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1. In a buy-bust operation, 42.

410 kilos of dried marijuana were seized from Raul


and Don. They were charged with the sale of illegal drugs. However, in the Information for
the sale of said drugs, the quantity was changed and altered to state 42.410 grams only. The
accused Raul and Don were arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge, and were sentenced
to suffer a jail term of 6 months and one day. Thereafter, they applied for probation. The
prosecution, within the reglementary period to appeal, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
contesting the Decision on the ground that the Information has been tampered. The Motion
for Reconsideration was denied. Can the prosecution file an appeal on the same ground?

Suggested Answer:

No.

It is well-settled that the conviction of an accused cannot be appealed without violating


the accused’s right to double jeopardy. The only exceptions are when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or when the trial was a sham, both of which cannot be considered to
be present in this case. [Sanvicente v. Ppl., G.R. No. 132081, 26 November 2002].

By invoking the alleged tampering of the Information in its Motion for Reconsideration,
the prosecution effectively seeks to: (a) amend the Information to reflect the correct quantity
of the dried marijuana allegedly seized from the accused; and (b) change the imposable
penalty.

Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying for probation. It is
too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to
try again the accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. Hence, the amendment of the information sought by the prosecution by way of
appeal after the accused had already been convicted violates the accused’s right against double
jeopardy. [Lasoy v. RTC 76, G.R. No. 129472, 12 April 2005]

Moreover, Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly states that
after the accused has pleaded, the amendment of an information is subject to the court’s
discretion provided that that it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. In
addition, the amendment of the information to charge the proper offense can be done only
before judgment and the filing of another information will not place the accused in double
jeopardy.

2. Manny and John were charged with Estafa in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. After trial, the court scheduled the promulgation of judgment with notice to the
accused and their counsel Federico Dominguez. During the promulgation of judgment only
Manny and Atty. Dominguez were present. Both the accused were convicted of the crime
charged.

a. Can Atty. Dominguez file a Notice of Appeal for Manny and John?
b. If Manny jumps bail after the appeal is perfected, what will happen to his appeal?

Suggested Answer:

a. Yes. However, in the case of John, said notice of appeal must be accompanied by a
motion for leave to avail the remedy of appeal. Rule 120, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the accused is absent during promulgation and the judgment is for
conviction, the accused must show justifiable cause for his absence. Otherwise, he shall
lose the remedies available under the rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest.

b. If Manny jumps bail after the perfection of his appeal, the appellate court may, upon
motion of the appellee (the People), or motu propio dismiss the appeal. [Rule 124,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court]

3. Jun Reyes was charged with Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide and
damage to property in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The charge stemmed
from the head-on collision of the passenger jeep driven by Jun Reyes, owned by the operator
Gerry Nova, with the Toyota Corolla driven by Hermes Carillo. By reason of the collision,
Hermes died instantaneously and the Toyota Corolla was totally destroyed. After trial, the
MTC convicted Jun of the crime charged. Can the operator Gerry Nova appeal the civil aspect
of the case.

Suggested Answer:

Yes. The general rule is that the finding of guilt of an employee is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. [Phil.
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004]

However, before the employer's subsidiary liability is exacted, it must be established


that: (1) he is indeed the employer of the convict; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and (4)
execution against the employee is unsatisfied. In this regard, the determination of an
employer's subsidiary civil liability is not conclusive in the sense that it cannot be appealed to a
higher court. It may be appealed at the instance of the aggrieved party-either the offended
party or the employer raising questions of fact and/or of law, or through a petition for review
on certiorari. Likewise, a special civil action of certiorari may be filed, upon the theory that the
determination was made by the Trial Court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. [Ozoa v. Vda. De Madula, G.R. No. L-62955, 22 December 1987]

4. James, a prosecution witness, was presented in court to testify on the text


message sent to him by accused Peter immediately after the commission of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide on June 15, 2005. On the witness stand, James confirmed that he
received a text message from Peter. However, when the prosecutor asked James regarding
the contents of said text message, Peter’s counsel objected and argued that allowing James
to testify on the contents of text message will violate Peter’s right against self-incrimination.
As the judge, how will you rule on the objection?

Suggested Answer:

I will overrule the objection. The right against self-incrimination may only be invoked by
the accused at the time when an incriminating question is propounded to him. It is only when a
particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. [People v.
Judge Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, 7 July 1989]
5. Frank filed a petition for probate of the last will and testament of Soledad in
the RTC of Iloilo. Frank claimed that he was the heir of Soledad and the executor of her will.
On May 30, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision allowing the probate of her will and the
issuance of letters testamentary to Frank. More than 4 months later, Gerry filed a motion to
reopen the proceedings. Gerry argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition due to deficient payment of docket fees, defective publication and lack of notice to
the other heirs of Soledad. The RTC denied Gerry’s motion. Thereafter, Gerry filed a petition
for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.

a. Can the RTC case be dismissed on the ground of insufficient docket fees?
b. Will the petition for annulment of judgment before the CA prosper?

