TORTS AND DAMAGES (15%)
Preliminaries:
Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
1. Torts
a. Articles 1156, 1157, 1170, 1173, 2176
Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or
not to do. (n)
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph
2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
1
i. REGINO vs PANGASINAN COLLEGES; GR
No. 156109, nov 18, 2005
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a
reciprocal contract. The students agree to abide by the
standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued
usually in the form of manuals that are distributed to the
enrollees at the start of the school term. Further, the school
informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay.
Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a student, vary
the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other than
those it specified upon enrolment.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year
computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
 During her second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
was enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Repondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad (her
teachers)
 the college arranged a fund raising campaign called “Rave
Party and Dance Revolution”. The proceeds of this dance
will be used to construct the school’s tennis and volleyball
courts.
 Everyone was required to buy at least two tickets priced at
100 pesos each. those who did not buy will not be allowed
to take the final exams.
 Khristine, having no money and religious restrictions,
refused to buy the tickets.
 Thus on the examination dates, she was not allowed by her
two teachers, Gamurot and Balalad, to take her final exam
on statistics and logic.
 The next day, the teacher announced to the whole class
that khristine and another student was not permitted to
take the exam because of the failure to buy the tickets then
subsequently ejected the two from class.
 Khristine continued to plead with the teachers to allow her
but they kept their stand and defended their position
saying that they were complying with PCST’s policy.
 Khristine filed in the RTC as a pauper litigant against
PCST and her two teachers for damages.
 The respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the
khristine’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as
they are contending that the case should’ve been filed in
the CHED (commission of higher education) and not in the
RTC
 Khristine on the other hand says that prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her
action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for
damages arising from respondents breach of the laws on
human relations
 RTC
o The RTC dismissed the complaint for the lack of cause
of action. It said that considering the case was
between a school, two teachers and a student, CHED
has jurisdiction over the case and not RTC. And it
dismissed the case for the lack of cause of action
without explaining their ground.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is applicable
2. W/N the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
HELD:
1. Yes
The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the
present case because the petitioner was not asking for the
reversal of the policies of the PCST neither was she demanding
that the school allow her to take the final examinations
(considering that she was already enrolled in a different school).
The acts of the respondent can no longer be reversed and even if
it was reversed, it would not be adequate to redress her
grievances
The Supreme Court also held that the doctrine can only
be applied when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Thus
in the case at bar, the CHED does not have the power to award
damages to the petitioner.
And lastly, the doctrine cannot be applied when the
issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The petitioner’s action for damages calls for the
application of the Civil Code which falls within the jurisdiction
of the courts.
2. Yes
a. Breach of Action
In the case of Alcuaz v. PSBA, the court characterized
the relationship between the school and the student as a
contract, where the student, once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester. And in a succeeding case
(Non v. Dames), the court ruled that it is not merely for one
semester but an entire period that the student is expected to
complete it. Thus it can be seen that when it comes to the court,
the relationship between the school and the student is
contractual in nature.
Being that the relationship is reciprocal, where the
school would be providing the education while the student will
be abiding by the rules and regulations of the school. The terms
of the contract are defined at the moment of its inception- upon
enrollment of the student. Thus it is in practice that the
student makes a down payment at the beginning of the
semester and succeeding payments paid before every
preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to
pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for
the school to deny them the opportunity to take these
examinations.
In the present case, the PCST imposed a revenue
raising measure in the middle of the semester. It made the
financial contribution of the student as a condition for the
students to take their final examinations which ultimately is
translated to the recognition of their ability to finish the course.
Considering that the fee was not part of the student-school
contract entered into at the start of the year, it cannot be
unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
It should be noted that the student-school contract is
not an ordinary one and is imbued with public interest
considering that it is protected by the constitution and by a
legislative act called the Education Act of 1982.
(The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first,
breach of contract; and second, liability for tort)
b. Liability for Tort
2
In her complaint, Khristine wrote that she was
inhumanly punished by reason only of their poverty, religious
practice or lowly station I life which inculcated feelings of guilt,
disgrace and unworthiness and as a result she was unable to
finish her subjects for the second semester and had to lag her
studies for a full year. The acts caused her extreme humiliation
and mental agony and she asks for compensation as the
respondents violated Article 19, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code.
The court held that generally, tort arises only between
parties not otherwise bound by a contract. But in the case of
PSBA vs. CA an academic institution may be held liable for tort
even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the
act that violated the contract may also be a tort.
We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from which we quote:
x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It
is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-
airlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a
contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
x x x This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early
as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v.
Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated
thus: x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21
x x x.
The Respondent CANNOT use the right to academic
freedom as a defense because According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED
 b. Defenses: Articles 2177-2179
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also
applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded
i. CALALAS vs CA GR No. 122039 May 31 2000
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took
a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension
seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the
rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages
against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by
the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as
a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-
party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck.
ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to
rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer
of the safety of its passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?
RULING:
No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused
to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case
is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party, obligation is created
by law itself)
3
Breach of contract / culpa contractual
1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor (here, the common
carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination
3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it isthe basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecutedmerely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this casethe common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination. In case ofdeath or injuries
