Karlos Adolfo Cañeda Provisional Remedies Case Digests

TORRES v. SATSATIN

G.R. No. 166759 November 25, 2009

Facts: Siblings Sofia, Fructosa and Mario Torres (Petitioners) each own adjacent 20,000 sqm. lots
in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Sometime in 1997, Nicanor Satsatin (Nicanor) asked the mother of the
herein petitioners, Agripina Adelia, if she wanted to sell their lands. After consultation with her
daughters, daughter-in-law and grandchildren, Agripina agreed to sell the properties. Through an
SPA, Petitioners authorized Nicanor to negotiate the sale of the properties. In 1999, Nicanor
offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources Inc. (Solar) which allegedly agreed to purchase
the 3 parcels of land and a 10,000 sqm. land owned by Rustica Adelia for P35,000,000. Petitioners
alleged that Nicanor was supposed to remit to them P28,000,000 or P9,333,333.00 each.

Petitioners claimed that Solar had already paid Nicanor the entire amount in 32 post-dated checks
which the latter has encashed/deposited. Petitioners also claimed that Nicanor has acquired a
house and lot and car, sometime between 2000 and 2002, which he registered in the names of
his unemployed children Nikki Normel and Nikki Norlin. Nicanor only remitted P9,000,000, leaving
an unremitted P19,000,000, and continues to fail to remit despite repeated written and verbal
demands.

Petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against Nicanor,
Erlinda, Nikki Normel and Nikki Norlin, all surnamed Satsatin on October 25, 2002. Five (5) days
later, petitioners filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on
the ground that respondents are about to depart the Philippines. The court issued on the same
day an order directing the Petitioners to post a bond of P7,000,000. On November 15, 2002, the
court issued a writ of preliminary attachment to attach the properties of respondents, real or
personal.

A copy of the writ of attachment was served upon respondents on November 21, 2002 and on
November 29, 2002, respondents filed their answer. On the same day, they also filed a motion to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment on the grounds that the (1) the bond was issued
before the issuance of the writ of attachment, (2) the writ was issued before the summons was
received by the respondents, (3) the sheriff did not serve copies of the application of attachment,
order of attachment, plaintiff’s affidavit and attachment bond to the respondents, (4) the sheriff
did not submit a sheriff’s return, and (5) the grounds cited for the issuance of the writ are baseless
and without merit. Respondents also offered to post a counterbond.

The RTC denied the motion but at the same time directed the respondents to file a counterbond.
The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was denied. Aggrieved, respondents filed
before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. In their appeal, respondents contended that the subject writ was
improper and irregular having been issued without the lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents, and the bond filed by Petitioners as defective since the bonding
company did not have clearance to do business with the RTC. The CA rendered a decision in favor
of Respondents finding grave abuse discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC. Petitioners filed an MR but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Preliminary Attachment was valid.

HELD: No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order
of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the
defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the
defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by
petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In
accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise,
the bond should be rejected.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction

between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance
to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement
the writ of attachment upon his person.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application;
second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ
is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the
court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court
has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from
the Court will not bind the defendant.

At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to
do so since the motion for its issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment.” However, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court
has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet
served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents
in order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding
effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or
irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the respondents.

Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the
trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them,
such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on
respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of
attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant
whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive
acquisition of jurisdiction.
 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. ALEJANDRO

G.R. No. 175587 September 21, 2007

FACTS: Respondent, Joseph Anthony Alejandro, executed in favor of Petitioner, Philippine

Commercial International Bank, a promissory note obliging himself to pay P249,828,588.90 plus
interest. Petitioner requested Respondent to put up additional security for the loan since the
fluctuations in the foreign currency rates resulted in the insufficiency of the deposits assigned by
Respondent as security for the loan. Respondent sought a reconsideration from such request
pointing out that Petitioners mishandled his account due to its failure to carry out his instruction
to close his account while the USD-JPY exchange rate was USD1;JPY127.50.

Petitioner filed against Respondent a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment citing Section 1, Paragraphs (2) and (f) of Rule 57 as grounds,
alleging that (1) Respondent withdrew his unassigned deposits not withstanding his verbal
promise not to withdraw them; and (2) the respondent is not a resident of the Philippines.

The trial court granted the application and issued the writ ex parte after petitioner posted a bond
of P18,798,734.69. The bank deposits of respondent in RCBC were garnished. Respondent, though
counsel, filed a manifestation informing the court that he is voluntarily submitting to its
jurisdiction. He subsequently filed a motion to quash the writ contending that the withdrawal of
his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent because it was approved by petitioner. Respondent
added that Petitioner knows he maintains a permanent residence at Quezon City and an Office
Address in Makati in a law firm where he is a partner, and that he is the managing partner of the
Hong Kong branch of the law firm and that his stay in Hong Kong is only temporary and the he
frequently travels back to the Philippines.