Suggested Answer:

a. Can the RTC case be dismissed on the ground of insufficient docket fees?

No. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the case. In Rivera v. Del Rosario, 464 Phil. 783
(2004), the Supreme Court, citing Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, ruled that the
filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If
the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of
court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making
a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but
jurisdiction is not automatically lost. Here, even though the payment of the prescribed docket
fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically
result in the dismissal of the case. Further, there is no showing of a deficiency in the docket fees
paid that would have warranted the clerk of court or his authorized deputy to make a
deficiency assessment.

On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has refrained from dismissing a


complaint/petition despite payment of insufficient docket fees when it was caused by the
erroneous assessment of the Clerk of Court. [Yambao v. CA, G.R. No. 140894, 27 November
2000; Ayala Land, Inc. v. Carpo, G.R. No. 140162, 22 November 2000]

However, when there is a showing that the payment of insufficient docket fees was
attended by bad faith on the part of Gerry, the dismissal of the petition is warranted.
[Manchester Devt. Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. L-75919, 7 May 1987]

b. Will the petition for annulment of judgment before the CA prosper?

No. A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Publication is notice to
the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. Thus, even
though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became
parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have availed of the remedies of
motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the
filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages,
insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order
is contrary to law. Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against
a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may
file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or
proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment
and within six (6) months after entry thereof.

In this case, petitioners apparently became aware of the Decision after 4 months since
its issuance. It was then that Gerry filed his motion to reopen. After it was denied, Gerry could
have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen.

For his failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available
to him, Gerry can no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, he
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. [Alaban, et al. v CA, G.R. No. 156021, 23
September 2005]

6. John filed a letter-complaint with the Building Official of Quezon seeking the
demolition of Patrick’s house which was constructed on John’s lot without his permit and
knowledge. Despite Patrick’s opposition, the Building Official issued an Order of demolition.
Patrick, thereafter, filed a complaint for injunction and damages against the Building Official
and John before the RTC of Quezon. Unfortunately, the RTC of Quezon dismissed Patrick’s
complaint. Thus, Patrick sought recourse before the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
Certiorari. However, said petition was dismissed on account of Patrick’s failure to sign the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Thereafter, Patrick filed an “Alternative Petition for
Certiorari and Petition for Review on Certiorari” with the Supreme Court. Will this petition
prosper?

Suggested Answer:

No. Patrick cannot delegate upon the Court the task of determining under which rule his
petition should fall. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Section 5(f) of the Rules of Court, a wrong or
inappropriate mode of appeal merits an outright dismissal. A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of, while a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. It is also settled that generally, the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file
a petition for review under Rule 45 or for the lost remedy of appeal. [Chua, et al. v. Santos, et
al., G.R. No. 132467, 18 October 2004]

7. Jay Franco is an accused in a criminal case for qualified theft. He is on


temporary liberty after posting a corporate surety bond equivalent to P30,000.00. The
accused was notified to appear for a hearing on July 14, 2007. However, despite notice he
failed to appear. The public prosecutor moved that the bond be forfeited in favor of the
government. The court granted the motion. What is the remedy of the corporate surety from
the Order of forfeiture?
Suggested answer:

Upon receipt of the order of forfeiture of the bail bond, the surety has a period of thirty
(30) days within which to comply with the following requirements: (a) produce the body of its
principal or give the reason for his non-production; and (b) explain why the accused did not
appear before the court when first required to do so. If the accused is not produced within the
30-day period, the court will issue a judgment on the bond which ultimately determines the
liability of the surety. (Rule 114, Section 21, Rules of Court. See also Mendoza, et al. v. Alarma,
et al., G.R. No. 151970, 7 May 2008)

8. Ricky, Dante and Rodel were arrested on September 14, 1992, while robbing
Metrobank Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. While under inquest investigation, they were
confronted by the inquest prosecutor of the robbery allegedly committed in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, Ayala Branch on August 12, 1992. The inquest prosecutor recommended
that they be detained for the robberies committed in different occasions. Is the action of the
inquest prosecutor proper?

Suggested answer:

The action of the inquest prosecutor is improper. The inquest proceeding may only be
conducted as regards the September 14, 1992 robbery, and not the August 12, 1992 robbery.

Rule 112, Section 7 of the Rules of Court state that an inquest is proper only when a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation. Section 1, DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993, otherwise known as the “New Rules on
Inquest” define inquest as “an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public
prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a
warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether or not said
persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.”

