level
1e-006 /AvgeYear
1e-007 /AvgeYear
1e-008 /AvgeYear 1e-007 /AvgeYear
1e-009 /AvgeYear
Def ault Model Selection
1e-006 /AvgeYear
Def ault Risk Ranking Point Set
Def ault Population Set
Industrial
Def ault Ignition Set
scan002
67
The HSE (Health & Safety Executive, UK) has published documents
outlining their approach to the development of Risk Criteria. In those
documents, HSE has concluded that broadly, the limit of tolerable risk to a
worker or employee is 10-3 fatalities per year. On the basis that the risk to a
member of the public should be at least an order of magnitude lower than
that to a worker / employee, the limit of tolerable risk to a member of the
public is taken as 10-4 fatalities per year.
The most comprehensive and widely – used criteria for individual risks are
the ones proposed by the UK HSE as follows:

Employees year
Public year
Negligible Risk : 10-6 fatalities per
year
68
7.9.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve
69
The Societal Risk criteria have not been as widely used as Individual Risk
Criteria. However, their value is becoming recognised, especially for
transport activities, but also as complementary to Individual Risk Criteria
is general. The UK HSE has used modified Individual Risk Criteria to
account for Societal Risk considerations (HSE 19989b), but more recently
moved towards the use of Societal Risk Criteria.
Authority FN Curve Maximum Negligible

Tolerance Intercept
Intercept with N = 1
with N= 1
Health & Safety -1 10 - 1 10 - 4
Commission. UK
(Existing Ports)
70
8 PROBABILITY OF SHIP COLLISION /

STRIKING
8.1 Ship Failure Analysis
This Report does not Address Marine Impact.
8.1.1 General Approach
The basic frequencies used for computation have been extracted from
previous DNV Technica Work (1990 & 1997)
Two types of accidents are distinguished and their frequencies calculated.
 Accidents at the terminal (i.e jetty, wharf or dock), expressed as
frequencies per visit, assuming a typical visit duration. These include
striking, impacts, fires / explosions and transfer spills.
 Accident in transit (on approach or departure), expressed as
frequencies per loaded kilometer. These include collisions, groundings
and fire / explosions. The number of “loaded kilometers” per visit is
usually the length of the approach route.
Together with the frequency of each type of accident, a probability of release is
calculated. The meaning of the term “release” is a follows:
 For liquefied gases – in general, a leak or cold rupture of the cargo
tank or loading arm / hose. An exception is fire / explosion accidents,
where it means a hot rupture of the cargo tank.
 For crude oil, petroleum products or chemicals – in general, a leak from
the cargo tank or loading arm / hose; except for fire / explosion
accidents, where it means an explosion of the cargo in the tank.
 For explosive solids – an explosion of the cargo in the hold.
For cargo transfer and explosion accidents, the release probability is unity
since the accident entails release directly. Standard Accident frequencies and
release probabilities are given in the tables below
Table 20 – Accident Frequencies by Port Type
Port Type Collision Grounding Striking Impact (per

(per (per km) (per visit)
encounter) passing)
Open Sea 5.0 x 10-4 6.5 x 10-5 4.0 x 10-6 2.2 x 10-3
Port
Wide 4.0 x 10-5 8.0 x 10-6 4.0 x 10-6 2.2 x 10-3
Estuary
71
Wide River 1.2 x 10-4 1.6 x 10-5 9.0 x 10-6 2.1 x 10-3
Narrow 5.0 x 10-4 1.0 x 10-4 4.2 x 10-5 6.5 x 10-3
River
Generic frequencies of transfer spills per visit are given in the below Table
according to cargo type.
Table 21 – Accident Frequencies by Cargo Group
Cargo Group Transfer (per Explosion (per

