3:19-cv-00755-JMC Date Filed 03/13/19 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

EDWARD WILLIAM RICHARDSON; )

AMANDA RICHARDSON, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:19-00755-JMC
)
BRYAN JAY KOON, in his official )
and individual capacities; )
LEXINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S )
DEPARTMENT )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________ )

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS, Edward William Richardson and Amanda Richardson, by

and through their undersigned counsel, who hereby complains against Defendants named above

and alleges and avers before this Honorable Court, demanding a trial by jury on all claims, states

as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action for money damages and declaratory relief brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983 and 1988, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under the law of

the State of South Carolina, against Bryan Jay Koon (Koon hereafter) and Lexington County

Sheriff’s Department (LCSD hereafter).

2. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Koon and LCSD blocked their personal Facebook

accounts from being able to make public comment on or send messages to the LCSD’s official

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Facebook page. Plaintiffs allege that the constitutional violation was committed as a result of the

policies and customs of the LCSD and that Koon is liable under the theory of viewpoint

discrimination.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Plaintiffs’ cause of

action arising under the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pursuant to

the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

4. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina because

the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in South Carolina. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Edward William Richardson (“Eddie”) is an adult citizen and resident of

Lexington County, South Carolina. Eddie Richardson is a retired law enforcement officer from

South Carolina Highway Patrol and LCSD.

6. Plaintiff Amanda Richardson is an adult citizen and resident of Lexington County, South

Carolina. Amanda Richardson is the spouse of Plaintiff Eddie Richardson.

7. The Defendant Bryan Jay Koon is, upon information and belief, a citizen of the United

States, State of South Carolina, and a resident of Lexington County. At all times relevant hereto,

Koon was the elected Sheriff of Lexington County and therefore is the head of LCSD and is a

“person” as that term is defined in relation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is sued herein for his acts

individually and in his official capacity as the elected Sheriff.

8. Defendant LCSD is an authorized political subdivision of the State of South Carolina,

indistinguishable from the County of Lexington County, State of South Carolina, that is

statutorily liable, both directly and vicariously, for the acts of the individual Defendant and the

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damages to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the South Carolina State Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code § 15-

78-10 et seq., and which is also liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 for the damages

suffered by the Plaintiffs due to its supervisory indifference and/or tacit authorization of the

misconduct of its agents as detailed herein.

BACKGROUND

9. Defendant Sheriff and Sheriff’s Department maintains a social media site on Facebook

called “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department” under the assigned handle1 “@lcsd.fb” over

which it exercises complete control. Defendants use their Facebook page to provide information

to the public about different projects, news stories, criminal arrests, pictures, videos, and they

solicit comments from citizens.

10. Defendants’ Facebook page is the official “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department”

Facebook page. It contains the physical address, phone number, and website address for the

LCSD.

11. Defendants manage the LCSD Facebook page with the ability to post to the page, edit

information, change its own posts, delete its own posts, delete visitor posts and comments, hide

comments, and control citizen communication altogether by blocking users from interacting with

its page.

12. Defendants often use the comments section of its posts to engage with Lexington County

citizens and other visitors to the official LCSD Facebook page.

1
Usernames and user IDs (or handles) are a part of Facebook public profiles, which help
Facebook users find other users or pages on Facebook. A “handle” is the web address for the
profile or Page (example: https://www.facebook.com/lcsd.fb/)

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13. Furthermore, Defendant uses its official Facebook page as a tool of governance to hold

back and forth conversations with the citizens it serves and solicits tips – when necessary – to

help solve crimes.

14. Plaintiff Eddie Richardson was a law enforcement officer with the South Carolina

Highway Patrol for 5-years while simultaneously contracting with the U.S. Marshals.

15. Afterwards, Plaintiff worked for LCSD for 7-years while simultaneously contracting for

the Town of Pelion Police Department and the University of South Carolina.

16. On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff, then Deputy Richardson with the LCSD, approached a

suspected burglar in a stolen small sedan. While approaching the vehicle, the suspect suddenly

drove right at Deputy Richardson and violently struck him with the car. Injured, Deputy

Richardson was still able to shoot and kill the suspect. Unfortunately, Plaintiff suffered severe

injuries to his spine and hip and was medically retired from his career in law enforcement.