The instances of valid warrantless arrests are enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5,
thus:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is


actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, Ricky, Dante and Rodel were arrested while robbing Metrobank Paseo de
Roxas. Applying Rule 113, Section 5(a), in relation to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
providing for the penalty of robbery, Ricky, Dante and Rodel may be subjected to inquest
proceedings for their acts on September 14, 1992.

On the other hand, Ricky, Dante and Rodel may not be detained for the robbery on
August 12, 1992 because none of the circumstances under Rule 113, Section 5(a) is present.
9. The Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Kawit,
Cavite were charged in an Information for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, for causing the registration of a foreshore land in Kawit, Cavite in the name of the
municipality of Kawit and selling the same to a corporation notwithstanding that under the
law the land is inalienable and cannot be disposed of except by lease. The accused were, after
hearing, all acquitted by the Sandiganbayan. Can the acquittal be questioned by the
prosecution? If yes, what is your remedy?

Suggested answer:

As a general rule, after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot
be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy
cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
(People v. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106, 15 July 2005)

However, the judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the prosecution in a petition


for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such case, the prosecution is burdened to
establish that the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. (People v. Sandiganbayan,
Acot, et al., G.R. No. 199151-56, 25 July 2016)

10. Norman was charged of serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. He is also being investigated together with some Senators, Congressmen and other
heads of agencies for the misuse of the Priority Development Assistance Fund. Norman,
through counsel, and in order to protect his testimony, applied for his conditional
examination in anticipation of the plunder case to be instituted against them. Should the
application for conditional examination of Norman be granted by the court?

Suggested answer:

Norman’s application for conditional examination of Norman should be denied.

Rule 119, Section 12 of the Rules of Court state that a conditional examination of
witnesses may be applied for when a person has been held to answer for an offense. In addition
to this requirement, the applicant must show that: (a) the witness is sick or infirm as to afford
reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial; (b) resides more
than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend the
same; or (c) that other similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable or prevent
him from attending the trial.

None of these circumstances is present in this case. At the outset, Norman has not been
charged with plunder before the court. Thus, Norman’s application for conditional examination
should be denied.

11. Vicks Liner, Inc.’s (Vicks) bus with plate no. DKT 453 accidentally hit and caused
the death of Maria Morabe in Dinalupihan, Bataan. Two of Maria’s sons filed a criminal
complaint in the MTC of Bataan against Juan Singson, the drive of the bus, for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The sons of Maria applied for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment against the operator of Vicks. The judge granted the application. Was
the action of the judge proper?
Suggested answer:

The action of the judge is improper. Vicks is not an accused in the case filed by Maria’s
sons. Thus, its property cannot be the subject of a writ of preliminary attachment.

While attachment is one of the provisional remedies in criminal cases under Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, the remedy should be availed by the offended party against the accused,
and subject to the existence of the following circumstances: (a) When the accused is about to
abscond from the Philippines; (b) when the criminal action is based on a claim for money or
property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a
public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of
his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation
of duty; (c) when the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about
to do so; and (d) when the accused resides outside the Philippines.

None of these circumstances is present in this case. In fact, Vicks is not even a party to
the criminal case filed by Maria’s sons. Thus, the action of the judge in granting the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Vicks is improper.

12. On November 25, 2008, the RTC of Makati promulgated a Decision finding
Maria guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total
amount of Php800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.
Maria was absent during the promulgation of judgment. The court nevertheless sent by
registered mail the Decision to the last known address of Maria which she received on
January 13, 2009. She then moved for reconsideration, but the court denied it in an Order
dated May 20, 2009, which Maria received on July 31, 2009. She filed a Notice of Appeal on
August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
Did the court correctly deny the Notice of Appeal? If yes, what remedy is available to Maria?

Suggested answer:

Maria’s failure to appear at the scheduled promulgation strips her of the right to avail of
the remedies under the Rules of Court. Thus, the court correctly denied Maria’s motion, but
based on an erroneous reason.

Rule 120, Section 6, paragraph 5 of the Rules of Court states that “if the judgment is for
conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose
the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.”
Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment: (a) the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122). (Villena, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 184091, 31 January 2011)

While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal,
this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could validly avail of the
remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this case, Maria lost her standing in
court by her unjustified failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment of conviction,
and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC. (Villena, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 184091, 31
January 2011)

In order to regain her standing in court and avail of the above-mentioned remedies,
Maria should: (a) surrender; and (b) file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies,
stating therein the reasons for her absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of
judgment. However, the 15-day period provided under this rule is counted from the date of
promulgation on 25 November 2008, and ended on 10 December 2008. Since Maria was unable
to comply with the requirements under the law, the RTC Makati’s judgment of conviction
against her became final and executory.

