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Pitjantjatjara Processes: An Australian Experiential Grammar

Article · January 1996

DOI: 10.1075/cilt.121.11ros

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 9

Pitjantjatjara Processes:
An Australian Experiential Grammar

David Rose
In R. Hasan, D. Butt & C. Cloran (eds.) Functional Descriptions: Language Form & Linguistic
Theory. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 287-322

1. Introduction
This paper interprets one dimension of the grammar of an Australian language, Pitjantjatjara, from
a functional perspective. Pitjantjatjara is the first language of several thousand anangu people in
central Australia, most of whom are also multilingual in dialects of indigenous languages and
English. It is one amongst many dialects of the language classified as `Western Desert', spoken in
an arc of arid lands from the coast of north-western Australia to the Great Australian Bight in South
Australia. The people of this area are related not only by their language, but through a system of kin
and marriage relations that are established and renewed in a network of ceremonial cycles, to
participate in which, vast distances are travelled by the peoples. Between the 1930s and 60s, almost
all the western desert peoples moved into missionary or government run settlements. Since the
1970s they have assumed control of these communities, and established new ones within their
traditional lands. While English literacy has been neglected in the past, there is now a strong push
by the Pitjantjatjara people in its favour in school and adult education.1

1 E.g. "The Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Education Committee are pushing the importance of English with
our school students. Our committee has a policy which asks all non-Anangu staff in schools and people working in our
communities, to only speak English to the school students. We want this to happen both inside and outside of school"
(PYEC, 1992).
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
2
The description offered in this paper makes comparisons at the levels of language and
meta-language. Pitjantjatjara grammatical functions and their structural realisations are compared
and contrasted with Halliday's 1994 functional description of English; and this functional approach
is compared with the formalist tradition which has been the dominant paradigm for the descriptions
of Australian languages to date. An academic description of indigenous languages is implicitly
comparative in two senses: first the indigenous meanings and forms are translated into English at
the same level of abstraction as wording in examples, and secondly, at higher levels of abstraction a
translation of descriptive categories takes place. In this paper, both kinds of comparisons will be
made deliberately in order to facilitate understanding across languages and linguistic paradigms.
There is considerable potential for enabling teaching of both English and Australian languages if
the practice of teaching is informed by an understanding of how each grammar works in relation to
the other. Bilingual speakers need to know how to express their meanings in either language, and
which meanings may not translate directly. This suggests a descriptive approach that starts with
meanings and asks how they are realised as grammatical structure; in other words, the approach
suggested is a functional one. It also suggests a comparative approach to grammatical function.
Which functions are common to both languages, which differ, and how are they expressed as
structures? Beyond the pedagogic applications opened up by such comparisons, there arise
questions about the nature of the relationship between languages as remote in time and space as
these. Traditional descriptions have focussed on universal formal categories of languages, sounds,
word classes, verb conjugations, nominal cases and so on. From these perspectives Pitjantjatjara
appears to resemble Latin more than English, since they both favour suffixing and traditional
descriptive categories tend to derive from Latin morphology. A systemic functional comparative
approach will establish interlanguage relationships in both meaning and structural realisation
simultaneously, at various degrees of delicacy. This enables us to pinpoint where the languages
converge and where they diverge, and to speculate on possible explanations.

1.1 Formal and functional interpretations of transitivity

The slice of grammar described here is the transitivity system, a set of grammatical resources
available for the representation of experience. Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) interprets
transitivity as a clause rank grammatical system, where the grammatical structure `clause' realises
the general semantic concept of `goings on'. Involved in each of these processes are one or more
participants, and there are a range of circumstantial elements with which they may be associated.
This general semantic distinction of process, participant and circumstantial functions, realised as
clause rank constituents, has been described for English by Halliday (1994), and, as we will
demonstrate, is equally valid for Pitjantjatjara.
The Pitjantjatjara transitivity system analyses reality into several types of process, realising
general semantic concepts of doing, happening, sensing, saying, being and having. Grammatical
criteria which distinguish these process types in Pitjantjatjara include inherent number of
participants, nature of participants (e.g. thing or conscious thing), potential for projection, inflection
of the nominal groups realising the participants, and whether or not the process must be overtly
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
3
realised with a verb. These criteria include grammatical constituents at the ranks of clause complex,
group, word and morpheme, all of which contribute simultaneously to the meaning of the clause.
From these criteria a complex Pitjantjatjara grammar of experience emerges. This system includes
six distinct process types — material, mental, verbal, behavioural, relational and existential
processes, as well as sub-types of these. Involved in these processes are 18 distinct participant
functions, each specific to process type. Associated with processes are nine main types of
circumstances which combine relatively freely with process types. These are the general functional
categories of the system, based on systematically recurring configurations of grammatical features.
This approach assumes that differences in grammatical structure realise semantic distinctions, that
there is a solidary (non-arbitrary) relation between a system of semantic concepts and their
grammatical realisations. Structural configurations are outputs from a system of potential choices;
transitivity is one such system.
This perspective on transitivity differs from that in formal grammars in which it denotes a
word rank classification of verbs, the classificatory criteria of which are structural configurations of
one or two nominal cases with the verb, producing a simple binary system of transitive vs
intransitive verbs. Nominal cases are interpreted as morphologically determined. Descriptions of
Australian grammars have generally been produced in a formalist framework, weighted towards
phonetics, morphology and word classes, followed by `syntax' which is interpreted as
configurations of word and morpheme classes (e.g. Dixon 1980). Function is also a consideration in
these descriptions, but it is secondary to forms at morpheme and word rank which determine it. The
descriptive sequence of smallest to largest structural unit and the interpretive priority given to form
over meaning reflects both linguistic tradition and the requirements of Australian language
genealogy projects, for the reconstruction of regular phonetic, morphemic and lexical changes to
demonstrate genetic relationships between languages.2 These contexts apply particularly to
Pitjantjatjara, and its neighbouring dialects, which have been the subject of formalist study since the
1940s.3
Although form is the starting point and primary classificatory criterion in formalist
Australian descriptions, semantic functions of syntactic forms are often employed as implicit
criteria. For example, the traditional interpretation of nominal case inflections and syntactic
concepts such as subject, object, and active subject are functional labels for types of participants.
Dixon (1980: 378) insists that all verbs in Australian languages are "either strictly transitive —
occurring with subject (A) and object (O) core NPs — or strictly intransitive — occurring just with
a subject (S) core NP." Claims such as these are a type of functional description, although
functional concepts subject, object and core are not explicitly distinguished from the form in which
they are realised, i.e. 'noun phrases'. There is also an implicit fusion of clause rank criteria (i.e.

