I. BILL OF RIGHTS (PART I: Article III, Sections 1 to 8) administration of the government.
administration of the government. POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
A. INTRODUCTION
1.Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers'
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which
may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their
jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be
lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are
absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.”
2. Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, [January 5, 1994
Facts :
Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors of
North EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within
the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights". Human rights are the basic rights which
inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of the world. Human rights include civil rights
(right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused
to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social services. Human rights
are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are inherent,
human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. Human rights includes all
the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate
and inalienable. CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or
establishment or administration of the government.
B.DUE PROCESS
Concepts
1.Article III of the Constitution, Section 1
2.City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed
as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be
closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels
and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but
mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power
W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law
HELD:
The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are not met.
The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of
the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every house, building, park,
curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no
"pure" places where there are impure men.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to
shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing,
a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local
Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is
not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council
3.Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) v. Natividad, G.R. No. 15574, September 17, 1919
FACTS
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of
its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine
Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross. The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of
transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application (Certificate of Philippine Regitry) was
made in Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The
Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were
not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands under Act No. 2761 which provides: SEC. 1172.
Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons
gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons
gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. SEC. 1176.
Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until
the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in
legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and
seventy-two of this Code. Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the
laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations
based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its properly without due process of law because by the passage of the law company was automatically
deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use.
ISSUE
WON the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny registry of vessel with foreign stockholders.
RATIO
Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to
the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of
Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co.
Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class
legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of
the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision. The guaranties of the Fourteenth
Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person"
includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their
property is concerned. Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made among
corporations, but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection. A literal
application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable deduction that Act No.
2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal
protection of the laws. To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a
certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or
of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the
exceptions. One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, broad and
comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes
termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of
the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must
often be had in certain districts. This is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court say "extends to
so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For
quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying to
the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public
interest. Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an antialien
shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. With full consciousness
of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly of the opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership
for purposes of obtaining a certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine Islands,
and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress
of August 29, 1916 No treaty right relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and
constitutional .
Life, Liberty, and Property
4.Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968
Facts:
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that “every public officer, ...after his assumption to office and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year...”
Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search
and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan. After the submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts, the
CFI found for Morfe, affirming that the requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause – hence,
Section 7 of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.
Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc appealed the decision of the CFI before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, pursuant to
R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the State’s police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause?
Ruling:
No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality
in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be
pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times
demanded such a remedial device.
In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of a statute’s validity must prevail over mere
pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila). While in the attainment of
attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear,
categorical, and undeniable that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting to
property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of the
security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be
invoked.
5.Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385
(Resolution), December 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain
provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
6.Cornejo v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 16887, November 17, 1920
Facts:
The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these proceedings in
mandamusto have theprovincial governor and the provincial board of the Province of Rizaltemporarily restrained from
going ahead with investigation of the charges filed against him pending resolution of the case, and to have an order
issue directed to the provincial governor commanding him to return the petitioner to his position as municipalpresident
of Pasay. The members of the provincial board have interposed a demurrer based on the ground that this court has
no right to keep them from complying with the provisions of the law. The provincial governor has filed an answer to
the petition, in whichhe alleges as a special defense that numerous complaints have been received by him against the
conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo, that these complaints were investigated by him; that he came to theconclusion that
agreeable to the powers conferred upon provincial governors, the municipal president should be temporarily
suspended, and that an investigation is now being conducted by the provincial board. Counsel for petitioner has
argued, that his client has been deprivedof an office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having
an opportunity to be heard in his own defense.  The respondents reply that all that the provincial governor and
theprovincial board have done in this case is to comply with the requirements of the law which they are sworn
to enforce.
Is su e :
WON the Provincial Governor may suspend the erring MunicipalPresident of Pasay without due process
of law
Held:
Yes, it is only fair to mention certain exceptions to the due process oflaw rule, which would seem to include the instant
case.
Ra tio:
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a
judicial proceeding. In certainproceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated,without
fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are notessential to due process of law.Again, for this
petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, itwould be necessary to consider an office as
"property." It is, however, wellsettled in the United States, that a public office is not property within thesense of
the constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is a publictrust or agency.The basic idea of government in
the Philippine Islands, as in the UnitedStates, is that of a popular representative government, the officers
beingmere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set ofmen has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where everyofficer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and
holds theoffice as a trust for the people whom he represents.
