RA 8189- The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996

Section 45. Election Offenses. - The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:

a) to deliver, hand over, entrust or give, directly or indirectly, his voter’s identification card to another in
consideration of money or other benefit of promise; or take or accept such voter’s identification card,
directly or indirectly, by giving or causing the giving or money or other benefit or making or causing the
making of a promise therefore;

b) to fail, without cause, to post or give any of the notices or to make any of the reports re-acquired
under this Act;

c) to issue or cause the issuance of a voter’s identification number or to cancel or cause the cancellation
thereof in violation of the provisions of this Act; or to refuse the issuance of registered voters their
voter’s identification card;

d) to accept an appointment, to assume office and to actually serve as a member of the Election
Registration Board although ineligible thereto, to appoint such ineligible person knowing him to be
ineligible;

e) to interfere with, impede, abscond for purpose of gain or to prevent the installation or use of
computers and devices and the processing, storage, generation, and transmission of registration data or
information;

f) to gain, cause access to use, alter, destroy, or disclose any computer data, program, system software,
network, or any computer-related devices, facilities, hardware or equipment, whether classified or
declassified;

g) failure to provide certified voters and deactivated voters list to candidates and heads of
representatives of political parties upon written request as provided in Section 30 hereof;

h) failure to include the approved application form for registration of a qualified voter in the book of
voters of a particular precinct or the omission of the name of a duly registered voter in the certified list
of voters of the precinct where he is duly, registered resulting in his failure to cast his vote during an
election, plebiscite, referendum, initiative and/or recall. The presence of the form or name in the book of
voters or certified list of voters in precincts other than where he is duly registered shall not be an excuse
hereof;

i) the posting of a list of voters outside or at the door of a precinct on the day of an election, plebiscite,
referendum, initiative and/or recall, and which list is different in contents from the certified list of voters
being used by the Board of Election Inspectors; and

j) Violation of the provisions of this Act.

 RA 9189 - The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003

Sec. 24. Prohibited Acts. – In addition to the prohibited acts provided by law, it shall be unlawful:

24.1. For any officer or employee of the Philippine government to influence or attempt to influence any
person covered by this Act to vote, or not to vote, for a particular candidate. Nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to prohibit free discussion regarding politics or candidates for public office.

24.2. For any person to deprive any person of any right secured in this Act, or to give false information
as to his/her name, address, or period of residence for the purposes of establishing his/her eligibility or
ineligibility to register or vote under this Act; or to conspire with another person for the purpose of
encouraging the giving of false information in order to establish the eligibility or ineligibility of any
individual to register or vote under this Act; or, to pay, or offer to pay, or to accept payment either for
application to vote in absentia or for voting;

24.3. For any person to tamper with the ballot, the mail containing the ballots for overseas absentee
voters, the election returns, including the destruction, mutilation and manipulation thereof;

24.4. For any person to steal, destroy, conceal, mutilate or alter any record, document or paper as
required for purposes of this Act;

24.5. For any deputized agent to refuse without justifiable ground, to serve or continue serving, or to
comply with his/her sworn duties after acceptance of his/her appointment;

24.6. For any public officer or employee who shall cause the preparation, printing, distribution of
information material, or post the same in websites without the prior approval of the Commission;

24.7. For any public officer or employee to cause the transfer, promotion, extension, recall of any
member of the foreign service corps, including members of the attached agencies, or otherwise cause the
movement of any such member from his current post or position one (1) year before and three (3)
months after the day of elections, without securing the prior approval of the Commission;

24.8. For any person who, after being deputized by the Commission to undertake activities in connection
with the implementation of this Act, shall campaign for or assist, in whatever manner, candidates in the
elections;

24.9. For any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines to participate, by word or deed, directly or
indirectly through qualified organizations/associations, in any manner and at any stage of the Philippine
political process abroad, including participation in the campaign and elections.

The provision of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, and with due regard to the Principle of Double
Criminality, the prohibited acts described in this section are electoral offenses and punishable in the Philippines.

The penalties imposed under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, shall be imposed on any
person found guilty of committing any of the prohibited acts as defined in this section: Provided, That the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person found guilty of Section 24.3
hereof without the benefit of the operation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. If the offender is a public officer
or a candidate, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum period. In addition, the offender shall be
sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to vote.
Immigrants and permanent residents who do not resume residence in the Philippines as stipulated in their
affidavit under Section 5(d) within three (3) years after approval of his/her registration under this Act and yet
vote in the next elections contrary to the said section, shall be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one
(1) year, and shall be deemed disqualified as provided in Section 5(c) of this Act. His/her passport shall be
stamped "not allowed to vote".

G.R. No. L-52365 January 22, 1980

AMADO F. GADOR, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONARDO
PEREZ,respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at
4:47 o'clock in the afternoon seeking the following relief:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectably prayed that the respondent be immediately ordered to

include the name of the herein petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of
Ozamiz which shall be printed and distributed soon to all voting centers in the City of Ozamis.

The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as
Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election; that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the
Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980; that the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
Mayor on January 7, 1980 on the basis of a news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6, issue; that on January 8,
1980, the petitioner wired the Chairman of the Commission on Elections informing him of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and at the time requesting him to release the approval of the said certificate; that on
January 11, 1980, the petitioner caused the Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to wire the Chairman,
Commission on Elections, reiterating the information that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy on
January 7; that he was already in the thick of campaigns and was asking about the status of his candidacy; that
in view of the President's announcement that the resolution of the respondent, Commission on Elections, for the
extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied, there is a
strong probability that the petitioner's name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list of candidates
to be voted which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City; and that on grounds of fairness,
principles of equity and for the best interest of the people of Ozamiz City, judgment should be rendered
commanding the respondent, Commission on Elections, to immediately include the petitioner in the list of
candidates for Mayor.

The only issue is whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7,
1980 is valid. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall
be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had
not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.

This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4,
1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
In as much as the election is only eight (8) days away, it is to the interest of all concerned, specially the
petitioner himself, that this matter be resolved immediately.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES,
QUEZON, VIVENCIO G. LIRIO respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1 (which dismissed
his petition to set aside respondent Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July 31, 1980 denying his
petition for annulment of the proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores,
Quezon and for his proclamation instead as such elected vice-mayor for having received the clear majority of
the votes cast), the comments of public and private respondents and petitioner's consolidated reply and
manifestation and motion of June 25, 1985 (stating that respondent abandoned his claim to the office and
accepted and assumed on June 10, 1985, the position of municipal trial judge of Lucban and Sampaloc, Quezon,
as verified from the records of the Office of the Court Administrator), the Court Resolved to RECONSIDER
and SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to GRANT the petition at bar.

The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as
independent for the office of vice-mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same
day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for
personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion
Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said
office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. ... The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner
over respondent with a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent Lirio's 2,660
votes). But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on
the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's name does not appear in
the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy was not
duly approved by the Comelec so that his votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly
proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of
the municipality of Dolores.

Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two grounds
after citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:

The 1978 Election Code provides:

SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the
candidate files with the office which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn
statement of withdrawal ...
 SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of
candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a
candidate on or before midday of election ...

Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength
of Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's withdrawal
of his certificate is not under oath, as required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces
no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal was made not after the last day (January 4, 1980)
for filing certificates of candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that very
same day.(Emphasis copies)

Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will
of the electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal or technical defects. (De
Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918)
Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969]; Yra vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil.
607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522 [1963], Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [19721; and
Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72 SCRA 170 [19761).

The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's substitute certificate of
candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath," should be
rejected. It is not seriously contended by respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an
actual fact and a reality, so much so that no votes were cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even though
his candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was not in the Comelec's certified list of candidates.
His unsworn withdrawal filed later on the same day had been accepted by the election registrar without protest
nor objection, On the other hand, since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of
registered candidates, because the election was only four days away, petitioner as substitute candidate
circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens election committees in
compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.

The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the
people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211,
clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory
and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the
electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact
that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance,
66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement
that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the
requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the very same day that
he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy shows that he was not serious about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not be done to would
be bonafide candidates, like petitioner who had not filed his candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy
who was one of his " co-planners " with "some concerned citizens ... (who) held causes to put up a slate that
will run against the erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."

The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in
consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such
substitute candidates in case of death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the
elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on
January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the
literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute
candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be successfully assailed. It follows that the votes cast in his favor must be
counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor...

ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the
proclamation of respondent Lirio as elected
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions.
This resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., on leave.

G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

EN BANC

MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case
No. 98-288 which disposed:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:

1. AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Commission (First
Division) in SPA No. 98-019 promulgated on May 5, 1998, to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division)

GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "PEMPE" MIRANDA's certificate of
candidacy for the position of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of

Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued therefor;
 3. DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, PREPARE a new
certificate of canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the winning candidate among those voted
upon as the duly elected mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election; and

4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Decision to the Office
of the President of the Philippines; the Department of Interior and Local Government; the
Department of Finance, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Santiago City.

SO ORDERED.

.)

The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First
Division of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing private respondent's petition to declare the substitution
of Jose "Pempe" Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void.

Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:

On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was
GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled
to DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed
his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.

During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner
garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20,336 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA
No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab
initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to
substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.

On May 16, 1998, Comelec's First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private
respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered
the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the
substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City.

On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Court's intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the
Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition. On
December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-234, Rollo) and on February
16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The
Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days from notice, but petitioner twice asked for
an extension of the period. Without granting the motions for extension of time to file consolidated reply, the
Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.
Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued

without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private
respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the
substitution and proclamation of petitioner.

On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Barretto (25 Phil, 245 [1913]), this Court had occasion
to apply the following principles:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. Since it is
the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of
that power or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should therefore be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the
decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the
subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is
but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

(p.
251)

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelec's action
nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is
proper and legally sound.

Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified
by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.

Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe" Miranda in the May 5, 1998
resolution and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has
been disqualified for any cause.
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may
substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those
cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and
cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also
by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid
substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is
denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they
could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied
due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only
"an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In Bautista
vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate
does not give rise to a valid candidacy" (p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.

The law clearly provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any
person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at
all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court
held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is
not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a
person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no
candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit
therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates
among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the
votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates,
there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or
fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
(Monsale vs. Nice, 83 Phil. 758 [1949]).

It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral
process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides
for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why
in Bautistawe ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the
case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate
of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of
a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.
Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as "disqualification for any cause" in
this case) follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies"
and "withdraws" in the instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 [1979]). A deceased candidate is
required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be allowed to
field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy,
the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in order to allow his
political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to
hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a
disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous instances.

Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning,
where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be
adopted. To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due
course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code,
leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a candidate
in the first place — a person who did not have a valid certificate of candidacy prior to substitution. Nemo dat
quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one
can give what he does not have.

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute
presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who
does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated
in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is
a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he
is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of
the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of
candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the
law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple case of hair-splitting. A
candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. Another
candidate may likewise be not qualified and at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for which
reason, said certificate of candidacy is also cancelled and/or denied due course. Or, a third candidate may be
qualified but, his certificate of candidacy may be denied due course and/or cancelled. This is possible because
the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus Election Code, Section 68 — Disqualifications) are totally
separate and distinct from the grounds for cancellation and/or denying due course to a certificate of candidacy
(Ibid., Section 69 — nuisance candidates; and Section 78 — material misrepresentation). Only the candidate
who had a valid certificate of candidacy may be substituted.

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the
Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and
cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for
the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled
favorably in the following manner:

SO ORDERED.

(p,43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it
is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there
being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the
granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. It may
be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences of this May 5, 1998 resolution are independent of the
issue of whether or not the Comelec was correct in reviving SPA No. 98-019 by consolidating it with SPA No.
98-288 in its December 8, 1998 resolution.

As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following considerations are also in
point:

It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over decisions of the Constitutional
Commissions, in general, and the Commission on Elections, in particular, were rather particularly defined and
"limited" by the 1987 Constitution, as they were also circumscribed in the 1973 Constitution, to a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]), the Court held:

. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]) — as
regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which
is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In Aratuc, we declared:

It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that

there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission
on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding
of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must
be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court."
And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the
Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari",
We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy,
considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well
known in remedial law.

xxx xxx xxx

 . . . It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that
the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court," which in turn suggests an appeal by
review by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating
from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that
justify certiorari under Rule 65.

(pp. 111-112)

To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished Member of this Court,
Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas' query during the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution thusly:

FR. BERNAS. So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the Committee?
What are the grounds for certiorari?

MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review

by certiorari would be relying on the provision of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the Rules of
Court that laid down the three grounds.

(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited in

Bernas, S.J, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 903.)

Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule 65.
Generally, certiorarilies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. "Without jurisdiction" refers to an absolute want of jurisdiction; "excess of jurisdiction" refers to the
case where the court has jurisdiction, but it transcended the same or acted without any statutory authority;
"grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction
in the present case, such is not within the province of certiorari, as a remedial measure, to correct. The only
issue that may be taken cognizance of in the present case is whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Intestate
Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 170 SCRA 246 [1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon
Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988]; Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error
of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of
discretion". An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The
abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and
despotically (Soriano vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284 [1989]).

Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution by and
proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to substitute for
disqualified the candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse of
discretion for the Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the winning candidate in the May
11, 1998 election.

Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution in SPA No. 98-019,
which was not elevated to it on review, the same having already attained finality by then.

While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
it motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in which was by then already final, it does not
necessarily follow that the Comelec also committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private
respondent's motion for reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G. Miranda. Evidently,
what is under review before us in this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and not SPA No. 98-019.

The question to answer is: will the Comelec's act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-
019 be tantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and distinct case of SPA
No. 98-288 as well? Clearly, non sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its own accord, and not under
the shadow of SPA No. 98-019.

Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion, in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent.
As earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the
issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G.
Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari.

As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelec's disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the fact that former
candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda's certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. There is no
dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course
and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore,
that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate,
the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda
was denied due course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even necessary for the Comelec to reiterate this in its
December 8, 1998 resolution. At best, the Comelec's motu proprio act of resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should
be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that the certificate of candidacy of Joel "Pempe" Miranda was denied
due course and cancelled did not depend on the en banc resolution dated December 8, 1998 of the Comelec. It
stems from the fact that the May 5, 1998 resolution GRANTED private respondent's Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.

Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the instant case and that it
was a valid ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-019. Also, there appears to be sound basis to
rule that a certificate of candidacy which has been denied due course on account of misrepresentation is, in
every legal contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there is nothing to substitute. If this judgment, rendered in
the Comelec's rightful exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-288 may, at all, be considered flawed, this
blemish would only constitute an error of judgment and definitely not grave abuse of discretion. And, of course,
errors of judgment may not be corrected by certiorari.

It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting opinion (pp. 93-
99, Rollo). However, her legal opinion failed to convince the majority of the collegiate body and was not
adopted by the Commission en banc. This Court in the present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Comelec without violating the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the matter. The
Comelec's decision is not subject to appeal to this Court. We may only strike out a Comelec decision if it was
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the sovereign will
of the electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should always be reminded that ours is a government of laws
not of men. If this Court should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every "clamor" of the majority of the
supposed constituency, where shall order and justice lie? Without the least intention to degrade, where shall
"people power" end, and where shall "law and justice" begin? Would the apparent results of the canvassing of
votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the law instead? The answers to the foregoing are obvious. The
Court cannot choose otherwise but to exercise its sacred duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic for and under which it exists. Besides, only history will discern whether Jose "Pempe" Miranda's filing
of a certificate of candidacy for a 4th term and the intended substitution by his son was a ploy to perpetrate the
Mirandas in power by way of a political dynasty disdained and abhorred by our Constitution which declared:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.