2 See for example, Norman Pama Historical Phonology (Blake 1980), The History of Australian Languages: A First
Approach (Capell 1979), The Languages of Australia (Dixon 1980), Proto-Ngayarda Phonology (O'Grady 1966),
Preliminaries to a Proto Nuclear Pama-Nyungan Stem List (O'Grady 1979), and Classification of Australian
Languages, including Tasmanian (Wurm 1971).
3 For example, Trudinger 1943, Douglas 1964, Glass & Hackett 1970, Institute for Aboriginal Development n.d,
Goddard 1985.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
4
types of clause structure AOV/SV), with word rank classification (classes of verbs
transitive/intransitive).
As a formal description Dixon's binary classification of verb types is under-elaborated since
clauses with more than one complement (object in traditional terms) are common in Australian
languages, as are also clauses without a verb, and complements may be projected clauses as well as
nominal groups. The "core" participant functions A, O and S are classified on morphological
grounds, inflecting as "ergative", "accusative" and "absolutive case" respectively. However it is
common for two nominal groups within one clause to take the same inflectional form, just as it is
common for clauses to occur with two participants, neither of which is inflected as "ergative".
Dixon's response to these problems is to propose deep/surface structure transformations where the
same meaning may be expressed by two distinct structures, in order to comply with rules of syntax
that are literally 'meaningless'. This dualising of form and meaning reflects the principle underying
formalist accounts, of an arbitrary relation between grammatical structure and semantic concept.
For example a clause with two participants, one inflected as S and the other in "dative" case, is
interpreted as a transformation of a deep AOV structure. Dixon asserts that the "underlying A NP
goes into S function; the deep O NP is now marked by the peripheral syntactic case, dative" (Dixon
1980). Working within Dixon's formalist framework, Goddard (1985) adopts the label
"ambitransitive" to expand the classification to accommodate Pitjantjatjara verbs which function in
both transitive and intransitive clauses, and "ditransitive" for verbs that occur in transitive clauses
with more than two participants, but these remain statements about structure only.4 In the
interpretation proposed in this paper, these regular structural variations are motivated not simply
and primarily by rules of syntax but by differences in meaning.
As a functional description the "SV/AOV" binary system is over-generalised because it is
based on only one type of process. Only material process clauses in Pitjantjatjara typically display
the distinction between `Actor doing' and `Actor doing to/with Goal'. Although material process
verbs in Australian languages tend to function in either transitive or intransitive clauses, there are
many verbs which may function in both types, particularly verbs of sensing and saying, as well as
doing. The intransitive/transitive choice is more accurately a clause rank system. For example the
verb wangkanyi `saying' may function as a verbal process with two or three participants, viz. Sayer,
Receiver and Verbiage, realised as nominal groups. Unlike material processes, verbal ones may
project locutions, while mental processes may project ideas, in which case Sayer may be the only
nominally realised participant. Furthermore the same verb may appear as a behavioural process,
construing verbal behaviour as a material act, with only one participant, a Behaver, as in English
'Mary is talking'. Since relational clauses in Australian languages are often realised without a verb,
these are frequently classed as noun phrases rather than as clauses in formalist descriptions,
particularly since both participants typically take the "accusative" case inflection, and so are not
morphologically distinct. A rich semantic domain in Pitjantjatjara is elided in such accounts,
restricting possibilities for comparison with English relational processes.

4 On a functional description of di-transitives, see Davidse, this volume. [Editors].

PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
5
1.2 Grammatical function and case marking
Formal grammars of Australian languages, recognise up to twelve different "syntactic functions" of
nominal groups ("NPs" in formalist terminology), indicated by case inflections on one or more
elements of the nominal group. Dixon (1980: 293-316) groups these functions, on either semantic
or morphological criteria, into "core", "local peripheral", and "syntactic peripheral" functions.
Although Dixon makes no explicit distinction between the general semantic functions of participant
and circumstance, his "core" includes the participant functions classed as "A, S and O"; "local
peripheral" includes the circumstantial functions of location ("locative", "allative", "ablative");
while "syntactic peripheral" includes participant functions Receiver and Phenomenon:reaction,
("dative"), circumstantial functions of cause ("purpose", "cause", "aversive") and means
("instrumental"), as well as group rank modifiers of possession ("genitive"). Thus, while some
general functional categories are recognised, circumstantial elements are grouped with outer
participant functions, and group rank functions purely because of their morphological similarity.5
In the analysis presented in this paper, participant functions are defined both grammatically
and semantically as specific to particular process types, where circumstantial functions may qualify
any process type. In addition inner participants are those that always occur in a particular process
type, while outer participants are optional to that process.
Pitjantjatjara has a basic repertoire of four nominal forms which contribute to realising
participant and circumstantial roles. In the following analyses we will call these neutral, active,
causative and locative. Their forms for common and proper nominals and pronouns are exemplified
and correlated with formalist case frames in Table 1:

Table 1: Common and proper nominals and their case frames

nominal class active neutral genitive locative

personal speaker ngayulu ngayu-nya ngayu-ku ngayu-la
pronouns: addressee nyuntu nyuntu-nya nyuntu-mpa nyuntu-la
non-interactant paluru palu-nya palu-mpa palu-la
common nominals ‘man’ wati-ngku wati wati-ku wati-ngka
demonstratives ‘this’ nyanga-ngku nyangatja nyanga-ku nyanga-ngka
proper names Mitaiki-lu Mitaiki-nya Mitaiki-ku Mitaiki-la

These nominal forms distinguish participant and circumstantial functions between multiple nominal
groups in clauses. For example, in intransitive material processes Actor takes the unmarked form.
The unmarked form for common or proper nominals is NEUTRAL, while that for pronouns is
ACTIVE. In transitive material processes, Goal takes NEUTRAL form, while Actor takes ACTIVE
form, irrespective of whether either of these participants is a common/proper nominal or a pronoun.
The difference in inflection patterns between pronouns and other nominals is a product of
their relative frequency in different functional roles. Pronouns most frequently function as the
participant that 'actualises' the process, Actor, Senser, Sayer, Carrier, Token. Since Pitjantjatjara is

5 See further discussion of case and function in the context of Tagalog, in Martin, this volume.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
6
a purely spoken language, pronouns are the most common realisation of these roles, referring to the
interactants (you, I & we) or other people in the contexts of situation or preceding discourse (s/he,
they). Because these are their typical roles, the unmarked inflection for pronouns is ACTIVE.
Common nominals on the other hand, which denote classes of entities, equally likely to occur in
'actualising' roles, as in any other. In clauses of two or more participants, they are more likely to
occur in 'non-actualising' roles. Common nominals therefore take NEUTRAL case as their unmarked
form. Proper nominals, naming people and places, follow the same ACTIVE/NEUTRAL pattern as
common nominals, except that their NEUTRAL case is overtly inflected. This is because their
uninflected form functions interpersonally as Vocative.

The functions of causative and locative inflections in distinguishing types of circumstances, is

tabulated in Table 2.

Table 2: Circumstantial functions and inflections

Duration iterated imperfective process ankula ankula ankula 'going going going'
Location:rest nom gp-ngka, -la, 'at, in'
motion 'towards': nom gp-kutu; 'away from': -nguru; 'through': -wanu
Means nom gp-gnka, -la 'with (thing)'
Destination nom gp-ku 'for (place)'
Intention nom gp-kitja 'for the purpose of (thing)'
Reason nom gp -nguru 'from (thing)'
Behalf nom gp -ku 'for (person)'
Accompani. nom gp-ngka, -la 'with (person/thing)'
Addition nom gpˆkulukulu 'as well as (person/thing)'
Quality adverbial gp
Comparison nom gp-purunpa 'like (person/thing)'
Role nom gp 'as (role)'

The circumstantial functions of causative and locative suffixes are similar to those of prepositions
in English,6 and they cover a remarkably similar semantic spread. The major exception to this in
Table 2, is the realisation of Duration as a series of imperfective non-finite processes.7 These may
consist of up to six iterated processes, the greater the number, the longer the Duration. These series
are not part of the verbal group in the clause, but are distinct elements, frequently spoken on a
separate tone group, presenting them as marked New information, on the same pattern as nominal

6 Describing a similar system in Kuniyanti, another Australian language, MacGregor (1992) labels such suffixes as
'post-positions', drawing attention to their functional similarity with prepositions in English.
7 'Serial verb form' in formalist accounts.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
7
circumstances. This construal of Duration is independent of any temporal divisions, which are the
basis of the English construal of Duration, exact or inexact. It strongly recalls Whorf's description
of temporal representations in Native American languages, as 'subjective experience of time
becoming later', in contrast to the 'objectification' of time in European languages.

