Critica de Cassirer A Heid.

Myth and Modernity: Cassirer's Critique of Heidegger
Author(s): Peter Eli Gordon

Source: New German Critique, Vol. 94, Secularization and Disenhantment (Winter, 2005), pp.
127-168
Published by: New German Critique
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040953
Accessed: 02/03/2009 10:43
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ngc.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
New German Critique is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to New German
Critique.
http://www.jstor.org
Mythand Modernity.
Cassirer CritiqueofHeidegger
PeterEli Gordon
"Thephilosopheris a mythologist."
- Plato
What is the relation between fascism and myth?l For the Frankfurt
School, fascism was not a reversion to barbarismbut a pathologized
extremityof enlightenmentitself. Following Weber'slead, Adorno and
Horkheimersaw enlightenmentas a transhistoricalratherthan a dis-
cretely historicalprocess, coordinatinga host of distinctphenomena;the
disenchantmentof the world, the secularizationof human conscious-
ness, the "extirpationof animism,"and the slow displacementof mime-
sis by symbolic and conceptual thought. While they acknowledged
fascism's atavisticappearance- especially its calls for a returnto fate,
blood and soil - they denied it could be characterizedin essence as a
merely retrogradedeparturefrom civilization. Still bound, however
weakly, to Marxianhabits of thought,Adornoand Horkheimersaw fas-
cism not as a lapse but as the crisis-stagein history's development,as
the apotheosisof bourgeoissubjectivityand a dialecticalconsequenceof
"instrumentalreason."Because myth is born from the desire to under-
stand and thereby to achieve some mastery over one's environment,
myth, in this sense at least, is "already"enlightenment.But in the con-
text of technological proficiency and social rationalization,enlighten-
ment devolves into a compulsivewill to masterywithout self-reflection
1. For comments and criticism, I am gratefulto MartinJay, WarrenBreckman,
SamuelMoyn, JonathanSkolnik,EugeneSheppard,JohnMcCole,andThomasMeyer.
127
128 Mythand Modernity
or normative orientation.Enlightenment,then, is already, in its one-

sided and distortedform, at least, a new species of myth. And fascism,
they claimed, was the indisputablespawn of modernity,the culminating
phase of the laboriousand collective effort by which humanity,having
originally sought release from its mythic fear of nature,ended in the
liquidationof the freedomit aimed to achieve. A political correlativeof
modernadvertising,fascism succeededby means of the cynical manipu-
lationof desire:It was, in sum, "fakemyth."2
This theory, which Adorno and Horkheimerput forth in the 1947
study, Dialectic of Enlightenment,is but one variantof the more com-
mon observationthat fascism is not truly "irrational"but only a simu-
lacrum of mythic unreason.Similar,though less rememberedtoday is
Ernst Cassirer'slast great contributionto intellectualhistory, The Myth
of the State, a work composedin Americanexile and published,posthu-
mously, in 1946. Like Horkheimerand Adorno,Cassirersaw the pecu-
liarity of National Socialism in its effort to forge an entire tissue of
belief by artificial means: "The new political myths," Cassirerwrote,
"do not grow up freely; they are not wild fruits of an exuberantimagi-
nation. They are artificialthings fabricatedby very skilful and cunning
artisans."In contrastto those liberal-mindedtheoristswho found conso-
lation in the view that Nazism was mere barbarismand primitivesenti-
ment, Cassirerdiscerned its specific modernity:"It has been reserved
for the twentiethcentury,our own greattechnicalage, to develop a new
techniqueof myth. Henceforthmyths can be manufacturedin the same
sense and according to the same methods as any other modern
weapon-as machineguns or airplanes."3
A promisingfeatureof this theorylay in the claim that fascism, while
essentially modern, succeeds by manipulating the pre-modern or
"mythic"dimension of humanexperience.From this perspective,fasc-
ism is a species of secularismcloaked only for effect in the guise of
faith. This view has enduringmerit not least because it promotes the
watchful attitudethat we modernsmust never consider ourselves fully
beyond the fascist danger.Indeed,there is no getting "beyond"hazards
inhering in modernity itself. But the theoryis not withoutits disadvan-
tages. As JiirgenHabermashas claimed, the thesis that fascism is the
2. TheodorW. Adornoand Max Horkheimer,Dialectic of Enlightenment,Philo-
sophical Fragments,trans.EdmundJephcott(Stanford:StanfordUP,2002) 9.
3. ErnstCassirer,The Mythof the State (New Haven:Yale UP, 1946) 355, here-
after,MS.
Peter Eli Gordon 129
spawnof instrumental reasonmay place too littletrustin the emancipatory

potentialof humanrationalityand can quickly devolve into a totalizing
polemic againstreason as such. Indeed,the ceaseless critiqueof reason
gone wrong can easily encouragea mood of fatalisticand stylish pessi-
mism that sabotagesthe liberatorywork of enlightenmentbefore it has
even begun.4From anotherperspective,however, one might claim the
theory places not too little confidencein reason but too much. By char-
acterizingfascism as an outcomeof modernity,the theory seems to rep-
resent modernity as having truly surpassed myth. Only a free and
disbelieving subject, it seems, is sufficiently demythologizedto wield
myth as an instrumentof cynical control. The theory of fascism as a
"techniqueof myth," in other words, may presupposea human subject
who has actuallyachievedthoroughgoingdisenchantment.
My claim in this essay is that theremay be no such thing as a modemrn
and rationalsubjectwho is entirely"disenchanted," in the sense that this
would entail the capacityto achieverationalmasteryover one's constitu-
tive meaning. Consideredbroadly,"myth"might indicate a structureof
social meaningthat seems both independentof the subject'sagency and
not fully transparentto humanreason- the mythicalnotion, for exam-
ple, that one's life-course is determinedby the Fates ratherthan one's
own rationalchoices. A "demythologized"subject, then, is capable of
rationalself-transparency, and thus capableof governingitself in accor-
dance with nothingbesides its own rules. The typical source for this sec-
ular model of the self is Kant'sepistemologyand moralphilosophy,and
in this respect, my argumentis directedagainst the conspicuous Kan-
tianismthatunderwritesthe "modernist" theoryof fascism.
The guiding insight of this essay is as follows: The modernisttheory
tends to regardany and all departuresfrom liberal-enlightenmentpoli-
tics as manipulated- hence its frequentrecourse to terms such as
"fake,"or "jargon,"or "technique,"- and it therebypresupposesthat
only the liberal view is "true."Thus, all other modes of political belief
must be explained by imagining that a liberal-enlightenmentsubject
somehow stands behindthose politics as their disbelieving creator.But,
one might object, this view rests upon an implausibletheory of social
meaning. An enlightenmentontology of the self has a peculiarly self-
credentializingstatus in that it dismisses any alternativepolitical beliefs
as unreal.Yet the challenge - indeed, the true horror- of fascism is
4. JiirgenHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourse of Modernity,TwelveLectures,
trans.FrederickLawrence(Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1987) esp. 106-130.
that it representsa mode of political belief that cannot be categorized

and consequently dismissed as a mere departurefrom the normative
contents of modernity.Ratherthanoffer some bold doctrineof my own,
this essay merely seeks to reconstructa possible alternativeto the Kan-
tian view by exploring the historical encounterbetween two philoso-
phers, Ernst Cassirerand MartinHeidegger.5As explained below, the
disagreementbetween them hinged upon two contrastingsets of ideas
concerningmyth, subjectivity,and self-transparency.
The confrontationbetweenCassirerand Heideggerspannedmore than
two decades, from 1923 to 1946, and was punctuatedby the famous
encounterat Davos, Switzerland,in the springof 1929. Witnessesto the
Davos debate have recalledan almost mythic contrastbetween Heideg-
ger's dark haired and youthful appearance,his abrupt,perhaps even
aggressivedemeanor,and Cassirer'sprematurelywhite hair,his professo-
rial eloquence,and his conciliatory,if perhapsless inspiring,style. While
Cassirerrepresentedthe older values of humanistreason, the uncanny
strains of Heidegger's so-called "existential"ontology bespoke a new
sense of urgencyand pathosseizing the youngergenerationat the end of
the 1920s. Studentmemoirs of the event are almost unanimousin the
judgmentthat Heidegger"won,"but for many critics, Heidegger'sdeci-
sion to embraceNazism fouryears laterexpressesthe alreadylatenttruth
of theirdebate:PierreBourdieu,for example,has organizedthe entirenar-
rativeof his polemic, ThePolitical Ontologyof MartinHeidegger,around
the assumptionthat the Heidegger-Cassirer debatewas an encryptedbat-
tle between liberalismand conservativerevolution.6Politics aside, the
philosophicalsubstanceof theirdisputeremainsdefinitivefor Continental
thought today: Cassirer'sallegiance to an enlightenmentmodel of the
autonomoussubject stands in starkcontrastto Heidegger'sview of the
self as "thrown,"as boundby meaningsit cannotharnessfully to rational
command.The debatebetweenthem is thus a significantchapterin the
ongoingstruggleto definethe ontologico-political subjectof modernity.
Cassirer'sPhilosophy of Form
Cassirer(1874-1945) was one of the most accomplishedphilos-
Emrnst
ophers to emerge from Central Europe in the early decades of the
5. For importantdocumentationand analysis,see JohnMichaelKrois,"Cassirer's
UnpublishedCritiqueof Heidegger,"Philosophyand Rhetoric16.3 (1983): 147-159.
6. PierreBourdieu,L'Ontologiepolitiquede MartinHeidegger(Paris:Editionsde
minuit, 1988). ThePolitical Ontologyof MartinHeidegger,trans.PeterCollier(Stanford,
CA: StanfordUP, 1991).
twentieth century.7 In 1894, Cassirerattended Georg Simmel's lectures on

Kant, and beginning in 1896, he studied under Hermann Cohen in Mar-
burg. Cassirer absorbed many of the characteristicassumptions of the neo-
Kantianmovement,includingan admirationfor the scientificmodel in phi-
losophy,an unflaggingconfidencein the rationalityof culture,and a strong
attachmentto progressivepolitics.8Althoughof Jewish descent,Cassirer,
like many GermanJews in the age of assimilation,maintainedlimitedties
to the Jewish faith.9His real devotionwas to scholarship.Fromhis earli-
est study,Leibniz'Systemin seinenwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen(1902),
his earlyfour-volumeinvestigation,TheProblemof Knowledgein Philoso-
phy and Science (1906-7) and his first contributionto the philosophyof
science, Substance and Function (1910), he displayed an astounding
breadthof eruditionand an uncompromising fidelityto the rationalistprin-
ciples of the Enlightenment.He wrote a biography,Kant' Life and
Thought(1918), which was meantto accompanya new editionof Kant's
collectedworks in the 1920s. Later,he authoredthe classic studyof eigh-
teenth-centurythought,ThePhilosophyof theEnlightenment (1932).
Beginning in the 1920s, Cassirerinvested a great deal of energy in
developing a philosophicalaccountof mythologicalconsciousness. His
monumental,three-volumework, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
(hereafter,PSF), explores the "formative"activity of consciousness in
the spheres of: "language"(Vol. I, 1923), "mythicalthinking"(Vol. II,
1925), and the "phenomenologyof knowledge" (Vol. III, 1929). A
fourth volume, on "the metaphysicsof symbolic forms," remained in
7. An excellent summaryof Cassirer'sthought can be found in John Michael
Krois,Cassirer:SymbolicFormsand History(New Haven:Yale UP, 1987).
8. Simmel's lectureson Kantexerteda tremendousimpactupon studentsof Cas-
sirer'sgeneration,since the lectureswere meant"to serve as an introductionto philosoph-
ical thinking"as such. See Georg Simmel,Kant:SechzehnVorlesungen,gehalten an der
Berliner Universitdt,3rd ed. (Munichand Leipzig: Dunckerund Humblot,1913) iii. For
Simmel's influenceon Cassirer,see David R. Lipton,ErnstCassirer. TheDilemmaof the
LiberalIntellectualin Germany,1914-1933(Toronto:U TorontoP, 1978) 3-5. On the gen-
eral outline of neo-Kantianism,see TimothyKeck, "Kantand Socialism: The Marburg
School in Wilhelmian Germany,"diss., University of Wisconsin, 1975); also Klaus
Kahnke,EntstehungundAufstiegdes Neukantianismus:Die deutsche Universitatsphilo-
sophie zwischen Idealismusund Positivismus(Frankfurt/Main,1991), and Ulrich Sieg,
AufstiegundNiedergangdes MarburgerNeukantianismus.Die Geschichteeinerphiloso-
phischen Schulgemeinschaft(Wiirzburg:K6nigshausen& Neumann,1994).
9. On Cassirer'sJudaism,see the thoughtfulessay by ThomasMeyer,"ErnstCas-
sirer- Judentumaus dem Geist der universalistischenVernunft," Aschkenas10.2 (2000):
459-502; also OswaldSchwemmer,ErnstCassirer Ein Philosophder europdischenMod-
erne (Berlin:AkademieVerlag, 1997) and Steven S. Schwarzschild,"Judaismin the Life
and Workof ErnstCassirer,"il cannocchiale1.1-2 (1991): 327-344.
manuscriptform and has only recently been published. Cassirer also
wrote a shorterwork, entitledLanguage and Myth (1925), which was
his first substantivecontributionto the culturalhistory series published
by the WarburgLibrary,where he laboredupon the PSF throughoutthe
1920s. In the midst of this work, Cassirer also wrote an historical
monograph,The Individualand the Cosmos in RenaissancePhilosophy
(1927) that investigates renaissancetheories of "ego and world" and
discerns the origins of the enlightenmentideal of spiritual creativity.
Nevertheless, vigorous attentionto political or social thought remains
noticeably underdevelopedin Cassirer's scholarship,which, given his
adherenceto enlightenmentideals, might appearsurprising.l0The vari-
ous essays collected in 1916 underthe title, Freedomand Form, repre-
sent an exception to Cassirer's largely scientific and cultural but
unpolitical labors.1l Cassirermarshaledhis intellectualresources only
once in defense of the precariousWeimarRepublic.12In 1928, he deliv-
ered a famous addresson "The Idea of a RepublicanConstitution,"in
which he attemptedto prove an affinity between Kant'sphilosophyand
political democracy.13His final work, The Mythof the State, represents
Cassirer'smost sustainedtreatmentof political matters,but it is also his
last statementon the broader,philosophicalsignificanceofmyth.14
10. The absence of a pronouncedethical theory in Cassirer'swork was first noted