The trial court issued an order quashing the writ finding that the withdrawal was not fraudulent
and that representatives of Petitioner regularly communicated with Respondent in his Quezon
City address and his Makati office address. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari . The CA
dismissed the petition. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also dismissed.

Respondent also filed a claim for damages against Petitioner in the amount of P25 million on the
attachment bond on the account of the wrongful garnishment of his deposits. He presented
evidence that his RCBC check paid to his lawyers was dishonored and testified that he is a graduate
of ADMU and UP, and presented witnesses that he is a well-known lawyer both in the Philippines
and Hong Kong. Petitioners only presented one witness who testified she acted in good faith.

The trial court awarded damages to respondent worth P25 million without specifying the basis
thereof. The Petitioner’s MR was denied. The CA affirmed that trial court’s decision holding that
petitioner cannot have acted in good faith in claiming that the Respondent was not a resident of
the Philippines. The CA, however, modified the amount from P25 million to P2 million. Both
parties moved for reconsideration. The CA denied Petitioner’s motion but granted that of
Respondent’s ordering the former to pay additional P5 million as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for improper issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment.

HELD: Yes.

In the instant case, it must be stressed that the writ was issued by the trial court mainly on the
representation of petitioner that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. Obviously, the
trial courts issuance of the writ was for the sole purpose of acquiring jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. Had the allegations in the complaint disclosed that respondent has a residence
in Quezon City and an office in Makati City, the trial court, if only for the purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction, could have served summons by substituted service on the said addresses, instead of
attaching the property of the defendant. The rules on the application of a writ of attachment must
be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. For attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and
summary in nature; it is a rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and
annoyance. It should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy.

It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a resident temporarily
out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ of attachment because the trial court
could acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted service instead of attaching the property
of the defendant. The misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent does not reside in
the Philippines and its omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move to ensure that
the application for the writ will be granted.

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals properly sustained the finding of the trial court that
petitioner is liable for damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of attachment against
respondent.

Anent the actual damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in not awarding the same inasmuch as
the respondent failed to establish the amount garnished by petitioner. It is a well settled rule that
one who has been injured by a wrongful attachment can recover damages for the actual loss
resulting therefrom. But for such losses to be recoverable, they must constitute actual damages
duly established by competent proofs, which are, however, wanting in the present case.

Nevertheless, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of
indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed, nominal
damages are damages in name only and not in fact. They are recoverable where some injury has
been done but the pecuniary value of the damage is not shown by evidence and are thus subject
to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.

In this case, the award of nominal damages is proper considering that the right of respondent to
use his money has been violated by its garnishment. The amount of nominal damages must,
however, be reduced from P2 million to P50,000.00 considering the short period of 2 months
during which the writ was in effect as well as the lack of evidence as to the amount garnished.

Likewise, the award of attorneys fees is proper when a party is compelled to incur expenses to lift
a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. The basis of the award thereof is also the amount of
money garnished, and the length of time respondents have been deprived of the use of their
money by reason of the wrongful attachment. It may also be based upon (1) the amount and the
character of the services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation and business in which the services were rendered; (4) the
responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money and the value of the property affected by the
controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and the experience called for in the
performance of the services; (7) the professional character and the social standing of the attorney;
(8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much
larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.

All the aforementioned weighed, and considering the short period of time it took to have the writ
lifted, the favorable decisions of the courts below, the absence of evidence as to the professional
character and the social standing of the attorney handling the case and the amount garnished,
the award of attorneys fees should be fixed not at P1 Million, but only at P200,000.00.

The courts below correctly awarded moral damages on account of petitioners misrepresentation
and bad faith; however, we find the award in the amount of P5 Million excessive. Moral damages
are to be fixed upon the discretion of the court taking into consideration the educational, social
and financial standing of the parties. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at
the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
reason of petitioners culpable action. Moral damages must be commensurate with the loss or
injury suffered.Hence, the award of moral damages is reduced to P500,000.00.

Considering petitioners bad faith in securing the writ of attachment, we sustain the award of
exemplary damages by way of example or correction for public good. This should deter parties in
litigations from resorting to baseless and preposterous allegations to obtain writs of
attachments. While as a general rule, the liability on the attachment bond is limited to actual (or
in some cases, temperate or nominal) damages, exemplary damages may be recovered where the
attachment was established to be maliciously sued out. Nevertheless, the award
of exemplary damages in this case should be reduced from P5M to P500,000.00.

