Tan vs COMELEC G.R. No.

73155 July 11, 1986

NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in this
case, however, is a bit on the technical side.

- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one unit
affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec.
3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January
3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:

(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:

W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec.
3 of the Consititution, which states that --

"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected."

HELD:

In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a majority
of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.

The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.

"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte."

The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable
Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which
the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the
aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:

"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."

It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall
be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the
approval of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained
change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The
Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes
the area affected.

"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and
far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse
economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners."

Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no
legal effect for being a patent nullity.

"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation
of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are
also declared null and void.

SO ORDERED."

Sardea vs COMELEC G.R. No. 106164 August 17, 1993

The petitioners who are allegedly bona-fide residents and voters of Mauban, Quezon, and who
are "so numerous it is impractical to bring them all before the Honorable Court" (p. 2, Rollo),
assail the Resolution promulgated on June 19, 1992, by the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), in Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, entitled: "In the Matter of the Petition to
Declare a Failure of Election in Mauban, Quezon," denying their petition against the COMELEC,
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon, and the private respondents who were
proclaimed the duly elected Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mauban, Quezon.

The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads as follows:

Irregularities such as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an

election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election
and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds,
precisely, of only a relatively few. . . . . (Grand Alliance for Democracy, GAD, et al.
vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. 78302, 27 May 87, En Banc, Resolution.)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . it is very clear that as early as May 14, 1992 petitioners were already not in
consonance with the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers. Yet, from petitioner
EDWIN SARDEA'S own admission, he only formally filed on May 18, 1992, his
petition assailing the legality of the canvassing being held, contrary to the
provisions of Sec. 17 and 19 of R.A. 7166.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to DENY

as it hereby DENIES this petition. (pp. 36-37, Rollo.)

Petitioner allege that respondent COMELEC "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution, considering that it blatantly
disregarded its own Rules of Procedure and, more importantly, it perpetuated (sic) a clear
violation of election laws"
(p. 85, Rollo).

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 12, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon, convened
at the Municipal Hall and canvassed the first batch of election returns for the just concluded May
11, 1992 elections in that municipality.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, 1992, while the canvassing of the election
returns was going on, some sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea, a defeated mayoralty
candidate of LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building" and "destroyed . . . all election
materials and paraphernalia including, among others, the copies of election returns furnished to
respondent Board . . ." (p. 86, Rollo).

On May 14, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and assessed the
extent of the damage wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered that the election returns in
the possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban were intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said election
returns for use in the canvass. However, due to the absence of certain forms needed for the
canvass, the same was suspended and moved to May 17, 1992. Still, on said date, the canvassing
was not resumed because the Board had to determine first the number of returns to be used in
the canvass.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on May 18, 1992, informed the parties that it
would continue the canvassing of the election returns based on the copies from the MTC of
Mauban. Atty. Romeo Devera, counsel of LAKAS-NUCD, objected. Later, he filed a petition in
behalf of petitioner Edwin Sardea to stop the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers on the
ground that it had no authority from the COMELEC to use the copies of the election returns
obtained from the MTC of Mauban. The Municipal Board of Canvassers overruled Attorney
Devera's objection and denied Sardea's petition to stop the proceedings, citing the directive dated
May 15, 1992 of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Adolfo Ilagan. The directive was based
on the authority given by Acting Executive Director Resurreccion Bora of the COMELEC, "to order
the Municipal Trial Court Judge of Mauban, Quezon to make available the copy of election returns,
etc., in his possession for the use of the Municipal Board of Canvassers" (p. 86, Rollo). As Sardea
manifested that he would appeal the ruling, the Board of Canvassers suspended the proceedings
in order that he may formalize his appeal. On May 19, 1992, he filed a notice of appeal.

On May 22, 1992, the COMELEC held a special meeting and resolved "to authorize the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon to reconvene and use the copies of the election returns
of the Municipal Trial Court Judge" (p. 87, Rollo).

On May 24, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened and dismissed Sardea's appeal.
The letter of Atty. Adolfo Ilagan dated May 15, 1992 and the minutes of the special meeting of
the COMELEC on May 22, 1992, were deemed sufficient authority for it to use the MTC Judge's
copies of the election returns. A copy of the excerpts of the minutes contained a written notation
of a certain Cesario Perez addressed to the chairman of the respondent Board commanding him
to "implement this resolution" and that "this is tantamount to denying the appeal to (sic) your
ruling, which appeal was not received by this Commission" (p. 62, Rollo). The canvassing
continued thereafter.

On May 26, 1992, Sardea filed a petition in the Office of the Election Registrar in Mauban, Quezon,
assailing the composition of the Board of Canvassers and its proceedings. He also filed an
Amended Notice of Appeal.

On May 27, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the private respondents as the
duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon.

On June 10, 1992, petitioners filed Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, seeking to declare a
failure of election in Mauban, Quezon, based on the grounds that:

I. The attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial grounds to declare

a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.

II. Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in canvassing the impugned election returns without prior authority
from the Honorable Commission. (p. 14, Rollo.)
On June 19, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated the challenged resolution, whereupon Sardea filed
this petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion:

1. in not annulling the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of

Mauban, Quezon, despite the failure of election in that municipality;

2. in considering the grounds raised by petitioners as proper for an election contest

despite the nullity of the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Mauban, Quezon; and

3. in ruling that petitioner did not appeal on time the resolution of the Municipal
Board of canvassers of Mauban, Quezon.

The respondents asked for the outright dismissal of the petition based on Section 3, Rule 39 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that decisions in special action cases "shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
retrained by the Supreme Court" (p. 90, Rollo).

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the finality of COMELEC decisions or resolutions is
indicated in Sec. 257 of B.P. 881, as amended (Omnibus Election Code) which provides that the
decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall become final thirty (30) days after its
promulgation.

Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 257. Decision in the Commission. — The Commission shall decide all election
cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision. The decision of the Commission shall become final thirty days after
receipt of judgment. (Art. XII, C, Sec. 3, Const.; Art. XVIII, Sec. 193, 1978 EC).
(Underlining supplied.)

A perusal of our election laws shows that they do not explicitly provide for an appeal from the
COMELEC to the Supreme Court. Section 7, Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
"unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
[Constitutional] Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty [30] days from receipt of a copy thereof." The petition for certiorari shall be
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rivera vs. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 178; Galido vs.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 79; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84; Pedalizo vs. Mariano, UDK-9819, March
15, 1990).

Since no constitutional provision or law fixes a shorter period, the reglementary period within
which a petition forcertiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court against the COMELEC is thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy of the COMELEC's order, decision, or ruling.

Respondents did not correctly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because
this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, hence, it falls under Sec. 1,
Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and Sec. 257 of the Omnibus Election Code. This
petition was therefore seasonably filed on July 23, 1992, within thirty (30) days after the petitioner
received the COMELEC resolution on June 23, 1992.

Nevertheless, it must fail because we find the grounds of the petition to be without merit.

The facts show that Sardea's two (2) complaints/petitions involved pre-proclamation
controversies which are defined as:

Sec. 241. Definition. — A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question

pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may
be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. (Art. XX
Omnibus Election Code: emphasis supplied.)

Sardea's first May 18, 1992 complain questioned the use of the Municipal Trial Court Judge's
copies of the election returns as basis for the canvass.

His second complaint on May 27, 1992, filed with the Election Registrar, assailed the composition
and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Both complaints definitely raised pre-
proclamation controversies.

We have already ruled in Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468, that pre-proclamation controversies my no
longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed and
assumed office. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is an election contest in the Regional
Trial Court as provided in Sec. 250 of B.P. 881 and Sec. 2(2),
Art. IX-C of the Constitution.

In this case, since the authenticity and completeness of the returns were never questioned and
the winning candidates had been proclaimed on May 27, 1992, Sardea's pre-proclamation
complaint in the COMELEC ceased to be viable.

The COMELEC correctly dismissed Sardea's petition on the ground that it was proper for an
election contest.

But its holding that petitioners' appeal from the resolution of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
was late, is erroneous.

Section 17, R.A. 7166 deals with the commencement of pre-proclamation controversies while Sec.
19 provides that "parties adversely affected by a ruling of the Board of Canvassers on questions
affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the Commission
within three (3) days from a ruling thereon."

The petitioners properly filed their objection to the use of the election returns from the MTC
during the canvassing on May 18, 1992, based on Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166. Said section provides
that persons objecting to the inclusion in the canvass of any election returns "shall submit their
oral objection to the chairman of the Board of Canvassers at the time questioned return is
presented for inclusion in the canvass." (Emphasis ours.)

By presenting his verbal objection, and subsequently filing a formal objection, on May 18, 1992,
Sardea acted in accordance with Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166. His notice of appeal was verbally denied
on May 24, 1992 by the Board of Canvassers. He filed a notice of appeal to the Commission on
May 26, 1992, or within three (3) days after the denial of his notice of appeal by the Board of
Canvassers.

This issue on the timeliness of the petitioners' appeal to the Commission is actually moot and
academic because said appeal could not survive after the winning candidates were proclaimed.

The lone remaining issue is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the
petition to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon province.

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is identical to Section 2, Rule 26 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, reads as follows:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,

fruad, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Sec. 7, 1978 EC).

In Usman vs. COMELEC (42 SCRA 667, 690), we held that the pre-conditions for declaring a
failure of election are: "(1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of
force mejeure, violence or terrorism, and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the
results of the elections. The language of the law clearly requires the concurrence of the[se] two
circumstances to justify the calling of a special election."

The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the Municipal Board of
Canvassers on account of violence committed on May 13, 1992 is not one of the causes that
would warrant the declaration of a failure of election because voting actually took place as
scheduled on May 11, 1992 and other valid election returns still existed. Moreover, the incident
did not affect the result of the election.

The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only
under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had
been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish and what
votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the
great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from
exercising their franchise (20 C.J., pars. 179-181; Capalla vs. Tabiana, 63 Phil. 95).

The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any evidence within reach, to ascertain
the true result - when neither from the returns nor from other proof, nor from all together can
the truth be determined (Law on Public Officers and Election Law by Hector S. De Leon, p. 381,
1990 Ed., citing A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, by F. MECHEM, note 1 at p.
143).

There is a failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be
ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as possible be
respected.

Since in this case copies of the election returns submitted to the MTC of Mauban, Quezon were
extant, and their authenticity was not questioned, they were properly used as basis for the
canvass. This is expressly authorized by Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881)
which provides that "if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon
prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns
or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission . . . ." (Emphasis ours.)

Thus did we rule in an earlier case:

"While it is true that in local elections, the original copy of the election returns is to be delivered
to the city or municipal board of canvassers as a body for its use in the city or municipal canvass,
there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code stating that the canvass should be based only
on the original copy of the election returns. Besides, the duplicate copy of election returns that
were used in the canvass of votes were not only authentic copies or certified copies but duplicate
originals. Moreover, petitioner failed to show or even make an allegation that the use of the
duplicate originals of the returns had in some definite manner caused him prejudice, like
uncounted votes in his favor or alteration of an election result otherwise in his favor." (G.R. No.
82674, In Re: Protest of Atty. Alberto de la Rosa, etc. vs. Comelec and City Board of Canvassers
of Zamboanga City, Resolution en banc dated November 3, 1988.)

There is no merit in the argument of the petitioners that inasmuch as B.P. 881 has been
amended/modified by R.A. 7166, 1 the copies of the election returns in the possession of the MTC
may not be used for the canvass but merely for comparison purposes to determine the
authenticity of other copies of said election returns as provided in Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A.
7166. 2 The repealing clause of R.A. 7166 enumerates the sections of the Omnibus Election Code
which it specifically repeals. Sec. 233 is not among them.

Since B.P. 881 and R.A. 7166 are statutes in pari materia, they should be so construed as to
harmonize with each other and with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system (Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823). Prior statutes relating
to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions, and if possible by
reasonable construction, both to be construed that effect may be given to every provision of each
(C&C Commercial Corp. vs. NWSA, 21 SCRA 984, citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol.
2 pp. 530-532).
Section 233 of B.P. 881 ought to be harmonized with Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A. 7166. Section
27, par. b(5) of R.A. 7166 presupposes that other copies of the election returns are existent and
may be compared with the copies of the MTC. It does not preclude the use of such authentic
copies in the canvass when the copies submitted to the Board of Canvassers have been lost or
destroyed. The letter of Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Adolfo Ilagan dated May 15, 1992 and
the minutes of the special meeting of respondent COMELEC held on May 22, 1992 constitute
sufficient authority for the use of such returns in the canvass.

In light of all the foregoing, the use by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon of
the election returns in the possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban, was not contrary to law, and
was in fact the best possible recourse under the circumstances in order to give life to the will of
the electorate. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion when it issued the assailed resolution
denying the petition to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Mitmug vs COMELEC G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994

FAILURE OF ELECTIONS
Mitmug vs. Commission on Election
G.R. Nos. 106270-73. February 10, 1994.*
Ponente: Digest Author: FABI

DOCTRINE: —Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare failure
of election, two (2) conditions must concur:first, no voting has taken place in the
precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect
the result of the election..

FACTS:

 Sultan Mitmug and Datu Dagalangit were among the candidates for the mayoralty position
of Lumba-Bayabao during the 11 May 1992 election. Other candidates for the said position
also included Datu Elias Abdusalam and Datu Bagtao Khalid.

 There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the said municipality.

 Voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49) precincts. Five (5) of these
precincts did not conduct actual voting at all.

 COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election in the five (5) precincts which failed to
function during election day.
  Mitmug filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election alleging various
irregularities such as the alteration, tampering and substitution of ballots.

 COMELEC considered the petition moot since the votes in the subject precincts were
already counted.

 Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates.

 Mitmug filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions.

 But COMELEC treated the same as a motion for reconsideration and promptly denied it
considering that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a prohibited
pleading.

 Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election.

 Sultan Mitmug impugned the creation of this Board.

 Nevertheless, new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes.

 Datu Dagalangit was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor.

 Mitmug filed this petition for certiorari seeking the declaration of failure of election in forty-
nine (49) precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their
votes.

 He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin Datu Dagalangit
from assuming office.

 Mitmug lodged an election protest with the RTC disputing the result not only of some but
all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao, del Sur.

 COMELEC et al. assert that with the filing of an election protest, petitioner is already
deemed to have abandoned the instant petition.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions
seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-
Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

RULING+RATIO: NO.

Petition to annul an election is not a pre-proclamation controversy. Consequently, the

proclamation of a winning candidate together with his subsequent assumption of office is not an
impediment to the prosecution of the case to its logical conclusion.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing
of a verified petition to declare a failure to elect, notices to all interested parties
indicating therein the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means
available. The hearing of the case will also be summary in nature.

Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature
must be acted upon with dispatch only after hearing thereon shall have been
conducted.
o Since COMELEC denied the other petitions which sought to include forty-three (43)
more precincts in a special election without conducting any hearing, it would appear
then that there indeed might have been grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitions.

However, a closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26,
thereof which was lifted from Sec. 6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines, indicates otherwise.
Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes the election in any precinct has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of
such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30)
days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election
or failure to elect.

Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election,
two (2) conditions must concur:
1. no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even
if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and
2. the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

In this case, the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first
requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if there is, the
results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since actual voting and
election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place, the
results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded.
o COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less
grave, in denying the petitions outright.
o There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not
constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the language
of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling
of a special election.
Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing on the
case will be held before COMELEC will act on it. The verified petition must still show on its
face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the absence
thereof, the petition must be denied outright.

There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has
been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be
accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires
that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes.

OTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Sultan Mitmug did not abandon this petition for certiorari when he filed an election
protest
 When Sultan Mitmug filed his election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Sur, he informed the trial court of the pendency of these proceedings. Paragraph 3 of his
protest states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your protestant filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 106270 assailing the validity of the
proclamation of the herein protestee. . . ."

 Evidently, Sultan Mitmug did not intend to abandon his recourse with this Court. On the
contrary, he intended to pursue it.
 Where only an election protest ex abundante ad cautela is filed, the Court
retains jurisdiction to hear the petition seeking to annul an election

DISPOSITION: there being no grave abuse of discretion, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED.

Lucero vs COMELEC G.R. No. 113107 July 20, 1994

Petitioner: Wilmar Lucero (Lucero), Jose Ong, Jr. (Ong)

Respondent: COMELEC
Consolidated petition for certiorari seeking to annul the 7 Jan 1994 resolution of COMELEC

Related Provision/s:
Omnibus Election Code, Section 6. Requirements for holding a special election
1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by
law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term

Facts:
• Lucero lost to Ong by 204 votes in the 1992 elections for the position of district representative
of the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar
• The tally, however, did not include the results of the following:
• Precinct No. 7 — Illegible
• Precinct No. 13 — Snatched ballots; no election held
• Precinct No. 16 — Missing election returns
 • In light of this failure, Lucero moved for the COMELEC to suspend the proclamation of Ong and
to hold a special election for Precinct No. 13
• Acting on Lucero’s urgent manifestation, COMELEC directed PBC to desist from reconvening
until further orders
• Ong moved to lift the suspension in which Lucero opposed
• COMELEC en banc issued a resolution ordering the Provincial Election Supervision (PES) of
Northern Samar to bring the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 to the Commission wherein the
keys thereof shall be turned over to the PES who shall in turn give the keys for each ballot boxes
to the duly authorized representatives of Lucero and Ong
• The Court issued a TRO against the implementation of the abovementioned resolution and
eventually ordered the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the same
Acting on motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by COMELEC and Lucero,
the Court modified its decision and instead ordered to re-raffle the case to COMELEC
In 1994, COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution ordering a re-tabulation of the votes
including the results of Precinct 16 and the ‘COMELEC-copy’ of the results for Precinct 7, a special
election for Precinct 13, and a recount of Precinct 7 conditioned upon the results of Precinct 13

• Both Lucero and Ong contested the said resolution

• Lucero — the count of ballots in Precinct 7 must be unconditional because the election returns
therefrom are invalid
• Ong — COMELEC has no authority to order the correction and to call for a special election
almost two (2) years after the regular election
• Hence, this petition
Issue/s:
W/N the count of Precinct 7 must come before the holding special election in Precinct 13 W/N a
special election could be held 1 year and 10 months after the regular election

Held:
• Yes. The count of Precinct 7 must be determined before holding a special election in Precinct
13
. • Requirement for holding a special election
• Failure of election
• Effect of failure of election in the results of the election
• It must therefore be necessary to know the total number of votes and the difference before it
could be determined if a special election is necessary
• If after including the count of Precinct 7, the difference in the votes are less than 213, which
is the total number of voters in Precinct 13, then a special election is deemed to be necessary
because its failure then would have an effect in the results of the election
• The ‘COMELEC copy’, which the authenticity is doubted, cannot be used, therefore, a count is
in order to determine the real results in Precinct 7
• Yes. A special election could still be held even after 1 year and 10 months after the regular
election.
• Requirements in fixing the date of the special election
• Not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of
the election or the failure to elect
• Reasonably close to the date of the election held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to
elect
 • The delay was primarily caused by the legal skirmishes and maneuvers of the petitioners,
therefore the holding of the special election after almost two years may still be deemed to be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held
• Constitutional and statutory proscription are inapplicable to special elections which may be
called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
Ruling:
Ong’s petition denied.
Lucero’s petition granted — ordering the COMELEC to count the votes in Precinct 7, correct and
add the votes in Precinct 13, and hold a special election in Precinct 13 in not later than 30 days
if found necessary after the completion of the preceding orders

Dela Torre vs Comelec G.R. No. 121592 : July 5, 1996

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was
convicted by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides as follows:

“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified

from running for any elective local position:

“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving

moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;”

Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he was granted probation
by the MTC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.

Held:

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact
that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in
point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft
invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private
duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to xxx accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to appropriate,
or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in
some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.

2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s
conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application
for probation. (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)

Hassan VS COMELEC G.R. No. 124089 : November13, 1996

Topic: Citizen Participation and Electoral Rights>Failure of Election
FACTS:
• petitioner Hassan and private respondent Buatan were candidates for the Office of the Vice
Mayor while the other private respondents were candidates for councilors in Madalum, Lanao del
Sur in the 08 May 1995 regular local elections
• due to threats of violence and terrorism in the area, there was a failure of elections in 6 out of
24 precincts in Madalum
• the ballot boxes were burned and there were threats by unidentified persons in Precinct No. 7-
A
• in Precinct Nos. 9, 9-A, 10, 13, and 14, elections did not take place because the members of
the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) failed to report to their respective polling places
 thus, the Monitoring Supervising Team (COMELEC Team) recommended the COMELEC the
holding of special elections in said precincts on 27 May 1995 which was rescheduled for 29
May 1995 for the reason that the members of the BEI failed to report for duty in their respective
polling places
 the rescheduling of the elections in these precincts is to be held at Liangan Elementary School,
which is 15 kilometers away from the designated polling places

 on May 29, the members of the BEI did not again report for duty hence, the COMELEC was
constrained to appoint police/military personnel to act as substitute members so as to push
through with the elections
 thereafter the winners were announced and the results for the Office of the Mayor showed
that private respondent Buatan won

 on 10 June 1995, petitioner Hassan filed a petition with the COMELEC assailing the validity of
the May 29 rescheduled special elections on the grounds that:

 the voting which started at 10:00 a.m. was forcibly ended at around 2:00 p.m. because of
exchanges of rapid gunfiring and grenade launching between unknown elements and the Army
or PNP soldiers;

 the voting was moves to Liangan E/S, located about 15 kilometers away from the respective
polling places;

 notices in the transfer of venue of the voting was sent only the “night” of 28 May 1995 and
only to a “few” but not to all concerned;

 only 328 out of the 1,645 registered voters of said precincts were able to vote constituting
only 21.1%, and disenfranchising 78% of the registered voters thereof; and

 the regular members of the BEI did not report for duty and were substituted by military
personnel

 COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying the petition for a declaration of failure of
elections and to call special elections in subject precincts in Madalum, Lanao del Sur

ISSUE: W/N under the circumstances attendant in the case, a declaration of failure of elections
is proper.

HELD: Yes.
DECISION:

• the authority of the COMELEC to declare a failure of election is provided by Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code
 in several cases, the Court has ruled that the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of
election are: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force
majeure, violence, or terrorism, and (2) that the votes cast therein suffice to affect the
results of the elections
 the concurrence of these two (2) circumstances are required to justify the calling of a
special election
 mindful of these two (2) requirements, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner
  the COMELEC cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the
area, sufficient enough to declare that no voting actually occurred on 29 May 1995 in the
areas concerned
 it must be recalled that elections had to be set for the third time because no members of
the BEI reported for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area
 the peculiar situation of Madalum cannot be overstated notwithstanding the notice given
on the afternoon of May 28 resetting the special elections to May 29 and transferring the
venue of the elections 15 kilometers away from the farthest barangay/school was too
short resulting to the disenfranchisement of voters
 out of 1,546 registered voters in the five (5) precincts, only 328 actually voted
 further, the Court cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers, or the
constituents must be charged with notice of the special elections to be held because of
the failure of the two (2) previous elections for to require the voters to come to the polls
on such short notice was highly impracticable
 in a place marred by violence, it was necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time
to be notified of the changes and prepare themselves for the eventuality
 from the foregoing, it is not difficult for the Court to rule that there was insufficiency of
notice given as to the time and transfer of the polling places; the low turnout of voters is
more than sufficient proof that the elections conducted on that day was vitiated - a less
than a day’s notice of time and transfer of polling places 15 kilometers away from the
original polls certainly deprived the electors the opportunity to participate in the elections
 the rescheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done in uncommon
haste and unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the changes, not only as
to the date but as to the designated polling place
 even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a problem; in the
absence of proof that actual notice of the special elections has reached a great number
of voters, the Court is constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid

Borja vs COMELEC G.R. No. 120140. August 21, 1996

Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. questions the authority of respondent Commission on
Elections en banc to hear and decide at the first instance a petition seeking to declare a failure
of election without the benefit of prior notice and hearing.
During the May 8, 1995 elections, Borja and private respondent Jose T. Capco vied for the
position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros which was won by Capco by a margin of 6,330
votes. Capco was consequently proclaimed and has since been serving as Mayor of Pateros.
Alleging lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence, terrorism and
analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and
unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors, Borja filed before the COMELEC a
petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify the canvass and proclamation made by the
Pateros Board of Canvassers.
 Concluding that the grounds relied upon by Borja were warranted only in an election contest,
the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition in its resolution dated May 25, 1995. It declared
that forced majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud and other analogous causes . . . are merely the
causes which may give rise to the grounds to declare failure of elections. These grounds, which
include (a) no election held on the designated election date; (b) suspension of election before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting; and (c) election in any polling place resulted in a
failure to elect, were not present in Borjas petition.
Aggrieved by said resolution, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court, arguing the same
matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned resolution of May 25, 1995. He avers that the COMELEC en banc does not have the
power to hear and decide the merits of the petition he filed below because under Article IX-C,
Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
After a careful scrutiny of petitioners arguments, this Court finds the same to be
untenable. The petition must inevitably be dismissed.
In order to resolve the threshold issue formulated at the outset, there must first be a
determination as to whether a petition to declare a failure of election qualifies as an election case
or a pre-proclamation controversy. If it does, the Constitution mandates that it be heard and
adjudged by the COMELEC through any of its Divisions. The COMELEC en banc is only
empowered to resolve motions for reconsideration of cases decided by a Division for Article IX-
C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides:

SEC 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

In the case at bar, no one, much less the COMELEC, is disputing the mandate of the
aforequoted Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution. As Borja himself maintained, the
soundness of this provision has already been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a number of
cases, albeit with some dissent.[1] In Ong, the Court declared that if a case raises pre-
proclamation issues, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has no original jurisdiction over the
same. Accordingly, said case should be remanded to the COMELEC which, in turn, will refer the
same to any of its Divisions for proper disposition.
A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as
classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election
case.
It must be remembered that Capco was duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of
Pateros. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity.[2] To destroy the
presumption, Borja must convincingly show that his opponents victory was procured through
extra-legal means. This he tried to do by alleging matters in his petition which he thought
constituted failure of election, such as lack of notice of the date and time of canvass; fraud,
violence, terrorism and analogous causes; disenfranchisement of voters; presence of flying
voters; and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors. These grounds, however,
as correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, are proper only in an election contest but not in a
petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation. Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code lays down the instances when a failure of election may be declared. It states thus:

SEC. 6. Failure of Election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice, and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The same provisions are reiterated under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Revised COMELEC Rules. In
other words, the COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure
of election only when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The
latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is nobody was elected. None
of these circumstances is present in the case at bar. At best, the grounds cited by Borja are simply
events which give rise to the three consequences just mentioned.
In reality, Borjas petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving an elective
municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 251 states:

Section 251. Election contests for municipal offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of a
municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after
proclamation of the results of the election. (Italics supplied)

The COMELEC in turn exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial courts decision pursuant to
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
 The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss Borjas petition, not only for being
deficient in form but also for having been filed before the wrong tribunal. This reason need not
even be stated in the body of the decision as the same is patent on the face of the pleading
itself. Nor can Borja claim that he was denied due process because when the COMELEC en
banc reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair hearing of his
case. The fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut the allegations therein certainly did not
deprive him of his day in court. If anybody here was aggrieved by the alleged lack of notice and
hearing, it was Capco whose arguments were never ventilated. If he remained complacent, it was
because the COMELECs actuation was favorable to him.
Certainly, the COMELEC cannot be said to have committed abuse of discretion, let alone
grave abuse thereof, in dismissing Borjas petition. For having applied the clear provisions of the
law, it deserves, not condemnation, but commendation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution of the Commission
on Elections dated May 25, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

Canicosa vs COMELEC G.R. No. 120318. December 5, 1997

CANICOSA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120318 | December 5, 1997

Petitioner Canicosa and private respondent Lajara were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna
during the May 1995 elections. After the canvassing, Lajara was proclaimed winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvasser. Thereafter, Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare
failure of election and to declare null and void the canvass and proclamation because of alleged
widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and accounting of votes, preparation of election
returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting and delay in the
delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the office of the Municipal
Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the
allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.