by Leo Strauss,in a critical review of The Mythof the State, which is reprintedin Leo
Strauss, Whatis Political Philosophy?and OtherStudies(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press,
1959) 292-96. For Strauss'searlierassessment,see Leo Strauss,"Religionsphilosophie:
Zur Auseinandersetzungmit der europiischen Wissenschaft,"Der Jude VIII.10 (1924):
613-617. Also see BirgitRecki, "Kulturohne Moral?WarumErnstCassirertrotzder Ein-
sicht in dem Primatder praktischenVemrnunft keine Ethikschreibenkonnte,"ErnstCassir-
ers Werkund Wirkung,KulturundPhilosophie,eds. DorotheaFrede,Reinold Schmlicker
(Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft,1997) 58-78.
11. ErnstCassirer,FreiheitundForm:Studienzur deutschenGeistesgeschichte,2nd
ed. (1916; Berlin:BrunoCassirer,1918).
12. On Cassirer'spoliticalsignificance,see Lipton.
13. Cassirer,Die Idee der RepublikanischenVerfassung,Rede zur Verfassungsfeier
am 11.August1928 (Hamburg:Friedrichsen,de Gruyter& Co., 1929), hereafter,Die Idee.
14. ErnstCassirer,ThePhilosophyof SymbolicForms. VolumeI: Language, Volume
II: MythicalThought,VolumeIII: ThePhenomenologyof Knowledge,trans.Ralph Man-
heim (New Haven:Yale UP, 1957), hereafterPSF, followed by volume numberand page.
Sprache und Mythos was originally published in Studien der Bibliothek WarburgVI
(1925). The Englishedition is Languageand Myth,trans.SusanneK. Langer(1946; New
York:Harper- Dover, 1953), hereafter,LM. ErnstCassirer,Individuumund Kosmos in
der Philosophieder Renaissance(1927), in Englishas TheIndividualand the Cosmos in
RenaissancePhilosophy,trans.MarioDomandi(New York:Harperand Row, 1963). Ernst
Cassirer,Die Philosophieder Aufkliarung (Tiibingen:J.C.B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck, 1932),
in English, The Philosophyof the Enlightenment,trans.Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P.
Pettegrove(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUP, 1951), hereafter,PE. Recently,John Michael
Krois has edited Cassirer'sessay, "Spiritand Life,"which containsan extensive response
to Heidegger,and was locatedin the previouslyunpublishedmanuscriptfor the projected
fourthvolume of PSR, TheMetaphysicsof SymbolicFormsthatwas completedin 1929.
Before specifically engagingCassirer'sdiscussionof myth, it is help-

ful to examine his more general philosophicalcommitments.For Cas-
sirer, human consciousness is best conceived according to a Kantian
model, where the mind stands as "lawgiver unto nature," granting
objectivity and order to the world it represents. According to this
model, the subjectrelatesto its world as its transcendentalground:We
encountera world of "orderand harmony"only because our reality has
been structuredin advanceby the formativeaction of reason. We do not
enjoy immediateaccess to things;indeed, withoutthe structuringaction
of our own mental apparatusthe world in itself would be presumably
without order or sense. Kant called this structuringaction "the sponta-
neity of humanunderstanding," and the doctrineexerteda strong influ-
ence upon Cassirerin all of his philosophicaland historicalwork. While
it is true that his philosophy of symbolic forms moved away from the
"spontaneity"thesis in significant respects, the essential view of the
mind as a formativeagency remainedunchanged.15
The immediate importanceof "form"in Kantianphilosophy is evi-
dent in the idea that space and time are pure "forms"of intuition,but it
gained a new prominencein Simmel's lectures on Kant. While still in
his 20s, CassirerabsorbedSimmel's interpretationof transcendentalide-
alism as a philosophy that concerned "the forms of experience"pro-
jected by the mind. For Simmel, Kant had shown that the
"determinationof Being" is only possible through"the forms and pro-
ductive powers of Spirit,"a mentalagency which was characteristicnot
only of practicaland theoreticalreason,but also of aesthetic-expressive
labor as well. In Simmel's view, the "unity"exhibited in a perfected
work of art was itself a reflection of the "form of the soul itself."l6
15. An exemplarystatementof Cassirer'smethodcan be foundin PSF: "Itis one of

the first essential insightsof criticalphilosophythat objectsare not 'given' to conscious-
ness in a rigid, finished state, in their naked 'as suchness' [ihremnacktenAn-Sich], but
that the relationof representationto object presupposesan independent,spontaneousact
of consciousness.The object does not exist priorto and outside of syntheticunity but is
constitutedonly by this synthetic unity; it is no fixed form that imprintsitself on con-
sciousness but is the productof a formativeoperation[Formung]effected by the basic
instrumentalityof consciousness,by intuitionand purethought.PSF takes up this basic
critical idea, this fundamentalprincipleof Kant's 'Copernicanrevolution,'and strives to
broadenit. It seeks the categoriesof the consciousnessof objects in the theoretical,intel-
lectual sphere,and startsfromthe assumptionthat such categoriesmust be at work wher-
ever a cosmos, a characteristicand typical world view, takes form out of the chaos of
impressions."PSF II 29 (German39).
16. Simmel,Kant49.
While Simmel's interpretationemphasizedthe centralityof "form"in

Kantianphilosophy,Simmel also noted that specifically regardingart,
Kant'sconceptof form remained"too narrow."l7The combination- of
Simmel's elucidationof Kantianform, and Cohen's "critical idealist"
readingof Kantas a theoristof scientific discovery- no doubtexerted
a powerfulinfluenceupon Cassirer'sown philosophyof form. But Sim-
mel's criticalremarkson the limitationsof Kant'soriginalprojectespe-
cially helpedmove Cassirertowarda broadertheoryof culture.
Cassirerfirst introducedthe idea of symbolic form in his 1921 study,
Einstein' Theoryof Relativity,where he claimedthat the theory of rela-
tivity demanded a "new concept [. . .] of the object," as "grounded in
the form of physical thought."Einsteinianphysics "strivesto determine
and to express in pure objectivitymerely the naturalobject, but thereby
necessarily expresses itself, its own law and its own principle."Now,
physics abandons the notion of "substance"and replaces it with a
notion of "function"anchoredin nothing but the symbolizing capaci-
ties of human consciousness. This move, Cassirer noted, was essen-
tially a restatementof the Kantianidea of the Copernicanrevolution,
which claims that ratherthan conceiving of the mind as conformingto
objects, objects are best conceived in conformityto the mind. But, Cas-
sirer hastened to add that this transcendentalprinciple was not only
applicablein science; it expressedthe far older notion that all religion,
indeedall of humanexperience,restsuponanthropomorphic foundations.
Here is revealedagainthat"anthropomorphism" of all ourconceptsof

natureto which Goethe[...] loved to point."All philosophyof nature
i.e., man, at unity with himself,
is still only anthropomorphism,
impartsto everythingthathe is not, this unity,drawsit into his unity,
makes it one with himself [. ..] We can observe,measure[.. .] weigh,
etc.,natureas muchaswe will, it is stillonlyourmeasureandweight,
as manis themeasureof allthings."'8
From the critique of religion to modern science, the principle of

"anthropomorphism" was "not to be understoodin a limited way but in
a universal,criticaland transcendentalsense."19Cassirerclaimedthatthe
17. Simmel,Kant 180.

18. Zur Einsteinschen Relitivitatstheorie,originallypublishedin 1921; in English
as Substanceand Functionand Einstein" Theoryof Relativity,trans.WilliamSwabey and
MarieSwabey (Chicago:OpenCourt,1923)445, hereafter,ETR.
19. ETR445.
Kantian principle could now be applied to the investigation of all of human

experience. His global ambitions are clear in the passage below, which is
generally accepted as Cassirer's first use of the term "symbolic form."
It is the task of systematicphilosophy,which extends far beyond the

theory of knowledge, [. . .] to grasp the whole system of symbolic
forms, the applicationof which producesfor us the concept of an
orderedreality,and by virtue of which subject and object, ego and
world are separatedand opposedto each otherin definiteform,and it
mustrefereach individualin thistotalityto its fixedplace.If we assume
this problemsolved, then the rightswould be assured,and the limits
fixed, of each of the particular[...] as of the generalformsof the theo-
retical,ethical,aesthetic,andreligiousunderstanding of the world.20
According to Cassirer, all of human culture, indeed the very sense of

there being a "world"as distinct from an "ego," is consequent upon
what Cassirernamed the spontaneous"application"of form by a tran-
scendental subject. And it is this form that "produces for us" the very
"concept of an ordered reality."
It is worth noting that this definition considerably expands upon
Kant's original model of mental spontaneity. Kant never suggested that
the formative function might extend further than the basic, a priori
application of space, time, and the categories. Cassirer closely followed
Kant's idea that our world is the result of the transcendental conscious-
ness "producing" an "orderedreality." However, he broadened the princi-
ple by claiming that symbolic forms govern the entire landscape of human
expression. In his work throughout the 1920s, Cassirer set out to show
how a Kantian investigation of transcendental consciousness might be
applied to broad areas of "symbolizing" activity from language to myth.
He laid out the basic presuppositions for the project in a programmatic
essay from 1922, "The Concept of Symbolic Form in the Construction of
the Human Sciences" [Der Begriffder Symbolischen Form im Aufbau der
Geisteswissenschaften]. Cassirer offered it as his inaugural publication for
the Warburg Library, where he carried out research for much of the
decade. The essay contains an importantredefinition of symbolic form:
By "symbolicform"[is meant]that energyof the spirit [Energiedes

Geistes]throughwhich a mentalmeaning-contentis attachedto a sen-
sual sign and inwardlydedicatedto this sign [. . .] [L]anguage,the
20. ETR447,myemphasis.
world,andtheartseachpresentus witha particular

mythical-religious
symbolicform.[I]nthemall we see the markof the basicphenome-
non, thatourconsciousness is not satisfiedto receive
[BewufJ3tsein]
impression[Eindruck]from outside,but rather[. . .] permeateseach
impressionwith afree activityof expression[miteinerfreien Titigkeit
desAusdrucks].
Inwhatwe calltheobjectiverealityof thingswe are
thus confrontedwith a worldofself-createdsigns and images."21
Here, Cassirercharacterizessymbolic forms as productsof "free"men-

tal energy and expression.Such forms are "self-created"and therefore
announce, against empiricism,that a spontaneityof the spirit pervades
all culturallife, most notably in science, but - and this provedjust as
important- in language,art,andmyth.
Cassireron Language and Myth

The second volume of PSF focuses specifically on mythical thought.
Here the spontaneitythesis is put on bold display.Cassirerpresupposed
that myth can only be understoodas the most primitivestratumof sym-
bolic consciousness, and thereforethat myth is graspedas an "expres-
sion" of spirit. He sharply differentiated this effort from any
investigationinto myth's originsor instrumentality. "Toseek a 'form' of
mythical consciousness,"he wrote, "meansto inquireneither after its
ultimate metaphysicalcauses nor after its psychological, historical or
social causes: it is solely to seek the unity of the spiritualprinciple by
which all its particularconfigurations,with all their vast empirical
diversity,appearto be governed."22With a nod towardHusserlianphe-
nomenology, Cassirerinsisted that his method is merely "criticalphe-
nomenology"since it separatedits phenomenologicalanalysis from any
discussion about the genesis or use of mythological systems. It
addresses "neitherfrom the godhead an original metaphysicalfact nor
from mankindas an original empiricalfact" but instead theorizes "the
subject of a culturalprocess"[das Subjektdes Kulturprozesses].It pre-
sents a narrativeof the "humanspirit"in its "pureactualityand diverse
configurations,"in orderto apprehendits own "immanentnorms."23
Cassirer'sanalysis of mythologicalconsciousnessfollows the Kantian
principle that consciousness must obey its own, interiorprinciples of
21. ErnstCassirer,"DerBegriffderSymbolischenFormim AufbauderGeisteswissen-
schaften,"BibliothekWarburg,Vortrage,1921/22(Leipzig:B.G Teubner,1923) 11-39, 15.
22. PSF, II 12.
23. PSF, II 19; English 13.
expression: Culture is ideally the work of autonomousspirit. Cassirer

departedfrom Kant,however,in his portraitof consciousnessas follow-
ing a logic of immanentdevelopment.If one could demonstratethat
myth is part of a "culturalprocess,"then the Kantianprincipleof men-
tal spontaneitymust be fundamentallyhistoricized.Here Cassirer'sthe-
ory adopts a Hegelian view of mythical"activities"as a primitivestage
in the unfoldingnarrativeof spirit:
It is only in these activitiesas a wholethathumankind constitutes