We will now turn to the description each process type in Pitjantjatjara.

2. Material processes

2.1 Actor and Goal

Material processes may involve either one or two inherent participants, functioning as Actor and
Goal. Intransitive clauses involve an Actor in an action or event; in transitive clauses the action is
extended to a Goal, on which it has some effect:8

(1) tjintu paka-nu

sun-NEUT did rise
Actor Pro:mat:intrans
the sun has risen

(2) ngayulu Kanpi-ku a-nanyi

I-ACTV Kanpi-CAUSTV am going
Actor Circ:destina Pro:mat:intrans
I'm heading for Kanpi

(3) minyma-ngku ultja paltji-ni

woman-ACTV clothes-NEUT is washing
Actor Goal Pro:mat:trans
the woman is washing clothes

These examples illustrate the construal of material action in Pitjantjara, as either effective
(transitive), as in (3), or non-effective (intransitive), as in (1) and (2). Most Pitjantjatjara verbs only
function in one or the other type of clause, but there are still a good number of verbs which may
function in either, as exemplified in (4):

(4) minyma paltji-ni shower-ngka

woman-NEUT is washing shower-LOC
Actor Pro:mat:intrans Circ:loc
the woman is washing in the shower

8 The "case" and other grammatical marking for the constituents in the Pitjantjatjara clauses is shown in capital
letters along with the literal translation. The key to the terms is provided at the end of this paper.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
8

The same verb that functioned effectively in (3) involves here in (4) only an Actor; the
process is not extended to a Goal. The `shower' is not a participant but a circumstance associated
with but not inherent in the process. Note however that the Actor remains the participant that
initiates the action; it is not possible for the Goal of the effective process to become the Actor in the
corresponding non-effective process, in contrast to the English pattern, as exemplified by the pair
`she is washing the clothes' and `the clothes are washing'. The apparently equivalent Pitjantjatjara
clause ultja paltjini, literally `clothes washing', actually involves an implicit (ellipsed) Actor `(s/he)
is washing the clothes'.
This is a significant point since it illustrates the model of nuclear transitivity in
Pitjantjatjara. In the environment of material processes, the nuclear configuration is Actor/Process
(+Goal) in contrast with English, where the nuclear model is Process/Medium (+Agent). Whereas
the English model focuses on the causation of the process, the Pitjantjatjara model focuses on its
resulting effect.

2.2 Additional participant roles in material processes

There may also be another type of participant role in material processes, that of Range:

(5) nyantju wala winki puli tati-nu

horse-NEUT very quickly-NEUT hill-NEUT did climb
Actor Circ:quality Range Pro:mat:trans
the horse climbed the hill flat out

In this example, both nyantju `horse' and puli `hill' take the neutral form. Their respective functions
are semantically distinct without any need for structural distinction, i.e. the `horse' is clearly the
Actor in the process of 'climbing'. However, the `hill' is not a circumstance of location; had it been
a locative circumstance, it would have displayed a locative suffix (cf example 7 below). So
although the process is extended to a second participant, the Actor is not marked in active form.
What then is the nature of the second participant and how does its relationship to the process differ
from that of a Goal? The same verb tatini `climb' can function in a transitive clause in which the
Actor is in fact inflected in active form:

(6) Ilyatjari-lu pony tati-nu

Ilyatjari-ACTV pony-NEUT did climb
Actor Goal Pro:mat:trans
Ilyatjari mounted the pony

These alternative structures are not random but realise a semantic distinction. In example
(6), the more common structure for effective material clauses, the process is not only extended to
but also results in an effect on the Goal. By contrast, in example (5), the process is extended to the
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
9
second participant, but does not result in an effect on it. This suggests that where common/proper
nominals, as Actor in effective material clauses, are not inflected in active form, this marks the
process as `non-effective'. That is to say, the process in such clauses does not produce an effect on
the second participant. This participant, to which the process is extended without a resultant effect,
is labelled Range (following Halliday 1994:146-9). Whereas in English, Range is distinguished
from Goal by its potential for realisation as a prepositional phrase, in Pitjantjatjara a similar
function is distinguished by the lack of active inflection on the Actor.
These examples are further evidence of the inadequacy of the formalist definition of
transitivity as a binary verb classification. Despite its common occurrence in transitive clauses,
Goddard (1985) classifies tatini `climb' as an "intransitive verb", giving the following example
(analysis ours):

(7) tjitji tjuta nyaratja punu-ngka tati-ni

child many yonder-NEUT tree-LOC are climbing
Actor Circ:loc Pro:mat:intrans
those children are climbing in a tree

This clause is translated by Goddard as "Those kids over there are climbing a tree", implicitly
interpreting the clause as an Actor/Process/Range configuration. But in this example `tree' is not
inflected as Range, but as Circumstance of location. The experiential focus is the Actor + Process
`children+climbing' nucleus; its domain (`tree') is more peripheral than if it had been marked as
Range.
There are also a few verbs such as patani `wait', and ngurini `search', which function in
Actor/Process + Range structures, in which the Range carries an additional sense of `purpose'. In
this case the Range is inflected with the `causative' suffix -ku or -mpa ("dative case" in traditional
terms).

(8) Ricky-nya anangu kutjupa-ku pata-ningi

Ricky-ACTV person another-CAUSTV was waiting
Actor Range:purpose Pro:mat:intrans
Ricky was waiting for somebody else

Dixon (1980) explains this type of structure as a surface intransitive structure SV+dative,
derived from deep transitive structure AOV, and Goddard (1985) accordingly classifies verbs such
as patani as "intransitive". However there are verbs which occur in both this type of structure and in
effective structures, with Actor-ACTV and Goal-NEUT. These include ngurini, which Goddard
classifies as a "transitive" verb, and panykani `stalking', which he classifies as "ambitransitive"
without suggesting a semantic distinction between the structural variants. However, as we saw in
examples (5) and (6), there certainly is a semantic distinction expressed by these alternative
structures.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
10
A third participant role in dispositive material processes, such as unganyi `giving' is the
Recipient:

(9) kami-ngku nganana-nya mayi u-ngu

grandma-ACTV us-NEUT food-NEUT did give
Actor Recipt Goal Pro:mat:trans
grandma gave us food

In this case, both Goal and Recipient are realised in neutral form, but their roles are semantically
distinct; it is unlikely that grandma gave us to the food. However Actor is distinguished from the
other participants by the active suffix. Goddard (1985:168) recognises this configuration as
regularly occurring with the verb unganyi, "The thing given and the recipient both take accusative
case", though which he would classify as O in Dixon's system is not clear. Goddard goes on to add
"with the recipient usually coming first, if both are mentioned", and contradicts this with his first
example (analysis ours):

(10) mai- ni u-wa

food-NEUT me-NEUT give!
Goal Recipt Pro:mat:trans
give me (some) food

Goddard may be suggesting `word order' to distinguish the two participant functions, but as we
discussed above, this is unnecessary since the two participants are semantically distinguishable
without structural marking. The order of constituents in Pitjantjatjara clauses is textually
significant, not experientially.
Each of the participant roles, Actor, Goal, Range and Recipient correspond closely between
Pitjantjatjara and English. The labels I have used here for participant roles follow Halliday (1994).
In English Actor is distinguished from Goal either by sequence or as a by-Adjunct. The other
participant roles Range and Recipient are also distinguished either by sequence or as prepositional
phrases. Pitjantjatjara relies on affixes and semantic distinctions to achieve the same ends.

