Casanas v. Yates PHC

Case4:08-cv-02991-CW Document15 Filed10/12/10 Page1 of 17
1
2
3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
5
6
7 PAUL CASANAS, No. 08-02991 CW
8 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR WRIT
9 v. OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND GRANTING
10 JAMES A. YATES, CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY ON
For the Northern District of California
11 Respondent. TWO CLAIMS

/
United States District Court
12
13
On June 17, 2008, Petitioner Paul Casanas, a state prisoner
14
incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison, filed a petition for
15
a writ of habeas corpus alleging three claims based on allegations
16
that the trial court improperly questioned and dismissed Juror
17
Number Three, insufficiently investigated Juror Number Five’s
18
alleged misconduct and improperly imposed the upper term sentence.
19
Respondent filed an answer and Petitioner has filed a traverse.
20
Having read all the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES
21
the petition. The Court grants a certificate of appealability on
22
two of Petitioner’s claims.
23
BACKGROUND
24
The following facts are taken from the state appellate court
25
opinion. On April 16, 2005, Petitioner was taken to a hospital
26
after being stabbed in his buttocks. At the hospital, Officer
27
Brian Franco seized Petitioner’s pants as evidence in the stabbing
28
1 investigation. Officer Branco found a glass pipe with white

2 residue inside one of the pants’ pockets. In another pocket,
3 Officer Branco found a second glass pipe, two plastic baggies of
4 marijuana, and nine smaller baggies of methamphetamine. After
5 Petitioner was treated for his stab wound, Officer Branco
6 transported him to the police department where he was interviewed
7 by Detective David Parris. Petitioner told Detective Parris that
8 he lived in a motel room with his sixteen-year old girlfriend,
9 Kimberly H.
10 The police interviewed Kimberly, who said she was sixteen
11 years old, had been using methamphetamine every day and had been
12 having sexual relations with Petitioner. At trial, she testified

13 that she had told Petitioner that she was eighteen years old and
14 had sex with Petitioner only once. She testified that she had
15 become addicted to methamphetamine before she met Petitioner and,
16 while with Petitioner, she took the drug from him without asking.
17 She testified that Petitioner gave her the drug directly on only
18 one occasion.
19 On April 20, 2005, Detective Parris again interviewed
20 Petitioner. Petitioner told him that Kimberly had originally told
21 him she was eighteen or nineteen years old, he was in love with her
22 and he wanted to marry her. He admitted that he had sexual
23 intercourse with Kimberly and that she received methamphetamine
24 from him.
25 At trial, sixteen-year old Tary Porter testified that she
26 observed Kimberly smoking a white substance from a glass pipe while
27 Petitioner was present. Petitioner presented no defense. The
28 2
1 court granted his motion to dismiss one of the counts of furnishing

2 a controlled substance to a minor. On September 13, 2005, the jury
3 convicted Petitioner of three counts of furnishing a minor with a
4 controlled substance and two counts of unlawful intercourse with a
5 minor.
6 On December 7, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to
7 nine years and eight months in state prison. In imposing the upper
8 term, the trial court found the following aggravating factors:
9 Petitioner induced others to participate in the commission of the
10 crime or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other
11 participants in its commission; Petitioner induced a minor to

12 commit or assist in the commission of the crime; the manner in

13 which Petitioner carried out the crime indicated planning,
14 sophistication, or professionalism; Petitioner’s prior convictions
15 as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
16 proceedings were numerous or of increasing seriousness; Petitioner
17 had served a prior prison term; and Petitioner’s prior performance
18 on probation or parole was unsatisfactory. The court noted that
19 Petitioner had prior felony convictions for robbery and burglary.
20 The court found one mitigating factor: the victim was a willing
21 participant.
22 On July 13, 2006, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the
23 California court of appeal. On August 30, 2007, the state
24 appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction. On October 5,
25 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California
26 Supreme Court, which was denied on December 12, 2007. Petitioner
27 timely filed this federal habeas petition.
28 3
1 LEGAL STANDARD
2 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state
3 prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
4 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28
5 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
6 Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition
7 challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim
8 that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state
9 court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that
10 was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
11 clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