17. Plaintiff is now an outspoken advocate for injured law enforcement officers as a member

of “The Wounded Blue” and a majority of his advocacy is shared on social media platforms such

as Facebook.

18. Plaintiff Amanda Richardson is Eddie Richardson’s spouse and worked in healthcare

until she left employment to care for her husband after his injuries.

19. During October 2017 – over a year after his line-of-duty injury and after Lexington

County cancelled his health insurance for his injuries – Plaintiff Eddie Richardson was

interviewed by The State Newspaper and WISTV news agencies. The interviews referenced the

denial of healthcare benefits related to his injuries as a Lexington County Sheriff’s Deputy.

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20. On or around October 25, 2017, Defendant Sheriff and Sheriff’s Department made a

Facebook post on its official Facebook page presenting details of a $500 sign-on bonus to

encourage new sheriff’s deputy recruitment and retention.

21. On or around October 25, 2017, Plaintiff Eddie Richardson commented on the

Defendants’ “incentive post” that, “That’s a great idea. But it would be a good idea to instead of

doing bonuses, put the money into a fund to take care of wounded officers.” The precise content

of Plaintiff Eddie Richardson’s comment, however, is unknown because Defendant Sheriff and

LCSD deleted the comment within an hour of Plaintiff posting it.

22. Simultaneously2 or soon after Plaintiff made this comment, Defendant also blocked3

Plaintiff’s personal Facebook profile preventing him from further interacting on the Defendant’s

Facebook page.

23. Afterwards, Plaintiff Amanda Richardson commented on the same post made by

Defendant Sheriff and LCSD that Defendants should not be blocking users, especially her

husband, from their Facebook page. The precise content of Plaintiff Amanda Richardson’s

comment, however, is unknown because Defendant also deleted her comment and banned her

from interacting with their Facebook page.

24. While blocked, Plaintiffs are able to read and share content posted on the Defendant

Facebook page; however, Plaintiff’s cannot like, comment on, send private messages, or interact

with the page.

2
Administrators of public Facebook pages have several options to control posts. These options
include but are not limited to (1) Copy (2) Hide, (3) Delete, (4) Ban From Page and Delete
Comment, or (5) Moderate Comments.
3
A block or ban on a public Facebook Page means the user is still able to share content from the
Page to other places on Facebook; however, the user no longer may publish to the Page, like, or
comment on the Page's posts, message the Page, or like the Page.

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25. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of the Defendants, Plaintiffs suffered the

following injuries and damages:

a. Violation of their constitutional protections under the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution to be free in the exercise of speech.

26. Defendants opened a forum for public speech and a digital space for the exchange of

ideas, opinions and thoughts by creating the “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department” Facebook

page.

27. Defendant’s creation of the Facebook page “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department”

and designating it as a channel of communication is comparable to traditional public fora as a

forum of speech.

28. Plaintiffs did not leave a comment that reflected foul language, threats, obscene

comments, or other unacceptable comments. Instead, Plaintiffs disagreed with the conduct of the

Defendants.

29. The actions of the Defendants violated the following clearly established and well-settled

federal constitutional protections of Plaintiffs:

a. Freedom from viewpoint discrimination in all forums.

30. With deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs to be free from retaliation for

exercising their First Amendment protections, Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD have

ongoingly encouraged, tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to an environment of retaliation to the

exercise of such rights by:

a. failing to conduct sufficient training or supervision with respect to the protected

speech rights of citizens to question the actions of government conduct without
retaliation;

b. by failing to adequately punish retaliation by employees against members of the

public who exercise their protected speech rights to object to government

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conduct;

c. by tolerating the use of retaliation based on protected speech;

d. and by ongoingly failing to properly investigate citizen complaints of retaliation

for exercising their First Amendment Protections.

31. It is the deliberately indifferent custom, habit, practice and/or policy of Defendant Koon

and Defendant LCSD to permit retaliation against individuals for exercising First Amendment

Protections, as well as to fail to supervise and to train employees in the constitutional protections

of individuals.

