Rule2 in StatCon is IBC, interpret before you CONSTRUE.

You CONSTRUE only when the written law is not enough

to give meaning and EFFECT to the INTENT of the LAW.

The RULES are simplified in the middle of this REVIEWER. Done by a Freshman, by ang aging Freshman who shall be
a Lawyer soooooon!!!

literal meaning or plain meaning rule

dura lex sed lex
doctrine of necessary implication
ejusdem generis
limitations of ejusdem generis
expressio unios est exclusio alterius
negative- opposite doctrine
application of expressio unius rule
doctrine of casus omissus
doctrine of last antecedent
reddeddo singula singulis
stare decisis
res judicata
obiter dictum

A legislature is a kind of deliberative assembly with the power to pass, amend, and repeallaws.[1] The law created by
a legislature is called legislation or statutory law. In addition toenacting laws, legislatures usually have exclusive
authority to raise or lower taxes and adopt thebudget and other money bills. Legislatures are known by many names,
the most common being parliament and congress, although these terms also have more specific meanings.

Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may sometimes be considered by
the judiciary when interpreting the law (see judicial interpretation). The judiciary may attempt to assess legislative
intent where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or adequately address a particular issue, or when
there appears to have been a legislative drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the inquiry into legislative intent ends
at that point. It is only when a statute could be interpreted in more than one fashion that legislative intent must be
inferred from sources other than the actual text of the statute.
Sources of legislative intent
Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine the goals and purposes that the legislative
body had in mind when it passed the law:

 the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,

 amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
 the record of hearings on the topic,
 legislative records or journals,
 speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
 legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
 other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the definitions in the statute on question,
 other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question,
 legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president,
 case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems the legislature was attempting
to address with the bill, or
 constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have passed certain sections of a statute 'had it
known' about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the statute?").
 legislative intent- the reason for passing the law

literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal meaning or plain rule means
INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL WORDS words in a statute should if possible, be given effect.

Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by CONSTRUCTION, be
given a different meaning. When the legislature defines a word used in a statute, it does not usurp the courts
function to interpret the laws but it merely LEGISLATES what should form part of the law itself.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases used in statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning which is supported by the maxim generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spoken shall be generally understood. It is also the same as GENERALI
DICTUM GENERALITIR EST INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is understood in a general sense.

WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not intent to words.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, do not distinguish.

dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.

doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof
as that which is expressed. Every statute is understand by implication to contain all such provision as
may be necessary to effectuate to its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of the
law.

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in
said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.

The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry out, not to defeat the intent or
purpose of the law; the rule must give way in favor of the legislative intent;

limitations of ejusdem generis

requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.

the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of OTHERS or

What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be extended to other matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions, what is not list down as an exception is
ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or savings excludes others.

application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule is used in CONSTRUCTION of statutes granting powers,
creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well
as those statutes which are strictly construed. It is only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for ascertaining the
legislative intent. The rule must also yield to legislative intent.
negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED is known as
negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is not absolute if it can be shown that
the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is
clearly indicated, the COURT may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the intent of the legislature and will
not do violence to its language.

doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAL RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA or
relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING WORDS restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated.

The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of a statute, by which "Referential and qualifying phrases,
where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent." The rule is typically bound by "common
sense" and is flexible enough to avoid application that "would involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain intent of
the language, or if the context for other reason requires a deviation from the rule." Evidence that a qualifying
phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may
be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma."

reddendo singula singulis when two descriptions makes it impossible to reconcile, reconcile it to have a
“singular meaning” to settle the issue.

refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words
should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by
context most appropriate related and to which it is most applicable.

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By rendering each his own; for example, when two descriptions
of property are given together in one mass, both the next of kin and the heir cannot take, unless in cases where a
construction can be made reddendo singula singulis, that the next of kin shall take the personal estate and the heir at
law the real estate. 14 Ves. 490. Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab. Conditions, L.

Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by
decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray duh-see-sis) n. Latin for "to stand by a decision," the doctrine that a trial court
is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents) on a legal question which is raised in the lower court. Reliance on
such precedents is required of trial courts until such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the trial court
cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it is "bad law")
Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is
conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could have been litigated in that
suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must then show that the decision
in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit. For example, assume that the plaintiff in the
first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She sues the driver of the other auto under a theory
of Negligence. A jury returns a verdict that finds that the defendant was not negligent. The injured driver then files a
second lawsuit alleging additional facts that would help her prove that the other driver was negligent. A court
would dismiss the second lawsuit under res judicata because the second lawsuit is based on the same Cause
of Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.
Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark
made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally,
and not directly upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of
the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.

AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in contravention of the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law or RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA.

Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes must be done to avoid evil and injustice. EA EST
ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation that will give the thing the
EFFICACY is to be adopted. Law must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are
enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will give LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE without
doing VIOLENCE to reason.

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must be interpreted to give it efficient operation and effect
as a whole avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT is so that a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a
useless SURPLUSAGE. Accordingly, in case of Doubt or obscurity, that construction should make the statute fully
operative and effective. IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT DO A VAIN THING IN THE
ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every

statute must be so CONSTRUED and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of Jurisprudence.
ALL laws are presumed to be consistent with each other.
DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA, distinguish times and you will harmonize laws.

IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware, and taken into account, PRIOR LAWS on
the subject of legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject is not intended and if such occur, Court must construe,
through reconciliation to give effect to the statute. If it is impossible to reconcile and harmonize, one statute
has to give way to the other. The latest statute shall prevail being the latest expression of the legislative WILL.

A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The fact that one is general and the other special
creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the General Act. One as
a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a Particular case. This shall apply all the time regardless
of which law was enacted first.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS are made by the EXECUTIVE

Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the Executive on Statutes, for them to implement
it, they must understand it and interpret it if the language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The executive makes RULES or
IRRs for this statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and PROCEDURES. These IRRs or RULES issued by the executive
to execute the Statute are CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS of the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out
PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS, under her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine Republic. The
issuances on how laws are to be prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION of the Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES handling disputes in a QUASI-JUDICIAL
MANNER. These decisions are based on their UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by congress, laws that are
enforced. These are CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS and Constructions.
THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN, WHEN THERE ARE NO ACTUAL
CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT, therefore,NO
STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY MAKE,
MAY ALSO DO CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE BOUND
TO FOLLOW.

WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF
THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER
POWER. This is so because the greater includes the lesser as expressed in the maxim, in eo quod plus
sit, simper inest et minus.THERE SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A LAW THAT SHALL
MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS INTENDED BY THE LAW.

Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions as maybe necessary to EFFECTUATE its
object and purpose, or to make effective Rights, powers, privileges or JURISDICTION which it grants, including all
such COLLATERAL and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as
expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate legis or from the NECESSITY of the LAW. Doctrine of Necessary
Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY. QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO,
PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM.
WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of Autolimitation—It is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres to principles of international law as a
limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.

Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either because of the arrival of an expiry
date or because an agency has accomplished the purpose for which it was created. Function is mere
FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated facts in support of the conclusion.

RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the statute ; and the security of men's lives and
property, require that they should be adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct ; and there is more danger to be
apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition; because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but,
when all is uncertain, they are left in the dark, and constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at one time, was thought
entitled to clergy, at another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the life or death of the citizen will be made to depend, not upon a
fixt rule, but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more miserable state of things cannot be
conceived.

1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the statute to be valid." Consequently, the burden to
show the constitutional defect is on the challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the
Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so as to sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When the
constitutionality of an act is challenged, a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge. All laws are
presumed to be constitutional and this presumption is one of the strongest known to the law.

b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge
of existing law and interpretations thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes are in pari
materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or
amends the earlier enacted statute.
c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the interpretation of the original act, it is
logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act, a formal change-rebutting the
presumption of substantial change.

e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute."

f. when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the CONGRESS, in amending
a statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the law. "Further, we assume that CONGRESS’ amendments to
a statute are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.

g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of statutory construction that, where both
general and specific statutes appear to address a matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," it is presumed that
CONGRESS intended to override any potential conflicts with earlier legislation.

i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with administration of those statutes is entitled to
great weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law made by CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled
to deference unless it is proven the agency erred. The grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or powers conferred by
law. As such, "regulations, promulgated pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have the force and effect of law. Moreover,
those regulations which "clearly and explicitly mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any regulation of the
Department must be reasonably grounded in an identifiable and definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court accords
substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not violate the
Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j. we will overturn COURT’s decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary or capricious" and thus a
"clear abuse of delegated discretion." On the other hand, an "agency does not possess specialized competence over
the interpretation of a statute merely because it addresses topics within the agency's delegable authority. Pure
statutory construction, a matter within the "core competency of the judiciary," . "This axiom stems from basic
principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the province and duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say
what the law is. It necessarily follows that the a priori question whether the statute delegates or withholds discretion
is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one implicating our duty of de novo review."

k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's reasoning, correctly noting that courts
give "great deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This deference stems from Code § 2.2-
4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take due account" of the "experience and specialized competence of the
agency" promulgating the regulation. Even so, "deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those
agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ. No matter
how one calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulation does not include the power
to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the agency's position would be to permit
the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation." Though agencies may
be tempted to adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the notice and
public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process - thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political
accountability of agency policy decisions adopted through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of
allowing "all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of determining
the rules that affect them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the language of the statute or when the interpretation
has not been consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should be withheld.

m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it
has no control over that implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation). The
legislative and executive functions are not combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves
to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning. And though the adoption of a
rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it
as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact
vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its
own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.

Construed Against the State/ Vagueness

a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be construed strictly against the state
and favorably to the liberty of the citizen. The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and not in the judicial department.
No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which imposes
such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can be punished his case must be plainly and
unmistakably within the statute. If these principals are violated, the fate of the accused is determined by the arbitrary discretion
of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against the STATE and in favor of an accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the STATE in criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court has considered whether the
words used have a well-settled . . . meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally understood" meaning for adjective in
ordinance). "A penal statute is void for vagueness if it both fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that her
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute and encourages selective prosecution

Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative Defense

1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their application, the
limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court
may determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the
prosecution. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should
look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When determining whether the limiting language is a negative
element or a statutory defense, this Court has identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the exception and its role in
relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to
complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be
criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant.' An application of these factors to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except as provided by law," as used
in Code § 29.1-553, establishes a statutory defense as opposed to a negative element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this case, we first must address the threshold issue of whether
the absence of a valid prescription is an affirmative defense or a negative element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden of
proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to the accused...When construing penal statutes which contain qualifications,
exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which
the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused
can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. The ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING
EVIDENCE OF THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. In determining
whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the
intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. Accordingly, we should consider the wording of the exception
and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the
exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification
for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general rule that the state must prove all the essential facts
entering into the description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that when a negation of a fact lies
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant it is incumbent on him to establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code § 18.2-250 relates to a fact that would be solely within the
knowledge of the accused. If we accept appellant's contention that the STATE must prove appellant had no valid prescription, the
offense would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to obtain a conviction under the facts of this case, the STATE
would be required to prove that no medical professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had prescribed
the drug to appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of chain drugstores, as well as independent pharmacies, hospitals,
prison infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an undertaking would most likely be impossible.
CONGRESS clearly did not intend such a result, nor would they enact such an impotent statute

Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not therein expressed.

2)“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity. It thus proclaims,
safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and life of
the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent and therein
stated…The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the
will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. As we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any
law or take any action “not prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by the Constitution.
3)“A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the constitutionality of a statute unless such
a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to avoid a constitutional
question whenever this is possible.

5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS (note it is congress construing, not the supreme court,
that is why it is CALLED “CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to consideration, and if the construction
is contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional provision, it is entitled to great weight. In addition, Long acquiescence
in such an announced construction so strengthens it that it should not be changed unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.

