Professional Documents
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(Negative side)
Arguing Against the Practicality of Adopting Federalism.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Your Honors, A shift to federalism can only spell
disaster for the Philippines, possibly stoking “hyperinflation” and ceding
more powers than what many local government units (LGUs) are ready to
handle. This is what Duterte’s economic managers have to say about the
fiscal impact of federalism. Not only is the draft constitution silent on many
of the fiscal and economic provisions that are supposed to engine it, but its
avowed goal of “empowering the regions” could also be achieved under the
current constitution without resorting to charter change because we can
empower these regions without assuming all the risks that accompany
charter change by simply amending the Local Government Code (LGC) as
well as Article X of the Constitution. In short, the costs of adopting
Bayanihan Federalism seem to outweigh the benefits because it does not
only endanger the government’s finances, it is also completely
IMPRACTICAL. In arguing against the practicality of adopting Federalism,
I present 5 main points:
1. It doesn’t ensure regional self-governance. The regional governments
are supposed to enjoy substantial independence and autonomy vis-à-vis the
central or federal government. But even in the proposed draft constitution,
regional self-governance is very weakly established, if at all. Article II, Sec.
27 of the draft constitution provides that the “Federal Republic shall promote
the autonomy of local government units.” But merely promoting autonomy
is a far cry from ensuring self-governance. This is why many experts say
that Bayanihan Federalism is not truly federalism, but just another exercise
in decentralization.
2. It fails to define the division of labor between federal and regional
governments. Bayanihan Federalism also fails to delineate the duties and
responsibilities of the federal and regional governments. To be sure, Art.
XII, Section 2 lists down the exclusive responsibilities of the regional
governments, which now include socioeconomic development planning,
economic zones, the justice system, and indigenous people’s rights and
welfare. But at the same time, the draft constitution removes from LGUs
some of their current responsibilities, such as natural resource management
services, environmental services, and – most crucially – social welfare and
health services. Why take away these essential local functions? More
importantly, the draft constitution is deafeningly silent about the powers to
be shared between the federal and regional governments, as well as between
the regional governments and the LGUs.
Failing to define such division of labor has 3 likely effects:
a) It could lead to duplication or under provision of services by both federal
and regional governments.
b) It could weaken the accountability of public officials, since people won’t
know whom exactly to blame for lousy delivery of services.
c) It makes self-governance all but impossible.
3. It could worsen regional economic inequality. Bayanihan Federalism
also provides that half of all national revenues are to be “equally divided”
among the regional governments. This means that poorer regions (say,
ARMM) will receive the same amount of resources as richer regions (say,
Calabarzon), even if the former doubtlessly need more support than the
latter. Such equal sharing scheme could only worsen rather than abate
existing regional inequalities. Moreover, even if we grant the regional
governments full autonomy to tax, poorer regions will still yield lower
revenues than richer regions. Unless we first fix existing regional economic
disparities, Bayanihan Federalism will only leave more poor regions behind.
4. It could make poorer regions more dependent on the federal
government. The affirmative side would argue that economic inequalities
may be remedied by tapping on the Equalization Fund to help poor regions
achieve economic sustainability. However, many studies also find that such
transfers could remove poor regional governments’ motivation to harness
their own economic potential. Instead of promoting productivity and
innovation in their own jurisdictions, poorer regions may grow complacent
and rely on regular dole-outs from richer regions. In other words, they will
become too dependent on the national government. To avoid dependency,
guidelines for redistribution should be made clear at the outset. But
Bayanihan Federalism falls short of explaining the mechanics of its
Equalization Fund.
5. Federalism won’t necessarily boost regional development because
investments will still flock to richer regions. In federalism, poor regions
are doubly at a disadvantage. Places like ARMM or Eastern Visayas, for
example, have small economies to begin with, and have fewer goods and
services to tax. Their small economies will yield little tax revenues they can
invest for their future growth. By contrast, richer regions like NCR and
Calabarzon already have large economies and substantial tax revenues at the
outset, which they can use to fund major public investments or offer
incentives to prospective investors. Hence, even with federalism in place,
investments could still end up flocking to richer regions rather than poorer
regions. What happened to the goal of empowering regions?
Ladies and Gentlemen, and Honorable Judges of this Court, let’s read
between the lines. It’s true that many regions of the Philippines are lagging
behind Metro Manila in terms of incomes and living standards. But there’s
simply no data or evidence to suggest that the proposed shift to a federal
system will make poorer regions catch up faster. In fact, if we ignore the
political and economic realities on the ground – like patronage politics –
federalism could even worsen existing regional inequalities. Just look at
ARMM: nearly 30 years since it gained autonomy and established its own
regional government, it has remained the poorest region in the country.
Many of the proposed changes to the Constitution also have nothing to do
with regional development at all. These include extending term limits
(Duterte and all lawmakers could serve for another 10 years), abolishing the
office of the vice president, and indefinitely postponing elections. Truth to
tell, if you carefully read the proposal, Duterte’s federalism looks less like a
plan to promote regional development, and more like a ploy to concentrate
political power on Duterte and his political party for the next 5 to 10 years.
Before it's too late, let us all read between the lines. And with that, Ladies
and Gentlemen, Your Honors, I proudly rest my case!
Interpellation:
Would you agree that Federalism will ultimately break the country into
autonomous regions?
Now, in our present political geography, can you identify one autonomous
region in the Philippines? – It’s the ARMM (Autonomous Region for
Muslim Mindanao).
And it had since gained autonomy and established its own regional
government for nearly 30 years, correct?
Are you aware that despite having attained autonomy for the last 30 years,
the ARMM is still the poorest region in the country?
Your Honors, I am only establishing the fact that making regions
autonomous under a Federalist setting will not necessarily boost regional
development as contrary to what the affirmative side would like to espouse.