(Rule 72, Purpose of Law on settlement of estates)

MENDOZA VS TEH et.al G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997

FACTS: On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of

the intestate estate of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for reconveyance of
title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for
preliminary injunction, complaint states: that Adelia C. Mendoza likewise
represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B.
Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B.
Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993; that Adelia C. Mendoza should
be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her
co-plaintiff for purposes of this case. Private respondents filed their answer
with motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint states no cause of action
and that petitioner’s demand had already been paid. On February 17, 1995,
private respondents filed another pleading entitled motion to dismiss
invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel,
laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction,
private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the
ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions,
petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in
the complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that
since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death,
the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of
that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking

appointment as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the whole case?

HELD: No. Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:

Jurisdiction in Civil Cases - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) (4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate

Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that: Metropolitan Trial

Court shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate. The above law is clear. An action
for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth millions of
pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC.
Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate.
Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings impliedly recognize the
jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of
administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement
of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the
net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such
appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both
public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2
of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95[8] provides that actions involving
title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located,
in this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased husband
resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but
not the jurisdiction of the Court.
WENCESLAO D. MONSERRATE v. CA, GR No. 78339, 1989-09-
29
Facts:
A verified petition for the adoption of Ervin O. Pompa who, at the time was
alleged to be married to Dorothea Albovia... was filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna... the petitioner purports to be Nieves
Suiza, 77 years old, widow, and a resident also of Nagcarlan, Laguna and
bears the written consent of the spouse of... the person to be adopted.
The petition alleged among others
That the Adopted's real mother, AURELIA OSUNA, now deceased, was the
daughter of MELECIO OSUNA's brother whom they also cared for and
reared until her marriage to SILVESTRE POMPA, also deceased, who in
turn was the first cousin of... herein petitioner.
That the petitioner has taken care at said Adopted from the time the latter
became an orphan when he was still a minor and up to the present time,...
judgment... rendered declaring
Ervin O. Pompa is for all legal intents and purposes the son of the herein
petitioner
Nieves Suiza died intestate without any issue
On February 14, 1984, plaintiffs commenced the present action with this
Court claiming that the adoption proceedings, as well as the order of
adoption, were null and void and of no legal force and effect
Respondent Court of Appeals,... dismissed the complain
A Motion for Reconsideration was... denied
Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFUNCT COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF LAGUNA HAD ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
QUESTIONED ADOPTION CASE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL WAS NOT NOTIFIED OR
REPRESENTED IN SUCH ADOPTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHALLENGED ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER OF ADOPTION ARE VITIATED WITH
NULLITY FOR LACK OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS PRESCRIBED BY LAWS
GOVERNING ADOPTION; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROCEEDINGS AND
ORDER OF ADOPTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED BY REASON OF
EXTRINSIC FRAUD
Ruling:
no existing law or rule has been pointed out requiring notice to the Solicitor
General as a condition precedent or as a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
valid exercise... of the court's jurisdiction in an adoption case.
Republic Act No. 644 gave to the justices of the peace and judges of
municipal courts concurrent jurisdiction on adoption cases with the then
Courts of First
Instance. In other words, adoption cases could be filed in any of the said
courts. Hence, Republic Act No. 644 cannot and did not in any way affect
the herein questioned petition for adoption which was filed with the then
Court... of First Instance of Laguna, which unquestionably had territorial
jurisdiction over Nagcarlan, Laguna, and had jurisdiction over the nature of
the petition
As to the alleged delegation to the Deputy Clerk of
Court, suffice it to say that this Court
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from
authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant
Petitioners' contention is untenable... petitioners' evidence... ere false and
falsified because the said... medical records are those of one Ursula Nazario
and not of Nieves Suiza
With said infirmities... petitioners' claim imputes... the commission of a
criminal offense of falsification committed in the course of judicial
proceedings, and as such, requires a strong, clear, and convincing if not
indubitable evidence; petitioners' adduced evidence could not be said as
strong, clear and convincing to warrant... the annulment of what strongly
appears to be a valid and regular proceedings.
(Rule 102, Habeas Corpus)

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent. PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when

presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates,
were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently, Dimagiba
was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the
Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or
Credit and for Other Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979). He was found
guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was
ordered to pay the offended party the amount he owed plus interest. On
February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a
Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the
recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision.
Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only,
instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The
MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and
imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba
filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which
was granted by the said court after hearing the case.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy.
(2) Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive application.

Held: (1) No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his
sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal
of the MTCC Order denying these motions. His petition for writ of habeas
corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become
final and executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum shopping.

(2) No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied
retroactively if favorable to the accused. SC-AC No. 12-2000 cannot be
given retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes the penalty of
imprisonment. It is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should
be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of the case.
(Rule 103, Change of Name)

VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG, Petitioners, v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her

brother and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition for registration
of title over a piece of land. In their petition, they declared that they are the
co-owners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest
“have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and
possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100 years”;
and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely
possessed the property in the concept of owners.

The trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. The

CA reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed petitioners’ application
for land registration on account that the land is classified as forest land and
is thus not subject to appropriation and alienation. The CA considered the
petition to be governed by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141 or the Public Land Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were not
able to present incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to
be registered are alienable and disposable.

Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered

and classified as forest land since there are buildings, residential houses
and even government structures existing and standing on the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing

their application for registration of title on the ground that they
failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act.

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: Forest land

Petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of
their application are alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Instead, petitioners contend that the subject properties could no longer be
considered and classified as forest land since there are building structures,
residential houses and even government buildings existing and standing on
the area. This, however, is hardly the proof required under the law.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
DENIED.

CA AFFIRMED.
(Rule 103, Change of Name)

Republic vs. Capote

Case Doctrines:
● A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding; it cannot be decided through a summary proceeding

● The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature.
● A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. All the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied
when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition.

Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed

a petition forchange of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores
Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso;
he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family
Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite
the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born
and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to
him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual
concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and
he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s
surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in
the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child;
and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.

Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the

trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was
ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition,
respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before
a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial
Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After
the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal

with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the
petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were
sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision ordering the change of name.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in

affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of
name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported
parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s
change of name should have been made respondents to make the
proceeding adversarial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?

3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements.
After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that
the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is
entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will
erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to
his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have
him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the
reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be
heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or
correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be
decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition
does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil
registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought
clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry,
although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a
corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in
name.

3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by

posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the
petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the
notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The
fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not
merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the
OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex
parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.

4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required
by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the
whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the
trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it.
Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied
when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG,
were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic of the
Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February
2, 2007).
(Rule 108, Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
Eleosida vs Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City GR No 130277 09
May 2002

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the RTC
of Quezon City dismissing motu propio the petition for Ma. Lourdes
Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles
Christian.
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert. of her son the following:

1. The surname “Borbon” should be changed to Eleosida (since the parents

were never married; the child is illegitimate and, therefore, should
follow the mother’s surname;
2. The date of the wedding should be blank;
3. Petitioner’s name should be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida (instead of Borbon).
No opposition was made to this petition.

RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors

(CLERICAL ERRORS) of a harmless and innocuous nature like misspelled
name, occupation of the parents, etc. may be subject of judicial order
authorizing changes or corrections and not as may affect the civil status,
nationality or citizenship of the person (substantial/material change/error)
involved.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether changes or corrections which are substantial may be

subject of a judicial proceeding.
Decision: Yes, Court find merit in the petition.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. (Note: CLERICAL -SUMMARY;
SUBSTANTIAL- ADVERSARIAL)

If all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 (Notice and publication
[especially]) (Note: Adversarial) have been followed, it was therefore error
for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu propio without allowing the
petitioner to present evidence to support her petition (and all the other
persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same).