PAKISTAN IN 2003: Political Deadlock and Continuing Uncertainties

Author(s): Ian Talbot

Source: Asian Survey , Vol. 44, No. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 36-42
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.1.36

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Asian Survey

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
PAKISTAN IN 2003
Political Deadlock and Continuing
Uncertainties

Ian Talbot

Abstract
This article surveys three key areas. The first is the political deadlock over the
Legal Framework Order. The second is international uncertainties, including
Pakistan’s uneasy peace process with India. Third, the article examines Paki-
stan’s continuing economic uncertainties, despite the post-9/11 improvement
in the external trading account.

The Legal Framework Order Controversy

The controversy over the Legal Framework Order (LFO)
of August 21, 20021 dominated Pakistan politics throughout most of 2003.
The LFO was issued by General Pervez Musharraf in his capacity as chief
executive as an amendment to the 1973 Constitution. It was designed to en-
sure a “smooth and orderly transition,” following the holding of general elec-
tions. The ensuing crisis paralyzed the business of government, raised severe
questions regarding the legitimacy of both the president and the prime minis-
ter, and threatened the dismissal of Parliament. The LFO had restored to the
president the authority to dissolve the National Assembly and to relieve the
prime minister and cabinet of their functions. Former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif had removed this power in April 1997, via the Thirteenth Amendment

Ian Talbot is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of the

Centre for South Asian Studies at Coventry University, Coventry, U.K. He is a Visiting Fellow
at Balliol College, Oxford, for 2003–2004.
Asian Survey, 44:1, pp. 36–42. ISSN: 0004–4687
 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California
Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223.
1. See Ian Talbot, “Pakistan in 2002: Democracy, Terrorism, and Brinkmanship,” Asian Sur-
vey 43:1 (January/February 2003), p. 203.

36

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN IN 2003 37
to the Constitution.2 The LFO had also introduced a National Security Coun-
cil, on which the service chiefs would be represented, to serve as a forum for
discussion of matters relating to democracy, governance, and interprovincial
harmony.
The opposition objected that amendments to the Constitution enshrined in
the LFO had not received the necessary two-thirds majority parliamentary
assent. The government response was that the LFO had become part of the
Constitution because the Supreme Court ruling of May 2000 that upheld the
October 12, 1999, coup authorized General Musharraf to make constitutional
amendments needed for his reforms. The struggle widened to one of enforc-
ing parliamentary supremacy. The protests against the LFO were thus also
linked with Musharraf’s simultaneous occupation of the posts of president
and chief of army staff. Moreover, his legitimacy as president was ques-
tioned because it was based on the controversial April 30, 2002, Referendum
that had provided him with a mandate to hold this office for another five
years. The disputes were ultimately not about constitutional niceties, but
about the extent and terms by which the army’s influence would be institu-
tionalized in the political process. A key government aim in the protracted
negotiations was to overcome its weak majority by driving a wedge between
the secular and religious opposition groupings of the Alliance for the Restora-
tion of Democracy (ARD) and the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) (United
Council of Action).
The ARD lacked a populist appeal. Its main components, the Pakistan
People’s Party and the Muslim League (Nawaz), suffered from the absence of
their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. It was further weakened by
the death in September 2003 of its chief, the veteran opposition politician,
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. The initiative thus fell to the MMA, which ex-
ploited popular discontent at Musharraf’s pro-American policies, spotlighted
by the Iraq crisis and its aftermath. The emboldened MMA stood up to the
military establishment in a way that previously would have been undreamed
of by religious parties. The MMA sought a more Islamic foreign policy,
opposed the sending of Pakistani troops to Iraq, and cooperated with the
ARD on the single-point issue of resistance to the LFO. The army had tradi-
tionally worked closely with the religious parties. Post-9/11, however, it was
not prepared to undermine its institutional interests that included strategic ties
with the U.S. Deadlock ensued. The terms on which the political stalemate
would be ended became the focus for intense bargaining in the periodic
rounds of negotiations between the government and opposition.
The National Assembly was convened on April 15. Its proceedings were
immediately disrupted by the combined protests of the ARD and MMA. The

2. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), p. 360.

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 38 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2004