12 of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

13 on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
14 evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.
15 § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal
16 law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if
17 it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts
18 materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but
19 nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d
20 1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003).
21 Even if the state court's ruling is contrary to or an
22 unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, that error
23 justifies habeas relief only if it resulted in "actual prejudice,"
24 that is, that the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or
25 influence in determining the jury’s verdict." Brecht v.
26 Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993).
27 The only definitive source of clearly established federal law
28 4
1 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

2 of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.
3 Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
4 To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary
5 to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
6 law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state
7 court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a
8 reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th
9 Cir. 2000). In the present case, the appellate court is the only
10 state court to address the merits of Petitioner's claims.
11 DISCUSSION
12 I. Juror Number Three

13 Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his Sixth
14 Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury by questioning Juror
15 Number Three during deliberations and then dismissing him. He also
16 argues that the jury foreperson wanted Juror Number Three removed
17 because he was the only juror to vote for acquittal.
18 A. State Appellate Court Opinion
19 The state appellate court summarized the facts regarding this
20 claim as follows:
21 The jury adjourned for deliberations late Thursday
morning, September 8, 2005. On Monday morning, September
22 12, 2005, the jury foreperson reported to the court that
Juror No. 3 had admitted to having discussed the case
23 with an outside party. The prosecutor, defendant and
defendant's counsel were all present. The judge asked
24 the foreperson to elaborate, and he explained: "In the
process of our deliberating about the counts for–-I
25 believe it's two, three, and four, sex with an under-age
individual, the–-one of the jury members stated that this
26 weekend he had a discussion about a buddy of his. And in
the process of relating his thought to us about the
27 charges, he said that his buddy said, 'Well, remember
28 5
1 when you were seeing Becky? You've got to think of it

that way.' [¶] And in that case, he stated that the jury
2 member was 22 and the–-Becky was 17, which means that--
which implied to me that he had, in some ways, revealed
3 some of the details of the case and was using external
sources to figure out what was going on and reach a
4 conclusion."
5 The jury foreperson believed that all of the jurors had
heard the comments of Juror No. 3, and one of the jurors
6 had asked the foreperson if he had heard the comments.
The foreperson's impression was that Juror No. 3 "was
7 still wrestling with it and attempting to remain fair and
impartial in terms of deliberating the facts of the case
8 before him." After Juror No. 3 made these comments, the
jurors continued to deliberate.
9
When questioned by defense counsel, the jury foreperson
10 stated that he inferred that Juror No. 3 "had to reveal
some of the details of the case [to his friend] for that
11 comment to be brought forth."

12 In the presence of both defense counsel and the

prosecutor, the trial judge called Juror No. 3 into the
13 courtroom. The court told the juror that "there's some
reference to you[r] hav[ing] commented that you spoke to
14 a friend this weekend about this case or about the
circumstances of this case." The judge then asked juror
15 No. 3 to comment on this. Juror No. 3 responded: "No. I
just said that–-that–-I told jurors that I–-somebody had
16 brought to my attention the fact that I–-that I–-you
know, when I was–-way back when, I believe, 22, I took a
17 girl to a prom. And she was five years lesser than me."
18 Juror No. 3 stated that the subject came up, not in the
context of discussing the pending case, but while
19 discussing a 26-year-old former classmate who recently
married a 53-year-old man. According to Juror No. 3, the
20 subject was age difference, not the pending case. He
asserted that there was no discussion whatsoever about
21 the pending case.
22 The judge asked Juror No. 3 why he had not revealed the
information about dating a female under the age of 18
23 years during jury voir dire when he was asked whether he
or anyone close to him "had ever had any experience with
24 a similar type event or offense." Juror No. 3 responded,
"Well, I just didn't really think that might–-my
25 experience–-I mean, I never–-for one, I forgot about it.
But I just, you know, until now, I–-I mean, I had
26 forgotten that it would fall into any type of
classification that was asked of me at that time."
27
28 6
1 . . .
2 When asked by the prosecutor whether he could separate
out his own personal feelings and just follow the law,
3 Juror No. 3 answered: "Yes, ma'am. I–-I was just–-I was
just in shock when–-personally, when it had–-you know,
4 when it dawned on me that I was in a similar situation.
And–-and I just–-I didn't know it at the time. I mean, I
5 didn't remember it until it was enlightened to me. And I
just know I was really shocked–-[.]"
6
The judge stated, "under the circumstances," he would
7 have to excuse Juror No. 3 because it appeared "that he
brought up something personal that is a factor for him in
8 evaluating the facts of this particular case." The judge
continued: "He obviously has discussed this. It's a–-
9 real factor for him as far as making his determination.
It's a fact that's outside the–-purview of what either
10 side is able to question about or present other
evidence."
11
Defense counsel responded that Juror No. 3 "perhaps did
12 not discuss the case outside of the–-jury deliberations.