7.Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, G.R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931
Facts:
Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December 29, 1928, by the
temporary councillors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it
impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2) it was enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended
for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of
the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee composed of persons who
are not members of the council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated by said
council to that committee.
He further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and open to the public the cockpit in
question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series
of 1928, he has acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928,
which was subsequently approved.
Issue:
Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under property rights which a person
may not be deprived of without due process of law
Held:
No.
The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the
holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when the public
interests so require; (2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a
study of the sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in character, but
only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a municipal council duly constituted,
which suspends the effects of another which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and
legal.
Aspects of Due Process: Substantive
8. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463
& 168730, September 1, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and
6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority
to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT
is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs
under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that
no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since
the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the
increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Discussions:
Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments,
but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the
House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive
to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach
the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to
the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.”
Rulings:
R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily,
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications
for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property,
the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s
power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear
showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
Aspects of Due Process: Procedural
9. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor
and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018
10. Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891 (Resolution),
March 11, 1991
Facts:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with untreated
wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On
September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on 2 findings made on
Solar Textile Finishing Corportion’s plant, directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater
pollution source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution
Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a temporary
operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the Board but the same
was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend
the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents
or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the
Board). Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may
issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and Writ of Execution against
Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. YES.
RULING:
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following
circumstances:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged
sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds
the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the
discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person
generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be
immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said
pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court.
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board were entirely within its lawful
authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like in this case. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that
the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like
those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's
petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as
Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the
decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis
of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
A. Judicial
(1) Impartial Tribunal
11. People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118882 (Resolution), September 26,
1996
FACTS:
-The case is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for injunction and/or restraining order which seeks to:
(a)Annul and set aside the decision of the case People of the Philippines vs Hon Pedro Espina et al. insofar
as it denied the Peoples prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro Espina of the RTC of Tacloban from
hearing the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs Cristela Reyes. And (b) enjoin the said judge
from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal case
-The court required the respondents to comment on the sad prayer of the petitioners within 10 days from notice.
The respondents however failed to do so.
-Until now, the respondents have not yet submitted their comments on the because the delays of the proceedings
may benefit the respondents and sanctions against them would not be that much since most of the
respondents are detained. The
-The court then proceeded to dispense the comments and proceed with the disposition of the petition.
ISSUE:
-W/N Judge Espino should be inhibited from presiding on the Criminal Case, People vs Cristela Reyes.
HELD:
YES
REASONING:
-Judge Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, cannot be considered to adequately possess
such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess the both the evidence to be presented by the
prosecution and defense in view of his previous decision wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation
at the Regional State Prosecutor’s office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in
the killing of her husband Dominador Go.
-Espina’s decision in favor of respondent Jane Go, serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution
to seriously doubt his impartiality in handing the cases.
-One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an
impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. The court
consistently demands the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
-The litigants should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice.
 (2) Jurisdiction Lawfully Acquired
12. Rabino v. Cruz, G.R. No. 95775, May 24, 1993
FACTS:
This case stems from the ejectment case filed by private respondents against David Palmenco, et. al. docketed as
Civil Cases No. 630 and No. 631 of the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, for the recovery of portions of a parcel of
land located at Sitio Sampalucan, Barangay San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners also occupies said land but were not
impleaded in the aforementioned cases. The MTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondents and ordered the
ejection of Palmenco. The court thereafter issued a writ of demolition which Palmenco appealed in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The petitioners, who were not impleaded in the Civil Cases, filed a
case as an opposition to the writ of demolition. The MTC, on December 6, 1988, issued a restraining order for said writ.
The Respondents appealed the December 6, 1988 order in the Court of Appeals which declared such order null and
void, hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were denied due process of law by including them in the writ of demolition
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner’s right to due process was violated because they were not impleaded as parties in Civil Cases No.
630 and 631, which are the basis for the writ of demolition. The rule is that judgment cannot bind persons who are not
parties to the action. This rule is anchored on the constitutional right of a person to due process of law. Due process is
satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing." It must be noted that respondent was not a party
to the ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and
during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Respondent only went to the court to protect her property from
demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the
judgment in said ejectment cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor
can its writ of execution be enforced against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.