13. On 16 February 1994, X filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC against Y.
The Complaint was prompted by the refusal of Y to pay the monthly rentals. In a Decision
dated 10 October 1994, which Y received on 22 October 1994, the MTC found that X is
entitled to possession, and Y should vacate the property owned by X. Can Y stay the
execution of the Decision?

Suggested Answer:

Yes, Y can stay the execution of the Decision.

As a rule, judgment against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately


executory, unless the defendant: (a) perfects an appeal; (b) files a supersedeas bond; and (c)
periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal (Acbang v.
Luczon, G.R. No. 164246, 15 January 2014). Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that:

If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue


immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from,
and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate
court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the
rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day
of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted
by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial
Court to which the action is appealed.

In this case, while a judgment was rendered against Y in an ejectment case where she is
the defendant, she can stay the execution thereof by: (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (c) periodically depositing the rentals that become due during the
pendency of the appeal.

14. SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a
Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV at about one o’clock in the afternoon on
January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three o’clock, Judge Cortes personally examined
SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being
satisfied of the existence of probable cause. The Search Warrant reads:

TO ANY POLICE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of facts
upon which the application for Search Warrant is based, after personally
examining by searching questions under oath, SPO2 Fernando V. Fernandez of
the CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Group with office address at DPS
Compound, Utility Road, Baguio City and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing
of Happy Hallow, Baguio City and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma, Baguio
City, after having been duly sworn to, who executed sworn statements and
deposition as witnesses, that there is probable cause to believe that a Violation
of R.A. 6245 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed and that there are
good and sufficient reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her possession
and control at her residence at Brgy. Gabriela SIlang, Baguio City, the following:

Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

xxxx

which are the subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the
undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the


day the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City,
and forthwith seize and take possession of the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish.

x x x nothing follows x x x

and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from the date of issue,
thereafter, it shall be void.

Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January 2000.

Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and PO2
Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused’s house, SPO2 Fernandez
invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since
no one was available, he requested on Eliza Pascual, accused’s neighbor, to come along.

Examine the search warrant and explain if it was validly issued.

Suggested Answer:

The Search Warrant was validly issued.

The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 7 June 2017), which states:

A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in


connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

The validity of the issuance of a search warrant, therefore, rests upon the following
factors: (a) it must be issued upon probable cause; (b) the probable cause must be determined
by the judge himself, and not by the applicant or any other person; (c) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (d) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized (People of the Philippines v. Tuan, G.R.
No. 176066, 11 August 2010).

An examination of the search warrant would readily show that it complied with all the
requisites of a validly issued search warrant. Notably, the place to be searched was described
with particularity as jurisprudence dictates that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness (People of the Philippines v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, 11 August 2010).

In this case, the address and description of the place to be searched was specific enough
as there was only one house located at said address, where the accused resides. Hence, the
search warrant was validly issued.

15. Accused Marvin together with accused Brian, were charged in Court for three
counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,923.00, P1,869.00, and
P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book
and payrolls for a given period, making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of a new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte, and collected their respective
salaries thereof when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee.

In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of “not guilty”
and substitute the same with a plea of “guilty,” provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or pleas of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if the proposal is not acceptable, the accused proposed instead to substitute their
plea of “not guilty’ to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of “guilty,” but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document
by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of “not guilty’ thereto with a plea of “guilty,” but to the lesser crime of
failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

Assuming that the prosecution agreed to the proposal for plea of guilt to a lesser
offense, and the Court granted the application, is there a need to amend the Informations to
reflect the lesser offenses proposed?

Suggested Answer:

There is no need to amend the Informations to reflect the lesser offenses proposed.
As a rule, there is no need to amend an information to reflect the lesser offense to
which the accused seeks to plead guilty to if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the
offense charged. An offense may be said to be necessarily included in another, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to
hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public
Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private
Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position
in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same
vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain
allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the
element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account was in
violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the
prescribed period (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, 28 March 2008).

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses
(Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, 28 March 2008). Accordingly, there is no longer
a need to amend the Informations.

16. On January 23, 1997, the prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an
uninhabited place against Joel before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 1, Manila.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

The undersigned accuses JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA of the crime of


Robbery in an Uninhabited Place, committed as follows:

That on or about July 22, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one ROSENDO OQUINA Y
ESMALI who is already charged with the same offense with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 304765, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain, by means of
force upon things, break into and enter the Administration Office of the Prince
Town Inn Corporation located at Valenzuela Street, Sta. Mesa, this City, which
is an uninhabited place, by then and there destroying the Jipson board ceiling
of the opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once inside, and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and
carried away cash money in the amount of P109,000.00 belonging to said
Prince Town Inn Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P109,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.