itselfin accordancewithits idealconceptandconcretehistoricalexist-
ence;it is onlyin theseactivitiesas a wholethatis effectedthatpro-
gressivedifferentiation of "subject" and "object,""I"and"world,"
throughwhichconsciousness issuesfromits stupor,fromits captivity
in mere existence [aus der Befangenheitim blofienDasein], in sensory
impressionand affectivity,and becomesa culturalconsciousness
[Kulturbewufl3tsein].24
The developmentalthesis, however,implies that myth can not be under-
stood as a perfect or complete expression of human consciousness. If
myth is merely a "stage" in the "objectification"[Objektivierung]of
spirit, it is difficult to avoid the judgmentthat myth is nothing but an
imperfectand occluded mode of representation."Withthe first dawn of
scientific insight,"Cassirerobserved,"the mythicalworld of dreamand
enchantmentseems to sink into nothingness"[die Traum-und Zauber-
welt des Mythos[. . .] scheintsie wie ins Nichts hinabgesunkenzu sein].
But questions concerningthe accuracyor truthof their representational
content of myth are not significant for Cassirer,since he is interested
solely in their mannerof objectification.Here Cassirercan affirm that
myth is indeed "objective"in so far as it discloses "an immanentrule,"
and "a characteristic"necessity."25Moreover,it is misleading to sug-
gest that myth yields entirely to scientific modes of representation.
"[E]ven the world of our immediateexperience- that world in which
all of us constantlylive and are when not engaged in conscious, critical-
scientific reflection - contains any numberof traits which, form the
standpointof the samereflection,can only be designatedas mythical."26
Cassirerwas not alone in proposing such a "pan-mythic"theory of
everydaybelief. He drew inspirationfrom WilhelmWundt'smonumen-
tal study, Volkerpsychologie,(publishedin ten volumes between 1900
24. PSF, I1 19; English13, translationmodified.
25. PSI II 19; English 14,translationmodified.
26. PSF II 20; English 14.
and 1920), which lays out a comprehensiveset of "developmentallaws"

guiding language,myth, and custom.27But it is perhapsmost instruc-
tive to compareCassirer'swork to contemporarytheories in anthropol-
ogy, which were breakingfrom the older, linear-progressivistmodel of
myth as merely imaginativerepresentation,and turninginsteadtowarda
view of mythas the "constitutive"frameworkof cultureas such.
Consider Bronislaw Malinowski's so-called "functionalism."Mali-
nowski follows Durkheim'sclaim in The ElementaryForms of Reli-
gious Life (1912) that "all religion is true," and Lucien L~vy-Bruhl's
holistic theory of myth in La Mentalitdprimitive(1922), and he argues
in Myth in PrimitivePsychology(1926) that myth is "notmerely a story
told but a reality lived [. . .] As our sacred story lives in our ritual, in
our morality,as it governs ourfaith and controls our conduct,even so
does mythfor the savage." Myth is not merely "primitive,"but rather"a
vital ingredientin human civilization."Malinowski'sgreat advance is
his suggestion that myth - like Durkheim'sreligion - provides the
basic frameworkfor human action. It is a "narrativeresurrectionof a
primevalreality."Most importantly,myth lays down the conditions for
intelligibilityin all humanconduct,withoutwhich life succumbsto "the
most formidable and haunting idea" of mortality. Mythic structures
serve as a bulwarkagainst meaninglessness."They would screen, with
the vivid texture of their myths, stories, and beliefs about the spirit
world, the vast emotionalvoid gaping beyond them."Myth is for Mali-
nowski not only the "backboneof primitive culture,"but in fact "an
indispensableingredientof all culture"(my emphasis).28
The functionalist and panmythic perspective in early sociological
and anthropological theory bears upon some of Cassirer's central
27. Wilhelm Wundt, Volkerpsychologie:eine Untersuchungder Entwicklungs-
gesetze von Sprache,Mythusund Sitte, 10 volumes (Vols. 1-5, Leipzig: W. Engelmann,
1900-1920;Vols. 5-10, Leipzig:A. Kriner, 1920).
28. Emile Durkheim,TheElementaryFormsof ReligiousLife (1912; Glencoe:Free
Press,1963).LucienL6vy-Bruhl,La Mentalitd primitive(Paris:LibrairieFelix Alcan, 1922).
BronislawMalinowski,Myth in PrimitivePsychology(New York:W.W.Norton, 1926);
republishedin the collection,Malinowskiandthe WorkofMyth,ed. IvanStrenski(Princeton,
NJ: PrincetonUP, 1992) 77-116. On the theme of death,see esp. 108: "Death[...] is not
vague,or abstract,or difficultto grasp[ . .] [it] is fraughtwithhorror,witha desireto remove
its threat,with the vaguehopethatit maybe, not explained,butratherexplainedaway,made
unreal,and actuallydenied."See also Malinowskias quotedin Cassirer,"Judaismand the
ModemPoliticalMyths,"Contemporary JewishRecord7 (1944): 115-126,reprintedin Cas-
sirer,Symbol,Myth,and Culture.Essays and Lecturesof Ernst Cassirer,1935-1945, ed.
Donald PhillipVerene(New Haven,CT: Yale UP, 1979) 233-241, 237. All quotes in this
paragraph arefromMalinowski77-106,interalia.
philosophical themes. On the one hand, their generous view of myth

anticipatedand inspiredthe later,universaliststructuralistview of myth,
especially that articulatedin Levi-Strauss's1962 La Pensde sauvage. At
the same time, the generalizedtheory of myth threatenedto destabilize
the objectivistrelationbetweentheoristand myth. If myth, like a prag-
matist's framework,was "good for thinking,"as Levi-Straussproposed,
this raisedthe questionof how the explanatorymethodsof anthropologi-
cal science differentiatethemselvesfrom the mythicalobjects it studied.
If myth were truly universal,then the diachronicmodel of secularizing
consciousness - from "myth" to "science" - must itself fall victim to
anthropologicaldescription,a conclusionthat promptedLevi-Straussto
announce,againstSartre,thathistoricalprogressivismis itself a myth.29
Cassirerwent as far as possible to endorsethe generalizedpragmatist
theory of myth, but he could not surrenderthe diachronictheory of pro-
gressive enlightenmentthat justified his own stance as a philosopher.
On the one hand, he took great pains to demonstratethat myth is an
objectificationof spirit and thereforeanchoredin humanrationality.As
the neo-Kantiancritic Kurt Sternbergobserved in a brief review, Cas-
sirer's method expandsupon Marburgmethodsto embracenot only the
logic of theoreticalreason but also the "logic of the unlogical."30How-
ever, mythical consciousness,unlike "trulyreligious"consciousness, is
incapableof distinguishingbetween its own symbolismand the world it
symbolizes. "Every beginning of myth," Cassirerobserved, "is perme-
ated by this belief in the objective characterand objective force of the
sign." Languagebegins on the same plane, as a symbolic orderperme-
ated by a mythicalbelief in the identitybetween word and thing. But as
language develops, the primal bond gives way to a new and higher
"stage of detachment."Finally, with the modern understandingof art,
"spirit"achieves a "truly free" relation with its surroundings."Mea-
sured by empirical, realistic criteria, the aesthetic world becomes a
world of appearance;but in severing its bond with immediatereality,
with the materialexistence and efficacy which constitutethe world of
magic and myth, [art] embodies a new step towardthe truth."Despite
his generous view of myth as an "objectification"of spirit, Cassirer
29. ClaudeL6vi-Strauss,La PensdeSauvage (Paris:Plon, 1962). For an accessible

summationof L6vi-Strauss'sviews, see his Mythand Meaning:Crackingthe Code ofCul-
ture(Toronto:U TorontoP, 1978).
30. KurtSternberg,"Cassirer,Ernst.Prof.an der UniversittitHamburg.Die Begriff-
sformim mythischenDenken,"Kantstudien,Band20 (1925): 194-195, 194, my emphasis.
nonethelessretainedan unmistakablyevolutionistbias:
Thus,althoughmyth,language,andartinterpenetrate one anotherin

their concretehistoricalmanifestations,
the relationbetweenthem
revealsa definitesystematic an idealprogression
gradation, towarda
pointwherethespiritnotonlyis andlivesin itsowncreations,
its self-
createdsymbols,butalsoknowsthemforwhattheyare.Or,as Hegel
set out to show in his Phenomenologyof Spirit:the aim of spiritual
developmentis thatcultural
realitybe apprehended
andexpressednot
merelyas substancebut"equallyas subject."
For Cassirerthis differenceremaineddecisive. While grantingthat myth

is a spontaneousexpression of human consciousness, he still insisted
that myth differs crucially from the disenchantedmodes of expression
- from both science and art. Whereasthe mythicalmind cannotrecog-
nize the world as its own thoroughlyhumancreation,the secular mind
"knowsthat the symbols it employs are symbolsand comprehendsthem
as such."31This teleological premise, that assumes enlightened self-
transparencyas the naturalendpointof humandevelopment,remaineda
fundamental commitment in Cassirer's philosophy throughout his
career.It is crucialfor Cassirer'sdiagnosisof fascism,as I will explain.
Before examining that diagnosis, Cassirer'sinvestigationsof mythic
consciousnessmust be consideredmore closely. In the same year as the
publication of PSF II: Mythical Thought,Cassirer also published a
shorteressay on Language and Myth (1925). As a sort of transitional
study in PSF - between the first volume on languageand the second
volume on myth - it focuses on the originalbond between these two
modes of symbolization.Indeed, Cassirertakes pains to show that lin-
guistic-theoreticalexpression is itself born from mythical conscious-
ness. "Theoretical,practical,and aesthetic consciousness,the world of
languageand of morality,the basic forms of communityand the state,"
all of these, he claims, are "originallytied up with mythico-religious
conceptions."The mythic world is, in Cassirer'sview, a sort of primal
unity, which only broke apartinto discrete spheres of expressive con-
sciousness over the course of the advancementcivilization. Certainly,
Cassirerremainedwedded to the view that spontaneityis an intrinsic
featureof humanconsciousnesswhateverits developmentalstage. But,
he hastenedto note, because mythicalconsciousnessdoes not recognize
31. The same point is repeated forcefully in the closing passage of Cassirer's
shorter,transitionalstudyfrom 1925,Languageand Myth,esp. 98-99.
its role in the creation of mythic phenomena,it ascribes autonomous

and non-humanauthorityto its own linguisticcreations.
The single most dramaticpiece of evidence for the mythical, non-
humanconceptionof languagein primitivecultures,Cassirerclaimed, is
the Melanesiancategoryof "mana,"which a variety of anthropologists
had subjected to intense theoretical scrutiny during the preceding
decades.32 Though its definition is much disputed among scholars,
mana seems to denote "supernaturalpower" which, in Cassirer's
description,"permeatesall things and events, and may be present now
in objects, now in persons,yet is never boundexclusively to any single
and individualsubject or object as its host." It is less an objectivefea-
ture of things than it is a mediumto identify elementsof the world that
evoke mythic "wonder"and seem to "stand forth from the ordinary
backgroundof familiar,mundaneexistence."33Mana is furtherproof
that myth does not merely consist of a set of discreteagencies or local
gods, but is, in fact, best understoodas a primitivemeans for organiz-
ing experience."[T]hewhole existence of things,"Cassirerwrites, "and
the activity of mankindseem to be embedded,so to speak, in a mythi-
cal 'field of force,' an atmosphereof potency which permeatesevery-
thing." Mana, like language, was to be catalogued among those
"spiritualfunctionswhich do not take their departurefrom a world of
given objects, divided accordingto fixed and finished attributes,but
which actually first producethis organizationof reality and make the
positingof attributespossible."As Cassirernotes approvingly,the French
anthropologistsHenri Hubertand MarcelMauss go so far as to declare
mana "afundamentalcategoryof mythicalthinking."34 And in his later,
English-languagesummation,An Essay on Man, Cassirerthereforecalled
mana"thefirst,or existential,dimensionof the supernatural."35
The strongest evidence for this "mythic"understandingof language
can be found in ancientcosmogony which once featuredthe "Word"as
the privileged medium of creation.The native practice of word-magic
functionsby identifyingword and object. It is predicatedon an "essen-
tial identitybetween the word and what it denotes."But if the thing and
its name are regardedas a primalunity, it suffices for somethingto be
32. Fora shortlist of exemplaryscholarshipon mana,see Cassirer,PSE II 76, n. 2.

33. LM66.
34. HenriHubertandMarcelMauss,"Esquissed'une thdorieg6n6ralede la magie,"
Ann&esociologique 7 (1902-03): 1-146, my emphasis.
35. EM99-100.
142 Myth and Modernity
named in orderfor it to be broughtforthmagicallyinto existence. More

specifically,word-magicconceives of the humansubject itself as utterly
interwovenwith the linguisticfabricof things. In mythic thinking,Cas-
sirerwrites, "even a person'sego, his very self and personality,is indis-
solubly linked [. . .] with his name."The "unityand uniqueness"of the
name serves not only to designatethe person, but actually "constitutes
it; the name is what firstmakesmanan individual."36
The logical affinity between language and myth, however, is not
merely a feature of primitivethought. In a brief and uncharacteristic
moment,Cassireradmitsthat the modem subjectdependsupon the spe-
cial, constitutive function of language in the formation of everyday
experience. In science, of course, it is possible to supplanta great deal
of organic language with the more artificial language of mathematical
symbolization. But for everyday personal and interpersonalrelations,
organic language remains indispensable,not only as a means of com-
municationbut as the constitutivemediumof meaningitself.
Indeed,it is the Word,it is language,thatreallyrevealsto manthat

worldwhichis closerto himthananyworldof naturalobjectsand
touches[him]moredirectlythanphysicalnature.Forit is language
thatmakeshis existencein a community possible;andonlyin society,
in relationto a "Thou,"can his subjectivityassertitself as a "Me."But
here again the creativeact while it is in progress, is not recognizedas
such; all the energyof that spiritualachievementis projectedinto the
resultof it, andseemsboundup in thatobjectfromwhichit seemsto
emanateas by reflection.37
From this comment,one might discernan element of hesitationin Cas-

sirer'sthinking.The originalbond betweenmythic and linguisticmodes
of symbolization never vanished entirely. Language, "while it is in
progress,"appearsas a force independentof its user. To be sure, secu-
lar consciousness lost the illusion of non-humanexistence in mythic
imagery.Further,scientific explanationsought to dispense with all but
the most artificial systems of symbolization. But if myth is disen-
chanted and has consequently forfeited its power of social cohesion,
languagestill preservessomethingof the same quasi-mythicopacity.
Language,then,even "secular"language,mightbearpersistenttracesof
mythicelements,in so far as languageand myth constituteindividualand
36. LM49-51.
37. LM61. Cassireremphasizes"community,"
the otheremphasisis mine.
social identity.Ordinaryexperiencemight preservethe sense of passivity