visit) visit)
Crude Oil 1.9 X10-4 1.3 X10-5
Low Flash products 1.9 X10-4 1.3 X10-6
High Flash products 1.9 X10-4 1.5 X10-6
Black oils 1.9 X10-4 0
Flammable Liquefied Gases 7.6 X10-5 --
Toxic Liquefied Gases 7.6 X10-5 0
Low Flash Chemicals 1.5 X10-4 1.3 X10-5
High Flash Chemicals 1.5 X10-4 0
Corrosive Chemicals 1.5 X10-4 0
Poisonous Chemicals 1.5 X10-4 0
Molten Solids 1.5 X10-4 0
Ammonium Nitrate 0 7.0 X10-8
72
Table 22 – Accident Frequencies & Release Probabilities by Ship Type
Port Type Release Releases Releases Releases Releases Fires (per Fires (per
per per per per Impact per Fire Visit) km)
Collision Grounding Striking
Crude Tanker 3.0 x 10-1 4.5 x 10-2 1.5 x 10-1 6.0 x 10-2 ---- ---- ----
Product 3.0 x 10-1 9.0 x 10-2 1.5 x 10-1 6.0 x 10-2 ---- ---- ----
Tanker
Chemical 1.0 x 10-1 4.5 x 10-2 7.5 x 10-2 3.0 x 10-2 ---- ---- ----
Tanker
Pressurized 5.6 x 10-2 1.5 x 10-2 5.2 x 10-2 1.0 x 10-3 7.2 x 10-4 9.4 x 10-5 2.8 x 10-6
Gas
Semi Ref Gas 5.6 x 10-2 1.5 x 10-2 5.2 x 10-2 1.0 x 10-3 7.2 x 10-4 9.4 x 10-5 2.8 x 10-6
Refrigerated 3.0 x 10-2 1.5 x 10-2 1.9 x 10-2 1.0 x 10-3 7.2 x 10-4 3.2 x 10-4 1.0 x 10-5
Gas
Assumptions:
Collision release probability is conditional on being struck when loaded.
Grounding release is conditional on being loaded in a port of average rockiness.
Striking release probability is conditional on being loaded.
73
8.1.2 Traffic Levels

In order to calculate the collision and striking frequencies, the annual
numbers of ships moving in the approach channel and past the berth must
be estimated. This is achieved here by distinguishing two types of
terminal.
 A riverside terminal. Here all ships visiting terminals further
upstream and approximately half of the ships visiting the terminal
under consideration will pass the berth in each direction. In the
approach channel, a ship approaching a berth of the terminal may
expect to encounter at least al the ships visiting its terminal and
those upstream. This neglects the possibility of encountering ships
visiting terminals downstream, but it is necessary simplification.
 A terminal in an enclosed basin. Here, a ship at the berth is
protected from ships passing to terminals upstream, and at most
only half of the ships visiting that terminal will pass the berth.
However, in the approach channel the same number of encounters
may be expected as for ships approaching a riverside terminal.
8.1.3 Collisions
The collisions frequency is assumed proportional to the number of
encounters made in a movement from sea to berth or from berth to sea. An
encounter is defined as two moving ships passing within 0.5 nautical miles
(0.9 km) of each other. The number of encounters per km in transit is
estimated to be:
Encounters per km = visits per yr X 2 X 7.7 X10-6 X Traffic Control Factor
Where:
Visits per year = total number of ships arriving at the port = 639 Nos
(Commodity Wise Performance Indicators – April 07 to March 08 Provided
by Traffic Department – Annexure 1))
Traffic control = proportion of encounters which are not eliminated by the
factor ports traffic control procedures.
The traffic control factor is taken as follows:
 For ports with one – way traffic – 0.0 i.e no head – on encounters
within the port.
 For ports with radar – based VTMS controlling two – way traffic 0.6
i.e a 40% reduction in collisions.
 For ports with VHF (Very High Frequency) – based VTMS
controlling two – way traffic 0.7 i.e a 30% reduction in collisions.
74
 For ports with radar – based VTMS controlling two – way traffic
with prohibited passing of hazardous ships 7.5 X10-4. This reduction
only applies to ships covered by the prohibited passing rule. For
others, the factor is 0.6 as above.
 For ports with no control of hazardous ships – 1.0
NMPT is equipped with radar – based VTMS controlling two – way traffic.
Hence traffic control factor is taken as 0.6 i.e. a 40% reduction in
collisions.
Encounters per km = 639 per yr X 2 X 7.7 X10-6 X 0.6
Encounters Per km = 5.9 X10-3
The number of collisions per km in transit is:

Collisions per km = Collisions per encounter x Encounters per km
Collisions per km = 5.0 X10-4 x 5.9 X10-3
Collisions Per km = 2.95 X10-6
Assuming that the collision rate is the same when loaded as when empty
and noting that only one of the two ships involved in a collision will be
struck, the number of hazardous collisions per loaded km is half the
number of collisions per km. A hazardous collision is one in which a loaded
vessel is stuck by another vessel while under – way.
Hence
Hazardous collisions per loaded km = Collisions per km x 0.5
Hazardous collisions per loaded km = 2.95 X10-6 X 0.5
Hazardous collisions per loaded km = 1.475 X10-6
The frequency of releases per km is transit is:

Releases per hazardous collision for NMPT is have been taken as average
of all the four products mentioned below (Refer Table 21)
Port Type Release per Collision

Crude Tanker 3.0 x 10-1
Product Tanker 3.0 x 10-1
75
Port Type Release per Collision

Chemical Tanker 1.0 x 10-1
Pressurized Gas 5.6 x 10-2
Average 1.89 x 10-1
Releases per loaded km = Releases per hazardous collision x Hazardous

collisions per loaded km
Releases per loaded km = 1.475 X10-6 X 1.89 X10-1
Releases per loaded km = 2.787 X10-7
8.1.4 Strikings
The proportion of time during which a berth is occupied by a ship is:
Berth occupancy = Berth visits per year x Hour of Berth per visit
Hour per year
Note: (Assumed that ship unloading for LPG will take 3 days)
Berth occupancy = 639 x 72 hours
8760 hours
Berth Occupancy = 5.25
The number of movements past the ship is then:

Movement past ship per visit = Movement past berth per year x
Berth occupancy
Berth Visits per Year
Note: (Considered that ship movements passing Berth 10, 11, 12 & 13 will
be applicable for Crude & POL products only since LPG ships will Berth at
No 9 and will not pass any other Berths)
Movement past ship per visit = 408 (As per commodity – wise performance
indicators April 2007 to March 2008 (Provided by Traffic Department –
Details enclosed in Annexure)) x 5.25 / 639
Movement Past ship per visit = 3.35
The frequency of Striking is:
76
Striking per visit = Striking per passing movement x Movements past ship
per visit x Striking control factor.
Striking per visit = 4 X10-6 x 3.35 x 0.6
Striking per visit = 8.04 X10-6
Striking per passing movement are given in the above Table 19 according
to Accident Frequencies by Port Type.
The striking control factor is taken as follows:
 For ports with radar – based VTMS implementing control zones
around hazardous cargo ships – 0.6 i.e a 40% reduction in strikings.
 For ports with speed limits of 6 knots or below passing hazardous
jetties - 0.7 i.e. an empirical 30% reduction in striking.
 For other ports – 1.0
The number of releases per visit is:
Releases per Striking collision for NMPT is have been taken as average of
all the four products mentioned below (Refer Table 21)
Port Type Release per Striking

Crude Tanker 1.5 x 10-1
Product Tanker 1.5 x 10-1
Chemical Tanker 7.5 x 10-2
Pressurized Gas 5.2 x 10-2
Average 1.06 x 10-1
Releases per visit = Releases per striking x Striking per visit.

Releases per visit = 1.06 x 10-1 x 8.04 X10-6
Releases per visit =8.52 x 10-7
8.2 Results of Release Frequencies arising out Collisions /

Strikings of Ships at NMPT
Collision Release Frequency Striking Release Frequency

(Releases per loaded km) (Releases per year)
2.787 X10-7 8.52 x 10-7
77
9 ANNEXURES
9.1 Commodity Wise Performance Indicators – April 07 to March
08 Provided by Traffic Department
78
9.2 Naphtha – MSDS
Sr. No C.A.S.NO. CHEMICAL HAZARD CLASSIFICATION

NAME
.N-1 8030-31-7 NAPHTHA FLAMMABLE - Y T0XIC - N CORROSIVE - N
SAFETY RELATED PROPERTIES
FLASH U.E.L. L.E.L. SPECIFIC GRAVITY WATER PHYSICAL STATE AT

