25

G.R. No. 88050 January 30, 1992

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ADRIANO URTESUELA, respondents.

FACTS:

In 1982, acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar National Fishing Co., Pan Asian Logistics and
Trading, a domestic recruiting and placement agency, hired Adriano Urtesuela, a Filipino seaman, as
captain of the vessel M/V Oryx for the stipulated period of twelve months. The required surety bond
(P50, 000) was submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. Urtesuela assumed his
duties, but three months later his services were terminated and he was repatriated to Manila. He filed a
complaint against Pan Asian and his former employer with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration for breach of contract and damages.

In due time, the POEA rendered a decision in his favor for the amount of P6,374.94, representing his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. The judgment eventually became final and executory,
not having been appealed on time. A writ of execution was issued against Pan Asian but could be
enforced only against its cash bond of P10,000.00, the company having ceased to operate. Urtesuela
then filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission against Stronghold on the basis of the surety
bond and prayed for the value thereof plus attorney's fees and litigation costs. The liability of the surety
under this bond didn’t exceed the sum of P50,000.00.

After hearing, the Insurance Commission held that the complaint should be reformed because the
provisions in the surety bond were not stipulations pour autrui to entitle Urtesuela to bring the suit
himself. It held that the proper party was the POEA. This ruling was reversed on appeal by the
respondent court in its decision dated April 20, 1989. It was there declared that, as the actual
beneficiary of the surety bond, Urtesuela was competent to sue Stronghold, which as surety was
solidarily liable with Pan Asian for the judgment rendered against the latter by the POEA.

The petitioner asked for reversal of the Court of Appeals. It submits that the decision of the POEA is not
binding upon it because it was not impleaded in the complaint. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Urtesuela. Accordingly, Stronghold seeks the reversal of CA’s Decision; it invokes due process claiming
that in the first place, it was not impleaded in the complaint neither was it notified nor did it participate
in the hearing to be specifically directed to pay the damages awarded to Urtesuela, in order to escape its
liability on the surety bond executed for the protection of the latter as a Filipino seaman. The case was
brought on a petition before the Supreme Court but to no avail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Stronghold, as surety, was condemned to pay without due process of law.

RULING:

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

No. As held in the case of Aguasin v Velasquez, although it is an elementary right for the surety to be
heard and to be informed that the property seeking indemnity would hold it liable, the instant case, as
excerpted from the same is "different from those in which the surety, by law and/or by the terms of his
contract, has promised to abide by the judgment against the principal and renounced the right to be
sued or cited." Strictly interpreted, this means that whether or not the surety (Stronghold) was
impleaded in the complaint and had the opportunity to defend itself, it already agreed to answer for
whatever decision might be rendered against the Principal (Pan Asia) because of the surety bond
wherein it clearly bound itself with the Principal for whatever liability the POEA may adjudge/impose
against it.

In the surety bond, the petitioner unequivocally bound itself:

To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration may
adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.

The petitioner agreed to answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the principal, whether
or not the surety was impleaded in the complaint and had the opportunity to defend itself. There is
nothing in the stipulation calling for a direct judgment against the surety as a co-defendant in an action
against the principal.

The printed form of the surety bond prepared by the petitioner shows its agreement that "notice to the
Principal is notice to the surety." Whereby, under this commitment, it has been given an opportunity to
participate in the litigation and to present its side, if it so chose, to avoid liability. Since it decided not to
intervene, it cannot complain to have been denied due process because it is also a right of a party to not
be compelled to speak if it chooses to be silent. This Court has consistently held in cases that if one opts
to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly
silenced. The Court upheld the fiduciary relationship between the principal and the surety, which is the
legal and also practical reason why the latter is willing to answer for the liabilities of the former.

The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not availed of does not disparage that opportunity and
deprive the person of the right to due process. Due process is not violated where a person is not heard
because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be
silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced.

If the petitioner believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what it should have done was object when
its inclusion as a condition in the surety bond was required by the POEA. Even if the POEA had insisted
on the condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the petitioner from refusing
altogether to issue the surety bond. The fact is that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the end
filed the surety bond with the suggested condition. The consequence of its submission is that it cannot
now argue that it is not bound by that condition because it was coerced into accepting it.

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

 26
G.R. Nos. 101557-58. April 28, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51, PALAWAN, and LEONARDO SALDE, SR.,
LEONARDO SALDE, JR., FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDE-PANAGUITON, and JOJETA PANAGUITON,
respondent.