HELD:

(1) There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
i) The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
ii) The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes; or
iii) After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

(2) Averment that more than one-half of the legitimate voters were not able to vote is not a
ground which warrants a declaration of failure of election.
(3) The grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Before COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must concur:
i) No voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there
was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and
ii) The votes that were not cast would affect the result of the election. From the face of
the instant petition, it is readily apparent that an election took place and that it did
not result in a failure to elect.

(4) The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote which
is a justiciable issue properly recognized by the regular courts. — Fifteen (15) days before the
regular elections, the final list of voters was posted in each precinct. Based on the lists thus
posted Canicosa could have filed a petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.

(5) The correction of the manifest mistake in mathematical addition calls for a mere clerical task
of the board of canvassers. The remedy invoked was purely administrative. The issue
concerning registration of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground in his petition for
declaration of failure of election, is an administrative question. Likewise, questions as to
whether elections have been held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured
and therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to vote. Such
questions are properly within the administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be acted
upon directly by the COMELEC en banc without having to pass through any of its divisions.
The provision in the constitution mandating the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by
division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by COMELEC en banc, not applicable if
the case about to be resolved is purely administrative in nature.

David vs Comelec G.R. No. 127116 : April 8, 1997

FACTS:
David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa
Pilipinas, filed apetition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second
Monday of May 1997.Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also filed a petition
to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: (1) Section 43(c) of R.A.
7160; (2) COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887fixing the date of the holding of the barangay
elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto; and,(3) The budgetary
appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General AppropriationsAct of
1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections.

Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5 years.
Although the LGCreduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangayofficials.

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions.
ISSUES & HELD:
Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA 7160
–3 years)
Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional? (YES)
Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)

Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years

RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict
between two laws,the later enactment prevails. (Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant .)
During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and
directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads (as in the Code).
In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, Congress appropriated the amount of P400
million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7
of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held “immediately
after the barangay elections in 1997.” These are clear and express contemporaneous statements
of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA
7160.

In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that “the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May,1997.” This
judicial decision
Is“part of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8).”

RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically
and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that “the term of office of barangay officials shall be for
three years.” It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were
elected on the second Monday of May1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be
deemed a general law.
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay
officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the law making body, without any specific
limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge
this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.
Constitutional Commission on how long the term of barangay officials is:
“As may be determined by law”; more precisely, “as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code
(Sec 43-c limits their term to 3 years)
Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms
Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for
and were elected to,under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is
unacceptable because under NCC 3, “ignorance of thelaw excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

Typoco vs COMELEC G.R. No. 136191 : November 29, 1999

 Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside the resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc dated October 12, 1998 which dismissed herein
petitioner Jesus Typoco, Jr.s (TYPOCO) petition for Annulment of Election or Election Results
and/or Declaration of Failure of Elections docketed as SPA No. 98-413.
The factual antecedents insofar as pertinent to the instant petition are as follows:
TYPOCO and private respondent Jesus Pimentel (PIMENTEL) were both candidates for the
position of Governor in Camarines Norte during the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 22, 1998,
TYPOCO together with Winifredo Oco (OCO), a candidate for the position of Congressman of the
Lone District of Camarines Norte filed a Joint Appeal before the COMELEC docketed as SPC-No.
98-133. TYPOCO and OCO questioned therein the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Camarines Norte which included in the canvass of votes the Certificate of Canvass of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. TYPOCO also filed a Motion to Admit Evidence to Prove
That a Substantial Number of Election Returns Were Manufactured as They Were Prepared by
One Person based on the report of one Francisco S. Cruz, a Licensed Examiner of Questioned
Document, who examined copies of election returns of the LAKAS-NUCD.
On June 4, 1998, COMELEC (Second Division) issued an Order dismissing the Joint
Appeal. Thereafter, TYPOCO filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his motion to admit
evidence to prove the manufacturing and/or spurious character of the questioned returns which
were allegedly prepared in group by only one person and which will materially affect the results
of the election for the position of Governor.
In the meantime, on June 10, 1998, TYPOCO and OCO filed with the COMELEC En Banc a
separate petition for Annulment of Election or Election Results and/or Declaration of Failure of
Elections in several precincts, docketed as SPA No. 98-413, subject of the instant petition. The
petition alleged that massive fraud and irregularities attended the preparation of the election
returns considering that upon technical examination, 305 election returns were found to have
been prepared in group by one person.
On July 15, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order directing the Voters Identification
Division of the Commissions Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to examine the
COMELEC copies of the 305 election returns questioned by TYPOCO.
On August 12, 1998, the COMELECs ERSD Voters Identification Division submitted its
Questioned Document Report to the COMELEC En Banc on the results of its technical examination
of the questioned election returns. The report disclosed, among others, that the handwritten
entries on 278 COMELEC copies of election returns particularly under the columns
Congressman/Governor/Vice-Governor Nickname or Stage Name, were written by one and the
same person in groups.[1]
On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the resolution denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration in SPC No. 98-133 on the ground that an election protest is the proper remedy.
TYPOCO then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the Order
dated June 4, 1998 and the Resolution dated August 31, 1998, respectively issued in SPC No. 98-
133 by the COMELEC (Second Division) and the COMELEC En Banc.[2] In a resolution dated
September 22, 1998, this Court dismissed the petition finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent COMELEC in issuing the aforesaid assailed orders. TYPOCOs motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by this Court with finality on September 29, 1998.
On October 12, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a resolution in SPA 98-413,
dismissing TYPOCOs petition for the Declaration of Failure of Elections and/or Annulment of
Elections in Camarines Norte for lack of merit, thus:

The grounds cited by petitioners do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

In Mitmug vs. Commission on Elections, 230 SCRA 54, the Supreme Court ruled that before the
Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of elections, at least two (2)
conditions must concur: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed by law,
or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and (b) the votes
that were not cast would affect the result of the election. From the allegations of the petition in
the instant cases, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to
elect. In fact, by separate resolution, the Commission has authorized the provincial board of
canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates and this as been implemented.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby DISMISSES the petition in each of the above cases, for lack
of merit.[3]

Hence, the instant petition on the grounds that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its
discretion as follows: 1. in holding that the grounds cited by TYPOCO do not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code; 2. in refusing to annul the
election or the election results or to declare a failure of election despite the fact that massive
fraud and irregularities attended the preparation of the election returns; 3. in failing to proclaim
TYPOCO as the winning candidate for Governor; 4. in failing to annul the proclamation of
PIMENTEL which is null and void from the beginning; 5. in ruling that an election protest is the
proper remedy and not an annulment of the election or election results and/or declaration of
failure of elections.[4]
Simply stated, did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in not declaring a failure
of elections for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte in the May 11, 1998 elections?
In a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment) filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), the latter joins TYPOCOs prayer for affirmative relief. The OSG explains thus:

13. The petition a quo (SPA No. 98-413) specifically prayed for annulment of election returns
and/or election results in the protested precincts where massive fraud and irregularities were
allegedly committed in the preparation of the election returns which, upon technical examination
of their authentic copies, were found to have been prepared in groups by one person (Petition,
Annex A, p.2).

14. On this score, it should be stressed that election returns are prepared separately and
independently by the Board of Election Inspectors assigned in each and every precinct. Hence,
uniformity in the handwritten entries in the election returns emanating from different electoral
precincts, as in this case speaks only of one thing --- THE ELECTION RETURNS WERE
FABRICATED OR TAMPERED WITH.
Here, the COMELEC itself, through its own Voters Identification Department, certified that out of
the 305 election returns in the 12 municipalities of Camarines Norte, 278 or 91.14% thereof were
found to have been written by one person which fact lucidly speaks of massive fraud in the
preparation of election returns.

15. Precisely, massive fraud committed after the voting and during the preparation of the election
returns resulting in a failure to elect, is a ground for annulment of election under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code. As such therefore, the case at bar falls within the jurisdiction of
COMELEC.

x x x x x x x x x.

18. At any rate, there is merit to petitioners claim that the votes in the subject election returns,
if correctly appreciated, will materially affect the results of the election for Governor, i.e.,

TYPOCO PIMENTEL

Votes per PBC Canvass 53,454 64,358

Less: Votes obtained from

Fraudulent Returns 11,253 27,060

Difference 42,201 37,325

Vote Lead of Petitioner 4,876[5]

The authority of the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections is derived from Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as, The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991, which
provides that the COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among
others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said Section 6, in turn, provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by the law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The same provision is reiterated under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Revised COMELEC Rules.
 Based on the foregoing laws, the instant petition must fail because the allegations therein do
not justify a declaration of failure of election.
The COMELEC correctly pointed out that in the case of Mitmug vs. Commission on Elections[6],
this Court held that before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, two (2) conditions must concur:first, no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted
in a failure to elect; and second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In Loong
vs. Commission on Elections[7], this Court added that the cause of such failure of election should
have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud of other analogous
cases. Further, in Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections[8], we stated that:

The COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election
only when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase,
in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is nobody was elected.

Clearly then, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any
polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (c) after the
voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.[9] In all instances there must have been failure to
elect; this is obvious in the first scenario where the election was not held and the second where
the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and transmission of the
election returns which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.
None of these circumstances is present in the case at bar. While the OSG joins TYPOCO in
pinpointing anomalies in the preparation of the election returns due to the uniformity of the
handwriting in the same, implying that fraud was committed at that stage, the fact is that the
casting and counting of votes proceeded up to the proclamation of the winning candidate thus
precluding the declaration of a failure of election. While fraud is a ground to declare a failure of
election, the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an
election including the preparation and transmission of the election returns.[10]
It can thus readily be seen that the ground invoked by TYPOCO is not proper in a declaration
of failure of election. TYPOCOs relief was for COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, on
account of the falsified election returns, which is properly the subject of an election contest.[11]
The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss TYPOCOs petition in accordance with
clear provisions of the law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent
Commission on Elections, the petition is DISMISSED and its Resolution En Banc of
October 12,1998 dismissing the petition before it on the ground that the allegations therein do
not justify a declaration of failure of election is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sison vs COMELEC G.R. No. 134096. March 3, 1999

(Joseph Peter Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999)

Facts:
It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before
the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation
in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was supposedly filed
pursuant to Section 63 of the Omnibus Election Code (BatasPambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on
the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred after
the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof,
which resulted in a failure to elect."

While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed
the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice
mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the
petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient
evidence, and (2) the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166
Issue:
WON the grounds are valid?
Ruling:
Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three(3)
instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such election result in a
failure to elect on account of force majuere, violence,terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes.
We have painstakingly examined petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found nothing
therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all
that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect
stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the
failure to elect came about.

Loong vs COMELEC G.R. No. 133676. April 14, 1999

FACTS:

Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose
Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections
in Sulu.

On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the
municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an
erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately
communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the
automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused
by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found
nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots,
as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials
overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and
private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The
meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals.
There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the
others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working
well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were
rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul
and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc
his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of
Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual
count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its
implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796
laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure
for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.

COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the
case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered
a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper
to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.

HELD:

the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there
being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution
Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.

(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first
impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of
the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor
of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court.

(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election
in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution
"to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election ,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is
to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is
well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the
municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated
machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing
of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated
count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu
would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate

In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot
kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not
prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be
self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an
election.

It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election
tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in
view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of
votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum
clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local
ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their
representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to
Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-
line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special
election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private
respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have
been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were
proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal,
their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be
singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.

Carlos vs Angeles G.R. No. 142907. November 29, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998
elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent
filed an election protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reports which also showed
that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court
set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant badges of fraud," which
it attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the winner.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning the
decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC.

HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in election
cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC,
the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule because under the
circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to
disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial
measure. More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. It
is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that
power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The result
is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a winner.
 Benito vs COMELEC G.R. No. 134913. January 19, 2001
FACTS: Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for the
position of municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5
precincts clustered in the Sultan Disimban Elementary School were met with violence when some
30 armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed panic
among the voters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. It
happened before noon at the day of election. A spot report reported the incident.
Both parties are contending contrary facts. Petitioner alleged that the voting never
resumed even after the lawless elements left. On the other hand, private respondent alleged that
voting resumed when the armed men left around 1 pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is only asking,
however, a declaration of failure of elections on the first three precincts, not with the entire five
precincts. During the counting, the ballots from the three precincts were excluded. Nevertheless,
the winner was the private respondent. And even if the votes from the three excluded precincts
were added, private respondent still emerged as the winner.
Petitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election.
COMELEC however denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.

HELD: Petition Dismissed.

1. Two preconditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has
been held in any precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast
therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise
before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

2. Whether there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are not proper
subjects of inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

3. Voting in all five precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in the Disimban
Elementary School. There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two precincts
during the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to the three
precincts herein?

4. Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis the number
of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there can be a failure of election
in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But
if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election
laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires
is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast.

5. The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only
under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had
been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what
votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the
great body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising
their franchise.
Pasandalan vs COMELEC G. R. No. 150312. July 18, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Pasandalan and respondent Bai salamona L. Asum were candidates for mayor
in the municipality of Lumbayanague, Lanao del sur- May 14, 2001 elections ⊥ On May
23, Pasandalan filed for nullification of election results in certain barangays (Deromoyod,
Lagin, Bualan etc) on the ground that, (1) while the election was ongoing, some Cafgu’s
stationed near the schools indiscriminately fired their firearms causing the voters to panic
and leave the voting centers without casting their votes, (2) failure to sign of BEIs to sign
their initials on certain ballots and (3) taking advantage of the fist fights, the supporters
of Asum took the ballots and filled them up with the name of Asum. ⊥ Comelec’s ruling:
No credence given to the allegations of Pasandalan. The 3 instances wherein a failure of
election could be declared is not present (1) The election is not held – (election was still
held), (2) the election is suspended- (it was not), and (3) the election results in the failure
to elect (Asum was elected through the plurality of votes). The evidence presented by
Pasandalan were only affidavits made by his own pollwatchers- thus considered as self
serving and insufficient to annul the results. ⊥ Hence the petition in this court

HELD:

COMELEC didn't commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling electionm. ⊥ The

irregularities alleged should have been raised as an election protest and not in a petition
to declare the nullity of an election. ⊥ Instances to declare a failure of election does not
exist (1) the election in a polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, terrorism, violence or fraud, (2) the election was suspended on the same
grounds in the 1st and (3) there was failure to elect still on the same grounds. ⊥ The
election was held in the precincts protested as scheduled, neither was it suspended (as
proved by the testimony of one of the election officers) nor was there failure to elect. The
alleged terrorism was not of that scale to justify declaration of failure of elections. ⊥
Credibility of the affidavits questioned: (1) it was pre-typed, all that the poll watchers have
to do is to fill it up and sign it. (2) identical statements- human perception is different for
each. Persons when asked about a same incident, although present in the incident, mat
have different observations.

Magno vs Comelec : 147904 G.R. No. October 4, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Magno ran for MAYOR of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in 2001. ⊥ Private Respondent
filed a petition for disqualification of Magno because he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
4 counts of Direct Bribery and sentenced. Magno applied for probation and was discharged on
March of 1998. ⊥ COMELEC disqualified petitioner based on a provision of BP 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) disqualifying a candidate convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude until after
the lapse of 5 years from the service of sentence. ⊥ Magno claims Sec 40 (a) RA7160 (Local
Government Code) should apply instead of BP 881: A person convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude may run after the lapse of 2 years after the service of sentence. ⊥ Sonia Isidro was
declared Mayor while the case was pending.
HELD:
First, Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude. Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as ‘an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men or society in general…’ Direct bribery
contemplates taking advantage of his position and is a betrayal of the trust reposed to him by
the public. Second, he is not qualified. RA 7160 should apply. First, RA 7160 is the more recent
law. It impliedly repeals BP 881 should there be any inconsistencies. Second, RA 7160 is a special
law applying specifically to local government units. BP 881 applies for the election of any public
office. Special law prevails. Since he was discharged on March 1998, Magno’s disqualification
ceased on March 2000.

Cawasa vs COMELEC G.R. No. 150469. July 3, 2002

FACTS:
Jun Rascal Cawasa and private respondent Adbulmalik M. Manamparan were among the
candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao Del Norte. Out of the forty (40)
precincts in Nunungan, only thirty-six (36) functioned, as there was a failure of election in the
remaining four (4) precincts. Thus the proclamation was deferred as the number of registered
voters would affect the election results. A special election was set for the remaining (4) precincts.
After the special election, Cawasa was proclaimed Mayor. Manamparan filed an appeal and
petition for the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Cawasa and for the annulment of the
special election results. The Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution annulling the results of
the special elections of the 4 precincts and annulling the proclamation of the winning candidates.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the result of the special election was valid due to the transfer of polling places in
adjacent areas.

HELD:
No. The Comelec ruled that the result of the special elections in the 4 contested precincts were
declared annulled, so as the proclamation of the winning candidates, as such election was not
genuinely held and resulted in failure to elect on account of fraud. As clearly provided by the law,
the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. While
the proclamation of a candidate has the effect of terminating pre-proclamation issues, a
proclamation that is a result of an illegal act is void and cannot be ratified by such proclamation
and subsequent assumption of office.

Rulloda vs COMELEC G.R. No. 154198. January 20, 2003

FACTS
:

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002,Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the
contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June
22,2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away. His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty"
wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay
Chairman. Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures
of people purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas. On July 14, 2002,
Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and Members of the
Barangay Board of Canvassers: read the same as it is written but add the words "NOTCOUNTED"
like "BETTY NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT COUNTED". Petitioner garnered 516 votes while
respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Placido as the Barangay Chairman.Petitioner learned that the Commission issued Resolution No.
4801. Section 9 of the same –
“Thereshall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials”.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No.
4801 and Resolution No. 5217.

ISSUE
: WON substitiion is allowed in barangay SK elections.

RULING
: the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on
Elections, insofar as it denied due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL
and VOID. The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman is
SETASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman.
RD:
Election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; embodiment
of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. Respondents base their
argument on
Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code on Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-
partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate
the substitute. However, it is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed
as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Contrary to
respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in
barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.

Moreno vs COMELEC G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an
answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued
that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides
that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence,
are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from
probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2)
years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence
but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.

On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not
serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the
Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further,
even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly
constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?

HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and
to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for
public office.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers
from running for a local elective office.

Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the
Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
statute.

Galo vs COMELEC G.R. No. 164225 April 19, 2006

Before us for resolution is the Petition1 for Certiorari,2 assailing the Resolution3 dated July 2, 2004
of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 04-348.

Juhary A. Galo, petitioner, and Minda P. Dagalangit, private respondent, were among the five
candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur in the May 10, 2004
national and local elections.

On May 10, 2004, however, there was a failure of election in Lumba-Bayabao due to serious
disagreements among the various local candidates involving the clustering of precincts, the
distribution of election paraphernalia, and the appointment of the members of the various Boards
of Election Inspectors. As a consequence, the COMELEC scheduled and held a special election on
May 12, 2004.

On May 19, 2004, petitioner Galo filed with the COMELEC En Banc a petition4 to declare a
failure of election and to annul the results of the May 12, 2004 special election involving six
precincts located in six Barangays of Lumba-Bayabao, namely: Precinct Nos. 1A (Barangay
Maribu), 34A (Barangay Sunggod), 29B (Barangay Rumayas), 22A (Barangay Lubo Basara), 31A
(Barangay Salaman), and 36A (Barangay Tamlang). Galo’s petition, docketed as SPA No. 04-348,
is based on his claim that there were "serious and massive irregularities committed by the
supporters of Dagalangit, in conspiracy with members of the Board of Election Inspectors."
Specifically, petitioner alleged that respondent Dagalangit’s supporters succeeded in placing fake
ballots inside a ballot box in Precinct No. 1A (Barangay Maribo); that in Precinct No. 34A
(Barangay Sunggod), the voting was irregular because the election inspectors hid a ballot box
allegedly to protect it from being forcibly taken; that during the counting of votes, fake ballots
were found in the ballot boxes in Precinct Nos. 22A (Barangay Lubo Basara), 29B (Barangay
Rumayas), 31A (Barangay Salaman), 34A (Barangay Sunggod), and 36A (Barangay Tamlang);
that the election inspectors in the said precincts refused to enter in the minutes their valid
objections; that all the election returns accomplished based on the fake ballots do not reflect the
true will of the electorate; and that the said irregularities justify the annulment of the election
held. Petitioner thus prayed that the COMELEC issue a temporary restraining order (TRO)
directing the Board of Canvassers to desist from canvassing the election returns from the said
precincts. Petitioner further prayed that after due hearing, the results of the election be annulled;
and that an immediate investigation of the anomalies committed during the election be
conducted.

On May 21, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued a TRO directing the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Lumba-Bayabao to SUSPEND its proceedings, particularly the proclamation of the
winning candidates, until further orders.

In her Answer dated May 24, 2004, respondent Dagalangit denied petitioner’s allegations of the
existence of fake ballots in the specified precincts. She averred that during the May 12, 2004
special election, all the 39 precincts of Lumba-Bayabao functioned in an orderly and peaceful
manner; that the ballots have been properly appreciated, counted and entered in the election
returns duly accomplished by the Board of Election Inspectors under the close scrutiny of the
candidates’ watchers; and that the use of fake ballots is not a valid ground for nullifying the
elections. She then prayed that SPA No. 04-348 be dismissed.1avvphil.net

During the May 27, 2004 hearing, petitioner did not appear before the COMELEC En Banc.
Instead, he filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion/Manifestation"5 stating that he was already
proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 20, 2004, thereby rendering his petition "moot and
academic;" and that he "has lost interest in the prosecution of the same." He prayed that his
petition be considered withdrawn.

Thereafter, pursuant to the order of the COMELEC En Banc, the contending parties filed their
respective memoranda.

On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution (1) dismissing the petition
for lack of merit; (2) annulling petitioner’s proclamation on May 20, 1994 for having been "made
surreptitiously and in contravention of the May 21, 2004 Order of the Commission;" and (3)
ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba-Bayabao "to immediately convene,
complete the canvass, and proclaim the winning candidates." The COMELEC En Banc held that
pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, the alleged use of fake ballots in the questioned precincts
is not one of the grounds for nullifying the election results. In fact, all the 39 precincts of Lumba-
Bayabao functioned during the May 12, 2004 special elections.

On July 4, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba-Bayabao completed its canvass
proceedings and proclaimed respondent Dagalangit as the winning candidate for mayor of that
municipality.6

Petitioner now comes to this Court through the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the
COMELEC, in issuing the challenged Resolution, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Respondents, in their respective Comments, vehemently opposed the petition and prayed that
the same be dismissed for being utterly unmeritorious.

The petition is bereft of merit.

We cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing his petition for a declaration of a failure of elections and for the annulment of the
election results. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code prescribes the conditions for such a
declaration, thus:

Section 6. Failure of Election – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of the verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect. (Underscoring supplied)

In Tan v. COMELEC,7 we held that the above provisions lay down three instances where a failure
of election may be declared, namely: (1) the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(2) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of any of such causes; or (3) after the voting and during the
preparation, transmission, custody or canvass of the election returns, the election results in a
failure to elect on account of any of said aforementioned causes. In all instances, there must
have been a failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios, where the election was
not held and where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the circumstances
attending the preparation, transmission, custody or canvass of the election returns
cause a failure to elect. The term failure to elect means "nobody emerges as a winner."8

The established rule is that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the tribunal are
determined by the law and the allegations in the petition regardless of whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.9 Here, it is not disputed that all the 39 precincts in
Lumba-Bayabao functioned in the May 12, 2004 special elections. And as correctly observed by
respondent COMELEC En Banc, petitioner himself failed to allege in his petition that no election
was conducted; and that the use of fake ballots is not a ground to declare a failure of elections.

In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections,10 we further held that before the COMELEC can act on a
verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two conditions must concur: first, no
voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was
voting, the election nevertheless results in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes cast would
affect the result of the election. In the case at bar, both conditions are not present.

Petitioner himself admits in his petition that during the special election, voting took place in the
questioned precincts. He also failed to show that the votes cast would affect the results of the
election.

Petitioner also questions the COMELEC’s nullification of his proclamation on May 20, 2004 by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers. We sustain the COMELEC En Banc’s action. As shown by the
records, petitioner was proclaimed as mayor on the basis of the results of "the elections held on
May 10, 2004."11 As stated earlier, no election was held on that day.

In fine, the COMELEC, in issuing the assailed Resolution, did not act with grave abuse of
discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Adap vs COMELEC G.R. No. 161984 February 21, 2007

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to set aside the
Resolution[1] of public respondent Commission on Elections, En Banc (COMELEC En Banc)
dated January 27, 2004.
 Petitioners were the proclaimed winning candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay in their respective barangays in the municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur in the
July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (2002
Elections). Individual respondents were candidates for the position of barangay chairmen in said
2002 elections, some of whom are Punong-Barangaysproclaimed in the barangay elections
previous to the 2002 elections.