POINT (%V/V) SOLUBILITY STORAGE CONDITION
0C (%V/V)
41.6 5 0.8 LIQUID VAPOUR NO LIQUID
0.86 N.A.
Nh =0 Nf =3 Nr = 0 IDLH, =10000 TLV = N.A. REACTIVITY WITH WATER

(ppm) (ppm)
HEALTH HAZARD DATA
INHALATION INGESTION SKIN EYES
EFFECTS Primary narcotic, If Swallowed Irritation Irritation
causing causes nausea or
unconsciousness in high vomiting
concentrations. The
symptoms of acute
benzene poisoning are
not likely, since the
compound has
components other than
benzene.
EMERGENCY Remove the victim from Do not induce wash with the plenty wash with the plenty
MEASURES exposed area. Support vomiting of water for 15 of water for 15 mins.
respiration. mins.Remove Seek medical aid
contaminated clothes immediately.
and shoes.
P.P.E.s Provide Hydorcarbon Plastic Gloves Face Shield
Vapour Canister
EMERGENCY / FIRST AID MEASURES

COMBUSTION PRODUCTS N.A.
FIRE FIGHTING Foam, Carbon Dioxide, D.C.P.
FIRST AID / ANTIDOTES Antidotes not available
SPILL CONTROL MEASURES For Small Sprilling absorb on earth and sand.
79
9.3 Kerosene – MSDS

C.A.S.NO. CHEMICAL HAZARD CLASSIFICATION
Sr. No NAME
K1 KEROSENE FLAMMABLE - Y T0XIC - N CORROSIVE - N

POINT (%V/V) (%V/V) SOLUBILITY STORAGE
0C CONDITION
>38 6.0 0.7 LIQUID VAPOUR NO LIQUID
0.8 4.5
Nh = 0 Nf =2 Nr=0 IDLH=N.A. TLV=N.A. REACTIVITY WITH WATER
NO
HEALTH HAZARD DATA
EFFECTS Cause headache, dizziness, If swallowed, it Irritant
nausea, anaemia and causes irritation of
bronchitis. mouth, throat,
nausea, vomiting,
drowsiness and
respiratory
disturbances.
EMERGENCY If vapors are inhaled in high Wash the If kerosene comes
MEASURES concentration, remove the affected parts of contact with eyes,
victim from the contaminated the body with flush them
atmosphere to fresh air and soap and water. immediately with
secure medical attention. large quantities of
water.
P.P.E.s Personnel should also be Rubber hand Chemical safety
provided with rescue gloves, goggles (gas-
harness, life-line and self- protective face tight)
contained breathing shield
apparatus to permit safe
escape, in case of emergency
Mechanical exhaust
ventilation should be
provided for tank cleaning.
COMBUSTION -
PRODUCTS
FIRE FIGHTING Small fires involving kerosene can be extinguished using foam, Dry Powder or Carbon
Dioxide extinguishers. Fires involving built storage of kerosene can be controlled using
foam or water spray by trained fire fighting personnel. They should be made aware of
hazards of kerosene and should be provided with protective equipment during fire fighting.
FIRST AID / Seek immediate medical help.

ANTIDOTES
SPILL CONTROL Spilled kerosene should never be left unattended. Shut off all sources of ignition. Use
MEASURES protective clothing while handling large kerosene spillages and leaks. Flush spills with a
large quantity of water, and ventilate the area till odor is eliminated completely.
80
9.4 High Speed Diesel Oil – MSDS

NAME
H1 HIGH FLAMMABLE -Y T0XIC - N CORROSIVE - N
SPEED
DIESEL OIL
POINT (%V/ (%V/V SOLUBILITY STORAGE
0C V) ) CONDITION
71 13.5 6.0 LIQUID VAPOUR NO LIQUID
<1 -
Nh = 1 Nf = 1 Nr = 0 IDLH, = TLV=N.A. REACTIVITY WITH WATER
N.A. NO
HEALTH HAZARD DATA
EFFECTS Harmful Irritation. Repeated Irritation
contact may cause
dermatitis.
EMERGENCY Remove contaminated Flush eyes with plenty of
MEASURES clothing. Wash water for at least 10 min.
affected skin with soap
and water
P.P.E.s Use PVC or rubber Goggles
gloves
COMBUSTION
PRODUCTS
FIRE FIGHTING Fire extinguishing by foam or dry agent such as dry chemical powder and CO2
FIRST AID / Seek immediate medical help. Treat symptomatically.

ANTIDOTES
SPILL CONTROL Stop leak, if safe to do so. Contain spillage. Absorb in sand or earth for disposal.
MEASURES Eliminate all sources of ignition. Use personal protective equipment. Cordon off the area.
Stay upwind.
81
9.5 Furnace Oil – MSDS

NAME
F1 -(Mixture) FURNACE FLAMMABLE-Y T0XIC - N CORROSIVE - N
OIL

POINT (%V/V (%V/V SOLUBILITY STORAGE CONDITION
0C ) )
>66 - - LIQUID VAPOUR NO LIQUID
0.95 >1
Nh = 1 Nf = 1 Nr = 0 IDLH, = N.A. TLV =N.A. REACTIVITY WITH
WATER
NO
HEALTH HAZARD DATA
EFFECTS Irritation to upper Harmful. Irritation. Irritation
respiratory tract Repeated
contact may
cause
dermatitis.
EMERGENCY Move victim to Have victim drink Remove Flush eyes with plenty of
MEASURES fresh air. Give water or milk. Do contaminated water for at least 10 min.
artificial not induce clothing. Wash
respiration, if vomiting affected skin
breathing has with soap and
stopped. water
P.P.E.s Breathing Use PVC or Goggles
apparatus if rubber gloves
required.
COMBUSTION -
PRODUCTS
Fire extinguishing by water fog, alcohol resistant foam or dry agent such as with dry
FIRE FIGHTING chemical powder and CO2.
FIRST AID / Seek immediate medical help. No specific antidote. Treat symptomatically.
ANTIDOTES
SPILL CONTROL Stop leak, if safe to do so. Contain spillage. Absorb in sand or earth for disposal.
MEASURES Eliminate all sources of ignition. Use personal protective equipment. Cordon off the
area. Stay upwind.
82
9.6 Motor Spirit (Petrol) – MSDS

NAME
M5 8006-61-9 MOTOR FLAMMABLE T0XIC -Y CORROSIVE -Y
SPIRIT(PETROL) -Y

FLASH U.E.L L.E.L. SPECIFIC GRAVITY WATER PHYSICAL STATE AT
POINT . (%V/V SOLUBILITY STORAGE CONDITION
0C (%V/ )
V)
-45 7.4 1.4 LIQUID VAPOUR NO LIQUID
0.731 5.4
Nh = 1 Nf = 3 Nr = 0 IDLH, = N.A. TLV = 500 ppm REACTIVITY WITH WATER
NO
HEALTH HAZARD DATA
EFFECTS Mildly toxic. May May irritate. May irritate.
cause Repeated contact
hallucinations, may cause
CNS depression, dermatitis.
asphyxia and
pulmonary edema
(which may be
fatal).
EMERGENCY Move victim to Have victim drink Remove Flush eyes with plenty of
MEASURES fresh air. Give water or milk. Do contaminated water for atleast 10 min.
artificial not induce clothing. Wash
respiration, if vomiting affected skin with
breathing has soap and water
stopped.
P.P.E.s Breathing Use PVC or rubber Goggles
apparatus if gloves
required.
COMBUSTION Oxides of lead.
PRODUCTS
Foam or dry agent such as with dry chemical powder and CO2
FIRE FIGHTING
FIRST AID / Seek immediate medical help. No specific antidote. Treat symptomatically.
ANTIDOTES
SPILL CONTROL Stop leak, if safe to do so. Contain spillage. Absorb in sand or earth for disposal. Eliminate
MEASURES all sources of ignition. Use personal protective equipment. Cordon off the area. Stay
upwind.
83
9.7 Liquefied Petroleum Gas – MSDS