3. Mental processes: perception & reaction

Mental processes differ from material processes in two most general ways:

a: The inherent participant, the Senser, is a conscious animal or person, whereas participants in material
processes may be any kind of entity.
b: There must be a complement to the process, that which is sensed, which may be represented as a clause rank
participant, a Phenomenon, or as a projected clause, an idea.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
11
Thus the crucial recognition features of mental clauses include the type of entity that can function
as Senser, and the potential for projection. The model of consciousness construed in mental
processes in Pitjantjatjara includes two general domains, perception of, or reaction to, external or
internal phenomena. In both types, the perceived phenomena may be represented as clause rank
participant, a Phenomenon, or as projected clause(s).

3.1 Perception
The grammar of perception construes the Senser's apprehension of external events, entities and
qualities as identical to her apprehension of phenomena internal to her consciousness. There is no
structural distinction between cognition and perception as we find in English for example. This
conflation of external and internal perception is mirrored lexically in the general mental verb
kuli-ni, which may be interpreted in English as `hear', `heed', `consider', `know', `understand',
`remember' or `feel', depending on the context. In other words the verb kulini may function as a
process of perception of external or internal phenomena, or simply as perceptive behaviour. The
alternative expressions of perception, as a projecting clause complex, and as a simple clause are
presented as follows.

3.1.1 Projecting
Projected perception represents meantal processing as 'internal speech'; the relation between the
projecting mental process and the projected clause is paratactic, the latter represented as quoted
'direct speech'. This is illustrated below in (11) and (12) for internal and external perception,
respectively.

(11) INTERNAL:
1 nganana kuli-nu
we-ACTV did think
Senser Pro:cog

"2 tjana tjinguru kawankati-ngu

they-ACTV maybe did get lost
Actor Pro:mat
we thought, "Maybe they have gotten lost."

(12) EXTERNAL:
α munu paluru nya-ngu
and she-ACT did see
Senser Pro:perception

'β nyaa nyanga-tja pupa-nyi

what-NEUT? this thing-NEUT is crouching
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
12
Att Carrier Pro:attributive
and while going she saw "what is this thing crouching?"

The representation of internal perception as direct speech, as in (11), is not dissimilar to to the less
frequent variant of projected cognition in English, as a paratactic clause complex (Halliday
1994:252). But the corresponding representation of external perception is unique; processes of
seeing and feeling phenomena external to the Senser are construed in the same manner as processes
of thinking (about) phenomena internal to her consciousness. That is the general concept of
perception is construed as the Senser 'thinking' in language. This is not the same as 'saying' as it is
construed in verbal processes (see below), which construes speech as an act of social exchange
between Sayer and Receiver. Rather it represents the perceptive domain of consciousness as the
production of meaning in the form of quoted wording. It is virtually impossible to re-present this in
English without reference to verbal processes such as 'talking to oneself', where the Sayer has the
same identity as Receiver, or to spatial metaphors like 'say it in your head'.

(13) PERFECTIVE:
α Jimmy-nya kuli-ni
Jimmy-NEUT is thinking
Senser Pro:cog

‘β anku-ntjikitja
to go
Pro:mat
Jimmy thinks he'll go

3.1.2 Non-projecting
Clauses with mental process are not constrained to project: i.e. they may be non-projecting. In that
case the Phenomenon is realised as a nominal group. It represents an entity or name for a process
that the Senser perceives, either in her external environment or internal thoughts. To distinguish
their roles, the Senser takes the ACTIVE nominal form, and the Phenomenon the NEUTRAL form,
reflecting the pattern in effective material clauses.

(14) NON-PROJECTING MENTAL PROCESS:

Jimmy-lu mama-nya kuli-ni
Jimmy-ACTV father-NEUT is thinking
Senser Phenomenon Pro:perception
Jimmy's thinking about his father

3.2 Perception
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
13
Mental processes of perception are like cognitive processes in that, here too, the Senser is a
conscious being, and that which is perceived may be a thing or projected idea. Projection in
perception differs from cognition in two ways:

a: Projected perceptions are only hypotactic, i.e. they do not represent perceptions as wording (cf example 11i-ii
above).
b: Projections are imperfective only, i.e. realis, since it is not possible to perceive events occurring in the future.

Below is provided an example of non-projecting perception process in (15), followed by examples

of projecting perception process:

(15) NON-PROJECTING:
tjilpi-ngku malu nya-ngu
old man-ACTV kangaroo-NEUT did see
Senser Phenomenon Pro:perception
the old man saw a kangaroo

(16) PROJECTING:
α nganana nya-ngu
we-ACTV did see
Senser Pro:perception

‘β nyuntu wati-pitja-nyangka
you-ACTV across-go-IMPERF:SW-S
Actor Pro:mat
we saw you going across

(17)
α ngayulu kuli-nu
I-ACTV did hear
Senser Pro:perception

‘β paluru ngintaka pawu-nyangka

s/he-ACTV goanna-NEUT was shooting
Actor Goal Pro:mat
I heard that s/he shot a goanna

To this point the semantic potential of mental processes and their similarities and
differences to material processes are comparable to those for English as described by Halliday
(1994). For both languages, material and mental processes differ with respect to number of inherent
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
14
participants, the consciousness of participants, and the type of complementation possible, i.e. as a
thing or as a projected idea.
However processes of doing and perceiving also resemble each other in another respect: in
both cases, there is potential for choosing either one, two or more participants realised as nominal
groups. Where there is only one inherent nominal participant, i.e. Actor in material or Senser in
mental, it will take the unmarked form. By contrast, where there are two, i.e. Goal in material or
Phenomenon in mental, these will take the unmarked NEUTRAL nominal form, while Actor or
Senser is distinguished by the ACTIVE form. Despite these similarities, it must be emphasised that
the Actor/Process+Goal material configuration is semantically distinct from the
Senser/Process+Phenomenon mental figure. The material model is clearly one of effect; an
effective material process results in some kind of effect on the Goal, creating it, changing it in some
way, transporting or exchanging it. But the mental model is one of signification; perceptive
processes re-present a concrete entity or process as an abstraction, an idea internal to the Senser.
This is made explicit in projections, which represent perception as internal speech, but applies
equally to Phenomenon:things. The perception has no material effect on the concrete thing
represented by Phenomenon; rather it results in a semiotic entity that is abstracted from the material
entity it signifies.
In formalist descriptions, the differences between material and mental process types are not
recognised. The distinct functions Goal and Phenomenon are both labelled O, since they are
realised by a common nominal form, so-called "accusative case", while Actor or Senser are both
labelled A, with "ergative case" inflection. However, insofar as "ergative case" implies a single
functional interpretation, as Agent of the process, it is over-generalised. We have already
demonstrated that the material model in Pitjantjatjara is one of effect, rather than agency, and that
effectivity is a clause rank system distinguishing non-effective Actor/Process configurations from
Actor/Process+Goal effective ones. In the latter, the so-called ergative inflection on Actor is more
accurately an ACTIVE form, which functions to distinguish Actor from Goal in the structure as a
whole; it does not inherently ascribe agency to the entity functioning as Actor. This is more
apparent in mental processes, in which the Senser is clearly not agentive; her process of perception
does not cause any change in the perceived entity or process. Rather, like Actor, the Senser is the
participant which 'actualises' the process, and is consequently the one inflected in ACTIVE form.

