WILLS & SUCCESSION CASE DOCTRINES
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition although it
1. Hemady vs Luzon Surety
Contracts; binding effect of contracts upon heirs of deceased
party.—The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the
deceased party is not altered by the provision in the Rules of
Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and
paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said
heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus
made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes
or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive. The general rule, therefore, is that a party’s contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
2. Alvarez vs IAC
The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors.—“The binding effect of
contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is
that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would
have been entitled to receive. Under our law, therefore, the
general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive ‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the
history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae,
in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no
other. x x x”
3. Union Bank vs. Santibanez
Civil Law; Settlement of Estate; Jurisdictions; Well-settled is the
rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.—Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has
the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
Wills; Partition; In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no
valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.—In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated: In
testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the
probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise or any
other transaction.—It must be stressed that the probate
proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To
dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint
agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
part of the estate.
Filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory.—The filing of a money claim against
the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we
held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: . . . This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement
of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.
4. Spouses Santos vs Lumbao
Succession; Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest—whatever rights and obligations of the
decedent have over a property are transmitted to the heirs by way
of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs.—The general rule that heirs are bound by
contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in
the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule.
It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted
to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the
property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot
escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by
their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the
property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their
deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother
had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and
binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse
nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and
the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not
excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
5. De Borja vs De Borja
Civil law; Wills; Remedial law; Testate and intestate pro.
ceedings; Rule of nullity of extrajudicial settlement prior to probate
of will inapplicable to case at bar.—The doctrine of Guevarra vs.
Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479, which holds that the presentation of a will
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution
of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will
is against the law and public policy, is not applicable where the
clear abject of the settlement was merely the conveyance by the
heir of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual, in the estate of the decedent and not the distribution of
the said estate among the heirs before the probate of the will.
Remedial law; Testate and intestate proceedings; Settlement
entered into by heir in his individual capacity does not need court
approval.—Where the compromise agreement entered into by
and between the various heirs in the personal capacity, the same
is binding upon them as individuals, upon the perfection of the
contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into
such agreement. The only difference between an extrajudicial
compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.
Civil law; Succession; Heir may sell her hereditary rights to co-
heir.—As owner of her individual share, an heir could dispose of it
in favor of whomsoever she chose, including another heir of the
same defendant. Such alienation is expressly recognized and
provided for by Article 1088 of the present Civil Code.
6. Bonilla vs Burcena
7. Balus vs Balus
Civil Law; Property; Succession; Inheritance; What consists
inheritance; The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death; The inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death as well as those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.—The rights
to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto
since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since
Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of
land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.
8. Uson vs Del Rosario
Descent and distribution; husband and wife; rights of lawful wife
as affected by the new civil code.—The right of ownership of the
lawful wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil Code
took effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Art. 657, old Civil Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased can not be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife over the lands
in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code provides that
rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when the
new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the
same origin.
Renunciation of Inheritance Made by Lawful Wife; Future
Inheritance, Not Subject to Contract.—Although the lawful wife
has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property
that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such
renunciation cannot be entertained for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced (1 Manresa, 6th ed., 123; Osorio vs. Osorio, et al., 41
Phil., 531).
Donations by Deceased; Essential Formalities of Donation.—
Assignments, if any, made by the deceased of real property for
which there was no material consideration, should be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the same
document or in a separate one (Art. 633, old Civil Code).
Assignments or donations which lack this essential formality have
no valid effect.
9. Go Ong vs CA
Special Proceedings; Mortgages; Where the real estate mortgage
was constituted in petitioner's personal capacity and not in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband, Sec. 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court requiring judicial approval of the
mortgage is not applicable,—Thus, in confirming the findings of
the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the Court
of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her
personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the
estate of her husband.
Fact alone that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the
deceased spouse the entire conjugal partnership property of the
marriage is under administration is not sufficient to invalidate the
whole mortgage; Art 493 of the Civil Code applies where the heirs
as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and he
may alienate, assign or mortgage it; Effect of alienation or
mortgage with respect to the co-owners.—Nevertheless,
petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA
1483) and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further
argues that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the
deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the
marriage is under administration, While such may be in a sense
true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole
mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner.
An opposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar
circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of
the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the
full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
10. Reganon vs Imperial
Interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased is attachable.—That
the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be
attached for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the
process of settlement before the courts, is already a settled
matter in this jurisdiction.
Civil law; Succession; Rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of death.—The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death,
and where the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened
with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to
the dominion, ownership, and possession of the properties of his
predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
latter (Cuevas v. Abesames, 71 Phil. 147).
11. Blas vs Santos
Wills; Succession; Contracts; Compromise; Future
inheritance; When agreement to transmit one-half of conjugal
share is a contract as to future inheritance.—-A document signed
by the testator's wife, promising that she would respect and obey
all the dispositions in the latter's will, and that she would hold one-
half of her share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and
legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of
conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she might
choose in her last will and testament, is a compromise and at the
same time a contract with sufficient cause or consideration.
Prescription; Actions; Accrual of cause of action upon death.—
The action to enforce the wife's promise to convey in her
testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties, did
not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did
not comply with her promise.
Definition of future inheritance.—Future inheritance is any
property or right, not .in existence or capable of determination at
the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by
succession.
12. Nufable vs Nufable
Civil Law; Wills; As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings
are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator’s
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law.—As a general rule, courts in
probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution
thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Said court at
this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provision of the will. The
question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
13. Austria vs Reyes
Civil law; Succession; Testamentary succession; Institution of
heir; Requisites for annulment of institution of heir for statement of
a false cause.—Before the institution of heirs may be annulled
under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must
concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated
in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false;
and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity
of the cause.
Where will does not state cause for institution of heir.—Where the
decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner
the cause for such institution of heirs, the will cannot be annulled
under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such institution may be
annulled only when it is clear, after an examination of the will that
the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had
known the cause for it to be false.
Interpretation of will; Testacy favored.—Testacy is favored and
doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling
is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
14. Balanay vs Martinez
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court may pass
upon intrinsic validity of a will before passing upon its formal
validity.—The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony
if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.
Invalidity of one testamentary disposition does not necessarily
invalidate all other dispositions made therein.—The rule is that
“the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will
does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it
is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such
other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made” (Art 792, Civil Code).
Statement that testator owns “southern half of conjugal state is
contrary to law because spouses are pro indiviso owners
thereof.—The statement of the testatrix that she owned the
“southern half” of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because,
although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and
proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does
not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
Provision in a will that testator’s estate be kept intact and
legitimes of heirs be paid in cash is contrary to Art. 1080 of Civil
Code where whole estate was not assigned to one or more
heirs.—The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband’s
lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be
paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. ... The
testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate
among her six children (her husband had renounced his
hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not
assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes
be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain
undivided only for a period of 20 years.
Renunciation of inheritance by widower subject to limitation for his
support and maintenance and preservation of his legitime.—Felix
Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his
one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his
one-half share in the conjugal estate, it should be subject to the
limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his
support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be
respected.
Husband’s renunciation of hereditary rights and share in conjugal
estate make these assets part of testator’s estate, but without
prejudice to creditors and other heirs.—It should be stressed that
by reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s will
and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal
share became a part of his deceased wife’s estate. His conformity
had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of
the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors
and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Preterition of surviving spouse who conformed thereto does not
produce intestacy.—In the instant case, the preterited heir was
the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and
renounced his hereditary rights.
Testacy is prefereable to intestacy.—Testacy is favored. Doubts
are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should
be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose
of giving it effect.
Probate court should not issue notice to creditors if only special
administrator has been appointed.—A notice to creditors is not in
order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section
1, Rule 86 x x x clearly contemplates the appointment of an
executor or regular administrator and not that of a special
administrator.
Courts; A court employee should not be appointed as
administrator of decedent’s estate.—The probate court’s
appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator is
not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion
that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in
milking the decedent’s estate. x x x A court employee should
devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as
a sideline the administration of a decedent’s estate.
15. Reyes vs Dimagiba
16. Nazareno vs CA
17. Heirs of Ureta vs Ureta
Wills and Succession; Art. 842 of the Civil Code refers to the
principle of freedom of disposition by will and has no application
to a disposition by Deed of Sale.—Article 842 of the Civil Code
provides: Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may
dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory
heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene
the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs. This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition
by will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition
by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not
first prove that the disposition substantially diminished their
successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.