NAME
L2 LIQUIFIED FLAMMABLE - Y T0XIC - Y CORROSIVE - N
PETROLEUM
GAS

POINT (%V/V) (%V/V) SOLUBILITY STORAGE CONDITION
0C
Propane Propane= Propane LIQUID VAPOUR NO LIQUID
= -104.4, 9.5, = 2.2,
Butane= Butane= Butane= 0.51- 1.5
-60 8.4 1.6 0.58
Nh = 1 Nf = 4 Nr = 0 IDLH, = TLV = 1000 ppm REACTIVITY WITH WATER
19,000 ppm
NO
HEALTH HAZARD DATA

EFFECTS Concentration in air
greater than 10%, cause
dizziness in a few minutes,
1% concentrations give
the same symptom in 10
min. High concentrations
cause asphyxiation.
EMERGENCY Remove victim from
MEASURES exposure and apply
artificial respiration.
Guard against self-injury
if confused.
P.P.E.s Self contained breathing
apparatus for high vapor
concentration
COMBUSTION -
PRODUCTS
FIRE FIGHTING Allow to burn while cooling adjacent equipment with water spray. Extinguish small fires
with dry chemical powder. Water not to be used.
FIRST AID / Seek immediate medical help.

ANTIDOTES
SPILL CONTROL Stop discharge if possible. Keep people away. Shut-off ignition sources and call fire
MEASURES department. Stay upwind and use water spray to 'knock down' vapor. Evacuate area if
large discharge. Avoid contact with Liquid.
84

QRA Report for New Mangalore Port Analyzes Risks

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Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Berth No: 13 & 14

New Mangalore Port

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Report for For

New Mangalore Port Petroleum Oil Lubricants

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 2

6.1.3 Transfer Spills while unloading from ships ................................................................................................ 42

7.6.1 Formula used for Calculation of Impact Distance (D) =

Figure 1 – Over view of New Mangalore Port ................................................................................................... 7

Table 1 – NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port................................................................................................... 18

ALARP : As Low As Reasonably Practicable

NMPT : New Mangalore Port Trust

Acceptance : Defines the level of risk to which an individual is

Frequency : This is the number of occurrences of an event

2.2 Objective and Scope

2.3 Risk Assessment and Methodology

Step 3: Determination of probabilities for immediate and delayed ignition

2.4 Risk Assessment Results and Conclusions:

Maximum Tolerable Risk for : 10-3 fatalities per

2.4.1 Individual Risk Contour Berth No 13

2.4.2 Societal Risk Contour F N Curve

3.1.2 Location - Latitude :12o 55' N, Longitude:74o 48' E

Figure 1 – Over view of New Mangalore Port

3.1.3 Metrological Data

Temperature Max : 34oC

The predominant direction of waves in the vicinity of New Mangalore Port

Figure 2 – Storms / Cyclones

Thus risk exposure can be considered as moderate.

The tidal particulars at New Mangalore Port are as follows

Higher High water springs : +1.68 m chart datum

3.2 Important Features of the Port

Water Spread : 320 acres (129 hectares)

3.2.2 Entrance Channel

Length : 7500 meters

3.2.3 Berth Particulars

Sr Name of Type of Berth Draught Length DWT (In

14 General General Cargo 14.00 350 90000

3.2.4 Details of Storage Tanks containing Hazardous Chemicals

Sr Owner/ Nos. Total Liquid Stored Remarks

3.2.5 Open Stack Yard

Sr.No. Area Capacity

3.3 Population Data (Approximate)

Sr. No. Location No. of

SL Product Berth Line Temp in Length of the Unloadin Unloading

3.4.1.1 Salient Features of the Proposed Oil Jetty

 Design Ship – 1,50,000DWT

3.4.2 Berth No: 14

4 DOW’S FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX & NFPA

F & EI Range Degree of Hazard

> 158 Severe

4.1 Ranking of Chemical Hazards

Table 1 – NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port

Table 2 – Explanation of NFPA Classification

4.1.1 Health Hazard Factor (Nh)

0 Material which on exposure under fire conditions would

2 Material which on intense or continued but not chronic

4.1.2 Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf)

0 Materials that will not burn.

2 Material must be moderately heated or exposed to

4.1.3 Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nr)

0 Material that in itself is normally stable, even under fire