Joel moved to quash the above information by alleging that it was patently irregular and
fatally flawed in form and in substance. The MeTC denied Joel’s Motion to Quash in its Order
dated September 15, 1997. Likewise, the MeTC denied Joel’s Motion for Reconsideration of
the order of denial. Via a Petition for Certiorari, Joel elevated the unfavorable ruling of the
MeTC to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila. Joel argued that the MeTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in not granting his motion to quash. Private complainant Jonathan
Briones moved to dismiss the petition for certiorari because it is not the proper remedy to
address the denial of a motion to quash. Was the legal remedy undertaken by Joel proper?
Explain.

Suggested answer:

No, the legal remedy undertaken by Joel was not proper.

In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused
results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered, and the lower court’s decision of conviction is
appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error
committed by the trial court, but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order, and is not


appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari, which can be
used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as
discussed above (Galzote v. Briones, G.R. No. 164682, 14 September 2011).

Thus, the legal remedy undertaken by Joel was not proper.

17. Larry charged Judge Agno with gross misconduct when he directed a judgment
on the pleadings. Larry claimed that Judge Agno had declared the parties as having agreed to
the rendition of judgment on the pleadings even while the defendant corporation, Oxo Farms
System Cooperative Foundation, of which Larry was the President, had never agreed to it. In
fact, Larry stated, the corporation precisely did not submit any memorandum for judgment
on the pleadings required by Judge Agno in his Order of 20 December 1999. On 4 April 2000,
Judge Agno, nevertheless, rendered a judgment based on the pleadings in favor of Ever
Marketing, the original plaintiff in the main case. A motion for the reconsideration of the
decision was denied in an order of 11 December 2000. Was the action of Judge Agno
rendering a judgment based on the pleadings proper?

Suggested answer:

The action of Judge Agno in rendering a judgment based on the pleadings was not
proper.

It is settled that the court may not render any judgment on the pleadings in the absence
of any motion from any of the parties that prayed for the rule’s application. Such motion is
required by Rule 34. In the absence thereof, the judge cannot motu proprio render judgment
on the pleadings (Spouses Pascual v. First Consolidated Rural Bank (Bohol), Inc., G.R. No.
202597, 8 February 2017) .

In this case, neither of the parties moved that a judgment based on the pleadings be
rendered. Thus, the action of Judge Agno was not proper.

18. Keyco was charged with murder committed with treachery and evident
premeditation. Keyco stabbed the victim while walking along a dark and unlighted street. The
defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the victim. This
was objected to by the prosecution and was granted by the trial court. Is the evidence of bad
character of the victim material to establish the probability or improbability of the
commission of the offense?

Suggested Answer:

No, evidence of bad character of the victim is not necessary to establish the probability
or improbability of the commission of the offense.

In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two


situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of
mind of the accused. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the
deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. When the evidence tends
to prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show
that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a
justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary

In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to
determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that
the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the
hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that
because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom
he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation, as in this case (People of the Philippines v. Lee,
G.R. No. 139070, 29 May 2002).

19. Arlon and Berna got married in 1995, and begot three (3) children, who are
now 11, 13 and 14 years old. In 2005, Berna was assigned by her employer to its branch office
in the United States. Arlon and Berna could not handle the long distance relationship, and
their marriage eventually turned sour. This was worsened by the fact that Berna obtained US
citizenship and she refuses to return to the Philippines. Thus, Arlon filed an action for nullity
of marriage against Berna in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

Meanwhile, Berna met Fernando, a Brazilian, and instantly fell in love with him. While the
nullity case in the Philippines was pending, Berna obtained a divorce decree against Arlon in
the United States. The divorce decree also declared that Berna is entitled to the custody of
the children.

a. Can the divorce decree be recognized in the Philippines? Why or why not?

Yes, the divorce decree can be recognized in the Philippines. It is well-settled that in
marriages between two Filipinos where later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree, said divorce decree likewise applies to the Filipino spouse
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
[Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005].

In such instances, the Filipino spouse must file with the Regional Trial Court a petition
for recognition of judgment, and prove both the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse according to our rules on evidence. [Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138311, 2 Oct.
2001].
b. Can the custody award be recognized in the Philippines? Why or why not?