A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its enforcement.

A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or requirement that must be followed.

A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on the legislature" for its implementation.

7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute
is challenged, we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be constitutional. Where a statute is
constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, departs from the express limitations of the
Constitution and relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and palpable
to justify the court’s holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.
9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well established. “The fact that many things of a diverse
nature are authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not objectionable, if
what is authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and natural association
therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is sufficient. “[I]f there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must
be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly
so. The analysis of a particular act must necessarily “stand on its own,” and we must look to both the body and to the title of
the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the
statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical
situation." We have said that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that
would support it." But where the statute creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or where it affects a
fundamental constitutional right, the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the "strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more
relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew," "beginning again."
Retroactive Enactment of Laws
1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of the parties are to be deemed in accordance
with the law in effect when the action is begun, unless the amended statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our
analysis is guided by the fundamental principles of statutory construction that retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute
is always construed to operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply only to
future cases unless there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new provision, which shows
that the new law was intended to have a retrospective effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved against a
retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear,
strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be given to a statute only
when legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear, explicit, and unequivocal terms.

Common Law

1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the common law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in the enactment of a statute.
The statute must therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the
statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the statute
was to change the common law.

3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will be recognized only in
that which is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is necessarily implied by its language.

4) " A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly
manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by
construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the common law is limited to that which is
expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended.
"When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only
to the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule

Previous Construction of a Statute

1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts, and is then re-enacted by the legislature, the construction given to it is
presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature, and thenceforth becomes obligatory upon the courts." Hence, when the court
finds the old construction should be modified, it cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old construction because such
statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the courts, and therefore, it "carries its historical
construction" when used by CONGRESS in a statute.
3) "We have said that “when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial
interpretations as well.” (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or STATUTE that is ambiguous
even if it was applied to a private case)
New Law New Remedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute prescribing a new remedy for an existing right
should never be construed to abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of express words or necessary
implication. Further, " 'when a statute gives a new remedy, and contains no negative, express or implied, of the old remedy,
the new one provided by it is cumulative, and the party may elect between the two.'

Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject

1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not be read in isolation. Such statutes should
be considered in pari materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed together to
achieve a harmonious result, resolving conflicts to give effect to legislative intent. An accepted principle of statutory
construction is that, when it is not clear which of two statutes applies, the more specific statute prevails over the more general.
Also, when statutes provide different procedures on the same subject matter, "the general must give
way to the specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your questions and in accord with the rule of statutory construction
in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law. Such provisions are to be
considered as a whole, or as parts of a greater connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single and complete
statutory compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but one act, so that sections of one act may
be considered as though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of related general
provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as
intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect conformably to it, and they should be so
construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the system and make the scheme consistent in all its parts
and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is shown plainly or with irresistible clearness. It will be
assumed or presumed, in the absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend
to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violate a general statute or system of statutory provisions the entire
subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary,
legislature did not intend to alter or repeal general statute or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two statutes which are closely
interrelated must be read and construed together and effect given to all of their provisions. Statutes
should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and effect should be given the provisions of each.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes,
"courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment. Potentially
conflicting statutes should be harmonized to give force and effect to each.

5) City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance
both can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.

The Meaning of Words

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to have their usual and ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be presumed to have some effect, and not be
treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not intend to do a vain and
useless thing. "It is a well established rule of construction that a statute ought to be interpreted in such a manner
that it may have effect, and not found to be vain and elusive. "A word or clause contained in a statute may only be
rejected as surplusage if it "appears to have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable
of any sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.

4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase, but will construe the words and terms
at issue in the context of the other language used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, that intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity.
"The Court has stated the related principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to
any curious, narrow, or strained construction." Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd
or irrational consequences.
6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought to be attained, and the legislative purpose
in enacting it; the provisions should receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather than one
which will defeat it.

7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It
is unnecessary to resort to any rules of statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those situations,
the statute's plain meaning and intent govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way, refers to two or more things
simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.”

9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally sufficient; binding." (noting that if the STATUTE
does not provide a statutory definition we may look to the dictionary definition to determine legislative intent

10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with a comma followed by the disjunctive word
"nor." We have noted that, pursuant to the rules of grammar, "phrases separated by a comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are
independent. The disjunctive serves to connect the two parts of the sentence but also to keep them separate and
independent.”

12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly,
obstinately, perversely[.] The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful. The
term "willful act" imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be
intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an injury. [T]he term "gross,
wanton, and culpable" describes conduct. The word "gross" means "aggravated or increased negligence" while the word
"culpable" means "deserving of blame or censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts
of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others,
under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and
the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of his acts
13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they permitted to accomplish the same
result by judicial interpretation." Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain
meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean
what it actually has stated.

14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a regulatory
interpretation by the Department that is in conflict with the plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.

15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words
follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular
words. Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when general and specific words are grouped,
the general words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those things
identified by the specific words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its terms, the exception negates the idea
that any other class is to be excepted.

17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine, is particularly applicable here and can be
summarized as follows: Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer
solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is 'the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent
without impairing the meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the provision or clause
immediately preceding it. (explaining and applying "the grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . . ."); (noting
that construction of a statute according to the last antecedent rule is "quite sensible as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with its enforcement cannot be permitted to override
[the statute's] clear meaning. Amendments of statutes can only be made by the legislature and not by the courts or
administrative officers charged with their enforcement

20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume that the same term has the same meaning
when it occurs here and there in a single statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as “effectively
irrebuttable.” We also understand that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously
construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same
section.” Thus, the “natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
 meaning … is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as
reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.” Ibid. A given
term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different
implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to provide
an endnote or footnote citation orreference for a source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is
similar in meaning to idem (meaning something that has been mentioned previously; the same), abbreviated Id.,
which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one must look at the reference preceding it.
21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or," are independent. (finding that, the word "or" connects
two parts of a sentence, "'but disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in alternatives, which must be treated
separately); (finding that limiting phrase in statute is independent of and does not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting
phrase is separated from the first two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma and the disjunctive
"or" as implying two separate and independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by corporation "out
of net earnings, or out of its net assets in excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the phrase, "made by the Defendant to any law
enforcement officer," is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded statement or confessions."

The Terms May/Shall

1) The term "may," as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary meaning intended by the CONGRESS -permission,
importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the word "may," while ordinarily importing permission, will be
construed to be mandatory when it is necessary to accomplish the manifest purpose of the legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute generally implies that its terms are intended to be mandatory, rather
than permissive or directive.
4) "[T]he use of ‘shall,’ in a statute requiring action by a public official, is directory and not mandatory unless the
statute manifests a contrary intent."14 "A statute directing the mode of proceeding by public officers is to be deemed directory,
and a precise compliance is not to be deemed essential to the validity of the proceedings, unless so declared by statute.

The Term Aggrieved “Locus Standi”

1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to determine who is a proper party to seek court
relief from an adverse decision. In order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must affirmatively appear that such person had
some direct interest in the subject matter of the proceeding that he seeks to attack. . . . The petitioner 'must show
that he has an immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a remote or indirect interest.' .
. . Thus, it is not sufficient that the sole interest of the petitioner is to advance some perceived public
right or to redress some anticipated public injury when the only wrong he has suffered is in common
with other persons similarly situated. The word 'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates a substantial grievance and means
a denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner
different from that suffered by the public generally.

Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent

1) "In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary element in the indictment and proof of a particular
crime becomes a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court. Thus, to insert a mens rea element into the offense,
and to require proof thereof, would defeat the statutory purpose, which is to criminalize the introduction of firearms into a school
environment. So we will not add, by implication, language to the statute that the legislature expressly has chosen not to include.
Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly decided, in refusing the instruction in question, that this statute is one of strict
criminal liability, and that the Commonwealth was required to prove only that the defendant had possessed, on school property, a
firearm of the type described in the statute.

2) "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is
as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar
exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by
Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious
will." Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early pronounced the same principle, although a few
exceptions not relevant to our present problem came to be recognized.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-
doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism.
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that
the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the
offense that it required no statutory affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the requirement as to offenses that were taken over
from the common law. The unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but
elusive mental element.
However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought,"
"guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil
purpose or mental culpability.
By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind
from conviction of infamous common-law crimes....The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to
change the weights and balances in the scales of justice.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to
conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to
circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on
judicial initiative.
3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea was long a requirement of criminal responsibility. But the list of
exceptions grew, especially in the expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety, and
welfare. Id., at 254. The statutory offense of embezzlement, borrowed from the common law where scienter was
historically required, was in a different category. 13 Id., at 260-261.
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning [401 U.S. 601,
608] of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind
unless otherwise instructed."

The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority

The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our determination of the powers of local governing bodies. This rule provides that
municipal corporations have only those powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly
granted powers, and those that are essential and indispensable.
"In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where a power is conferred and the mode of its execution is specified, no
other method may be selected; any other means would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable. A
necessary corollary is that where a grant of power is silent upon its mode of execution, a method of exercise clearly contrary to
legislative intent, or inappropriate to the ends sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine of implied powers should never be applied to
create a power that does not exist or to expand an existing power beyond rational limits. Always, the test in
application of the doctrine is reasonableness, in which concern for what is necessary to promote the public interest
is a key element.
Finally, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority exists only to the extent specifically granted in the
statute. It can never go beyond the authority given .

6) “When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative agency to promulgate regulations, those regulations
must neither exceed the scope of the authority delegated nor be inconsistent with it. Furthermore, "delegations of
legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board
in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and
void." For example, language in an enabling statute which provides merely "that the regulations be designed to protect and
promote the safety and health of employees" is insufficient.
7) "We consistently have held that when the primary purpose of an enactment is to raise revenue, the enactment will
be considered a tax, regardless of the name attached to the act. The General Assembly is directly prohibited from
enacting “any local, special, or private law . . . [f]or the assessment and collection of taxes. There is, however, an
exception to this specific prohibition. The General Assembly may by special act like RA 7160(Local
Government Code) delegating the power of taxation to any province, city, municipality.

Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of Executive Departments have the force of law,
and that any Executive Department concerned with the execution of a statute’s interpretation of its governing statutes, as
reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight. Regulations, however, may not conflict with the authorizing
statute. Whether a regulation is inconsistent with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them
and not nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with STATUTES. Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law when they
cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a county or municipal ordinance enlarges on a statute's provisions does not create a
conflict with the statute unless the statute limits the requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for all cases to its own
terms. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply
them together.

A Single Body of Law

1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a statute with "a view toward harmonizing it
with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary
meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the SUPREME Court often examines other related statutes
that contain similar or contrasting language to help determine legislative intent.
The Exclusion Rule

Ambiguity
1) "Language is ambiguous when it may be understood in more than one way, or simultaneously refers
to two or more things.
2) "When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a manner that will give effect to the intent
of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to legislative intent, with the reading of a statute as a
whole influencing the proper construction of ambiguous individual provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used in the connection with the construction of written documents to the effect that an
ambiguous provision is construed most strongly against the person who selected the language." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive covenant, in particular the phrase "residential purposes," to be ambiguous in several
respects....Indeed, even the circuit court's interpretation that the term " '[r]esidence' means more than mere physical presence and
less than domicile" is ambiguous. It can be argued that a nightly or weekly rental is more than mere physical presence. Moreover,
if the phrase "residential purposes" carries with it a "duration of use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental of the
property moves from short-term to long-term. Under our case law, a restrictive covenant of "substantial doubt or ambiguity" must
be interpreted "in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions

Criminal Versus Civil Intent of a Statute

The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction." First,
one must determine whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil
penalty, one must address "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution

1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution supersedes any conflicting state law. The preemption of Local laws by
STATUTES may occur by express statutory language or other clear indication that Congress intended to legislate exclusively in
the area. Even if Congress does not intend the enactment of a STATUTORY scheme completely to preempt Local laws in the
area, congressional enactments in the same field override Local laws with which they conflict.
The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which preemption may occur:
(1) Congress may adopt express language setting forth the existence and scope of preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that "occupies the field" and leaves no room for states to adopt supplemental
laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with the constitution, typically when compliance with both laws is a "physical impossibility"
or the statute stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
2) "Settled legal principles provide that the Constitution, not a state court erroneous interpretation of it, is controlling. (in
context of determining whether to apply retroactively a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions, adopting Blackstonian
view that judges...find the law rather than make the law and that judicial declaration of law is merely a statement of what the law
has always been.

Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the lawmakers on matters of economics, sociology and public policy. . . .
Those considerations belong exclusively in the legislative domain. Regardless of whether it "may or may not be better public
policy". Meaning COURTS do not interpret provisions for ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY and PUBLIC POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the "propriety, wisdom, necessity and expediency" of legislation. We ask only
whether the statutory classification erects an irrational, arbitrary distinction - one that no conceivable state of facts could
reasonably sustain.

Full case

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 79543. October 16, 1996]

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is constitutionally guaranteed

certain rights. One of the most cherished of these is the right to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his choice. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly
covenants that such guarantee cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the
right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took
place in 1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest
was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was extracted through torture, and that the
prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner,
the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed is likewise motu propio
addressed by the Court in this Decision.

Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decisioni of respondent Sandiganbayanii in

Criminal Case No. 8496 promulgated on June 19, 1987 convicting petitioner of brigandage, and
the Resolutioniii promulgated on July 27, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro
Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and
commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not
therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as
the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino,
CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo
Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada,
petitioner Filoteo was charged in the following Information:iv

That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauyan, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two
of whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence,
threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was
travelling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then
take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:

1) Postal Delivery Truck

2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers

3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers

4) Treasury Warrants

5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS
Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga,
Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the owners in the
aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law.

On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted by their
respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro
and Escalada were never arrested and remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police
custody and was tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973
Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial on February 21,
1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but remained at large
since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in absentia.v Only
Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and
Resolution.

Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the prosecution for a stipulation of facts, the
defense admitted the following:vi

The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737-B-82, consisting of 343 pages
from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Bernardo Relator was a PC
Sergeant at Camp Bagond Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such PC Sergeant, accused Relator
was issued a service revolver, Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707
(Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1) with six (6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or
thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel was a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused
Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles, a former PC Sergeant, was
invited for investigation in connection with the hijacking of a delivery van by the elements of the
Special Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of their right to remain silent and to have
counsel of their choice, as shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the existence of the
sworn statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-11) as well as the Certification
dated May 30, 1982, subject to the qualification that said document was made under duress.

The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo
Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr.6-a and the
submission of Exhibits A to K. In their defense, accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented their
respective testimonies plus those of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also submitted
his Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution
proffered rebuttal evidence and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A-31 and L.

Evidence for the Prosecution

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van no. MVD 02 left San
Fernando, Pampanga to pick up and deliver mail matters to and from Manila. On board the
vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two couriers named Bernardo Bautista and
Eminiano Tagudar who were seated beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning
at the Airmail Distribution Center of the Manila International Airport where they were issued
waybillsvii for the sacks of mail they collected. They then proceeded to the Central Post Office
where they likewise gathered mail matters including 737 check lettersviii sent by the United
States Embassy. All the mail matters were placed inside the delivery van, and its door padlocked.

As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they took the MacArthur
Highway on the return trip to Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan at
about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue Mercedes Benz sedanix overtook their van and cut across
its path. The car had five (5) passengers -- three seated in front and two at the back. The cars
driver and the passenger beside him were in white shirts; the third man in front and the person
immediately behind him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in the back had
on a long-sleeved shirt.x

Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at driver Nerito Miranda as
someone uttered, Are you not going to stop this truck?xi Frightened, Miranda pulled over and
stopped the vans engine. Alighting from the car, the armed group identified themselves as
policemen.xii They ordered the postal employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out of
the van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when threatened, he surrendered it to one of
the car passengers.xiii The three postal employees were then ordered to board the Benz.

As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw one of the malefactors, who
turned out to be Reynaldo Frias, going up the van. Inside the car, the three delivery employees
were ordered to lower their heads. They sat between two of their captors at the back of the car
while two others were in front. Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up as he
was feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a glimpse of the pimply face of the
man to his left. He also recognized the driver who had glanced back. These men turned out to be
Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias, respectively.xiv

As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling densely confined. He was allowed
to raise his head but with eyes closed. However, he sneaked a look and recognized the driver of
the car as Raul Mendoza and the fellow beside him who poked a balisong at him as Angel
Liwanag. The man in uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he was about to
enter the car, Bautista looked back and recognized Frias.xv These incidents yielded the pieces of
information critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza, Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias
in the line-up of suspects at Camp Crame later on.

The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came to a stop, the captured men
discovered that they were along Kaimito Road in Kalookan City. They were made to remove
their pants and shoes and then told to run towards the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon
realizing that the hijackers had left, they put on their pants and reported the incident to the
Kalookan Police Station.

The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the postal van at the corner
of Malindang and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on May 4, 1982. Discovered missing
were several mail matters,xvi including checks and warrants, along with the vans battery, tools
and fuel.xvii

In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montao, then Postmaster General Roilo
S. Golez sought the assistance of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine
Constabulary in the investigation of the hijacking incident.xviii Responding to the request, the
SOG, which was tasked to detect, investigate and neutralize criminal syndicates in Metro Manila
and adjacent provinces, organized two investigative teams. One group was led by Capt. Rosendo
Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they conducted a massive intelligence
build-up to monitor the drop points where the stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.

On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian informer that two persons were looking
for buyers of stolen checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the informer to arrange a meeting with them.
The meeting materialized at about 9:00 P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in
Cubao, Quezon City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The informer
introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn showed Capt. Ferrer a sample
Social Security System (SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk of the checks were in the
possession of their companions in Obrero, Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed
to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer introduced himself and his
companions as lawmen investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and distressed, Frias
calmed down only when assured that his penalty would be mitigated should he cooperate with
the authorities. Frias thus volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo
Perez and Raul Mendoza.
Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations officer who was in another car
during the mission, to accompany Frias to Obrero, Tondo while he escorted Alcantara to their
headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in
the hijacking although he admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in possession of
several checks. Alcantara was turned over to the investigation section of the SOG for further
questioning.

Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilaos group was able to corner Ricardo Perez in his house in Tondo.
Confronted with the hijacking incident, Perez admitted participation therein and expressed
disappointment over his inability to dispose of the checks even after a month from the hijacking.
He surrendered the checks in his possession to Lt. Pagdilao.xix

An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over their two-way radio that Ricardo
Perez and Raul Mendoza were in Lt. Pagdilaos custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of
returning to headquarters, Lt. Pagdilao and his companions should meet him in Quirino,
Novaliches to apprehend Martin Mateo. They met at the designated place and proceeded to
Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29, 1982.

Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two men heading in their
direction. Perez identified them as Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The latter threw something
into the ricefield which, when retrieved, turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in
cellophane inside a plastic bag.xx As the two were about to board the SOG teams's car, Mateo
said, Sir, kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa panalo. Marami pa
akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na natin para di na natin babalikan.xxi Capt. Ferrer
accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved several other checks in another plastic
bag.

On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and Liwanag admitted participation
in the postal hijacking. At a confrontation with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed to
petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind of the crime.

Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany Mateo to the house of petitioner
in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen found petitioner at home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to
shed light on his participation in the hijacking, petitioner was dumbfounded (parang nagulat).
Pursuant to standard operating procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his constitutional
rights,xxii whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame. However, the group, including petitioner,
returned to the latters place to recover the loot. It was in the neighborhood, not in petitioners
house, where the authorities located the checks.xxiii

The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the hijacking, telling him that Frias,
Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered the information that petitioner furnished the Benz
used in the hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three
other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out
to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,
petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt.
Romeo P. Espero which, quoted in full, reads as follows:
BABALA: -- Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, na ang dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito
ay tungkol sa isang kasong Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982
doon sa Meycauyan, Bulacan, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saang
maraming tsekeng US, tseke ng BIR at iba pang mga personal na tseke ang nabawi mula sa iyo.
Nais ko ring ibigay sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng
Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod:

a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik;

b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong sarili mong pili upang may
magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat;

c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga katanungang maaring makasira sa

iyo sa dahilang anumang iyong isalaysay ay maaaring gamitin pabor or laban sa iyo sa
kinauukulang hukuman;

d. Na ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, ako mismo ang makipag-ugnayan sa

CLAO-IBP upang ikaw ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang bayad.

1. TANONG:- Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang naipaliwanag sa iyo ay iyong lubos
na naiintindihan at nauunawaan?

SAGOT:- Opo.

2. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at sagot na ito bilang katibayan na
iyo ngang naiintindihan ang iyong mga karapatan at gayun na rin sa dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na
ito, at ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay,
sumagot sa mga katanungan at sumusumpang lahat ng iyong isasalaysay ay pawang mga
katotohanan lamang?

S:- Opo, pipirma ako Ser.

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
(Affiant)

MGA SAKSI:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROMEO P. ESPERO THERESA L. TOLENTINO
Ssg., PC C1C WAC (PC)"

3. T:- Maari bang sabihin mong muli ang iyong buong pangalan, edad at iba pang bagay-
bagay na maaring mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?
S:- Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may asawa, isang Patrolman ng Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya at kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810
Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo, Manila.

4. T:- Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang Kabatas?

S:- Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa, noong ako ay mapasok sa
serbisyo.

5. T:- Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?

S:- Noon lamang pong January 1982.

6. T:- Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saang bayan, lungsod or lalawigan?

S:- Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang aking ina naman ay Bisaya, pero
ako ay ipinanganak na sa Maynila noon July 17, 1951.

7. T:- Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?

S:- Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil hindi ko natapos ang second semester
ng 4th year ko.

8. T:- Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-MPF?

S:- Sa Follow-Up Unit ako.

9. T:- At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit ng GAS, ano naman ang iyong mga specific
duties?

S:- Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga at large sa mga suspects namin sa
mga kasong hawak ng investigation.

10. T:- Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon humigit kumulang,
saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S:- Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin iyong hinayjack namin na Philippine
Mail delivery van.

11. T:- Wika moy kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasamahan?

S:- Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin Mateo, Jr. who was seated in the
investigation room and asked the name and was duly answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey Frias;
Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at ang mga taga LRP ng PC Brigade na sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel,
Sgt. Dan Miravales at isa pang Sergeant na ang alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag namin.
Walo (8) (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as SIYAM [9]) kaming lahat doon noon at
ang mga gamit naman naming kotse noon ay ang kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy Miranda na
isang Mercedes Benz na may plakang NMJ-659 kung saang ang driver namin noon ay si Raul
Mendoza (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as AKO) at ang mga kasama naman naming
sakay ay sina Angelo Liwanag, Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP (affiant
added and initialled this additional fact: AT RAUL MENDOZA). Ang isang kotse namang gamit
namin ay pag-aari daw ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na kanya na rin mismong minamaneho na
isang Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang mga sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay sina Junior
Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt. Dan Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may kasama pa kaming contact ni
Carding Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina Alias NINOY na isang dispatcher at Alias
JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito sa trabahong ito ay si Carding PEREZ at kami naman ng mga
sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta upang umeskort sa kanila sa pag-hijack ng
delivery van.