On August 19, 2002, after learning that a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
of winning candidates for Punong Barangay and Kagawad ng Sangguniang Barangay,
proclaiming petitioners as winning candidates had been submitted to the COMELEC, respondents
filed a petition for declaration of failure of elections and the holding of special elections in the
whole municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur and to annul for being void ab initio the
proclamation of petitioners.[2]

Respondents alleged that the 2002 Elections have not been conducted in thirteen
(13) barangays of Pagayawan on July 15, 2002 for the reason that the official ballots, election
forms and paraphernalia, including CEF No. 25, intended for Pagayawan have not been issued or
distributed to the Board of Election Tellers (BET) by Acting Treasurer Pangalian Alawi.[3]

After trial, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated the herein assailed Decision on January
27, 2004, finding that there was, indeed, failure of elections in the barangays of Pagayawan,
Lanao del Sur. The dispositive portion of the Resolution in question reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission en banc RESOLVED as it

hereby RESOLVES to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the 15 July 2002 proclamation of
the above named Respondents (now petitioners) Punong Barangay respectively in
the subject Barangays of the municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission en banc hereby ORDERS:

a) The herein Respondents (now petitioners) namely: Hadji Faisal

D. Adap, Mohammadali G. Pangcoga, Allan Ampuan, Cader Carim,
Hadji Yusoph Bohary Ampuan, Dathman M. Abbas, Lomala Sarip
Cader, Bondiong Comiling, Hadji Omair Sarip Marohom, Ampuan
Casim, Pendatun B. Orangot, Aminollah D. Ampuan and Pangcoga
Saripoden TO VACATE the Office of the Punong Barangay of
Ngingir Bubong, Ilian, Padas, Pinalangca, Diampaca, Linindingan,
Mapantao, Biala-an, Ayong, Reboken-Kamalig (Rubokan), Lumbak
(Lumbac), Badaraingud and Madang, Pagayawan, Lanao del
 Sur, TO CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of said
office.

b) The Petitioners-Punong Barangay (now respondents) who have

been duly elected and proclaimed in the barangay elections
previous to the 15 July 2002 barangay elections in the subject
barangay of the municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur, to
continue as such Punong Barangay in a hold-over capacity until the
holding of a Special Barangay Elections in the Municipality of
Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur.

c) The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operation to

implement this resolution re the guidelines in the holding of the
Special Barangay and SK Elections in the municipality of
Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur.

d) The Law Department to conduct the appertaining investigation

to determine the administrative and criminal liability of the above
named Respondents (now petitioners) and of Election Officer Taha
C. Ali. (Italization ours).

e) The Clerk of the Commission to furnish a copy thereof to the

Office of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, the Office of the
Governor, Lanao del Sur, and to the Office of the Secretary of the
local Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Barangay, Pagayawan,
Lanao del Sur.

No pronouncement as to costs.[4]

Aggrieved by the foregoing Resolution, petitioners come to this Court, claiming that it was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc in (1)
declaring failure of elections in barangays not subject of the petition filed before it; (2)
not examining and viewing the election paraphernalia inside the ballot boxes of the questioned
precincts of subject barangays; and (3) ordering herein individual respondents, who have been
duly proclaimed in the barangay elections previous to the 2002 Elections, to continue
as Punong Barangays in a hold-over capacity until the holding of special elections.[5]
The Court reiterates and emphasizes the oft-repeated rule stated in Pangandaman v.
Comelec,[6] to wit:

x x x the propriety of declaring whether or not there has been a total

failure of elections x x x is a factual issue which this Court will not delve

into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is

in the best position to assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent

any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of fact of the

COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise in

its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court. x x x [7]

(Emphasis supplied)

The petition is without merit. There is no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the
COMELEC En Banc. It did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. It acted well within its
jurisdiction when it issued the Resolution of January 27, 2004.

First of all, petitioners' allegation that the COMELEC En Banc declared failure of elections
in barangays not covered by the respondents' petition is highly inaccurate. It is not even specified
in the Petition which barangays were not covered by respondents Petition filed with the
COMELEC. Moreover, the COMELEC En Banc, in the Resolution dated January 27, 2004, held that
there was failure of elections in the thirteen (13) barangays subject of respondents petition,
namely: Ngingir Bubong, Ilian, Padas, Pinalangca, Diampaca, Linindingan, Mapantao, Biala-an,
Ayong, Reboken-Kamalig (Rubokan), Lumbak (Lumbac), Badaraingud and Madang, and nullified
the proclamation of petitioners as punong barangays of the subject thirteen barangays.

Secondly, it was not necessary for the COMELEC En Banc to examine and view the election
paraphernalia inside the ballot boxes of the questioned precincts of subject barangays,
considering that there is substantial evidence on record to convince said body that no elections
had actually been conducted.
To refute the claim of failure of elections in subject barangays of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur,
herein petitioners (respondents below) formally offered the following documents as evidence, to
wit:

Exhibit 1. Certification from the Chief of Police of Pagayawan (SPO1 Amerodin T.

Baraguer) stating, among other things, that the elections on July 15, 2002 are

peaceful and orderly. To prove that no incident of failure of election was reported

to the PNP and Military deputized to safeguard the conduct [of] the aforesaid

election.

Exhibit 2. Certification from the Acting Municipal Treasurer Panangalian Alawi

stating, among other things, that the election paraphernalia were properly

distributed to the Board of Election Tellers for the eighteen (18) Barangays on July

15, 2002. To prove that there were indeed elections in Pagayawan as wrongfully

pictured by petitioners.

Exhibit 3. Certification from Minonting Macatumpag, DECS District

Supervisor, Municipality of Pagayawan, stating among other things, that the

members of the Board of Tellers of the 18 Barangays were recommended and

appointed as such. To prove that there were teachers from the Department of

Education and Culture who conducted the election on July 15, 2002 in accordance

with Resolution No. 4846 of this Honorable Commission.

Exhibit 4. Communication dated July 25, 2002 of the Acting Municipal

Administrator of Pagayawan Oloden D. Balt refuting the failure of election

thereof. To prove that the report of failure of election in Pagayawan has no factual

basis.

Exhibit 5. Communication dated July 25, 2002 of Mustapha Sarip, Management

Officer of Pagayawan, refuting the false report on failure of election. To prove

further that there were indeed elections for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan

in Pagayawan on July 15, 2002.

Exhibit 6. [Enumeration of submarkings omitted]. Acknowledgement reciept of

Official Ballots, election returns and other forms and supplies by the Board of

Election Tellers (CE Form No. 14). To prove that the designated Election Tellers

have received the election paraphernalia alloted

for Municipality of Pagayawan on July 15, 2002, and subsequently, conducted the

election for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) in accordance with

Resolution No. 4846 of this Honorable Commission.

Exhibit 7. [Enumeration of submarkings omitted]. Joint Affidavit of the designated

Board of Tellers for the 18 Barangays in Pagayawan. To prove the conduct of

election on July 15, 2002 in Pagayawan and refute the distorted report of failure

by Election Officer Alican Kapampangan and the petitioners.[8]

The COMELEC En Banc, however, found the foregoing evidence insufficient to overcome
respondents' evidence, to wit:

Although, the Respondents [herein petitioners] have submitted various

certifications, its contents appear to be diametrically opposed to what have actually

transpired as indubitably established by the following documentary evidence which

overcome [sic] and impeached the evidence thus presented by Respondents, to

wit:

1. The Acknowledgement Receipt executed by Acting Treasurer Pangalian

Alawi dated 19 July 2002 effectively destroys the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the Certificates of Proclaimation of the Respondents
which were all dated 15 July 2002. Thus, supporting the conclusion that
the alleged Certificates of Proclamation were spurious and manufactured.

2. The transmittal of the results of the election in Pagayawan by TAHA C.

ALI, who is not the Election Officer of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur is in itself
questionable because it should be Election Officer of the municipality,
Alican Kamampangan, who has the duty to do so. Taha C. Ali, in his
memorandum dated 13 January 2002 to Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain,
therein admits that there was no reassignment of station that
happened. How could then he served (sic) as Acting EO of Pagayawan.

3. The Consolidated List of Candidates for the 15 July 2002 Synchronized

Barangay and SK Elections of Pagayawan CONFIRMED that certain non-
candidates were proclaimed illegally, for the simple reason that they were
not candidates for the positions. x x x

xxxxxxxxx

4. In their ANSWER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS, Respondents alleged that

EO KAPAMPANGAN assisted Acting Treasurer Pangalian Alawi in distributing
the election forms, documents and other paraphernalia.

However, in their memorandum, Respondents contradict themselves by

alleging that EO Alican Kapampangan abandoned his duty to supervise the
aforesaid elections and was no where to be found after the receipt of the
election paraphernalia allocated to Pagayawan on 14 July 2002 by Acting
Municipal Treasurer Pangalian Alawi from the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer at Marawi City. That EO Kapampangan only re-appeared after
the election on 15 July 2002, that was on 19 July 2002, when the Board of
 Election Tellers of the eighteen (18) barangays have already proclaimed
the winners.

xxxxxxxxx [9]

It should be borne in mind that for this Court to uphold the factual findings of the COMELEC, it
only needs to be shown that the same is supported by substantial evidence.[10] Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.[11] In this case, the Court is convinced that the finding of fact made by the
COMELEC En Banc, that there was no actual casting of votes in subject barangays of Pagayawan,
Lanao del Sur, is supported by substantial evidence, as discussed in the assailed Resolution
dated January 27, 2004.
Lastly, petitioners' contention that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC En Banc to
order herein private respondents to continue as Punong Barangays in a hold-over capacity until
the holding of special elections, is likewise devoid of merit. In Sambarani v. Comelec,[12] the Court
already explained, thus:

x x x Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 (RA 9164) provides:

Sec. 5. Hold Over. All incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang
kabataan officials shall remain in office unless sooner removed or
suspended for cause until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified. The provisions of the Omnibus Election Code relative to failure
of elections and special elections are hereby reiterated in this Act.

RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK elections, prescribes
the term of office of barangay and SK officials, and provides for the qualifications
of candidates and voters for the SK elections.

As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA 9164 is clear. It is the duty
of this Court to apply the plain meaning of the language of Section 5. Since there
was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August
2002 special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay
chairmen of their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They shall continue
to discharge their powers and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights
and privileges pertaining to the office. True, Section 43(c) of the Local Government
Code limits the term of elective barangay officials to three years. However, Section
5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in
office in a hold over capacity until their successors are elected and qualified.

Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which provides that [A]ll

incumbent barangay officials xxx shall remain in office unless sooner removed or
suspended for cause xxx until their successors shall have been elected and
 qualified. Section 8 of the same RA 6679 also states that incumbent elective
barangay officials running for the same office shall continue to hold office until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified.

The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity in the transaction of

official business and prevents a hiatus in government pending the assumption of
a successor into office. As held in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, cases of extreme
necessity justify the application of the hold-over principle.[13]

Clearly therefrom, the COMELEC En Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in ordering those who have been elected and proclaimed in the barangay elections prior to the
2002 elections to continue as Punong Barangays in a hold-over capacity until the holding of
special barangay elections.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teves vs COMELEC G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in
Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in
a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he
was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office.
The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member
of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14
May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.
 Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held:
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a
public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract
or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with
such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
o The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still
he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan,
they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation
can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section
89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the
same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the
violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such
acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively
prohibited, as in the instant case.
The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine."
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable
by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral.
The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction
does not involve moral turpitude.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.

In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow
it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.

PART 2

Abella vs COMELEC G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991

1. Facts:

Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with
the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the
ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga,
Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was
earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition.
However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the
Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes
in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner,
however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of
the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run
for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of
determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus
revertendi rather than anything else." In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent
physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or
removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced
by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she
had physically resided at Ormoc City." Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the
second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position
was disqualified. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was
originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was
filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of
February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona
fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a
qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained
the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was
 repudiated by the electorate. As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI [Faypon v.
Quirino:[M]ere absence from one's residence or origin- domicile-to pursue studies, engage in
business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who
claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-
ponderantly such abandonment or loss.] In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove
that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any
calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc
City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of animus
revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact
that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to
continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where
we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents
and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.

18. Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte [the petitioner insists
that she is such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 She cancelled her
registration in Ormoc City on Nov 25, 1987, and 2 she then transferred her registration to
Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election
day (Feb 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte. ] We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of
belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course
of events or the natural behavior of persons. Among these are: (1) The application for cancellation
of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a clerk in the
Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in
a sealed envelope; (2) The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January
9,1988; (3) The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering
letter from the Election Registrar or anybody else; (4) The election clerk delivered the application
for cancellation only towards the last hour of the revision day, allegedly at 4:30 P.M., January 9,
1988; (5) All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutes indicating that no revision
of the voter's list was made as of 5:00 PM (6) The poll clerk and the third member prepared
another minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered the application for cancellation at
4:30 P.M. without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed; (7) Emeterio
Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was
supposed to have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. 15,
Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent with his registration. His application for cancellation was
never submitted in evidence. (8) The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses
Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from the serial numbers of the other new registrants
in November 28, 1987 in the same precinct. The most telling evidence is the list of voters, that
the Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the same, closed by the signatures of
both officials showing that there were only 9 additional registered voters in Precinct 17, petitioner
was not there. It was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks after the election day that the
same Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the
names of the Larrazabals and the second, which appeared only after February 1, submitted by
the Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the
petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no
impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. Section 12,
Article X of the Constitution provides: Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12,
Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when
organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the
province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters
from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the prohibition
against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition
of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable. Section
12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are
independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within
a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like
Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are
treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to
which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the
prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the
provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission
on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves
Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits
registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province
of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled
to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting
for any provincial elective official." The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She
opines that such interpretation is "wrong English" since nowhere in the provision is there any
reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective office. She states that if the
prohibition to run was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be
qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have been used after
the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of
the provincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the
words "not entitled to vote." The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious. In the case
of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase
"in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province
of Leyte."
2. 19. Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's
second division is null and void on the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner
Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already
expired on February 2, 1991. Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term
from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three years he exercised his duties
and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating
when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members commence and expire, that his
term expired on February 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional
provision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing
and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a color
of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to February 15, 1991, are
considered valid.
Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor by virtue of Section 6 RA 6646

Held:

Ratio:

Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According
to him these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and
Labo cases were petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code,
contesting the eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to
the Office from which they were sought to be unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed
before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code sought to deny due
course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentations and was
seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that since under section 6 of Republic
Act 6646 it is provided therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be counted. the
votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered
counted making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes
should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 88004. While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course
to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position
of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net
effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the
Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the
second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo
the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of
the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that in the event a
candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of
votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election
as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the
same position can not assume the vacated position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No.
88004, the Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to
conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a candidate for
the position of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R.
No. 88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: Finally,
there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto
petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat
and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won
by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, with three
dissenting and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave. ... it would be
 extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage
if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that
no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated
as stray, void or meaningless. In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set
aside the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in
terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995
election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and
void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated
the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez,
Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren
Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three
consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed
winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was
duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995
elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper
remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three
years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner
was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final
judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has
been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned
by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents’ contention
that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because
he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers
of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of
writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office
is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full
term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term
for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him
disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of
office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC
does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the
merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of
the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and
may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after
he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the

candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.” (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000

FACTS:

On May 11, 1998, the party-list election was held simultaneously with the national election. A
total of 123 parties, organizations and coalitions participated but only 13 party-list representatives
from 12 parties and organizations which obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system were proclaimed. The COMELEC enbanc determined that
COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation Inc.), was entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 2.04% of the total votes cast for the part-list system. Thereafter, several party-
list organization filed a petition to the COMELEC to proclaim the said winner under the Constitution
which was later on granted by the COMELEC in division and affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
Consequently, several petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of the temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction were filed to the
Supreme Court by the parties who also obtained at least two percent votes cast for party-list
system.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty
percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional
prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR:
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the
elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups
which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation
of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred
to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed
that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
Ang Bagong Bayani G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of
Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for
the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as
an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed,
and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan
Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of
herein respondents.

On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to
file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,
but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589,
assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court
directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from
notice.

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as
GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed
respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of
May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.

Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically,
is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785."
Held: WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED
to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report
within 30 days from notice hereof.

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC"to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the
COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785

Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge
may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent

Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The
COMELEC, however, did not act on that Petition.

In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved
the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the COMELEC, through
theOffice of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in
the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that
certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is
one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant
case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves
the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system,
which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
 Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."

In view of the participation of political parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political
parties."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More
to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain
of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."

In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that
any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the
party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law;
namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseasworkers,
and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable

electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system,
Filipino-style.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-
list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute
are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

In view of OSG contention

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends
that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the
elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing
the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors
are manifestly disparate; hence, theOSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason
and common sense.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the
opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.

In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or
ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities
is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.

In view of the Courts assistance

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this
light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its work.

In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)

Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a
type of proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win
a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they
have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered
"marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are elected
from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-
take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes,
he gets no seat.

Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order
to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district,
the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented.

What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for
"marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only
one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other
hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was
intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently
strong to enable them to be represented in the House. They may include Villacorta's
"marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have
been no need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for
three terms if the two systems are identical.

In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-
take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this
problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-
list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list
system.

Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list
system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors.

For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic

purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional
representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a
chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e.,
labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups
can possibly include other sectors.

Pimentel vs HRET G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002

FACTS:

In the May 1998 elections, APEC party-listwas able to send 2 representatives to the House, while
12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Subsequently, the Houseconstituted its
HRET and Commission on Appointments (CA) contingent by electing its representatives belonging
to the different political parties. Sen. Aquilino Pimentelassails the composition of the HRET and
the CA and prays that HRET be ordered to “alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure”its
composition to include party-list representatives in accordance with the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act.

HELD:

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionality defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Sec. 18, Art. VI
of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among
their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members
in the Commission on Appointments. Under Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionality defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. Even
assuming that party-list representatives comprise sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to HRET, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with the Court.

BASIS Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution –There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote except in case
of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days
of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all the
Members.

COMPOSITION

25 Total Membership

Senate President –ex officio Chair –votes only in case of tie 12 Senators –elected based on
proportional representation 12 Members of HOR –elected based on proportional representation

FORMULA

No. of Senators of Political Party ×12 Seats ÷ Total No. of Senators Elected ILLUSTRATION: 2
LP Senators ×12Seats ÷ 24 = 1 Seat

POWERS
act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days from their submission
Adormeo vs COMELEC G.R. No. 147927 February 4, 2002

(Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed
their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.

Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he was
re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall election of May 2000,
he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the
1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground
that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that
serving the unexpired term of office is considered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost
his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen,
thus he had not been a mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official shall
serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”

Issue:

WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of Lucena City.

Held:

No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a
private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998
elections.

Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for
clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service
(Lonzanida vs COMELEC).
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack of confidence.
It is initiated only in the middle of the year.

Facts:

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-
2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy
was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms
in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor.
Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue:

Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms
and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted
by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is
sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the
disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in
the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two
previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth
term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the
law. (Adormeo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)

Socrates vs COMELEC G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002

(Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts:
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto
Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the
disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the
ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995
and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issue:

WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for
mayor in the recall election.

Held:

Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election,
is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is
an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election
is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-
election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in
any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits
is a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001.

Facts:

On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto
Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) at the Brgy. San Jose
Gymnasium from 9:00am – 12:00noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates, petitioner, who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30, 2011.
Mark David Hagedorn, the president of the Association of Baranagy Captains was designated as
interim chair. The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution) which declared its loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall and requested the Comelec to schedule the recall
election for mayor within 30 days of receipt of the Recall Resolution. On July 16, 2002, Socrates
filed with the Comelec a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution, but it
was dismissed by the Comelec en banc on August 14, 2002. Comelec gave due course to the
Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Comelec fixed the
campaign period from August 27 to September 5, 2002 (10 days).

On August 23, 2002, Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election.

On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E. Gilo filed a petition before Comelec to
disqualify Hagedorn and cancel his certificate of candidacy (and 2 other petitions were filed), on
the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a 4th consecutive term”, having been
elected and having served mayor of the city for 3 consecutive full terms immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post.

In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the Comelec First Division dismissed for lack
of merit the petitions and declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The Comelec
also reset the election from September 7 to September 24, 2002.

G.R. NO. 154512

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the Comelec resolution dated August 14, 2002 which gave due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that Comelec gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution on
the following grounds:

Not all members of the PRA were notified.

The proof of service notice was palpably and legally deficient.
Members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their constituents.
The adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority.
The PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public’s constitutional
right to information.

G.R. NO. 154683

Petitioner Vicente Sandoval Jr. seeks to annul Comelec Resolution 5673 dated August 21, 2002
insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002 and gave only the candidates a 10-
day campaign period.

In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court directed the Comelec to give the candidates
additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Accordingly, on September
9, 2002, the Comelec en banc issued Resolution No 5708 giving the candidates additional 15 days
to campaign and reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.

G.R. NO. 155083-84

Petitioners Adovo, Gilo, and Ollave assail the resolutions by Comelec dated September 20 and 23
declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They argue that Comelec
gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn’s qualification to run for mayor in the recall
election despite constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a 4th consecutive term.

The Court, on September 23, 2002, ordered Comelec to desist from proclaiming any winning
candidate in the recall election. In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes
in the recall election with 20,338 votes, followed by Socrates with 17,220 votes, and Sandoval
with 13,241 votes. Hagedorn then filed motions to lift the order restraining Comelec from
proclaiming the winning candidate and allow him to assume office.

Issues:
Whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa (G.R. No. 154512).
Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on
September 24, 2002 (G.R. No. 155083-84).

Ruling:

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing
the campaign period of only 10 days has become moot, since the Court has ordered Comelec to
give the candidates additional 15 days to campaign.

No. The Court is bound by the findings of fact of the Comelec on matters within the competence
and expertise of the Comelec. Comelec found that the proponents for the recall sent notices of
the convening of PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Notices were also posted in conspicuous areas particularly at the Barangay Hall. Proponents
likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA. The
City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City also certified that upon a thorough and careful
verification of the signatures in the Recall Resolution, majority of the members of the PRA
approved said resolution.

Socrates also admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and event sent his representative and
counsel who were present during the PRA proceedings. Socrates also had the right to examine
public documents relative to the PRA such as the resolution, minutes, journal, and attendance
sheets but he did not do so and he does not claim that Comelec denied him that right.

Yes. Section 8 Article X of the Constitution states that the term of elective officials shall be by 3
years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service. Section 43(b) of RA 7160 or Local Government Code also provides that no local
elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service.
After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a 4th
term. The prohibition refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered
by the prohibition for two reasons: (1) a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after 3 consecutive terms, and (2) the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a 4th term following 3 consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a 4th term as
long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the 3rd consecutive term. Also, the
framers of the Constitution did not intend the period of rest of an elective official who has reached
his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate reelection after his 3rd consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. After
Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
election of September 24, 2002. The period when Hagedorn was a private citizen was an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, because it was due to a legal
prohibition which was involuntary. Also, Hagedorn’s recall does not retroact to include the tenure
in the office of Socrates. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the
recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term
limit. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than 9
consecutive years comprising the recall term plus the regular three full terms.

Latasa vs COMELEC G.R. No. 154829 December 10, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections
of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for
the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition
to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three
consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of
candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the
post of city mayor.

The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for
reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was
proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that
declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in
his favor should not be counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it
attained a different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local
government post.

Issue:

Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created
City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality
of Digos?

Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those
who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that
it limits the range of choice of the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government
post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor
of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the
very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after
an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would
be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this
Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to
set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
Ang Bagong Bayani G.R. No. 147589. June 25, 2003

Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. The
ultimate question raised is this: Aside from those already validly proclaimed[1] pursuant to earlier
Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed
winners? The answer to this question is circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our
June 26, 2001 Decision in these consolidated cases, as well as by the four unique parameters of
the Philippine party-list system:

First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party-list.

Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives.

Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.[2]

The Antecedents

To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some relevant
antecedents.
On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring
Comelec to do the following:

x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list

participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number
of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming
any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself
will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.[3]

Comelecs First Partial

Compliance Report

In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended that the
following party-list participants be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point guideline referred to
in the aforementioned Court Decision:
1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)
2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)
3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)
4. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)
5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT
MANGINGISDA (ABA)
6. PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)
7. SANLAKAS
It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their
failure to pass the guidelines:
MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)
ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)
NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC)
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)
CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC.
(COCOFED)
COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)
ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT, INC.
(AKLAT)
THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND
PEOPLE) ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MARCOS LOYALIST)
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA)
BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)
In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which partially
lifted its May 9, 2001 Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did so to enable Comelec
to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the last party-list election, with the caveat
that all proclamations should be made in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in
the instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786,
and 136795, October 6, 2000, on how to determine and compute the winning parties and
nominees in the party-list elections.
In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its May 9, 2001
TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTIL as winning party-list groups, in
accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans
Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000.
In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
on behalf of the Comelec, recommended that -- except for the modification that the APEC, BUHAY,
COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as having complied with the guidelines set forth in the June
26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [--] the Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001
be AFFIRMED.[4] But because of (1) the conflicting Comelec reports regarding the qualifications
of APEC and CIBAC and (2) the disparity in the percentage of votes obtained by AMIN, the Court
in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required the parties to file within 20 days from notice
their respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or should not be
proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections.
Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,[5] the Court agreed to qualify APEC
and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report.
Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the
Comelec to proclaim APEC and CIBAC as winners in the party-list elections. The Court said:

we accept Comelecs submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-
point guidelines of this Court and have garnered sufficient votes to entitle them to seats in
Congress. Since these issues are factual in character, we are inclined to adopt the Commissions
findings, absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its action. There is no
substantial proof that CIBAC is merely an arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA.
The OSG explained that these are separate entities with separate memberships. Although APECs
nominees are all professionals, its membership is composed not only of professionals but also of
peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally important, APEC addresses the issues of job
creation, poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is composed of the
underrepresented and marginalized and is concerned with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly
interested in the youth and professional sectors.[6]

To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report
and its amendments, the following nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA
(Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL
(Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).