No. The custody award in said divorce decree will not be recognized in the Philippines.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts. [Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No.
124371. November 23, 2000] Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the foreign court, it must be shown
that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in


order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our
Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

20. Marivic, a single mother, obtained a loan from Rich Bank in the total amount of
P850,000.00. Due to bad business, she defaulted in her obligation. The bank filed an action
for recovery of sum of money with interest. The court after trial rendered a monetary award
in favor of Rich Bank which became final and executory. Upon Rich Bank’s insistence, the
Sheriff immediately levied against Marivic’s real properties. Was the Sheriff’s action proper?
Explain.

Suggested answer:

No. The Sheriff should not have immediately levied on Marivic’s real properties. Under
Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, a judgment for money may be executed by first
demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment in cash of the full amount
adjudged by the court and all lawful fees. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, then the Sheriff shall levy on properties of every kind and nature upon the
option of the judgment obligor. If the judgment obligor does not exercise this option, then the
Sheriff shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then the real properties, if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

21. Miley leased her farmland in Bulacan to James. Upon the expiration of their
lease contract, James refused to vacate the property. Thus, Miley filed an action for recovery
of possession against James. Before James filed his Answer, his lawyers applied for the taking
of his deposition in the court where the action is pending. The deposition of James was taken
inside the courtroom by the Clerk of Court in the presence of the parties and their lawyers,
and the entire proceedings were transcribed by the stenographers of the Court. During trial,
Miley’s lawyers objected to the use of James’ deposition citing the errors and irregularities in
the manner of preparation the deposition, particularly as to the requirements that it has to
be sealed, examined and signed by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and signed by the
deposition officer. The court overruled the objection and admitted the deposition. Is the
court’s ruling correct? Why or why not?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The court’s ruling was correct.

Rule 23, Section 29 (f) of the Rules of Court expressly states that errors and irregularities
in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed,
certified, sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the deposition officer
are waived, unless a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with
reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence might have been,
ascertained.

In this case, both Miley and her lawyer were present when James’ deposition was being
taken yet did not raise any objections regarding the errors and irregularities in the manner of its
preparation until said deposition was about to be used. Hence, said objection is already
deemed waived.

22. Celso and ABA Corporation own adjoining lots, with Celso’s lots forming part of
the residential subdivision. Celso filed an action for damages with prayer for issuance of writ
of injunction against ABA Corporation in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, alleging that
ABA Corporation had been conducting quarrying activities without a permit since 2001 and in
violation of the boundary limits. After conducting a summary hearing, the RTC granted
Celso’s application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, ABA Corporation filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Was the remedy taken by ABA Corporation proper?

Suggested answer:

No. ABA Corporation’s filing of a Petition for Certiorari was improper. Under Rule 58,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy is for ABA Corporation to file a motion for
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction. It must attach to said motion affidavits proving
the grounds for dissolution, such as insufficiency of the application for preliminary injunction,
or that the continuance thereof would cause irreparable damage to ABA Corporation, while
Celso may be fully compensated for the damages it may suffer. ABA Corporation must also file a
bond in the amount fixed by the court, which shall answer for the damages which Celso may
suffer by the dissolution of the writ.

23. On June 1993, the special task force of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Boyoyong Gang in Quezon City.

In a press interview, SPO2 Malakas of the Criminal Investigation Command, which was
part of said special task force, said that there was no shoot-out between the police and those
who were slain, but that it was a summary execution. After a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, several informations were filed against the
members of the special task force with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however,
ordered the transfer of the cases to the RTC of QC for lack of jurisdiction.

The RTC, on the other hand, ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of
probable cause in view of the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants.

The following year, the PNP Director sought to revive the cases and requested the DOJ
to conduct another preliminary investigation. The DOJ constituted a panel of prosecutors
who found probable cause to hold the members of the PNP special task force liable for 11
counts of murder. Thus, separate informations were filed against them with the RTC QC.

The accused filed with the RTC a motion for judicial determination of probable cause,
which the judge granted on the ground that the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were
inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary investigations before the
Ombudsman. Hence, the case was dismissed. Was the judge’s ruling correct?

Suggested answer:

No. The judge’s dismissal of the case is improper.

It is well-settled that once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to
determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. [Rule 112, Section 6] At
this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

Therefore, in determining the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest,


the judge must confine himself/herself to the evidence submitted by the prosecution, who
already made an independent finding of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
information.

In this case, it was improper for the judge to consider the affidavits from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman since the proceedings before the Ombudsman
were separate and distinct from the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ panel.

24. Jaro was charged with Kidnapping for Ransom of Ricky, the son of Spouses Ann
and Oli, with the RTC of Muntinlupa. In the course of the trial, the public prosecutor was not
allowed by the RTC judge to question the victim, Ricky, although he asked for leave to ask
additional questions after the private prosecutor was done with his questions on direct
examination. Instead of granting the requested leave, the RTC judge consulted the defense
counsel and the private prosecutor who both manifested that whatever questions the public
prosecutor had in mind should be coursed through and asked by the private prosecutor. Thus,
the RTC judge directed the private prosecutor to propound whatever questions the public
prosecutor would suggest. Was the order of the RTC judge proper?