FACTS:

On 7 April 1988, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases
7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde,
Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking
turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and
hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused
his death in Criminal Case 8572 (GR 101557), and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking
her with a bolo which would have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558).

On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton
were arraigned. They all pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned
and likewise entered a plea of "not guilty."

On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with
counsel for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion
filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor.

On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their
intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending
appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on
the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real
aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense.

On 9 February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan,
Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397.

Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to refile the
Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new Informations for frustrated murder against the same
accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573).

On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the accused moved to quash on
the ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July
1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to
reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16
August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

Whether or not the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.

RULING:

No. The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of
which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril
and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.

It is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were
filed against Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It
is likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The
only question then remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express
consent.

This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of the case
before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in
the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express
consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original informations.

While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, these cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed
negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting
Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was
found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses Amado and
Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended
themselves from the attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to
prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case.

Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their
dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is
necessary only in cases of contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be
contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the
Rubites, on the other hand, are precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the
dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile.

The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The
remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and
not certiorari.

Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense
of double jeopardy must prevail.

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

 27
G.R. No. L-44251 December 29, 1977

FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, BLAS F. OPLE and ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF), serving as head of
its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a complaint for immorality lodged against
him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a
committee to investigate such charge. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral
advances committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara.

The first hearing was attended by Montemayor as well as the complainant with his two witnesses.
Montemayor sought the postponement of the investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28
May 1974, he filed a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed
an affidavit to sustain his defense.

On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the investigating committee came, and was adverse
to Montemayor. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree. On 5 August 1974,
Salcedo adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of
the AUF for appropriate action.

On 8 November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castañeda, and
Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another committee
was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing set for 18 and 19 November 1974, but was
denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence.

On 5 December 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor to
have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of the
AUF his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of
Policies of the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal was ordered effective 15 November 1974,
the date of his preventive suspension.

On 12 December 1974, the University filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
report of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on 21
November 1974, Montemayor in turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AUF for reinstatement
and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant
thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC
found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with back wages and
without loss of seniority and other privileges.

Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. AUF appealed to the
Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement, finding
Montemayor's dismissal justified. The AUF was, however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend
him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his
dismissal from AUF.

RULING:

No. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of academic
freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a professor who after
due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.

In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to
proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. Academic due
process, a term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when an
adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair
way of reaching a conclusion.

Every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges
against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special
or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher
accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure followed in the first
investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process requisite. The second
investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for postponement therein was denied,
the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in
submitting its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and
recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as Montemayor was able to
present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of due process happened only in the proceeding
he had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was
given the fullest opportunity to present his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for
certiorari. Montemayor was afforded his day in court.

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

 28
G.R. No. 156093 February 2, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, Dasmariñas, Cavite Branch, REYNALDO
FERRER, and S.K. DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER CORP., Respondents.

FACTS:

NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas of
Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote
230 kV Transmission Line Project.

On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for eminent domain and expropriation of an
easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated.

After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP
5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.5 Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order. The trial court issued a Writ
of Possession over the lots owned by respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer on March
10, 1999 and April 12, 1999, respectively.

However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-
defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order,6 in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be expropriated
from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.

As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses,
the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement.

The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection and based on the analysis of data gathered and
making the proper adjustments with respect to the location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest
and best use of the subject properties, it is the opinion of the herein commissioners that the fair market
value of the subject real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter.

Both commissioners recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to be expropriated by petitioner
be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation pegged in the RTC, petitioner filed an appeal before
the CA but it was dismissed.

Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision, but it directly filed a
petition for review before the SC.

ISSUE:

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.

Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to present evidence on
the reasonable value of the expropriated property before the board of commissioners.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to present evidence
before the commissioners.

It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before them, issue notices to the parties to attend hearings,
and provide the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes. It is also undisputed that
petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the commissioners’ report, and that petitioner
was also not given any opportunity to file its objections to the said report.

It is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two appointed commissioners in
this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and
to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them;
(2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity
for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings.

The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken
is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the
principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is
indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true
that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the commissioners have
applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all."

The constitutional guarantee of due process still requires that a party should be given the fullest and
widest opportunity to adduce evidence during trial, and the availment of a motion for reconsideration
will not satisfy a party’s right to procedural due process, unless his/her inability to adduce evidence
during trial was due to his/her own fault or negligence.

DE LEON, JURY ANN P.