Comelecs Second Partial

Compliance Report

In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this Court on August
28, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list participants[7] be deemed qualified
under the Courts guidelines:
 10. ABANSE! PINAY
11. ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, AT
HANAPBUHAY (AKO)
12. ALAGAD
13. SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)
14. ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)
15. MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)
16. ANG BAGONG BAYANI OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)
17. ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA SA
AGRIKULTURA KATIPUNAN (AMMMA)
18. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA
KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)
19. ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)
20. MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC.
(MSCFO)
21. WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)
22. AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)
23. ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)
In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list groups as
unqualified:
GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)
ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)
PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO PINATUBO PARTY (PMP-
PINATUBO)
REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)
BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT
LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)
KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)
AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)
PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)
ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER,
INC. (AASENSO KA)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)
ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)
ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC.
(ABCD)
LIBERAL PARTY (LP)
CITIZENS DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)
ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)
ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)
 KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN)
BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)
ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK
COALITION]
GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY
OPERATORS (PADPAO)
ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND
PROSPERITY (AGAP)
ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY (ANGKOP)
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)
PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)
PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)
PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (PCAP)
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, AND
PEACE (JEEP)

Comelecs Final Partial

Compliance Report

In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by the Court
a day later, Comelec recommended that the following be considered as qualified party-list
participants:
24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND DRIVERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACTODAP)
25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION,
INC. (SCFO)
26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TRICAP)
27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)
28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS CARE)
29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)
30. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)
31. PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)
32. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)
33. ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR CITIZENS, INC.
(ARPES)
34. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)
35. FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)
36. GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)
37. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)
38. ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)
 39. PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND RE-
INTEGRATION (POWER)
40. KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)
41. KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN (KALOOB)
42. ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG LAGUNA,
INC. (ALYANSA)
43. DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)
44. PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)
Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list groups:
AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)
PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)
CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)
CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
INC. (CONSLA)
PEOPLES PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD
GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL
ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)
AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)
ANGAT
SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)
A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE
MOVEMENT (APO)
PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)
PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)
CITIZENS ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)
ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)
BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)
UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)
ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)
PEOPLES REFORM PARTY (PRP)
COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE (COALITION
349)
RIZALIST PARTY (RP)
NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)
ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)
BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)
BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)
CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR REFORMS IN
GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT, INC. (HOMEOWNERS)
PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)
LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN (KKK)
BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)
KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)
FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS,
INC. (LAHING VETERANO)
 PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)
PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)
COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)
TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)
ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TRUST
PARTY (AKA)
ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)
PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)
BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)
PHILIPPINE PEOPLES PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)
SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)
KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)
CITIZENS FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND
INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)
NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list
election)
SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)
ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY PRINT)
PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)
ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)
DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY (DWP)
SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)
ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K. NAPU)
PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY KAGAWAD SA
PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)
NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)
LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)
TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG WARAY)
FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (FLRF)
KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)
DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN (DUGTUNGAN)
KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG
SAMBAYANAN (KABATAS)
GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT
PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)
PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)
GABAYBAYAN (GAD)
ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)
ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE
NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEA)
All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in regard
to the First Compliance Report, it agreed -- as earlier stated -- to add APEC and CIBAC to the list
of qualified groups.

Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings

Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,[8] Comelec motu proprio amended its Compliance
Reports by, inter alia, adding four more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and
BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections.
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that Comelec acted correctly in
revising its Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, so as to reflect the correct number of votes cast in
favor of qualified party-list parties and organizations.[9] Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO
with respect to COCOFED, BUHAY, SANLAKAS and PM, because [a]s shown in the revised
COMELEC Party-list Canvass Report No. 26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM
received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and 3.17%, respectively, of the total votes cast[10] in the May 14,
2001 party-list election.[11]
It added that the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM
(as well as all other qualified parties and organizations which received at least 2% of the total
votes cast in the same party-list election) as winners in the said party-list is in order.[12]
However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, which is not a
qualified party or organization per the Comelec [First] Partial Compliance Report dated July 27,
2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the last party-list elections.[13] It also recommended that
ABAs Motion to lift the TRO with respect to its proclamation should be likewise granted, because
it is a qualified party or organization that hurdled the 2% threshold in the last party-list
elections. For, ABA received 3.54% of the votes cast in the said party-list elections, as shown in
COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABAs proclamation as winner is therefore in order.[14]
Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process, the Court
resolved on February 18, 2003 to require the parties, including the OSG, to submit their respective
Position Papers on the following issues:

1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,[15] Grego v. Comelec[16] and related cases should be

deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections

2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified
for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in our June 26, 2001
Decision should be deducted from the total votes cast for the party-list system during
the said elections

The Courts Ruling

At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial
recommendation contained in Comelecs First Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding
BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these two party-list groups should be
deemed qualified.

Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED

In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being most probably merely an extension
of the El Shaddai, a religious group, Comelec said in the above-mentioned Report:

Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon BUHAYs
declarations of intent in its constitution, upon its avowed platform of government which both
mirror the sentiments of the El Shaddai Movement and upon the circumstances surrounding its
relationship with the El Shaddai Movement, BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of the
El Shaddai. In this light, it is very likely that the relationship between the leader of the El Shaddai,
and the nominee of BUHAY is less a matter of serendipity than an attempt to circumvent the
statutory prohibition against sects or denominations from participating in the party-list
elections.[17]

In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in the House
of Representatives, because it was allegedly an adjunct of the government. Explained the
Commission:

COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization

of coconut farmers and producers, established in 1947. It has no religious affiliations. However,
the records indicate that it is an adjunct of the government.

COCOFEDs Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:

The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized representative shall
automatically be a member of the National Board.

The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government which receives
support and funding from the national government. Thus, to have the Chairman of the Philippine
Coconut Authority sit on the National Board of COCOFED clearly amounts to participation of the
government in the affairs of candidate which, as this Court has said, would be unfair to the other
parties, and deleterious to the objectives of the law.

Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of its primary

purposes, the obtaining of possible technical and financial assistance for industry development
from private or governmental sources.[18]

On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG -- in
representation of the poll agency -- argued that the above findings of the Comelec in regard, inter
alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are not supported by substantial evidence and, thus, should be
modified accordingly. This opinion is buttressed by the OSGs Comment dated November 15,
2002.[19]
The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was merely anchored on conjectures
or speculations. On COCOFED, the OSG explained that the bylaws making the chairman of the
Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board has already
been deleted as early as May, 1988.
 It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFEDs Articles of Incorporation authorize
the organization to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry
development from private or governmental sources x x x, this statement does not by itself
constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded
or assisted by the government.
We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier accreditation of
APEC and CIBAC, we accept the OSGs position that indeed Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY
and COCOFED.[20]
Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier mentioned
and thereby increase the total to 46.
We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during the last
party-list election.

Legal Effect of the Disqualifications

on the Total Votes Cast

The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many party-list
organizations has reduced the total number of votes cast for the party-list elections. Because of
this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has now been allegedly attained by
movants. Hence, they now pray for their proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.
Recall that under Section 11(b)[21] of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled
to have a seat in the House of Representatives. The critical question now is this: To determine
the total votes cast for the party-list system, should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates
be deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause total votes cast for the party-list system include
only those ballots cast for qualified party-list candidates?
To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the matter,
especially Labo v. Comelec[22] and Grego v. Comelec,[23] which were mentioned in our February
18, 2003 Resolution.

Labo and Grego

Not Applicable

In Labo, the Court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.[24] In other
words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered stray.
However, this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected.[25] In short, the votes cast for a notoriously
disqualified candidate may be considered stray and excluded from the canvass.
The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception
mentioned in Labo v. Comelec is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1)
the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[26]
Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections for local
offices and (2) involved the interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.[27] They were not meant to
cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this latter law
clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition not entitled
to be voted for shall not be counted:

SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote is a vote
for candidate for membership of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the
second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of
Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or
coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first
election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998. (Emphasis supplied)

The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for
application.[28] Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic aids is warranted when the language of the law
is plain and unambiguous.[29]
Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single elective
posts, while the present controversy pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional
seats depending on the total election results -- such that even those garnering second, third,
fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners depending on their compliance with other
requirements.
RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the
controlling law in matters pertaining thereto. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into
being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the latter is a qualification of the former ruling and
law. On the other hand, Grego and other related cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941
should be construed as inapplicable to the latter.[30]
Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total votes
cast under the party-list system will reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the
two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified marginalized and under-
represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of disqualified party-list participants will
increase and broaden the number of representatives from these sectors.Doing so will further
concretize and give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941, which we reproduce thus:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered, national and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and
shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Need for Patience

and Perseverance

BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates
disqualified after the holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the
system. The reason is that qualified party-list candidates would be encouraged to seek the
disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining the needed percentage
of the votes cast. Although such scenario may be possible, we believe that the perceived
instability can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past elections, Comelec now has the herein
qualified and disqualified participants list, which can be used for future elections; and (2) in the
light of recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when
accrediting new candidates for the next party-list elections and will be able to set the period for
accreditation in such time and manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications long before
the elections are held.
Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and under-represented
sectors ably represented in Congress. The controversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001
party-list elections should further embolden, not distract, the nation in the process of
implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-style party-list system. At this point, the Court
needs to stress what it said in Veterans:

[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge
to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in
their campaign for representation in the States lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion
call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.

With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we
are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with
patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino
dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine
style.[31]

We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for
computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be
disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on
Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list
candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.
The Party-List Winners

As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be
counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the
votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during
the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and
ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes
they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide.
Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during the last
elections, pursuant to the approved Comelec Compliance Reports[32] and our various Resolutions
in these consolidated cases.Based on our foregoing discussion, we will deduct the votes obtained
by the 116[33] disqualified candidates from the total votes cast for the May 14, 2001 elections. The
votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630.Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the
total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185
valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure representing the votes
cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent
threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that the
Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance
Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants we approved in our January 29, 2002
Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED) per our earlier discussion in this
ruling. Table No. 1 below-lists the 46 qualified parties.
Table No. 1[34]

Rank Party-List Votes Cast Percentage to

Group Total Votes Cast
(%)

1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19

2 APEC 802,060 12.29
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
10 PM 216,823 3.32
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07
13 AKO 126,012 1.93
14 ALAGAD 117,161 1.80
15 ELDERLY 106,496 1.63
16 ATUCP 103,273 1.58
17 MARITIME 98,946 1.52
18 OFW 97,085 1.49
 19 AMMMA 65,735 1.01
20 ANAKBAYAN 63,312 0.97
21 AKAP 54,925 0.84
22 MSCFO 49,914 0.76
23 WPI 46,831 0.72
24 AAAFPI 43,882 0.67
25 AWATU 42,149 0.65
26 NACTODAP 38,898 0.60
27 SCFO 37,470 0.57
28 TRICAP 35,807 0.55
29 PINOY MAY K 32,151 0.49
30 VETERANS CARE 31,694 0.49
31 OCW-UNIFIL 29,400 0.45
32 PWP 24,182 0.37
33 DA 24,029 0.37
34 PARP 23,297 0.36
35 ARPES 22,497 0.34
36 ARBA 22,345 0.34
37 FEJODAP 21,335 0.33
38 GABAY OFW 17,777 0.27
39 AASAHAN 16,787 0.26
40 AYOS 15,871 0.24
41 POWER 13,050 0.20
42 KILOS 11,170 0.17
43 KALOOB 9,137 0.14
44 ALYANSA 7,882 0.12
45 KATUTUBO 6,602 0.10
46 DFP 6,600 0.10
Total 6,523,185

The Winners and

Their Nominees

Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least
two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast. Two percent of this number is
130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes may be declared
winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:
Table No. 2

Rank Party-List Votes Cast Percentage to Total

Group Votes Cast (%)

1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19

2 APEC 802,060 12.29
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
 5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
10 PM 216,823 3.32
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07

We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in
accordance with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its
nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is considered
the first party. The applicable formula[35] is as follows:

Number of votes of first party = Proportion of votes of first party relative to

Total votes for party-list system total votes for party-list system

Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:

1,708,253 = 26.19%
6,523,185

Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats. This finding is
pursuant to our ruling in Veterans, the pertinent portions of which we reproduce as follows:

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

xxxxxxxxx

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the
other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene
the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of
the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled
to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a
significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats
as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a
party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the
one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of
 three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first
party. [36]

As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to APEC,
AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC will not be addressed in this Resolution; a separate Motion (with
Supplemental Motion) challenging their entitlement thereto has been filed by BAYAN MUNA and
is still pending completion as of this writing. Hence, we shall compute only the additional seat or
seats to be allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM,
SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:

Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party
= 290,760 x 3
1,708,253

= 0.51

Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.[37] It is entitled to
only one qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in
Table No. 3:
Table No. 3

Rank Party-List Votes Percentage(%) Additional

Seats[38]

2 APEC 802,060 12.29 n/c

3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79 n/c
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 n/c
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 n/c
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 0.51
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 0.44
8 ABA 242,199 3.71 0.42
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 0.40
10 PM 216,823 3.32 0.38
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 0.26
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 0.24

In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate pending
challenge, are entitled to the following congressional seats:
1. BAYAN MUNA three (3) seats [one qualifying and
two additional seats]
2. BUHAY one qualifying seat only
3. AMIN one qualifying seat only
4. ABA one qualifying seat only
5. COCOFED one qualifying seat only
 6. PM one qualifying seat only
7. SANLAKAS one qualifying seat only
8. ABANSE! PINAY one qualifying seat only

Epilogue

The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither easy nor
simple. The novelty of the party-list system in our country necessarily demanded careful study
and deliberation by the Court.Principles and precedents in other democracies of the world have
not been very helpful, because our party-list law (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters,
giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-style party-list system. Our difficulties have also
been aggravated by the less than firm actions of the Commission on Elections referred to earlier,
which had to be reversed based on the OSGs later submissions.
To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the process of
determining the party-list winners in the future, we deem it wise to summarize the implementing
process we followed in this Resolution, as follows:

1. After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to
conduct a factual determination as to which of the various party-list candidates
had passed the eight-point guideline we instituted in that Decision.Although we
gave Comelec only 30 days to undertake the work, it was able to submit its Final
Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.

