G.R. No.

108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.

Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still
a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?

The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court
which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration
over the lots in question.

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total
area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before
the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the
court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and
confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in
the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth
but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City
and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.

Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the
certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-
way.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:

In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they
bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.
Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as
has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed
out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm
and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High
Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the
applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which
was belatedly filed.

Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for the
constitutional issue presented therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in
their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant
for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

As found by the trial court:

The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-
fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent
parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)

Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:

The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable
zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed
realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon";
that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979;
that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and
"J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great
significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the
subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application
for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo,
p., 27)

The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:

17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)

18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the
application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have
been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141;
sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of
the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to
prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987),
they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according
to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp.
14-15)

The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to
apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-
in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not,
however, what the law provides.

As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

As amended by PD 1073:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.

It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for
only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents'
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed
land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and
therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession
thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue
thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.

At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986 case
of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v.
Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Narvasa, declared that:

(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. . . .

Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act

No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's
case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
 since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent
...

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing

provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in
Cariño, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director
of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41
[1993]).

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the
land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of.

In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land
(Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As
could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest
had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true
copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that
the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented
in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were
part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR
No. 28953, Records, p. 33).

In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign
nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants
in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the
alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the
applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before
us on review and we reversed.

This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:

As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of
the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or
royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado"
title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion
posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.

If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time
immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):

. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors
in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant
does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his
first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his

predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
(Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)

It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]),
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R.
Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.

In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property
subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property
. . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).

. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently
baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has
learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case
of private respondents. . . .
 . . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had
possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of
both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in
such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi
doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right
whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes
without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the
property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American
citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been
segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have
acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.

In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest
under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:

Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or
one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail
of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
 In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature
on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could
be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels
of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private
respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:

Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to
lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the
register of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing
the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and
children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the
Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his
Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.

The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said
requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be
submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving
the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when
the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the
certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds
has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to
be issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
 Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

With all due respect, I have to dissent.

The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons. It was
really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.

But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born Filpinos at
the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.

The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land,
they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.

Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses
were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.

Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a former
natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.

Thus it states:

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.

Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have
observed "the limitations provided by law."

The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name have
been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.

The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should
also be applied.

Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have become
foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be
less so with those who have renounced our country.

Feliciano, J.: concurring

I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion, of
the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses became
transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who
happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they
became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It
is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land
(not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken together
with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)

B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that is,
purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.

# Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

With all due respect, I have to dissent.

The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons. It was
really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.

But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born Filpinos at
the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.

The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land,
they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.

Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses
were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.

Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a former
natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.

Thus it states:

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.

Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have
observed "the limitations provided by law."

The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name have
been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should
also be applied.

Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have become
foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be
less so with those who have renounced our country.

Feliciano, J.: concurring

I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.

This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion, of
the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses became
transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who
happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they
became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It
is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land
(not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken together
with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)

B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that is,
purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
 [G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE, SR.,
EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, and ELISA BERNABE, Respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated
February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R, entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., Et. Al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,"
affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC
Cadastral Record No. 1097, which dismissed petitioner Republic’s petition for review of the decrees of registration issued
pursuant to the decision rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of the private Respondents herein, the
lots applied for by them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.

On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).

On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a portion of Lot
No. 622 — Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 — and a portion of Lot No. 324 — Lot Nos. 791 and 799 — more
particularly identified and delineated in the segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342
and Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots, having
allegedly acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose
possession of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive,
public, adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).

On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and directing that the Republic of the
Philippines be notified thereof by furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, a
copy of said Order together with Respondents’ petition by registered mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).

On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the petition once
the area involved is found to be within the timberland and therefore inalienable under the Constitution (Record on
Appeal, p. 7). Upon verification, however, the Director of Forestry found the area to be the portion of the timberland
already released by the government from the mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition (Record on
Appeal, p. 8).

On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his
opposition to the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject
of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.

The lower court found that the petitioners have complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle them to a
grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19), reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342, Sgs-3343 and Sgs-3340 and their
technical descriptions are hereby APPROVED, and pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the court hereby adjudicates in favor
of petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr., married; Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz Bernabe, single; Amparo Bernabe, single
and Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos and residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein applied for as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.

3339

Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.

3341

Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.

3342 795 100,439 sq. m.

Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.

3343 797 75,100 sq. m.

Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.

Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.

and upon this decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby directed to issue the
corresponding decrees of registration therefor." cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818, all
dated May 7, 1969 (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-25).

On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, through the Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration under Section
38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds that the entire
proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the petition for re-opening
of the cadastral proceedings; that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are
portions of the public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition
only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not have a registerable title to the land subject matter
of the proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of registerable title to
respondents over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not qualify under the provisions of Section 48(b) of
CA 141, as amended, and that under the circumstances, respondents employed actual fraud in procuring title over the
parcels of land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).

On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the Petition for Review on the grounds that: (1) The trial court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review of a decree of
registration. If the Solicitor General was not notified of the subsequent hearings, it was because he delegated his
appearance to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. Besides the setting aside or review was filed out of time. (2) The petition
states no cause of action, the parcels of land involved in the actions having been already transferred to innocent
purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-General even filed the petition for review (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-40).

Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until the hearing of the merits of the case which was set for August
16, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer, respondents
reiterated their grounds in their motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 40-44).

On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that after having
fraudulently secured title over the parcels of land involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale purporting to
convey various lots composing portions of the parcels involved to third parties for fictitious considerations in an obvious
attempt to remove the parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section 38 of Act 496, but in truth, the
aforementioned third parties are not innocent purchasers for value, being mere dummies of the petitioners, holding the
parcels of land involved only in trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the
Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).

On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order denying petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review (Record on
Appeal, p. 56).

On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1971, the questioned Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).

On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of
merit, in the Resolution of a special Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.

Hence this petition.

Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court, through its First Division, resolved on May 5, 1975 to require the
respondents to comment thereon. On May 30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the decision of
respondent Court and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Neither was
the discretion exercised by respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.

In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and denied the urgent motion
of respondents for leave to file a supplemental and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on November 29,
1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976. Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March 25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case
was deemed submitted for decision.