It appears that the issue arose, you know, from some
13 other collateral source."
14 The judge decided to excuse Juror No. 3 over defense
counsel's objection.
15
. . . .
16
After instructing the jury to decide all factual issues
17 based on the evidence presented during the trial and not
from any outside source, the court explained: "And I
18 suppose, just to be more direct about it, it came to our
attention that potentially one of the other jurors had
19 talked to someone outside of court and maybe not
discussed necessarily the facts of this case but own
20 experiences and brought those into the jury deliberation
room. [¶] What we have to do is make sure that you make
21 your decision only on the facts presented here in court.
[¶] Anyone have a difficulty setting–-setting aside
22 anything that you might have heard earlier relative to
something happening outside of court and making your
23 decision only on the facts presented here in open court?
Any difficulty with that? [¶] Okay. No one's raising
24 their hand."
25 The judge then told the jury that it would have to
disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating
26 anew.
27 . . .
28 7
1 [T]he jury with the alternate juror deliberated for about

two and one-quarter hours. The jury returned verdicts
2 convicting defendant of two counts of unlawful
intercourse with a minor, and three counts of furnishing
3 a controlled substance to a minor.
4 . . .
5 On October 27, 2005, defendant moved for a new trial and
requested that the court investigate misconduct
6 allegations. Defendant attached to his motion the
declaration of the dismissed juror, Juror No. 3. Juror
7 No. 3 stated that, while he was a member of the jury,
there were approximately six to seven open votes taken
8 regarding the guilt or innocence of defendant on the
various counts. He asserted that he “was the sole juror
9 who was not persuaded that the case had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt as to each count.” . . . He
10 further declared that he believed the report of his
alleged misconduct “was motivated by a desire to force”
11 him off the jury as he was “seen as an obstacle to a

quick verdict.” . . .
12
When explaining the reason for denying the motion for a
13 new trial, the trial court stated that it did not find
the denial of Juror No. 3 that he did not discuss the
14 case outside the jury room as “particularly convincing.”
The court stated that it did not find that particular
15 misconduct sufficient, in itself, to excuse him. More
significantly, the court found that Juror No. 3 “by the
16 nature of the discussion which he candidly admitted that
he was considering his own position having committed a
17 crime in assessing the facts of this case. In other
words, assessing in essence the morality or propriety of
18 a charge in which one could be charged with having sex
with an under-aged female and using his own experience in
19 that respect. [¶] Frankly, this is not anything for the
jury’s consideration whatsoever. [¶] What the jury’s duty
20 is to–-duty to accomplish is to assess the facts that are
presented and determine whether the facts are true or not
21 true, not the propriety of the law in that respect.”
22 The court elaborated: “That was the reason in combination
with what I found to be somewhat suspect denial or of his
23 explanation as to why he would be discussing that
particular aspect with a friend over the weekend. I
24 didn’t find that particularly convincing. But more
specifically, the fact he was discussing something which
25 would be inappropriate for him to consider in this
particular case, and in combination with the fact that he
26 did not disclose that to the court upon direct inquiry on
voir dire–and I suppose people forget those sorts of
27 things. I think excusing [Juror No. 3] was appropriate
28 8
1 under those circumstances and with the inquiry that had

been received.”
2
Resp’s. Ex. 6, People v. Casanas, No. A 112452 (2007) at 3-9.
3
The state appellate court noted that, under California law, it
4
is misconduct for a juror to express opinions based on personal
5
experience that differ from the law as instructed by the court.
6
The appellate court found that the trial court made a proper,
7
limited inquiry of Juror Number Three, without delving into his
8
thought processes or the content of the jury deliberations. Based
9
upon Juror Number Three’s responses to the trial court’s inquiry,
10
the appellate court found that Juror Number Three was considering
11
whether a sexual relationship between an underage female and an
12
adult male should be against the law. Because Juror Number Three
13
was concerned with whether the charges against Petitioner were
14
proper, the appellate court concluded that he could not be an
15
impartial juror. The appellate court also noted that, although
16
later Juror Number Three submitted a declaration to the trial court
17
that he had been a holdout juror, at the time the trial court made
18
its inquiry of him, the trial court had not known that the jury had
19
been deadlocked or that Juror Number Three was a holdout juror and,
20
therefore, there was no reason for the trial court to have made
21
further inquiry of the jurors.
22
B. Analysis
23
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the criminally accused a
24
fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. U.S.
25
Const. amend. VI; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). A Sixth
26
Amendment claim may be made on the ground that a particular juror
27
28 9
1 was substituted without good cause. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d

2 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1997). Good cause for removal of a juror may
3 exist where the facts show that the juror was biased. Coughlin v.
4 Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997). Juror bias
5 may be actual or implied. Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 948
6 (9th Cir. 2004). Implied bias is found where “an average person in
7 the position of the juror in the controversy would be prejudiced.
8 Prejudice will be presumed under circumstances in which the
9 relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the
10 litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average
11 person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the

12 circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Juror bias may

13 be presumed or inferred where a juror has personally been involved
14 in a situation similar to the defendant’s. Coughlin, 112 F.3d at
15 1062; Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir. 2008).
16 Here, the trial court noted that, although Juror Number Three
17 denied discussing the pending case with a friend, he confirmed that
18 he had mentioned dating an underage female to the jury and that he
19 did so because he was surprised that his conduct could constitute
20 the same offense as the defendant’s. The trial court reasonably
21 doubted whether the subject of Juror Number Three’s dating
22 situation came up in his conversation with his friend without
23 reference to the pending case. The court also reasonably found
24 that Juror Number Three mentioned his experience to the jury, not
25 to help with the determination of facts, but to question whether a
26 sexual relationship between an adult male and an underage female
27 should be unlawful. As noted by the appellate court, Juror Number
28 10
1 Three’s response to the trial court’s question as to why he told

2 the other jurors about his dating an underage girl made it clear
3 that he realized that he could have been charged with the same
4 offense as Petitioner.
5 Citing Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 878-79 (9th Cir.
6 2004), Petitioner argues that Juror Number Three was merely
7 bringing his life experiences to assist the jury in its
8 deliberations. Grotomeyer is distinguishable. In that case, the
9 jury foreperson, based on her experience as a medical doctor,
10 stated that the defendant’s mental disorders caused him to commit
11 the crime. Id. at 878. The Ninth Circuit held that this was not
12 misconduct because a juror could bring his or her life experience

13 to bear on the evidence. Id. In contrast, Juror Number Three
14 related his personal experience in regard to the legitimacy of the
15 charges against Petitioner, not to the evidence. The appellate
16 court reasonably found that Juror Number Three was applying his
17 experience to question the law, not using his experience to
18 determine the facts.
19 At the time the trial court dismissed Juror Number Three, the
20 court was not aware that he was a holdout juror or that the jury
21 was deadlocked. Evidence to that effect was submitted to the court
22 in support of Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. Removing a
23 juror for good cause may be proper even if the trial court knows
24 that the excused juror was the sole holdout for acquittal. See
25 Perez, 119 F.3d at 1427 (dismissal of holdout juror permissible
26 because juror's emotional instability that made her unable to
27 continue deliberating provided good cause for her dismissal). The
28 11
1 court may not remove a juror during deliberations if the request

2 for discharge stems from the juror’s doubts about the sufficiency
3 of the government's evidence, id. at 1428, but such was not the
4 case here.
5 The hearing that the trial court held, with the parties in
6 attendance, upon learning from the jury foreperson that Juror
7 Number Three might have discussed the case with an outside party,
8 was not an improper procedure.
9 The appellate court was not unreasonable in concluding that
10 the trial court correctly found that Juror Number Three was not
11 unbiased and impartial.