2. Of the various parties and organizations[39] which Comelec allowed to participate in

the 2001 party-list elections, it recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports to
the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were added, for a total
of 46.

3. Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two percent
of the total votes cast for the party-list system. To do so, we subtracted the votes
obtained by the disqualified candidates from the total votes cast.Those parties,
organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this balance
were declared winners.

4. After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas mandated

in Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees each winning party was entitled to.

5. The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners proclaimed
before the end of the year 2002, had Comelec been more resolute and exacting in
the factual determinations contained in its Compliance Reports.

6. In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of
whether the votes of disqualified candidates should be deducted from the total
votes cast nationwide.
 7. The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages, because
almost all of the original party-list participants filed -- some repeatedly -- motions,
pleas, position papers and so on, which all needed attention. Thus, the Court had
to devote an enormous amount of time and effort poring over, understanding, and
ruling upon these submissions.

8. In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution
was discussed, finalized and promulgated by the Court within weeks after it had
received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.

IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more
expeditiously, now that there are precedents to guide all concerned, especially the Commission
on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list of 46 qualified parties. For
another, given the lessons and experiences in these proceedings, it can now more speedily, more
carefully and more prudently pass upon the qualifications of new candidates. Such process can
even be done in advance under such rules and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law
and with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants well in
advance of the elections.
In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous
journey they experienced in our one-of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list system, the marginalized
and under-represented sectors of our country will be accorded ever-widening opportunities to
participate in nation-building, so that they can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society
that is just, humane, progressive and free.
WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes
cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are DECLARED elected with
one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. To
enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution -- these winners
and their respective nominees, we hereby partially LIFTour Temporary Restraining Order dated
May 9, 2001, in regard to them only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not
qualify and win.
SO ORDERED.

Tolentino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
(“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No.
01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed
the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006
declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the
Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001.
Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution
further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June
30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates
as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the
13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan
ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition
for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC
issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to
require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881;
and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without
distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just
a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance
of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any
restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan
questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters
because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they
sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers
some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the
statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of
the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of
voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill
vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted
the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to
document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special
election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of
R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others,
the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14,
2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially,
the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention
of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However,
upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by
providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”

Ong vs Alegre G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006

FACTS: In May 1995 elections, Francis Ong was elected mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte.
He was re-elected in May 1998 elections, however, respondent Alegre filed an election protest.
The RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision
came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term
and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality
of San Vicente.

ISSUE: Whether or not Francis Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998
to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

HELD: YES. The Court held that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service
for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the Constitutional and statutory provisions barring local executive officials from
being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.

It is true that the RTC ruled in Election Protest that it was respondent Alegre who “won” in the
1998 mayoralty race and therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis Ong’s
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected Mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of
the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

For the three-term limit for elective government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) terms in the
same local government post, and 2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Rivera vs COMELEC G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007

FACTS:
A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate
in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already
served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run.

Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term) and
2004-2007 (3rd term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd term)
because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.

Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it
final and executory on May 14, 2004.

ISSUE:
WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.

HELD:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.

Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position.
He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent)
as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.

Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites
of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number
of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the
second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the
elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.
Facts:
In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition
to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served
three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998
(first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as
a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared
void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman
in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999.

Issue:

1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?

2. If so, who should then take his position?

Held:

1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He
was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest
case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was
promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving
his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In
just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full
term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having
found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should
be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must
be considered stray votes.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the
remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a
second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-
Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. (Rivera III vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)

CIBAC vs COMELEC G.R. No. 172103 April 13, 2007

Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not
entitled to an additional seat. Party-list Canvass Report No. 20 contained in the petition shows
that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of
1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was
proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats based
on June 2, 2004 Resolution NO. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans
formula would therefore lead us to the following result:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional Additional
––––––––––––– x seats allocated to = Seats for
No. of votes of the first party concerned
first party (Emphasis supplied.) party

Applying this formula, the result is as follows:

495,190
–––––––– x 2 =
1,203,305
0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986

This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the
multiplier “allotted seats for the first party,” viz:

Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats

____________________ for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party

Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:

Additional seats = 495,190 x 3 = 1.2345

________
1,203,305

Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.

Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not
obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in
Veterans that “in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.”
Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.

BA-RA 7941 vs COMELEC G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007

Bantay vs COMELEC
Facts:
There were two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941,
for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec
resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming
party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,
or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each
seeks to represent.
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April
3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner
Rosales’ previous letter-request
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have
the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be “declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.

Issues:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the COMELEC to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do
not appear to be qualified?
2. Whether respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.
Ruling:
1.The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would
require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial
review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called
upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.
The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )

2. COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list
groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny
the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List” of the names.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the
right to information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional
provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have a bearing on their choice While the vote cast in a party-list elections is
a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate
cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election.

3.COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where
the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records
are not absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands
of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions
The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents
named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby
ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.

Montebon vs COMELEC G.R. No. 180444 April 8, 2008

Facts:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu
in 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he
succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor
retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007 elections,
a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. In his
answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3-term limit rule
because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the
retirement of elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's
assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in
the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal
councilor.

Issue:
Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance
or interruption?

Held:

Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act
No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post
or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking
councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.
Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent
inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to
assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for
some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it
involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which
exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and
neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement
of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him
in accordance with law. Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004
was an involuntary severance from his office as
con’t. 7.

municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot
be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of
law. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008)

Note:

● Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office
as vicemayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary
renunciation of his position as councilor.

Aldovino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is
an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide
complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the
three-term limit rule.

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to
deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour in its Resolution
of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed
to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan
had ordered.

ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-
term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term
of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during which an
official has title to office and can serve

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes
that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption…

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on

the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate,
the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared
invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of
the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive
terms…… The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)

"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that
involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to
occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not
constitute an interruption.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Dizon vs COMELEC G.R. No. 182088 January 30, 2009

Facts:

Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC
to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter
was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of
the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001
and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy
on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of
Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that
the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly
elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position
in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004
is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice
of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was
elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an
electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case
that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was
considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections
is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Issues:

1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his
office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

Held:

1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth
term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales
were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code
state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three
years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive
terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified Morales from his
candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court
previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no
interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the
trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001
term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to
the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the
Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day,
Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the
mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of
the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service.
Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the
position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1995-1998
1998-2001
2001-2004
2004-2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-
2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales
cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of
Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-
term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively
Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088,
January 30, 2009)

BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 July 8, 2009

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board of
Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the fullnumber of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to
declare the petition moot and academic was approved by theCOMELEC en banc.

BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.

The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,organization, or coalition in accordance
with
Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of
the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 toqualify for one seat is
constitutional

How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in theparty-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participatingin the party-list elections?

RULING:

The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
"the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4.
Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)seats.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either
"a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate
in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Philippine Guardians vs COMELEC G.R. No. 190529, March 22, 2011

Topic Party-list System

Case No. GR No. 190529, Apr 29, 2010, Mar 22, 2011
Case Name PGBI vs. COMELEC
Ponente Brion, j.

DOCTRINES

 There are two grounds for delisting a party-list from the roster of registered party-lists.
Both should be satisfied before delisting.

 The doctrine of stare decisis is not cast in stone. Court can abandon a previous ruling if it
sees that a law was erroneously applied in the case.

SUMMARY
 PGBI complained to COMELEC because it was removed from the roster of registered party-
list because of its failure to get 2% of votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the
2007 elections. COMELEC denied complaint using Minero as basis. Court overturned
Minero ruling, sided with PGBI.

RELEVANT FACTS

 Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC

may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition…
xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

 For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the
party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to
get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national,
regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or
through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
  PGBI filed its Opposition to the COMELEC resolution, citing among others the
misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, which the COMELEC denied.
 Minero ruling states that since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the
votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to
get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding
elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it. COMELEC was relying on
this jurisprudence.
 PGBI participated in the 2004 elections but failed to garner the required number of votes.
It, however, did not take part in the 2007 elections so it alleged that it must be allowed
to be listed in the 2010 elections because the first ground for delisting states that a party-
list fails to participate in the last two preceding elections. It only failed to participate in
one.

ISSUE

1. whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI

2. whether PGBIs right to due process was violated.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Issue Ratio
W there is legal basis for NO.
delisting PGBI The court overturned the Minero ruling. It is an erroneous
application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons
for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply
cannot stand. COMELEC cannot remove PGBI from the list of those
party lists intending to be voted for in the 2010 elections.

2. Whether or not PGBI’s

right to due process was (2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process
violated. was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did
seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of
due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
 essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of
notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process

RULING

NOTES

 In the March 2011 ruling on the case, COMELEC did not apply what the SC instructed in
the disposition because according to COMELEC it would be very difficult to incorporate the
name of PGBI in the latest election activities.
 PGBI filed a case of contempt of court against COMELEC for its disobedience of court
instructions. Court found Comelec guilty of indirect contempt of court. The penalty of
which is severe reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall
be dealt with more severely.
 PGBI intended to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections but it was not able to do so
because the Comelec did not - contrary to our express directive - include it in the list of
party-list organizations to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010 elections. As it was the
Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in the May 10, 2010 party-list
elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited
party-list groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list despite
our directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed to have participated in the May
10, 2010 elections, and cannot be disqualified for non-participation or for failure to garner
the votes required under Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941.

Ruling on the March 2011 case:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Comelec Chair and Members are hereby found GUILTY
of CONTEMPT of the Supreme Court for their disobedience to our lawful directive, specifically
the Status Quo Order dated February 2, 2010. They are accordingly SEVERELY
REPRIMANDED for this disobedience. They are further WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. shall be deemed not to have transgressed the
participation and level of votes requirements under Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 with
respect to the May 10, 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

Macalintal vs PET G.R. No. 191618 June7,2011

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, EN BANC (Nachura, J.)

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET
simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential
context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.

Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his
arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the
president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits
that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme
Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.

Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision
dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as
constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the
Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the
basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests
for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.

HELD:

Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.

 Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And
under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the
function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of
justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text
of the provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality.

The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission, which drafted the present Constitution.

The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was
merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the
Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific
wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.

“The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election
contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts,
respectively.

At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial
- exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives
and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI
(for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC,
the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review
- via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that the decision was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution
is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not
contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of
the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court,
in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The
power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate
and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12,
Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The
Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices
shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the
Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is
the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of
the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution,
is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to
use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant
of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should not
constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power”

Finally, petitioner’s application of the Court’s decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth

Commission to the present case is an unmitigated quantum leap.

The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) “finds justification
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.” A plain reading of the constitutional provisions,
i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch,
reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and
the Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution
of the PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission during the drafting of the present Constitution.

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC vs COMELEC G.R. No. 192803
December 10, 2013
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by a party-list group that ran for the 2010 national
elections. The petitioner questions the validity of the formula used by the Commission on Elections in
determining and proclaiming the winning party-list groups.

FACTS:

Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10,
2010 elections and ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers
initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five
(35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. The petitioner questioned the formula used by the
COMELEC and filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes
that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the
petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on
Elections’ erroneous interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to
petitioner ARARO)

On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers is the following:
Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20 =Number of seats available to party-list
representatives .80
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:
229__x .20 =57 .80
The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC 18 to arrive at the
winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats, where:
Number of votes of party-list
______________________________=
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
Total number of votes for party-list candidates

the Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid
or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on Elections argues
that this will contradict Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC 22 and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any
qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the
party-list system."24

ISSUE:

I. Whether the case is already moot and academic

II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of
the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed
in the 2010 elections
The third issue requires our determination of the computation of the correct divisor to be used. The
options are
 HELD:

1. This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed the issues raised by the petitioner as these
are capable of repetition yet evading review32 and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.33

2. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold
required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it
has no legal standing to raise the argument in this Court.

3. The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid
due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes
cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part
of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list
groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to
such elections should not be included in the divisor.

Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall
be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:
1. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case
of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or
Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast
for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups
listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to
such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are
declared spoiled or invalid.

FALLO:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified party-list groups is
denied for being moot and academic;

2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case
of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED

Atong Paglaum, Inc vs COMELEC G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of
their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their
desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to
grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB
does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on
7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in
the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC
to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court
adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the
rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious
reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-
list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after
this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the
three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941

Abundo vs COMELEC G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013

Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and
2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly
served the corresponding terms as mayor.

In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed
as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of
mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office
starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral
contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding
petition, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.

ISSUE #1:

Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election
protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three
consecutive term limit for elective local officials?

RULING:
No. Abundo cannot plausibly claim,even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor
as a matterof right during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until
May 8, 2006. Neither can heassert title to the same nor serve the functions ofthe said elective
office. The reason is that during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right
to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his
declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004
elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally
contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo
fully served the term 2004-2007.

ISSUE #2:

Under what instances are the consecutive terms not “involuntary broken or interrupted”?

RULING:
The instances wherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having been “involuntarily
interrupted or broken” are as follows:

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law;

(2) Recall Election;
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City;
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension; and
(5) Election Protest