Petitioner assigns the following errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BECAME AGRICULTURAL ONLY ON
JULY 6, 1965 WHEN THE SAME WERE RELEASED FROM THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THEY LACK THE
REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS POSSESSION TO ENTITLE THEM TO A GRANT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDING FOR REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE LOTS IN QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK OF
NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF
REVIEW CONSTITUTES FRAUD SCHEMED BY THE TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING ANY ACTION AIMED AT
NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES THERETO.

The government’s cause is meritorious.

It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles
Cadastre and in fact a decision was rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097, declaring the lot in question as public land. It must be stressed that said lot was declared public land by virtue of a
court decision which has become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata. (Republic v.
Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is therefore beyond question that the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the
cadastral proceeding under R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision therein rendered is null and void ab
initio.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622 was released as an agricultural land for disposition under Public
Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The lower court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decrees of registration for the
lots, pursuant to Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
providing for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
cralaw virtua1aw library

As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject
of a judicial confirmation of title under the aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.

The answer is in the negative.

Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered
with forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued
during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v.
Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director
of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Director of Lands v. Abanzado,
65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA
648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].

Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a
grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1
year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when
the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267, which includes the
lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above
mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots
for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.

II

Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the
Solicitor-General, should have been furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions, as in ordinary cases, in
order to bind the government. Failure to give such notice deprives the State of its day in Court, and renders the decision
void. (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).

The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen Cadastral
Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision itself promulgated by the
lower court on December 19, 1968 was sent instead to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized
representative of the Solicitor-General in the cadastral proceeding as shown in a telegram dated January 19, 1968.
(Record on Appeal, p. 47).

In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426 [1976], the Supreme Court, applying the time-honored
principle of agency ruled that the service of the questioned decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be service
on the Solicitor-General, and added that technical transgressions relative to the filing and service may be brushed aside
when the adverse party (this time the Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the Solicitor-General) is aware of
the matter which his adversary would want the court to act upon. Once it appears that the party is already informed by
one means or another of what he is to be notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict observance
thereof is considered waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]).

In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor General was so apprised of the decision of the lower court in
question as there is no proof that the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy thereof.
Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court, the
Provincial Fiscal on March 21, 1969 manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal upon the intervention of the District
Forester. (Respondent’s Brief, p. 44).

It will be observed however that later decisions of the Supreme Court tend to be more strict in the matter of giving notice
to the Solicitor General. In a more recent case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 [1985], it was established
that the Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases and as such, he alone
may withdraw the Government’s appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be furnished copies of all court
orders, notices and decisions and as held the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time
the Solicitor-General’s Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the special counsel or the
fiscal was served with that order. Thus, representatives of the Solicitor General in the case at bar, had no power to
decide whether or not an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor-General and
without copies of court orders, notices and decisions, having been provided by either the trial court or the Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan to the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.

III

The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 as amended was filed by the
Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the same Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, exactly a year after the issuance of aforesaid decrees of registration, on the ground of
actual fraud. (Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).

The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or
dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year from
the issuance of the decree and (4) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. (Libudan
v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, Et. Al. v. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however that the action to
annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts
upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. (Libudan v. Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual
malice. (Rublico v. Orellana, supra).

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over parcels of
land of the public domain as it is a matter of record that the land in question was opened for disposition and alienation
only on July 6, 1965. The matter was threshed out in the lower court and the decision of the latter was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Actual malice is therefore absent.

However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled
within one (1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is true if entered in compliance
with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, such as want of due process, (Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo,
110 Phil. 118 [1960] or lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case. (Republic v. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA
720 [1969]). Thus, on both counts, the case at bar can properly be the subject of review, it having been shown that the
Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and copy of the assailed decision but more importantly,
the lower court as previously stated had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as
amended by R.A. No. 2061.

IV

As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that
a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machiner
Co., Et Al., 37 Phil. 651[1918]. Without the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in
contemplation of law.

Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void, when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or
timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for
value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring
supplied). In the case at bar, it will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the lower court counted the
period of possession of private respondents before the same were released as forest lands for disposition, which release
is tantamount to qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they were still non-disposable. Thus, under the
foregoing rulings, even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived
from the titles of private respondents which were not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain,
may be cancelled.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First Instance are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED, because the lots in question still form part of the public domain. The certificates of
title issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J.
PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other
DOES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as follows.

On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued Executive
Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio
Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine
Commission. 1

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of America, ordered
the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on
December 9, 1916; 2 December 28, 3 and January 17, 1917. 4 Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting
of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 5 to
his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. 6

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo
filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. 7 The Register of
8
Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.

On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and,
therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor
registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).

The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon 9 and introduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed
Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private
respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does
who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913
and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than
P2,000.00.

On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation
of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of
Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi
Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.

The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank was
already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.

A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986,
the trial court rendered the following decision:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the
complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against the plaintiffs.

In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well
as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153, 10 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles
Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions
based on said titles.

(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands in
question that are found therein and introduced by the defendants;

(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and 4
of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;

(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-
3912, T-3913 and T-3914.

Costs against the defendants.

So Ordered. 12

The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established property
rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at
the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of
Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because these were issued
only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note that although the Geodetic
Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the
properties stated in his reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only
1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area, 13 the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic)
Plan II-9205 cancelled.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence
this petition raising the following issues:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court.

2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer certificates
of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on
the matter.

3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the
government is against our existing law and jurisprudence.

The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant
to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the
petition for reconstitution are valid.

Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th
century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American government had no
inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government
reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of
the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of
private property without due process of law.

In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First Instance
of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America which state that the predecessors in interest of the
petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50
years at the time of their registration in 1916.

We are not convinced.

The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty
of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony
and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concesion
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or
Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January
26, 1889.

Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record
Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28,
1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated
December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America
presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years. 14 The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance, however,
were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of
the clerk of court.

Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were
surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously , in
February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already
surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors
in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917,
they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It
certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the
reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.

As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government opposition,
the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel, does not operate against the
Government for the act of its agents. 15

Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the lands are still not capable of
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.

There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified
by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as
alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. 16 Moreover, as part of
the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is
not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, 17 unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch
as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration
cases. 18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements
introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time
the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands
were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of
title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the
Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed
in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 19 contains the following note, "in conflict with provincial
reservation." 20 In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the
registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing
improvements on the lots.

Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation,
TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled
in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, 21 were within the perimeter of the national park, 22 no pronouncement
as to damages is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913
be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi
against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and
absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c)
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to
pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and,
as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States
under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made
in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the
costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the
following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff
is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of
Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the
Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for
new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B).
After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12,
reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had
already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with
the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the
land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial,
the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint
(Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela
Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of
the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of
Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the
register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.
Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he
refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
(Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments
of error.
lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for
about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in
the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts
her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land
a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof. lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law,
private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to
bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed
in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of
Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court, committed
an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he
would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the
Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs.Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or registration
of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No.
141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems
unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in
interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and
that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of
registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession
at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not
have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between
vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of
the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application
filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo a parcel
of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the continuous, public, and
adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other
grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands.

One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in question is
susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia, inspector of the
Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that the land, notwithstanding the use to
which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary
of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, is as follows:

1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution may be
interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition.

1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of
the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands" had, therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our
public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed
by our Supreme Court in many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574;
Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593; Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs.
Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516 Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina
175, 181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)

Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in
one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they
must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not,
the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524; Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co.,
123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural or not
(State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).

Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15, 1940,
overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed for the applicant. The
Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General appearing for appellant, maintains that
the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question
and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and void.

This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the lower court's
decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring null and void the purchase
made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state our opinion on the
important question raised, it must be squarely decided.

The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:

I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the applicant who,
according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.

(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in the Public Land
Act includes residential lots.

In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered agricultural
lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has well settled judicial
definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine
Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands
(Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159;
Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560;
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra, the Supreme Court, in defining the meaning and scope of that phrase from the
context of the sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said:

The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is
also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands.

xxx xxx xxx

"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that only definition
which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 say that the
Government shall "make and rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of
public lands other than timber or mineral lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be
said to be given agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in
Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
. . ." Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.)

"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the first public
land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by the Philippine
Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted in the case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government, supra. This is a self-evident from a reading of section 1, 10, 32, and 64 (subsection
6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural public lands" is used in any of said sections, it is
invariably by the qualification "as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two."

"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme Court
held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is agricultural land, irrespective of
the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of agriculture for the simple reason that it is susceptible of
cultivation and may be converted into a rural estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestal
in its nature it must necessarily be included within the classification of a agricultural land. Because of the
special applicability of the doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from the decision
therein rendered:

"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan Ibañez
de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and ceasing to be
agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding
Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may converted into a
field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal
in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agriculture land, not
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides the Act of Congress
(of July 1, 1902) contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect
to building lots or urban land that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .
 xxx xxx xxx

"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the exception
of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destine
to the use of public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may
be acquired by any private or juridical person; and considering their origin and primitive state and
the general uses to which they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and
building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no
obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural
estates." (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163 164, 165, 166; emphasis
added.).

(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), the phrase
(Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land" includes lands of the public
domain suitable for residential purposes.

"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:

"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ."
(Emphasis added.).

"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization of the natural
resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to citizens of the Philippines or to
the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also clearly appears from said provision
that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, are not subject to alienation.

"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act the lands of the public have been
classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands
designated alienable or disposable correspond to lands designated in the Constitution as public
agricultural lands, because under section 1, Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural
resources of the country which are the only natural resources of the country which are subject to
alienation or deposition.

"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public lands shall be
classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a agricultural, residential,
commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that under this classification residential
land is different from agricultural land. The difference however, is more apparent than real. 'Public
agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in the Constitution means alienable lands of the public domain
and therefore this phrase is equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
alienable or disposable. The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes administration and
disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are especially adopted. But notwithstanding
this of all said lands are essentially agricultural public lands because only agricultural public lands are
subject to alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would
necessarily create a conflict between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the
Constitution, and such conflict should be avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the
fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.

"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an Act will be
so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although such a construction
may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The Court may resort to an implication to sustain a
statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go beyond the province of legitimate
construction, in order to save a statute; and where the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read
into it or out of it for that purpose." ( 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, which a compilation of
the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the amendments thereto, form to the Constitution.

"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a
revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)

"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been classified
pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by reason of this
classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural public land, it will no longer be
subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the constitutional provision that only agricultural lands
are alienable; and yet such residential lot is alienable under section 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations mentioned in section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore, the classification of public agricultural lands into various
subdivisions is only for purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the
inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural lands.

"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.

"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient authority for giving
the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation, and this is especially so in view
of the length of time during which this interpretation has been maintained by the courts. On this point
Sutherland has the following to say:

"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague manner
by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be sufficient authority for
adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We find solemn determination of these doubtful
expressions in the statute, and as that now put another construction has since prevailed, there is
no reason why we should now put another construction of the act on account of any suppose
change of convenience." This rule of construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that
the practical erroneous; so that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different
construction. Lord Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable not so much
that the principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as that the law
should be settled, and should, when once settled, be maintained without any danger of vacillation
or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and practice will have weight, and when continued for a long time
will be sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of the statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .

"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction is the
length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from being adopted, soon
after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that the legislative sense of its policy,
and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary and controls its exposition. Having
received at that time a construction which is for the time settled, accepted, and thereafter
followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the of the authority appointed to expound the law,
just and correct conclusions, when reached, they are, moreover, within the strongest reasons on
which founded the maxim of stare decisis. Such a construction is public given, and the
subsequent silence of the legislature is strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive.
. . . (II Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)

"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article XII of the
Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning therefor given to it and
therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution, includes residential lands and another
lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and timber lands.

"Adoption of provisions previously construed — ad. Previous construction by Courts. — Where a

statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been reenacted in same, or
substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with its
construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law, unless a contrary intent clearly appears, or
a different construction is expressly provided for; and the same rule applies in the construction of
a statute enacted after a similar or cognate statute has been judicially construed. So where
words or phrases employed in a new statute have been construed by the court to have been
 used in a particular sense in a previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they
are presumed, in the a absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the
same sense in the statute as in the previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-1063.).