12 II. Juror Number Five

14 Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury by failing to hold a
15 post-trial evidentiary hearing based on Juror Number Three’s
16 declaration that Juror Number Five had engaged in misconduct during
17 deliberations.
18 A. State Appellate Court Opinion
19 The state appellate court summarized the facts regarding this
20 claim as follows:
21 Defendant attached the declaration of Juror No. 3 to his
motion for a new trial, and Juror No. 3 asserted that
22 Juror No. 5 reported that he had seen Kimberly
“previously on Second Street in Eureka in an area where
23 the ‘hookers are.’” He further declared that this
statement by Juror No. 5 was made during deliberations
24 with all the other jurors present.
25 On November 30, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on
the motion for a new trial and considered the declaration
26 of Juror No. 3. The court found that it did not have
“anything here that would suggest” that it “should
27 inquire further into the deliberations of the jurors.”
28 12
1 The court stated that the declaration by Juror No. 3 did

not suggest that anything said by Juror No. 5 affected
2 the verdict. It therefore denied the motion for a new
trial and declined to hold an evidentiary hearing.
3
Resp.’s Ex. 6 at 18.
4
B. Analysis
5
The appellate court concluded that, when presented with an
6
allegation of juror misconduct involving extrajudicial information,
7
it is the court’s obligation to examine the information and then to
8
determine whether this information was likely to have influenced
9
the juror. An evidentiary hearing is not required for every
10
allegation of juror misconduct; in determining whether to hold an
11
evidentiary hearing, the court must consider the content of the
12
allegations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias and
13
the credibility of the source. Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037,
14
1044 (9th Cir. 2003).
15
The appellate court reviewed Kimberly’s testimony and
16
reasonably concluded that the extrajudicial information that she
17
might be a prostitute would not have created juror bias against
18
Petitioner. The appellate court noted that, because Kimberly was a
19
witness for the prosecution, derogatory information about her might
20
have been helpful to the defense. On the other hand, to the extent
21
that her testimony was helpful to the defense, derogatory
22
information about her could be helpful to the prosecution.
23
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that derogatory
24
information about Kimberly would not produce bias in favor of
25
either the defense or the prosecution. The appellate court also
26
reasonably found that any potential bias or influence of
27
28 13
1 extrajudicial information was cured by the trial court’s repeated

2 instruction to the jurors to base their decision solely on the
3 evidence presented at trial and not on any outside information.
4 Even if the court did err, the strong evidence presented by
5 the prosecution, including Petitioner's admission that he had
6 sexual intercourse with Kimberly and that he had given her
7 methamphetamine, Kimberly's corroborating testimony that she had
8 sexual intercourse with Petitioner and that he had given her
9 methamphetamine on one occasion, and Tary Porter's testimony that
10 she had seen Kimberly smoke a substance that looked like
11 methamphetamine while Petitioner was present, ensured that any

12 misconduct by Juror Number Five had no “substantial and injurious

13 effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See
14 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.
15 Therefore, the appellate court’s denial of this claim was not
16 contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
17 authority or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
18 the evidence before the state court. This claim for habeas relief
19 is denied.
20 III. Blakely Violation
22 Amendment rights under Blakely v Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),
23 and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), by imposing an
24 upper term sentence based on aggravating factors that were not
25 found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
26 “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
27 increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
28 14
1 maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

2 doubt." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000). The
3 “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
4 judge could impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury
5 verdict or admitted by the defendant; that is, the relevant
6 “statutory maximum” is not the sentence the judge could impose
7 after finding additional facts, but rather is the maximum he or she
8 could impose without any additional findings. Blakely, 542 U.S. at
9 303-04. In Cunningham, the Court concluded that the middle term
10 specified in California's statutes, not the upper term, was the
11 relevant statutory maximum; therefore, California's determinate