Clearly, the second requirement aforementioned does not obtain in Civil Cases no 630 and 631, for the trial court in
said cases did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners as they were not impleaded therein and were
consequently not summoned to appear and present their defenses to resist the claims of private respondents
(3) Opportunity to be heard
13. Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation Office v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395,
July 3, 2017
(4) Lawful Hearing
14. Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corp., G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January
19, 2018
B. Administrative Due Process/Quasi-Judicial
15. Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940
16. Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
Publication and Due Process
17. Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985
Appeal and Due Process
18. Dimarucot y Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 183975 (Resolution), September 20,
2010
C.EQUAL PROTECTION
Definition
1.Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R.
No. 148208, December 15, 2004
FACTS
The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Other
Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended their charters. After almost 8 years following the amendment
of the GFIs’ charters, BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against the BSP and the
Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the
New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary
grade of 19 and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade under 19). They alleged its constitutionality for
being an invalid “class legislation”.
Petitioner’s Contentions: (1) The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the officers of the BSP
(those holding the salary grade of 19 and up) are exempted from the SSL.(2) Those belonging from 19 and up and
those 19 below do not really differ from one other in terms of the nature of work and expertise.(3) Other GFIs, which
are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.
BSP’s contention:(1) The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed
in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.”
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:(1) The proviso is not unconstitutional as the
classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of the new SB Act
to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national
government.
ISSUE:
WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause
RULING
YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate – so
long as the classification is not unreasonable. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons themselves, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the
SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination or distinction
has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in the
subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case
changed. The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to salary grade or
position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and
unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely the
fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their
rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file
employees of the exemption from SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection. The equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
 Valid Classification
(1) Substantial Distinction
2.Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
FACTS
In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children”. It
defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate
partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child. Rosalie Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The husband now, assails the constitutionality
of RA 9262 as being violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the Equal Protection clause
RULING
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed
and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse
to whom the State extends its protection.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The unequal power relationship
between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake ameliorative action that
would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the
government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
Notes:
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The
non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give
substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological,
historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic
violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender
equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in
favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence,
said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is
therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
(2) Germane to the Law's Purpose
3.Bartolome v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
FACTS
Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome was the biological mother of John Colcol. John was a seaman and he died due to an
accident while on duty. Bartolome sought to claim death benefits from the SSS as she was the sole heir and
beneficiary of John. Her request was denied. The SSS explained that she is no longer considered the parent of John
as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents you submitted to us. Cornelio Colcol was
John's great grandfather. The decree of adoption attained finality in February of 1985 while John was just 2 years old.
Based on these facts, the SSS claimed that Bartolome is no longer the legitimate parent of John and is thus not
entitled to Employees compensation, that the legitimate parent is now Cornelio Colcol.
Respondents cite the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation which states:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition
(a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully
employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self -
support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or
more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21
years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical
or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
ISSUE: WON the interpretation of the ECC stating that only legitimate parents may benefit from compensation is
correct; and if petitioner qualifies as a “dependent parent” notwithstanding her son’s adoption by someone else
RULING
No. The interpretation is incorrect. Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code on employee's compensation provides that
beneficiaries are the “dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.” The ECC on the other hand, interpreted this provision to
state that only “legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support.” This is unauthorized
administrative legislation. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law
because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
Guided by this doctrine, we find that the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase
“dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”
YES. The Supreme Court also noted that three years after the adoption decree, Cornelio died while John was still a
minor. John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor because under such circumstance,
parental authority must be deemed to have reverted back to the biological parent. PETITION GRANTED.
Notes:

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal
protection clause (4) Applies Equally to all Members of the Same Class

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of
equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming
benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
5.Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036,
[December 7, 2010], 651 PHIL 374-773
FACTS
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:

(3) Not Limited to Existing Conditions (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
4.Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17,
1968 (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
FACTS:
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing “on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with
sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.”Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
P12,087.50. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer,
Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
clause. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city’s power to enact
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
ISSUE:
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
WON the ordinance is violative of the constitutional provision on equal protection?
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
RULING:
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause. The equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (a) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
differences; (b) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (c) the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (d) the classification
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it
applies only to those who belong to the same class.
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable classification. The ordinance taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. To be
purposes.
reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of
ISSUE: WON E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. PETITION GRANTED. RULING

Notes:
The SC ruled in favor of Ormoc Sugar Company. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and no other.
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must
not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.