3.3 Reaction
Mental reaction differs from perceptive processes in its construal of the nature of the process and its
relation to its Phenomenon. We have seen how perceiving is construed as extended from the Senser
+ Process configuration to the Phenomenon, in which they are somewhat similar to transitive
material processes. Reaction on the other hand is construed as a change in the Senser in response to
an outside stimulus. This distinction recalls Halliday's description of bi-directionality in English
mental processes, `I like it/it pleases me' (Halliday 1994), and Martin's formulation for Tagalog
processes, of a "centrifugal" vs "centripetal" orientation (no date).
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
15
Reaction processes in Pitjantjatjara are realised by verbs of affective or cognitive states that
are inflected for inceptive aspect, suggesting an internal event of `becoming'. The Phenomenon here
is realised by the CAUSATIVE nominal inflection (which also inflects circumstances Location:
towards or Destination), or a perfective non-finite process, e.g. anku-ntjikitja 'to do' (the suffix of
which also inflects circumstances of Intention). These nominal and verbal forms both suggest an
external stimulus which the internal event is directed towards. Reaction projections are, in other
words, always hypotactic and non-finite:perfective. A relatively large group of Pitjantjatjara verbs
function in reaction processes. The majority of these represent affective states. Below are some
instances of these, followed by examples of non-projecting and projecting reaction:

kuntaringanyi feel shy, embarrassed, ashamed

kuraringanyi dislike
mirpanarinyi feel offended, annoyed
mukuringanyi like, want, desire
mula-mularinganyi trust, believe
ngalturinganyi feel sympathy
nguluringanyi fear
nyararinganyi feel jealous
pikaringanyi feel angry
raparinganyi feel brave, confident

(18) NON-PROJECTING:
i nyuntu nyaa-ku ngayu-ku pikari-nganyi?
you-ACTV why? me-CAUSTV being angry
Senser Phenomenon Pro:reaction
why are you angry at me?

ii tjitji palatja nyantju-ku nguluri-nganyi

child that-NEUT horse-CAUSTV is fearing
Senser Phenomenon Proc:reaction
that child is frightened of horses

(19) PROJECTING:
α anangu tjuta mukuringku-pai
person many-NEUT does like
Senser Pro:reaction

‘β Tjulu-ku anku-ntjikitja
Tjulu-CAUSTV to go
Circ:destin Pros:mat
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
16
many people like to go to Tjulu

In addition to these affective states, there are a few verbs that represent cognitive rather than
affective states, e.g.

nintiringanyi learn
rukuringanyi be reminded

However the structural realisations of these processes are identical to the affective states described
above, so they are construed grammatically as the same process type, despite their lexical
association with cognition. Examples are given below:

(20) NON-PROJECTING:
tjitji tjuta Englisha-ku nintirinku-pai school-angka
child many-NEUT English-CAUSTV do learn school-LOC
Senser Phenomenon Pro:reaction Circ:loc
children learn English at school

(21) PROJECTING:
α ngayulu iriti nintiri-ngu
I-ACTV long ago did learn
Senser Circ:loc:time Process:reaction

‘β motorcar palya-ntjikitja
motorcar-NEUT fix-PERF:SA-S
Goal Pro:mat
I learnt to fix motorcars a long time ago

Many verbs that realise mental reaction also have corresponding causative forms. These
verbs function in clauses which involve an additional agentive participant, the Inducer, as well as a
Senser and Phenomenon; and again the processes may be non-projecting or projecting:

(22) NON-PROJECTING:
tjilpi-ngku ngayu-nya tjukur-ku ninti-nu
old man-ACTV me-NEUT Dreaming-CAUSTV did teach
Inducer Senser Phenomenon Pro:reaction:causative
old men taught me that Dreaming

(23) PROJECTING:
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
17
α kutjupa-ngku palu-nya muku-muku-nu
another-ACTV him/her-NEUT did cause to want
Inducer Senser Pro:reaction:causative

‘β anku-ntjaku
to go
Pro:mat
another person persuaded him/her to go

4. Verbal processes: saying

Verbal processes are, in many ways, similar to mental processes. There is one essential participant
Sayer, but only human beings may occupy this role, not other conscious animals (except where
these are mythic beings that are simultaneously human and animal). This contrasts with the verbal
model in English, in which any entity capable of symbolising, such as clocks and texts, may
function as Sayer, reflecting the influence of its written mode.

That which is said may have the status of a participant, the Verbiage, which may be realised
nominally; or it may be a projected clause. Verbal projections may be paratactic, i.e. quoting
speech, or hypotactic, reporting speech. Cross-classifying these two dependency types is the speech
function of the projecting and projected clauses, whether proposition or proposal. Projected
propositions are typically represented as quoted speech, as in mental perception; but they may also
report speech, in which case person and temporal reference concords with that in the projecting
clause, as in English, 'he said that he was coming'. Projected proposals are realised as non-finite
perfective processes, as in mental reaction, 'tell him to go', except where the projecting clause is in
imperative mood, in which case the structure is paratactic and the projected clause is also
imperative in mood, 'tell him give me'. We will begin our analysis with non-projecting clauses, and
then illustrate the paratactic and hypotactic variants of projected proposals and propositions.

4.1 Non-projecting
As with Senser in mental perception, the role of Sayer in non-projecting verbal processes is
distinguished by the ACTIVE nominal form, from the Verbiage which is inflected as NEUTRAL.
There is also a third participant role specific to verbal processes, the Receiver, to whom the saying
is addressed. Receiver is realised by the LOCATIVE suffix, distinguishing its role from Sayer and
Verbiage. Less frequently, if there is no other participant in the clause aside from Sayer, the
Receiver may take the NEUTRAL form. (24) exemplifies some of these roles:

(24) mama nguntju-ngku tjukurpa wangka-pai tjitji tjuta-ngka

mother father-ACTV story-NEUT do tell child many-LOC
Sayer Verbiage Pro:verbal Receiver
parents would tell stories to their children
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
18

4.2 Projected propositions

As introduced above, propositions may be projected paratactically or hypotactically, exemplified by
(25) and (26), respectively:

(25)
1 ka ngayulu palu-la wangka-ngu
and I-ACTV him-LOC did say
Sayer Receiver Pro:verbal

"2 muntauwa nyuntu kutitju-nu

aha you-ACTV did steal
Actor Pro:mat
and I said to him "aha, you stole it!"

(26)
α munu palu-nya tjakaltju-nu
and (she) her-NEUT did say
Receiver Pro:verbal

"β panya palu-mpa katja Adelaide-alakutu a-nu

that her son-NEUT Adelaide-LOC did go
Actor Circ:location Proc:mat

Note that the projected clause in (26) is introduced with the anaphoric reference item panya, here
functioning as a conjunction which marks the clause complex relation as projection. This is a
general feature of reported propositions, equivalent in this function to 'that' in English reported
speech. Turning to proposals, these may be projected hypotactically as non-finite perfective
processes, or paratactically as finite clauses in imperative mood, where the projecting clause is also
imperative. These are illustrated in (27) and (28) respectively.

(27)
α paluru tjana ngayu-la watja-nu
they-ACTV I-LOC did command
Sayer Receiver Pro:verbal

"β ma-pitja-ntjaku
away-go-PERF:SW-S
Process:mat
they told me to go away
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
19

(28)
1 palu-la wangka
him-LOC tell!
Receiver Pro:verbal

"2 ka ni money uwa

and me-NEUT money-NEUT give!
Recipient Goal Pro:mat
tell him "give me money!"

The projected clause in (28) is introduced by the additive conjunction ka. In this environment it
fulfils the same conjunctive role as panya in (26), but here ka is used to mark the clause complex
relation as paratactic projection.

5. Behavioural processes
Behavioural processes resemble mental and verbal processes, in that one participant is typically a
conscious being. However, behavioural processes do not project, and there is most frequently no
other participant, whereas mental and verbal processes must include a complement as participant or
projection. Many verbs that function as mental or verbal processes may also function as
behavioural processes, but the latter represent the processes of sensing and saying as a material act,
rather than the production of meaning:

(29) ngayulu kuli-ni

I-ACTV am listening
Behaver Pro:behavioural
I'm listening

(30) kanyila para-nyanga-nyi

wallaby-NEUT is looking around
Behaver Pro:behavioural
the wallaby is looking around

(31) whitefeller telephone-angka wangkanyi

whitefeller-NEUT telephone-LOC is speaking
Behaver Circ:loc Pro:behavioural
a whitefeller is talking on the telephone
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
20
Another important distinction between verbal processes and verbal behaviour, is that the Behaver
may be any entity construed as 'talking', since this is not necessarily the same as 'saying'. For
example, birds may talk, tjulpu tjuta wangkanyi 'many birds are talking', although they cannot
actually say anything, and even the wind is construed as talking, walpa wiru wangkanyi 'a sweet
wind is talking (blowing)'.

In the examples, the behavioural process is realised by the verbs `listening', `looking', `talking', etc.,
representing it congruently as an action of the Behaver. But the process of behaving may also be
realised nominally as a second participant, the Behaviour. This is typically the name of a process:

(31) kungka tjuta inma inka-nyi

girl many-NEUT song-NEUT are playing
Behaver Behaviour Pro:behavioural
the girls are singing a song

In this example, the meaning of `singing' is realised as a nominal element inma `song'. The process
inkanyi `playing' is required to fulfil the need for a verb to indicate mood, tense and aspect, as in
English `sing a song, play a tune, have a shower' etc. There are a few such verbs in Pitjantjatjara,
with a specific range of Behaviours associated with them, such as arkani `acting, behaving'. The
same structure occurs with verbs of speaking as Process and language varieties as Behaviour:

(32) tjilpi tjuta alpiri wangka-pai

elder many-NEUT speech style-NEUT do speak
Behaver Behaviour Pro:behavioural
the elders speak alpiri

Both Behaver and the Behaviour take the same neutral form here; since they are semantically
distinct, there is no need for a structural distinction. In this respect, behavioural processes are like
middle material processes with Actor and Range. With the latter, however, the Actor may be any
kind of entity and the Range does not represent a behaviour of a conscious or talking entity.

6. Relational processes: being and having

Relational processes in Pitjantjatjara are of two general types, both involving two inherent
participants inflected in unmarked form. Identifying processes equate two entities at different levels
of abstraction, such as name and referent. Attributive processes describe or classify an entity. Each
of these types may be cross classified as intensive `x is a', possessive `x has a', or circumstantial `x
is at a'. From a semantic perspective, they share a conceptual spread similar to that of English as
described by Halliday (1994). Relational clauses in Pitjantjatjara need not include a verb; the
relation is realised both lexically and rhythmically as a configuration of Thematic foot and Tonic
foot; one participant is presented as Theme, and the other as New information, respectively. Since
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
21
mood, tense, phase and aspect are realised by inflection of verbs in Pitjantjatjara, relational clauses
without verbs are inherently indicative and `timeless'. Where a relation requires temporalising or
imperative mood, it can be realised with a verb. Thus relational clauses most generally represent
types of relations between entities, and these relations may be more specifically construed as
processes. For this reason we will refer to these configurations as 'relations', with 'relational
processes' as a sub-variant.

6.1 Identifying
In Pitjantjatjara identifying clauses, the two inherent participant roles conform with Halliday's
formulation for English (1994:124): "one element will be the Value (meaning, referent, function,
status, role) and the other element will be the Token (sign, name, form, holder, occupant)". The
Value is always a nominal constituent, as is the Token, except in the case of possessive identifying
relations, when it may be inflected as an inceptive process. Identifying relations are illustrated
below for intensive, possessive and circumstantial variants.

6.1.1 Intensive
The intensive identifying relation is concerned with identifying an entity with some role, status,
meaning etc.

(33) ngayulu ini Jimmy-nya

I name-NEUT Jimmy-NEUT
Value Token
my name is Jimmy

(34) wati palatja mayitja

man that-NEUT boss-NEUT
Token Value
that man is the boss

(35) ka Watarr-nga waru piti

and Watarru-NEUT fire place-NEUT
Token Value
and Watarru is (represents) the place-of-fire

There is no structural distinction between Token and Value, unlike English where the Token may
be realised as a by-Adjunct, as in 'Hamlet was played by Mr Garrick' (Halliday 1994:123). But the
two participants are semantically distinct, since Token is the signifier of the Value. In (33) a name
identifies a person; in (34) a person is equated with his social role, and in (35) a place is equated
with its role in the Pitjantjatjara mythological system `place-of-fire'. Identifying relations may be
probed with ...nyaa `which?' and ngananya `who?', e.g.:
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
22

(36) ngananya nyuntu

who-Token you-1-Value
who are you?

Intensive identifying relations may also be brought about by an agentive participant, the
Assigner. In this case the identifying relation is realised as process, the Assigner takes ACTIVE
form, while both Token and Value are NEUTRAL:

(37) mama nguntju-ngku palu-nya ini-nu Tjimiya-nya

mother father-ACTV her-NEUT did name Tjimiya-NEUT
Assigner Value Pro:ident:causative Token
the parents named her Tjimiya

Some verbs functioning in such causative identifying processes, such as inini `naming' or
wangkanyi `saying' are variously classified by formalists as "transitive" or "ditransitive" to account
for the presence of two participants in neutral form.

6.1.2 Possessive
The possessive identifying relation is concerned with identifying a possession with its possessor. In
this type, the Token takes the possessive -ku/mpa suffix:

(38) mukata palatja nyuntu-mpa

hat that-NEUT yours-POSS
Value Token
that hat is yours

(39) wati tjuta-ku ngura panyatja

man many-POSS place that-NEUT
Token Value
that place is the men's

The possessive type may also be construed as a process, for the purpose of expressing inceptive
phase, together with tense or aspect, by an inceptive suffix on the Token, as in (40):

(40) nyangatja ngayu-ku-ri-ngu

this-NEUT has become mine
Value Token:process
this has become mine
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
23
6.1.3 Circumstantial
Circumstantial identifying clauses in Pitjantjatjara include the circumstantial meanings of place or
time. An example of each is given in (41) and (42) respectively.

(42) nyangatja ngura nyaa?

this-NEUT place what?-NEUT
Value Token
what place is this?

(43) kinara nyaa nyangatja?

month what-NEUT this-NEUT
Token Value
what month is this?

6.2 Attributive
Attributive relations ascribe an Attribute, a class, possession or location, to an entity, functioning as
Carrier. As with identifying processes, attributive relations may be realised without a verb by
juxtaposition of two participants functioning as Carrier and Attribute. However, they are distinct
from identifying relations in that an Attribute represents a class or descriptive category to which the
Carrier is attributed, whereas the identifying relation equates rather than classifies.

