August 2010 Philippine Supreme

Court Decisions on Labor Law

and Procedure
Posted on September 16, 2010 by Leslie C. Dy • Posted in Labor Law
• Tagged abandonment, backwages, breach of trust,burden of proof, damages, employee benefits, illegal
dismissal, illegal strike, labor-only contracting, loss of trust and
confidence, merger, negligence, NLRC, probationary employment, project
employee, rehabilitation, reinstatement,retirement, security of tenure, serious misconduct, union

Here are selected August 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on labor law and
procedure:

Labor Law

Dismissal; abandonment. Time and again, the Supreme Court has held that abandonment is
totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so if the
same is accompanied by a prayer for reinstatement. In the present case, however, petitioner filed
his complaint more than one year after his alleged termination from employment. Moreover,
petitioner did not ask for reinstatement in the complaint form, which he personally filled up and
filed with the NLRC. The prayer for reinstatement is made only in the Position Paper that was
later prepared by his counsel. This is an indication that petitioner never had the intention or
desire to return to his job.Elpidio Calipay vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R.
No. 166411, August 3, 2010.

Dismissal; burden of proof. In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence that the dismissal is for just cause. If the employer fails to discharge the
burden of proof, the dismissal is deemed illegal. In the present case, BCPI failed to discharge its
burden when it failed to present any evidence of the alleged fistfight, aside from a single
statement, which was refuted by statements made by other witnesses and was found to be
incredible by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Alex Gurango vs. Best Chemicals and
Plastic, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 174593, August 25, 2010.

Dismissal; burden of proof. The law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the
termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.
Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal
justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor
of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution. Century
Canning Corporation, Ricardo T. Po, Jr., et al. vs. Vicente Randy R. Ramil, G.R. No. 171630,
August 8, 2010.

Dismissal; due process. In termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process

consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the
first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The
requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and
not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et al. vs.
Ricardo P. Albayda, Jr., G.R. No. 172724, August 23, 2010.

Dismissal; due process. The Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers,
without distinction as to the cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed
involvement in strike-related violence. In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter to the affected
union members/officers, directing them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be
dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike; three days later, the union
members/officers were informed of their dismissal from employment. We do not find this
company procedure to be sufficient compliance with due process. It does not appear from the
evidence that the union officers were specifically informed of the charges against them. Also, the
short interval of time between the first and second notice shows that a mere token recognition of
the due process requirements was made, indicating the company’s intent to dismiss the union
members involved, without any meaningful resort to the guarantees accorded them by
law. PHIMCO Industries, Inc. vs. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association (PILA), et al., G.R.
No. 170830, August 11, 2010.

Dismissal; employee’s past infractions. A previous offense may be used as valid justification for
dismissal from work only if the past infractions are related to the subsequent offense upon which
the basis of termination is decreed. The respondent’s previous incidents of tardiness in reporting
for work were entirely separate and distinct from his latest alleged infraction of forgery. Hence,
the same could no longer be utilized as an added justification for his dismissal. Besides,
respondent had already been sanctioned for his prior infractions. To consider these offenses as
justification for his dismissal would be penalizing respondent twice for the same
offense. Century Canning Corporation, Ricardo T. Po, Jr., et al. vs. Vicente Randy R.
Ramil, G.R. No. 171630, August 8, 2010.

Dismissal; feng shui; breach of trust and confidence. The Court finds that the complainant’s
allegations are more credible and that she was dismissed from her employment because the Feng
Shui master found that complainant’s Chinese Zodiac Sign was a mismatch to that of
respondents. This is not a just and valid cause for an employee’s dismissal.

In contrast, respondent’s pleadings and evidence suffer from several inconsistencies and the
affidavits presented by respondents only pertain to petty matters that are not sufficient to support
respondent’s alleged loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid cause for termination of
employment, the act or acts constituting breach of trust must have been done intentionally,
knowingly, and purposely; and they must be founded on clearly established facts. Wensha Spa
Center, inc. and/or Xu Zhi Jie ,vs. Loreta T. Yung,G.R. No. 185122, August 16, 2010.