12 sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment because it authorized

13 the judge, not the jury, to find the facts permitting an upper term
14 sentence. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293. However, the trial court’s
15 selection of an enhanced sentence based on the defendant’s prior
16 conviction does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 288-89
17 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239-47
18 (1998) and Apprendi 530 U.S. at 490). Because, under California
19 law, only one aggravating factor is necessary to set the upper term
20 as the maximum, any Apprendi error would be harmless if the court
21 sentenced a defendant to the upper term on the basis of a prior
22 conviction, even if other aggravating factors were not proved
23 beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d
24 624, 649 (9th Cir. 2008).
25 The state appellate court relied on the above-cited Supreme
26 Court authority and People v. Black, 41 Cal. 4th 799 (2007),
27 decided after Cunningham, to conclude that there was no sentencing
28 15
1 error. The appellate court noted that, under Black, one

2 aggravating factor is sufficient to impose an upper term sentence
3 and, because the trial court found three recidivism factors, one of
4 which was his record of prior convictions for robbery and burglary,
5 which does not require a finding by a jury, the imposition of the
6 upper term did not infringe Petitioner’s constitutional right to a
7 jury trial.
8 The court of appeal’s decision affirming Petitioner’s sentence
9 was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
10 authority. This claim for habeas relief is denied.
11 CONCLUSION
12 Based on the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas

13 corpus is denied. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the
14 file.
15 The Court finds that Petitioner has raised colorable
16 constitutional claims about whether his Sixth Amendment rights were
17 violated when the trial court dismissed Juror Number Three and
18 failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on Juror Number Five’s alleged
19 misconduct in giving extrajudicial information to the jury.
20 Therefore, a certificate of appealability is granted only on these
21 two claims.
22 IT IS SO ORDERED.
23 Dated: 10/12/2010
CLAUDIA WILKEN
24 United States District Judge
25
26
27
28 16
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE
2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
PAUL CASANAS,
4 Case Number: CV08-02991 CW
Plaintiff,
5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
v.
6
JAMES A YATES et al,
7
Defendant.
8 /
9
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,
10 Northern District of California.
11 That on October 12, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said
12 envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located
in the Clerk's office.
13
14
15 Paul Casanas F-08944
D1-12 Low
16 Pleasant Valley State Prison
P.O. Box 8504
17 Coalinga, CA 93210
18 Dated: October 12, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
19 By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 17

Casanas v. Yates PHC

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Casanas v. Yates PHC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case4:08-cv-02991-CW Document15 Filed10/12/10 Page1 of 17

11 Respondent. TWO CLAIMS

1 investigation. Officer Branco found a glass pipe with white

12 having sexual relations with Petitioner. At trial, she testified

1 court granted his motion to dismiss one of the counts of furnishing

11 participants in its commission; Petitioner induced a minor to

12 commit or assist in the commission of the crime; the manner in

11 clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

12 of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

1 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

12 I. Juror Number Three

1 when you were seeing Becky? You've got to think of it

11 comment to be brought forth."

12 In the presence of both defense counsel and the

12 not discuss the case outside of the–-jury deliberations.

1 [T]he jury with the alternate juror deliberated for about

11 him off the jury as he was “seen as an obstacle to a

1 under those circumstances and with the inquiry that had

1 was substituted without good cause. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d

11 person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the

12 circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Juror bias may

1 Three’s response to the trial court’s question as to why he told

12 misconduct because a juror could bring his or her life experience

1 court may not remove a juror during deliberations if the request

11 unbiased and impartial.

12 II. Juror Number Five

1 The court stated that the declaration by Juror No. 3 did

1 extrajudicial information was cured by the trial court’s repeated

11 methamphetamine while Petitioner was present, ensured that any

12 misconduct by Juror Number Five had no “substantial and injurious

1 maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

11 relevant statutory maximum; therefore, California's determinate

12 sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment because it authorized

1 error. The appellate court noted that, under Black, one

12 Based on the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

18 Dated: October 12, 2010

You might also like