CONTINUED AND CONTINUING CRIMES

In criminal law, when a series of acts are perpetrated in pursuance of a single criminal impulse,
there is what is called a continued crime. In criminal procedure for purposes of venue, this is
referred to as a continuing crime. The term “continuing crimes” as sometimes used in lieu of the
term “continued crimes”, however, although both terms are analogous, they are not really used
with the same import.

“Continuing crime” is the term used in criminal procedure to denote that a certain crime may be
prosecuted and tried not only before the court of the place where it was originally committed or
began, but also before the court of the place where the crime was continued. Hence, the term
“continuing crime” is used in criminal procedure when any of the material ingredients of the crime
was committed in different places.

A “continued crime” is one where the offender performs a series of acts violating one and the
same penal provision committed at the same place and about the same time for the same criminal
purpose, regardless of a series of acts done, it is regarded in law as one.

In People v. de Leon, where the accused took five roosters from one and the same chicken coop,
although, the roosters were owned by different persons, it was held that there is only one crime
of theft committed, because the accused acted out of a single criminal impulse only. However
performing a series of acts but this is one and the same intent Supreme Court ruled that only one
crime is committed under one information.

In People v. Lawas,the accused constabulary soldiers were ordered to march with several muslims
from one barrio to another place. These soldiers feared that on the way, some of the Muslims may
escape. So Lawas ordered the men to tie the Muslims by the hand connecting one with the other,
so no one would run away. When the hands of the Muslims were tied, one of them protested, he
did not want to be included among those who were tied becase he was a Hajji, so the Hajji
remonstrated and there was commotion. At the height of the commotion, Lawas ordered his men
to fire, and the soldiers mechanically fired. Eleven were killed and several others were wounded.
The question of whether the constabulary soldiers should be prosecuted for the killing of each
under a separate information has reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the
accused should be prosecuted only in one information, because a complex crime of multiple
homicide was committed by them.
Umil vs. Ramos

Facts:
On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-
CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in
Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car. As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando
Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie
Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” The
case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who,
at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears
that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned.
Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after
the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando
Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant
is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Issue:
Whether an arrest and search warrant is required for the crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State.

Held:
No, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis
in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045,
are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the
arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in
our jurisdiction. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing
their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less
justified. In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that
the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint
sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed,
in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if
there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released
on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested
him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]

Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report
to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo,
et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:
Whether Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 issued by the President declaring a state
of rebellion are constitutional.

Held:
Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime, and the authorities may resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or
that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of
the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
ARTURO A. MEJORADA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:
Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section3(E) of RA. 3019,
aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Mejorada was a right-away agent whose duty was to
process the claims for compensation of damagesof property owners affected by highway
construction and improvements. Herequired the claimants to sign blank copies of Sworn
Statements and Agreementsto Demolish, where it appeared that the properties of the claimants
have highervalues than the actual value being claimed by them. However, the claimants did not
bother reading through the paper because they very much interested in the compensation of
damages. After processing the claims, instead of giving to the claimants the proper amount,
Mejorada gave one of them Php 5,000 and the rest, Php 1,000 each, saying that there are many
who would share in said amounts. The claimants weren’t able to complain because they were
afraid of the accused and his armed companion. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Mejorada 56 years
and8 years of imprisonment which is equivalent to the eight (8) penalties for the eight (8)
information’s filed against him. Contention of the State: Section 3 of RA 3019 states that Mejorada
should be punished with “imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years” as stated
in Sec 9 of the same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges against him and each charge should be
served with the penalty prescribed by the law. Contention of the Accused: Mejorada states that
the penalty imposed upon him is contrary to the three-fold rule and states that the duration should
not exceed 40years. This is in accordance to Article 70 of the RPC.

ISSUE:
Whether the penalty imposed upon him violates the three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC.

RULING:
The Court favors the State. Article 70 of the RPC does not state anything about the “imposition of
penalty”. It only explains the “service” of sentence, “duration” of penalty and penalty “to be
inflicted”. It should be interpreted that the accused cannot be made to serve more than three
times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty (40) years. As stated in a
previous case, “ The courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct
offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is
prescribed by law.” With these reasons, Mejorada cannot correctly contend that his penalty is
excessive. There are eight charges against him and each has an equivalent penalty as prescribed
by RA 3019, thus, Sandiganbayan has imposed the correct penalty