12. T:- Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng Post Office patungong norte?

S:- Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng alas-4:00 hanggang alas-5:00 ng
hapon.

13. T:- Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga naganap noong hapon na iyon?

S:- Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post Office, sinundan na namin, una ang
van, sumunod ang Lancer at huli ang Mercedes Benz namin. Pagdating namin sa Malinta,
Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng puwesto sa pagsunod, van naman ngayon, sunod
ang Mercedes Benz at huli na ang Lancer. Noong makapasok na kami ng boundary ng
Meycauyan, Bulacan ay kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon makatiyempo kami ay kinat namin
ang delivery van. Tumigil naman ito at bumaba kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun ng
LRP dahil sila noon ang may hawak ng kanilang Armalite Rifle pero may service pa silang
maiksing baril. Pinababa nila ang tatlong maydala ng delivery van at pinasakay sa Mercedes
Benz, habang nakatutok ang kanilang mga baril sa kanila. Ako naman ay bumaba na sa aming
kotse at sumakay ng delivery van at ako na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako nina
Junior Mateo at si Rey Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post
Office na maydala ng delivery van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na namin sa Manila
ang van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minamaneho pa rin ni Raul Mendoza ay dumeretso pa norte
samantalang ang Lancer naman ay nag-U-turn din at sumunod sa amin. Noong makarating na
kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila ay inunahan na kami ng Lancer at iyon na nga,
parang follow the leader na dahil siya na noon ang aming guide.

14. T:- Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?

S:- Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina Carding Perez, at noong
nakarating ng kami roon ay iniyatras ko na ang van sa kanilang garahe at doon ay ibinaba namin
lahat ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na po alam kung ilan lahat iyon, na siyang laman ng delivery
van at pagkatapos ay umalis kaming muli ng mga kasama ko rin sa van papuntang Quezon City
kung saan namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung hindi
ako nagkakamali.
15. T:- Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?

S:- Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding Perez sa may bahay nila sa
Obrero, Tondo, Manila at inabutan na namin sila na nagkakarga na noong mga duffle bag sa
(sic), madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng mamula-mula o orange na Camaro at isa pang
Mercedes Benz na brown, dahil ang Lancer ay isinoli na raw nila sa may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon
ang mga duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi ang usapan namin noon dahil sumilip lamang
ako noon at kasama ko si Carding Perez, kami naman ngayon ay pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy
Miranda sa San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na sakay ng isang Toyota Corona na brown na si
Carding Perez ang nagmaneho. Pagdating namin doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay naroon na rin
noon ang Mercedes Benz na ginamit namin, pero wala na ang crew ng delivery van dahil ibinaba
at iniwanan daw nila sa Caloocan City. Ang naroroon na lamang noon ay sina Angelo Liwanag,
si Raul Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon ang
Mercedes Benz namin doon kina Rudy Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi doon sa kamag-anak,
dahil hindi nila alam ang trabahong ito. Sumakay na iyong apat naming kasama sa Toyota
Corona na sakay namin at inihatid namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun doon sa tinitirhan nitong
huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit sa Del Pan Bridge sa may Recto Avenue sa San
Nicolas yata iyon sa Manila. Kami naman ngayong apat, sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at
si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa Bocaue, Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa North Diversion Road at
paglabas namin sa exit papuntang Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam
ang lugar pero alam kong puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak ni Carding Perez iyon pero
hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Naroon na ngayon ang buong tropa, maliban sa mga dalawang
sundalong naihatid na namin sa may Manila, at may mga nadagdag pang ibang mukha pero hindi
ko ito mga kakilala. Si JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay naroon din noon. Kumain kami,
pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na ng mga duffle bag. Iyon na nga,nakita na namin ang mga tsekeng
ito, (Affiant pointed to the checks he voluntarily surrendered) at aming inihiwalay ngayon sa
mga sulat na naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo sa Novaliches.
Di magdamag ngayon ang trabaho namin, kinabukasan ay kanya-kanyang uwian na, pagkatapos
ay pahinga. Kinabukasan muli, gabi, inilipat na namin doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo ang mga
tsekeng ito (Affiant again referred to said checks). Isinakay namin noon sa isang cargo truck na
pag-aari din daw nina Carding. Iyong mga tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay noon doon sa isang
sikretong compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may chassis. Sikretong compartment iyon,
na mahirap mahalata.

16. T: Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung ganoon, sabihin mo nga kung
anong uring baril iyon?

S:- Wala po akong baril, Ser.

17. T:- Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the checks recovered from the Affiant
was referred to) sa iyo?

S:- E, di ganoon na nga ho, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang situwasyon sa aming grupo, dahil
iyong partehan sana namin ay puro pangako ang nangyari. Kaya napagpasiyahan namin na hatiin
na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang onsehan sa amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt.
Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravalles Alias JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay doon muna sa
amin ito nakatago (The checks recovered from the Affiant was referred to). Pero habang
tumatagal ay umiinit at nalaman namin pati na may alarma na, kayat inilipat namin doon sa may
Raxa Bago sa may likod ng Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Factory sa Tondo, Manila at akin
munang ipinatago sa isang kumare ko doon, pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong kumare ko
ang laman noon dahil mahigpit kong ipinagbilin na huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin
kinuha iyon noong isurender ko ang mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa kinuha na namin ang
supot na ito (the checks placed in a plastic bag was again referred to) ay wala pa rin kamalay-
malay ang kumare ko.

18. T:- Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa Central Post Office, mga
kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito?

S:- Iyong araw na lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon ko noon silang nakikita, itong
si Alias NINOY lamang ang dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya noon at nakikipag-usap kina
Carding Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias. Makikilala ko itong si Alias NINOY kung
makita ko siyang muli.

19. T:- Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa trabahong ito?

S:- Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong tropa na namin.

20. T:- Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa iyo, mayroon ka bang nais na
idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya sa salaysay na ito?

S:- Wala na po.

21. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang patotoo sa katotohanan nito
nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan or pinangakuan kaya ng anuman upang lumagda lamang?

S:- Opo.

WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . . . /ac

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO

MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:

(Sgd.)
SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC
(Sgd.)
CIC THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC)xxiv

Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May 30, 1982. One was a certification
stating that he voluntarily surrendered voluminous assorted US checks and vouchers, that
because of the large number of pieces of checks, he affixed his signature upon the middle portion
of the back of each check to serve as identification in the future, prior to the completion of its
proper inventory and listing conducted by elements of SOG in his presence, and that he guided
the elements of SOG to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of the sky-blue
Mercedes Benz car which was surrendered to the SOG Headquarters.xxv The other document was
a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and the following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights
under Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all his rights
thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP but he refused to
avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG men in his house at around 11:00 p.m. of
May 29, 1982 sa dahilang ako ay kasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants, SSS
Pension Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare Checks and Vouchers mula sa delivery van ng
Philippine Mail; (c) that the SOG men confiscated from him numerous checks and a Mercedes
Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken
from him which was not duly receipted for.xxvi

As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document), he led the SOG operatives to the
house of Rodolfo Miranda on Singalong where the latter admitted that petitioner was his friend.
He denied, however, having knowledge that his car was used in the hijacking until the authorities
came to his house. According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his car would be used for
surveillance purposes because petitioners jeep was not available. The car was not returned until
the evening following that when it was borrowed.xxvii After the trip to Mirandas house, petitioner
informed the investigators that some more checks could be recovered from his kumare. Said
checks were retrieved and turned over to headquarters along with the car surrendered by Miranda
who later executed a sworn statement dated May 31, 1992 at the SOG.xxviii

Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie Saguindel and Bernardo Relator, the
team of Capt. Ferrer proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the afternoon of May 30, 1982. They
met Miravalles along the way to his house. Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions
were already under custody and that they implicated him as one of their confederates, Miravalles
reacted by saying, Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob niyan, eh.xxix

Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie Saguindel. At the barracks of the Long
Range Patrol in Bicutan, Metro Manila, Saguindel voluntarily accepted the invitation to proceed
to the SOG headquarters, after Miravalles initially informed him of the facts obtained during the
investigation. Saguindel was heard saying, Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa mga tsekeng iyan
kasi isang buwan na hindi pa nabebenta.xxx With Miravalles and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer and his
team moved on to Binondo, Manila to look for Bernardo Relator. When they found him at home,
Relator excused himself, went upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber revolver with six bulletsxxxi
and said, Sir, ito yong baril na nagamit.xxxii The three suspects were brought to Camp Crame for
further investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer submitted an after-operations report about their
mission and executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao on affidavit on the same matter.xxxiii

Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed sworn statements.xxxiv Prior to doing
so, they waived their right to counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted their participation and
implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez, on the other hand, denied having driven a Lancer car in
the hijacking and stated that he was implicated in the crime only because in one drinking spree
with petitioner, Mateo and one alias Buro during that month of May, they had a heated
altercation. Like petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they voluntarily surrendered
vouchers and checks which were part of their loot in the hijacking; they also executed waivers
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For his part, Relator executed a certification to the
effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .32 caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used in
the commission of the crime. In spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a lawyer, petitioner
did not manifest that he needed the assistance of counsel. During the taking of his statement,
petitioner was visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade from the General Assignment
Section of the WPD.

For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint affidavitxxxv manifesting their
option to avail of their right to remain silent until such time as they would have retained a
counsel of their choice. Frias and Mendoza executed a similar joint affidavit.xxxvi Severino
Castro, the postal employee implicated, also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in
court. However, he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former clerk of the Central
Post Office and son of a director of the Bureau of Posts in Region I.xxxvii

On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned postal employees Miranda,
Bautista and Tagudar and directed them to proceed to Camp Crame. At the office of the SOG,
they were told to go over some pictures for identification of the culprits. The three recognized
and pointed to the suspects in a line-up. Tagudar identified Saguindel and Liwanag.xxxviii Miranda
pointed at Frias and Liwanagxxxix while Bautista identified Frias, Mendoza and Liwanag .xl
Petitioner himself, when told to identify his alleged cohorts, pointed to Severino Castro as their
contact at the post office.xli Five of the suspects who were not identified in the line-up were
however implicated by Liwanag, Mateo and petitioner.

SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-in-band (hijacking)
before the Municipal Court of Meycauyan, Bulacan against petitioner and ten (10) others,
namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles, Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and
Escalada (Criminal Case No. 7885).xlii

On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and aforequoted was filed with the
Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496.

On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal issued orders for
the arrest of the accusedxliii and fixed bail at P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and Relator filed a
motion to quash the Information asserting that under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D.
1850, they should be tried by a court martial.xliv The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on
January 3, 1984xlv on the ground that courts martial could no longer exercise jurisdiction over
them by virtue of their separation from military service.

Evidence for the Defense

Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a patrolman since August 21, 1978
assigned to the Investigation Division or the Detective Bureau of the WPD to which the General
Assignment Section belonged, he was the recipient of several awards and recognitions starting
with ranking fifth in the Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police officers.xlvi He also
claimed to have received a loyalty medal for meritorious service above the call of dutyxlvii and
several commendationsxlviii for the distinguished performance of his duties. On that fateful date
of May 3, 1982, he was a member of the Special Task Force Unit covering the tourist belt area.

Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted knowing only Martin Mateo whose
name appeared in the initial follow-up operation he allegedly participated in regarding a
P250,000 qualified theft case on May 16, 1980 at the Shemberg Marketing Corporation.xlix
Although a suspect, Mateo was not charged in the information subsequently filed in that case.
Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police headquarters seeking assistance
in his bid to lead a new life. Considering Mateos familiarity with underworld characters,
petitioner readily made him an informer who was paid from time to time out of the police
intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an effective informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital
information on the identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery cases at the La Elegancia
Jewelry Store, at the Likha Antique and Crafts,l and in an alleged racket in Aranque Market in
Manila involving jewelries.