Dismissal; gross negligence and loss of confidence. Gross negligence connotes “want of care in
the performance of one’s duties.” Petitioner’s failure on 3 separate occasions to require clients to
sign the requisite documents constituted gross negligence. Furthermore, it has been held that if
the employees are cashiers, managers, supervisors, salesmen or other personnel occupying
positions of responsibility, the employer’s loss of trust and confidence in said employees may
justify the termination of their employment. As the Bank’s Personal Banking Manager,
petitioner’s failure to comply with basic banking policies and procedures were inimical to the
interests of the bank, making his dismissal based on loss of confidence justified. Jesus E.
Dycoco, Jr.vs. Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro), Rene Bunaventura and Siles
Samalea, G.R. No. 188271, August 16, 2010.

Dismissal; loss of trust and confidence. Employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in
terminating the services of employees who perform functions which by their nature require the
employers’ full trust and confidence and the mere existence of basis for believing that the
employee has breached the trust of the employer is sufficient. However, this does not mean that
the said basis may be arbitrary and unfounded. Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause
for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established. It must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whim, caprice or suspicion;
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Century Canning
Corporation, Ricardo T. Po, Jr., et al. vs. Vicente Randy R. Ramil, G.R. No. 171630, August 8,
2010.
Dismissal; probationary employment. Though the acts charged against de Castro took place
when he was still under probationary employment, the records show that de Castro was
dismissed on the ninth month of his employment with LBNI. By then, he was already a regular
employee by operation of law. As a regular employee, de Castro was entitled to security of
tenure and his illegal dismissal from LBNI justified the awards of separation pay, backwages,
and damages Carlos De Castro vs. Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. and Edgardo
Quigue, G.R. No. 165153. August 25, 2010.

Dismissal; project employees; damages. Prior or advance notice of termination is not part of
procedural due process if the termination of a project employee is brought about by the
completion of the contract or phase thereof. This is because completion of the work or project
automatically terminates the employment, in which case, the employer is, under the law, only
obliged to render a report to the DOLE. Therefore, failing to give project employees advance
notice of their termination is not a violation of procedural due process and cannot be the basis
for the payment of nominal damages. D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Antonio Gobres, et al., G.R. No.
169170, August 8, 2010.

Dismissal; separation pay and backwages. The awards of separation pay and backwages are not
mutually exclusive and both may be given to the respondent. The normal consequences of a
finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes
entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and, secondly, the
payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. These are two separate and distinct remedies granted to the employee and the
inappropriateness or non-availability of one does not carry with it the inappropriateness or non-
availability of the other. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay
has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. The grant of separation pay is a proper substitute only for reinstatement; it
cannot be an adequate substitute for both reinstatement and backwages. Century Canning
Corporation, Ricardo T. Po, Jr., et al. vs. Vicente Randy R. Ramil, G.R. No. 171630, August 8,
2010.

Dismissal; serious misconduct. Misconduct is defined as “the transgression of some established

and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.” For serious misconduct to justify dismissal
under the law, “(a) it must be serious, (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.”

It is noteworthy that prior to this incident, there had been several cases of theft and vandalism
involving both respondent company’s property and personal belongings of other employees. In
order to address this issue of losses, respondent company issued two memoranda implementing
an intensive inspection procedure and reminding all employees that those who will be caught
stealing and performing acts of vandalism will be dealt with in accordance with the company’s
Code of Conduct. Despite these reminders, complainant took the packing tape and was caught
during the routine inspection. All these circumstances point to the conclusion that it was not just
an error of judgment, but a deliberate act of theft of company property. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) and Helen Valenzuela vs. Keihin Philippines
Corporation, G.R. No. 171115, August 9, 2010.

Dismissal; union security. In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union
security clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is
applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the
CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the
employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee
based on the union security provision of the CBA.
The petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement since nothing in the records would show
that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the union.
Significantly, petitioner’s act of dismissing respondents stemmed from the latter’s act of signing
an authorization letter to file a petition for certification election as they signed it outside the
freedom period. The mere signing of an authorization letter before the freedom period is not
sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was
actually filed during the freedom period. The court emphasizes anew that the employer is bound
to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made
upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Picop
Resources Incorporated (PRI) vs. Anacleto L. Tañeca, et al., G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010.

Dimissal; use of illegal drugs. The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by
authorized drug testing centers. In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic
is an accredited drug testing center nor did it deny the complainant’s allegation that S.M. Lazo
Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test was conducted to determine if the
complainant was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result
of the screening test with a confirmatory test as required by R.A. 9165. Hence, Sulpicio Lines
failed to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs and failed to clearly
show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the
alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the
law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Jeffrey Nacague vs. Sulpicio Lines,
Inc., G.R. No. 172589, August 8, 2010.

