.

GOVERNMENT
See Bernas, S.J., pp. 35-46

CASE LIST
a. Government of the Philippines, Defined
• U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, at 339 (1903)

Issue

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of
Act No. 292.

Held

No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No.
292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of
specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi

N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the
tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all
the justices agreed on the same conclusion.

As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the existing
political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as
the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the
framers of the said law intended to mean specific government personnel, they would have
expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of its individual
members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292.

b. Constituent and Ministrant and Functions of the Government

• Bacani vs. Nacoco, November 29, 1956.

Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government,
make them a part of the Government of the Philippines

Held: NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the stenographers’
fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has
reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive,
and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are
twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional.

Rulings:

No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a
position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of
copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government,
as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the
same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

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 c. Traditional Classification of Government Functions Obliterated
• ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 256 (1989)
in question?

RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely: constituent and
ministrant. The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more
on public welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety. From such, we may infer that there are
functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and
which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people.

The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic life of the people. In
short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled corporation which is governed by Corporation
Law.

Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far
as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned.

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the government are
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made
effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.

Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in question; petitioners are
not subject to reimbursement

d. De Facto and De Jure Government

• Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, 75 Phil. 113 (1946)
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained
valid even after the American occupation;

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may
be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil
obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds
of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it
would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

e. Revolutionary Government
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190 (2003)

• In Re: Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, 24 October 1986.

the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and
to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the
second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said
1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise
sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said
cases were dismissed outright by the Supreme Court which held that: “Petitioners have no personality to sue
and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.

• In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno, A.M. No. 90-11- 2697-CA, 29 June 1992.

Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to
seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.

Held:

The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution
has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by
the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under
Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would
negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

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 f. Parens Patriae
• Government v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728 (1916)
• Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank for the
reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

• Discussions:
• In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the
people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other
party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take
back the money intended for the people.

• Rulings:
• Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation
of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to
enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it.
•
• This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection
to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased
to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative
department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

• Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD, G.R. No. 199669, 25 April 2017.

The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the community and
even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens patriae which holds it under
obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its people especially those who cannot tend to
themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country, and refers to the State in its role as “sovereign”,
or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves. 33 In fulfilling this
duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of
taxation.

g. Immunity from Suit

• Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 (1987)
• Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

• Discussions:

• A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State
has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain
to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.

• Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in
strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act
of the legislative body.

• Ruling/s:

• No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded
the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.
A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed
against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint
filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

• The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the
complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.

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• Meritt v. Government of the Phil. Island, 34 Phil. 311 (1916)

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.

HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede
its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of
such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither
fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent
(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all
its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest.”

• Phil. Agila Satellite v. Lichauco, G.R. No. 134887, July 27, 2006
The Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be
properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to
impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported
award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action,
the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an
unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against
the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

• Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, 23 February 2011.

Whether ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.

Ruling/s
SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner (ATO) because it is an agency of the State engaged
in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative. The CA thereby
correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. The SC further observes that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking
without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s
property.

Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has been rendered moot by the
passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of
2008. R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO and u nder its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of
the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATOs powers, duties
and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and revenues. Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the power to sue and be sued, to
enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain,
administer and lease personal and real properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most
advantageous to it, any claim by or against it. With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No.
9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale
with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.

• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 88537, 17 April 1990.

• Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, 8 April 1991.

1. Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge
of governmental functions?

HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue
and be sued.

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 2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver
of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

• Professional Video, Inc. v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009

Can TESDA be sued without its consent?

RULING:

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without
its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that
antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state
and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state.

TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing
and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of
this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the
performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use
and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.

h. Sovereign Immunity in Relation to a Foreign Entity

• Deusche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152318, 16 April
2009.

ISSUE
Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.

HELD
A state may waive its immunity through a general or specific law. The special law can take the form of the
original charter of the incorporated government agency. In this case however, GTZ presented any evidence to
support their claim that they are immune from suit, and has failed to obtain a certification of immunity from suit from
the Department of Foreign Affairs. If GTZ has done so, then there would be no ambiguity in their claim that they are
immune from suit.

• Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142396. 11 February 2003.

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that
the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory
of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

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• Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzons, G.R. No. 154705, 26 June 2003

Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private
capacities.

The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The
mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that
the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities
to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of
a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered
into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived
its immunity from suit.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity
from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on
behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as
a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions.

i. Money Claims
• Ministerio v. CFI, 40 SCRA 464 (1971)
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the
suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly
entertained by the court except with the consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.

NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The
Court may proceed with the complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle

j. Inherent Powers of the State

• Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
• Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of
government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct
unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing
the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was fantastic
because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed
from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement
from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of ewd’s. Bother
possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

• National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville Development Corporation, G.R. No. 223366, 1 August
2017.
• Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, 3 December 2013.

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