speaker, Chaudhry Amir Hussain, adjourned the session amid the uproar of
“No LFO No,” and “Go Musharraf Go” slogans. This pattern was to be re-
peated in the Senate. The four-and-a-half hours of slogan-chanting and desk
thumping were the longest protest in Pakistan’s parliamentary history.3 The
first attempt to end the deadlock involved the creation of an 11-member joint
government-opposition constitution committee. This was chaired by the
president of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (PML[Q]), Chaudhry Shujaat
Hussain. The joint committee held 10 sessions over a two-week period, but
failed to reach a consensus on a constitutional package to be presented to
parliament for approval.
There were signs at the beginning of June that an agreement with the
MMA might resolve the LFO dispute. The MMA had reviewed its stand on
the issue of the president’s simultaneous army post, while putting forward 10
demands with respect to Islamization,4 provincial autonomy, and the rights of
minorities. The PML(Q) president promised that the demands would be im-
plemented. Hopes were dashed by confrontation between the center and the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) MMA government of Akram Khan
Durrani. The NWFP government had become embroiled in a dispute over the
powers of the district nazims (administrators).5 Following the adoption of a
Shariat (Islamic law) bill, it was accused of seeking the Talibanization of the
province. MMA activists had torn down advertising signs that they regarded
as obscene. The confrontation was resolved only when Musharraf personally
intervened. He rejected the nazims’ resignation, while simultaneously di-
recting the NWFP government to restore their powers concerning postings
and distribution of funds as delegated by the 2001 Local Government Ordi-
nance. Two days earlier, on June 8, in a speech organized by the Lahore Bar
Association, Musharraf had pointedly remarked that the “people of Pakistan
do not want a theocratic state and are strongly opposed to Talibanization of
society.”6
The federal finance minister, Shaukat Aziz, presented the budget on June
7, against the continuing noisy backdrop of the LFO protests. The combined
opposition parties subsequently boycotted the budget debates in both the Na-

3. Dawn newspaper (Karachi, Pakistan), April 19, 2003.

4. The demands included the molding of the economy, education, and the media on an Islamic
pattern; the introduction of Islamic subjects as part of the curricula; and the removal of obscenity
and vulgarity from the electronic media. It would be left to Parliament to decide whether Friday
should become the day of rest.
5. All the 24 district nazims had stepped down and had submitted their resignation letters to
President Musharraf, rather than to the NWFP chief minister. They had been elected on a non-
party basis in the local government polls, and did not share the MMA ideological outlook. They
claimed that the MMA had brought false corruption charges against them because they did not fit
in with its priorities.
6. Dawn, June 9, 2003.

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN IN 2003 39
tional Assembly and the Senate. They introduced a no-confidence motion on
June 20 against the National Assembly Speaker, Chaudhry Amir Hussain,
after he had ruled that the LFO was part of the Constitution. In the event, in
a stormy session eight days later, no votes were cast, but a similar opposition
no-confidence motion was moved against the deputy speaker, Sardar Yaqub
Khan, for his alleged partiality in deviating from the political neutrality ex-
pected in this role. This was withdrawn on July 7, when Prime Minister
Zafarullah Khan Jamali offered to resume talks on the LFO.
The talks revealed differences between the ARD and MMA opposition
groupings. The religious parties appeared more willing to compromise in
negotiations with Jamali, who was under pressure within his ruling alliance to
resolve the nine-month LFO deadlock. Jamali’s room for maneuver was con-
strained not just by Musharraf, but by the powerful PML(Q) president,
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, who regarded the LFO as a settled part of the
Constitution. When the MMA balked at splitting completely with the ARD,
the talks became deadlocked again. The MMA, together with the ARD,
staged a walkout on August 20 from a hastily convened National Assembly
session. Two days later, an altercation within the Assembly led to allegations
that a minister had attacked a female opposition member. Talks were re-
sumed at the beginning of September, but had not reached a conclusion by
the time of the Washington trips of Pakistan’s president and prime minister,
which occurred within seven days of each other. Chaudhry Shujaat Hus-
sain’s departure on October 8 for medical treatment in Germany virtually
ended all hopes of an immediate resolution of the LFO controversy.

Pakistan-India Relations amid

International Uncertainties
The brinkmanship between India and Pakistan of 2002 was replaced by a
thaw in relations that owed much to U.S. influence. India responded to this
because it sought to cement its growing relationship with the U.S. in terms of
trade, technology, and military cooperation.7 It was also eager to mend
fences with Washington after the Iraq crisis.8 Islamabad responded to U.S.
influence because of its growing international uncertainties. There was dis-
quiet arising from Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s successful
visit in June to Pakistan’s traditional Chinese ally. Closer ties between India
and Israel were also disquieting and threatened to escalate a regional arms
race. While the U.S. continued to provide Pakistan with economic assis-

7. Joint military exercises with U.S. forces in Alaska in October 2002 were followed up with
a joint exercise in Ladakh in September 2003.
8. Herald (Karachi, Pakistan), May 2003, pp. 44–45.

