Persons Meeting 2

Olaguer v. Purugganan, G.R. No. 158907, February 12, 2007

CASE:
FACTS:
● Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer who is an activist against the Marcos administration, was the owner of 60,000
shares of stock of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of P600,000.00. Olaguer then made an unwritten
agreement with Joaquin, Locsin and Hofileña that in the event that he will be arrested or detained, they would support
his family by the continued payment of his salary. With this, Olaguer executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) on
May 26, 1979. He appointed Locsin, Joaquin, and Hofileña, and gave them the right to sell or transfer his shares of
stock with Businessday. The parties then acknowledge such SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan Jr., who was
then the Corporate Secretary of businessday and a notary public for Quezon City.
● Olaguer was arrested by the Marcos military by virtue of an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order and was
detained for allegedly committing arson on December 24, 1979. During this time, respondent Locsin tried to sell
Olaguer’s shares, but he was not able to, because the buyers were discouraged due to Olaguer’s status as an
oppositionist. Because of this, Locsin decided to buy the shares himself and bought the shares at its par value. The
Regional Trial Court has discovered that respondent Locsin has bought the shares with the consent of Olaguer, since
Olaguer’s wife received the payment from Locsin, which was P600,000.
ISSUE:
● The main issue in the case is whether or not Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA.
RULING:
● The Supreme Court ruled that Locsin did not exceed his authority under the SPA. It is a general rule that a
power of attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to grant only those powers that are specified,
and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and
should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. If the language will permit, the
construction that should be adopted is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment.
Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the
instrument in accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always
be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.
RATIO:
● In the present case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code
and of "incapacity" under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if
not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards that would justify the
appointment of a representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been
appointed to administer the property. In the present case, petitioner himself had already authorized agents to do specific
acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court. Likewise, limiting the
construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction," as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA ineffective.
● Petitioner received from respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments for a total
of P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or complaint. It was only four years after 1982 when Olaguer
demanded the return of the shares. The petitioner’s claim that he did not instruct respondent Locsin to deposit the
money to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to prove that petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since
respondent Locsin was authorized, under the SPA, to negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale including the
manner of payment. Moreover, had respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the petitioner, as the latter
suggested in this petition, the proceeds were likely to have been included among petitioner’s properties which were
confiscated by the military. Instead, respondent Locsin deposited the money in the bank accounts of petitioner’s in-
laws, and consequently, assured that the petitioner’s wife received these amounts. Article 1882 of the Civil Code
provides that the limits of an agent’s authority shall not be considered exceeded should it have been performed in a
manner more advantageous to the principal than that specified by him.

(i) Insolvency and Trusteeship, NCC Arts. 1381, 1491, 2236

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 Umale v. ASB Realty, G.R. No. 181126, June 15, 2011

● It is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
on October 15, 2007 as well as the resolution on January 2, 2008 which ruled in favor of ASB Realty
Corporation (ASB), affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which reversed the ruling of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City.
● The case involves a parcel of in Amethyst Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City (Lot 7, Block
5). It was previously owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation (Amethyst Pearl).
● Amethyst Pearl is a company that was owned by ASB. In 1996, Amethyst Pearl executed a
Deed of Assignment in Liquidation for the subject premises in favor of ASB for the full redemption of the capital
stock from ASB. The subject premises was transferred to ASB and on 1997, it was registered at the Register
of Deeds of Pasig City.
FACTS:
● In June 1999, ASB alleges that they entered into a contract with Leonard S. Umale (Umale)
which involved Umale starting a pay-parking business on the subject premises from June 1, 1999 to May 31,
2000 at the rate of P60,720.00. It was payable to ASB.
● Even beyond the expiration of the contract, Umale continued to occupy the subject premises
and paid the rental fee at an increased rate of P100,000.00. The last payment Umale made to ASB was for
June 2001, to May 2002.
● On June 23, 2003, ASB served a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate
and Pay, terminating the lease which will be effective midnight of June 30, 2003 but Umale did not comply
with ASB’s demands and continued to occupy the subject premises and even began constructing commercial
establishments on the premises. ASB then filed a case at the MTC of Pasig City against Umale for unlawful
detainer.
● Umale admitted that he occupied the property since 1999. But by virtue of a verbal contract
with the original owner of the subject premises, Amethyst Pearl. Since there was no written contract between
ASB and Umale, ASB had no cause of action to file the unlawful detainer complaint against him.
● Umale alleged that the lease period was for an undetermined time and after 1 year of lease,
Amethyst Pearl and Umale came to a verbal agreement that Amethyst Pearl will sell the subject premises to
Umale. Umale also said that Amethyst Pearl did not require him to pay the lease until the agreement on the
sell was perfected between them. Umale still paid the annual rental fee of P1.2 Million pesos.
● Umale questioned ASB’s personality to recover the subject premises since the corporation
was put under the receivership and only the receiver can have the personality to recover the subject premises.
ASB argued that Umale with ASB and not with Amethyst Pearl. ASB also presented the official receipt of the
rent payment of Umale.
● The MTC ruled in favor of Umale due to an inconsistencies found in the contract. Specifically
the name of Eden C. Lin as the representative of ASB but in the signatory page, Eden C. Lin had her name
under a heading Amethyst Pearl. The Judge ruled that Amethyst Pearl only has the power to seek the
ejectment of Umale from the subject premises. The MTC also agreed that ASB does not have any personality
to file the complaint since they were put under receivership and only rehabilitation receiver can recover the
subject premises.
● ASB appealed to the RTC. The RTC reversed the MTC decision, ruling in favor of ASB.
RTC stated that sufficient evidence has been found to prove that the owner of the subject premises is ASB
and not Amethyst Pearl and Umale was aware of it. With the contract established between Umale and ASB,
the latter had the right to terminate the lease contract and seek his eviction from the subject premises due to
the end of the contract as well as Umale’s failure to pay the rental fee. On the issue of ASB’s personality to
file the unlawful detainer suit, the RTC ruled in favor ASB, stating that ASB retained all of its corporate powers
despite the appointment of a receiver. Umale filed a Motion for Reconsideration while ASB moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The RTC
denied Umale’s motion and granted ASB’s motion.
● Umale then filed his appeal to the CA who affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:

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 ● Whether or not a corporate officer of ASB can file a case to recover an unlawfully detained
corporate property despite the fact that the corporation is placed under rehabilitation.
● Whether or not a contract of lease exists between ASB and Umale
● Whether or not Umale is entitled to avail the lease periods provided in Article 1687 of the
Civil Code
○ Article 1687: If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year
to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent
is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid,
and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after lessee has
occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the court may likewise determine a longer period
after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a
longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (1581a)
RULING:
● On the issue regarding the personality of the corporate officers to recover properties despite
being put under rehabilitation, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of ASB.
● On the issue regarding the existence of the contract of lease between ASB and Umale, the
SC ruled in favor of ASB.
● On the issue of Umale’s entitlement to avail the lease periods provided in Article 1687, the
SC ruled in favor of ASB.
RATIO:

● The SC stated that being put under rehabilitation does not limit the powers of the corporate
officers. The rehabilitation receiver is not intended to take over the company but rather monitor the successful
implementation of the rehabilitation. To keep the rehabilitation receiver informed of how the proceedings are
going is necessary since the receiver is tasked to manage the assets of the corporation in accordance to the
approved rehabilitation plan.
● The SC stated that it is conceivable that a businessman, such as Umale, would enter into a
commercial transaction with and pay substantial rentals to a corporation nary a single documentation. They
also state that the petitioners’ arguments have no merit. They have failed to take into consideration the
consistency of Umale’s actions with the terms of the contract for a 12 month period.
● The SC states that taking into consideration Article 1687, the petitioners’ lost sight of Article
1675. Article 1675 states that if the lessee commits any of the grounds for ejectment stated in Article 1673,
which includes the non-payment of lease rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those
stipulated, will not be able to avail of the periods established in Article 1687.