Dismissal; validity. The company did not adduce any evidence to prove that Siazar’s dismissal
had been for a just or authorized cause, as in fact it had been its consistent stand that it did not
terminate him and that he quit on his own. But given the findings of the Court that the company
had indeed dismissed Siazar and that such dismissal has remained unexplained, there can be no
other conclusion but that the dismissal was illegal. Agricultural and Industrial Supplies
Corporation, et al. vs. Jueber P. Siazar, et al., G.R. No. 177970, August 25, 2010.

Due process; decision rendered without due process. The violation of a party’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue that cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial
and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether
judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia Vs. Mario I. Molina, et al.,G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137,
August 10, 2010.

Employee; evaluation and promotion. The fact that employees were re-classified from Job Grade
Level 1 to Job Grade Level 2 as a result of a job evaluation program does not automatically
entail a promotion or grant them an increase in salary. Of primordial consideration is not the
nomenclature or title given to the employee, but the nature of his functions. What transpired in
this case was only a promotion in nomenclature. The employees continued to occupy the same
positions they were occupying prior to the job evaluation. Moreover, their job titles remained the
same and they were not given additional duties and responsibilities. SCA Hygiene Products
Corporation Employees Association-FFW vs. SCA Hygiene Products Corporation, G.R. No.
182877, August 9, 2010.

Employee; security of tenure. A worker’s security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution

and the Labor Code. Under the security of tenure guarantee, a worker can only be terminated
from his employment for cause and after due process. For a valid termination by the employer:
(1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282, or for any of the
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A just and valid cause for an
employee’s dismissal must be supported by substantial evidence, and before the employee can
be dismissed, he must be given proper notice of such cause/s and an adequate opportunity to be
heard. In the process, the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal of an
employee was for a valid cause. Its failure to discharge this burden renders the dismissal
unjustified and, therefore, illegal. Wensha Spa Center, Inc. and/or Xu Zhi Jie vs. Loreta T.
Yung, G.R. No. 185122, August 16, 2010.

Employee benefit; time of death. The death should be deemed compensable under the ECC since
Henry was on his way back to Manila in order to be on time and be ready for work the next day
when his accidental death occurred. He should already be deemed en route to the performance of
his duty at the time of the accident. It should be noted that Henry’s superior allowed him to
travel to La Union to visit his ailing mother on the condition that that he return the next day.
Under these facts, Henry was in the course of complying with his superior’s order when he met
his fatal accident. To be sure, he was not in an actual firefighting or accident situation when he
died, but returning to work as instructed by his superior is no less equivalent to compensable
performance of duty under Section 1, Rule III of the ECC Rules. Government Service Insurance
System vs. Felicitas Zarate, as substituted by her heirs, namely Melanie Zarate, et al., G.R. No.
170847, August 3, 2010.

Illegal dismissal; effect of rehabilitation proceedings. The existence of the Stay Order – which
would generally authorize the suspension of judicial proceedings – could not have affected the
Court’s action on the present case due to the petitioner’s failure to raise the pendency of the
rehabilitation proceedings in its memorandum to the Court. At any rate, a stay order simply
suspends all actions for claims against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation; it does not work
to oust a court of its jurisdiction over a case properly filed before it. Thus, the Court’s ruling on
the principal issue of the case stands. Nevertheless, with LBNI’s manifestation that it is still
undergoing rehabilitation, the Court resolves to suspend the execution of our Decision until the
termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. Carlos De Castro vs. Liberty Broadcasting
Network, Inc. and Edgardo Quigue, G.R. No. 165153. August 25, 2010.

Job contracting. In permissible job contracting, the principal agrees to put out or farm out with a
contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service
within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to
be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. The test is whether
the independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and
without being subject to the principal’s control except only as to the results, he has substantial
capital, and he has assured the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational
safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and
social and welfare benefits. Spic n’ Span Services Corp. vs. Gloria Paje, et al., G.R. No. 174084,
August 25, 2010.

Management prerogative; transfer of employees. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of

management prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to
another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other
privileges, and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a
form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. To determine the validity of the
transfer of employees, the employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome
this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to constructive
dismissal. Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo P. Albayda, Jr., G.R. No. 172724,
August 23, 2010.