to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
commoncarriers are presumed to have been at fault or have
acted negligently unless theyproved that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755
ofthe Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof. Itis immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and thetruck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause
isapplicable only in action for quasidelict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. Thedoctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
betweenhim and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not
exercise utmost diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
2. Overloading of passengers.
ii. JARCO MAREKTING CORPORATION vs CA GR
No. 129792 Dec 21 1999
JARCO MARKETING CORP. V. CA
G.R. No. 129792
December 21, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the
owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati
City. Petitioners are Leonardo Kong (store branch
manager), Jose Tiope (operations manager) and Elisa
Panelo (supervisor). Private respondents are spouses and
the parents of the 6-year old Zhieneth Aguilar.
 On 9 May 1983, while Criseldawas signing her
credit card slip at the payment and verification counter at
the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked
behind her and saw her daughter,Zhieneth, on the floor,
crying for help, her young body pinned by the bulk of the
stores gift-wrapping counter. Criselda immediately asked
help from the people around and Zhieneth was quickly
rushed to the Makati Medical Center. However, 14 days
after the accident, she died due to the critical and severe
injuries she sustained.
Respondents demanded upon petitioners the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and
funeral expenses. Petitioners refused to pay.Respondents
filed a complaint for damages, asserting that:
(1)Zhieneth should be entitled to the conclusive
presumption that a child below 9 years is incapable of
contributory negligence; (2) Zhienethhad a small frame,
thus it was physically impossible for her to have propped
herself on the counter; (3) Gerardo Gonzales, a former
employee of the storewho accompanied Zhieneth when she
was brought to the emergency room, testified that
Zhieneth said that “I did not come near the counter and
the counter just fell on me”. Hence, this testimony should
be considered as part of res gestae and accorded credit; (4)
Criselda is not negligent for it was reasonable for her to
have let go of Zhienethwhen she was signing the credit
card slip; (5) the proximate cause of Zhieneth’s death, was
petitioners’ negligence in failing to institute measures.
Petitioners denied any liability for the injuries
and consequent death of Zhieneth, arguingthat:
(1)Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence
over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in
a store filled with glassware and appliances; (2) Zhieneth
was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the
counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her; (3) the
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support
and it never collapsed since its construction; (4)petitioner
Jarco Marketing Corp. observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection, supervision and control
of its employees; (5) other petitioners also claimed to have
exercised due care and diligence; (6) Zhieneth’s death was
an accident; (6) the criminal casefor homicide through
simple negligence filed by respondents against the
petitioners was dismissed;(7) since the action was based
on tort, negligence on the part of the respondents would
negate their claim for damages, where said negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury sustained; (8) since
Gonzales was already separated from Syvels, his
testimony is doubtful.
Based on preponderance of evidence, the RTC
dismissed the complaint in favor the petitioners, ruling
that: (1) the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on
Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it; (2) Criselda’s
negligence also contributed to Zhieneth’s accident; (3) the
counter was not an attractive nuisance.
Upon respondents’ appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC, finding that: (1)petitioners were negligent in
maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.1; (2) two
former employees of petitioners had already reported to
1 The counter was shaped like an invertedL. Its top was heavy
and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly
distributed.
4
the management the matter, but the latter ignored it;(3)
Zhieneth, who was below 7 years old was absolutely
incapable of negligence or other tort, since even a child
under 9 years could not be held liable for an intentional
wrong. CA awarded the respondents actual damages for
the hospitalization expenses and compensatory damages
for the death of Zhieneth, but it denied an award for
funeral expenses.Petitioners filed this petition before SC.
ISSUES:
(1) W/Nthe death of Zhieneth was attributable to the
negligence of the petitioners.
(2) W/N Zhieneth is had contributory negligence to the
incident.
(3) W/N Criselda is had contributory negligence to the
incident.
HELD:
(1) YES, the death of Zhieneth was due to the
negligence of the petitioners. On one hand, an accident
pertains to an unforeseen event, an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to
whom it happens. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused
by fault of any person and which could not have been
prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do.It is the
failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance, which the circumstances demand, whereby
other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence
cannot exist together.
The court gave credence to the testimony of
Gonzales, pertaining to Zhieneth’s statement formed part
of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.2 Matters relating to declarations of pain or
suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All that
is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be uttered under the influence of a
startling event before the declarant had the time to think
and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who
testified in court. In this case,it is unthinkable for
Zhienethto have lied that time.
2Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
 Also, petitioner Panelo and another store
supervisor failed to exercise due diligence required
of a good father of a family, since they were already
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
counter, yet, they did not ensure the safety of the stores
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have done.
(2) NO, Zhieneth is not guilty of contributory
negligence to the incident. The court applied the
conclusive presumption that children below 9 years old are
incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute
contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she
climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if
we accept petitioners’ theory that the counter was stable
and sturdy. It was found that the counter was not durable.
Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base
was not secured.
(3) NO,Criseldais not liable for contributory
negligence to the incident. Initially, Zhieneth held on
to Criseldas waist, later to the latters hand. Criselda
momentarily released the child’s hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for Criselda to let go
of her child. Also, whenZhieneth was pinned down by the
counter, she was just near her mother and did not loiter.
She even admitted to the doctor that she did not do
anything; the counter just fell on her.
The petition herein is DENIED and the CA decision is
AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.
iii. TAYLOR vs THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD
GR No. L- 4977 March 22, 1910
FACTS:
 September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed
the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of
visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine
 After leaving the power house where they had asked for
Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in
the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
 they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground
 These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of
small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long
thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the
use of electricity
 They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power
 the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick,
of which each took end, and carried them home
 After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less
than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home
5
 The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
 trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no
result
 break the cap with a stone - failed
 opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was
filled with a yellowish substance they got matches
 David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to
the contents
 An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries
to all three
 Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the
contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run
away, received a slight cut in the neck
 Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
 David was struck in the face by several particles of the
metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an
extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
 Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable
RULING
- It is clear that the accident could not have happened and
not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point
where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due
care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is
equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured
had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered
upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant,
and had he not picked up and carried away the property of
the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he
not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and
applied a match to its contents.
- We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs.
Stout (supra). Applied to the case now before us, they
require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of
negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it
in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden
all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes
merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On
the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit
its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual
approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its
slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of
the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew
that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality
and playing around the shaft house in the immediate
vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety
of these children would have suggested that they were in
danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of
which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain
prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might
accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the
circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard
to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to
see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a
trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose
protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.
- In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that
if a man dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his own
ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another,
that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his
neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their
instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his
 neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an
action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing
the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he
can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?"
What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is
there between an express license to the children of this
village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of
its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from the
habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or
warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or
pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen,
Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence,
volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a
barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land
liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat,
so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct,
might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt
him from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed
and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that
his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to
intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might
thereby be killed or maimed for life.
 while we hold that the entry upon the property without
express invitation or permission would not have relieved
Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
of the injury received
 cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of
the resultant injuries inflicted
 Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries
thus incurred
 2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as
a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he
took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical
drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after
his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical
draftsman and continued in that employment for 6 months
at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy
of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature
both mentally and physically than most boys of 15
 The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by Jessie who even ran
away
 True, he may not have known and probably did not know
the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected
from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he
did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would
be going far to say that "according to his maturity and
capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone
else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred
by him under such circumstances.
 The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said
to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so
as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due
care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and
indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so
to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
6
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor
to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences
 he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be
held to have been the direct and immediate result of his
own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true
that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury
iv. NIKKO HOTEL vs REYES GR No. 154259 Feb 28
2005
Facts: Roberto Reyes aka as the actor “Amay Bisaya” was a
gate crasher in an exclusive birthday party of the manager of
Nikko Hotel. He claimed that he was asked to leave the party in
an scandalous manner by the organizer Ruby Lim, resulting to
his humiliation and embarrassment. Because of his alleged
cause of action he asked the Court for damages under Article 19
(Principle of Abuse of Power) and Article 21, which he alleged
were violated by Ruby Lim with the solidary liability of Lim’s
employer, Nikko Hotel Manila.
Issues:
1. WoN Ruby Lim violated the said provisions
entitling Reyes to damages.
2. Won Nikko Hotel is solidarily liable with her as her
employer.
Held:
1. No. Ruby Lim did not violate the provisions. Since
the lower court and and appellate court were in disagreement
as to the facts, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to
determine which version is credible. It sided with the lower
court’s version and concluded that Lim was not liable because of
the following findings:
a. Reyes himself admitted that when he was asked to leave,
Ruby Lim was so close to him to a point that they “almost
kissed,” suggesting that Lim observed proper decorum as to
avoid being heard by other people to the embarrassment of
Reyes. The claim of Reyes that he was escorted by the
police is not because of Lim’s orders to get him out of the
party but because of how he reacted when discreetly told to
do so. Hence,not violating Article 19 on Abuse of Power.
b. Reyes failed to show that Lim was driven by animosity
when she asked him to leave, For the record that incident
was the first time when they actually met. Also, the
contestation of Reyes that Lim is an old maid who has
"very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes)
possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the
hotel with foreign businessmen” leading to such animosity
is so lame an argument which cannot merit any
consideration. Hence, not violating Article 21.
2. No. Nikko Hotel is not liable upon the finding that
Lim is not guilty.