NCC:
● Article 1381: The following contracts are rescissible: (1) Those which are entered into by
guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the
things which are the object thereof; (2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer
the lesion stated at the preceding number; (3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot
in any other manner collect the claims due them; (4) Those which refer to things under litigation, if they have
been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants, or of competent judicial
authority; (5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission. (1291a)
● Article 1491: The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the meditation of another (1) The guardian, the property of the person or
persons who may be under his guardianship; (2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have
been intrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given to them; (3) Executors and
Administrator, the property of the estate under administration; (4) Public officers and employees, the property
of the state or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution,
the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government
experts who, in any manner whatsoever take part in the sale; (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in the litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act acquiring by

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 assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession; (6) Any others specially disqualified by law.
(1459a)
● Article 2236: The debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the fulfillment
of his obligations, subject to the exemptions provided by law.(1911a)
● Article 2237: Insolvency shall be governed by the special laws insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.(n)

(j) Gender, Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution; cf. NCC Art. 403
See also: ROC, Rule 3 Section 4

(k) Physical Incapacity/Disease, FC Arts. 45(5), 45(6), 46; NCC Art. 820
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 185922, Jan. 15, 2014
CASE:
● Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. from his first wife filed an action for annulment of the Deed
of Donation that their father allegedly executed prior to his death which left certain properties in favor
of his grandchildren with his second wife.
● On November 14, 2005, the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation.
● The respondents challenged the nullification before the Court of Appeals and the CA motu
proprio ordered the dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint.
● The petitioners filed an instant petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
● Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) and they
had seven children. When Capitolina died on March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales (Juana)
as his common-law wife and they had one child -- Mariano G. Favis (Mariano).
● When Dr. Favis married Juana in 1974, he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as
one of his legitimate children.
● Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995 and left several properties; and on October 16,
1994, prior to his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying certain
properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
● Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina then filed an action at the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
Branch 20 for annulment of the Deed of Donation because they were claiming that the said donation
prejudiced their legitime. However, the respondents asserted that the donation was made inter vivos.
● The RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled its corresponding tax declarations on
grounds that Dr. Favis was 92 years old and plagued with illness when he allegedly executed the
Deed of Donation -- meaning that he couldn’t have had full control of his mental capacities during
that time.
● The respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial
court’s nullification on the ground of vitiated consent of the Deed of Donation, and the Court of
Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for the petitioners’ failure to make an
averment that they have made earnest efforts toward a compromise (as mandated by Article 151 of
the Family Code).
● The petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration, which was rejected by the Court of
Appeals.
● The petitioners then filed an instant petition to the Supreme Court raising the argument that
the CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing their complaint.
ISSUE:

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 ● Whether or not the CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing the complaint of the
petitioners for their failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
RULING: YES.
● The SC ruled that the CA ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated the refusal
by the respondents to compromise and committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.
● The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
● The judgment of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
● Article 151 of the Family Code -- No suit between family members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

In the present case, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition
precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal
respondents brought before the Court of Appeals. The facts of the case show that after losing their
case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on
the ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis; and that compromise was never an option
insofar as the respondents were concerned.

D. Domicile and residence of persons

1. Juridical persons NCC Art. 51

2. Natural persons NCC Art. 50 ; FC Arts. 68-69

cf. NCC Art. 110
cf. FC Arts. 55, 101, 149, 152, 101

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

CASE:

- Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, petitioned a motion for reconsideration after previously

admitting that she has only been a resident of Leyte for 7 months.

- Second division Comelec, gave resolution to allegations as it was based on merely

confusion

FACTS:

- Imelda (She) filed for a certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of First
District in Leyte

- Montejo (He), a private respondent filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
since Imelda allegedly did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency, following the 1987
Constitution, “a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the election”

- She then filed a petition to correct submitted candidacy to change ‘7 months’ to ‘since
childhood’ due to an ‘honest misinterpretation’. As she always maintained domicile in Tacloban, (March 29)

- Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte: office cannot accept certificate on the ground that
it has file out of time (March 20)

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 - Second Division COMELEC: dismissed her petition and certificate of candidacy as well

- After obtaining an overwhelming votes, Imelda then petitioned for a reconsideration

- Second Division COMELEC: admits confusion in the concepts of ‘domicile’ and

‘residence’,revealing a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of the two and Thus, makes a
resolution for previous allegations

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections

RULING:

- Court stated that mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence does not
result in a loss or change of domicile.

- SC ruled that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First district of Leyte; Setting aside previous Comelec allegations.

RATIO:

- Following Article 50, “for the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence”, wherein one intends to return.

- For election purposes, ‘residence’ is used synonymously with ‘domicile’, favored by the
Court supporting Imelda’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the first district of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency for the following reasons:

- A minor follow domicile of her parents, being Tacloban the domicile of Imelda by operation
of law

- Domicile of origin is not easily lost if there is an intention of abandoning former residence
and establishing a new one that correspond with a purpose

- A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile, keeping her domicile of origin
and merely gaining a new home

- After her husband’s death, she acquired a right to choose a new domicile, and clearly
indicating that she chose Tacloban, her original domicile, as her domicile of choice.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012

FACTS:

- Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973.

- He acquired Australian citizenship in 1981.

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 - On November 22, 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother.

- After 4 days, he took an oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

- He was then issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of

Immigration.

- On September 1, 2009, he renounced his Australian citizenship.

- At the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he
resided and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.

- He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo,
Sr., opposed.

- The Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission
on Elections (COMELECs) voters list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

- Erasom filed a petition on the 1st Municipal Trial Court (MCTC) to exclude Jalosjos from the
official voters list.

- The MCTC denied the petition and the RTC affirmed the MCTC decision when it was
appealed.

- On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.

- Erasmo filed a petition to deny his COC on the ground that he failed to comply the
requirements of R.A. 9225 and the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.

- The second division of COMELEC ruled that he complied with the requirements of R.A 9225
but he failed to prove the requirements for a gubernatorial candidate.

- Jalosjos won the election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the
Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
present evidence of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. Zamboanga Sibugay

RULING:

- Yes, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

- The Supreme Court set aside both the resolutions of COMELEC that disqualified the
petitioner from seeking election

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 RATIO: The facts show that Quezon City was his domicile of origin. Even if he did migrate, he
came back to the Philippines to live with his brother, renounced his Australian citizenship, and reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. These points out that Jalosjos did have intent to change his domicile for good.

SEE ALSO FOR REFERENCE: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, April 5, 2016
FACTS:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24
May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however,
and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as
newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American
citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post
as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either
of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship
and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three
justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE:
1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates
2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her
COC

RULING:
1: No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on
the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

2: Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

3: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
domicile.

4: No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon.
Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
RATIO:

1: In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only

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the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent.
There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of
provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a
candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

2: First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos.
The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a
circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

3: Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when
he4eq5w6bxv5cy5dftgh4gy78r application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases
which decree that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in
which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for
good.

4: In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.

IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY CODE

A. Effect and Retroactivity E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227
R.A. No. 6809, R.A. No. 7610
FC Art. 256, cf. FC Art. 36 in rel. to 39 FC Arts. 105, 162 & 257

Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a
subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He
asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not
bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.

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After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the affection of his children. The
Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.

The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated twice without marriage
license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California was because he believed in good
faith and for all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without marriage license.

He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because his first marriage in 1965 was
governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991 under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act to cohabit with De Castro

Held:

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage
license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent
was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second
time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

Bernabe v. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving
heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of the putative father
had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to
prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by
Article 283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.

HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as
it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family
Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to
its enactment.

Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later
in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would
prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes
spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of
certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty.

10
Plagata went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale
was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession
and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale
and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that
Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to
annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses. CA
reversed this ruling stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which
provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be
brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well
within the prescriptive period.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land
to the Fuentes spouses was forged.
HELD: The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document giving
consent and another document executed at the same time period.

2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed;

HELD: Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the
effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment
of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void
under Art 124 of the family code.

B. Repeal/Amendment FC Arts. 254, 255

V. MARRIAGE & PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

A. The concept of “marriage” FC Art. 1 cf. NCC Art. 52, FC Art. 149
Art II Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution
Art. XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution

Obergefell et. al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et. al. Supreme Court of The United States,
Nos. 14–556, 14-562,14-571 and 14–57, 200 U. S. 321
(http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf)

B. Nature of marriage in Philippine law FC Art. 1

cf. ROC, Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa)
NCC Art. 220
P.D. No. 1083, Sec. 14

Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916

CASE:

An action made by the wife (petitioner) against her husband (defendant) for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
From a judgement sustaining the defendant’s demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the petitioner declined to amend, the latter
appealed.

11
FACTS:

• On Jan. 7, 1915, the parties were legally married in the city of Manila, where they lived together for about a
month.

• On the first month of living together in marriage, the petitioner returned to the home of her parents w/ the
complaint that the defendant, one month after he contracted marriage w/ petitioner made lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife; that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs,, that the petitioner spurned
and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation with the defendant. Upon the refusal of the
petitioner, the defendant maltreated her by word and deed and inflicted injuries upon different parts of her body. With
this petitioner was compelled to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.

• Petitioner filed a complaint against defendant for support outside the conjugal home.

• The trial court (Court of First Instance) ruled in favor of defendant and stated that petitioner could not compel
her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from defendant.

• The petitioner filed a motion for review.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner can compel her husband to give her support even if she already left their conjugal home.
YES.

RULING:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. Article 149 of
the Civil Code promotes that the person obliged to give support may at his option, satisfy it by paying the pension that
may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own house the person having the right to the same.

However, this option granted by law is not absolute. The law does not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.

In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault
of the husband. Therefore, it is only but right, to claim support from the husband for separate maintenance albeit
outside the conjugal home.

Sermonia v Republic, G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994

Facts:

• On May 26, 1992, petitioner Jose Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC for contracting
marriage with Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia Nievera remained valid and
subsisting.

12
• Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription. Respondent judge denied the motion to quash.

• Petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that
since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record that constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore
is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information
for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not in 1992.

• On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.

Held: No, the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.

• To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be
said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from
the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to
them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And
for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such
a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite
difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agency.

• SC: “Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of
conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social
institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.”

• The rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal action if the factual and legal
circumstances so warrant. The principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy
because a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
subsisting marriage. If applied, the rule will make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of marriages listed
in the various local civil registries all over the country to make sure that no second or third marriage has been
contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse.

o As compared to cases involving real property, wherein verification on the Register of Deeds is easy,
verification by an offended person or the authorities of a bigamous marriage would be difficult as such a marriage
may be entered into in a place where the offended is not known to be still a married person.

• Note: The doctrine on constructive notice states that the legal fiction that someone actually received notice
(being informed of a case that could affect their interest).

13
 Perido v. Perido, G.R. No. L-28248, March 12, 1975

FACTS:

- Lucio Perido was married to Marcelina, after his first wife, Benita, died. With five children
and three children respectively.

- Both parties (heirs) executed a document “Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial

Partition” of the estate lots (of Lucio, petitioners’ grandfather and defendants’ father)

- Petitioners then had second thoughts about partition and filed a complaint praying for
annulment of the said document, alleging that they were induced by the defendants to execute the
document

- They also alleged that the Lot partitioned are conjugal properties of Lucio’s first marriage
and that defendants are illegitimate children therefore, had no successional rights.

- RTC did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiff as it held that the
five latter children were legitimate.

- The plaintiffs appealed insisting that the said children were illegitimate on the theory that
the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio’s first wife, while the last two were
also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not the five children of Lucio Period with his second wife are legitimate

RULING:

- Yes, they were born during their parents’ marriage therefore, are legitimate. The CA found
that there was evidence to show that Lucio’s first wife died during the Spanish Regime. Therefore, Lucio had
no legal impediment to marry his second wife before the birth of their first child in 1990.

People v. De La Cruz, G.R. No.187683, February 11, 2010

FACTS: That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill his wife
Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on
her trunk and on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.

HELD: In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself,

14
is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly,
then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

Anonuevo, De Santis & Neri v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo Jalandoni,

G.R. No. 178221, December 1, 2010
FACTS:

RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER SYLVIA WAS DAUGHTER OF ISABEL AND
JOHN. BUT AT THE TIME OF RODOLFO’S DEATH, THEIR GRANDMOTHER ISABEL WAS THE LAWFUL WIFE
OF RODOLFO BASED ON A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. RODOLFO’S BROTHER OPPOSED THEIR
INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA STATES THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE
MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO WAS NULL AND VOID. ANONUEVO ET AL
HOWEVER ARGUED THAT THE ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD NOT BE USED AS
PROOF THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE INDEED MARRIED. FURTHER, SUCH STATEMENT OF MARRIAGE IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO SAVE FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.

ISSUE:

CAN ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENE?

RULING:

NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING TO INTERVENE. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA WHICH
SHOWS THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT INDEED THEY WERE
MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO IS VOID SINCE AT THAT TIME ISABEL WAS STILL
MARRIED TO JOHN. BEING NOT MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER DESCENDANTS HAVE NO SHARE
IN THE ESTATE OF RODOLFO.

WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF A MARITAL UNION, IT IS

NOT REGARDED AS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE.[1][47] JURISPRUDENCE
TEACHES THAT THE FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVEN BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE.[2][48] HENCE, EVEN A PERSON’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE REASON “FACE SAVING/
CUSTOMARY” IS WITHOUT MERIT. THE COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FOLKWAY.

The ruling of the Court:

PEREZ, J.:

15
XXXXXX

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of
Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s
estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis
was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and
John Desantis exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage.[3][47] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate.[4][48] Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.[5][49]

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John
Desantis were “married” and (b) that Sylvia is their “legitimate” child.[6][50] In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws,[7][51] the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true.
Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.[8][52]
In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made
only in order to “save face.”[9][53] They urge this Court to take note of a “typical” practice among unwed Filipino couples
to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot
countenance.

The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the
probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a
supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners
would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful
statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated,
supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of
any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion
is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved
results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners
and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015

FACTS:

16
 ● Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (Wenifreda)
were married on September 16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties,
including a 700-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (the
subject property), which was bought on November 17, 1991. The deed of sale over the said property was
signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner Rosario
Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed therein as “Rosario Banguis.” When Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-145321) covering the subject property was issued, however, it was made under
the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.”

● All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco (Nolasco). They
were married on October 15, 1975, and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive, and his
marriage to petitioner subsisted and was never annulled

● On June 7, 1998, Adriano died without a will.

● On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, She
alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; that TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered
and made in the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS;” that per annexed
Marriage Contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could not have been married to
Adriano; and that consequently, she suffered damages. Thus, Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-145321 be
cancelled; that a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse indicated;
that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT T-145321; and that moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation be adjudged in her favor.

● The RTC of Malolos ruled in Wenifreda’s favor, effectively cancelling the TCT in question.

● Banguis then moved for reconsideration, one of her main arguments is that Wenifreda’s
Petition for Cancellation of the TCT is in reality a partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the
subject property to Wenifreda’s estate and thus divests Banguis and her son (with Adriano), Adrian of their
rights and interests therein.

ISSUE:
● Who should be recognized as Adriano’s lawful spouse, Wenifreda or Rosario?

RULING:
The Court could not agree with Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT
T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano’s estate. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the
correction of the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title –
that Adriano is married to Wenifreda – and nothing else.
Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage.”
EMERGENCY RECIT: Calimag and Silvestra were co-owners of the subject property. 3 years after Silvestra’s death
(died without issue), the TCT was cancelled pursuant to a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Calimag and Silvestra.
Hence, respondents, as children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastasio, Sr., and Fidela. Calimag argues that respondents
have no legal standing to sue since they are illegitimate children of Anastasio and Fidela, and are prohibited from
inheriting from Silvestra pursuant to Art. 992 of the Civil Code. In other words, Anastasio and Fidela were allegedly
not married. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed. SC: Anastasio and Fidela were married therefore
respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra. Respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth to prove
filiation. Item no. 24 of said documents show the date and place of marriage of Anastasio and Fidela as “May 25,
1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.” Moreover, the respondents’ certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children —