Merger; employee terms and conditions. That BPI is the same entity as FEBTC after the merger
is but a legal fiction intended as a tool to adjudicate rights and obligations between and among
the merged corporations and the persons that deal with them. Although in a merger it is as if
there is no change in the personality of the employer, there is in reality a change in the situation
of the employee. Once an FEBTC employee is absorbed, there are presumably changes in his
condition of employment even if his previous tenure and salary rate is recognized by BPI. It is
reasonable to assume that BPI would have different rules and regulations and company practices
than FEBTC and it is incumbent upon the former FEBTC employees to obey these new. Not the
least of these changes is the fact that prior to the merger FEBTC employees were employees of
an unorganized establishment and after the merger they became employees of a unionized
company that had an existing CBA with the certified union. Thus, although in a sense BPI is
continuing FEBTC’s employment of these absorbed employees, BPI’s employment of these
absorbed employees will not be under exactly the same terms and conditions as stated in the
latter’s employment contracts with FEBTC. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees
Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, August 10,
2010.

Reinstatement of employee; doctrine of strained relations. Under the doctrine of strained

relations, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On the one hand, such
payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On
the other, the payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of
maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust. Wensha Spa Center, Inc. and/or Xu
Zhi Jie vs. Loreta T. Yung, G.R. No. 185122, August 16, 2010.

Retirement pay; applicability to employees on commission basis. Even if the petitioner as bus
conductor was paid on commission basis, he falls within the coverage of R.A. 7641 and its
implementing rules. Thus, his retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of 5-days SIL
and 1/12 of 13th month pay. The NLRC’s reliance on the case of R & E Transport, Inc. as a basis
for ruling that bus conductors are not covered by the law on SIL and 13th month pay is
erroneous since that involved a taxi driver who was paid according to the “boundary system.”
There is a difference between drivers paid under the “boundary system” and conductors who are
paid on commission basis. In practice, taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages and retain only
those sums in excess of the “boundary” or fee they pay to the owners or operators of the
vehicles. Conductors, on the other hand, are paid a certain percentage of the bus’ earnings for the
day. Rodolfo J. Serrano vs. Severino Santos Transit and/or Severino Santos, G.R. No. 187698,
August 9, 2010.

Separation pay. In those instances where an employee has been validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character, separation pay may still
be granted after giving considerable weight to his long years of employment. In this case, equity
considerations dictate that respondent’s tenure be computed from 1978, the year when
respondent started working for Upjohn, and not only from 1996, when the merger of Pharmacia
and Upjohn took place. Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo p. Albayda, Jr., G.R. No.
172724, August 23, 2010.

Strike; validity of strike. Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and the union’s
compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be held illegal where the means
employed are illegal. While the strike had not been marred by actual violence and patent
intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA officers and members undertook as part of their
strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from PHIMCO’s premises, thus
preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering the PHIMCO
compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code and tainted
the strike with illegality. PHIMCO Industries, Inc. vs. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association
(PILA), et al., G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010.

Union; eligibility of confidential employees to join. Confidential employees are defined as those
who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative,
and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee – that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor
must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. In the present case, there
is no showing that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity
to managerial employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor relations
policies. And even assuming that they had exposure to internal business operations of the
company, as respondent claims, this is not per seground for their exclusion in the bargaining unit
of the rank-and-file employees. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia
Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 162025, August 3, 2010.

Union; liability for invalid strike. The effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the
Labor Code, make a distinction between participating workers and union officers. The services
of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike;
proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The
services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated, not only when he
actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike. PHIMCO Industries, Inc. vs. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association (PILA), et al., G.R.
No. 170830, August 11, 2010.

Union shop; effect of merger. All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop
Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms. However, under law and
jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, (1)
employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a
religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious
grounds; (2) employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the
majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect; (3) confidential employees who are
excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and (4) employees excluded from the union
shop by express terms of the agreement. In the absence of any of these recognized exceptions,
there is no basis to conclude that the terms and conditions of employment under a valid CBA in
force in the surviving corporation should not be made to apply to the absorbed employees. Bank
of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI
Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010.