As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing petitioners owner-type jeep

whenever he was given an assignment. In one instance however, petitioner saw Mateo using his
jeep with some male companions. Because Mateo denied the occurrence of the incident,
petitioner from then on refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an allowance
to cover his travelling expenses.

About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and requested the latter to give him a
good project as he was working for his transfer to the Metrocom Intelligence Security Group
(MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged petitioner to lend him his jeep in order that he could
follow-up a bank robbery case. That same evening, petitioner approached his kumpare, accused
Rodolfo Miranda, to borrow the latters old Mercedes Benz since, if the jeep was used, Mateo
could be identified as an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and went around
boasting of the Mercedes Benz.li

Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner advised him to return the car
between the hours of two and three in the afternoon at the Lakan Beer House at the corner of
Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta. Cruz, Manila where petitioner was to meet his friend
Manolo Almoguera who would be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and
company at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly before 5:00 in the
afternoon when he was constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because he had to attend a
mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the police headquarters. From there, petitioner
proceeded to his area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He returned to the beer house at about
6:00 in the evening hoping to find Mateo and the automobile. A little before 8:00 oclock,
someone informed him that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded Mateo for
being late; the latter apologized and said that his surveillance bore good results. Petitioner then
returned the car to Miranda, through the latters cousin.

At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo, escorted by a group of military men,
went to petitioners house at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The group refused to give any
reason for their visit but arrested him. Wearing only short pants, petitioner was made to board a
car where he was handcuffed. The men asked him about the Benz and the identities of his
companions in an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having knowledge of the exact
location of the car but denied participation in the crime. Nobody apprised him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.lii

Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the residence of Miranda to get the
Benz. They were on board two cars. When petitioner noticed that they were not heading for
Mirandas place, he clutched the hand of Lt. Pagdilao, pleading for pity and thinking that he was
about to be salvaged. Lt. Pagdilao however informed him that they would be dropping by
petitioners house first per the investigators information that more checks could be recovered
thereat. A warrantless search was then allegedly conducted in petitioners house but nothing was
found. Suddenly, someone from the other car came out of a nearby house owned by Mateo and
reported that they had recovered some checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of
Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The latter surrendered his Benz to the group.

At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in
the hijacking. As he vehemently denied the accusation against him, someone blindfolded him
from behind, led him outside and loaded him in a car. He was taken to an unidentified place and
made to lie flat on his back. An object was tied to his small finger to electrocute him. While a
wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth, someone mounted his chest and applied the water
cure (tinutubig) through his nose. Because these ordeals were simultaneously carried out,
petitioner felt unbearable pain. He sought permission to get in touch with his father-in-law, Atty.
Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They urged him to cooperate otherwise something
terrible would happen to him.

Meanwhile, petitioners wife reported to the WPD General Assignment Section her husbands
forcible abduction by armed men whom she mistook for CIS agents. A check with the CIS
yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo Dator went to the SOG where he was informed
that petitioner was being investigated but no details were given thereon pending clearance with
superior officers.liii Consequently, a newspaper carried an item on the SOGs refusal to allow
petitioners co-police officers to see him in his detention cell.liv

Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD who was transferred to the
SOG, was able to visit him. Petitioner revealed to Victorino the maltreatment done him but the
latter expressed helplessness about it. In fact, Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that the
SOG would not incriminate him (para hindi ka pag-initan dito).lv The advice came after
petitioner was warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be liquidated by the SOG,lvi
should he refused to cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioners cell and confided that he had
been similarly maltreated and forced to implicate petitioner.

After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to petitioner. Because its contents
were false, petitioner refused to sign it. Placing his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt.
Lagman told petitioner that he thought they had an understanding already. Petitioner later
discovered that Lagman was not member of the military but an agent of the SOG, and a member
of the Contreras gang. Petitioner was therefore constrained to sign the statement because of his
excruciating experience (hirap na hirap). He however admitted having read the document before
affiixing his signature thereto and initialing the corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code and the certification he executed were allegedly also obtained by
duress. Although he picked out one Severino Castro in a police line-up, he did not even know
Castro. He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a certain Boy Zapanta.

Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and
several John Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its
dismissal for petitioners failure to appear despite subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions
as well as to authenticate his statement.lvii However, petitioner swore that he never received the
subpoenas.

Petitioners alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose birthday on May 3, 1995 was the
reason for the celebration at the Lakan Beer House. While his baptismal certificate indicated that
he was born on May 4, 1956,lviii a joint affidavitlix also attested that his birth date was actually
May 3, 1956. Gary Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated Almogueras testimony as
to petitioners alleged presence during the birthday celebration.

The Respondent Courts Decision

On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein questioned 51-page Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin
Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY
as co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3
(b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 and hereby sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN
(13) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as maximum, both of reclusion
temporal, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the action. Accused Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, for insufficiency of evidence.

No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth of any proof as to the actual
damages suffered by the Bureau of Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail matters, and it further
appearing that the mail van which was hijacked had been recovered, as well as most of the
checks and warrants which were surrendered by some of the accused, without prejudice to the
institution of the proper civil action to recover damages should proof thereof be available.

Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, which are the .32 Cal. Revolver,
Smith and Wesson, Serial No. 11707, its holster and six (6) live ammunition respectively, which
were surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J, J-1 to J-5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197,
194 and 22 pieces, respectively, of Social Security System and Medicare checks and vouchers,
be returned to the Firearm and Explosive Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the
Social Security System, respectively, upon proper receipts.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General, Central Post Office, Liwasang
Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame,
Quezon City for their information and guidance with respect to the other accused who are still at-
large.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
challenged Resolution of July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant alternative petition for certiorari
and/or review on certiorari charging the Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at said
Decision.

The Issues

The amended petition raises the following:

Assignments of Error
and / or
Excess of Jurisdiction / Grave Abuse of Discretion

xxx xxx xxx

First

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
when it made its determination of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis of mere
preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Second

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in finding that petitioners having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the other accused
in the hijacking of the mail van idubitably established his direct participation and/or
indispensable cooperation in the said hijacking, the same being in gross disregard of basic Rules
of Law.

Third

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in finding that the voluminous SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were confiscated from and
surrendered by petitioner and three of the other accused and in finding the testimonies and
investigation reports relative thereto, credible and unrefuted, said findings being, insofar as
petitioner is concerned, absolutely without any basis in the evidence and in fact contrary to the
prosecutions only evidence that has some measure of competency and admissibility.
 Fourth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in finding that dorsal portions of the
checks and warrants allegedly taken from petitioner were signed by him to indicate his admission
of accountability therefor and that his signatures thereon confirm the confiscation from and/or
surrender by him of said checks, said findings being absolutely without any support in the
evidence.

Fifth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in admitting and considering against petitioner his alleged extra judical confession, despite
petitioners uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to give or sign the
same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without
the presence and assistance of counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross violation of
Constitutional Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence.

Sixth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in finding that petitioners participation in the hijacking of the mail van is indubitably established
by the manner by which the SOG operatives succeeded in ferreting out the members of the
hijacking syndicate one by one through patient sleuthing and in finding that they did so without
resorting to extra-legal measures and that no evidence having been adduced to show that they
were actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the herein accused, then their
testimonies should be accorded full credence.

Seventh

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in finding that even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and
Liwanag, x x x substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of
Filoteo (Petitioner).

Eight

Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that accused Filoteos (petitioners) and Mateos
[alleged] unexplained possession of the stolen checks raised the presumption that they were
responsible for the robbery in question, petitioners alleged possession not being borne out but
disputed by the prosecutions own evidence.

Ninth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in finding that accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and
implausible. The truth of the matter being that they should have been sustained since petitioner
was not identified by the direct victims-eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or were
present at the hijack and none of the checks and treasury warrants were found in his possession
or retrieved from him.

Tenth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in finding that the participation of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of record and that said evidence not only confirms the
conspiracy between [him and the other accused] as easily discernible from their conduct before,
during and after the commission of the offense; but also their participation therein as co-
principals by direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation.

Eleventh

The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction
in cavalierly rejecting, through the use of pejorative words, and without stating the legal basis of
such rejection, the various vital factual points raised by petitioner, in gross violation of the
express mandate of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court believes that the above errors may be condensed into four:

(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?

(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and
therefore illegal and inadmissible?

(3) Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper?

(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?

The Courts Ruling

Preliminary Issue: Rule 45 or Rule 65?

Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on the procedural aspects of the
case. Petitioner, a segurista, opted to file an (amended) alternative petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 and for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however hold that
the instant petition must be considered as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In Jariol,
Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,lx this Court clearly ruled:

Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan,
specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on
certiorari by this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides, in Section 2, that only questions of law may be raised in the
Petition for Review and these must be distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of
the Sandiganbayan are not to be reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
There are, of course, certain exceptions to this general principle. Here, reading petitioners
Petition for Review and Memorandum in the most favorable possible light, petitioner may be
seen to be in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain (f)acts in arriving at
its factual conclusions.

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that
(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of
fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave misapprehension
of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the
Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a persons life and liberty are at stake. lxi

As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy. For waffling on procedural matters, petitioner could have lost
this battle through a summary dismissal of his alternative petition. But in view of the importance
of the issues raised, the Court decided to take cognizance of the matter.

First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver

On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioners
extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime. Petitioner contends
that respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through
torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence
and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was
denied the right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right was likewise without
the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Courts admission in
evidence of his extrajudicial confession on the strength of caseslxii upholding the admissibility of
extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel especially where the statements
are replete with details and circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness. We shall first
tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.

The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.
(underscoring supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above underscored.)

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera,lxiii the Court categorically held that the
aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter)
must be prospectively applied. This Court said:

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a
prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to
silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is
admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity
of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been
informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before
that date.

By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by
an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the
assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the
right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a
number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in
force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel,lxiv the definitive ruling
was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile,lxv
issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The court
specifically ruled that (t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel.lxvi Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino,lxvii the Court
through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:

x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal
effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs.
Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers
made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales.

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit
rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on
May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective application of judge-made laws was
underscored in Co vs. Court of Appealslxviii where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that (j)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code which states that (l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes,
original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.lxix

Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given
retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code provides that (p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed
here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously
not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and
privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or
by individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the state.lxx Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are
those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the
state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and
enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law.lxxi

Hence, petitioners vigorous reliance on People vs. Sisonlxxii to make his extrajudicial confession
inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19,
1983, clearly after the promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983.

The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the
Court has still to determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently.lxxiii The
waiver must also be categorical and definitive,lxxiv and must rest on clear evidence.lxxv
In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code,lxxvi petitioner stated that:

x x x matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng Special Operations Group,

PC/INP Central Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga
karapatan alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng
Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na
walang abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa dahilang alam at nauunawaan
ko ang aking ginagawa at wala naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga katotohanan lamang,
bagamat ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na ikuha ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula
sa CLAO-IBP na akin namang tinanggihan:

xxx xxx x x x;

Na ako ay hindi sinaktan o minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha mula sa akin na hindi
niresibohan;

xxx xxx x x x.

Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner of his right to
counsel even in waiving the same rightlxxvii but petitioner did not even inform him that his father-
in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was
his comrade at the WPD General Assignment Section,lxxviii still, petitioner did not invoke his
right to counsel.

It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused.
He was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course.lxxix
Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the
detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects. lxxx in
other words, he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture?

Petitioners claim that he was tortured into signing the confession appears incredible, or at least
susceptible to serious doubts. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical reportlxxxi
showing no evidence of physical injuries upon his person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, there is no reason to maltreat him in particular when the record shows that the
investigating team respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent. When he was
presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, petitioner even
waived his right to present evidencelxxxii instead of impugning his confession on account of the
torture allegedly inflicted upon him. If indeed he had been tortured, he would have revived the
case he filed against his alleged torturers upon learning of its dismissal.

Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different documents on record bearing the
same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent
in his certification, extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention. Human experience has
proven that the lines and strokes of a persons handwriting reflect his disposition at a certain
given time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed to declare that petitioners
signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately after he had
been subjected to maltreatment. In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is
presumed to have been voluntarily made, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that
petitioners consent in executing the same had been vitiated.lxxxiii

Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a
factual question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on this
Court whose function, as afore-discussed, is principally to review only of questions of law.
Moreover, we have pored over the assailed Decision and we are satisfied that respondent Court
performed its duty in evaluating the evidence. More on this later.

The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers invited him
without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to
torture almost a month after the commission of the crime.lxxxiv Petitioners claim is belatedly
made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the trial
court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.:lxxxv

Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant.
When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped
from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant
of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this
issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest
of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error.

The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint for grave coercion,
grave threat & maltreatment which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684 before the Fiscals Office
of Quezon City.lxxxvi The complaint was an offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of
the SOG upon his arrest. However, as stated above, he did not lift a finger to revive it upon its
dismissal.

The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence

Contrary to petitioners claim, his culpability has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He
borrowed a car to use in the hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-type jeep would give
away his identity. He could not be identified by the postal employees in the postal van simply
because after overtaking said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up driving the
Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were made to ride, and commandeered the van. That
the checks were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and upon learning
that the authorities had begun to nail down the identities of the malefactors, he had entrusted
them to his kumare. It was petitioner himself who led the team of Lt. Pagdilao back to his place
after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio Carlos that his share of the checks were in the possession of
his kumare in the neighborhood.lxxxvii

In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct participant in the
commission of the crime. His alibi has been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be
weak and implausible. The distance between Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown
Manila where petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15) to
twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated during that time in
approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not therefore have been physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.lxxxviii

Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioners confession, this Court holds that the full
force of the totality of the prosecutions evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt.
Weighing heavily against the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial
courts -- in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself -- particularly in the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.

x x x It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
passing on the credibility of the witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.lxxxix

The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial courts conclusion on issues of credibility is accorded
with highest respect by the appellate courts (People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170). Appellate
courts will generally respect the findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses since trial
courts are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies. They heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. x x x.xc

So overwhelming is the prosecutions evidence that respondent Court opined that even without
the inter-locking confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag the remaining evidence would still
be sufficient for conviction.xci Said the respondent tribunal:

However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and
Liwanag, we are of the considered opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence exist which
indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo and Saguindel who had submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was responsible for securing
the use of the Mercedes Benz car used by the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with
Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered voluminous assorted checks which were part of
the loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm was used by him in the hi-jacking, which
firearm was identified by prosecution witnesses Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel was identified
in line-ups at the SOG office as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an Armalite rifle
by prosecution witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three (3) accused, namely, Mateo, Relator
and Saguindel also jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence to refute the
evidence presented by the prosecution against them. Such flight to evade prosecution constitutes
an implied admission of guilt.

Moreover, accused Filoteos and Mateos unexplained possession of the stolen checks raises the
presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in question. It is a rule established by an
abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in the possession of one, not the
owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be presumed the thief. This
rule is in accordance with the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act. In the instant
case, said accused has not given such satisfactory explanation, much more so when their
possession had been positively established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Capt.
Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by accuseds own signatures at the back of said checks.

Furthermore, accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and
implausible. His claim that he merely borrowed the Mercedes Benz car from Rodolfo Miranda to
help out his co-accused Mateo, who had been utilized by the police as an informer and was
following up tips in certain unsolved cases, appears to be incredible and fantastic. He also
claimed that he could not have participated in the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in
the morning of May 2, 1982, he waited at the corner of Zurbaran St. and Avenida Rizal between
2-3:00 oclock p.m. of the same day and then went to the WPD headquarters to attend the police
formation at around 5:00 oclock p.m. when Mateo failed to show up. Thereafter, he tried to show
through his witnesses Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with them between 3:00
oclock to 4:45 oclock p.m., then from 6:00 oclock to 8:30 oclock p.m. and, finally, from 10:45
oclock p.m. to 11:00 oclock of the same date. It was through said witnesses that he tried to
establish his whereabouts between 4:30 oclock to 7:30 oclock p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period
from the time the mail van was hi-jacked up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and
Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City and freed by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to
show that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the hi-jacking. We
take judicial notice that the distance between the crime scene and downtown Manila is some 15-
20 kilometers and negotiable over first-class roads in some thirty (30) minutes.

We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the
evidence of the participation of each of the accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision:xcii

The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy
have (sic) been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which evidence
not only confirms the existence of the conspiracy between them as easily discernible from their
conduct before, during and after the commission of the offense, but also their participation
therein as co-principals by direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted
efforts were performed with closeness and coordination indicating their common purpose.
Hence, there being collective criminal responsibility, the act of one is the act of all, and each of
the participants are responsible for what the others did in all the stages of execution of the
offense.
Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?

The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and though not argued by the parties in
their pleadings, the question of which law was violated by the accused should be discussed and
passed upon. In fact, petitioner should have brought up such question as it may benefit him with
a reduced penalty.

The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 532.xciii

Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates:

Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known
as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect to
the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a Philippine Highway which under
Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or any
part thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or
locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods,
articles or property or both, while under Section 2 (e) thereof Highway Robbery/Brigandage has
been defined as the the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or
the taking away of property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway. (Underscoring supplied)

The offense described in the information and established by the evidence presented by the
prosecution properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was
conclusively proven that a postal van containing mail matters, including checks and warrants,
was hi-jacked along the national highway in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of
force, violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal employees who were occupants
thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and its contents
consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the crime was committed by
the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with
their co-accused Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated in the
planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated
offense under the law in point are present. (Underscoring in the original text.)

Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the taking or robbery was
perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been
the statute violated. Such reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the case of
People vs. Isabelo Puno,xciv where it was ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more than
the situs of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court through Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado:

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The
crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the
crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a
band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band sala a los campos para
dedicarse a robar. (Italics ours.)

In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is
only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree
No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This
conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from
the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts
of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless are still committing acts
of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute x x x highway robbery/brigandage which are

among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries:

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such
acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people; (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by
the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, and which single act of depredation
would be capable of stunting the economic and social progress of the people as to be considered
among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries, and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished is said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering
on the ridiculous.

From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the
locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to
prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act of robbery but for several
indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence presented
that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another. What was duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van.
There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show
the indiscriminate commission thereof.xcv

Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D. 532.xcvi The facts alleged
therein and proven by the evidence constitute the offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in
relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 294, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code.xcvii From the
facts, it was duly proven that:

 personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools, etc.)

 belonging to another were

 unlawfully taken by the accused

 with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

 with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)

 in an uninhabited place, or

 by an band, or

 by attacking a moving motor vehicle

 on a highway; and

 the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)

Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided under
paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which is, prision correctional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period.

Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be lightened. However, such lighter
penalty shall benefit only herein petitioner and not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal
the Sandiganbayans Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295
and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of
the costs of the action.

All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., No part, being on official business abroad when this case was deliberated.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., No part, signatory to the appealed judgment.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 117818 April 18, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMAN DERILO, ISIDRO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias "Sido", LUCAS DOÑOS,
ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and JOHN DOE, accused

ISIDORO BALDIMINO y QUILLO, alias, "Sido", accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe
were charged with the so-called crime of murder committed by a band before the First Branch of
the former Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed therefor
1

alleges —

That on January 1, 1982 at about 6:00 o'clock P.M. at sitio Palaspas, Taft, Eastern
Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, with
the use of firearm and bolos, confederating and mutually helping one another did
then and there shot (sic) and stabbed (sic) one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting
injuries which caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought
within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the
information was translated in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded
not guilty. Trial on the merits was conducted thereafter.
3

However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6,
1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte, manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to
withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a
re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of murder.4
A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to test appellant's voluntariness and
comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of guilty. Satisfied with the answers
of appellant, the trial court convicted him of the crime of murder defined and punished under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 5

A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecution eyewitness Cresencio Lupido. 6

According to him, Perpetua C. Adalim went to his house at Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in
Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening of January 1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and
desiring to work in her ricefields. Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one
of the properties owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed Lupido's wife to get
food from her house in the poblacion as she had decided to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas.

While Perpetua was waiting and standing in the yard of the house, five armed men arrived and
confronted Perpetua. Lupido recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidoro
Baldimo, as these two frequently passed by his house at Sitio Palaspas. He did not know the
other three men but he claimed that he could identity them if brought before him.

Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then, without any warning, Derilo shot
Perpetua three times with the pistol he was carrying. After she fell to the ground, appellant, who
was standing at the right side of Derilo, approached Perpetua and stabbed her several times with
a knife that looked like either a Batangas knife or a bolo know locally as "depang." A third
member of the group, with a short and stout physique, followed suit in stabbing Perpetua. After
the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the yard for some time and left, walking in the
direction of the mountains. All of them carried long firearms.

As soon as the group had left the scene of the crime, Lupido hurriedly went to Perpetua's house
in the poblacion of Taft where he informed the family of the deceased about the incident. 7

Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief
pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death penalty
imposed by the lower court to life imprisonment. Although appellant is aware that he has made
8

his plea of guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence, thus foreclosing the
application of paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, he contends that his untimely
9

acknowledgment of culpability may still be treated by analogy as a mitigating circumstance

under paragraph 10 of the same article, invoking therefor the aforesaid case of Coronel. 10

Unfortunately, that decision relied upon by appellant is inapplicable to his case. The death
penalty in People vs. Coronel, et al. was modified to "life imprisonment" not in consideration
11

of paragraph 10, Article 13 of the code but because the number of votes of then required to
affirm a sentence of death imposed by a lower court was not secured by this Court in its
12

automatic review of the judgment. Apparently, the required number for concurrence was not
obtained because some members of the Court treated the belated confession of the accused
therein as an indication on his part to reform, and they felt that he should only suffer the same
penalty imposed on some of his co-conspirators.
The late plea of guilty entered by herein appellant cannot be considered mitigating because the
plea made is not "of a similar nature and analogous" to the plea of guilty contemplated in
paragraph 7 of Article 13. A plea of guilty is considered mitigating on the rationale that an
accused spontaneously and willingly admits his guilt at the first opportunity as an act of
repentance. An accused should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of the proceedings by
pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to later substitute the same with a plea of guilty after
discovering that the People has a strong case against him. Withal, all is not lost for appellant.

The killing of the victim, Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the lower court to have been
qualified to murder by treachery. Although not alleged in the information, the circumstances of
superior strength hand cuadrilla were taken note of by the court a quo based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution, but the same were correctly regarded by said court as absorbed in
alevosia. However, it found that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
likewise attended the commission of the crime. Hence, with no mitigating circumstance to offset
this aggravating circumstance, the trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the supreme penalty of
death and to indemnify and pay damages to the heirs of the victim.

It will be observed from a reading of the lower court's decision that its judgment was obviously
13

based not only on the evidence presented by the prosecution but also on appellant's belated
admission of guilt, together with some inconclusive pronouncements of this Court on conspiracy.
The former apparently proved the circumstances of treachery, superior strength and cuadrilla,
while the latter supposedly supplied the ground for the finding of evident premeditation.

We agree with the finding of the court below that appellant participated in the treacherous killing
of Perpetua C. Adalim. Appellant's presence in the locus criminis and his identification were
positively supplied by the prosecution's eyewitness. The unwavering and unequivocal testimony
of Lupido, corroborated by that of Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone who conducted the postmortem
examination on the corpse of the victim and submitted his corresponding autopsy report,
14 15

indubitably show the deliberate employment by the accused of a reliable and unfailing means to
ensure the killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend herself.