Suggested answer:

No. The RTC judge’s order is improper.

Rule 110, Section 5 clearly states that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. In fact, the private prosecutor may only
prosecute the case upon the written authorization of the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecution and subject to the approval of the court. Moreover, the public
prosecutor may revoke or withdraw the authority previously granted to the private prosecutor
to prosecute the case.

Hence, it was improper for the RTC judge to require the public prosecutor to course his
questions through the private prosecutor. Instead, the RTC judge should have allowed the
public prosecutor to propound additional direct examination questions, since he controls the
prosecution of the case.
25. In May 2000, following the information received from a female civilian
informant that a certain “Steve” was a supplier of marijuana, team leader SP04 Tito Jasmin of
the PNP Narcotics Group at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga instructed his men to
conduct surveillance and intelligence investigation at Aguso, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.

On 10 June 2000, PO2 Luisito Ubias who was designated as poseur buyer and the
civilian informant arranged with “Steve” by telephone for the sale of 50 kilos of marijuana to
be made on 11 June 2000, at 4:00 a.m., at the Dau bus terminal station in Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga.

After waiting for more or less 25 minutes, the civilian informant called PO2 Ubias’
attention to a man wearing a “blue or green t-shirt” who directly approached them. The man,
later identified as Stephen Cadley, showed a rectangular object wrapped in newspaper, with
a hole through which the contents could be seen, and informed the two that he had left 70
kilos of marijuana with his companion. PO2 Ubias took a sample of the contents of the
rectangular object and once he was convinced that it was marijuana, he wiped his face with a
face towel several times, the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the team members to
approach them. Steve was arrested, and was indicted for drug selling.

During pre-trial, Steve’s counsel moved for plea bargaining from selling to mere
possession of drugs to lower the penalty. Can the court grant the application for plea
bargaining even if it was with the consent of the public prosecutor?

Suggested Answer:

Yes. The prohibition against plea bargaining in dangerous drugs cases under Republic Act
(“R.A.”) No. 9165 has been declared unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection
clause. (See Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017) Therefore, the court may
grant Steve’s application for plea bargaining in this case.

26. On 21 October 2002, Aurora So was charged with serious physical injuries. The
information contains a certification signed by Assistant Prosecutor Roger Bergado. Three days
after the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge, she filed a motion to quash on the ground
that the offense charged in the information does not constitute an offense. The trial court
granted the motion to quash. Was the action of the trial court proper? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

Yes, the trial court may grant the motion to quash which accused filed after his
arraignment. The rule that accused’s failure to assert any ground of a motion to quash before
he enters his plea to the complaint or information shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
does not apply where the ground is, among others, that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. (Rule 117, Sections 3 and 9, Rules of Court)

27. Jamie Lapid was an eyewitness to the killing of Ricky Liban by John Fong.
During the preliminary investigation of John Fong, the prosecutor was informed that Lapid
will be leaving for Qatar to work as a mechanic with no definite date of returning to the
Philippines. For this reason, the counsel of the victim applied for conditional examination of
Jamie Lapid. If you were the public prosecutor, will you grant the request for conditional
examination of the witness? Explain.

Suggested Answer:
No. As a mode of discovery, the conditional examination of a witness in a criminal case
may only be requested: (a) by the accused, if said witnesses would be conditionally examined in
his behalf; (b) upon the filing of an information against the accused; and (c) before: (i) the court
having jurisdiction over the case; (ii) a lawyer so designated by the judge; or (iii) an inferior
court to be designated by the court of superior jurisdiction, whichever is applicable. To be sure,
when the accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to
the other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. (Rule 119, Section 12,
Rules of Court; Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, 18 July 2012)

28. Spouses Dick and Mita have a child named Dianne. Dick loved his daughter
more than he loved Mita. Soon this created a crack in the relationship between Dick and
Mita. Eventually, Dick insured himself and named Dianne as the beneficiary and her uncle,
Mandy, as a trustee during the minority of Dianne. When Dianne was around 12 years old,
Dick died. Pursuant to the policy, the proceeds of the life insurance was given to Mandy, and
not Mita. Mita filed an action seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds to her. Is Mita
the real party in interest?

Suggested answer:

Yes, Mita is a real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that a real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. [Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, 22 August
2012]

Mita, as the surviving parent and who has parental authority over Dianne, stands to be
benefitted or injured by the court’s judgment as to whether she is entitled to the delivery of
Dick’s insurance proceeds over Mandy who was designated as the trustee. Thus, she is a real
party in interest.