Finally, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the instant case for damages by reason of the invalid
issuance of the writ, survives the dismissal of the main case for sum of money. Suffice it to state
that the claim for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may arise and be decided
separately from the merits of the main action.
 MARQUEZ, et al v. SANCHEZ, et al

G.R. No. 141849 February 13, 2007

FACTS: Marcial M. Marquez was an incorporator and officer of Lucena Entrepreneur and Agri-
Industrial Development Corporation (LEAD). LEAD applied for a loan with respondent DBP, which,
on November 9, 1977, granted LEAD an agricultural loan of P2,105,000.00 that would cover the
construction and procurement of the fishing vessel and the required equipment, subject to the
required level of capitalization or equity ratio by LEADs principals. DBP required that the
principals, including Marquez, be held jointly and severally liable with borrower-corporation
DEAL. To secure the loan, some of the principals of LEAD, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Venuso Bibit and
Mr. and Mrs. Eduardo Murallon, entered into a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) of two (2) properties
with DBP.

The construction of the fishing vessel and the procurement and installation of the equipment and
other accessories were subjected to DBPs local competitive bidding in consonance with its
standing policies. Consequently, Trigon Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation (Trigon) won
the bid and was duly approved by DBP. The corresponding Boat-building Contract was executed
by and between LEAD and Trigon which stipulated, inter alia, that Trigon would complete the
work within 150 calendar days from the perfection of the contract and, as consideration, LEAD
would pay Trigon P1,955,000.00.

The project could not be completed at the original cost stipulated in the boat construction
contract because, first, some scheduled releases of the loan were withheld by DBP as the
capitalization or equity ratio of the principals of LEAD was not complied with. Second, there were
defects in the construction of the fishing vessel which required compliance by Trigon before any
subsequent releases of the loan could be made. These contretemps delayed the construction of
the fishing vessel for over two (2) years, yet the fishing vessel was only 77.14% complete by then.
Third, the delay aggravated the situation for the boat construction was overtaken by increases in
costs of materials and machinery.

It was agreed that LEAD would get the fishing vessel at its present state and LEAD would complete
the construction and installation of the equipment and accessories, for which DBP would grant
LEAD an additional loan of P714,600.00. The additional loan was granted and was consolidated
with the first loan. To secure the additional loan, an additional REM, a second mortgage, was
undertaken by Marquez and his wife on their property. The loan was fully released. In short, the
fishing vessel christened F/B LEAD 1 was completed and launched. A chattel mortgage was
constituted on the fishing vessel, together with the machineries and equipment on it and it was
insured with the GSIS Property Insurance Fund in favor of DBP and/or LEAD.

DBP informed LEAD of the arrearage of P906,887.58 of its outstanding loan and to remit
P363,022.01 for the loans interest. When LEAD was not able to pay, DBP formed a collection
committee; however, the conferences with LEAD principals yielded negative results.

Subsequently, disaster struck F/B LEAD 1 as it sank off the coast of Unisan, Quezon at the height
of a typhoon. Upon receiving notice of such event, DBP filed an insurance claim with the GSIS and
collected the proceeds of P1,186,145.00 which DBP applied to the loan account of LEAD,

For having defaulted on its contractual obligations, DBP demanded LEAD and its principals to
settle their outstanding loan obligation, with warning that non-settlement would compel DBP to
institute the necessary legal action to protect its interest, including appropriate actions to
foreclose the mortgaged properties. With the inaction of LEAD and its principals, DBP was
compelled to file with the Clerk of Court of the Quezon RTC an application for foreclosure sale of
the REMs constituted to secure its loan with DBP.
A Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale of the following properties mortgaged by Sps. Bibit and Sps.
Murallon to satisfy the mortgaged indebtedness of P4,595,450.00 to which both spouses did not
contest.

Marquez, however, instituted the instant action for Damages, Cancellation of Mortgage and
Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
before the RTC. Marquez alleged that LEADs involvement in purse seine fishing was premised
substantially on a partnership with DBP and not that of a simple debtor-creditor relationship; that
the loan contracts and REM constituted for them were legally impaired, bereft of consideration,
and did not reflect the true and proper relationship between LEAD and DBP; that DBP was liable
for breach of agreement when it failed to deliver a seaworthy and well-equipped fishing vessel;
that DBP reneged on its commitment to render technical expertise on purse seine fishing when
needed most; that LEAD was prejudiced by DBPs bureaucracy and the controversy with its
commissioned boat-builder, Trigon; that having collected the insurance proceeds from GSIS after
the sinking of the fishing vessel, it had extinguished whatever obligations LEAD had with DBP; and
that DBP refused in bad faith to render an updated accounting or allow Marquez to scrutinize the
loan account.