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 40 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2004

tance,9 there were tensions with Washington over the issue of cross-border
terrorism in India. Some commentators have linked the inconsistencies in
Pakistan’s response to this issue with domestic political pressures arising
from the Musharraf government’s desire not to alienate the MMA in the
wake of the LFO controversy. Another uncertainty stemmed from the grow-
ing tensions with Afghanistan, despite the fact that Islamabad had offered
diplomatic and economic assistance10 to the interim administration of Presi-
dent Hamid Karzai. The problems arose because of alleged Pakistani mili-
tary incursions into the Goshta and Lalpor districts during operations against
al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The deteriorating relations between the two
countries were symbolized by the temporary closure of the Pakistani embassy
in Kabul, following public protests.
The thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations must be set in this context of regional
uncertainty and competition between New Delhi and Islamabad for U.S.
favor. The peace process was unexpectedly signalled by Vajpayee on April
18, during the first public speech in 15 years by an Indian prime minister in
Srinagar. Official progress was slow. Terrorist outrages always threatened
it,11 as did domestic political pressures. Nevertheless, full diplomatic ties
were reestablished. During June and July, there were a number of private
goodwill visits by parliamentarians and businesspeople from both Pakistan
and India. An Indian delegation in August included the Bihar former chief
minister, Laloo Prasad Yadav. On July 11, the Lahore-Delhi bus service that
had earlier been symbolic of Indo-Pakistan détente was restarted after an 18-
month suspension. Talks regarding the resumption of civilian aviation, how-
ever, stalled in late August, against the backdrop of the Mumbai blasts and a
gunbattle between militants and Indian forces in Srinagar that coincided with
Vajpayee’s visit. The tense exchanges between him and Musharraf at the
U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York in September marked a further
deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations. On October 22, the Indian govern-
ment offered 12 steps to normalize relations, ranging from full sporting ties to
increased air, rail, and maritime links. On November 23, the Pakistan prime
minister announced a unilateral ceasefire that was to hold along the border of
the Line of Control in Kashmir. This offer, however, did not imply that
dialogue on the key issue of Kashmir was any nearer. President Musharraf
unexpectedly announced during an interview less than three weeks before the
Indian prime minister’s visit to Pakistan during the January 2004 regional
South Asian summit that he was prepared to be “bold and flexible” on the

9. Musharraf’s visit to Washington secured the promise of a $3 billion aid package.

10. Pakistan had contributed $100 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
11. The most serious incident was the August 25 Mumbai bomb blasts that killed 52 people.
Deputy Indian Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani dismissed Pakistan’s condemnation as “a
mere formality.” Dawn, August 27, 2003.

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN IN 2003 41
Kashmir dispute. While stating that Pakistan was still for the U.N. mandated
plebiscite, he continued, “However, we now have left that aside.” For over
fifty years, Pakistan had insisted on the holding of a plebiscite. This impor-
tant shift in policy came three days after the Pakistan president survived a
bomb attack on his motorcade.

Economic Uncertainties
The post-9/11 Western economic aid to Pakistan continued. The new British
high commissioner, Mark Lyall Grant, announced in July that aid would be
increased fourfold, to $100 million. President Musharraf’s trip to America a
month earlier was marked by the signing of a Trade and Investment Agree-
ment aimed at opening up U.S. markets for Pakistani goods. The two coun-
tries also signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and
technology. The Bush administration also agreed to a five-year, $3 billion
economic assistance package, tied to an annual review of Pakistan’s coopera-
tion in three areas: the war on terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, and do-
mestic political democratization. America had earlier cancelled $1 billion
worth of Pakistani debt. The impact of external support was seen most
clearly in the recovery of foreign exchange reserves from the vulnerable posi-
tion of 2001 to a record level of $10.5 billion, which were sufficient to fi-
nance more than 11 months of imports. External debt and foreign exchange
liabilities had decreased by 6.2% to $35.58 billion during the period from
June 2000 to March 2003.12 In addition to foreign support, the economy
benefited from record remittances being sent home by overseas Pakistani
workers of $4 billion (an increase of more than 98% from 2001–02 levels),
and from the strengthening of the rupee against the dollar.
Even government spokesmen, however, acknowledged that structural
problems remained, both in the performance of public-sector utilities, particu-
larly power utilities, and in the low and stagnant tax-to-GDP ratio. Mushar-
raf himself blamed the failure to attract local and foreign investment on the
prolonged political uncertainty. The rate of fixed investment as a percentage
of GDP, at 13.1%, was the lowest in Pakistan since 1950.13 The 2002–03
annual government economic survey also revealed that defense expenditure
had increased by 6%. The 2003–04 budget projected it at $2.8 billion, in
comparison with poverty-related social sector spending at $3.23 billion. In
such circumstances, progress in the eradication of poverty was bound to be
slow. Pakistan’s traditional pattern of solid GDP growth rates (5.1% for the

12. Ibid., June 6, 2003.

13. Ibid., August 22, 2003.

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 42 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2004

fiscal year 2002–03), delivering a per capita income14 that was not matched
by its international ranking in human development indicators, seemed likely
to continue.

14. According to the 2002–03 Economic Survey launched by Foreign Minister Shaukat Aziz
on June 5, per capita income had increased during the fiscal year by 17.4%, rising to $492. Ibid.,
June 6, 2003.

This content downloaded from

111.68.96.34 on Thu, 28 Feb 2019 11:49:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms