POLITICAL LAW DIGEST:

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

GR. NO. L-75697. June 18, 1987

FACTS:

This case is premised on a petition filed by TIO, on behalf of himself and purportedly of other
videogram operators assailing the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled an Act creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

Section 10 of the said law, levies a tax at the rate of 30% of the purchase price or rental rate for every
sale, lease, or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program.

The attack on the constitutionality of the law is premised on the following:

ISSUES:

1. WON the imposition of 30% tax on gross receipts is a RIDER and not germane to the subject
matter of the law
2. WON tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive, and unlawful restraint of trade in violation
of due process
3. WON there is undue delegation of legislative power and authority under Section 11 of the law
4. WON Section 15 of the Decree is an ex post facto law
5. WON there is over regulation of the video industry

HELD: Petition is DENIED.

1. Petitioner’s contention that tax provision of the Decree is a RIDER is without merit. The
foregoing provision is allied and germane to and is reasonably necessary for the establishment
of and general object of the Decree which is regulation of the video industry through Videogram
Regulatory Board as expressed in the title. It is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the Decree. The express purpose of the Decree to include
taxation of the video industry to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of
videograms, which are evident in the Preambular clauses of the Decree.

2. The tax imposed by the Decree is not only regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted
by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around 600 million pesos per
annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the government of additional source
of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available
for public viewing. It is similar to 30% amusement tax borne by movie-industry which theater
owners pay to government but which is passed on to entire cost of admission ticket, thus
shifting the burden to the buying or viewing public. It is imposed uniformly on all videogram
operators.

It was for public purpose imposed primarily for the need to regulate the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and
the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the Decree to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
3. There is no undue delegation of legislative power. The authority of the Board (VRB) to solicit
direct assistance of other agencies of the government and deputize heads or personnel thereof
to perform enforcement functions of the Board is not a delegation of power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to execution, enforcement and
implementation of the law. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority as to
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first, cannot be done; to
the latter, no valid objection can be made.

4. The Decree is not violative of ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is, among other
categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense."
Section 15 of the Decree provide as follows:

“All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five
(45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a
permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the
BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other
technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person
engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the
BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession
of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.”

As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953]
at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-
641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of
proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience".

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection
between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is
violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the
DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is,
therefore, neither retrospective in character.

5. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being
eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for
its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber
of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video
tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
 activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit
and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

GARCIA VS. MATA

NO. L-33713. July 30, 1075

FACTS:

Garcia was a reserved officer with a rank of Captain on active duty with the AFP until his reversion to
inactive status on November 15, 1960.From November 15, 1960 of inactive status, Garcia was no
longer receiving any emolument from the AFP nor was he employed in any capacity.

On July 11, 1956, when Republic Act 1600 aka Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines took effect, and while in active status, Garcia had an accumulated active commissioned
service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the armed forces.

Section 11 of RA 1600 according to Garcia prohibits his reversion to inactive status for having
accumulated at least 10 years of commissioned service. The said provision is quoted as follows:

After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of
five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except those
whose military and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the
needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be
reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their
request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at
least five of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's
authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active
commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under
the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a
tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who
are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the
appropriations authorized in this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any
provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable
since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose
of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National Defense shall render a
quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp. 892-
893, RA 1600) (emphasis supplied)

Garcia filed an action for Mandamus and recovery of sums of money in CFI of Quezon City against
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the AFP to compel them to reinstate him to active
commissioned service, to readjust his rank and to pay all emoluments due him from the time of
reversion to inactive status.

The Court denied the petition declaring Section 15 of RA 1600, invalid, unconstitutional and
inoperative. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES:

WON Section 15 of RA 1600 is unconstitutional and therefore inoperative

HELD:

Petition is DENIED.

A perusal of the challenged provision of RA 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the appropriation act as a whole. Incongruity and irrelevancy of the
very first clause of paragraph 11 itself is already evident. First clause is quoted as follows:

“After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of
five consecutive years:”

While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-
1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to
active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and
irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general
appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the
Appropriation Act.

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly
connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every
fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislative
enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus,
in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane
to that general subject." The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation
of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted
subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the
body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy
matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such
provision is inoperative and of no effect.
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being
unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it is as though it
has never been passed

PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS

No. L-10405. December 29, 1960

FACTS:

Wenceslao Pascual in his capacity as Governor of Rizal brought the action for declaratory relief and
injunction on the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for
Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of
P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder
road terminals.

The same feeder roads consisting of 4 parcels of land are projected and planned subdivision roads,
not yet constructed within San Antonio subdivision. These are also private properties and do not
connect to any government property or any important premises to the main highway.

At the time the law was approved, the properties are owned by respondent Jose Zulueta who was
then a member of the Senate.

The alleged Deed of Donation in favor of the government for the said feeder roads was executed only
on December 15, 1953.

ISSUES:

WON the appropriation contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals is
constitutional, and valid.

HELD:

Decision appealed from the lower court dismissing the action filed by Pascual is REVERSED.

The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval,
not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation
infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when
the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was
approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953
(see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and hence, was null and void. The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after
the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned
basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration
of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994

FACTS:

This case arose from the enactment of Republic Act No. 7716 which seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code.

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the
House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the
Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President
signed into law. According to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic
Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on
the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill
on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee
which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No.
11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy
of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees."

The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
(VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was
thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2,
1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994,
signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716

ISSUES:

a) WON RA 7716 was passed in compliance with Section 24 and 26 Article VI of the 1987
constitution quoted below:

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
 b) WON conference committee has power to enact entirely new bill
c) WON RA 7716 is valid

HELD:

a) This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill —
which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. Xxx At this
point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also
to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills
in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize
its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different.
We are dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives." The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It
is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing
the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such non-
legislative power by the Senate.

The power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with
respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the
other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from
the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two
are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply
dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days
before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very
premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is
certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed
with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring
immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and
distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a
law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-
President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening
of Congress in emergency session.

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate
days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.

b) As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has
been explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any
material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the
problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The
versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the
only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
Senate bills.

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid
as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted
as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

c) Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that
a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval
had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the
printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal
branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.