(Article II, 1987

Constitution)

The invalidation of petitioner's supposed substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda brings about the disqualification
of petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections (275
SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes
v. Comelec(254 SCRA 514 [1996]), viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner
Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.
Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability
caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this
Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not
be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Garcia's plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for
Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason
can be treated as stray, void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
cannot retroact to the date of the elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
 Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to
follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1[1989]).

(pp. 782-783)

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled
ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino
vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275
SCRA 763 [1997]).

Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to petitioner as
the electors' choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the pertinent provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on the matter, nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to
the fact that private respondent was not then the choice of the people of Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has
no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City to accept private respondent
as their mayor. The law on succession under section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, would then apply. Said provision relevantly states:

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor, — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member, or, in case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

xxx xxx xxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the
total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election
and proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is, however, hereby GRANTED so as to
MODIFY the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board
of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May
11, 1998 elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the restraining order issued in this
case is forthwith LIFTED.
G.R. No. 135805 April 29, 1999

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.

PARDO, J

The case before us is an appeal via certiorari interposed by the Civil Service Commission from a decision of
the Court of Appeals ruling that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was not guilty of nepotism and declaring null
and void the Civil Service Commission's resolution dismissing him from the service as Vocational School
Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade, Allen, Northern Samar.

The facts may be succinctly related as follows:

On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern
Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for
habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. 1

After a fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found a prima
facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996, issued the corresponding formal charge against
him. 2 Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission conducted a formal investigation, and, on January 28, 1997,
the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge
of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped
Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and
control as the Vocational School Administrator as Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from the service. 3

On February 25, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration; 4 however, on May 20, 1997,
the Civil Service Commission denied the motion. 5

On July 18, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction 6 to set aside the Civil Service Commission's resolutions.

On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and,
hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints
who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act." 7

Hence, this appeal.

On November 17, 1998, we required respondent to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice. 8 On December 11, 1998, respondent filed his comment.

We give due course to the petition.

The basic issue raised is the scope of the ban on nepotism.

We agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and
correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.

The law defines nepotism 9 as follows:

Sec. 59. Nepotism. — (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

a) appointing authority;

b) recommending authority;

c) chief of the bureau or office, and

d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of
the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen,
Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and
utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the
Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority to
recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers,
and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent
Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions
shall be under Mr. Daclag's immediate supervision. On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III,
DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993,
Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who
certified that "funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy" and even rated his
performance as "very satisfactory". On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that
his father was "his next higher supervisor". The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious.
Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his
immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed
them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both
positions are career positions.

To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.

At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who may take an
appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. There
is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil
Service Commission adverse to him. 10 He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from
the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent
Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent 11 as the government agency tasked
with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. 12

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent
not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court?
Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan,
who was merely a witness for the government. 13 Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the
party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. 14 By this ruling, we
now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase 'party adversely affected by the
decision' refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which, may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office" 15 and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" 16 or "when the respondent is exonerated
of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." 17 In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the
Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; 18 Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission; 19Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; 20 Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export
Processing Zone Authority 21and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. 22

The Court of Appeals' reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, 23 to support its ruling is misplaced.
The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism
or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had
gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after
the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage
of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in
Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: . .
. The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither
authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction
there. 24

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we
stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that
the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." 25 "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the
scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive." 26 If not within the exceptions, it is a
form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we
said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the "outstanding" civil
servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance
with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law." 27
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated
January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.

No costs.

G.R. No. 178454 March 28, 2011

FILIPINA SAMSON, Petitioner,

vs.
JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision1 dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution2 dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for reconsideration. The CA
affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b)3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission with office at the
Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.

Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the
latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the expenses
would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of
respondent’s land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is
government property. When petitioner failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent
also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against
petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her from
office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the standard set in
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed service when she
embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of title over the latter’s land.4

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order5 dated March 15, 2004, reduced the penalty to
three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s
payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of personal conduct
required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions
of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The Ombudsman held:
x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of P50,000.00 from the [respondent] and
even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic Engineer to do the surveys.

While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government agencies for the
processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that her mere act in accepting the money
from the [respondent] with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to
create a perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that public officials and
employees shall endeavor to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of undue
patronage.

xxxx

x x x [petitioner’s] act to x x x restore the amount of [P50,000] was to avoid possible sanctions.

x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it was agreed upon
by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within which to pay the amount of P50,000.00
including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had available money to pay and had been persistent in returning
the amount of [P50,000.00] to the [respondent], she would have easily given the same right at that moment (on
19 October 2002) in the presence of the Barangay Officials.6 x x x. (Stress in the original.)

The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman’s Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that contrary to
petitioner’s contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private matter. The
CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a public officer when she
demanded and received the amount of P50,000 on the representation that she can secure a title to respondent’s
property and for failing to return the amount. The CA stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 requires
petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her role as a dispenser and peddler of
undue patronage.7

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a government
employee or where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty?

2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable despite the
dismissal of the estafa case?

3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view of mitigating
circumstances?8

Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for
holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was dismissed upon a finding that she
was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be attributed to her. And even assuming that she is
guilty of misconduct, she is entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such as the fact that this is the
first charge against her in her long years of public service.9

Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the CA correctly
resolved.10 She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when
she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.11
We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add, however, that
petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.

On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint
against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them.12 Section
13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on
complaint by any person anyact or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 1614 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section
1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to
acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official
or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law
does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.16

On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she
cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.17

For proper consideration instead is petitioner’s liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.

We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:

SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall
observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the
public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their
respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter
public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others,
and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on
account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect
to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of
their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone
without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt,
courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when
 required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information on their
policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information,
public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and
systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and
appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the
depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the
Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods, resources and
technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the
democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest
by deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives
appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious
display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these
standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit
increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office
colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and
experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in
raising the general level of observance of these standards.

Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section 4(A)(b) on
professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a
profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity with great competence. Indeed, to call a
person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or polished.18 In the
context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of professionalism also means upholding the
integrity of public office by endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any appearance of impropriety
affecting the integrity of government services. However, it should be noted that Section 4(A) enumerates the
standards of personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution of official duties."

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of professionalism
by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public duty. The Ombudsman said
that petitioner’s act deprived the government of her committed service because the generation of a certificate of
title was not within her line of public service. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman said that it would have been sufficient if petitioner just referred the respondent to the
persons/officials incharge of the processing of the documents for the issuance of a certificate of title. While it
may be true that she did not actually deal with the other government agencies for the processing of the titles of
the subject property, petitioner’s act of accepting the money from respondent with the assurance that she would
work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer.

On its part, the CA rejected petitioner’s argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those "wrong
perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law enjoins public officers, at all times to
respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good customs, public order, public
policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality of the acts that is being punished but the
commission of the act itself.

Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough to apply
even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one’s office. We hold, however, that
petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. The reason though does not
lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all related to petitioner’s discharge of her duties as department
head of the Population Commission.

In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized19 the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to
promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the
Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (hereafter,
Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive and Rewards System for
public officials and employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit:

RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM

SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have demonstrated
exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4
of the Code, namely:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x

(b) Professionalism. - x x x

(c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x

(d) Political neutrality. - x x x

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x

(g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x

(h) Simple living. - x x x

On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative disciplinary
action, as follows:

RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under existing laws,
the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual,
temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall
constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities
provided herein, such as:

(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval
of his office. x x x.
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by his
office, unless expressly allowed by law;

(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law or
regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions;

(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending
official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or referral is mandated by (1) law, or
(2) international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the functions of his office;

xxxx

(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by reason of
his office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give undue advantage to
anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;

(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything
of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his office. x x x.

xxxx

(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to morals or public
policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to
the general public;

(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference;

(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;

(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules;

(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a reasonable time
from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these Rules;

(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or to act promptly
and expeditiously on public personal transactions;

(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business
interests and financial connections; and

(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from
assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest himself of his
shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such assumption of
public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those who are already in the
service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or divest himself of
said interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the conflict of
interest had arisen.
In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,20 this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by the norms
of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for
disciplinary action, to wit:

The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The provision commands
that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an
ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness
and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to
democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713
adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to officials and
employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their observance of the norms of conduct
laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and
employees who comply with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot
expect the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have
to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules
affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by
the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for
administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A.
No. 6713 is not one of them. (Emphasis supplied.)

Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in that case.

We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we reverse the CA and
Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In so ruling, we
do no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules issued by the CSC under the authority
given to it by Congress. Needless to stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written
in the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.21

But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action under R.A.
No. 6713?

We also rule in the negative.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved
by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.22 Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of
misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of grave misconduct
because there was substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of
supplies as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules.23 We have also ruled that complicity in the
transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple misconduct only as there was
failure to establish flagrancy in respondent’s act for her to be held liable of gross misconduct.24 On the other
hand, we have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the
law, and grave misconduct, since the complainant did not even indicate the particular acts of the judge which
were allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct.25

In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner’s violation of an established and definite rule of action or
unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent could merely point to
petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly
meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.

True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution that public
office is a public trust. However, respondent’s allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that belongs to
another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even say what acts of interference
were done by petitioner. Neither did respondent say in which government agency petitioner committed
interference. And causing the survey of respondent’s land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs of
another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population Commission. It does not show
that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government agency. Even the Ombudsman has
recognized this fact. The survey shows only that petitioner contracted a surveyor.1ihpwa1 Respondent said
nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did. The survey shows that petitioner also started to work
on her task under their agreement. Thus, respondent’s allegation that petitioner received an amount for
undelivered work is not entirely correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the
legal obstacle that the land is government property.

However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.

But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of P50,000 from respondent
because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from her.26 We find in the allegations and
counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioner’s house in Biñan, Laguna, and asked petitioner if she can
help respondent secure a title to her land which she intends to sell. Petitioner agreed to help. When respondent
asked about the cost, petitioner said P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial
expenses.27

We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the aborted
transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the Ombudsman, if
petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of P50,000 until the preliminary investigation of
the estafa case on September 18, 2003,28 there would have been no need for the parties’ agreement that
petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner’s belated
attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of
the estafa case against her.

For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public
officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents therein were guilty of conduct
unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent documents
notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the complainant’s rights over the
subject property were transferred to the sister of one of the respondents.29 Recently, in Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming
conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.301avvphi1

This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public office shall not
be countenanced.31 The Constitution categorically declares as follows:

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.32

Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing to accomplish
the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa, thus reinforcing
the latter’s suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the element of deceit was not proven
in the criminal case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated
basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer,
petitioner’s transgression could erode the public’s trust in government employees, moreso because she holds a
high position in the service.

As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-Rodriguez. Under
the circumstances of this case, a fine of P15,000 in lieu of the three months suspension is proper. In imposing
said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance petitioner’s 37 years of public service and the fact
that this is the first charge against her.33 Section 5334 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And since
petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of P50,000 including interest, we find it proper to order her to
comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time to rekindle their friendship.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and
Order dated March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new judgment as
follows:

We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her
a FINE of P15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality of this
Decision.

We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.

With costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 190524 February 17, 2014

MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIA B. MONAYAO, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn
duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty,
the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage,
the effective performance of their duties and functions.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the November 28, 2008 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102407 and its November 27, 2009 Resolution3 denying reconsideration thereof.

Factual Antecedents

In a May 19, 2003 letter-complaint4 filed with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
petitioner Atty. Michaelina Ramos Balasbas accused respondent Patricia B. Monayao – then employed by the
DSWD – of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement an October 6, 1998 Order5 issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in a land dispute – docketed with the DENR as
H.A. NRD, 11-15-004 (E-11-16-004) – filed sometime in 1987 by petitioner’s brother against respondent’s
father.

It appears that in said case, respondent appeared in lieu of her father, who she claimed passed away. Petitioner
claimed further that despite judgment rendered in the said dispute awarding one-half of the disputed land to her
brother, and respondent’s subsequent notarized waiver of her rights to her half, the latter illegally sold the
portion, over which she had waived her rights, to her children via a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed by
her father, which was simulated considering that as early as 1987, respondent’s father was already deceased.

In a June 24, 2003 letter-reply,6 the DSWD informed petitioner that respondent was no longer an employee
thereof, but was devolved in 1992 to the local government of the municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao
Province. Petitioner was thus advised to address her complaint to the Office of the Mayor of Alfonso Lista.

Petitioner thus filed with the Mayor of Alfonso Lista a July 30, 2003 sworn letter-complaint7 against
respondent. In a September 18, 2003 reply8 to petitioner, however, Alfonso Lista Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano
refused to take action on the complaint, citing an August 19, 2003 opinion9 of Victor P. Sibal, Director II of the
Cordillera Administrative Region office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC-CAR), which stated that
petitioner’s complaint against respondent may not be acted upon as the acts complained of were not in relation
to the latter’s duties and responsibilities as Municipal Population Officer.

Petitioner wrote an October 16, 2003 letter10 to the CSC, appealing the August 19, 2003 opinion of the CSC-
CAR. She claimed that the actions of respondent violated the civil service laws and amounted to grave
misconduct and immorality, thus:

The question is this – is it only acts related to the duties and responsibilities of a government officer that can be
the subject of an administrative case? Stated otherwise, would you have as a member of the Civil Service a
person who has engaged in misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and has contemptuously refused to implement
an Order of the DENR dated 6 October 1998?

I believe that nowhere in the Civil Service Law is there such a qualification. The acts complained of also
amount to grave misconduct and immorality – unless one only thinks of immoral as only referring to sex.

On the other hand – granting arguendo that there is such a limited interpretation, how can having mistresses
(which currently the government is relentlessly pursuing to rid of) fall within the ambit of a government
official’s duties and responsibilities?11

In an October 6, 2004 letter-opinion,12 the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (CSC-OLA) denied petitioner’s
appeal and affirmed the August 19, 2003 opinion of the CSC-CAR. The CSC-OLA held that the CSC had no
jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint as it stemmed from a private transaction between the protagonists;
petitioner’s remedy was instead to seek execution of the DENR’s Decision in H.A. NRD, 11-15-004 (E-11-16-
004).

Petitioner, in a November 11, 2004 letter,13 sought a reconsideration of the above October 6, 2004 opinion.
Petitioner argued that under Section 4 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,14 the jurisdiction of the CSC over public officers or employees is not limited to their acts or omissions
that are work-related; disciplinary action may be taken for their acts of dishonesty, immorality, oppression,
notorious undesirability, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, habitual drunkenness, or gambling.
Petitioner adds that even the lending of money at usurious rates, conducting illicit relations, and willful failure
to pay just debts are grounds for disciplinary action.15 Petitioner concluded that respondent’s misrepresentation,
fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement the DENR’s October 6, 1998 Order relative to the 1987 DENR land
dispute constitute acts unbecoming a public official and fall within the jurisdiction of the CSC. Petitioner thus
prayed that the CSC reconsider its October 6, 2004 letter; declare respondent guilty of misrepresentation, fraud,
dishonesty and refusal to implement the DENR’s October 6, 1998 Order; and impose upon her disciplinary
action and penalties in accordance with civil service laws and regulations.

On January 14, 2008, the CSC issued Resolution No. 080059,16 which decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for want of merit.
Accordingly, the opinion of the Office for Legal Affairs dated October 6, 2004 is AFFIRMED.

In dismissing petitioner’s appeal, the CSC held firm to the view that Monayao’s purported misrepresentation,
fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement the DENR Order in H.A. NRD, 11-15-004 (E-11-16-004) had no
bearing on her official duties as a local government employee, and that petitioner’s relief was to move for the
execution of the unsatisfied DENR judgment and thus compel respondent to honor her notarized waiver of her
rights to one-half portion of the land in dispute, or proceed to court for judicial intervention. It held, thus:

After due consideration, the Commission is inclined to dismiss the present appeal.