32. At all relevant times, Defendant Koon was acting under color of law and under color of

authority as the head of Defendant LCSD in the U.S. state of South Carolina, county of

Lexington.

33. At all relevant times, Defendant LCSD was acting under color of law and under color of

authority as an authorized political subdivision of the State of South Carolina, indistinguishable

from the County of Lexington County, State of South Carolina.

COUNT I

42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment

(Against Bryan Jay Koon)

34. Plaintiffs restate and reavers all foregoing paragraphs as if restated here verbatim.

35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of
any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate
proceeding for redress . . .

36. Plaintiffs in this action are citizens of the United States and Defendant Koon is a person

for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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37. Defendant Koon was, at all times relevant, a policymaker for the LCSD and in that

capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices for the same at all times

relevant hereto, was acting under the color of state law in his capacity as the elected Sheriff and

his acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of his official duties or employment.

38. At the time of the complained of event, Plaintiffs had the clearly established

constitutional protections to be free from retaliation for the exercise of protected speech.

39. Any reasonable elected official such as Defendant Koon knew or should have known of

this right at the time of the complained of conduct as it was clearly established at that time.

40. Plaintiffs exercised their constitutionally protected right to question the conduct of the

government and/or engaged in protected speech in a digital public forum.

41. Retaliatory animus for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their constitutionally protected right to

question the conduct of government programs controlled by Defendant Koon was a substantially

motivating factor in the blocking of Plaintiffs’ personal Facebook accounts.

42. The actions taken against Plaintiffs in retaliation for their protected conduct would deter a

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct on the

“Lexington County Sheriff’s Department” Facebook page.

43. Defendant Koon blocked Plaintiffs as a means of retaliation for Plaintiffs’ protected

speech. He is therefore liable for violating the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment protections.

44. Defendant Koon is not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.

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COUNT II

42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Deliberately Indifferent Policies, Practices, Customs, Training, and

Supervision in violation of the First Amendment
(Against Bryan Jay Koon and LCSD)

45. Plaintiffs restate and reavers all foregoing paragraphs as if restated here verbatim.

46. At the time of the complained of event, Plaintiffs had the clearly established

constitutional protections to be free from retaliation for the exercise of protected speech.

47. Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD knew or should have known of these rights at the

time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.

48. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.

49. Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD were, at all times relevant, policymakers for the

LCSD and in that capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices for the

same.

50. These Defendants developed and maintained policies, procedures, customs, and/or

practices exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional protections of citizens, which

were moving forces behind and proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional

protections and federal rights as set forth herein and in the other claims, resulted from a

conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various available

alternatives.

51. Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD have developed and maintained long-standing,

department-wide customs, policies, procedures, practices, and/or failed to properly train and/or

supervise its employees in a manner amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional

protections of the Plaintiffs and of the public.

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52. The deliberately indifferent training and supervision provided by Defendant Koon and

Defendant LCSD resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action

from among various alternatives available to Defendants and were moving forces in the

constitutional and federal violations complained of by the Plaintiffs.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

53. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests this Court to:

a. Award all such actual, general, special, compensatory, and consequential

damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an
amount to be determined by the trier of fact;

b. Award punitive damages on all claims allowed by law against individual

Defendants and in an amount to be determined at trial;

c. Issue a declaratory judgment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 declaring Defendants’

conduct unconstitutional;

d. Issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting all Defendants and all those acting in
concert with them from blocking users without procedural due process on their
official government social media platforms;

e. Issue a permanent injunction prohibiting all Defendants and all those acting in
concert with them from blocking users without procedural due process on their
official government social media platforms;

f. Award Plaintiff reasonable fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any
other applicable provisions of law; and

g. Award such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a jury trial, pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States, as to all claims for damages.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Thomas M. Fernandez
Thomas M. Fernandez, FED ID #12984
Fernandez Law LLC
477 Whispering Breeze Lane
Summerville, South Carolina 29486
(843) 580-6045
Tom@TomFernandezLaw.com
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

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