Labor Procedure

CSC; rules for dismissal. The filing of formal charges against the respondents without
complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the
opportunity to comment violated the latter’s right to due process. These rules on due process
apply even in cases where the complainant is the disciplining officer himself, as in this case. The
fact that the charges against the respondents are serious or that the evidence of their guilt is
strong cannot compensate for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner. Winston F.
Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia Vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No.
157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 10, 2010.

Labor case; due process; reevaluation. A reevaluation is a process by which a person or office (in
this case the DOLE secretary) revisits its own initial pronouncement and makes another
assessment of its findings. In simple terms, to reevaluate is to take another look at a previous
matter in issue. From a procedural standpoint, a reevaluation is a continuation of the original
case and not a new proceeding. The evidence, financial reports and other documents submitted
by the parties in the course of the original proceeding are to be visited and reviewed again. A
reevaluation does not necessitate the introduction of new materials for review nor does it
require a full hearing for new arguments. Hence, failure to order the presentation of new
evidence in the reevaluation of an Order is not a violation of due process. NASECO Guards
Association – PEMA vs. National Service Corporation, G.R. No. 165442, August 25, 2010.

Labor case; non-lawyer as representative. The respondents in this case were represented by a
non-lawyer who never showed any proof of his authority to represent the respondents. Petitioner
argued that the respondents’ representative had no personality to appear before the Labor Arbiter
or the NLRC, and his representation for the respondents should produce no legal effect. The
Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that the cited technical infirmity cannot defeat the
respondents’ preferred right to security of tenure, without prejudice to whatever action may be
taken against the representative, if he had indeed been engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. Spic n’ Span Services Corp. vs. Gloria Paje, et al., G.R. No. 174084, August 25, 2010.

NLRC; factual findings. Findings of fact of the NLRC, affirming those of the LA, are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. The CA had
overstepped its legal mandate by reversing the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC as it
appears that both decisions were based on substantial evidence. There is no proof of arbitrariness
or abuse of discretion in the process by which each body arrived at its own conclusions. Thus,
the CA should have deferred to such specialized agencies that are considered experts in matters
within their jurisdictions.Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo P. Albayda, Jr., G.R.
No. 172724, August 23, 2010.

NLRC; review of decisions. The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via
Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St. Martin
Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission. This Court held that the proper vehicle
for such review was a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
and that this action should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of
the hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, as amended,
the Court of Appeals – pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions
for Certiorari – is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary,
to resolve factual issues. Picop Resources Incorporated (PRI) vs. Anacleto L. Tañeca, et
al., G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010.

Pleading verification. The lack of a verification in a pleading is only a formal defect, not a
jurisdictional defect, and is not necessarily fatal to a case. The primary reason for requiring a
verification is simply to ensure that the allegations in the pleading are done in good faith, are
true and correct, and are not mere speculations. As previously explained in Torres v. Specialized
Packaging Development Corporation, where only two of the 25 real parties-in-interest signed
the verification, the verification by the two could be sufficient assurance that the allegations in
the petition were made in good faith, are true and correct, and are not speculative. Spic n’ Span
Services Corp. vs. Gloria Paje, et al., G.R. No. 174084, August 25, 2010.

Procedural rules; strict application. Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or
filing a petition for review are generally inviolable. It is doctrinally entrenched that an appeal is
not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail
themselves of such privilege must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Furthermore, the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court
final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision. Elpidio Calipay vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 166411,
August 3, 2010.

Real party in interest; dismissed employee. It is clear that the petitioners failed to include the
name of the dismissed employee in the caption and body of its petition for certiorari and,
instead, only indicated the name of the labor union as the party acting on behalf of such
dismissed employee. Hence, the Court of Appeals rightly dismissed the petition for not having
been filed by an indispensable party in interest. (The Court still proceeded to discuss the
substantive issues and merits of the case despite affirming the dismissal of the case based on
procedural grounds.) Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU)
and Helen Valenzuela vs. Keihin Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 171115, August 9, 2010.

Rule 45; review of factual findings. As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in
petitions for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, there are recognized
exceptions to the rule. Among the exceptions are when the findings of fact are conflicting and
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.
In the present case, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of fact
of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. Also, the finding of the Court of Appeals that Gurango
engaged in a fistfight is a conclusion without citation of specific evidence on which it is
based. Alex Gurango vs. Best Chemicals and Plastic, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 174593, August 25,
2010.