HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO vs. AURORA O. SANTOS, JOVITA SANTOS GONZALES, ARNULFO O.

SANTOS,
ARCHIMEDESO. SANTOS, ERMELINA SANTOS RAVIDA, and ANDRES O. SANTOS, JR. (G.R. No. L-46892 September 30,
1981)

FACTS:
Amparo Del Rosario entered into a contract with Atty. Andres Santos and his wife Aurora Santos whereby the latter
sold to the former a 20,000 sq. m. of land which is to be segregated from Lot 1. Said lot forms part of the several lots
belonging to a certain Teofilo Custodio, of which lots, Attorney Santos, by agreement with the latter, as his attorney’s
fees, owns ½ interests thereof. Parties agreed that spouses Andres shall thereafter execute a Deed of Confirmation
of Sale in favor of Del Rosario as soon as the title has been released and the subdivision plan of said Lot 1 has been
approved by the Land Registration Commissioner. Due to the failure of the spouses Andres to execute the deed after
the fulfilment of the condition, Del Rosario claims malicious breach of a Deed of Sale. Defendant thereafter filed a
motion to dismiss setting up the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the action lack of
cause of action as well as the defense of prescription. They further alleged that the deed of sale was only an
accommodation graciously extended, out of close friendship between the defendants and the plaintiff, hence,
tantamount to waiver, abandonment or otherwise extinguishment of the demand set for thin the complaint. Finally,
defendants alleged that the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the statute of frauds
and that the cause or object of the contract did not exist at the time of the transaction. The lower court resolved to
deny the motion to dismiss. After actions by respective parties, the lower court ordered the defendants to execute
and convey to plaintiff the 200,000 sq. m. of land to be taken either from Lot 4 or from Lot 5- A of Custodio’s lots,
which defendants own ½ interest thereof.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendants filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which certified the
records of the case to the Supreme Court for final determination.

ISSUE: WON THE SALE IS VALID AS TO THE CAUSE OR OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the execution of the Deed of Sale is valid notwithstanding the lack of any title to the
lot by appellants at the time of execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of appellee as there can be a sale of an expected
thing in accordance with Article 1461 of the NCC: “Article 1461: Things having a potential existence may be the object
of the contract of sale. The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope of expectancy is deemed subject to the condition that
the thing will come into existence. The sale of a vain hope or expectancy is void.” The case at bar is not a case of a
vain hope or expectancy which is void under the law. The expectant right came into existence or materialized for the
appellants actually derived titles from Lot 1which subsequently became the object of subdivision.
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, 439 SCRA 1 (2004)

FACTS:

In a complaint for sum of money filed before the RTC, petitioner Permanent Savings and Loan Bank sought to recover
from respondent Mariano Velarde, the sum of P1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and penalties, based on a loan
obtained by respondent from petitioner bank as evidence by promissory notes. Petitioner bank sent a letter of
demand to respondent on July 27, 1988, demanding full payment of the loan. Despite receipt of said demand letter,
respondent failed to settle his account.

Velarde contends that he caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the allegations thereat are true and
correct; that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein
defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in
the defenses

The Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has already admitted
these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive pleading.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant has really executed the Promissory Note considering the doubt as to the
genuineness of the signature and as well as the non-receipt of the said amount

RULING: No. The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan, but absent the testimony of a
competent witness to the transaction and the documentary evidence, coupled with the denial of liability by the
defendant does not suffice to meet the requisite preponderance of evidence in civil cases.

The documents, standing alone, unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have no legal basis to stand
on. They are not competent evidence. Such failure leaves this Court without ample basis to sustain the plaintiff’s cause
of action and other reliefs prayed for. The loan document being challenged. Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to
strengthen its case by the required preponderance of evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.

The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence and execution of the
documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of Velarde. This falls short of the requirement that
(B)efore any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court)
Tigno v. Spouses Aquino 444 SCRA 61 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Spouses Aquino filed a complaint against Isidro Bustria which sought to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the
Aquinos of a 120,000 square meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The conveyance was covered by a Deed of
Sale dated 2 September 1978.

2. A compromise agreement was entered into between them whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of
the sale, and the Aquinos agreed to grant Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven
7 years.

3. Bustria died and was substituted by his daughter, Zenaida B. Tigno. On 1 December 1989, Tigno attempted to
repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation and depositing 230,000 with the RTC, but this was
opposed by the Aquinos arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to
make a tender of payment.

4. RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.

5. Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment. The Aquinos filed an answer wherein they alleged that Bustria had
sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale.

6. Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia, the instrumental witness to
the deed of sale, and former Judge Cariño, who notarized the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion
of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence,
the Aquinos offered for admission the deed of sale purportedly executed by Bustria

7. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent
document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering
that it had been previously unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's previous
Motion for Consignation.

8. RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence. RTC then ruled in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed
doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cariño as conflicting.
The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged
by Bustria; that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel in connection with the
preparation and execution of the deed of sale or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous
Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.

9. CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Aquino. The appellate court ratiocinated that there
were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cariño and De Francia that would taint
the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat
did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not
render the document null and ineffective. It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption
of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence to contradict the same.

ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale was notarized properly, hence admissible as evidence

RULING:
No. SC ruled in favor of Tigno. RTC decision is reinstated.
RATIO: The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known
to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.

FRANKLIN CARIÑO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an
acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a
jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.

But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this petition. This
pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cariño to notarize the Deed of Sale.

It is undisputed that Franklin Cariño at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are
empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya, the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cariño
may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected
with any official duties of Judge Cariño, and there was no reason for him to notarize it.

Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The validity of a
notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have
the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized.

What then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the
absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article
1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable
property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form
does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not
essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience.

The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents; hence, it
must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge
Cariño is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the
Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not properly
acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.

Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement that before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence by Aquinos, hence, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its
authenticity and due execution. However, the SC observed that no receipts were ever presented by the respondents
to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the respondents that the
amount was covered by seven receipts. Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged
signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record.

CHONG vs. CA (G.R. No. 148280; July 10, 2007)

FACTS:
On August 25, 1989, petitioner Loreta Agustin Chong filed a complaint for annulment of contracts and recovery of
possession against respondent-spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman, and Fortune Development Corporation before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner alleged that she is the common-law wife of Augusto Chong; that on
February13, 1980, she bought a parcel of land from respondent corporation as evidenced by Contract to Sell No. 195.
She further stated that by virtue of a special power of attorney that she executed in favor of Augusto, the latter sold
the subject lot to respondent spouses, but it was not paid and despite repeated demands of surrender of the lot, the
respondent spouses did not heed. In their amended answer, respondent-spouses asserted that the Transfer of Rights
and Assumption of Obligation was supported by sufficient consideration; that they paidP125,000.00, and not
P25,000.00 as alleged by petitioner, for the house on the subject lot; that the Deed of Sale over the house constructed
on the subject lot was signed by petitioner on February 22, 1987 while she was still in the country but it was notarized
only on February 24, 1987 or after she had left to work abroad; that petitioner failed to allege or submit any actionable
document to prove her claim of ownership; that the house located in Singalong is owned by respondent-spouses. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor or respondent spouses. CA confirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.

Issue:
Whether the Transfer of Rights and Assumption of Obligation was void or, in the alternative, unenforceable as against
petitioner.

HELD:
The clear and unmistakable tenor of the Special Power of Attorney reveals that petitioner specifically authorized
Augusto to sell the subject lot and to settle her obligations to third persons. The Special Power of Attorney is a duly
notarized document and, as such, is entitled, by law, to full faith and credit upon its face. Notarization vests upon the
document the presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof. Rather than
challenging its validity, petitioner admitted in open court that she signed the Special Power of Attorney with a full
appreciation of its contents and without reservation.
The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. BTL Construction Corporation G.R. No. 176439,
February 26, 2007

FACTS:
1. COJCOLDS and BTL entered into a Construction Contract for the latter’s construction of the former’s meeting
house facility. However, due to bad weather conditions, power failures, and revisions in the construction, the
completion date of the Medina Project was extended.

2. BTL informed COJCOLDS that it suffered financial losses from another project and thereby requested that it be
allowed to: (a) bill COJCOLDS based on 95% and 100% completion of the Medina Project; and (b) execute deeds of
assignment in favor of its suppliers so that they may collect any eventual payments directly from COJCOLDS. COJCOLDS
granted said request which BTL, in turn, acknowledged.

3. BTL ceased its operations in the Medina Project because of its lack of funds to advance the cost of labor necessary
to complete the said project, as well as the supervening increase in the prices of materials and other items for
construction. Consequently, COJCOLDS terminated its Contract with BTL on August 17, 2001 and, thereafter, engaged
the services of another contractor, Vigor Construction (Vigor), to complete the Medina Project.

4. BTL filed a complaint against COJCOLDS for damages

ISSUE: What are their liabilities to each other?

HELD:
I. Liabilities of COJCOLDS to BTL.
a. The 10% Retention Money and the Unpaid Balance of the Contract Price: Because the 10% retention money should
not be treated as a separate and distinct liability of COJCOLDS to BTL as it merely forms part of the contract price.
While COJCOLDS is bound to eventually return to BTL the amount of P1,248,179.87 as retention money, the said
amount should be automatically deducted from BTL’s outstanding billings. Ultimately, COJCOLDS’s total liability to BTL
should only be pegged at P1,612,017.74, representing the unpaid balance of 98% of the contract price, inclusive of
the 10% retention money.

II. Liabilities of BTL to COJCOLDS.

a. Liquidated Damages Due to Delay: BTL’s liability to COJCOLDS for liquidated damages is a result of its delay in the
performance of its obligations under the Contract.
b. Cost Overrun: BTL should therefore reimburse COJCOLDS the said cost which the latter incurred essentially because
of BTL’s failure to complete the project as agreed upon.
c. Overpayments: Therefore obliged to return the same to COJCOLDS pursuant to Article 2154 of the Civil Code which
states that "[i]f something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises."

III. Mutual Liabilities: Attorney’s Fees- NONE , because neither party was shown to have acted in bad faith in pursuing
their respective claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by the fact that the CIAC, the CA, and
the Court have all found the parties’ original claims to be partially meritorious.
HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
AURORA O. SANTOS, JOVITA SANTOS GONZALES, ARNULFO O. SANTOS, ARCHIMEDESO. SANTOS, ERMELINA SANTOS
RAVIDA, and ANDRES O. SANTOS, JR.,
defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-46892 September 30, 1981FACTS:
Amparo Del Rosario entered into a contract with Atty. Andres Santos and his wifeAurora Santos whereby the latter
sold to the former a 20,000 sq. m. of land which is to besegregated from Lot 1. Said lot forms part of the several lots
belonging to a certain Teofilo
Custodio, of which lots, Attorney Santos, by agreement with the latter, as his attorney’s fees,owns ½ interests thereof.
Parties agreed that spouses Andres shall thereafter execute a
Deed of Confirmation of Sale in favor of Del Rosario as soon as the title has been releasedand the subdivision plan of
said Lot 1 has been approved by the Land RegistrationCommissioner. Due to the failure of the spouses Andres to
execute the deed after thefulfilment of the condition, Del Rosario claims malicious breach of a Deed of Sale.
Defendantthereafter filed a motion to dismiss setting up the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of thecourt over the
subject of the action lack of cause of action as well as the defense of prescription. They further alleged that the deed
of sale was only an accommodationgraciously extended, out of close friendship between the defendants and the
plaintiff, hence,tantamount to waiver, abandonment or otherwise extinguishment of the demand set forthin the
complaint. Finally, defendants alleged that the claim on which the action or suit isfounded is unenforceable under the
statute of frauds and that the cause or object of thecontract did not exist at the time of the transaction. The lower
court resolved to deny themotion to dismiss. After actions by respective parties, the lower court ordered
thedefendants to execute and convey to plaintiff the 200,000 sq. m. of land to be taken eitherfrom Lot 4 or from Lot
5-
A of Custodio’s lots, which defendants own ½ interest thereof.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendants filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which certified the
records of the case to the Supreme Court for final determination.
ISSUE: WON THE SALE IS VALID AS TO THE CAUSE OR OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT.HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the execution of the Deed of Sale is validnotwithstanding the lack of any title to the
lot by appellants at the time of execution of theDeed of Sale in favor of appellee as there can be a sale of an expected
thing in accordance
with Article 1461 of the NCC: “Article 1461: Things having a potential existence may be the
object of the contract of sale. The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope of expectancy isdeemed subject to the condition
that the thing will come into existence. The sale of a vainhope or expectancy
is void.” The case at bar is not a case of a vain hope or expectancy
which is void under the law. The expectant right came into existence or materialized for theappellants actually derived
titles from Lot 1which subsequently became the object of subdivision.