17
the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is
admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. A man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
FACTS:
• Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N.
Macapaz (Silvestra).
• Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O.
Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
• The subject property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an
Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq. m.
• November 11, 2002: Silvestra died without issue.
• July 7, 2005: TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in
the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her
99-sq.-m. portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00.
• Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit
dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of
adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally
ineffective.
• September 16, 2005: Fidela passed away.
• Respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of
Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City.
• In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal
capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they
have no right over Silvestra’s estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.
• RTC found for the respondents. CA affirmed.
ISSUE(S): WoN Anastasio, Sr. and Fidela were married, therefore, respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra. –YES.
RATIO:
• Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
• Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of
Live Birth issued by the NSO where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
• A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents — their
father’s name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother’s maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24
thereof where it asks: “24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)” it was stated
therein that respondents’ parents were married on “May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.”
• The respondents’ certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited
as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio,
Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the
validity of marriage.
• Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of
a solemnized marriage, viz.:
In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a
witness to the matrimony; b) the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
• Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, “[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of

18
Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.”

C. Agreements prior to marriage

1. Stipulations in marriage FC Art. 1 cf. NCC Art. 221

Espinosa v. Atty. Omaña, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s
legal advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a document entitled
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the conditions of the said contract. However,
Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the
advice of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana
was not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana
denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization
of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was
out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged
her signature and notarized the contract.

ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” W/N the Kasunduaan ng
Paghihiwalay is valid.

HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The
Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what
Omaña did in this case.

2. Breach of promise to marry NCC Arts. 19 - 21; NCC Art. 2176

NCC Art. 1403 2(c); FC Art. 22

Hermosisima v. CA, 109 Phil 629

In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance underwriter), and
Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a refular
intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad.
In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman
named Romanita Perez.

Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with Soledad and for
damages due to Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him
in order to satisfy his sexual desires – that being, the award of moral damages is proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its award of
damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that “Moral damages may be recovered from… (3)
Seduction, xxx…” However, it must be noted that the “Seduction” being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision
is the same “Seduction” being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not
present in this case.

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Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given the circumstances
of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall
than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered
herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit
of clergy.”

Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4,
1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent
a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said
wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has
changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was
made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a
breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of
promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable
withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is
supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met
Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two
got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the
semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s
parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter
for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their
relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying
Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued
Gashem for damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have
violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to
marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She
was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised
to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary
to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him
liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is
meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It
was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was carnal
knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if
there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
Abanag v Mabute, A.M. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011

*Note: Please bring a sample marriage contract and an application for a marriage license.

D. Requisites for a valid marriage

Mariategui v. CA, G.R. No. L-57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first
wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second
wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third
time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified
that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a
voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings
in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

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 ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence
was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

1. Kinds of requisites & effects of non-compliance FC Arts. 2-5; 35; 45

cf. NCC Art. 53
RPC Arts. 350-351

De Mijares v. Villaluz, A.C. No. 4431, June 19, 1997

Facts:

Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while
respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission.

Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained
a decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years. Thus, she got married to
respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.

They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of the son
of Mijares.

During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit affair with
another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the complainant judge. As a result,
they lived separately and did not get in touch with one another and the respondent did not bother to apologize
for what happened.

Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez.
Complainant then filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and bigamously
entered into a second marriage while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil
status as single.

In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham marriage”; that
he voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for immorality filed against
her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with complainant,
he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage
had not yet become final and executory or published.

Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on
affirmed by the Court.

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 Issue:

a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid

b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage

Ruling:

a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under
Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was facing
criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in civil case declaring the
annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife had not attained complete finality, the marriage
between complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.

b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration.
Thus, former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; he is hereby suspended from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.

2. Essential requisites

(a) Legal Capacity

(i) Gender, FC Art. 2 (1) cf. FC Art. 148

Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his
sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law
allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion.
The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the
petition.

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