However, we cannot give the same stamp of approval to the finding on premeditacion conocida
declared by the trial court. The disturbing conclusions of said court thereon need to be clarified
to obviate misconceptions that may affect the stability of our present rules on evidence and
criminal procedure. Said the lower court on this aspect:

The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is likewise present in the

commission of the offense of murder as the existence of the conspiracy among the
accused Baldimo and his co-accused having been duly proven also beyond
peradventure of doubt, presupposes evident premeditation (People vs. Belen, L-
13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39) which the said accused himself supplied the
evidence on this score by virtue of his plea of guilty, which circumstance is not
the least disproven by the evidence on record. Thus, its appreciation as an
aggravating circumstance in this case.
 A plea of guilty constitute(s) an admission of all material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances alleged, although the
offense charged be capital. (People vs. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA
88; People vs. Mongado, L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; People vs.
Tilos, L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734).

A plea of guilty is mitigating and at the same time it constitutes an admission of

all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital. Because of the
aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the
trial court to receive his evidence, much less require his presence in court. (People
vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450; People vs. Estebia, 40 SCRA 90). 16

The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crime of murder on the bases of its findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant and
the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused. As earlier stated, appellant entered his plea of
guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence
whatsoever was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation. The records and the
transcripts of stenographic notes are barren of any proof tending to show any prior reflection on,
followed after some time by persistence in, the criminal resolution of the five accused.

It is elementary law that to establish evident premeditation, these must be proof of (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its
warnings. 17

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to
18

kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot
be considered. Evident premeditation must be based on external acts and must be evident, not
merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning. Otherwise stated, there must be a
demonstration by outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. 19

As there is no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to show when appellant
and his co-accused meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill the victim and the
intervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out, the circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be presumed against appellant. As early as 1905, we laid down the rule that
the circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as
conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish
their presence. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must
not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the liability of the accused. 20
It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance before being
taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of
the act charged as the criminal offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be
21

shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have
been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of
proof.22

II

The foregoing doctrines consequently point to the need of reconciling them with the old rule that
a plea of guilty admits not only the crime but also its attendant circumstances which is relied
upon and invoked by the lower court in this case to justify its conclusion of evident
premeditation to aggravate the liability of appellant.

Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile
rule enunciating that there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged
in an information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our rulings
regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise:

Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances were

deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information covers both the
crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the
crime. 23

We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically with
the consequences thereof. Thus, in People vs. Rapirap, it was formerly explained that the
24

subject doctrine has the following effects:

A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or information,
but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of the trial itself. Such
plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents and
purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It
leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law.

Then, in People vs. Lambino, we prevented the accused in criminal actions from contradicting
25

the outcome of his admission, with our holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all
the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing that he has
not committed them.

People vs. Yamson, et al. thereafter expanded the application of the doctrine to both capital and
26

non-capital cases:

A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint
or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient
 to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the
necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant
himself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not even if the offense is
capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as well as its
attendant circumstances.

Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. cited by some of the cases relied upon by the lower court,
27

declared that —

While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an

admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstance therein recited, . . . The prosecution does not need to
prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in the second amended
information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite
proof.

With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed that it had acted correctly in
presuming the existence of evident premeditation based on appellant's plea of guilty without any
proof being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental
growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial
courts should follow in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty, was introduced into our
remedial law with this provision:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the

accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. 28

We expounded on this in People vs. Camay with this explanation:

29

Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a
plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court
must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent
jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial
court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its
meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the introduction of
evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the
defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not only to satisfy the trial
 judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not the accused really
and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his
plea.

The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in
the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might
have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to
which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the
crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the
imposition of the prescribed penalty. 30

To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot that the rule in Section 3, Rule
31

116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge who fails to observe its command
commits a grave abuse of discretion.

This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule with regard to the presentation of
evidence in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting
trial courts in the earlier Rules of Court sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever
32

guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the lower
courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the accused fully comprehends
the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty.

III

There is another reason why we have to reject the aforesaid conclusion reached by the lower
court in this case. Under settled jurisprudence, the consequences of aggravating circumstances
alleged in the information must be explained to the accused when he pleads guilty to a crime
imputed against him.

A reading of the questions directed at appellant during his re-arraignment reveals a shortcoming
on the part of the trial court to fully explain to appellant the consequences of his plea.
33

COURT:

All right, please come forward, Mr. Baldimo. Your lawyer, Atty.
Camilo Libanan manifested to the court that you intimated to him
your desire to withdraw your plea of not guilty when arraigned in
this case and to substitute the same with a plea of not guilty after
the prosecution has already presented evidence and in fact closed
its evidence this morning. What have you to say about the
manifestation of your lawyer, Atty. Libanan?

ACCUSED: Yes, your honor.

COURT:
All right, re-arraign the accused. Did you understand the
information charging, you with the crime of murder along with
some other persons?

A Yes, your honor.

Q All right, what will your plea be?

ACCUSED:

Guilty.

COURT:

When you withdraw your plea of not guilty to the information

when arraigned the first time and substitute the same with a plea of
guilty this morning, did you do so of your free and voluntary will?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you not forced, threatened, coerced or intimidated to

change your plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a plea
of guilty?

A I was not.

Q Were you not under influence by any person or persons who

exercises legal authority over you which may have been the
consideration why you are now pleading guilty to the offense
charged?

A None.

Q Do you realize the consequences of a plea, of your plea of

guilty?

A Yes, your honor.

Q You are therefore aware that by your plea of guilty you will be
penalized by the court and ordered to indemnify your victim as
well as other accessory penalties provided for by law?

A Yes, your honor.

Q And this notwithstanding your realization of what a plea of

guilty entail, will you still insist on your plea of guilty to the
 information charging you with the crime of murder committed by a
band?

A Yes, your honor.

Q Was it your realization that you actually committed the crime

charged and the prodding of your conscience that you now enter
the plea of guilty?

A Yes, your honor.

Q Are you now repentant?

A I am not repentant.

Q You are not repentant for what you have done?

A Yes, sir, I am repentant.

Q In other words, you regret having committed the acts, having

committed the crime charged?

A Yes, your honor.

COURT:

All right, promulgation is set on August 18. All right, September 1.

A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was even made to explain to the
accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense, attended by an aggravating
circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death penalty. We cannot declare with
34

reasonable certainty that when appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information
he knew that he was at the same time admitting the presence and serious effects of the
aggravating circumstances alleged therein. We are more inclined to believe, as a matter of
judicial experience, that when he admitted his role in the killing of the deceased, he only
intended to limit such admission to the crime charged and not to the aggravating circumstances.

The trial judge did not himself try to inform or advise appellant regarding the consequences of
pleading guilty to having killed the victim with both circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery. More particularly, the trial judge did not himself try to convey to appellant, in ordinary
language that appellant would be assumed to understand, the meaning of evident premeditation
and treachery as circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder and to aggravate the
penalty as to call for the maximum penalty of death. 35

We quote from the old but instructive and still authoritative case of U.S. vs. Jamad. 36
 If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense
charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical language
so often used in formal complaints and informations in qualifying the acts
constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly understand the consequences by
way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from his admission of his guilt
of the crime in the precise technical manner and form in which it is charged, his
plea of guilty should not be held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Our experience has taught us that it not infrequently happens that, upon
arraignment, accused persons plead "guilty" to the commission of the gravest
offenses, qualified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in truth and in
fact they intend merely to admit that they committed the act or acts charged in the
complaint, and have no thought of admitting the technical charges of aggravating
circumstances. It not infrequently happens that after a formal plea of "guilty" it
develops under the probe of the trial judge, or in the course of the statement of the
accused made at the time of the entry of his plea, or upon the witness stand, that
the accused, while admitting the commission of the acts charged in the
information, believes or pretends to believe that these acts were committed under
such circumstances as to exempt him in whole or in part from criminal liability.
Clearly, a formal plea of guilty entered under such circumstances is not sufficient
to sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime charged in the information.

In People vs. Alamada, this Court found the trial court to have failed in observing that quantum
37

of care which it had prescribed for the valid admission of a plea of guilty by an accused,
especially in capital cases, when it did not explain to the accused the nature of the charges
against him, particularly the allegations regarding conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, which are terms so technical that the layman, especially an
unschooled one like the accused in the said case, cannot possibly understand without proper
elucidation.

It is neither just nor reasonable to assume that an uneducated person understands the allegation
that "the aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation were present in the
commission of the crime," inasmuch as "treachery" and "premeditation" are highly technical
terms the juridical meaning of which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates alone but
even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers. 38

If many members of the Bar are unable to call to mind the technical requisites of "treachery" and
"evident premeditation" as qualifying and aggravating circumstances, there is no reason for
supposing that the accused, who is a farmer by occupation, understood such elements and
requisites after a few minutes of whispered advice from a counsel de oficio in open court. 39

Another reason why we cannot agree with the lower court's posture on this issue is the consistent
holding in several cases that a plea of guilty to an information alleging aggravating
circumstances will not be considered an admission of such circumstances if the evidence
presented by the prosecution fails to establish them.
Even the case of People vs. Boyles cited by the trial court disallowed the appreciation of the
40

aggravating circumstance of nighttime when the Supreme Court found out that other than the
time of the commission of the crime, nothing else suggested the circumstance of nocturnidad as
understood in criminal law, to wit:

Not one of the prosecution evidence, oral or documentary, makes the slightest
indication that the protection of the night's darkness was deliberately availed of by
the appellants. In view of this deficiency in the case for the Government, we are
constrained to disallow the said circumstance even as, technically, it may have
been accepted by them when they pleaded guilty on arraignment.

On the same ratiocination, although herein appellant pleaded guilty to the charge as alleged in
the information, evident premeditation may not be taken against him since the evidence
presented by the People does not adequately disclose the existence of the same. Where the
41

aggravating circumstances listed in the information were not supported by the evidence adduced,
a plea of guilty to a capital offense cannot constitute an admission of the aggravating
circumstances set forth in the information. 42

The above rulings drew from People vs. Corachea which, in turn, reiterated the dictum in
43

People vs. Galapia that even under the old rule on judicial confession of guilt, to be
44

appreciated the aggravating circumstances must further be duly proved.

The rule is that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged
in the information including the aggravating circumstances listed therein. But,
where such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, it should be disallowed
in the judgment. Thus, in People vs. Gungab (64 Phil. 779), the Court ruled "that
when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads guilty to the crime of parricide
described in the information as having been committed with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and his testimony given
under oath before the trial court, upon his petition fails to show the existence of
such aggravating circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being
limited to the admission of having committed the crime of parricide, not having
done so with treachery and evident premeditation.

In view of the present requirement of Section 3, Rule 116 for the presentation of evidence but
with due explanation to appellant of the significance of the aggravating circumstances alleged in
an information, and considering the insufficiency of the People's evidence showing evident
premeditation in this case, we cannot consider appellant's plea of guilty as an admission of the
existence of that aggravating circumstance.

As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot
stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by said Section 3 of Rule
116. Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the
attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the
prosecution should prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Section 3 would
become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating
circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule.

While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned,
we find no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely
whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty
is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction
is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged . 45

Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there
is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. As already observed, the
46

prosecution had already rested when appellant decided to change his plea. The prosecution then
had all the opportunity to verify the material allegations in the information. Despite such
opportunity, it only successfully established treachery but failed to present any evidence tending
to prove evident premeditation.

We also doubt the applicability to the case at bar of People vs. Belen, cited by the lower court,
47

to the effect that conspiracy presupposes evident premeditation. A reading of People vs.
Timbang, et al. upon which Belen is based, does not state, either categorically or impliedly, that
48

evident premeditation exists where conspiracy is proven.