29. Rodrigo is a naturalized American. He filed a petition with the United States
government so that his brother Godofredo and his nephew Pfeger can become immigrants of
the Unites States. When the petition was approved Godofredo and Pfeger flew to the United
States and stayed with Rodrigo. Very trusting of his brother and nephew, Rodrigo opened a
bank account in the amount of $230,000 with the Bank of Boston making Godofredo and
Pfeger as his trustees. Unknown to Rodrigo, his brother and nephew used the funds for
purchasing properties and placing the same in their names.

Having discovered the acts of his relatives, Rodrigo filed an action for recovery of
money and application for writ of preliminary attachment against Godofredo and Pfeger who
have returned to the Philippines. Rodrigo’s counsel applied for the taking of deposition of
Rodrigo and any competent officer of the Bank of Boston. The court issued an Order granting
the application and issuing a letters rogatory to a court in Boston. The court in Boston totally
ignored the letters rogatory originating from the Philippines. Hence, Rodrigo through counsel
took his deposition before a Notary Public in New York and had the same authenticated
before the Philippine consulate in Washington.

Was the deposition of Rodrigo properly taken?


Suggested answer:

Yes. Rodrigo complied with the requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries.
Depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under
letters rogatory; or (c) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing
by the parties. While letters rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are
directives to officials of the issuing jurisdiction. The authentication made by the consul was a
ratification of the authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. The
deposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer through letters
rogatory. Likewise, the allowance of the deposition cannot be said to have caused any prejudice
to the adverse party. (Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, 11 November 2005)

While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of
Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to follow the
directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely brushed it aside and refused to cooperate.
Respondent cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought about by this circumstance.
Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in
strict adherence to its original directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have the depositions
authenticated. Obviously, it was not within the trial court’s power, much less the respondent’s
to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to have the deposition taken before it. It would be illogical
and unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the letters rogatory without the
cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory and requested
to examine the witnesses. (Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, 11 November 2005)

30. Complainant, Jose Lim, is the Chairman of Banana Research and Information
Center, Inc. (BRIC), an association of Filipino banana plantation workers who were exposed to
a certain chemical “dibromochoropropane” used in the plantation which caused ill-effects on
their reproductive organs. The Filipino victims together with the other victims from 12
countries filed civil cases for mass torts against Shell Oil, Dow Chemical, Standard Fruit and
Del Monte in the United States. However, the US courts dismissed the case on the ground of
forum non conveniens and the claimants were directed to file their actions in their home
countries. BRIC and the Filipino plantation workers instituted an action in the Philippines for
damages against the foreign corporations. The cases in different countries were globally
settled in the U.S. by virtue of the document known as Compromise Settlement and
Indemnity (Settlement). In the Philippines, the parties moved for the approval of the
settlement. The Philippine court approved the settlement by way of judgment by
compromise.

BRIC moved for execution which was opposed by the foreign corporations on the ground that
the Settlement has long been satisfied. The Court issued a writ of execution but it was
returned unsatisfied. The foreign corporations moved for reception of evidence by the Judge
of the Philippine Court in the United States to prove the defense that the
Settlement has been satisfied. The reception of evidence was primarily for the Philippine
Judge to oversee the photocopying, certification and authentication of the individual release
and other related documents which are in the safekeeping of a law firm in Houston Texas.
Can the Philippine Judge conduct proceedings for reception of evidence in the United States?

Suggested answer:

No. such proceedings are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Courts.
Besides, the Supreme Court has not granted him any authority to conduct proceedings abroad.
The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Chiquita Brands v. Omelio (G.R. No. 189102, 7
June 2017), is in point:

In Maquiran v. Grageda, 491 Phil. 205 (2005), Judge Grageda was held
administratively liable for conducting proceedings in the United States in relation
to Civil Case No. 95-45 without this Court's approval. Although he was granted
authority to travel to the United States from August 26, 2003 to September 15,
2003, it was for the sole purpose of visiting his daughter:

[N]o matter how noble [Judge Grageda's] intention was, he is not at


liberty to commit acts of judicial indiscretion. The proceedings conducted by
[Judge Grageda] abroad are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine
Courts. He is the Presiding Judge of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Region, the territorial jurisdiction of which is limited only to
Panabo, Davao del Norte. This Court had not granted him any authority to
conduct the proceedings abroad.

It is not [Judge Grageda's] duty to secure these documents for the


defendants, as he is the judge in the pending case and not the counsel of the
defendants. Judges in their zeal to search for the truth should not lose the
proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their
duties, they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid by the rules of
procedure. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

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