Doctrines:
1. Article 19 (Abuse of Power) is not a panacea for all human
hurts and social grievances. when "a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be responsible."The object of this article, therefore, is to set
certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties. These standards are the following: act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages
is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article
20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Hence, Reyes
invoked Article 21. (Refer below).
2. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
Under Articles 19 and 21 the nature of the act to be
able to claim damages must be intentional. It has been
proven in the case, however, the Lim’s acts were otherwise.
3. Doctrine of Violenti Non Fit Injuria (“to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) pertains
to the self-inflicted injury which will not entitle a person
for damages because of the very fact that it in the first
place it was his fault on why he was injured. This doctrine
was invoked by Nikko Hotel in the petition, claiming that
Reyes exposed himself to the injury of being thrown out of
the party as a gate crasher. The Court, however, said that
this is not applicable in this case because despite Reyes’
improper behaviour of gate-crashing, Nikko Hotel and Lim
should still observe proper treatment towards him under
Articles 19 and 21 as to not expose him to humiliation and
shame.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned,
any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms.
Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of
propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
c. Doctrine of Vicarious Liability (Doctrine of Imputed
Negligence)
Vicarious liability refers to a situation where someone is held
responsible for the actions or omissions of another person. In a
workplace context, an employer can beliable for the acts or
omissions of its employees, provided it can be shown that they
took place in the course of their employment.
Additionally, Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under
such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or
omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or
subsidiarily under certain circumstances
7
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship
and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made
a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child
Article 2180[16] of the Civil Code provides that a person is not
only liable for ones own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is
popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain
claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee
was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2)
That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which
the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That
the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason
of the functions entrusted to him
i. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
 1. TAMARGO vs CA G.R No. 85044 June 3 1992
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that
resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural
parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the
tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to
adopt AdelbertoBundoc. Such petition was granted on
November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the
adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties
and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which
includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In
the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority
over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It
follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code”.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be
essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested
in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody
however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting
incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural
parents of Adelberto.
DOCTRINE:
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon
the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated
child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction
in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil
8
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain
that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption
court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was
vested in the latter. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto’s
allegedly tortious conduct.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child
is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor
child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded
as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the
United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a
little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at
the time the tort was committed.
"Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No Petition for adoption shall be
finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given
by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six
months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for
the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents." (Emphasis
supplied
 2. CUADRA vs MONFORT GR No. L-24101 Sept 30, 1970
FACTS
 Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13,
were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher
assigned them, together with three other classmates, to
weed the grass in the school premises.
 While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young
girls over their hair.
 Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm
and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object
at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to
face her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
 She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20
and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for
a total of 23 days, for all of which the parents spent the
sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however,
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her
right eye.
 action for damages based on quasi-delict was instituted by
the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the
defendant was ordered by CFI to pay P1,703.00 as actual
damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the defendants should be made liable? NO.
2176 and 2180 of Civil code (see codal)
Defendant liable
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be
inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage
by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee
such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act
which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate
much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which
would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and
sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is
at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has
no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral
compulsion of good conscience.
d. Parental and Pseudo-Parental Vicarious Liability
- While a minor is generally responsible for the damage he
or she causes, it is difficult, if not impossible, to collect
monetary reparations from a minor. Thus, the parents and
guardians of children are legally responsible when a child
commits a criminal act, or damages and injures another
person, animal or property