It is unavailing for the private complainant to insist that there are disciplinary grounds that are not work-related
such that her complaint, rooted as it was on a private transaction, should not have been perfunctorily dismissed.
True it is that some of the recognized grounds for administrative disciplinary actions against government
officials and employees contemplate of private deeds. Two such examples are disgraceful and immoral conduct,
and non-payment of just debt. However, it may be noted that these personal actions give rise to administrative
culpability because they indubitably reflect on the moral fitness and integrity of the respondent public official or
employee. This means that the commission of any of the said acts betrays the moral unfitness of the respondent
public officer, which would make them amenable to disciplinary sanctions.

In the herein case, the complaint is based on Monayao’s supposed misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and
refusal to implement an order of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) relating to a
land dispute. Yet, such actuation of Monayao relates to her private dealings with the private complainant, and
has no bearing at all on the performance of her official duties as a local government employee. Instead of filing
an administrative complaint, it would have been more appropriate for the private complainant to seek relief
through the proper remedial action, which is, as noted in the impugned opinion, to move for execution of the
unsatisfied DENR order or to proceed to court for possible judicial enforcement.

In CSC Resolution No. 96-5593, dated September 4, 1996, the Commission pertinently ruled in this wise:

"x x x True, the respondents are government employees, but there is no showing that the non-remittance of said
amount was committed while in the performance of their official duties x

x x Thus, said failure or omissions on the part of the respondents were done in their personal or private capacity
arising out of private transactions. It is therefore clear that the acts complained of do not constitute an
administrative offense or offenses within the jurisdiction of the Commission. At any rate, the dispute between
the herein complainants and the officers of said association, subject of this complaint, should be better resolved
before a competent court."

More importantly, the Commission observes that the complaint is fatally defective. It contains mere conclusion
of law, not concrete allegations of facts.17

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review18 filed with the CA, petitioner questioned CSC Resolution No. 080059 and prayed that
the CSC be ordered to assume jurisdiction over her complaint against respondent.
On November 28, 2008, the CA issued the assailed Decision which contained the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.19

The CA held that none of the circumstances mentioned in Section 46,20 Chapter 7, Book V, of Executive Order
No. 292 (EO 292), or the Administrative Code of 1987, is present in petitioner’s case, and that her main
complaint against respondent pertains to the latter’s refusal to abide by the DENR judgment relative to the one-
half portion of the property in dispute, which is not connected with or related to her position or performance of
her functions as a public official. The appellate court added that while it is true that disciplinary action may be
imposed for acts or omissions not connected with a public officer or employee’s official functions or
responsibilities, such as dishonesty or immorality, the act complained of – even if true – does not reflect on the
moral fitness and integrity of the respondent which may affect her right to continue in office. Finally, the CA
acknowledged that petitioner’s accusations against respondent were unsubstantiated. On this point, however, the
appellate court did not elaborate.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 but the CA denied the same via its November 27, 2009
Resolution. Hence, petitioner instituted the present Petition.

Issue

Petitioner contends that the CA committed the following error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE

DECISION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN FINDING THAT THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS
OF RESPONDENT, ARISING OUT OF HER PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES WHICH THE SAID COMMISSION COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
AND DO NOT REFLECT ON HER MORAL FITNESS AND INTEGRITY AS A PUBLIC SERVANT.22

Petitioner’s Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the CSC be directed to take cognizance of her
complaint against respondent, petitioner maintains in her Petition and Reply23 that while respondent’s dishonest
acts and misrepresentations were committed in relation to a land dispute arising from her private dealings, they
cast serious doubt as to her fitness to continue in the public service. Specifically, petitioner insists that while
respondent claims that her father died in 1987, the latter was able to transfer – in 1992 – the land in dispute to
respondent’s children, which thus renders respondent guilty of dishonesty and misrepresentation. Moreover,
respondent’s defiance of the DENR decision by orchestrating the 1992 simulated sale demonstrates her
disregard for rules and orders of duly constituted government authority, which is anathema to her position as a
public servant.

Petitioner adds that dishonesty is a serious offense, indeed so grave that it is punishable by dismissal for the first
offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. And, contrary to the
pronouncements of the CSC and CA, dishonesty which justifies dismissal from the service need not be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the public officer or employee.24

Petitioner further asserts that, contrary to the pronouncements of the CA, her charges against respondent are
fully substantiated and covered by sufficient attachments. She cites her July 30, 2003 sworn letter-complaint
filed with the office of the Mayor of Alfonso Lista, which she claims was "complete with enclosures and
attachments, evidencing the allegations"25 against respondent.
Finally, petitioner points out that public office is a public trust; a person aspiring for public office must observe
honesty, "candor, and faithful compliance with the law."26 Dishonesty remains the same whether it is committed
in relation to the public official’s duties or in the course of his private dealings: it reflects on his "character and
exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue and integrity."27

Respondent’s Arguments

In seeking the denial of the instant Petition, respondent in her Comment28 tersely counters with a reiteration and
citation of the CSC and CA pronouncements that her complained actuations relate to her private dealings and
have no bearing on her official duties and functions; that petitioner’s remedy is to move for the execution of the
unsatisfied DENR decision or proceed to court for judicial enforcement; that the alleged acts do not reflect on
her moral fitness and integrity, nor do they affect her right to continue in office; and finally, that petitioner’s
accusations remain unsubstantiated.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or
connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.

On the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden
act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. x x x29

Without a doubt, respondent’s supposed dishonest acts and misrepresentations committed in relation to a land
dispute arising from her private dealings cast doubt on her fitness to discharge her responsibilities as a public
official. If it is true that respondent caused the execution of a forged or falsified deed of sale in 1992 in order to
transfer the disputed portion of the property to her children, then she committed a dishonest act even as she is
enjoined to adhere at all times to law, morality, and decency in her private and professional life. "[D]ishonesty,
in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty" by the public
officer, for it "inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline
and morale of the service."30

Indeed, at the very least, the acts complained of constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
an administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions.

x x x As long as the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office, the
corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) enunciates, inter alia, the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4(c) of the Code
commands that "[public officials and employees] shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest. x x x"31

However, petitioner’s accusations do not appear to hold water. From an examination of all her letters, pleadings,
and other submissions – from her letter-complaint with the DSWD, to her sworn letter-complaint with the office
of the Alfonso Lista Mayor, to her appeal letter to the CSC, to her letter-Motion for Reconsideration with the
CSC, and finally her CA Petition for Review – it is evident that she offered nothing more than bare imputations
against the respondent. Though she claims that respondent falsified a 1992 deed of sale whereby the disputed
portion was transferred to her children, the deed of sale was never shown; a copy thereof was never attached to
petitioner’s complaints and other papers or pleadings. And if it is true that respondent’s children were able to
secure title to the disputed portion in their name through such falsified deed of sale, then petitioner could have
simply attached a copy of the new title issued in their name. But she did not.

Petitioner is a lawyer; she should know that as the complainant in the administrative case, upon her lies the
burden of proof to establish her cause of action against the respondent. All that is required is substantial
evidence, yet she could produce none; the allegations in her complaint are not duly supported by necessary
documents that would demonstrate the justness of her claims. While technicalities may be dispensed with in
administrative proceedings, "this does not mean that the rules on proving allegations are entirely dispensed
with. Bare allegations are not enough; these must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least."32

Thus, in the eyes of the law, respondent committed as yet no visible wrong. The CSC and the CA may not be
faulted for deciding the way they did. From her numerous complaints alone, it can be seen that she had no cause
of action against the respondent, for her accusations were not supported by the required documentary evidence
that should have been readily available to her, given that it consists of public documents which may be
inspected and reproduced by permission from the government offices having custody thereof.

The Court therefore sees no reason to disturb the findings of the CSC and the CA. Their findings of fact bind
the Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, or that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record. Moreover, their conclusion - to the effect that what remains to be done is to
cause the execution of the DENR Order in H.A. NRD, 11-15-004 (E-11-16-004) - is correct, and this may be
achieved in the same administrative case or by filing a proper case in court.

While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn
duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty,
the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage,
the effective performance of their duties and functions. While –

x x x We do not deny the citizen's right to denounce recreant public officials if their incompetence or lack of
integrity or qualification may adversely affect the public service, but We certainly frown upon the practice of
some misguided citizens to subvert the noble ends for which administrative discipline is designed which is to
purge the public service of undesirable officials.33

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed November 28, 2008 Decision and the November 27, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102407 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
BP Blg. 881 - "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines."

Section 12 Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

ARTICLE IX
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES AND CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

Section 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having

(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;

(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or

(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who
is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Section 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
 RTICLE XXII
ELECTION OFFENSES

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -

(1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any
office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an
expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association,
corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for
or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant
for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a
political party.

(2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits or receives, directly
or indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office or employment, public or private, for any
of the foregoing considerations.

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons, whether candidates or not, who come to an
agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) of this section and decide to
commit it.

(c) Wagering upon result of election. - Any person who bets or wagers upon the outcome of, or any
contingency connected with an election. Any money or thing of value or deposit of money or thing of
value situated anywhere in the Philippines put as such bet or wager shall be forfeited to the government.

(d) Coercion of subordinates. -

(1) Any public officer, or any officer of any public or private corporation or association, or any
head, superior, or administrator of any religious organization, or any employer or land-owner
who coerces or intimidates or compels, or in any manner influence, directly or indirectly, any of
his subordinates or members or parishioners or employees or house helpers, tenants, overseers,
farm helpers, tillers, or lease holders to aid, campaign or vote for or against any candidate or any
aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates.

(2) Any public officer or any officer of any commercial, industrial, agricultural, economic or
social enterprise or public or private corporation or association, or any head, superior or
administrator of any religious organization, or any employer or landowner who dismisses or
threatens to dismiss, punishes or threatens to punish be reducing his salary, wage or
compensation, or by demotion, transfer, suspension, separation, excommunication, ejectment, or
causing him annoyance in the performance of his job or in his membership, any subordinate
member or affiliate, parishioner, employee or house helper, tenant, overseer, farm helper, tiller,
or lease holder, for disobeying or not complying with any of the acts ordered by the former to
aid, campaign or vote for or against any candidate, or any aspirant for the nomination or
selection of candidates.
(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion. - Any person
who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence,
injury, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage upon any person or persons or that of the immediate
members of his family, his honor or property, or uses any fraudulent device or scheme to compel or
induce the registration or refraining from registration of any voter, or the participation in a campaign or
refraining or desistance from any campaign, or the casting of any vote or omission to vote, or any
promise of such registration, campaign, vote, or omission therefrom.

(f) Coercion of election officials and employees. - Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens,
intimidates, terrorizes or coerces any election official or employee in the performance of his election
functions or duties.

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. -
During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election,

(1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality,
whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints
or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any
new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant
the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper
functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election.

As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent
need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission
within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of
this provision shall be null and void.

(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or
privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations.

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. - Any public official who makes or causes
any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school
teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. - Any officer or employee in the civil service, except
those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all
other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly,
intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

(j) Undue influence. - It is unlawful for any person to promise any office or employment, public or
private, or to make or offer to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or to cause an expenditure to
be made to any person, association, corporation or entity, which may induce anyone or the public in
general either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate in any election or any
aspirant for the nomination or selection of an official candidate in a convention of a political party. It is
likewise unlawful for any person, association, corporation or community, to solicit or receive, directly or
indirectly, any expenditure or promise or any office, or employment, public or private, for any of the
foregoing considerations.
(k) Unlawful electioneering. - It is unlawful to solicit votes or undertake any propaganda on the day of
registration before the board of election inspectors and on the day of election, for or against any
candidate or any political party within the polling place and with a radius of thirty meters thereof.

(l) Prohibition against dismissal of employees, laborers, or tenants. - No employee or laborer shall be
dismissed, nor a tenant be ejected from his landholdings for refusing or failing to vote for any candidate
of his employer or landowner. Any employee, laborer or tenant so dismissed or ejected shall be
reinstated and the salary or wage of the employee or laborer, or the share of the harvest of the tenant,
shall be restored to the aggrieved party upon application to the proper court.

(m) Appointment or use of special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or the like. - During
the campaign period, on the day before and on election day, any appointing authority who appoints or
any person who utilizes the services of special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or persons
performing similar functions; persons previously appointed as special policemen, special agents,
confidential agents or persons performing similar functions who continue acting as such, and those who
fail to turn over their firearms, uniforms, insignias and other badges of authority to the proper officer
who issued the same.

At the start of the aforementioned period, the barangay chairman, municipal mayor, city mayor,
provincial governor, or any appointing authority shall submit to the Commission a complete list of all
special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or persons performing similar functions in the
employ of their respective political subdivisions, with such particulars as the Commission may require.

(n) Illegal release of prisoners before and after election. - The Director of the Bureau of Prisons, any
provincial warden, the keeper of the jail or the person or persons required by law to keep prisoners in
their custody who illegally orders or allows any prisoner detained in the national penitentiary, or the
provincial, city or municipal jail to leave the premises thereof sixty days before and thirty days after the
election. The municipal or city warden, the provincial warden, the keeper of the jail or the person or
persons required by law to keep prisoners in their custody shall post in three conspicuous public places a
list of the prisoners or detention prisoners under their care. Detention prisoners must be categorized as
such.

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign. - Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever, directly or
indirectly, (1) public funds or money deposited with, or held in trust by, public financing institutions or
by government offices, banks, or agencies; (2) any printing press, radio, or television station or audio-
visual equipment operated by the Government or by its divisions, sub-divisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; or (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the
government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled
corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan
political activity.

(p) Deadly weapons. - Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place and within a
radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law for the registration of
voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in
cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer authorized by the Commission to
supervise the election is entitled to carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving
order and enforcing the law.

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. - Any person who, although possessing a
permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the
election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water
or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of their
duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually
carry large sums of money or valuables.

(r) Use of armored land, water or air craft. - Any person who uses during the campaign period, on the
day before and on election day, any armored land, water or air craft, provided with any temporary or
permanent equipment or any other device or contraption for the mounting or installation of cannons,
machine guns and other similar high caliber firearms, including military type tanks, half trucks, scout
trucks, armored trucks, of any make or model, whether new, reconditioned, rebuilt or remodelled:
Provided, That banking or financial institutions and all business firms may use not more than two
armored vehicles strictly for, and limited to, the purpose of transporting cash, gold bullion or other
valuables in connection with their business from and to their place of business, upon previous authority
of the Commission.

(s) Wearing of uniforms and bearing arms. - During the campaign period, on the day before and on
election day, any member of security or police organization of government agencies, commissions,
councils, bureaus, offices, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or privately-owned or
operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agencies, who wears his uniform or uses his
insignia, decorations or regalia, or bears arms outside the immediate vicinity of his place of work:
Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply when said member is in pursuit of a person who has
committed or is committing a crime in the premises he is guarding; or when escorting or providing
security for the transport of payrolls, deposits, or other valuables; or when guarding the residence of
private persons or when guarding private residences, buildings or offices: Provided, further, That in the
last case prior written approval of the Commission shall be obtained. The Commission shall decide all
applications for authority under this paragraph within fifteen days from the date of the filing of such
application.

During the same period, and ending thirty days thereafter any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, special, forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military
units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who wears his uniform or bears arms outside
the camp, garrison or barracks to which he is assigned or detailed or outside their homes, in case of
members of para-military units, unless (1) the President of the Philippines shall have given previous
authority therefor, and the Commission notified thereof in writing, or (2) the Commission authorizes
him to do so, which authority it shall give only when necessary to assist it in maintaining free, orderly
and honest elections, and only after notice and hearing. All personnel of the Armed Forces authorized by
the President or the Commission to bear arms or wear their uniforms outside their camps and all police
and peace officers shall bear their true name, rank and serial number, if any, stitched in block letters on a
white background on the left breast of their uniform, in letters and numbers of a clearly legible design at
least two centimeters tall, which shall at all times remain visible and uncovered.

During the election period, whenever the Commission finds it necessary for the promotion of free,
orderly, honest and peaceful elections in a specific area, it shall confiscate or order the confiscation of
firearms of any member or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, home
defense forces, barangay self-defense units, and all other para-military units that now exist, or which
may hereafter be organized, or any member or members of the security or police organization,
government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, or government-owned
or controlled corporations and other subsidiaries, or of any member or members of privately owned or
operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agencies performing identical or similar
functions.
(t) Policemen and provincial guards acting as bodyguards or security guards. - During the campaign
period, on the day before and on election day, any member of the city or municipal police force, any
provincial or sub-provincial guard, any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, special forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or
which may hereafter be organized who acts as bodyguard or security guard of any public official,
candidate or any other person, and any of the latter who utilizes the services of the former as bodyguard
or security guard: Provided, That, after due notice and hearing, when the life and security of a candidate
is in jeopardy, the Commission is empowered to assign at the candidate's choice, any member of the
Philippine Constabulary or the police force of any municipality within the province to act as his
bodyguard or security guard in a number to be determined by the Commission but not to exceed three
per candidate: Provided, however, That when the circumstances require immediate action, the
Commission may issue a temporary order allowing the assignment of any member of the Philippine
Constabulary or the local police force to act as bodyguard or security guard of the candidate, subject to
confirmation or revocation.

(u) Organization or maintenance of reaction forces, strike forces, or other similar forces. - Any person
who organizes or maintains a reaction force, strike force or similar force during the election period.

The heads of all reaction forces, strike forces, or similar forces shall, not later than forty-five days before
the election, submit to the Commission a complete list of all members thereof with such particulars as
the Commission may require.

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. - Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special
election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

(a) Maintenance of existing and/or completed public works project: Provided, That not
more than the average number of laborers or employees already employed therein during
the six-month period immediately prior to the beginning of the forty-five day period
before election day shall be permitted to work during such time: Provided, further, That
no additional laborers shall be employed for maintenance work within the said period of
forty-five days;

(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated contract
awarded, before the forty-five day period before election: Provided, That work for the
purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called "takay" or "paquiao" system shall
not be considered as work by contract;

(c) Payment for the usual cost of preparation for working drawings, specifications, bills
of materials, estimates, and other procedures preparatory to actual construction including
the purchase of materials and equipment, and all incidental expenses for wages of
watchmen and other laborers employed for such work in the central office and field
storehouses before the beginning of such period: Provided, That the number of such
laborers shall not be increased over the number hired when the project or projects were
commenced; and

(d) Emergency work necessitated by the occurrence of a public calamity, but such work
shall be limited to the restoration of the damaged facility.
 No payment shall be made within five days before the date of election to laborers who have
rendered services in projects or works except those falling under subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and
(d), of this paragraph.

This prohibition shall not apply to ongoing public works projects commenced before the
campaign period or similar projects under foreign agreements. For purposes of this provision, it
shall be the duty of the government officials or agencies concerned to report to the Commission
the list of all such projects being undertaken by them.

(2) The Ministry of Social Services and Development and any other office in other ministries of
the government performing functions similar to said ministry, except for salaries of personnel,
and for such other routine and normal expenses, and for such other expenses as the Commission
may authorize after due notice and hearing. Should a calamity or disaster occur, all releases
normally or usually coursed through the said ministries and offices of other ministries shall be
turned over to, and administered and disbursed by, the Philippine National Red Cross, subject to
the supervision of the Commission on Audit or its representatives, and no candidate or his or her
spouse or member of his family within the second civil degree of affinity or consanguinity shall
participate, directly or indirectly, in the distribution of any relief or other goods to the victims of
the calamity or disaster; and

(3) The Ministry of Human Settlements and any other office in any other ministry of the
government performing functions similar to said ministry, except for salaries of personnel and
for such other necessary administrative or other expenses as the Commission may authorize after
due notice and hearing.

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance
of treasury warrants and similar devices. - During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any
public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or
avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of
value chargeable against public funds.

(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer. - The provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding during the election period, any public official who suspends, without prior
approval of the Commission, any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer, unless said
suspension will be for purposes of applying the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in relation to the
suspension and removal of elective officials; in which case the provisions of this section shall be
inapplicable.

(y) On Registration of Voters:

(1) Any person who, having all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter,
fails without justifiable excuse to register as a voter in an election, plebiscite or referendum in
which he is qualified to vote.

(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false or untruthful statement relative to any of the
data or information required in the application for registration.

(3) Any person who deliberately imprints or causes the imprinting of blurred or indistinct
fingerprints on any of the copies of the application for registration or on the voter's affidavit; or
any person in charge of the registration of voters who deliberately or through negligence, causes
or allows the imprinting of blurred or indistinct fingerprints on any of the aforementioned
registration forms, or any person who tampers with the fingerprints in said registration records.

(4) Any member of the board of election inspectors who approves any application which on its
face shows that the applicant does not possess all the qualifications prescribed by law for a voter;
or who disapproves any application which on its face shows that the applicant possesses all such
qualifications.

(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration.

(6) Any person who registers in substitution for another whether with or without the latter's
knowledge or consent.

(7) Any person who tampers with or changes without authority any data or entry in any voter's
application for registration.

(8) Any person who delays, hinders or obstruct another from registering.

(9) Any person who falsely certifies or identifies another as a bona fide resident of a particular
place or locality for the purpose of securing the latter's registration as a voter.

(10) Any person who uses the voter's affidavit of another for the purpose of voting, whether or
not he actually succeeds in voting.

(11) Any person who places, inserts or otherwise includes, as approved application for
registration in the book of voters or in the provincial or national central files of registered voters,
the application of any fictitious voter or any application that has not been approved; or removes
from, or otherwise takes out of the book of voters or the provincial or national central files of
registered voters any duly approved voter's application, except upon lawful order of the
Commission, or of a competent court or after proper cancellation as provided in Sections 122,
123, 124 and 125 hereof.

(12) Any person who transfers or causes the transfer of the registration record of a voter to the
book of voters of another polling place, unless said transfer was due to a change of address of the
voter and the voter was duly notified of his new polling place.

(13) Any person who asks, demands, takes, accepts or possesses, directly or indirectly, the
voter's affidavit of another, in order to induce the latter to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against any candidate in an election or any issue in a plebiscite or referendum. It shall be
presumed prima facie that the asking, demanding, taking, accepting, or possessing is with such
intent if done within the period beginning ten days before election day and ending ten days after
election day, unless the voter's affidavit of another and the latter are both members of the same
family.

(14) Any person who delivers, hands over, entrusts, gives, directly or indirectly his voter's
affidavit to another in consideration of money or other benefit or promises thereof, or takes or
accepts such voter's affidavit directly or indirectly, by giving or causing the giving of money or
other benefit or making or causing the making of a promise thereof.

(15) Any person who alters in any manner, tears, defaces, removes or destroys any certified list
of voters.
 (16) Any person who takes, carries or possesses any blank or unused registration form already
issued to a city or municipality outside of said city or municipality except as otherwise provided
in this Code or when directed by express order of the court or of the Commission.

(17) Any person who maliciously omits, tampers or transfers to another list the name of a
registered voter from the official list of voters posted outside the polling place.

(z) On voting:

(1) Any person who fails to cast his vote without justifiable excuse.

(2) Any person who votes more than once in the same election, or who, not being a registered
voter, votes in an election.

(3) Any person who votes in substitution for another whether with or without the latter's
knowledge and/or consent.

(4) Any person who, not being illiterate or physically disabled, allows his ballot to be prepared
by another, or any person who prepares the ballot of another who is not illiterate or physically
disabled, with or without the latter's knowledge and/or consent.

(5) Any person who avails himself of any means of scheme to discover the contents of the ballot
of a voter who is preparing or casting his vote or who has just voted.

(6) Any voter who, in the course of voting, uses a ballot other than the one given by the board of
election inspectors or has in his possession more than one official ballot.

(7) Any person who places under arrest or detains a voter without lawful cause, or molests him in
such a manner as to obstruct or prevent him from going to the polling place to cast his vote or
from returning home after casting his vote, or to compel him to reveal how he voted.

(8) Any member of the board of election inspectors charged with the duty of reading the ballot
during the counting of votes who deliberately omits to read the vote duly written on the ballot, or
misreads the vote actually written thereon or reads the name of a candidate where no name is
written on the ballot.

(9) Any member of the board of election inspectors charged with the duty of tallying

the votes in the tally board or sheet, election returns or other prescribed form who deliberately
fails to record a vote therein or records erroneously the votes as read, or records a vote where no
such vote has been read by the chairman.

(10) Any member of a board of election inspectors who has made possible the casting of more
votes than there are registered voters.

(11) Any person who, for the purpose of disrupting or obstructing the election process or causing
confusion among the voters, propagates false and alarming reports or information or transmits or
circulates false orders, directives or messages regarding any matter relating to the printing of
official ballots, the postponement of the election, the transfer of polling place or the general
conduct of the election.
 (12) Any person who, without legal authority, destroys, substitutes or takes away from the
possession of those having legal custody thereof, or from the place where they are legally
deposited, any election form or document or ballot box which contains official ballots or other
documents used in the election.

(13) Any person having legal custody of the ballot box containing the official ballots used in the
election who opens or destroys said box or removes or destroys its contents without or against
the order of the Commission or who, through his negligence, enables any person to commit any
of the aforementioned acts, or takes away said ballot box from his custody.

(14) Any member of the board of election inspectors who knowingly uses ballots other than the
official ballots, except in those cases where the use of emergency ballots is authorized.

(15) Any public official who neglects or fails to properly preserve or account for any ballot box,
documents and forms received by him and kept under his custody.

(16) Any person who reveals the contents of the ballot of an illiterate or disabled voter whom he
assisted in preparing a ballot.

(17) Any person who, without authority, transfers the location of a polling place.

(18) Any person who, without authority, prints or causes the printing of any ballot or election
returns that appears as official ballots or election returns or who distributes or causes the same to
be distributed for use in the election, whether or not they are actually used.

(19) Any person who, without authority, keeps, uses or carries out or causes to be kept, used or
carried out, any official ballot or election returns or printed proof thereof, type-form mould,
electro-type printing plates and any other plate, numbering machines and other printing
paraphernalia being used in connection with the printing of official ballots or election returns.

(20) Any official or employee of any printing establishment or of the Commission or any
member of the committee in charge of the printing of official ballots or election returns who
causes official ballots or election returns to be printed in quantities exceeding those authorized
by the Commission or who distributes, delivers, or in any manner disposes of or causes to be
distributed, delivered, or disposed of, any official ballot or election returns to any person or
persons not authorized by law or by the Commission to receive or keep official ballots or
election returns or who sends or causes them to be sent to any place not designated by law or by
the Commission.

(21) Any person who, through any act, means or device, violates the integrity of any official
ballot or election returns before or after they are used in the election.

(22) Any person who removes, tears, defaces or destroys any certified list of candidates posted
inside the voting booths during the hours of voting.

(23) Any person who holds or causes the holding of an election on any other day than that fixed
by law or by the Commission, or stops any election being legally held.

(24) Any person who deliberately blurs his fingerprint in the voting record.

(aa) On Canvassing:
 (1) Any chairman of the board of canvassers who fails to give due notice of the date, time and
place of the meeting of said board to the candidates, political parties and/or members of the
board.

(2) Any member of the board of canvassers who proceeds with the canvass of the votes and/or
proclamation of any candidate which was suspended or annulled by the Commission.

(3) Any member of the board of canvassers who proceeds with the canvass of votes and/or
proclamation of any candidate in the absence of quorum, or without giving due notice of the
date, time and place of the meeting of the board to the candidates, political parties, and/or other
members of the board.

(4) Any member of the board of canvassers who, without authority of the Commission, uses in
the canvass of votes and/or proclamation of any candidate any document other than the official
copy of the election returns.

(bb) Common to all boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers:

(1) Any member of any board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who deliberately
absents himself from the meetings of said body for the purpose of obstructing or delaying the
performance of its duties or functions.

(2) Any member of any board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who, without
justifiable reason, refuses to sign and certify any election form required by this Code or
prescribed by the Commission although he was present during the meeting of the said body.

(3) Any person who, being ineligible for appointment as member of any board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers, accepts an appointment to said body, assumes office, and
actually serves as a member thereof, or any of public officer or any person acting in his behalf
who appoints such ineligible person knowing him to be ineligible.

(4) Any person who, in the presence or within the hearing of any board of election inspectors or
board of canvassers during any of its meetings, conducts himself in such a disorderly manner as
to interrupt or disrupt the work or proceedings to the end of preventing said body from
performing its functions, either partly or totally.

(5) Any public official or person acting in his behalf who relieves any member of any board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers or who changes or causes the change of the
assignments of any member of said board of election inspectors or board of canvassers without
authority of the Commission.

(cc) On candidacy and campaign:

(1) Any political party which holds political conventions or meetings to nominate its official
candidates earlier that the period fixed in this Code.

(2) Any person who abstracts, destroys or cancels any certificate of candidacy duly filed and
which has not been cancelled upon order of the Commission.

(3) Any person who misleads the board of election inspectors by submitting any false or spurious
certificate of candidacy or document to the prejudice of a candidate.
 (4) Any person who, being authorized to receive certificates of candidacy, receives any
certificate of candidacy outside the period for filing the same and makes it appear that said
certificate of candidacy was filed on time; or any person who, by means of fraud, threat,
intimidation, terrorism or coercion, causes or compels the commission of said act.

(5) Any person who, by any device or means, jams, obstructs or interferes with a radio or
television broadcast of any lawful political program.

(6) Any person who solicits votes or undertakes any propaganda, on the day of election, for or
against any candidate or any political party within the polling place or within a radius of thirty
meters thereof.

(dd) Other prohibitions:

(1) Any person who sells, furnishes, offers, buys, serves or takes intoxicating liquor on the days
fixed by law for the registration of voters in the polling place, or on the day before the election or
on election day: Provided, That hotels and other establishments duly certified by the Ministry of
Tourism as tourist oriented and habitually in the business of catering to foreign tourists may be
exempted for justifiable reasons upon prior authority of the Commission: Provided, further, That
foreign tourists taking intoxicating liquor in said authorized hotels or establishments are
exempted from the provisions of this subparagraph.

(2) Any person who opens in any polling place or within a radius of thirty meters thereof on
election day and during the counting of votes, booths or stalls of any kind for the sale, dispensing
or display of wares, merchandise or refreshments, whether solid or liquid, or for any other
purposes.

(3) Any person who holds on election day, fairs, cockfights, boxing, horse races, jai-alai or any
other similar sports.

(4) Refusal to carry election mail matter. - Any operator or employee of a public utility or
transportation company operating under a certificate of public convenience, including
government-owned or controlled postal service or its employees or deputized agents who refuse
to carry official election mail matters free of charge during the election period. In addition to the
penalty prescribed herein, such refusal shall constitute a ground for cancellation or revocation of
certificate of public convenience or franchise.

(5) Prohibition against discrimination in the sale of air time. - Any person who operates a radio
or television station who without justifiable cause discriminates against any political party,
coalition or aggroupment of parties or any candidate in the sale of air time. In addition to the
penalty prescribed herein, such refusal shall constitute a ground for cancellation or revocation of
the franchise.
Local Government Code

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.