that originallybelongedto the mythicconceptionof language.If, so, then
Cassirerwould admit a non-spontaneouscharacterin all meaning-struc-
tures,mythic and secularalike. But whetherCassirerreallymeantthat an
elementof mythicreceptivityremainsin the secularconceptionof reality
might be disputed.In any event, the qualificationposes no significant
problemfor his theorymoregenerally.Even withoutthis prerequisite,it is
instructiveto compare Cassirer'smodel of mythical consciousness to
Heidegger'sanalysis, since Heideggeradmitsno transformationwhatso-
ever in the basic structuresof meaning.Indeed,the passivitythat belongs
to Cassirer'schief characteristicsof the mythic conceptionof language
closely resemblesthe "thrownness" thatHeideggerconsidersa basic char-
acteristicof all humanmeaning,as summarizedin his statementthat it is
not man,butinstead"itis languagethatspeaks."38
It is importantto emphasizethat Cassirer'soverall theory of secular-
ization introduceda crucial distinctioninto the comparisonof mythic
and modern consciousness. Whereasmythic thought remains confined
to the illusion of receptivity,modem consciousnesscan, at any moment,
free itself from the language-liketexture of its surroundingsto recog-
nize its own agency.Cassirerconcludedthat
of mythicthinkingwhichdividesit
we arefacedwitha characteristic
sharplyfromthewayof"discursive" ortheoretical,
reflection.Thelat-
by the factthateven in apparently
ter is characterized immediately
"given"datait recognizesan elementof mentalcreation[...] Even in
matters of fact it reveals an aspect of mental formulation;even in
sheer sense data it tracesthe influenceof a "spontaneityof thought"
thatgoes to theirmaking.- But while logical reflectiontends [ . .] to
resolve all receptivity into spontaneity, mythic conception shows
exactly the opposite tendency, namely, to regard all spontaneous
action as somethingreceptive,and all humanachievementas some-
thingmerelybestowed.'9
For Cassirer,the differencebetween "mythical"and modern,"theoreti-

cal" thought remained decisive. Whereas myth regards meaning as
something"bestowed"and does not recognizethe primitiveevidence of
its own mental activity in mythic forms, theoreticalreflection emerges
38. MartinHeidegger,"...Poetically
ManDwells...,"Poetry,Language,Thought,
trans.AlbertHofstadter
(SanFrancisco: andRow,1971)211-229;216.
Harper
39. LM60,myemphasis.
from the self-negating"dialecticof mythicalconsciousness,"and passes

throughthe higherand more self-consciouslysymbolizingstage of reli-
gion, to reach at last the apogee of developmentwhere human con-
sciousness sees worldly experience- even experiencesof mere fact -
as governed by its own mental principles. This essentially Kantian
insight into the "spontaneityof thought"is only possible for a subject
who has achievedthe self-transparency and demythologizedunderstand-
ing characteristicof secular In its final stages, the symbol-
modemrnity.40
izing function "leaves [. . .] behind" both myth and religion, and rises to
a mode of "aestheticconsciousness"in which the imagistic expressions
of mind relinquish any claim to non-subjective"reality."In art, the
fruitsof symbolizingconsciousness
realityof
confessthemselvesto be illusionas opposedto theempirical
things;butthisillusionhasits owntruthbecauseit possessesits own
law.Inthereturnto thislawtherearisesa newfreedomof conscious-
ness: the imageno longerreactsuponthe spiritas an independent
materialthing but becomes for the spirita pure expressionof its own
creativepower.41
In sum, Cassirer'sphilosophy rested upon a teleological premise that

takes the enlightenmentsubject as the necessary goal of human devel-
opment.Moreover,it providesan unapologeticdefense of secularismas
the preconditionfor any truly philosophicalaccount of myth: Because
only secular consciousnesscan recognize the "spiritualnecessity" from
which myth is derived, it follows that only secular consciousness can
possibly possess the requisite instrumentsto subject mythological sys-
tems to genuinely philosophicalunderstanding.42 It is worth noting that
Cassirer's commitmentto the Kantianconception of a transcendental
self marks the decisive differencebetween his theory of myth and that
of Levi-Strauss,which Paul Ricoeuraptly summarizes,in a phrasecited
approvinglyby the author,as "Kantismwithout a transcendentalsub-
ject.'"43The dangerattendantwith this view is that the anthropological
descriptionis robbedof its non-mythicstatus,an implicationwhich Levi-
Straussembracedin the introductory remarksto TheRaw and the Cooked
40. See esp. PSF II, PartIV,"TheDialecticof MythicalConsciousnes"235-61.
41. PSF II 261, my emphasis.
42. PSE II, English21.
43. Paul Ricoeur,"Symbole et temporaliti,"Archivodi Filosofia 1-2 (1963): 24;
to a Scienceof Mythology,
TheRawandtheCooked,Introduction
quotedin L6vi-Strauss,
trans.John and Doreen Weightman(New York:OctagonBooks, 1979) 11, originallyLe
Cru et le Cuit(Paris:Plon, 1964).
(1964) and he affirmedthat his own reconstructionswere themselves a

species of myth. While this generalizedand fully synchronictheoryrisks
collapsingthe distinctionbetween science and mythology,Cassirer'shis-
toricizedmodel of Kantianspontaneitywardsoff the specterof anthropo-
logical relativism and in so doing, equips him with a preemptive
justificationfor his own analysis.44It was preciselyCassirer'sassumption
of a "secular"or transcendental
consciousnessthatHeideggerdisputed.
Cassirerand Heidegger on Myth and Subjectivity

For more than twenty years, Cassirerand Heidegger engaged in an
uneasy and often interruptedphilosophical discussion that revolved
chiefly aroundthe question of myth. The debate began in 1923 when
the two philosophersexchangedthoughtsduringa local "Kantsociety"
meeting in Hamburg.In Being and Time,HeideggeracknowledgedCas-
sirer for having "recentlymade the Dasein of myth a theme for philo-
sophical interpretation,"and the following year he published an
extended review of Cassirer's myth-philosophyas presented in PSF,
Volume II. Their most extensive discussion occurredin the spring of
1929, when they met publicly at Davos, Switzerlandfor a dramaticdis-
putation concerning the broader aims of Kantian philosophy. Once
again, the conversationhinged on contrastingmodels of human subjec-
tivity, and Heidegger energetically disputed the Kantian premises of
Cassirer's ideal of freedom. There is some evidence, albeit uncertain,
that Heidegger might have behaved toward Cassirer with noticeable
aggression.45It is certain,however,that relationsbetween them soured
shortly thereafter.Cassirer's 1932 review of Heidegger's book, Kant
and the Problem of Metaphysics, in Kantstudien,expanded on and
sharpenedthe criticismof Heidegger'swork he made public threeyears
44. This doctrineof secularizationas a self-justifyingdescriptionof philosophical
practiceis repeatedmost forcefullyin the introductorycommentsto volume three,which
is devotedto the logic of scientificexplanation."Forthe conceptof philosophyattainsits
full powerand purityonly wherethe worldview expressedin linguisticandmythicalcon-
cepts is abandoned,where it is in principleovercome.The logic of philosophyfirstconsti-
tutes itself by this very act of transcendence.To achieve its own maturity,philosophymust
above all come to gripswith the linguisticandmythicalworldsandplace itself in dialectic
oppositionto them. Only in this way can it define and assert is concepts of essence and
truth."PSF, III 16.
45. According to HendrikJ. Pos, Heidegger did not shake Cassirer'shand, see,
"Recollections of Ernst Cassirer,"The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, ed. Paul Arthur
Schlipp, Vol. 6, TheLibraryof the LivingPhilosophers(La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1949)
61-72, 69.
earlier. More recently, a little-known manuscriptfrom 1929 entitled

"Spiritand Life" has come to light that Cassirerhad meantto include in
a projectedfourthvolume of PSF. In it he accuses Heideggerof aban-
doning philosophical objectivity and falling into a religiously-tinged
solipsism. Even more dramaticare the closing pages of TheMythof the
State, where CassirercondemnsHeidegger for having endorsed"mod-
ern politicalmyths."46
In order to understandthe stakes of this dispute, one must consider
Heidegger's remarkson mythic consciousnessin Being and Time.It is
also helpful to recall that the book's broaderaim was to lay out a phe-
nomenologicaldescriptionof the basic structureof humanunderstand-
ing. Moreover,he insists fromthe outsetthat humanunderstandingonly
shows itself in the unfolding process of existence itself. There is, in
other words, no core "essence"of humanbeing besides that which takes
shape in the course of living one's life and interpretativelydeveloping
one's identity along the way. "Dasein's 'essence,'" Heidegger claimed,
"justis and is nothingother than its existence."First and most trivially,
this means that understandingthe world is somethingthat occurswholly
"in-the-world."Heidegger, like Kant and Cassirer following him,
showed little patience for extramundanespeculation.More importantly,
this implies that the basic structures of human understandingare
groundedin everydaylife. There is no special "spirit"or "transcenden-
tal self," Heidegger claimed, that lies somewherebeneath the worldly
self as its logical support. There is, however, a "logic" to existence
itself, in that one's interpretativeactivity in the world exhibits certain
modes of understandingthat admit of formal description.In Being and
Time Heidegger strove to differentiatethose modes through what he
called an "existentialanalytic."
This so-called existential analytic was clearly offered as a corrective
to what Kant had called the "transcendental" analyticin the Critiqueof
Pure Reason. An importantdifferenceis Heidegger'sbelief that human
understanding does not enjoy "transcendental" prestige,as it does not rest
upon a foundationotherthanits own temporalexistence,or Dasein. This
belief sets Heideggerat odds with Cassirer,whose entirephilosophy,as
shown above, rests upon the presuppositionthat human understanding
exhibits an unmistakablemoment of "spontaneity."Heidegger rejected
any philosophy that sought to isolate principlesof mental spontaneity
46. MS 355.
within the structureof human understanding.Rather than beginning

with any so-called "transcendental"logic and analyzing reason in
abstraction from practice, Heidegger claims that the basic rules of
human meaning are best discernedby concentratingupon the way our
interpretativeactivity actuallyworks in medias res. Thus he rejects any
attempt to isolate rules of meaning from existence, specifically, the
method of epoch&,or "bracketing"that is the hallmarkof Husserl's
"transcendentalphenomenology."Instead, he concentrateshis analysis
on that always-situatedsort of interpretativepractice which Husserl
identifies with "the naturalconceptionof the world."47In Heidegger's
own terminology, the task is to explicate the meaning-structureof
humanexistence in its "everydayness"[Alltaglichkeit].48
Heidegger's interest in myth and "primitive"consciousness arose
directly from his methodologicalfocus on everydayness.In the final
section of the expository chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger
announces "the task of a preparatoryanalysis of Dasein," and warns
readers not to mistake the philosophicalengagement of everydayness
for a sophisticatedrejectionof modernity:"Everydaynessdoes not coin-
cide with primitiveness,"he explains, and it must be considereda con-
stant modality of Dasein's being, "even when that Dasein is active in a
highly developed and differentiatedculture.'"49Heidegger is strongly
opposed to nostalgic attemptsto locate the more "genuine"aspects of
human life in what is merely "some primitive stage of Dasein with
which we can become acquaintedempiricallythroughthe medium of
anthropology."With "everydayness"he wishes only to drawphilosophi-
cal attentionto the fact that humaninterpretativeactivities are, for the
most part, lived in the mannerof absorbedand non-discursiveconcern.
Everydaynessis a modality for all human understanding,and, among
otherthings, this impliedthatprimitiveDasein exhibitseverydaynessno
less and no more than does any sort of "developed"culture.Heidegger
was thereforewary of anthropologicalstudies,which tended in his view
to rely upon a naively empiricisttechnique for gatheringinformation
47. Indeed,Husserlsuggestedthatworkingout a logic of the naturalconceptionof
the worldwas a crucialtask for phenomenology.See Ideas,I. GeneralIntroductionto Pure
Phenomenology,trans.W.R.Boyce Gibson(New York:Macmillan,1931),esp. 101-103.
48. MartinHeidegger,Sein und Zeit, 11th ed. (Ttibingen:Max Niemeyer, 1967),
hereafter,SZ. Translationsfrom MartinHeidegger,Being and Time,trans.John Macquar-
rie and EdwardRobinson(New York:Harperand Row, 1962), hereafter,BT. Quotation
fromSZ s 9, 67-71, esp. 70, translationmodified.
49. SZ s 11, 76-77, 76, originalemphasis.
about native systems of meaning. "Ethnology itself," he warned,

"already presupposes as its clue an inadequate analytic of Dasein."50
Despite this warning, Heidegger's existential analysis of myth closely
resembled that of Malinowski's functionalism, according to which myth
serves a universal human purpose: to render livable that sense of "over-
whelming foreboding, behind which, even for the native, there lurks the
idea of an inevitable and ruthless fatality."51 What Malinowski called
the "pragmatic charter of primitive belief," and the "backbone" of com-
munity, Heidegger now identified as the "background"to the lived-prag-
matic world.52 Like Durkheim and Malinowski, Heidegger sees that a
certain methodological advantage can be derived from fixing one's
attention on the "life of primitive peoples," because:
'primitivephenomena'are often less concealedand less complicated

by extensive self-interpretation
on the partof the Dasein in question.
PrimitiveDaseinoften speaksto us moredirectlyin termsofa primor-
dial absorptionin 'phenomena'[. . .] A way of conceiving things
which seems, perhaps,ratherclumsy and crude from our standpoint
[therefore],can be positively helpful in bringingout the ontological
structuresof phenomenain a genuineway.53
Although Heidegger sees human culture as the ongoing work of self-

interpretation, he suggests that there might be an added benefit in
attending more specifically to primitive cultures, in which the basic out-
lines of "everydayness" remain most vivid.54 As evidence of how phi-
losophers can learn from the study of primitive culture, Heidegger
specifically cites Cassirer's PSF II: Mythical Thought, which contains
"clues of far-reaching importance." However, he already registers
50. SZ 5 1;BT 76.