6.2.1 Attributive clauses: no verb

Examples (43)-(45) illustrate verbless attributive clauses of the three sub-types, intensive
possessive and circumstantial:

(43) INTENSIVE:ATTRIBUTE AS THING

ngayulu wati
I-ACT man-NEUT
Carrier Attribute
I am a (initiated) man

(44) INTENSIVE:ATTRIBUTE AS QUALITY

tjitji nyangatja upa
child this-NEUT weak-NEUT
Carrier Attribute
this child is weak

(44) POSSESSIVE:
ngayulu nyantju tjuta-tjara
I-ACTV horse many-POSS
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
24
Carrier Attribute:possession
I have many horses

(45) CIRCUMSTANTIAL:
paluru ngura nyara-ngka
s/he-ACTV place yonder-LOC
Carrier Attribute:location
s/he is at yonder place

6.2.2 Attributive: with verb

Each of these attributive sub-types above can also be realised with a verb, inflecting for tense,
phase, aspect, or imperative mood. In the intensive type the Attribute is inflected as an inceptive
process-ringanyi `becoming (thing/quality)'; the possessive relation is realised by a verb kanyini,
which means `hold' in its other function as a material process; circumstantial relations are realised
by verbs of posture, nyinanyi, `sit', ngarinyi, `lie', and ngaranyi, `stand', or (less frequently) pupanyi
'crouching',wanani `following in a line', waninyi `scattered around'. Examples of these sub-types
are given below:

(46) INTENSIVE:
kuka nyangatja una-ri-ngu
meat this-NEUT has become bad
Carrier Attribute:process
this meat has gone bad

(47) POSSESSIVE:
walawuru rabbita kanyi-ni
eagle-NEUT rabbit-NEUT is holding
Carrier Attribute Pro:attrib:possessive
the eagle has a rabbit

(48) CIRCUMSTANTIAL:
minyma panyatja wali-ngka nyina-ngi
woman that-NEUT house-LOC was sitting
Carrier Attribute:loc Pro:attrib:circumstantial
that woman was in the house

Like identifying intensive relations, the attributive intensive relation may also be causative
with an additional agentive participant, the Attributor. In this case the Attribute is inflected as a
process, Attributor is inflected in ACTIVE and the Carrier in NEUTRAL form. These are of two
types; the first is related to material processes in that the Carrier is classified by a change in form;
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
25
the second is related to verbal processes in that the Carrier classified by a change in vocation. These
are exemplified in (50) and (51) respectively:

(49) nyinka nyangatja tjilpi tjuta-ngku ngula wati-lku

teenage boy this-NEUT senior man many-ACTV later will make man
Carrier Attributor Circ Attribute:process
later on the senior men will make this teenage boy a man

(51) Ilyatjari-lu ni katja-nma-nu

Ilyatjari-ACTV me-neut did make son
Attributor Carrier Attribute:process
Ilyatjari made me a son

7. Topological perspective on process types

In our discussion so far, we have classified Pitjantjatjara clauses as either material, mental, verbal,
behavioural or relational according to criteria which are exclusive to each process type, such as
inherent number of participants, nature of participants, inflection of the nominal groups realising
the participants, potential for projection, and whether or nor not the process must be overtly realised
with a verb. And we have further subclassified process types according to more delicate criteria,
e.g. mental processes of perception and reaction. In doing so we have employed an elaborate
descriptive model which integrates semantic and grammatical strata, systemic and structural axes,
and lexicogrammatical ranks of morpheme, word, group, clause and clause complex. This
typological classification focusses on differences between categories, defining process types as
general semantic concepts with characteristic clusters of structural realisations. Although we have
greatly expanded the formalists' binary classification of verbs as either transitive or intransitive, we
have used the same descriptive principle of typological classification as traditional descriptions.
But at the same time we have also recognised similarities between process types. For
example behavioural processes may resemble mental processes in that one participant is a
conscious thing, the Behaver. On the other hand they also resemble non-effective material
processes since the process is not extended to a Phenomenon or mental projection, but may involve
the Range-like participant Behaviour. A complementary perspective on transitivity is described by
Martin and Matthiessen (1991), following Lemke (n.d.) who defines a "topology" as "a set of
criteria for establishing degrees of nearness or proximity among members of some category".9
From a topological perspective each Pitjantjatjara process type is located at the centre of a semantic
domain which is closer or farther from other process types. This perspective does not negate the
typological classification of semantic categories as `doing', `sensing', `saying' and `being/having'.
Rather it complements typology as similarity complements difference, elaborating potentials for
meaning making, within both languages and linguistic theory.

9 See further discussion of "topology" in Martin, this volume.

PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
26
Figure 1 attempts to capture both of these perspectives on Pitjantjatjara transitivity. It begins
with the typological categories of material, mental, verbal and relational types as semantic spheres.
Their topological resemblances to each other are then illustrated as parabolas extending from one
sphere towards another.

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

Figure 1: Typological and topological perspectives on Pitjantjatjara processes.

The view presented in the Figure illustrates the following topological relationships:

a: Non-projecting verbal processes and mental processes of perception resemble transitive material processes. In
these cases the Senser or Sayer resembles an Actor, since both are inflected in ACTIVE form, although
semantically Senser must be conscious, and Sayer human, while Actor may be any entity. Likewise
Phenomenon or Verbiage morphologically resemble a Goal, although semantically they stands for an
abstraction, a perception or speech act, while Goal represents the concrete entity an action has an effect on.
b: Mental processes of reaction resemble attributive relations where the Attribute is a reactive mental state
(knowledgeable, fearful, etc.), since both Senser and Carrier are conscious things, and both may project.
However non-projecting reaction clauses must involve a Phenomenon which the Senser reacts to, while the
corresponding attributive relations typically don't.
c: Relational clauses in which the relation is expressed as a process resemble material processes. In
circumstantial and possessive relations, the process is realised by verbs of 'posture' or `holding' which can
otherwise function as material processes. Causative attributive and identifying clauses structurally resemble
efective material clauses, since the Assigner or Attributor is inflected in ACTIVE form like an Actor, while the
Carrier or Value resembles a Goal with NEUTRAL inflection. However causative identifying clauses include a
third participant, the Token, and semantically the process is one of assigning an identity to the Token.
Likewise the meaning of causative attributive processes is to attribute a quality or class to a Carrier, and the
Attribute is inflected as a process.

These complementary perspectives help to explain how traditional Australianists can

produce such apparently different classifications from our own. For example, the structural
similarities we see above between material and other process types lead formalists to define all
clause types in material terms as either SV or AOV, while ignoring or explaining other patterns in
non-functional terms. On the other hand, if we extend the topological principle from linguistic
description to meta-linguistic comparison, we are able to embrace both similarity and difference
between our functional approach here and the more formally oriented traditional Australianist
description.

8. Conclusion: comparing grammars in a post-colonial context

PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
27
While typological classification of process, participant and circumstantial functions has been the
starting point for this description of Pitjantjatjara transitivity, we have simultaneously been
concerned with relationships of similarity and difference with the language of description, English.
From this topological translinguistic perspective across languages, the analysis of experience
presented by the grammar of Pitjantjatjara exhibits a number of general resemblances to the English
transitivity system, as described by Halliday and other SF linguists (e.g. Fawcett 1980; 1987; Shore
1992; Davidse 1991; 1992; Matthiessen in press, and others). In my own experience as a second
language Pitjantjatjara speaker this is intuitively predictable, at the general semantic level described
here. It is in more delicate semantic distinctions, particularly in their lexis, that the languages differ
as much as they coincide. At the level of generality we have discussed in this paper, the general
categories of the transitivity system, grammatical similarities between the languages tend to be
foregrounded.
A grammatical system, in the interpretation here, is a set of resources that are potentially
deployed to create text and thus to exchange meanings. A grammatical description is by no means a
description of the language as a whole. Rather it represents the general categories of resources with
which a language may realise innumerable possible meanings in various social contexts. The range
of possible meanings expressed by one culture's grammar will coincide with the range of another in
some respects10 and diverge in others. The possibilities actually taken up by speakers will differ
even further, within the same culture let alone between different ones.
It should therefore not be surprising that much general semantic potential overlaps between
experiential grammars as geographically and culturally remote as Pitjantjatjara and English. This
includes types of processes and participants, as well as many of the forms of their structural
realisation. These general domains of meaning lie deep in the grammar, in the 'collective
unconscious' of its speakers, and, by comparison with sounds and words, are relatively immune to
change. Given the large number of commonalities in semantic domains, and simultaneously in their
structural realisations, it is not beyond consideration that they derive from a common linguistic
inheritance in the remote past.11 This becomes more plausible as geneticists reduce the timescale of
human divergence to 100,000+ years, commensurate in order of magnitude with the probable age
of Australia's relatively homogeneous language family of 40,000+ years (SA reference).
An alternative explanation is that many semantic concepts are so broadly utilitarian that
they are likely to be found in any culture, that similarities are a consequence of common biologies
confronting similar environments. This view assumes the 'sociobiological' paradigm that has
dominated debates within modernism on the definition of humanity, for over three decades,
attributing human commonalities to biology and differences to culture (Haraway 1989). In either
case, the cultures that these two languages realise may not have been so different from each other in
the relatively recent past. It is only a couple of centuries since English was predominantly spoken
by a peasant agricultural people, and the speakers of its ancestral Indo-European languages had
been pastoral nomads a millennium or two before (IE reference). Thus it is reasonable that English

10 See Hasan and Fries (1995) for some discussion of grammatical comparison across languages.
11 cf Ruhlen date, on language typology research using lexical evidence.
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
28
should share, for example, many of its circumstantial representations of space and time with
Pitjantjatjara, whose speakers had maintained their nomadic harvesting economy until a mere half-
century ago. On the other hand, the general semantic domains of material, mental, verbal and
relational processes are arguably an analysis of experience generated by the nature of our
experience of ourselves interacting with our social and material environment. They are likely to be
found in some configuration across cultures.
This should not be read as an attempt to posit language universals in the traditional sense.
This has been pursued and adequately proved in the realms of phonology and morphology by
formally oriented Australianists. What we need to focus on are relationships of similarity and
difference between these languages which now share a single national and local community. And
there are significant differences. English for example has similar structural realisations across
mental processes; cognition, perception and affection differ most markedly in the type of ideas they
project, propositions vs proposals (Halliday 1994:257-60). In Pitjantjatjara, cognition and
perception are conflated, and have quite distinct structural realisations from mental reaction;
perception and reaction are more transparently alternate models of consciousness.
More abstractly, the evolution in English of the ergative model of nuclear transitivity
(Martin 1992, Halliday 1994, Mathiessen in press) contrasts with the nuclear model in
Pitjantjatjara. In the English model the clause nucleus consists of Process+Medium, where
Medium is the inherent participant "through which the process is actualised" (Halliday 1994:163).
English Medium may conflate with alternate transitive roles, such as Actor in middle clauses' the
clothes are washing', or Goal in effective material clauses, 'the clothes are being washed'. In the
latter Actor is optional, and conflated with the nuclear role of Agent, 'by the woman'. In the
Pitjantjatjara nuclear model, the Medium is the inherent participant that 'actualises' the process or
relation, Actor, Senser, Sayer, Carrier, Value. The clause nucleus consists of Actor/Process,
Senser/Process, Sayer/Process, Carrier/Attribute or Value/Token (Attribute or Token may also be
inflected as processes), and it is these 'actualising' roles that take unmarked ACTIVE form as
pronouns. In material clauses the Actor/Process configuration may result in an effect on the Goal,
depending on the effectivity of the process. The Pitjantjatjara material model foregrounds effect
over causation, and this tendency is also reflected in the fact that cause:reason is a minor semantic
motif in the grammar and discourse, whereas cause:purpose is diversified and frequently deployed
(Rose 1993). This contrasts with recent developments in English, which have produced a
proliferation of resources for expressing reason, including the conflation of cause with agency in
circumstantial identifying processes, on the model of 'Value y is caused by Token x' (Halliday
1994:398-403).
The most radical contextual and semantic differences between English and Pitjantjatjara
have arisen over the past five centuries, as English culture has undergone mercantile, imperial and
industrial revolutions. English maintains the core transitivity system that served the needs of its
agricultural/pastoral speakers, but has since developed vast new specialised vocabularies and
potentials for semantic change through grammatical metaphor. A central feature of this semiotic
process is the capacity to nominalise processes which may then function as participants in other
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
29
clauses. Another is to render many types of logico-semantic relation as relational processes, with
myriad shades of meaning. Pitjantjatjara shares neither of these features, which have evolved
primarily in English's written mode, borrowed from Latin and Greek, in the contexts of
mercantilism, administration and science. These processes of grammatical metaphor are major
stumbling blocks for speakers of Australian languages learning to crack the English written code.12
Generally it is less problematic learning to translate spoken Pitjantjatjara experiential meanings into
spoken English grammar, which is predictable given the comparisons we have drawn between
transitivity systems. The experiential semantic potential of spoken English and Pitjantjatjara are
probably broadly convergent; it is when this basic system is played around with in written English
that the semantic potential diverges most dramatically.
Many 19th and early 20th century linguists believed they could make scientifically valid
comparisons between cultures on the basis of the phonology and morphology of their languages.
These methods have been long discredited, not only for their implausibility but because they were
associated with unacceptable theories of ethnic hierarchies. More recently formally oriented
linguists have gone to great lengths to show that all languages, no matter what the technology of
their cultures, share equal levels of phonological and morphological complexity, or that the number
of lexical items used by average speakers of Australian or European languages is about the same.
At the same time there is a fascination with differences in `world-view' between these cultures and
attempts to locate its expression at the levels of lexis or syntax. Typically the latter begin with
philosophical concepts such as `synthetic' (Australian) or 'atomistic' (European) for which evidence
is sought in clause rank structures.13 What these methods lack however is a clear theory of the
complex relation between social context, meaning and grammar, such as has been developed in
SFL over the past 30 years. Whorf's (1938; 1950) elaborate comparisons of the `cryptogrammars' of
native American and `Standard Average European' languages, showed that there were important
differences in their construals of time, for example. Under the ensuing hegemony of universalism
however, his discoveries and methods were rejected or ignored, and it is only recently that the
metalinguistic tools for such large scale semantic comparisons have become available. The most
important recent grammatical work in this respect is not across languages, but between registers of
spoken and written English, many of which are unintelligible to the majority of English speakers
(Halliday 1985, Rose et al 1992, Halliday and Martin 1993).
It is now possible to strike a balance between the impulse towards linguistic universalism
and the interest in cultural difference that reflect complementary movements within modernism.
There is no longer any need to prove or disprove equality or sameness, nor to explain or exoticise
difference. In the emerging post-colonial environment it is necessary to study and understand
cultural and linguistic relationships from simultaneous perspectives of similarity and difference, not
merely to expand the cultural capital of the imperial academy, but to use it for the mutual benefit of
partners in reconciliation.

12 Cf Martin 1991, for a discussion of problems faced by Aboriginal ESL learners, in dealing with grammatical
metaphor.
13 Eg Christie M, 1992. Grounded & ex-centric knowledges: exploring Aboriginal alternatives to western thinking
PITJANTJATJARA PROCESSES
30

Abbreviations
ACTV ACTIVE

CAUSTV CAUSATIVE

circ Circumstance
cog cognition process
destin destination
DURTV durative
FUT future tense
HABIT habitual
INCEPTV inceptive
IMP imperative mood
IMPERF imperfective
intrans non-effective
LOC LOCATIVE

mat material process

NEUT NEUTRAL

PERF perfective
POSS possessive
PRES present tense
pro Process
PST past tense
react reaction process
Recipt Recipient
SA-S Same Subject
SW-S Switch Subject
TRANS transitive

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