"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. — In the adoption of the code, the legislature is
presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been placed on the former
statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general revision of provisions substantially
the same as those contained in the former statutes is a legislative adoption of their known judicial
constructions, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated
statutory language after it had been judicially construed shows that they had such construction in
view." (59 C. J., 1102.)

"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant (appellee).

"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain by reason of
the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's predecessors in interest, and that the
latter had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and were entitled to a certificate
of title under section 48, subsection (b), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land of
December 8, 1938, to the applicant as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being
contrary to section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain of the Philippines."

"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
(section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ),
and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private agriculture land.

"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as hereinbefore
demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above quoted provision, can only
mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential, commercial or industrial. And this
necessarily so, because the phrase 'agricultural land used in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law
must be given the same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private
ownership, which is neither mineral or forestal.

"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute,
unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in a technical sense
and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the
legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the
rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according
to the sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction., p. 758.) .

"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our Constitution and
laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as solemnly enunciated in the
preamble to the Constitution.

"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and defeat the
nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, steady, and unlimited
accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our patrimonial estates, to the detriment of our
national solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent the acquisition of a great portion or
the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a city or urban area is more strategical than a
farm or rural land.

"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the
intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to
admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent
prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so read as to conform to the spirit of the
act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it,
the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal
interpretation of such words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
 "We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his name falls
within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our Constitution and,
consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by hereditary succession."

The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent of the
Constitutional Convention.

One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:

The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1) the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of our commerce and industry
compatible with good international practices. With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural
resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino
hands. ... Lands and natural resources are immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs
of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If
we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time
will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for
what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those
of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).

From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:

The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their conservation
for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into
the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the
Philippines a source of international conflict with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other
natural resources said;

"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of land and natural
resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens should be restricted in the
acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is afforded by the case of Texas. This state
was originally province of Mexico. In order to secure its rapid settlements and development, the Mexican
government offered free land to settlers in Texas. Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans,
and soon they organized a revolt against Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United
States. A new increase of alien landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a prevent a repetition
of the Texas affair. Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right
of aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example."

xxx xxx xxx

It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed principle of
prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the same reasons the Convention approved equally
readily the proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer of assignment to aliens of private agricultural
land, save in the case of hereditary succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp.
604, 605, 606.).

All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with Solicitor
General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far as the outright
pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void.

BRIONES, M., con quien estan conformes PARAS y TUASON, MM., disidente:
El solicitante en este expediente pide el registro del solar de que se trata como terreno de propiedad privada, y
tan solo con caracter supletorio invoca las disposiciones del capitulo 8.º de la Ley No. 2874 sobre terrenos
publicos (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 3.)

Por su parte el Director de Terrenos se opone a la solicitud en virtud de tres fundamentos, a saber: (1) porque ni
el solicitante ni sus predecesores en interes pueden demonstrar titulo suficiente sobre dicha parcela de terreno,
no habiendose adquirido la misma ni por titulo de composicion con el Estado bajo la soberania de España, ni
por titulo de informacion posesoria bajo el Real Decreto de 13 de Febrero de 1894; (2) porque el citado solar es
una porcion de los terrenos de dominio publico pertenecientes al Commonwealth de Filipinas; (3) porque siendo
el solicitante un ciudadano chino, no esta capacitado bajo las disposiciones de la Constitucion de Filipinas para
adquirir terrenos de caracter publico o privado (idem, pags. 5 y 6).

Tanto el solicitante como el Director de Terrenos practicaron sus pruebas ante un arbitro nombrado por el
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas. Con vista de tales pruebas, el Juez Magsalin, del referido Juzgado,
dicto sentencia a favor del solicitante, de la cual transcribimos las siguientes porciones pertinentes:

La representacion del opositor Director de Terrenos trata de probar por medio del testimonio del
Inspector del Buro de Terrenos que, el terreno objeto de la solicitud es parte del dominio publico y
ademas el solicitante es ciudadano chino, pero dicho testigo afirmo que el terreno objeto de la presente
solicitud es un solar situado dentro de la poblacion del municipio de Guinayanga, Tayabas, y en el
mismo existe una casa de materiales fuertes y careciendo de merito esta oposicion debe desestimarse
la misma.

Por tanto, previa desestimacion de la oposicion del Director de Terrenos, se adjudica con sus mejoras la
parcela de terreno objeto de la presente solicitud descrito en el plano Psu-109117, a favor del solicitante
Oh Cho, ciudadano chino, mayor de edad, casado con Yee Shi, y residente en el municipio de
Guinayanga, Tayabas, Islas Filipinas. (Decision, pag. 8, Record on Appeal.)

De lo transcrito se infiere de una manera forzosa lo siguiente: (a) que el tribunal inferior desestimo de plano la
oposicion del Director de Terrenos fundada en el supuesto de que el solar cuestionado es parte del dominio
publico; (b) que el mismo tribunal rechazo el otro fundamento de la oposicion, esto es, que siendo el solicitante
ciudadano chino esta incapacitado bajo nuestra Constitucion para adquirir terreno, ya publico, ya privado,
aunque sea un solar de caracter urbano; (c) que, segun el fallo del Juez a quo, no siendo publico el terreno
cuestionado, es necesariamente terreno privado.

El Director de Terrenos, no estando conforme con la sentencia, apelo de ella para ante el Tribunal de Apelacion
y hace en su alegato dos señalamientos de error, ninguno de los cuales pone en tela de juicio la calidad de
privado del terreno cuestionado. El apelante no plantea ninguna cuestion de hecho; plantea solo una cuestion
de derecho. Por eso que en la reconstitucion de este expediente — el original se quemo durante la guerra — no
ha habido necesidad de incluir las notas taquigraficas ni las pruebas documentales, y de hecho hemos
considerado y decidido este asunto sin dichas notas y pruebas. El abogado Constantino, del apelado, en la
audiencia para la reconstitucion de los autos, hizo esta manifestacion; "In view also of the fact that the questions
involved here are only questions of law, this representation waives the right to present the evidence presented in
the trial court . . . ." Por su parte, el Procurador General, al explanar el caso en representacion del apelante
Director de Terrenos, principia su alegato con la siguiente declaracion:

This appeal is a test case. There are now several cases of exactly the same nature pending in the trial
courts.

Whether or not an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name is the only question
raised in this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas which sustained the
affirmance and decreed the registration of the said property in favor of the applicant who, by his own
voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic. This question is raised in connection with the
constitutional provision that no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned to foreigners
except in cases of hereditary succession. (Pags. 1, 2, alegato del apelante.)

Habiendose apelado de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal de Apelacion ¿por que se elevo este asunto al
Tribunal Supremo, ante el cual ya estaba pendiente aun antes de la guerra, y sin resolverse durante la
ocupacion japonesa? La razon no consta especificamente en autos, pero como no se trata de una alzada del
Tribunal de Apelacaion a la Corte Suprema, la unica explicacion que cabe es que aquel, la percatarse de que
en la apelacion no se planteaba mas que una cuestion de derecho, ordeno, como era de rigor, el traslado del
asunto a esta Corte por ser de su jurisdiccion y competencia.
Hemos estimado necesario sentar las anteriores premisas porque las mismas sirven de base a la
argumentacion que a seguida vamos a desenvolver para fundamentar esta disidencia.

I. De lo expuesto resulta evidente que el Director de Terrenos se ha opuesto al registro solicitado, entre otros
fundamentos, porque el terreno es publico; que el tribunal inferior ha desestimado este fundamento por "carecer
de merito," fallando que el terreno es privado; que el Director de Terrenos, en su apelacion ante nosotros, no
cuestiona esta conclusion del Juez a quo, sino que dando por admitido que el terreno es de propiedad privada,
arguye, sin embargo, que bajo la seccion 5, Articulo XII de la Constitucion de Filipinas el solicitante, por ser
extranjero, no puede adquirir terreno agricula privado, estando incluido en este concepto un solar urbano como
el de que se trata en este expediente. Planteado el asunto en tales terminos ¿puede esta Corte considerar y
resolver un punto no contendido entre las partes — un punto que esta firme y definitivamente resuelto y no es
objeto de apelacion? Dicho de otra manera: ¿puede esta Corte, como hace la mayoria en su opinion, revocar
una conclusion del tribunal-inferior que no esta discutida en el alegato del apelante? ¿Podemos, en buena ley
procesal, declarar publico el terreno en cuestion por nuestra propia iniciativa, cuando el mismo Procurador
General, que representa al Estado, admite en su alegato el caracter privado del solar, y solo suscita una
cuestion, de derecho, a saber: que bajo nuestra Constitucion ningun acto traslativo de dominio a favor de un
extranjero es valido, asi se trata de predio urbano, porque la frase "terreno agricola privado" qe se contiene en
la Constitucion abarca no solo las fincas rusticas sino tambien las urbanas? Y, sobre todo, ¿podemos, en
equidad y justicia, considerar y revisar un punto que no solo no esta discutido por las partes, pues lo dan por
admitido y establecido, sino que es de derecho y de hecho al propio tiempo? ¿Que base tenemos para hacerlo
cuando no tenemos delante las pruebas tanto testificales como documentales? Nuestra contestacion es, en
absoluto, negativo.

La competencia de esta Corte para revisar las sentencias de los tribunales inferiores, de las cuales se ha
interpuesto apelacion, se basa en el principio de que dicha competencia, en su ejercicio, tiene que limitarse a
las cuestiones controvertidas, y esto se determina mediante el señalamiento de errores que el apelante hace en
su alegato. El articulo 19 del antiguo reglamento de los procedimientos en este Tribunal Supremo decia en su
primer parrafo lo siguiente:

Anexo al alegato del apelante y en pliego separado, se acompañara una relacion de los errores de
derecho que han de discutirse. La especificacion de cada uno de estos errores se hara por parrafos
separados, con toda claridad, de una manera concisa, y sin incurrir en repeticiones, y seran numerados
por orden correlativo.

El articulo 20 del mismo reglamento preceptuaba:

Ningun error de derecho fuera del relativo a competencia sobre la materia de un litigio, sera tomado en
consideracion como no se halle puntualizado en la relacion de los errores y presentado como uno de los
fundamentos en el alegato.

Interpretando estas disposiciones reglamentarias, la Corte hizo en el asunto de Santiago contra Felix (24 Jur.
Fil., 391), los siguientes pronunciamientos doctrinales:

1. APELACION; EFECTO DE DEJAR DE PRESENTAR RELACION DE ERRORES; REGLA

FIRMEMENTE ESTABLECIDA. — Es regla establecida por la jurisprudencia de los Tribunales de estas
Islas, en virtud de repetidas y uniformes sentencias de esta Corte, la de que si en una apelacione el
recurrente dejare de hacer señalamiento de los errores en que haya incurrido el Tribunal inferior, y se
limitare a discutir cuestiones de hecho en general, no es posible que este Tribunal pueda considerar ni
revisar la resolucion adversa a la parte apelante, por el motivo de haberse dictado contra la ley y el peso
de las pruebas, sino que es necesario que se señale y se especifique el error o errores que
determinaron la decision apelada que el apelante califica de ilegal e injusta.

2. Id.; Id.; Regla Igual a la Adoptada por los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos. — Igual doctrina legal se
halla en observancia en los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos de America del Norte, toda vez que una
manifestacion general de que el Juzgado erro en dictar sentencia a favor de una de las partes, no es
suficiente como base para que la Corte pueda revisar la sentencia apelada, pues que a no ser que la
apreciacion hecha por un Juez de los hechos alegados y probados en juicio sea manifestamente
contraria al resultado y peso de las pruebas, el Tribunal de alzada suela aceptar el juicio y criterio del
Juez sobre las cuestiones de hecho, y no procede revocar sin motivo fundado la sentencia apelada.
(Enriquez contra Enriquez, 8 Jur. Fil., 574; Capellania de Tambobong contra Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693;
Paterno contra la Ciudad de Manila, 17 Jur. Fil., 26)" (Santiago contra Felix, 24 Jur. Fil., 391.)
Esta doctrina se reitero posteriormente en los siguientes asuntos: Tan Me Nio contra Administrador de
Aduanas, 34 Jur. Fil., 995, 996; Hernaez contra Montelibano, 34 Jur. Fil., 1011.