There is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the concerted actions of the
accused. The existence of this mode in the commission of a felony can be inferred from the
sudden shooting of the victim by Derilo and the successive stabbing of her person by appellant
and his unidentified companion.

However, to claim that evident premeditation can be inferred from conspiracy violates the
fundamental principle that aggravating circumstances should also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt as the crime alleged to have been committed. While the court below did not equate
conspiracy with evident premeditation, the latter cannot be deduced from the former as the
elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely different.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement, the agreement concerned
the commission of a felony, and the execution of the felony is decided upon. However, unlike
evident premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences on his
intended deed, conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this assent is established, each and
everyone of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime committed by anyone of
them. 49

To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the previous agreement and
decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective. To end any doubt on this matter, we quote our ruling in People
50

vs. Rizal:51

There is no proof, aside from conspiracy, that the accused and his companions
had sufficient time to plan the killing, reflect on it and after reflection decided to
commit the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances where conspiracy is present
with proof of attendant deliberation and selection of the method, times and means
of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation is taken for granted.
But when conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused and his
companions in the perpetration of the crime and there is no showing that
characterizes evident premeditation, such aggravating circumstance cannot be
taken for granted but must be proved like any other of its kind. (Emphasis
supplied).

It can thus be said that evident premeditation can only be deduced from conspiracy if in the
course of directly proving conspiracy, the elements of evident premeditation were likewise
presented and proven. But then, in such a case, evident premeditation would not merely be
presumed but actually established. Hence, it follows that there is really a need for the
presentation of evidence indicating the existence of premeditacion conocida, which was not done
in this case.

IV

We could stop at this juncture, with the vital points against the death penalty having been made,
but there are certain facets of this case which necessitate elucidation. Indeed, the peculiar
antecedents and chronological milieu of the instant case confront us now with what appear to be
the problematical application of two penal laws.

At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused
on October 12, 1986, the substantive law in force dealing with the crime of murder was Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code which took effect way back on January 1, 1932. Said provision
provided that any person guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death.

Then on February 2, 1987, a new Constitution came into force after its ratification on that date
by the people. The 1987 Constitution, regarded by some as progressive since it contains new
provisions not covered by our earlier two Constitutions, proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill
of Rights) thereof the imposition of the death penalty, as follows:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country,
Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further
amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said law was
officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is now
the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.

Although the elements and circumstances which qualify a killing to murder were maintained,
Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by imposing a heavier penalty for
murder than that originally prescribed, the new penalty provided in Section 6 of said amendatory
statute being reclusion perpetua to death.

Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be applied to the crime of
murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws.
Further, the presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or
is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt,
52

the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Nor can the prospective
53

application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted just because of the constitutional provision
leaving to Congress the matter of the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress
did not otherwise provide.

The interpellations in the Constitutional Commission tasked to draw up the present Constitution
is enlightening in our determination of the non-retroactivity of said law, thus:

MR. BENGZON. And then, supposing Congress passes a law

imposing the death penalty on those very same crimes committed
by those that were convicted of the death penalty which penalty
has been commuted to reclusion perpetua, will they go back?

MR. MONSOD. No.

MR. BENGZON. Not anymore?

MR. MONSOD. Any new law passed by the National Assembly

would be prospective in character. 54

One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity. This general
principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission," and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no act or
omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at
the time the act was committed. 55

Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7659 would be
violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Among others, an ex post
56

facto law has been defined as one which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. 57
It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the accused.
58
Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for
murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall within the
exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal laws.

Lastly, observance of juridical uniformity in the decisions of this Court requires that we refrain
from applying Republic Act No. 7659 to the case at bar. The present case is not the first and only
instance where the Court has had to review a sentence for death after this amendatory law came
into force. To give retroactive effect to said law in this case will disturb the numerous decisions
of the Court imposing reclusion perpetua on the accused who committed capital offenses prior
to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and were convicted after its effectivity but before that
of Republic Act No. 7659, even though the penalty imposable would have been death.

Having eliminated the possibility of applying the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659 in
the present case, we now examine the applicability of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
prior to its aforesaid amendment. On May 20, 1987, this Court issued Circular No. 9 regarding
the imposition of the death penalty, under the circumstances therein defined. In the said circular,
all courts were enjoined to impose only the penalty of reclusion perpetua, even in those cases
wherein our penal laws provide for the imposition of the death penalty, until Congress shall have
provided by law for the definition of the heinous crimes contemplated in the 1987 Constitution.

Prior thereto, in an en banc resolution dated April 30, 1987 issued in Administrative Matter No.
87-5-3173-0, the Court took cognizance of the Cabinet Meeting held on April 8, 1987 wherein,
among others, the President agreed to issue a statement officially commuting to life
imprisonment the death sentence theretofore imposed on some convicts, in accordance with the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. However, a verification with the Executive Department,
through the Department of Justice, reveals that the projected presidential commutation never
materialized.

It will further be noted that said circular referred only to those cases then "under automatic
review by the Court," and the aforestated resolution quoted therein likewise contemplated
"pending cases before the Court," that is, as of May 20, 1987. Those issuances could not
therefore apply to the present case since, as hereinafter explained, the case at bar was brought on
appeal to this Court only on July 20, 1994.

Be that as it may, however, whether or not evident premeditation was present in this case and
regardless of the inapplicability thereto of the aforementioned circular and resolution, the Court
is reasonably convinced that it cannot validly impose the capital punishment on appellant. The
words of the Constitution are clear: Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. Appellant, it will be recalled, was sentenced in 1986 to suffer the death
penalty as then provided under the Revised Penal Code. With the ratification of the Constitution
in 1987, that sentence should have been reduced to reclusion perpetua under such constitutional
fiat.

The fact that this Court will have the opportunity to review appellant's case only now does not
detract from the force of such directive of the Constitution. Neither will the fact that Circular No.
9 was not yet issued when appellant was tried and convicted prevent the application to him of
that Constitutional provision. It is not the action of the courts which, under the circumstances,
convert his sentence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such reduction is directed and effected by
the explicit words of the fundamental charter; the courts merely apply this express and self-
executing provision of the Constitution when they impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua
rather than the imposable penalty of death in appropriate cases.

Again, the following proceedings in the Constitutional Commission yield light on the foregoing
proposition:

MR. DE CASTRO. The proponent's amendment is a comma (,)

after "inflicted" on line 29 to be followed by the clause "UNLESS
FOR COMPELLING REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS
CRIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY." In this proposed amendment, there will still
be a need for the National Assembly to pass a law providing for
the death penalty. Is this correct?

MR. MONSOD. Yes.

MR. DE CASTRO. What happens to those awaiting execution,

having already the death penalty on their heads, but there is no law
yet passed by the National Assembly?

MR. MONSOD. Then the next sentence will apply: "Death penalty
already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua. 59

It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not made dependent on a
law, decree, condition, or period before the aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the
courts. It cannot be inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from the
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should be brought to the
Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in order that it can be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to
be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. 60

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view
to upholding rather than destroying it.

The fact that no proclamation or grant of commutation was officially issued by the President will
not prevent the implementation and operation of Section 19 to appellant. To argue otherwise
would be subordinating the command of the Constitution to the will of the President. The
framers of the Constitution never intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death
sentence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent on the act or omission of the
Chief Executive.

Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission will justify this conclusion:
MR. REGALADO. May I ask Commissioner Monsod about this
second sentence. "Death penalty already imposed shall be
commuted to reclusion perpetua."

When we say commuted to reclusion perpetua, I think we refer to

the power of the President to effect commutations because only the
President can commute sentences already final and imposed by the
courts. Is that correct?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I am not the proponent of that

sentence. Perhaps the Committee should answer that.

MR. REGALADO. That was the answer of the Gentleman in

response to the inquiry of Commissioner Bengzon.

MR. MONSOD. My answer is reflective of what the Committee

had answered before. And since that has not been changed, I
suppose the answer would be the same. But if the Committee
would like to answer it in more detail, perhaps it should be the one
to answer that.

FR. BERNAS. The intention of the provision here is, upon

ratification of this Constitution, the death penalty already imposed
is automatically — without need for any action by the President —
commuted.

MR. REGALADO. Yes, because the wording here is: "Death

penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua." The power of commutation is a presidential prerogative.

FR. BERNAS. Or we can say "ARE HEREBY commuted," if that

is clearer. But that is the intention.

MR. REGALADO. Does the Commission mean "are hereby

reduced"?

FR. BERNAS. Commuted to the death penalty.

MR. REGALADO. It "shall be REDUCED to reclusion

perpetua"?

FR. BERNAS. To reclusion perpetua, yes.

MR. REGALADO. Maybe the Commissioner should eliminate the

word "commute" because we are invading the presidential
prerogative.
 THE PRESIDENT. Is the Gentleman proposing an amendment to
the amendment? 61

Although Commissioner Regalado was not able to formally propose an amendment because of
an intervening question by another commissioner, his observation was correspondingly accepted
by the Commission as shown by the use of the word "reduced" in the present provision of the
Constitution, instead of "commute" as originally proposed. The fact is that he did not have to
propose an amendment as Commissioner Bernas, who was representing the committee
concerned, had already taken note thereof and acceded thereto.

Thus, in his work on the 1987 Constitution, Commissioner Bernas had this to say on the matter:

. . . . But since "commutation" is technically an executive prerogative, the

Commission, in order to make the effect automatic without having to wait for
presidential action, deliberately avoided the use of the word "commuted" and, on
the suggestion of Commissioner Regalado, used instead "reduced". Thus the
provision reads: "Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua." The phrase "shall be reduced" is not a description of some future act
but a command that is immediately effective. (Nevertheless, President Aquino
issued an Executive Order, perhaps ad cautelam, commuting death sentences
already imposed.) 62

From the foregoing, it is apparent that no presidential action is necessary in order that any
accused sentenced to the death penalty under the same circumstances as herein appellant may
avail of the benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of his
sentence. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, its language should be
understood in the sense that it may have in common use. Its words should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. While "to commute" necessitates
63

presidential initiative, "to reduce" does not.

Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation, the death penalty
prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court
in 1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in
1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived
the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By February 2, 1987, that
penalty had already been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the
President or of the courts, but by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.

Before we end, we note the extremely protracted delay in bringing appellant's conviction to the
attention of this Court. Although the judgment of the lower court was promulgated on October
12, 1986, the records of this case were elevated to this Court only on July 20, 1994. Even by
64

this date, the records were not yet complete as some of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial were not included in the records forwarded to this Court.

We can only blame the court of origin for this improbable and unexplained delay of almost eight
years. It is the express and specific duty of the clerk thereof to transmit to this Court, within the
periods allowed therefor, the complete records of the case where the death penalty is imposed for
automatic review. Paragraph 5, Section L (Appeal), Chapter VI (Duties in Criminal Cases) of the
Manual for Clerks of Court, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 10, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, provides:

5. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. — In all cases where the

death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days but
not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of
denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter.

The Office of the Court Administrator is accordingly directed to investigate this matter and
submit the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation to this Court within ninety (90)
days from notice hereof.

All clerks of court are hereby ordered to scrupulously comply with their duty and responsibility
of seasonably transmitting to this Court the complete records of cases where the death penalty
was imposed, especially now that the trial courts have imposed the death penalty in many cases
involving heinous crimes.

With respect to the case at bar, in justice to appellant this appellate proceeding shall be treated as
an automatic review because there is no showing in the records that he was advised that the death
penalty imposed upon him has been reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of the 1987 Constitution; and that his case is no longer subject to automatic review, as
provided and required in Circular No. 9 of this Court, hence a notice of appeal should have been
filed.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and by virtue of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court
a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.