RULING:
Underlying basis - Parents and guardians are held responsible under the
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is theory of “vicarious liability.” While a “parent” may be
the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, anyone who exercises control or authority over the child,
typically the custodial parent is the one held civilly
there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby.
responsible for the child’s acts. Parental vicarious liability
When the act or omission is that of one person for whom stems from a parent’s responsibility to supervise and
another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable educate a child.
under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein,
such as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied
the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima
facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of
Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in
this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage."

Burden of proof and diligence

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense,
the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant.
Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence
of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every
individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of
such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
9
 i. FUELLAS vs CADANO GR No. L14409 October 31,
1961
Facts:
- Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-
appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and
classmates.
- While they were in school they had a quarrel. Their teacher
separated them and told them to go home. After going
down the schoolhouse Rico Fuellas held Pepito Cadano by
the neck and pushed him to the ground.
- Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his
body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side.
- On May 18, 1956 Rico Fuellas was convicted of the offense
charged in the criminal case. No pronouncement was made
in the criminal case on his civil liability by the court
stating that the same shall be determined in the civil case.
On May 25, 1956 the same court rendered a judgment in
the civil case holding Agapito Fuellas liable in damages in
the total amount of P9,600 under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
- The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by reducing
the moral damages. Agapito Fuellas appealed to the
Supreme Court on questions of law.
- In the Supreme Court Fuellas contended that since the act
of his minor son was deliberate and intentional Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code was not applicable. Fuellas also contended
that the only way by which a father can be made
responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with
deliberate intent and with discernment, is an action based
on the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability of parents.
Issue: whether the provision regarding negligence and quasi-
delict applicable in this case.
Held: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by
their minor children imposed by Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal
acts of their minor children who act with discernment is
determined under the provisions of Art 2180, New Civil Code
and under Art 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold
that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Judgment affirmed.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals
on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault
or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the
present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind
the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's
criminal responsibility is of no moment.
10
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
ii. LIBI vs IAC GR No. 70890 Sept 18 1992
FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors,
before he turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the
parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover
damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious
liability.
RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by
their minor children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary
and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents can
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to
prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in
supervising the activities of their son. It was only at the time of
Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug
informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting
incident was missing from the safety deposit box. Having been
grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to
said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural
consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in
their company.
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their
children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity
involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees
been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell,
and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides.
 iii. Art 58 Child and Youth Welfare Code
Art. 85. Duties of the Community. - To insure the full
enjoyment of the right of every child to live in a society that
offers or guarantee him safety, health, good moral environment
and facilities for his wholesome growth and development, it
shall be the duty of the community to:
(1) Bring about a healthy environment necessary to the
normal growth of children and the enhancement of their
physical, mental and spiritual well-being;
(2) Help institutions of learning, whether public or private,
achieve the fundamental objectives of education;
(3) Organize or encourage movements and activities, for the
furtherance of the interests of children and youth;
(4) Promote the establishment and maintenance of
adequately equipped playgrounds, parks, and other recreational
facilities;
(5) Support parent education programs by encouraging its
members to attend and actively participate therein;
(6) Assist the State in combating and curtailing juvenile
delinquency and in rehabilitating wayward children;
(7) Aid in carrying out special projects for the betterment of
children in the remote areas or belonging to cultural minorities
or those who are out of school; and
(8) Cooperate with private and public child welfare agencies
in providing care, training and protection to destitute,
abandoned, neglected, abused, handicapped and disturbed
children.
iv. Article 211, 218-219, 221, 236 of the family Code
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards
their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the
children are under parental authority
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
11
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
v. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. -
The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of
Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and
by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the
persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined,
even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12,
the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter
that part of their property exempt from execution
1. MERCADO v CA GR No. L-14342 May 30, 1960
Facts:
- Plaintiff Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and defendants
Augusto Mercado, 9 years old, were students in the
Lourdes Catholic School.
- They quarrelled over an empty nutshell used by