51. Malinowski,"Mythin PrimitivePsychology"108.
52. Malinowski,"Mythin PrimitivePsychology"82.
53. SZ51;BT 76.
54. It is worth noting that Heidegger'sattractionto primitivesystems of meaning
thatare "less concealed"in theirontologicalstructureresemblesMalinowski'sarguments,
and also those put forthby Emile Durkheimin his classic study,TheElementaryFormsof
Religious Life (1912). For Durkheim,"all religion is true,"and all culturesexpress some
variantof religion,just as Heidegger finds "everydayness"in all culture.More impor-
tantly,both Heideggerand Durkheimbelieve thatthe focus on "primitive"belief is most
useful methodologically,thatit discloses the structureof humanmeaningin "simpler"and
more vivid fashion.Primitivereligion,he argues,is "crudeand rudimentary," and not yet
"elaborated"to the point of obscuringtheirdeeperstructure.See Durkheim,TheElemen-
tary Formsof ReligiousLife,trans.KarenFields (New York:The FreePress, 1995) 7.
doubts concerning Cassirer's transcendental presuppositions. "[I]t

remains an open question,"he writes, "whetherthe foundationsof this
Interpretationare sufficientlytransparent- whether [...] the architec-
tonics and [. . .] systematiccontent of Kant's Critiqueof Pure Reason
can provide a possible design for such a task, or whether a new and
more primordialapproachmay not herebe needed."55
If Heideggerdid not make sufficientlyclear what he found unsatisfac-
tory, the broaderdrift of his remarksis evident. Cassirer's study of
myth presupposesa Kantianmodel of subjectivityand it regardsmyth
through the distorting lens of transcendental consciousness. But,
Heidegger argues, if mythologicalstudy is to have any bearing on the
philosophical analysis of everydayness,it must be anchoredin a very
different model of the subject. Heidegger's focus on the practicaland
situated quality of "everyday"meaning offers a superior model of
humanDasein preciselybecauseit avoids any referenceto a "conscious-
ness" that is split off from its interpretativeactivity. But then a "new"
and "more primordial"method is needed. For such a task, Heidegger
suggests, only phenomenologywill do. To strengthenhis case by com-
parison, he observes, ratherdisingenuously,that Cassirerhimself con-
cedes the usefulness of a phenomenological approach in PSF II.
Moreover,he notes that, in his 1923 conversationwith Cassirerin Ham-
burg,"we had agreedin demandingan existentialanalytic."56
Heidegger's doubtsregardingthe validity of transcendentalsubjectiv-
ity when applied to myth was most explicit in his lengthy criticism of
Cassirer'sPSE II that he publishedin 1928.57Now there was no mis-
taking his criticism. "The neo-Kantianorientationto the problem of
consciousness,"wrote Heidegger,"is so disadvantageous,that it [. . .]
hinders a firm footing in the center of the problem."58The difficulty
was that Cassireralreadyassumedthe "ontologicalconstitution"of the
subjectprior to his investigation,while "a radicalontology of Dasein in
55. BT 290, n. xi.

56. SZ Div. I, Ch. 1, n. xi.
57. MartinHeidegger,"ErnstCassirer,Philosophie der symbolischenFormen. 2.
Teil: Das mythischeDenken. Berlin 1925" (Review). Originally,Deutsche Literaturzei-
tung, N.F. 5, Heft 21 (1928): 1000-1012.Reprintedas AppendixII in Kantund der Prob-
lem der Metaphysik,5th ed. (Frankfurt/Main: VittorioKlostermann,1991) 255-270; in
Englishas "Reviewof MythicThought,"ThePiety of Thinking:Essays by MartinHeideg-
ger, trans. James Hart and John Maraldo(Bloomington,IN: IndianaUP, 1976) 32-45,
hereafter,MH: ReviewofPSFII.
58. MH:Reviewof PSFII42.
the light of the problem of Being in general" was required. The analy-
sis of mana, for example, seemed to highlight the fact that mythic
human existence does not conceive of its meaning-systems as mere
"representations" that are simply "present" [vorhanden] to a conscious-
ness. Mana, in particular,was a powerful illustration of the fact that, for
"mythic Dasein," the meaningfulness of the world could not be por-
trayed as born from the sovereign capacities of an expressive subject.
Which is the mode of being of mythic"life"which enablesthe mana-

representationto function as the guiding [. . .] understandingof
Being? The possible answerto this questionof coursepresupposesa
previousworkingout of the basic ontologicalconstitutionof Dasein.
If this basic constitutionis to be foundin "care,"[.. .] then it becomes
clear that mythic Dasein is primarilydeterminedby "thrownness"
[Geworfenheit].59
For Heidegger, mana indicates a mode of meaning not subject to human

control. Therefore, it is presumptuous for Cassirer to describe mana
from the point of view of a specifically "modern" and enlightenment
consciousness, as if it is obvious that mythic thinking expresses the dis-
engagement and "presence" characteristic of a Kantian subject. "In
'thrownness,'" Heidegger concludes, "mythic Dasein, in its manner of
being-in-the-world, is delivered up to the world in such a way that it is
overwhelmed by that to which it is delivered up."60
The difference is dramatic.For Heidegger, the analysis of mythic
meaning can only succeed if it presupposes a subject characterized by
"thrownness"and not "spontaneity"as its methodological point of
departure.This implies that one should not presume a subject that is
split from the "objects"it representson the ontologicallevel. The sense
of being "overwhelmed" by representations is not, as Cassirer supposed,
merely an illusion inflicted upon a primitive consciousness that lacks
rational insight into its own powers of creation. Instead, it is an experi-
ence of all humanexistence in its "everyday"mode. Cassirerassumesas
"a basic rule which governs all development"that "spiritachieves true
and complete inwardnessonly in expressing itself."61But even this
model of expressionpoints away fromthe Kantianmodel of subjectivity
as sovereign and toward a model of subjecthoodas dependent. To
59. MH: ReviewofPSFII 43.
60. MH: Reviewof PSFII43.
61. MH: Reviewof PSFII44; citing Germanof PSFII242; and EnglishPSFII 196.
emphasize this point, Heidegger poses a purely rhetorical question:

"Whatis the ontological constitutionof humanDasein which accounts
for the fact that it, as it were, comes to its properself only by way of a
detourthroughthe world?"62
As this abbreviatedsummarymay suggest, the disagreementbetween
Cassirer and Heidegger concerningthe appropriatesubject-modelfor
the study of myth was not an isolated affair. It was rooted in more
basic, ontological assumptionsregardingthe constitutionof language,
meaning, and the self. As noted above, Cassirerregardedthe primitive
understandingof myth as essentially a misunderstanding, since he took
it as a given that all myth and languageare the projectionsof sovereign
human consciousness. Because only the modern subject could recog-
nize culture as the effects of its own creative agency, the only proper
analysis of myth was that performedby the modemrn, secular mind.63
Heidegger,by contrast,wished to addressmyth on its own terms,which
meant that he saw the experienceof dependencyas something inelim-
inablefrom phenomenologicaldescription.He also supposedthat myth
promises a "more direct"or simplified illustrationof how "everyday-
ness" functionsmore generally.He concludedthat the mythicalsense of
dependency - myth as thrownness - could afford philosophy a crucial
glimpseintothe ontologicalconstitutionof humanexistenceas such.64
62. MH: Reviewof PSFII 45. The Heideggerianperspectiveimpliesthat myth is a

structurewithouttranscendental anchor,and withouta "center"or pointof naturalisticcon-
tact with the real - a view that closely anticipatesJacquesDerrida'scriticismof Claude
Ldvi-Strauss's views in his address,"Structure,
Sign,andPlay in the Discourseof the Human
Sciences,"first publishedin Derrida,L'dcritureet la dfference (Paris:Editionsdu Seuil,
1967);in Englishas WritingandDifference,trans.AlanBass (Chicago:U ChicagoP, 1978).
63. HabermaseloquentlysummarizesCassirer'sview: "Thepositionof humanbeing
in the world is defined by a form-givingpower which transformssense impressionsinto
meaningfulstructures.Humanbeings masterthe forcesof naturewhich rush in uponthem
throughsymbolswhich springfromthe productiveimagination.Thus they gain a distance
fromthe immediatepressureof nature.Of course,theypayfor this emancipationwith their
mentaldependenceon a semanticizednature,whichreturnsin thespellbindingforceof myth-
ical images.Thatfirst act of distantiationmustthereforebe repeatedin the courseof cultural
development."Jiirgen Habermas,"The LiberatingPower of Symbols: Ernst Cassirer's
HumanisticLegacyandthe WarburgLibrary," TheLiberatingPowerof Symbols:Philosoph-
ical Essays,trans.PeterDews (Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2001) 1-29,24, my emphasis.
64. This view of dependencyis summarizedin Heidegger'salmost"mythical"pro-
nouncementthat humanitydoes not possess language,since language is the "house of
Being." See Heidegger,"Letteron Humanism,"Pathmarks,ed. WilliamMcNeill (Cam-
bridge,UK: CambridgeUP, 1998) 254.
152 MythandModernity
The Davos Encounterand the Myth-Debate

The contrast between thrown and spontaneous subjectivity was
broughtto a head duringHeideggerand Cassirer'sfamous meeting at
Davos in 1929. The proposed topic was Kant's philosophy, which
remaineda majortouchstonefor any broaderphilosophicaldiscussion.
Even in the Weimarera, Kant was, in Heinrich Rickert'sphrase, the
"philosopherof modem culture."65It seemed naturalto organize the
public encounterbetween Cassirerand Heidegger as a debate over the
of Kantiandoctrine.
properinterpretation
It quickly became obvious that not only did Cassirerand Heidegger
disagree about how best to read Kant, but more profoundly,about the
status of philosophy as such. Indeed, Cassirerquickly discerned that
Heideggerdeploys Kantas an opportunityto promotehis own "existen-
tial" brandof phenomenology.After listeningto Heidegger'sattemptto
transformKantianepistemologyinto what he called a "groundlayingfor
metaphysics"for threeweeks, Cassirercomplainedthat
thereis hardlya singleconceptwhichhasbeenparaphrased with so

WhatdoesHeideggerhavein
littleclarityas thatof neo-Kantianism.
mindwhenhe employsthephenomenological critiquein placeof the
neo-Kantianone? Neo-Kantianismis the scapegoat[Stindenbock]of
thenewerphilosophy.66
Heidegger's entire presentationof "existential"philosophy is, Cassirer

claimed, based upon a one-sided caricatureof the Marburgneo-Kantian
legacy. Heideggerspoke as if Cohen's entireteaching could be reduced
to a mere theory of scientific discovery,whereas, in fact, Cassirersug-
gested, the term "neo-Kantianism"was best understoodnot "substan-
tially" but "functionally."The Kantianview is not reducibleto a "kind
of philosophy as dogmatic doctrinalsystem" [als dogmatischesLehr-
system] but is instead"a directionfor posing questions."[eine Richtung
der Fragestellung]67
65. HeinrichRickert,Kantals Philosophder modernenKultur;ein geschichtsphil-

osophischer Versuch(Tilbingen:J.C.B.Mohr,1924).
66. "Davos Disputation,"cited in the originalDavos transcriptfrom Otto Friedrich
Bollnow and JoachimRitter,MartinHeidegger,Kant und das Problemder Metaphysik,
GS, Band3 (1973) 274-296, in English,in Heidegger,Kantand the ProblemofMetaphys-
ics, trans. RichardTaft (Bloomington,IN: IndianaUP, 1990) 171-185; 171, translation
ammended.Hereaftercited as Davos. For documentationand interpretativeesssays, see
most recently,Dominic Kaegi and Enno Rudolph,eds. Cassirer- Heidegger 70 Jahre
Davoser Debatte(Hamburg:MeinerVerlag,2002).
67. Davos 171.
But if Cassireris right, then the difference between his own quasi-
Kantian "direction"of philosophicalinquiryand Heidegger's "existen-
tial" orientationis even more dramaticthan it appearedat first. Kantian-
ism is merely the "scapegoat"for a general disagreementconcerning
the status of the "modern"subject in philosophy.Cassirerinsists that
the theory of symbolic forms illustratesthe validity of the Kantian-tran-
scendental subject-model,since the theory shows how human experi-
ence in diverse spheres is governed by the formativeaction of human
spirititself. It is the principleof form, Cassirersaid, that allows the sub-
ject to "transposeeverythingin him which is lived experienceinto some
objective shape," in which he discovers nothing but his own mental
energy "objectified"as world-meaning.There is, Cassirer affirms, "a
true spiritualrealm,"but it is nothing more or less than "the spiritual
world created from himself."68Moreover,whatever one's doubts con-
cerning the origins of humanculture,it is clear that ethics provides an
illustrationof the humancapacityto live by forms one has oneself cre-
ated. Cassirerconcludes that this is the essence of Kantianautonomy
and throughthe categoricalimperative,the humanbeing is capableof a
"breakthrough" [Durchbruch]to a plane "which is no longer relativeto
the finitude"of mereexistence.69
Heidegger,not surprisingly,found such argumentsunacceptable,and
he noted that any inquiry into the "essence"of human being must be
founded on an ontological basis quite different from the neo-Kantian
premise of mental spontaneity."How is the inner structureof Dasein
itself," he asked, "is it finite or infinite?" To answer this question,
Heidegger claimed, one must returnto "philosophy'scentral problem-
atic,"which impliesthrowingman "intothe totalityof beings"in orderto
"revealto him there,with all his freedom,the nothingnessof his Dasein."
Heidegger understoodthat from the neo-Kantianposition, a philoso-
pher's fixation on themes of world-dependencyor finitudeappearas lit-
tle more than an "occasionfor pessimismand melancholy."But it was in
fact an "occasionfor understanding[...] thatphilosophyhas the task of
throwingman back, so to speak, into the hardnessof his fate from the
shallowaspectof a manwho merelyuses the workof the spirit."70
Cassirer's allusion to ethics does not prove the self's "infinite"for-
mative agency, since even the categorical imperativerequires a finite
68. Davos 179.
69. Davos 291.
70. Davos 291.
being whose capacities for self-transparency are, Heidegger claims,

necessarily limited to mortal existence.
In the CategoricalImperativewe have somethingwhich goes beyond

the finite creature.But preciselythe conceptof the Imperativeas such
shows the innerreferenceto a finite creature.Also, this going-beyond
to somethinghigheris alwaysjust a going-beyondto the finitecreature,
to one which is created(angel). This transcendencetoo still remains
withinthe [sphereof] creatureliness[Geschapflichkeit]and finitude.71
For Heidegger, the transcendental capacities of the self are severely lim-
ited by the constitutive features of "creatureliness." What Cassirer cele-
brates as the human ability to "live" in obedience to one's own rules is,
from another perspective, further evidence of the fact that mental
agency cannot achieve, as Cassirer contends, any true "breakthrough"to
a sphere of absolute objectivity. Heidegger's startling reference to an
"angel" demonstrates that his philosophical rejection of an enlighten-
ment model of mental spontaneity draws upon religious resources.
The Davos disputation has remained a reference point in the history
of philosophy, not least because it has afforded many commentators
with a dramatic illustration of the cultural rift which threatened Ger-
man culturein 1929.72There is some evidence that the public confron-
tation between the two philosophers was not entirely amicable. One of
Cassirer's students has written that when Cassirer offered his hand to
his interlocutorat the end of the discussion,Heideggerrefusedto take it.
71. Davos 279.

72. On the Davos disputation,see the excellentstudyby MichaelFriedman,A Part-
ing of the Ways(Chicago:OpenCourt,2000); andalso PierreAubenque,Luc Ferry,Enno
Rudolph, Jean-FrancoisCourtine,and Fabien Capeillires, "RoundtableDiscussion on
'Philosophieund Politik: Die Davoser Disputationzwischen ErnstCassirerund Martin
Heideggerin der Retrospektive',"
InternationaleZeitschriftfiirPhilosophie,Heft2 (1992):
290-312; Aubenque,"Le Ddbatde 1929 entreCassireret Heidegger"Ernst Cassirer:De
Marbourg/i New York,L'intindrairephilosophique,ed. Jean Seidengart(Paris:Les Edi-
tions du Cerf, 1990) 81-96; WayneCristaudo,"Heideggerand Cassirer:Being, Knowing
andPolitics,"Kantstudien82 (1991):469-483;KarlfriedGriinder,"CassirerundHeidegger
in Davos, 1929" OberErnstCassirersPhilosophieder SymbolishenFormen,eds. Hans-
Jirg Braun,HelmutHolzhey,and Emrnst W. Orth(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,1988); John
MichaelKrois,"Aufklrung und Metaphysik:Zur PhilosophieCassirersund der Davoser
Debattemit Heidegger,"InternationaleZeitschriftfiirPhilosophie2 (1992): 273-289; Den-
nis A. Lynch,"ErnstCassirerand MartinHeidegger:The Davos Debate,"Kantstudien81
(1990): 360-370; FrankSchalow,"Thinkingat Cross Purposeswith Kant:Reason, Fini-
tude, and Truthin the Cassirer-Heidegger
Debate,"Kantstudien87 (1996): 198-217;and
CalvinO.Shrag,"HeideggerandCassireron Kant,"Kantstudien58 (1967): 87-100.
Moreover,four years later,Heideggerassumedthe position of Rektorat

FreiburgUniversityunderthe aegis of the National Socialists, whereas
Cassirerand his wife fled Hamburgin 1933, first to Vienna,and then to
Englandand Sweden,beforesettlingin the UnitedStatesin 1941.
Many critics have been temptedto read Cassirer'sconfrontationwith
Heidegger in a straightforwardly political fashion. For PierreBourdieu,
it appeared obvious that Heidegger's language is little more than a
barely encrypted "irrationalism,"a "conservativerevolution"directed
against liberal-democracyand the culturallegacy of Kant.73Even Jtir-
gen HabermastransformsCassirer'sargumentsinto presentistpolitical
material when he notes that the "humanist legacy which Cassirer
bequeathsto us throughhis philosophyconsists not least in sensitizing
us to the fake primordialityof political myths."In what seems an inten-
tional referenceto Heidegger,Habermashastens to add that "Cassirer
makes us wary of the intellectualcelebrationof archaicorigins, which
is widespreadtodayas in the 1930s."74
It would be rash, however, to read the Heidegger-Cassirerdispute in
any directly "political"fashion.75The Davos encounterwas only one
moment in an ongoing philosophicaldiscussionas to whetherthe mod-
emrnist'sfaith in the autonomy of the subject is warranted.Cassirer's
essentiallyKantianview of spontaneousconsciousnesscontrastsdramati-
cally with Heidegger's theory of human being-in-the-worldas essen-
tially "thrown."Significantly,Cassirer'sportraitof mythic consciousness
bears strikingresemblanceto Heidegger'sportraitof Dasein, notwith-
standing its historical status, primitive or modern. For example, what
73. Bourdieu'sviolent reductionof philosophyto little more thana field of cultural
power seems remarkablyinconsistentwith any defense of rationalism.Of course, this is
not Bourdieu'spoint, since he reflexively admitsthe embeddednessof his own perspec-
tive. Still, he risks makinga merelyad hominemallegorywhen he suggeststhat"Heideg-
ger's hostility to the grandmastersof Kantianism,especially Cassirer,was rooted in a
profoundincompatibilitywith their alien habitus,"which includedthe tension between
"thisdark,atheleticlittle man,"andthe "white-hairedman, Olympiannot only in appear-
ance but in spirit."One should note that Bourdieuis quotingthe memoirof an audience
memberat Davos; the questionremainswhat Heidegger's"dark"appearanceis supposed
to indicatein contrastto Cassirer'sprematurelywhite hair.Needless to say, the contrast,
Olympianreferenceaside, calls upona panoplyof mythicaloppositions.See PierreBour-
dieu, ThePolitical Ontologyof MartinHeidegger.(Stanford:StanfordUP, 1991) 48.
74. Habermas,"TheLiberatingPowerof Symbols"26.
75. Fora longertreatmentof the problemsinvolvedin the politicalinterpretation of
the Davos encounter,see my essay, "ContinentalDivide: Ernst Cassirer and Martin
Heideggerat Davos, 1929 - an Allegory of IntellectualHistory,"ModernIntellectual
History 1.2 (2004): 219-248.
Cassirerconsideredpeculiarto the mythic conceptionof space - where

"zones and directions[OrteundRichtungen]of space standout from one
anotherbecausea differentaccentof meaningis connectedwith them"-
anticipatesthe "existential"of space-as-environment
that Heideggercon-
sidered a structuralfeatureof being-in-the-world.
"If Dasein, in its con-
cern, brings something close by, this does not signify that it fixes
somethingat a spatialpositionwith a minimaldistancefrom some points
of the body";it signifiesa "regional"andready-to-handinvolvementinso-
far as it is "something [. . .] we can come across [...] as having form and
direction [wird das Zuhandene nach Form und Richtung vorfindlich]."76
The apparentsimilaritybetween these two theories of space is even
more striking,because Cassireremphasizesthe merelyprovisional sta-
tus of the mythic conception.He claims that myth, by force of its own
dialectical logic, must eventually "go beyond" itself to the more
abstracted symbolism of religion, and eventually to the enlightened
frameworksof science.77On Cassirer'sview, myth necessarilyoutgrew
those very modes of understanding that Heideggerconsideredpermanent
and structural"existentials"of humanbeing.78Moreover,in a footnoteto
PSF, Cassirerhintedat a resemblancebetweenthe mythic conceptionof
language and certain characteristicsof "psychopathology."79 This is a
profound,but politically indeterminate remark. Still, it contains a force-
ful anticipationof Cassirer'slater claim that Heidegger'sphilosophy is
itself symptomaticof the modernreversionto myth.Almost twentyyears
later,once Cassirerhad begun teachingin America,he expandedon this
argumentin his own, expresslypoliticalassessmentof Heidegger'sthink-
ing in whatwas to be his finalwork,TheMythof theState.
Cassirer'sPolitical Testament
Cassirer'sThe Myth of the State is one of the faded classics of mid-
twentieth-centuryintellectualhistory.A genealogyof NationalSocialism,
76. Cassirer,PSF II 96 (German122);Heidegger,BT 144-45;SZ 110-111.

77. See esp. PSF, II, PartIV,"TheDialecticof MythicalConsciousness"235-261.
78. For Cassirer'sexplicit remarkson surpassingHeideggerianpragmaticspace, see
the remarks in PSF, Vol. III: "Whatdistinguishesour own undertakingfrom that of
Heideggeris above all thatit does not stop at this stageof the at-handand its mode of spa-
tiality,but withoutchallengingHeidegger'spositiongoes beyondit; for we wish to follow
the road leadingfrom spatialityas a factorin the at-handto space as a form of existence,
and furthermoreto show how this roadleadsrightthroughthe domainof symbolic forma-
tion." 149 n. 4, my emphasis.
79. See PSF II 41-42, n. 13.
it presents the history of political thought as an ongoing struggle

between "logos"and "mythos,"between a "rational"theory of the state
promotingfreedomand autonomy,and a "mythic"theorypresentingthe
world as governedby forces beyond humancontrol, condemningus to
unfreedomand ontologicalpassivity.Withinthis broadscheme, Cassirer
emphasizes those moments of struggle between logos and myth that
anticipatethe modernclash betweenthe republicanideal of autarkyand
the fascist myth of collective submission. He takes particularcare to
prove how the contemporaryencounterwith mythic politics is rooted in
ancient sources.Plato's "struggleagainstmyth"and the consequentban-
ishment of the arts from the polis is only an expressionof that deeper,
"rationalist"tendency in Platonic thought, which, Cassirer claims,
teaches "how to classify and systematizeour concepts,"to impose form
upon the world and bring "the chaos of our minds, of our desires and
passions,of ourpoliticaland social life [.. .] into orderandharmony."80
For Cassirer,a rationaltheory of politics cannot be defined in isola-
tion from broader philosophical commitments. A politics of reason
gains its definitive characteronly insofar as it draws upon a transcen-
dentaltheory of mind, and as a rationalepistemologyimplies spontane-
ity, it demandsa model of the subjectthat is capableof actively forging
the rules that order its experience. Similarly, rational politics imply
"autarky"or self-rule:To be rationalis to enjoy an active share in self-
governance.But for Cassirer,there is more than an analogy between the
epistemological and political manifestationsof reason. As discussed
above, Cassirerbelieves that "mythic"consciousnessis essentially inca-
pable of recognizing its own formativeagency. It follows that a mythi-
cal vision of the world lacks the experience of self-transparencythat
autarkyrequires.Only a fully secular consciousness achieves the full
measureof self-recognitionandthereforeself-governance.81
Cassirerillustratesthis point by assessing some of the paramountfig-
ures of Westernpolitical theory. Machiavelli'stheory of statecraft,for
example, can hardlybe considereda perfectexpressionof autarky,since
governmentis solely for the prince and not the people. Nonetheless, it
is an importantstep in the "secularizationof the symbol of Fortune."82
Although originally a mythic force beyond human appeal, Fortuna
80. MS 93.
81. For a summaryof this theme in GermanIdealism,see my review essay, "Self-
AuthorizingModernity,Problemsof Interpretationin the History of GermanIdealism,"
Historyand Theory44 (Feb. 2005): 121-137.
82. MS 199, emphasisin original.
becomes in Machiavelli's thinking a principle at least potentially

responsiveto humanagency.Cassirernotes that for Machiavellithe true
measureof princelyskill is the abilityto achieve some measureof ratio-
nal mastery."Manis not subduedto Fortune;he is not at the mercy of
winds and waves. He must choose his course and steer his course."But,
Cassirerhastenedto add, "if he fails to performthis duty Fortunescorns
and deserts him." Machiavelli is admittedly "the first philosophical
advocate of a resolutemilitarism,"but as a theoristof political logos he
is most significantfor his belief that statecraftmust be achieved by "a
clear,cool, and logical mind."83
From Machiavelli to the seventeenth-centuryfoundations of social
contracttheory,Cassirersaw only a small step. Here, too, he celebrates
the freedom and rationalityof the subject. What he calls the "rational
character"of the seventeenth-century's politicalphilosophersis founded
on their revival of an originallyStoic principleconcerningthe "autarky"
of human reason. "Reasonis autonomousand self-dependent.It is not
in need of any externalhelp; it could not even acceptthis help if it were
offered. It has to find its own way and to believe in its own strength."
As in Machiavelli, social contracttheory supplantsthe notion of sub-
mission to mythic forces with the doctrineof rationalcontrol;it is now
entirelypurgedof "mystery."
[F]or if we reducethe legal and social orderto free individualacts, to

submissionof the governed,all mysteryis
a voluntarycontractual
gone. Thereis nothingless mysteriousthana contract.A contract
mustbe madein full awarenessof its meaningandconsequences;it
presupposesthefreeconsentof allthepartiesconcerned.84
Vanquishing"mystery"requires stripping the political sphere of all

meaning in which one could not recognize one's own agency. Contrac-
tual politics presupposedemythologization:the mythical experience of
dispossession can be fully dissolved into the experience of self-reflec-
tive reason.
Today, much of Cassirer'spolitical analysis may appearnaive. The
contrastbetween reason and myth seems too starkto be serviceablein
identfying more specific doctrines in the history of political thought.
Indeed,the argumentmakesthe choice of correctpolitics so obvious that
83. MS 200, 202-203.