La regla 53, seccion 6, del actual reglamento de los tribunales, dispone lo siguiente:

SEC. 5. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the
brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.

No se dira que la cuestion de si el terreno cuestionado es publico o privado, considerada y resuelta por la
mayoria en su decision sin previo señalamiento de error ni apropiada argumentacion en el alegato del
Procurador General, esta comprendida entre las salvedades de que habla la regla arriba transcrita porque ni
afecta a la jurisdiccion sobre la materia del litigio, ni es un "plain error," o "clerical error."

Se notara que en el antiguo reglamento no habia eso de "plain errors not specified" (errores patentes o
manifiestos no especificados en el alegato). Pero ¿cabe invocar esta reserva en el caso que nos ocupa
Indudablemente que no, por las siguientes razones: (a) los autos no demuestran que el Juez a quo cometio un
error patente y manifiesto al declarar en su sentencia que el terreno no es publico sino privado; no tenemos mas
remedio que aceptar en su faz la conclusion del Juez sentenciador sobre este respecto por la sencilla razon de
que no tenemos ante nosotros las pruebas ni testificales ni documentales, y, por tanto, no hay base para
revisar, mucho menos para revocar dicha conclusion, habiendose interpretado esta reserva en el sentido de que
solo se puede tomar "conocimiento judicial del error palpable con vista de los autos y procedimientos"; (b) aun
admitiendo por un momento, a los efectos de la argumentacion, que Su Señoria el Juez padecio error palpable
al sentar dicha conclusion, como quiera que el Procurador General no suscita la cuestion en su alegato debe
entenderse que ha renunciado a su derecho de hacerlo, optando por fundamentar su caso en otros motivos y
razones; por tanto, no estamos facultados para considerar motu proprio el supuesto error, pues evidentemente
no se trata de un descuido u oversight del representante del Estado, sino de una renuncia deliberada, y la
jurisprudencia sobre el particular nos dice que "el proposito subyacente, fundamental de la reserva en la regla
es el de prevenir el extravio de la justicia en virtud de un descuido." He aqui algunas autoridades pertinentes:

Purpose of exception as to plain errors. — The proviso in the rule requiring assignments of error,
permitting the court, at its option, to notice a plain error not assigned, "was and in intended, in the
interest of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public duty, to take cognizance of
palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, especially such as clearly demonstrate that the
suitor has no cause of action." Santaella vs. Otto F. Lange Co. (155 Fed., 719, 724; 84 C. C. A., 145).

The rules does not intend that we are to sift the record and deal with questions which are of small
importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and of a controlling
character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule is to prevent the miscarriage of justice
from oversight. Mast vs. Superior Drill Co. (154 Fed., 45, 51; 83 C. C. A. 157).

II. Hasta aqui hemos desarrollado nuestra argumentacion bajo el supuesto de que la calidad de privado del
terreno litigioso no es controversia justiciable en esta instancia por no estar suscitada la cuestion en el alegato
del Procurador General ni ser materia de disputa entre las partes en la apelacion pendiente ante nosotros; por
lo que, consiguientemente, no estamos facultados para revisar, mucho menos revocar motu proprio la
conclusion del tribunal a quo sobre el particular. Ahora vamos a laborar bajo otro supuesto — el de que el
Procurador General haya hecho el correspondiente señalamiento de error y la cuestion este, por tanto,
propiamente planteada ante esta Corte Suprema para los efectos de la revision. La pregunta naturalmente en
orden es la siguiente: ¿cometio error el Juez a quo al declarar y conceptuar como privado el terreno en
cuestion, o es, por el contrario, acertada su conclusion a este respecto? Somos de opinion que el Juez no
cometio error, que el terreno de que se trata reune las condiciones juridicas necesarias para calificarlo como
privado y diferenciarlo de una propiedad de dominio publico, y que, por tanto, el solicitante tiene sobre la
propiedad un titulo confirmable bajo las disposiciones de la Ley de Registro de Terrenos No. 496.

Afirmase en la decision de la mayoria que el solicitante no ha podido demostrar que el o cualquiera de sus
causantes en derecho adquirio el lote del Estado mediante compra o concesion bajo las leyes, ordenanzas y
decretos promulgados por el Gobierno Español en Filipinas, o en virtud de los tramites relativos a informacion
posesoria bajo la ley hipotecaria en tiempo de España. De esto la mayoria saca la conclusion de que el terreno
cuestionado no es privado porque, segun su criterio, "todos los terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno
(Gobierno Español, se quiere decir), ya mediante compra, ya por concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico"; y
citando como autoridad el asunto clasico de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular la ponencia no admite mas
excepcion a la regla que el caso en que un terreno ha estado en la posesion del ocupante y de sus
predecesores en interes desde tiempo inmemorial, pues semejante posesion justificaria la presuncion de que el
terreno nunca habia sido parte del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun antes de la
conquista española."

Lo que, en primer lugar, no parece correcto es la seguridad con que en la ponencia se afirma que el terreno no
se adquirio bajo la soberania española en virtud de cualquiera de los modos conocidos en la legislacion de
entonces, pues como no tenemos delante las pruebas, no hay naturalmente manera de comprobar la certeza de
la proposicion. Si se tiene en cuenta que el Director deTerrenos se opuso a la solicitud de registro por el
fundamento de que el terreno es de dominio publico, y que el tribunal inferior desestimo este fundamento, la
presuncion es que la calidad de privado del terreno se probo satisfactoriamente, presuncion que queda
robustecida si se considera que el Procurador General, al sostener la apelacion del Gobierno, no discute ni
cuestiona en su alegato la conclusion de que el referido terreno es de propiedad particular.