children as a piggy bank. Augusto Mercado wounded
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. on the right cheek with a
piece of razor blade.
- Quisumbing, Jr. and his father brought an action for
damages against Augusto Mercado and his father.
Defendant Mercado contended that since the incident
occurred while his son was in school it should be the
teacher or the head of the school and not Mercado the
father who should be held responsible.
Issue: moral damages
Ruling:
- In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court
pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered moral
damages "by reason of the wound inflicted by Augusto
Mercado." While moral damages included physical
suffering, which must have been caused to the
wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the
decision of the court below does not declare that any of
the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which moral damages may be recovered, has attended
or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible
circumstance in the case at bar in which moral
damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense
or a quasi-delict has been committed.
- It does not appear that a criminal action for physical
injuries was ever presented. The offender, Augusto
Mercado, was nine years old and it does not appear
that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted
the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
- It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have
considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty,
of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we
assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a
quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet
the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to
intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado
to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is, according to
the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado
12
was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn,
also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that
the proximate cause of the injury caused to
Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence
for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get
the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
- After considering all the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the
grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed.
Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified.
- petitioner is declared exempt or free from the payment
of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical
expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
2. PALISOC vs BRILLANTES GR No. L-29025 Oct 4 1971
FACTS
- Deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute,
and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and
three o'clock, they, together with another classmate
Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the
ground floor.
- Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a
machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was
acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc
slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation,
gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
- Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to
fall face downward.
- Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so he was
immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness; finally he died.
- Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of the deceased had filed
on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages.
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "Defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which
gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the Board
of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio
Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago M.
Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased
belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow
student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila
Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately
on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
- The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code however
absolved from liability the three other defendantsofficials
of the Manila Technical Institute citing that Article 2180 is
not applicable in the case at hand.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 5. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs CA GR No. 82465 Feb
25, 1991
- W/N the trial court erred in absolving the defendant-school
officials.
6. PHIL SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION vs
RULING CA GR No. 84698 Feb 4, 1992

YES, DEFENDANTS-SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE LIABLE

UNDER ART. 2180

- The lower erred in law in absolving defendants-school

officials on the ground that they could be held liable under 7. ST. JOSEPH’S vs MIRANDA GR No. 182353 June 29
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted ,2010
the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of
the school." 8. AQUINAS SCHOOL vs SPOUSES INTON GR No.
- As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so 184202 Jan 26, 2011
long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time.
- There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
- Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and
teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held
jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their
codefendant Daffon in the latter having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc.
- The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said
defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in
the school premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At
any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of
the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove
such exemption from liability. .

3. AMDAORA vs CA GR No. L-47745 apr 15, 1988

4. SALVOSA vs IAC GR No. 70458 Oct 5, 1988

13
 Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
2. Damages iniquitous or unconscionable.

a. Actual Damages Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the
defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
i. Actual agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine
the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.

ii. Compensatory
f. Exemplary Damages (Article 2229)

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by

way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
b. Moral damages (Article 2217)

i. Instances when no need of proof

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental

anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

c. Nominal damages (Article 2221-2223)

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a

right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.

Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every

obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157,
or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude

further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective
heirs and assigns.

d. Temperate Damages

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more

than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the
case, be provided with certainty.

Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the

circumstances.

e. Liquidated Damages

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the

parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.

14