84. MS 216.
the real divergenceof opinionappearsinexplicable.The entire narrative

seems bent toward unifying diverse political philosophiesinto the gen-
eral dramaof an ongoing battle,betweenthe hypostasizedand transhis-
torical forces of "mythos"and "logos," a schema, ironically, which
seems to call uponthe very style of mythicthoughtit wantsto combat.
One explanationfor this weakness is Cassirer'suncriticalfidelity to
the Enlightenment.His public address, "The Idea of the Republican
Constitution,"which was deliveredon the constitutionalanniversaryof
August 11, 1928, presentsan eloquent and moving defense of democ-
racy as rooted deep in Kantian thought. The principle of republican
government,Cassirerclaims, drew upon Kant's enlightenmentfaith in
the "intelligible"characterof the humanbeing in relationto its sensual
surroundings,and its capacityto lift itself above the "causalnexus" of
"empirical-historicalevents" as a "subjectof freedom."The rhetorical
urgency of this claim is unmistakable:At a momentwhen a nationalist
prejudicewas gatheringforce in the belief that Weimardemocracywas
"un-German,"Cassirerwished to prove that "the idea of a republican
constitutionwas hardly a 'foreigner' [Fremdling]to German intellec-
tual history [deutschenGeistesgeschichte],"but had in fact "grownfrom
its native ground"and had been "nourishedupon its most unique ener-
gies [. . .] of idealist philosophy."85 Cassirer's other widely read work
of intellectualhistory, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment(1932), is
also an encomium to the period which "discoveredand passionately
defended the autonomy of reason [. . .] in all fields of knowledge."86
Indeed, it is the essentially Kantianprincipleof mental agency, which
Cassirerbelieved broughtall of the diverse currentsof eighteenth-cen-
tury thoughtto perfection.This admiration,however,admitslittle quali-
fication. The prefatoryremarksfor the 1932 edition urged readersthat
"[m]orethan ever before" it was importantto hold up to "the present
age" that "brightclear mirrorfashionedby the Enlightenment,"and that
the "age which veneratedreason and science as man's highest faculty
cannotand mustnot be lost evenfor us."87
While Cassirerwas perhapsrightto thinkthat the Weimarexperiment
was under assault due in part to the reemergenceof "anti-Enlighten-
ment"sentiments,he lacked insight into the limits of the Enlightenment
itself. He was unmovedby the spirit of ruefulparadoxthat allowed the
85. Die Idee 31.
86. PE, Englishxi, my emphasis.
87. PE, Englishxi, my emphasis.
Frankfurt School, among others, to discern in the dialectical relation

between myth and enlightenment the specifically modern sources of
fascism. Indeed, the entirety of Cassirer's scholarship seems immune
from any and all doubt concerning the ambivalent consequences of
secular modernity. But this raises the troublesome question as to
whether his commitment to the Enlightenment was itself a species of
rationalist mythology.
In the closing pages of The Myth of the State, Cassirer turns back to
reflect one last time upon the culturaland political ramificationsof Heideg-
ger's philosophy. Its core idea, Cassirer observes, is that "existence has a
historical character"and "is bound up with the special conditions under
which the individual lives. To change these conditions is impossible."
In orderto expresshis thoughtHeideggerhad to coin a new term.He

spoke of the Geworfenheitof man (the being-thrown).To be thrown
into the streamof time is a fundamentaland inalterablefeatureof our
humansituation.We cannotemerge from this streamand we cannot
change its course. We have to accept the historicalconditionsof our
existence. We can try to understandand interpretthem;but we cannot
changethem.88
Although one might quarrel with this summary of Heideggerian

"thrownness,"Cassirer makes it clear that he is not interested in
Heidegger's philosophy itself; he is concerned solely with its cultural
consequences: "I do not mean to say that these philosophical doctrines
had a direct bearing on the development of political ideas in Germany.
Most of these ideas arose from quite different sources." But Heideg-
ger's thinking, Cassirer observes, helped at the very least to "enfeeble
and slowly undermine the forces that could have resisted the modern
political myths." It was judged not on its merits as philosophy, but
instead as an "instrument"of Nazi propaganda:
[. . .] a theorythatsees in the Geworfenheitof manone of his principal

characteristics has given up all hopesof an activesharein the construc-
tion and reconstructionof man's cultural life. Such a philosophy
renouncesits own fundamentaltheoreticaland ethicalideals.It can be
used,then,as a pliable instrumentin thehandsof thepoliticalleaders.89
This is Cassirer's final judgment of Heidegger: "Thrownness"had become

88. MS 368-9.
89. MS369.Myemphasis.
a "pliable instrument"to be manipulatedas a myth for the benefit of

National Socialism. Existentialismitself representedbut one variantof
what Cassirercalls "thereturnof fatalismin ourmodernworld."90
The peculiarityof this criticism is that it does not address Heideg-
ger's philosophy as such. It claims only that its philosophicalthemes
were made serviceable as "political myth," as cultural beliefs that
encouragedsubmissionto the state. To be sure, Cassirerclaims fatal-
ism was alreadylatent in Heidegger'sphilosophy.Moreover,by capitu-
lating to Nazism, Cassirer observes, Heidegger betrayed the ideal of
non-partisanphilosophical inquiry. But Cassirer's charge nonetheless
ignores the possibility that thrownnessand mythic dependency are in
fact constitutive features of the human subject - a possibility which
requiresphilosophicaldiscussion quite apartfrom the disastrousconse-
quences of drafting such an insight for its political effects. Cassirer,
however, seems to have believed his condemnationof Heidegger's own
complicity in mythic politics suffices as proof that the idea of thrown-
ness is itself a myth. But the analogy is specious, since the populareffi-
cacy of an idea has no self-evidentbearingon whetherthat idea is true.
Indeed, Cassirer's argument implies evaluating philosophical ideas
solely in terms of their political application,which is to say, evaluating
them as political "myths."But this breaksdown the distinctionbetween
philosophy and politics to such a degree that the only concepts to be
praised are the ones which promoteliberal-enlightenmenteffects when
set loose in the broadercircuitof politicalculture.
This argumentativeshift - from conceptualtruthto pragmaticeffi-
cacy - was most apparentin a 1944 lecture that Cassirerdelivered at
ConnecticutCollege and closely followed the argumentsof TheMythof
the State. The lecture repeatedalmost verbatimthe book's attemptto
indict Heideggerian"thrownness"along with Oswald Spengler's theo-
ries of culturaldecline as signals of Germany'satavistic returnto the
"general mythical concept [. . .] of fate." But here, Cassirer inserted the
additionalclaim that philosophymust fulfill "its most importanteduca-
tional task,"which is to "teachman how to develop his active faculties
in order to form his individualand social life." Accordingto Cassirer,
however,Heideggerianthinkingcould not fulfill this mission:
As soon as philosophyno longertrustsits own power,as soon as it
90. MS 369.
giveswayto a merelypassiveattitude,[...] it cannotteachmanhow

to develophis activefacultiesin orderto formhis individualand
sociallife. A philosophythatindulgesin somberpredicationsabout
the declineandinevitabledestruction
of humanculture,a philosophy
whose whole attentionis focused on the Geworfenheit,the Being-
thrownof man,canno longerdo its duty.91
Here Cassirerconflatestruthand pragmaticeffect. He assumes that it is

the presidingduty of philosophy,its "educationaltask,"to promotethe
enlightenmentof subjectsfor republicanrule. To fulfill this task, how-
ever, Cassirer claims that a philosophy must endorse an ontology of
freedom ratherthan fatality, since only the widespreadbelief in free-
dom would "teachman"how to "develophis active facultiesin orderto
form his individualand social life." But this argumentremainsopen to
the charge of political partisanship,since it is based chiefly upon an
empirical observation concerning the popular advantage of certain
beliefs ratherthan a philosophicalvindicationof their truth.Ironically,
by conflatingwhat is true and what is merely an effective belief-frame-
work for action, Cassirerfound himself in dangerousproximityto the
universal-pragmatist theoryof mythhe claimedto oppose.
How did Cassirerfall into this paradox?One explanationis that he
failed to appreciatethe phenomenonof modernist technique. As an
unapologeticpartisanof the Enlightenment,he embracedthe view that
secularizationmeans liberationfrom mythic dependency,and thatpoliti-
cal liberty is therefore contingent upon achieving a fully demytholo-
gized subjectivity.At times his commitmentto the Enlightenmentseems
to verge on dogmatic and perhapsreligious foundations.In an essay
published in 1944, Cassirer, following his teacher Hermann Cohen,
extols the Jewish people - the mythical"enemy"in Nazi propaganda
- for representingcertain "ethicalideals," which, once "broughtinto
being by Judaism,"have "foundtheir way into general human culture,
into the life of all civilized nations."As the first religion to break from
myth, Judaismhas contributedto the ethical ideals that are required"to
break the power of the modernpolitical myths," and it has "done its
duty,havingonce morefulfilled its historicaland religiousmission."92
This paean to Judaism is suggestive, since Cassirer identified the
"duty"to break from myth not only with Judaismbut also, as noted
91. "Philosophyand Politics,"Symbol,Myth,and Culture230.

92. Cassirer,"Judaismandthe ModemPoliticalMyths"241. My emphasis.
above, with the liberatoryimpulseof secularizingphilosophyitself. But

the comparison only serves to show how Cassirer's philosophical
project is committed- almost as an article of faith - to the possibil-
ity of a wholly disenchantedsubjectivity.This momentof dogmatismin
Cassirer's thinking becomes obvious if one contraststhe earlier writ-
ings on myth, which display a generously functionalistview of myth,
and the judgments in The Myth of the State, where Cassirerseems to
deploy the term"myth"itself as a near-synonymfor illusion. His antipa-
thy for mythic unreasonran so deep that it blindedCassirerto the ques-
tion of modernity'sindependentshare in spawningfascist thinking:He
criticized the status of "myth"(as if the problem were solely mythic
consciousness)butneglectedthe propagandistic"manipulation" of myth.
Cassirernever adequatelyaddressedthe modernist-subjective assump-
tions underlyingthis so-called "technique."As noted at the startof this
essay, Cassirerrecognizedthat the peculiarityof the "moderntechnical
age" is that "myths can be manufactured[. . .] accordingto the same
methods as any other modernweapon."Fascism, he claims, works by
means of a "techniqueof myth,"which is not to be confused with myth
itself. But if so, it made little sense for Cassirerto attack Heidegger's
philosophy as supporting "mythic" consciousness. He should have
directlycondemnedthe philosophicalcast of mindthatenablesan instru-
mentalistrelationto myth, since he finds this instrumentalismthe most
peculiarfeatureof NationalSocialistrule. In otherwords, if fascism is a
"techniqueof myth,"which is moreto blame,mythor technique?
It is easy to see why Cassireravoidedthis question.Any scrutinyinto
the ontological sources of moderndominationwould have pushed Cas-
sirer toward the recognitionthat fascism would not have been possible
were it not for the modern ideal of autonomy.Cassirerrefused to see
any continuity between autonomy and fascism because he could not
admit that the enlightenmentsubject itself bore at least some responsi-
bility for modern domination.Heidegger,by contrast,had argued that
the ideal is an illusion, since on his view the human being is always
thrown into historical and social meanings that cannot be made fully
available for subjective command. It is crucial to note that Cassirer
misses the point that Heidegger's philosophical claims are primarily
about how we are constitutedas humanbeings, and not how we should
believe ourselves to be constituted.In Heidegger's own jargon, such
claims are ontological, not normative.But Cassirerdid not take care to
distinguish between the conceptualunderstandingthat we are thrown,

and the normativeproposalthat one should submitto this condition.Of
course, if normativeclaims on behalf of National Socialism appear to
follow from "ontological"inquiriesinto humanconstitution,Heidegger
himself is chiefly to blame. By lending an imprimaturof philosophical
dignity to the execrable vernacularof National Socialist propaganda
throughhis many speeches (which were replete,moreover,with his own
philosophical terminology), Heidegger succeeded far more than Cas-
sirerin openingan empiricalroutefromontologyto politics.
ConcludingRemarks
Whateverits limitations,The Myth of the State has made an impor-
tant contribution to a broader discussion concerning the relation
between secularizationand reason in modern political life. Indeed, a
chief point of dissension in both the Anglo-Americanand continental
secularizationdebatesis whethermyth can be defined,with Cassirer,as
a mystified expression of human imaginationthat must yield to the
more "sophisticated"works of the self-transparent mind, or whetherit is
salutary to admit myth, with Heidegger, as the constitutivebackground
of all human action and the name for a fundamentalreceptivity that
cannotbe expunged.I have triedto reconstructthe debatebetween Cas-
sirer and Heideggerin orderto illuminatesome of their deeper assump-
tions. My aim is chiefly confined to exposition, but I also hope to
advance a certainmeasureof skepticismregardingCassirer'sbasically
"Kantian"view that there can be such a thing as fully self-transparent
subjectivity,i.e., a humanbeing which enjoys the capacityto direct its
actionwithoutrelianceuponexternalmeaning.
It is worth noting that this sort of skepticism is typically associated
with the conservativecritiqueof liberal autonomy.It can be found, for
example, in such diverse works as Michael Oakeshott's 1947 essay,
"Rationalismin Politics,"which is widely regardedas the paradigmof
conservativetheory,as well as AlisdairMacIntyre'sAfter Virtue(1981),
and even Charles Taylor's politically more progressive reflections in
Sources of the Self (1989). While divergentin many respects, these
works share an appeal to the necessity of inherited "frameworks,"
93. MichaelOakeshott,"Rationalismin Politics,"Rationalismin Politics and other
essays (Indianapolis,IN: LibertyFund, 1991); AlasdairC. Maclntyre,After Virtue:A
Studyin Moral Theory(NotreDame, IN: U Notre Dame P, 1981);CharlesTaylor,Sources
of the Self TheMakingof the ModernIdentity(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUP, 1989).
which are often understood in religious terms and are supposed to guide
human action, and a correlative emphasis upon the limits of post-enlight-
enment reason, which they assail as "Cartesian,"or "managerial," or, in
Oakeschott's words, as "technique." On the Continent, such concerns lay
at the heart of the so-called "secularization debate" of the 1960s, which
pitted Hans Blumenberg'smodernistdefense of self-assertionin The
Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1966) against Karl L6with's indictment
of "secular presumption" in Meaning in History (1949) as the transfig-
ured face of an originally eschatological Heilsgeschichte. Most recently,
Marcel Gauchet investigates the birth of political agency from religious
otherness in his book, The Disenchantment of the World (1985), and
offers liberal-democratic theory a deepened awareness of that "radical
dispossession" which characterizesthe most primal forms of religion.94
But it would be a mistake to assume that the critique of modern
autonomyas illusory must result in conservativepolitics.95There is no
obvious or axiomatic relation between politics and ontology. Cassirer
believed that "modernpolitical myths" were both politically undesir-
able as well as false. But what if autonomy is itself a "myth"?Cas-
sirer's error was to have presumed that there is necessarily a link
between "demythologized"subjectivityand political emancipation.It is
this linkage - between enlightenment and freedom - that permits the
self-justifyingthesis thatonly liberalismis "true."But the two are in fact
distinct.As RichardRorty suggests,the beliefs that guide our actions in
the political sphere are not bound to how we are constitutedas human
beings. One of the uncomfortable things about political action is that it
cannot claim authority based on some deeper, putatively ontological
94. KarlL6with,Meaningin History:The TheologicalImplicationsof the Philoso-