18. Natividad vs Natividad
Civil Law; Contracts; Statute of Frauds; Under the Statute of
Frauds, an agreement to convey real properties shall be
unenforceable by action in the absence of a written note or
memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by
his agent.—Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of any
contract, whatsoever, because petitioners failed to prove, in the
first place, that there was a verbal agreement that was entered
into. Even granting that such an agreement existed, the CA did not
commit any error in ruling that the assignment of the shares of
Sergio in the subject properties in petitioners’ favor as payment of
Sergio’s obligation cannot be enforced if there is no written
contract to such effect. Under the Statute of Frauds, an agreement
to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the
absence of a written note or memorandum thereof and subscribed
by the party charged or by his agent. As earlier discussed, the
pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, consisting of
respondents’ acknowledgment of Sergio’s loan obligations with
DBP as embodied in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as
well as the cash voucher which allegedly represents payment for
taxes and transfer of title in petitioners’ name do not serve as
written notes or memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement.
Interest Rates; The Supreme Court (SC) finds no error in the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) that such interest should be
computed from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a
written demand for the payment of respondents’ obligation.—As to
when the interest on the sum due from respondents should be
reckoned, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that such
interest should be computed from June 23, 2001, the date when
petitioners made a written demand for the payment of
respondents’ obligation. There is no merit in petitioners’ contention
that the reckoning date should have been September 23, 1994,
the date when respondents executed the Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs, because there is nothing therein to prove that
petitioners, at that time, made a demand for reimbursement.
19. Puno vs Puno
Succession; Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not
automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire
the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the
corporation—the stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in
estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be
recorded in the books of the corporation; During such interim
period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the
executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being
vested with the legal title to the stock.—Upon the death of a
shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders
of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the
deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be
distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer
of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation.
Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall
be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is
recorded in the books of the corporation. During such interim
period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the
executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being
vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and
division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are
held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such
time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise
the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner
presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the
son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from
respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of
the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This
would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an
heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
A determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights
over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased
must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of settling the estate of the latter.—Corollary to this is
the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir
of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the
latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir
to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action, as in a case for the recovery of property. The doctrine
applies to the instant case, which is one for specific
performance—to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner
to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his
representatives.
20. Reyes vs RTC
Jurisdictions; Succession; Probate Proceedings; The status of
heirs as co-owners of shares of stocks prior to the partition of the
decedent’s estate does not immediately and necessarily make
them stockholders of the corporation—unless and until there is
compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the
manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered
stockholders of the corporation.—Article 777 of the Civil Code
declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacia’s
death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title
includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the
estate’s partition, deemed co-owners thereof. This status as co-
owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make
them stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is
compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the
manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered
stockholders of the corporation. Simply stated, the transfer of title
by means of succession, though effective and valid between the
parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate and her
heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The
transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to
make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as
such both by the corporation and by third parties.
Where there is an absence of partition and transfer of shares, an
heir cannot yet be considered a stockholder of a corporation, and
the Court, therefore, cannot declare that an intra-corporate
relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring the case
within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction.—Rodrigo must,
therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a
stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally
belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are
shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can
be determined only in a settlement of the decedent’s estate. No
such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must
register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it
binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be
done unless and until he has established his specific allotment
(and prima facieownership) of the shares. Without the settlement
of Anastacia’s estate, there can be no definite partition and
distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and
distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And
without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a
stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within
the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. In sum, we find
that—insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacia’s
shares) are concerned—Rodrigo cannot be considered a
stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an
intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to
bring this case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction
under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended. Rodrigo’s
complaint, therefore, fails the relationship test.

A Regional Trial Court, acting as a special commercial court, has

no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a
deceased; Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.—More than
the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to
accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar
is the distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior
settlement of her estate—an objective that, by law and
established jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati,
acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle,
partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant
provision—Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court—
that contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the
heirs declares: Questions as to advancement made or alleged
to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
[Emphasis supplied.] Worth noting are this Court’s statements in
the case of Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385
(2001): Matters which involve settlement and distribution of
the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province
of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.