Respondent Presiding Judge issued an Order granting a TRO to maintain the status quo pending
resolution of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent Judge
issued the first assailed Order denying Marquez’s prayed for injunctive writ, to which he filed his
Motion for Reconsideration. Marquez filed an Urgent Motion to Restrain the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale scheduled. Earlier, after the order of denial was issued, DBP applied for an extra-
judicial foreclosure sale of the property, which was granted through the Notice of Extra-judicial
Sale. Respondent Judge issued the second assailed Order denying Marquez’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Urgent Motion to Restrain. Marquez’s property was sold to DBP as the
highest bidder.

Marquez was granted a TRO by the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari. Later, the
CA then rendered a decision affirming the orders of the RTC and Marquez’s MR was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court's refusal to grant an injunction against the threatened extra-
judicial foreclosure sale by DBP constitutes grave abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

HELD: No. The requisites for injunctive writ are not present. the trial court did not commit any
manifest abuse nor gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
denying the writ of preliminary injunction as well as Marquez’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable

injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, it will
be issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an
urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the requisites of preliminary
injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following:

(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.

It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which
should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds
expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme
caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when the
court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation
of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the
probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of
multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief
of injunction should be refused.

In the instant case, both the trial court and the appellate court found that Marquez was not
entitled to the injunctive writ. Verily, the trial court has exercised its sound discretion in denying
the writ. The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court in injunctive matters should
not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. Indeed, a scrutiny of the records fails to
show any manifest abuse committed by respondent Presiding Judge.
 ST. JAMES COLLEGE OF PARAÑAQUE v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 179441 August 9, 2010

FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Jaime (now deceased) and Myrna Torres owned and operated St.
James College of Paraaque (St. James College), a sole proprietorship educational institution.
Sometime in 1995, the Philippine Commercial and International Bank (PCIB) granted the Torres
spouses and/or St. James College a credit line facility of up to PhP 25,000,000. This
accommodation or any of its extension or renewal was secured by a real estate mortgage (REM)
over a parcel of land in the name of St. James College.

PCIB eventually merged with Equitable Bank with the surviving bank known as Equitable PCI Bank
(EPCIB) (now Banco de Oro). The credit line underwent several annual renewals, the last being
effected in 2001. As petitioners had defaulted in the payment of the loan obtained from the
secured credit accommodation, their total unpaid loan obligation, as of September 2001, stood
at P18,300,000.

EPCIB informed petitioners that it is denying their request for the reinstatement of their credit
line, but proposed a restructuring package with a soft payment scheme for the outstanding loan
balance. Petitioner Jaime Torres agreed to pay the equal annual amortizations of PhP 6,100,000
payable every May as the bank booked the accumulated past due loans to current status and
charge interest at a fixed rate of 13.375% per annum.

On May 2003. Petitioners failed to pay the stipulated annual amortization of P6,100,000 agreed
upon. EPCIB addressed to petitioners a demand letter requiring them to settle their obligation.
On June 2003, petitioners tendered, and EPCIB accepted, a partial payment of P2,521,609.62.
Petitioners promised to make another payment in October 2003 and that the account would be
made current in June 2004. They manifested, however, that St. James College is not subject to the
10% value-added tax (VAT) which EPCIB assessed against the school in its June 15, 2003 statement
of account. Petitioners accordingly requested the deletion of the VAT portion.

In answer to petitioners cover letter, EPCIB reminded and made it clear to petitioners that their
first partial payment did not detract from the past due character of their outstanding loan for
which reason it is demanding the remaining P5,100,000 to complete the first P6,100,000 principal
payment. EPCIB again sent another demand letter to petitioners, but to no avail. Petitioners
requested that the bank allow a partial payment of the May 2003 amortization balance of
P5,100,000. EPCIB responded denying petitioners request, but nonetheless proposed a new
repayment scheme to which petitioners were not amenable.

Petitioners made a second check remittance, this time in the amount of P921,535.42. EPCIB again
reminded petitioners that its receipt of the check payment for the amount of the PhP 921,535.42
is without prejudice to the bank’s rights considering the overdue nature of petitioners loan.
Petitioners issued a Stop Payment Order for their P921,535.42 check.

EPCIB, through counsel, demanded full settlement of petitioners loan obligation in the total
amount of P24,719,461.48. The demand letter which went unheeded.

EPCIB filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC in Parañaque
of the a Petition for Sale to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property. After due
publication, the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was set. In another court in Pasig
City, Petitioners instituted against EPCIB a complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunction and
Damages, with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
On the very day of the scheduled foreclosure sale, the Pasig City RTC issued a TRO, enjoining EPCIB
from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale, and set a date for the hearing on the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC issued an Order granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of petitioners.

EPCIB went to the CA on certiorari to nullify the RTC Orders and necessarily to assail the propriety
of the writ of preliminary injunction thus granted. The CA found that grave abuse of discretion
attended the issuance of the assailed writ of preliminary injunction rendered the assailed decision
nullifying and setting aside the RTC orders. Petitioner’s MR wad denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the required ground or grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
is/are present.

HELD: No. The requisites of injunctive writ are not present in this case.

An application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following grounds are
established, thus:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in
esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.

The petitioners have not shown a right in esse to be protected. Indeed, the Rules requires that
the applicants right must be clear or unmistakable, that is, a right that is actual, clear, and positive
especially calling for judicial protection. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse
and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.

An application for a preliminary injunction is a mere adjunct to the main action. While the instant
proceeding is only for the purpose of determining whether grave abuse of discretion indeed
attended the issuance by the RTC of the writ in question, as the CA has determined positively, it
is inevitable that our pronouncements may have some unintended bearing on the main suit for
declaratory relief. Nonetheless, it behooves the Court to resolve the matter in keeping with the
requirements of justice and fair play.

A judicious review of the records shows petitioners applying for and EPCIB granting the former
credit facilities and for which a bona fide REM over the St. James College lot had been constituted.
EPCIB has shown documentary evidence of how petitioners agreed to the credit line
accomodation with a limit of P25,000,000. Moreover, the late petitioner Jaime indeed agreed to
the January 9, 2003 counter-proposal of EPCIB for the payment of the P18,300,000 outstanding
loan, by signing his conforme on the counter-proposal and voluntarily opting to pay the loan on
equal annual payments of P6,100,000 every May for three years.

Given the foregoing perspective, EPCIB has clearly established its status as unpaid mortgagee-
creditor entitled to foreclose the mortgage, a remedy provided by law and the mortgage contract
itself. On the other hand, petitioners can hardly claim a right, much less a clear and unmistakable
one, which the intended foreclosure sale would violate if not enjoined. Surely, the foreclosure of
mortgage does not by itself constitute a violation of the rights of a defaulting mortgagor.

The main purpose of the subsidiary contract of REM is to secure the principal obligation. Withal,
when the mortgagors-debtors has defaulted in the amortization payments of their loans, the
superior legal right of the secured unpaid creditors to exercise foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgage property to answer for the principal obligation arises. So it must be in this case.

Contrary to what the RTC wrote, there was no urgent necessity to issue the writ to protect the
rights and interest of petitioners as owners. First, they could participate in the foreclosure sale
and get their property back unencumbered by the payment of the obligations that they
acknowledged in the first place. Second, a foreclosure sale does not ipso facto pass title to the
winning bidder over the mortgaged property. Petitioners continue to own the mortgaged
property sold in an auction sale until the expiration of the redemption period. Third, petitioners
have one year from the auction sale to redeem the mortgaged property. The one-year redemption
period is another grace period accorded petitioners to pay the outstanding debt, which would be
converted to the proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the requisites under Sec. 6 of Republic
Act No. 3135, as amended, for the redemption of a property sold in an extrajudicial sale, also in
accordance with Sec. 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1828.
It is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtors having
made use of their right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold become consolidated in
the purchaser or winning bidder.

Petitioners contend that the proposed foreclosure sale would likely cause unemployment in, as
well as the displacement of thousands of students of, St. James College. Petitioners thesis of
unemployment and displacement provides a practical, not a legal reason, for the issuance of an
injunctive writ.

Finally, petitioners point to the fact that the mortgaged property has a value of over P1 billion
which is many times over their unpaid loan obligation.

The disparity between what the mortgaged lot is worth and petitioner’s unpaid debt of P24 million
is not, standing alone, a ground to enjoin a foreclosure sale. Neither would petitioners, as
mortgagors, be placed at a disadvantage by such state of things.
 POWER SITES AND SIGNS, INC., v. UNITED NEON

G.R. No. 163406 November 24, 2009

FACTS: The petitioner sent a letter-complaint to the Muntinlupa City Engineer and Building Official
requesting to revoke United Neon’s building permit and to issue a Cease and Desist Order against
it. The City Building Official referred the complaint to United Neon to comment. However, before
a resolution could be made by the City Building Official, Power Sites filed a Petition for Injunction
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages
against United Neon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City.

After the filing of the parties’ respective memoranda, which took the place of testimonial
evidence, the RTC granted petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

United Neon then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals. In brief,
United Neon claimed that the grant of preliminary injunction was unwarranted, particularly
because Power Sites only prayed for a prohibitory injunction in its original petition, but the Order
went as far as to grant a mandatory injunction in favor of Power Sites. United Neon prayed that
the Court of Appeals invalidate the RTC’s Order and Writ, issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining the RTC from further proceeding. After the parties’ exchange of pleadings, the Court of
Appeals invalidated the Order of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly invalidated the order of the RTC which granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Power Sites

HELD: Yes

A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to
the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. While the
existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. The standard is even
higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction, which should only be granted –

x x x in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion
of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting
continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation x x x.

The evidence presented before us in support of a preliminary injunction is weak and inconclusive,
and the alleged right sought to be protected by petitioner is vehemently disputed. We note that
both parties allege that: (1) they began construction of their respective billboards first; (2) the
billboard of the other party blocks the other’s exclusive line of sight; (3) they are entitled to
protection under the provisions of the National Building Code and OAAP Code of
Ethics/Guidelines. However, we are not in a position to resolve these factual matters, which
should be resolved by the trial court. The question of which party began construction first and
which party is entitled to the exclusive line of sight is inextricably linked to whether or not
petitioner has the right that deserves protection through a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the
trial court would be in the best position to determine which billboard was constructed first, their
actual location, and whether or not an existing billboard was obstructed by another.
 JESUS ARRANZA v. BF HOMES INC

G.R. No. 131683 June 19, 2000

FACTS: BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and
selling residential lots. When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which had
substantial investments in BFHI, BFHI filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a
declaration that it was in a state of suspension of payments. SEC appointed a Receiver and
approved a Revised Rehabilitation Plan. The Receiver instituted a central security system and
unified the sixty-five homeowners' associations into an umbrella homeowners' association called
United BF Homeowners' Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), thereafter incorporated with the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).

BFHI, through Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control and administration of security in the
subdivision, the Clubhouse and the open spaces along Concha Cnn Drive. Through the Philippine
Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC), BFHI's managing company for waterworks in
the various BF Homes subdivisions, BFHI entered into an agreement with UBFHAI for the annual
collection of community assessment fund and for the purchase of eight new pumps to replace the
over-capacitated pumps in the old wells.

When the receiver was relieved of his duties, a new Board of Receivers consisting of 11 members
of BFHI's Board was appointed for the implementation of the rehabilitation and it revoked the
authority given to use the open spaces and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the
purchase of new pumps; recognized BF Parafiaque Homeowners' Association, Inc., (BFPHAD as
the representative of all homeowners in the subdivision; took over the management of the
Clubhouse; and deployed its own security guards in the subdivision.

Consequently, Ananza, et al., filed with the HLURB a class suit for and in behalf of the more than
7,000 homeowners in the subdivision against BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C.
Aguirre Management Corporation to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots in BF Homes
Parafraque alleging that the forty (a0) wells, mostly located at different elevations of the
subdivision and with only twenty-seven (27) productive, are the sources of the inter-connected
water system in the 765-hectare subdivision and there is only one drainage and sewer system,
among others. Arranza, et al., raised issues on the following basic needs of the homeowners:
water, among others and the interlocking corporations that made it convenient for respondent
to compartmentalize its obligations as general developer, even if all of these are hooked into the
water, drainage and sewer systems of the subdivision.

Lower Court's Ruling: The HLURB issued a 20-day temporary restraining order to avoid rendering
nugatory and ineffectual any judgment that could be issued in the case; and subsequently, an
Order granting Arranza, et al.'s prayer for preliminary injunction was issued enjoining and
restraining respondent BFHI, its agents and all persons acting for and in its behalf from taking
over/administering the Concha Garden Row, and for other actions upon posting of a bond which
shall answer for whatever damages respondents may sustain by reason of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction if it tums out that complainant is not entitled thereto.

Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA rendered a decision-annulling and setting aside the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the HLURB. It ruled that BFHI's action may properly be regarded
as a "claim" within the contemplation of PD No. 902-4 which should be placed on equal footing
with those of Arranza, et al.'s other creditor or creditors and which should be Issue: Whether it is
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) that has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a
subdivision developer that is under receivership for specific performance regarding basic
homeowners'needs such as water, security and open spaces Supreme Court's Ruling: Case is
remanded to HLURB for continuation of proceedings with dispatch as SEC proceeds with the
rehabilitation of BFHI, through the Board of Receivers. Thereafter, any and all monetary claims
duly established before the HLURB shall be referred to the Board of Receivers for proper
disposition and thereafter, to the SEC, if necessary. PD 957 was issued in answer to the popular
call for correction of pernicious practices of subdivision owners and/or developers that adversely
affected the interests of subdivision lot buyers and it empowered the National Housing Authority
(NHA) with the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business. PD 1344 was
issued to expand the jurisdiction of the NHA to include the specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Thereafter, the regulatory and quasi-judicial
functions of the NHA were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
by virtue of Executive Order No. 648 which specifies the functions of the NHA that were
transferred to the HSRC including the authority to hear and decide cases on unsound real estate
business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers,
brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance. Executive Order No. 90 renamed the HSRC
as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Arranza, et al.'s complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of
subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and
security. The HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint. The fact that BFHI is under receivership
does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. No violation of the SEC order suspending payments
to creditors would result as far as Arranza, et al.'s complaint before the HLURB is concerned. To
reiterate, what Arratua, et al. seek to enforce are BFHI's obligations as a subdivision developer.
Such claims are basically not pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally involve monetary
considerations. Neither may Ananza, et al. be considered as having "claims" against BFHI within
the context of the following proviso of P.D. No. 902-4 to warrant suspension of the HLURB
proceedings. In this case, under the complaint for specific performance before the HLURB,
Arranza, et al. do not aim to enforce a pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbursement should
be viewed in the light of BFHI's alleged failure to observe its statutory and contractual obligations
to provide Attanza, et aI, a "decent human settlement" and "ample opportunities for improving
their quality of life." The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal with that
matter.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the SEC is defined by P.D. No. 902-4 while P.D. No. 957
delineates that of the HLURB. These two quasi-judicial agencies exercise functions that are distinct
from each other. The SEC has authority over the operation of all kinds of corporations,
partnerships or associations with the end in view of protecting the interests of the investing public
and creditors. On the other hand, the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating to observance
of laws governing corporations engaged in the specific business of development of subdivisions
and condominiums. The HLURB and the SEC being bestowed with distinct powers and functions,
the exercise of those functions by one shall not abate the performance by the other of its own
functions. What complicated the jurisdictional issue in this case is the fact that Arranza, et al., are
primarily praying for the retention of BFHI's obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement
that the Receiver had entered into with them but which the present Board of Receivers had
revoked.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over Arranza, et al.'s complaint because it pertains to
matters within the HLURB's competence and expertise. The HLURB should view the issue of
whether the Board of Receivers correctly revoked the agreements entered into between the
previous receiver and Arranza, et al. from the perspective of the homeowners' interests, which
P.D. No. 957 aims to protect. Whatever monetary awards the HLURB may impose upon
respondent are incidental matters that should be addressed to the sound discretion of the Board
of Receivers charged with maintaining the viability of respondent as a corporation. Any
controversy that may arise in that regard should then be addressed to the SEC.

It is worth noting that the parties agreed that should the HLURB establish and grant Arranza, et
al.'s claims, the same should be referred to the SEC. Thus, the proceedings at the HLURB should
not be suspended notwithstanding that BFHI is still under receivership. The TRO that the Court
has issued should accordingly continue until such time as the HLURB shall have resolved the
controversy. The present members of the Board of Receivers are reminded of their duties and
responsibilities as an impartial Board that should serve the interests of both the homeowners and
respondent's creditors. Their interests, financial or otherwise, as members of respondent's Board
of Directors should be circumscribed by judicious and unbiased performance of their duties and
responsibilities as members of the Board of Receivers. Otherwise, BFHI's full rehabilitation may
face a bleak future. Both parties should never give full rein to acts that could prove detrimental
to the interests of the homeowners and eventually jeopardize respondent's rehabilitation.
 SPS. LARROBIS v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

G.R. No. 135706 October 1, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner spouses contracted a monetary loan with herein respondent bank secured by a
REM executed on their lot. Respondent bank then went bankrupt and was placed under
receivership/liquidation by the Central Bank. Sometime after, respondent bank sent a demand
letter for the amount of the insurance premiums advanced by it over the mortgaged property of
petitioners. More than 14 years from the time the loan became due and demandable, respondent
bank moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property and was sold to it as being
the lone bidder. Petitioners moved to declare the foreclosure null and void contending that the
respondent bank being placed under receivership did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period. RTC ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not foreclosure of mortgage is included in the acts prohibited during
receivership/liquidation proceedings.

(2) Whether or not the period within which the respondent bank was placed under receivership
and liquidation proceedings interrupted the running of the prescriptive period in bringing actions.

HELD: No

(1) While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of “doing business,” it should
not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks are “prohibited from
doing business” during receivership and liquidation proceedings. This is consistent with the
purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles and preserve the assets of the
bank in substitution of its former management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the
detriment of the creditors of the bank.

There is also no truth to respondent’s claim that it could not continue doing business from the
time it was under receivership. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, respondent was even able
to send petitioners a demand letter, through Francisco Go, for the insurance premiums advanced
by respondent bank over the mortgaged property of petitioners. How it could send a demand
letter on unpaid insurance premiums and not foreclose the mortgage during the time it was
“prohibited from doing business” was not adequately explained by respondent.

(2) A close scrutiny of the Provident case shows that the Court arrived at said conclusion, which is
an exception to the general rule, due to the peculiar circumstances of Provident Savings Bank at
the time. The Superintendent of Banks, which was instructed to take charge of the assets of the
bank in the name of the Monetary Board, had no power to act as a receiver of the bank and carry
out the obligations specified in Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act.

In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank was placed under receivership by the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank pursuant to Section 29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency
of banks. Unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein
respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law.
Thus, the ruling laid down in the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.
 SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL

G.R. No. 169596 March 28, 2007

FACTS: Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of

providing public transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the
Alabang northbound exit lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National
Construction Company (PNCC). PNCC‘s Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic
control and security department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The bus
was turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of
adequate space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be towed by the
PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but
Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same
value for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.

Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an
amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision and concluded that the case should have been brought against the police
authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper

HELD: Contrary to PNCC‘s contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is
whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary
and recover damages for illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object
sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same.

In the case at bar, Superlines‘ ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of
whether PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on
the request of Lopera in violation of constitutional right against unreasonable seizures. The
seizure and impounding of Superlines‘s bus, on Lopera‘s request, were unquestionably violative
of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without impleading
Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus.
The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a
contract of deposit was perfected between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu
proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera and any other responsible
police officers.
 ROGER V. NAVARRO v. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO

G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of
money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue
writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. Petitioner
maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no prior
demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the
complaints for replevin were filed.

ISSUE: WON prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

HELD: No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows
the facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may
recover from the applicant in the action.

The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to
make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
 SPS. PRUDENCIO & FILOMINA LIM v. Ma. CHERYL S. LIM

G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009

FACTS: In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business,
which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had
no steady source of income.

On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her
(then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
(defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000
pendente lite.

On January 31, 1996, RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide
P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the
balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability. The defendants sought
reconsideration, questioning their liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified that
petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability to
give sufficient support”.

Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents.
Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects
by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of
the Philippines).

On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually
support one another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great
grandchildren. Should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy
all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary
support. This is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives
and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. CA denied
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD: Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren. By statutory
and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to
the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions
found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that
their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued
for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners
submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have
to follow the order of support under Art. 199. There is no showing that private respondent is
without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support.

There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion
of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.1avvphi1

Petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’
grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong
to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly
support RTC awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to
remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil
Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining
respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners. The
application of Article 204 which provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining
in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot
be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law.
Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided
future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her
husband’s infidelity.
 SUSAN LIM LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA

G.R. Nos. 175279-80 5 JUNE 2013

FACTS: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. In her prayer for support pendente lite for
herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support,
citing respondent's huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and
businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order... granting support pendente
lite. From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This
amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos... for medical
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable
upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being
a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him... considering the vast financial
resources at his disposal.

According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for... their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with family's social and financial standing.

As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and... beyond the
intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.

His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA. On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,... nullified and set aside and
instead a new one is entered... to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of
P115,000.00.

ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of

PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children. The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and
maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry... goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not
only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well.

It also noted the lack of contribution... from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to
support their children. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

ISSUES: Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the
total support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.

HELD: As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support... comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the... parties, guardian or
designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of
judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the... case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked
to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve
the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary...
evidence appearing in the record. In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
petitioner and her two children was determined after due hearing and submission of
documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced
on appeal, it is... clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA
was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing,
salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.

Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.

As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for
the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his
children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time... housewife.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the
spouse.

Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either
party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling the support in... arrears.

The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.