Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs)

Peter Jennings, the Executive Director, ASPI, posted the following article on The Strategist on
10 April 2015 : http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/one-defence-leave-it-to-peever/

I was prompted to email him about one particular aspect:

"Hi Peter,

I enjoyed reading your 'One Defence' article in 'The Strategist'. It prompted me to look at your
earlier posts and I came across 'Integration, strategy and the ADF' from last month. In it you
state:

'But I’m still looking for the convincing explanation that shows how these plans
connect—the integration factor, if you will—showing how the ADF will fight as an
organisation. The kinds of details which would provide for a compelling
explanation here would include things like: How will the Joint Strike Fighter
operate with Army’s deployed LAND 400 vehicles? [

May I suggest that the "integration factor" is a human one.

I can't speak for those Australian AFV crews who operated in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but I can say from my experience as a tank troop leader in Vietnam, that it is people
that make integration work. I had occasion to request the assistance of US air support
while engaged in the middle of an attack on a major enemy defensive position.
Nothing could have proceeded more smoothly.

My training meant that I was able to describe exactly what air delivered munitions
were needed, where they were needed and when they were needed ("everything
you've got ... 50 yards in front ... now!"). More than anything else, however, it was
the commitment of both parties to achieve the same goal which made all the
difference.

The guys 'on top' were just as much at risk as those of us on the ground. The human
factor involved here is one of determination borne of confidence in your training,
your equipment, your men and your allies.

I guess this is why morale is regarded as being an integral component of 'combat

power'.

Peter responded to say:

"Yes, you are right. People are the most important integrating factor at all times. That’s
what will make the First Principles Review succeed or fail.

The systems integration I was talking about in the earlier piece becomes an adjunct to
people making the system work. There should, for example, be IT connectivity that create a
common operating picture for the JSF and ground forces to deliver an even faster ground
support response. Well, that’s the theory of it. But right now Land 400 (future Army vehicle
fleet) and JSF aren’t really synchronising that piece – at least as I understand it."
What is the IT connectivity that he refers to? Another example he offers in The
Strategist article is illustrative: "What are the integration capabilities required to
provide appropriate targeting information for the many capable new weapons and
platforms coming into service?"

An article was recently posted on Defence's Land Power Forum: 'War: An integrated
endeavour' by Major Mark Mankowski http://www.army.gov.au/Our-
future/Blog/2015/April/War-integrated-endeavour (10 April 2015) [If the foregoing
link doesn't work, Google 'Land Power Forum'.] An extract from it is:

"Both the US Army and the US Marine Corps were equipped with broadly similar
weapon systems during the advance on Baghdad in 2003, but it was the Marine
Corps’ command system and use of battlefield geometry that was better equipped to
efficiently locate, process and prosecute target that were beyond the range of land-
based weapons using airpower."

Are the requirements for LAND 400 lacking in this area as suggested by Peter
Jennings? I thought that directing JSF ground support was one of the functions of the LAND
400 Phase 2 'joint fires control' vehicles. The LAND 400 Operational Requirement also
states:

"For the LCVS [Land Vehicle Combat System], there will be a requirement to accept
the development of emerging technologies during LOT and to operate effectively with
legacy capabilities including the M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT), Land 200 Battle
Management System and Land 121 Field Vehicles, Trailers and Modules (FVT&M)".

Furthermore, the 2014 Future Land Warfare Report makes the point that: "Under
initiatives such as Plan Beersheba, the Army is transforming to meet a new security
environment, focused on the power of joint effects and enabled by amphibious
operations. Success will be measured by the Army’s capacity to prepare for, conduct,
and conclude military operations as part of a joint force. Integration and
interoperability will be critical issues in joint, combined and coalition operations."

Is the proposed Battlefield Operating System a disjointed one as far as Army and Air
Force are concerned?