phy ofHistory (Chicago:U ChicagoP, 1949);HansBlumenberg,Die Legitimititder Neu-
zeit (Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp,1966) in English, The Legitimacyof the ModernAge,
trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge,MA: MIT P, 1983); Marcel Gauchet,Le disen-
chantementdu monde: une histoirepolitique de la religion (Paris:Gallimard,1985), in
English, The Disenchantmentof the World:a political history of religion, trans. Oscar
Burge,forewordby CharlesTaylor(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUP, 1997).
95. The recognitionthat modem autonomyis foundedupon a false ontology does
not necessarilyimply that it is dispensable.Ben Halpernhas noted"thehistoricalprocess
whereby both 'myth' and 'ideology' acquiredtheir derogatoryconnationsand came to
mean a 'subjective'or 'interested'approachto reality.Etymologically,'myth' means sim-
ply a 'relating';hence it was originallyquite objective in meaning.It took on negative
connotationsthroughthe very ancientGreekcriticismof myth [. . .] and throughthe sub-
sequentcriticismof mythby monotheisticiconoclasm."See Halpern,"'Myth'and 'Ideol-
ogy' in Modem Usage,"Historyand Theory1.2 (1961): 129-149, 131 n. 5.
knowledge about who we "really"are. Politicaljudgmentsdo not get

their credence from metaphysicalinsight, althoughpolitical actors fre-
quentlywish and behave as if this were the case. Liberalismis no more
"true"to the self thanany of its politicalalternatives,and to believe so is
to subscribeto a faultymodel of social meaning.Moreover,it is charac-
teristicof many liberalpoliticaltheoriesthatthey mistrustpreciselythose
sorts of political movementsthat claim to embody the "truth"of human
existence,since politicalappealsto certitudequiteoftenturnpernicious.96
Ironically, it was Cassirer,not Heidegger,who wished to found his
political philosophy upon the final and incorrigibleknowledge of the
wholly "demythologized"subject. But it is not obvious that human
beings possess such knowledge, and it is even less obvious that such
knowledge would inform a palatablepolitical order. Cassirer presup-
posed human spontaneity,which forced him, however unwillingly, to
regard myth merely as occluded spirit. Heidegger, on the other hand,
believed that the study of myth could provide insight into the existen-
tial structureof all humanmeaning;he was not merely making a plea
for "more"tradition.But it follows that there are always such myths
independentof one's choice of political program.The significance of
Marcel Gauchet's recent contributionto the secularizationdebate is,
among other things, to suggest that a truly "liberal"theory of politics
might best emerge from the post-Heideggerianrecognition of human
finitude ratherthan the quasi-Kantianpresumptionof self-transparency
and ontologicalindependence.
Here one can discern a differencebetween enlightenmentand disen-
chantment:WhereasCassirerdescribedhistoryas enlightenmentthrough
reason, Heidegger describedhistory as disenchantmentwith metaphys-
ics - especially, the metaphysicsof rationalcontrol.97Their philoso-
phies seem to embody the two, distinct paths by which the subject of
philosophyhas moved from religion to modernity.For Heidegger,what
distinguishedthe post-metaphysicalsubject of modernityis not that it
has achieved a position of god-like sovereigntyover its own constitu-
tive meaning. On the contrary,the modern subject for Heidegger was
96. RichardRorty,Contingency,Irony,Solidarity(Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUP,
1989).
97. This anti-foundationalist view may also underwritea charistmatic,yet stoic
"strength"in the face of nothingness.It is a featureof Weber'stheorythatTerryMaleyhas
called the "politicsof disenchantment." See Maley,"ThePoliticsof Time:Subjectivityand
Modernityin Max Weber,"The Barbarismof Reason: Max Weberand the Twilightof
Enlightenment, eds. AsherHorowitzandTerryMaley(Toronto:U TorontoP, 1994) 139-166.
one which had arrived at the "disenchanted"recognition of its own

existentialconstitution:it knowsitself to be thrownand no longer thinks
itself capable of wresting itself free of this condition. It is aware that
there are always backgroundconditions to its action, and it concedes
those conditionsare withoutmetaphysicalground.Heidegger'sdoctrine
of myth thus implies the constitutivepermanenceof human finitude.It
sustainsthe Christiandoctrineof humanfallenness,while recastingthe-
ism as the metaphysicaltheoryof"nothingness."
According to Cassirer'sphilosophy,on the other hand, myth is the
manifestationof human "infinite"capacities. It models epistemic and
political action after the Hegelian image of a self-expressivespirit, and
it regardsthe work of cultureas a canvass upon which spirit leaves the
traces of enlightenmentfreedom.One can rightly accuse Heidegger of
anti-modernism,since his theory of the subject presumesthe irrevoca-
bility of the fall. For Heidegger,history cannot be dissolved, since its
meanings are what lend subjectivity its grounding in the world.
Thrownnessis constitutive,and thereforeunmasterable.Ironically,Cas-
sirer'smodel of spiritualdevelopmentthat is supposedlythe standardof
modernityillicitly relies on Christian-eschatological hope.98If so, then
autonomyis the political trace of a theologically-inspiredplenitude,the
dreamof meaningwithoutdispossession.
On this point,the FrankfurtSchool took a positionequidistantbetween
Heidegger and Cassirer.WhereasHeideggerturned"nothingness"into
the last metaphysicaldogma, the FrankfurtSchool upheld the Kantian
doctrine of self-regulatingcritique,without, however, indulging in the
enlightenmentview of freedomas an intelligibleidea metaphysicallyat
odds with historicity.This "qualified"faith in the promisesof modern-
ism, however,placed them at odds with Cassirer,whose own fidelity to
the Kantianideal of autonomypreventedhim from recognizingmoder-
nity's own inner demons. Certainly,Adorno and Horkheimerare also
famously critical of Heidegger, since they claim the critique of myth
points toward an ideal of autonomy,which, though forever unrealized,
must be sustainedin thoughtif the unfinishedprojectof enlightenmentis
to provide normativeguidance. Even in Adorno's late work, Negative
Dialectics, freedom retains its regulative function, but only at what
98. This is a point made by Karl L6with. The modernist"self-assertion"LiSwith
criticizedwas laterdefendedby Blumenberg.Fora discussionof the latter,see MartinJay,
"Blumenbergand Modernism:A Reflectionon TheLegitimacyof the ModernAge," Fin
de Siccle Socialismand OtherEssays (New York:Routledge,1988).
AlbrechtWellmerhas calledthe "vanishingpointof demythologization."

Whetherthis meant the ideal was itself a "myth"remains unclear.99
What is certainis thatthe Frankfurtschool locates fascist dominationin
an uncriticalmomentof freedomitself, and one might thereforecharac-
terize their position as a qualifiedmodemrnism. They take up a position
at some distance from Cassirerand are critical of his attemptto resur-
rect the Enlightenmenton its own terms, without, however, assuming
with Heideggeran attitudeof mere "piety"externalto subjectivistmeta-
physics. But the Frankfurt"left" and the Heideggerian"right"critique
of technologicaldominationnonethelessconverge in the claim that ide-
alism's celebrated notion of spontaneity has spawned a specifically
modern will to mastery and decontextualizedtechnique. Against Cas-
sirer, however, they locate the pathology of instrumentalreason not in
its truth,as if full enlightenmentwere an actualcondition,but insteadin
the compulsive effort to proclaim as truth a species of unconditional
freedom that was, on their view, constitutivelyimpossible. From their
perspective,then, autonomymight well figure as the most consequen-
tial myth of modernity.
99. Adorno's comment is particularlyrevealing, that, "beside the demand thus

placed on thought,the questionof the realityor unrealityof redemptionitself hardlymat-
ters."FromTheodorW. Adorno,"Finale,"MinimaMoralia,Reflectionsfrom a Damaged
Life,trans.E. F.N. Jephcott(London:Verso, 1978)247. Wellmer,perhapscontroversially,
finds in Adornothe residuesof a "theologicalmotif."But Wellmeris rightthatthe stance
is aporetic,in alliancewith metaphysicsbut only "atthe momentof its fall." On the diffi-
culties of this self-collapsingideal, see AlbrechtWellmer,"Reason,Utopia,and the Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment," ed. RichardJ. Bernstein,Habermasand Modernity(Cambridge,
MA: MITPress, 1985)35-66, and Wellmer,"Metaphysicsat the Momentof its Fall,"End-
games, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1998), 'theological motif'
fromthe latter,193. Onthe Habermasianattemptto rescueconceptualformitself as a non-
repressiveideal, see Habermas,The Theoryof Communicative Action,I: Reason and the
Rationalizationof Society (Boston:Beacon Press, 1984), and "Die Moderne-ein unvol-
lendetes Projekt,"Die Moderneein unvollendetesProjekt,Philosophisch-politischeAuf
sitze (Leipzig:Reclam, 1994) 32-54.

Critica de Cassirer A Heid.

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Critica de Cassirer A Heid.

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Myth and Modernity: Cassirer's Critique of Heidegger

Author(s): Peter Eli Gordon

or normative orientation.Enlightenment,then, is already, in its one-

spawnof instrumental reasonmay place too littletrustin the emancipatory

that it representsa mode of political belief that cannot be categorized

twentieth century.7 In 1894, Cassirerattended Georg Simmel's lectures on

10. The absence of a pronouncedethical theory in Cassirer'swork was first noted

Before specifically engagingCassirer'sdiscussionof myth, it is help-

15. An exemplarystatementof Cassirer'smethodcan be foundin PSF: "Itis one of

While Simmel's interpretationemphasizedthe centralityof "form"in

Here is revealedagainthat"anthropomorphism" of all ourconceptsof

From the critique of religion to modern science, the principle of

17. Simmel,Kant 180.

Kantian principle could now be applied to the investigation of all of human

It is the task of systematicphilosophy,which extends far beyond the

According to Cassirer, all of human culture, indeed the very sense of

By "symbolicform"[is meant]that energyof the spirit [Energiedes

world,andtheartseachpresentus witha particular

Here, Cassirercharacterizessymbolic forms as productsof "free"men-

Cassireron Language and Myth

expression: Culture is ideally the work of autonomousspirit. Cassirer

It is only in these activitiesas a wholethathumankind constitutes

and 1920), which lays out a comprehensiveset of "developmentallaws"

philosophical themes. On the one hand, their generous view of myth

29. ClaudeL6vi-Strauss,La PensdeSauvage (Paris:Plon, 1962). For an accessible

Thus,althoughmyth,language,andartinterpenetrate one anotherin

For Cassirerthis differenceremaineddecisive. While grantingthat myth

its role in the creation of mythic phenomena,it ascribes autonomous

32. Fora shortlist of exemplaryscholarshipon mana,see Cassirer,PSE II 76, n. 2.

named in orderfor it to be broughtforthmagicallyinto existence. More

Indeed,it is the Word,it is language,thatreallyrevealsto manthat

From this comment,one might discernan element of hesitationin Cas-

social identity.Ordinaryexperiencemight preservethe sense of passivity

For Cassirer,the differencebetween "mythical"and modern,"theoreti-

from the self-negating"dialecticof mythicalconsciousness,"and passes

In sum, Cassirer'sphilosophy rested upon a teleological premise that

(1964) and he affirmedthat his own reconstructionswere themselves a

Cassirerand Heidegger on Myth and Subjectivity

earlier. More recently, a little-known manuscriptfrom 1929 entitled

within the structureof human understanding.Rather than beginning

about native systems of meaning. "Ethnology itself," he warned,

'primitivephenomena'are often less concealedand less complicated

Although Heidegger sees human culture as the ongoing work of self-

50. SZ 5 1;BT 76.

doubts concerning Cassirer's transcendental presuppositions. "[I]t

55. BT 290, n. xi.

Which is the mode of being of mythic"life"which enablesthe mana-

For Heidegger, mana indicates a mode of meaning not subject to human

emphasize this point, Heidegger poses a purely rhetorical question:

62. MH: Reviewof PSFII 45. The Heideggerianperspectiveimpliesthat myth is a

The Davos Encounterand the Myth-Debate

thereis hardlya singleconceptwhichhasbeenparaphrased with so

Heidegger's entire presentationof "existential"philosophy is, Cassirer

65. HeinrichRickert,Kantals Philosophder modernenKultur;ein geschichtsphil-

being whose capacities for self-transparency are, Heidegger claims,

In the CategoricalImperativewe have somethingwhich goes beyond

71. Davos 279.

Moreover,four years later,Heideggerassumedthe position of Rektorat

Cassirerconsideredpeculiarto the mythic conceptionof space - where

76. Cassirer,PSF II 96 (German122);Heidegger,BT 144-45;SZ 110-111.

it presents the history of political thought as an ongoing struggle

becomes in Machiavelli's thinking a principle at least potentially