Por otro lado, la mayoria parece dar un caracter demasiado absoluto y rigido a la proposicion de que "todos los
terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (en tiempo de España), mediante compra o por concesion,
pertenecen al dominio publico." Interpretando estrictamente la ley, esta Corte Suprema denego el registro
solicitado en el celebre asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular que cita la mayoria en su opinion, por eso
mismo que se acentua en la ponencia — por el fundamento de que Cariño no pudo demostrar titulo de compra,
concesion o informacion posesoria expedido por el Gobierno en tiempo de España, siendo por consiguiente el
terreno parte del dominio publico. Pero al elevarse el asunto en grado de apelacion a la Corte Suprema de los
Estados Unidos, la misma revoco la sentencia de esta Corte, declarando el terreno como propiedad privada y
decretando su registro a nombre del solicitante. En la luminosa ponencia del Magistrado Holmes se sientan
conclusiones que proclama el espiritu liberal de aquel gran jurista y reafirman con vigor democratico los
derechos de propiedad de los nativos de estas Islas sobre sus predios en contra del concepto y teoria feudales
de que la Corona de España era la dueña absoluta hasta del ultimo palmo de tierra y de que ningun habitante
podia ser dueño de nada, a menos que tuviese en sus manos un titulo o papel expedido por aquel Gobierno. He
aqui lo que dice el Magistrado Holmes:

We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below — namely, whether the plaintiff
owns the land. The position of government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title
to all the land in the Philippines except so far it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there
was no prescripcion against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required
registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and
therefore became, if it was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain,
and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine Government is bound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown of Spain
in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which the United States
succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that
Spain, in its earlier decrees,"embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled
to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also that, in
legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert,
as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side,
sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon
the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts,
are matters for it to decide. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, p. 596.)

Mas adelante se dice lo siguiente en la citada sentencia de la Corte Suprema Federal:

It is true that, by section 14, the Government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands were some, but not all, spanish conditions has been
fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of public lands actually occupied
by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if
confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued
for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the
occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native
who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat.

xxx xxx xxx

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was
bas by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws
cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were
recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume
to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton vs. Murciano (3 Phil., 537), while it commands viceroys and others, when it
seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants
or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the
origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in (3 Phil., 546): "Where
such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that
ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." It may be that this means possession from before
1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was
recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was
recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove" possession for the
necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove"
(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon
to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, as not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment
under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a
confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed.
This same decree is quoted by the court of land registration for another recognition of the common-law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, pp. 597-599.)
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967

HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed
MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS
REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.

Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.

Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for
registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro,
Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."

The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.

On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio
Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos"
issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants
invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the
ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in
concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.

Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The
latter's opposition recites:

x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or
less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in
Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same Court through the
then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought
to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for
a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession,
according to them, was open continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the
proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to
prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in
another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed
in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" — in other
words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no
more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the
Director of Lands.

On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to
dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had
already been declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.

The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27,
1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having
jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the
Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."

In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a
brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the
previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to
be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on
the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public
Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. 1äwphï1.ñët

The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to
December 31, 1968.

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under
Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession
for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment
therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which
they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that
the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is
already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the
claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant.

On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an
opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have
furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands. 1äwphï1.ñët

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and
judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The
Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the
Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on
October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession
of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and
public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom
the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from
time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November
15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh.
'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not
found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited
and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that
Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members
of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and
occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason
thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to
acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11
of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to
Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding
lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on
the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a
similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the
capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The
lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It
was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and
 the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other
hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.
The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section
48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed,
the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree,
but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally
and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs.
Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking
and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable
under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
 xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would
be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of
the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put
in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force
(or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring
and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the
Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot
impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of
Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time
the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S.
1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open
to doubt or controversy.
 Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the
land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs.
CA, 123 Phil. 919). 15
<äre||anº•1àw>

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded
as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise
affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts,
the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and
registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a
juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a
technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land
to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves
applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands
back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks
no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the
test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion,
as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly
on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of
an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution
and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in
that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent
was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the
time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old
above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which
departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio
decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The
words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to
June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into
private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as
claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under
the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even
on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as
owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P
45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the
municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right
which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land
of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it
has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated
under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant
the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such
application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable:
"The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation
of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the
natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in
another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural
result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not
defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them
to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights
to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly
applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would
be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a
technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
 and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can
apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision
(Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v.
Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact
an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of
a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no
effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and
words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a
nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143
NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court
to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter
or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799
[1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent
was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the
time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old
above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which
departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio
decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The
words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to
June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
<äre||anº•1àw>

acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into
private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as
claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under
the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even
on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as
owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P
45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the
municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right
which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land
of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it
has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated
under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant
the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such
application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable:
"The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation
of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the
natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in
another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural
result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not
defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them
to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights
to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
 conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly
applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would
be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a
technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now." (Emphasis supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can
apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision
(Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v.
Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact
an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of
a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
 interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no
effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and
words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a
nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143
NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court
to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter
or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799
[1982] and related cases.
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by Msgr.
Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from the 1) decision * of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated May 13, 1986, in
AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant-appellee vs. Republic of the
Philippines, et al., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision ** of the then Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated
November 4, 1980 in Land Registration Case No. N-1106 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest Development, oppositors, ordering the registration of title to the parcel of land
designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical
description, together with whatever improvements existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated
June 19,1986, denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

The factual background of the case as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court are as follows:

On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T.
Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said
parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio
Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592
is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application,
the applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as
far back as 1928.

The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was the service of
copies of notice of initial hearing on the proper government officials.

In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the
Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging therein among others, that the
applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied
for.

At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation of
the Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to the application. Hence, an
Order of General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a quo except for the
Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development.

The preliminaries dispensed with, the applicant then introduced its proofs in support of the
petition, summed up by the lower court as follows:

With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, plan PSU-65686.

Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSU-65686 respectively containing an area of 18,977,

6,910 and 16,221 square meters, are adjoining lots & are situated in the Barrio of
Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas)
(Exhibits F, F-1, F-2 and F-3). Said lots were surveyed for the Roman Catholic
Church on November 3, 1928 (Exhibit P-5) and the survey plan approved on
October 20, 1929 (Exhibit F-6).

Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father Raymundo
Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado
on October 20, 1928 (Exhibits G, G-1), portion of Lot 2 also by purchase thru
Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet from the spouses Benito Maramot and
 Venancia Descaller on May 22, 1969 (Exhibits M, N-1), while the remaining
portion of Lot 2 and Lot 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman
Catholic Church even prior to the survey of the said three lots in 1928.

Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed

that even as early as November 1918, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the
Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon (Exhibit N, N-1 to
N-5).<äre||anº•1àw>

These three lots presently constituted the Roman Catholic Church cemetery in
Candelaria, Quezon.

Lots 1, 2 and 3 are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman
Catholic Church under Tax Declaration Nos. 22-19-02-079, 22-19-02-077 and 22-
19-02-082 as 'cemetery site' (Exhibit S, V and T).

With respect to the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592:

This parcel of land situated in the barrio of Bucal (Taguan), Municipality of

Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) and more particularly
described in plan PSU-1 12592 and its technical description with an area of 3,221
square meters (Exhibit 1) was formerly owned and possessed by the spouses
Paulo G. Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de Macasaet. Said spouses, on February
26, 1941, donated this lot to the Roman Catholic Church represented by
Reverend Father Raymundo Esquenet (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-4). It was surveyed for
the Roman Catholic Church on Aug. 16, 1940 as church site and the
corresponding survey plan approved on Jan. 15, 1941 (Exhibits I-1, I-2, 1-3).

Previously erected on this Lot was an old chapel which was demolished and new
chapel now stands in its place on the same site.

For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not adduce
evidence in support of its opposition and will submit the instant case for decision.'

Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis of
acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown title to the parcels
of land being claimed.

Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in
continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together
with its predecessors-in interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least
from the date of the survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years
with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU- 65686; and more than 39 years with respect
to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-112592 (at least from the date of the
survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against
the whole world, and in the concept of owner.

Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvements
thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious
corporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines."

Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for reconsideration on the following
grounds:

1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution(1973) disqualifies a private corporation from
acquiring alienable lands for the public domain.

2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New Constitution on
January 17, 1973.

which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.

 Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration (a point which, incidentally, the
appellant never raised in the lower court prior to its Motion for Reconsideration), the Republic
elevated this appeal. (Rollo, pp. 25-28)

On May 13, 1986, the first Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its Decision the
dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the judgment a quo to be supported by law and the evidence on record,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo p. 30)

A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of the Philippines, but for lack
of merit, its motion for reconsideration was denied on June 19, 1986, by Resolution of the First Civil Case
Division, Intermediate Appellate Court which resolution reads in full:

Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed on June 4,
1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds
raised therein having all been considered in the decision. (Rollo, p. 31)

Hence, this petition.

The following are the assigned errors raised by the petitioner in its petition:

1. The decision and the resolution in question are contrary to law and decisions of this honorable
Court in Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome and Republic, 114 SCRA 799 (prom. June
29,1982); Republic vs. Judge Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, June 29, 1982);
and Republic vs. Judge Gonong and Iglesia ni Cristo, 118 SCRA 729-733 (November
25,1982); Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas, Inc. 141 SCRA 21-25 (Jan. 7,1986).

2. The lands applied for registration were the subject of a previous registration case where a
decree of registration was already issued.

3. Respondent corporation failed to establish the indentity of the lands applied for. (Rollo, pp. 14-
15)

The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a
corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.

Corollary thereto is the question of whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private
corporation, for purpose of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.

Article XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:

Sec. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares....

Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a Certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
 agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contends that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena (private
respondent herein) which is admittedly a corporation sole is disqualified to own and register its title over the
parcels of land involved herein. (Rollo, p. 41)

In its petition it likewise argued that being a juridical entity, private respondent cannot avail of the benefits of Sec.
48(b) of the public land law which applies to FILIPINO citizens or NATURAL persons. On the other hand, private
respondent in its MEMORANDUM espoused the contrary view.

There is no merit in this petition.

The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in
continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-in-interest,
covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2,
about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth
parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public,
continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.

Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution to
the case at bar.

Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is disqualified to own and
register its title to the lots in question. Further, it argues that since the application for registration was filed only
on February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973, the application for
registration and confirmation of title is ineffectual because at the time it was filed, private corporation had been
declared ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said
constitution. (Rollo, p. 41)

The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509 [1986]) which reversed the ruling first enunciated in the 1982 case of Manila
Electric Co. vs. CASTRO BARTOLOME, (114 SCRA 789 [1982]) imposing the constitutional ban on public land
acquisition by private corporations which ruling was declared emphatically as res judicata on January 7, 1986
in Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., (141 SCRA 21 [1986]). In said <äre||anº•1àw>

case, (Director of Lands v. IAC, supra), this Court stated that a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of institution of the registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of the public domain, it
must be answered in the negative.

If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporation or association obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in said case, this Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the then Justice, later Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line of cases beginning with CARINO, 1 in 1909, thru SUSI, 2 in 1925, down to
HERICO, 3 in 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes' private property. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518).

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of
the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the state than the
dictim of the statute itself; 4 that the possessor "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissable to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
ORIGINALLY convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino,
"... There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 520).

The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private respondent can clearly be gleaned
from the following facts on record: Lot 1 and portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in 1928 and 1929,
respectively. The remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was already owned and possessed by private respondent
even prior to the survey of said lots in 1928. In fact, records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of
Candelaria, Quezon showed that as early as 1919, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic
Church as its cemetery. That at present, said three lots are utilized as the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria,
Quezon. That said lots are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth
parcel of land was acquired by donation in 1941 and same lot is utilized as church site.

It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole should be treated like an ordinary
private corporation.

In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, et al. (L-8451,
December 20,1957,102 Phil. 596). We articulated:

In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A
corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived
and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to
as "that unhappy freak of English Law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of
ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the
property owner (See 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).

A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a
time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal
capacities and advantages, particulary that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they
could not have had. In this sense, the King is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct
from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 fla. 849, 112 So. 846).

Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows:

Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. — Any corporation sole may purchase and hold
real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes,
and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real
property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the
province where the property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made to the
satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given
by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said court may have directed,
and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted.
The application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the chief
archbishop, bishop, priest, minister, rabbi or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may
be opposed by any member of the religious denomination, sect or church represented by the
corporation sole: Provided, That in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the
religious denomination, sect or church religious society or order concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate
and personal property, such rules, regulations and discipline shall control and the intervention of
the courts shall not be necessary.

There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase
and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation
because whether or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not
applicable.

In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra,
513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of
title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and Resolution of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.