G.R. No.
164527 August 15, 2007 MO 415 of former President Aquino and
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC.,
R-II HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT
TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO
II, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In his capacity as taxpayer, the Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directly for,
among other things, access to all documents and
information relating to the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (the “Project”),
including its underlying Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a
government body, and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI).
With Congress having approved the Project as a
boost to infrastructure through its development of low-
cost housing projects, a private sector joint venture
scheme was pursued in accordance with the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Law whereby “the contractor
undertakes the construction . . . [for] the government
agency or local government unit concerned which shall
pay the contractor its total investment expended on the
project, plus reasonable rate of return”.
After multiple design changes, cost overruns,
and corresponding amendments to the JVA, the Project
was ultimately suspended, and RBI made demands for
payment. A few years later, the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council initiated a bidding
process for the work remaining on the Project, and the
NHA reached a settlement with RBI to terminate the
original JVA. Raising constitutional issues and asserting
his right to all information related to the Project, Mr.
Chavez filed a petition directly with the Court.
The reclamation project in this case was
undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency
in consultation with PEA and with the approval of two
Philippine Presidents, Aquino, mère, and Ramos.
The NHA and RBI executed a JVA after RBI was
declared the winning bidder on August 31, 1992 as the
JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after compliance
with the requisite public bidding.
Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos, coupled
with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598,
classified the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable
lands of public domain.
In this NHA case, the JVA and subsequent
amendments were already substantially implemented.
Subsequently, the Project was terminated through a
MOA signed on August 27, 2003. Almost one year later
on August 5, 2004, the Chavez petition was filed.
In the instant petition, RBI and other
respondents are considered to have signed the
agreements in good faith as the Project was terminated
even before the Chavez petition was filed.
The NHA-RBI JVA and subsequent amendments
constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law.
The reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a
government entity NOT tasked to dispose of public land
and therefore said alienable lands were converted to
patrimonial lands upon their transfer to NHA.
ISSUE: Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given
the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands. NO, there is no more need.
Petitioner Chavez puts forth the view that even
if the NHA and RBI were granted the authority to reclaim,
they were not authorized to do so by the DENR.
HELD: Under existing laws, the NHA is still required to
procure DENR’s authorization before a reclamation
project in Manila Bay or in any part of the Philippines can
be undertaken. The requirement applies to PEA, NHA, or
any other government agency or office granted with such
power under the law.
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission,
we nevertheless find petitioner’s position bereft of
merit.
The DENR is deemed to have granted the
authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for,
among others, the reason that:
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides
that "the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices." The President is
assigned the task of seeing to it that all laws are
faithfully executed. "Control," in administrative law,
means "the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify
 or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the Revised Administrative Code to the DENR Secretary to
performance of his duties and to substitute the authorize the NHA to reclaim said lands.
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
What can be done indirectly by the DENR can be
As such, the President can exercise executive done directly by the President. It would be absurd if the
power motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision power of the President cannot be exercised simply
of a subordinate with the President’s own. The DENR is a because the head of a department in the executive
department in the executive branch under the President, branch has not acted favorably on a project already
and it is only an alter ego of the latter. approved by the President. If such arrangement is
allowed then the department head will become more
Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff
powerful than the President.
work are initially done by a department like the DENR
and then submitted to the President for approval.
However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if
the President decides on the implementation of a certain
project or activity and requires said department to
implement it. Such is a presidential prerogative as long
as it involves the department or office authorized by law
to supervise or execute the Project. Thus, as in this case,
when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the
corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a
member of the committee tasked to implement the
project, the required authorization from the DENR to
reclaim land can be deemed satisfied.

It cannot be disputed that the ultimate power

over alienable and disposable public lands is reposed in
the President of the Philippines and not the DENR
Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on the
Smokey Mountain when the President has already
authorized and ordered the implementation of the
Project would be a derogation of the powers of the
President as the head of the executive branch.
Otherwise, any department head can defy or oppose the
implementation of a project approved by the head of the
executive branch, which is patently illegal and
unconstitutional.

President Aquino reserved the area of the

Smokey Mountain dumpsite for settlement and issued
MO 415 authorizing the implementation of the Smokey
Mountain Development Project plus the reclamation of
the area across R-10. Then President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 39 covering the 21-hectare dumpsite
and the 40-hectare commercial/industrial area, and
Proclamation No. 465 and MO 415 increasing the area of
foreshore and submerged lands of Manila Bay to be
reclaimed from 40 to 79 hectares. Having supervision
and control over the DENR, both Presidents directly
assumed and exercised the power granted by the
 G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO,
JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: After a month in office, President Benigno
Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July
30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).
The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption
involving third level public officers during the
administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings
and recommendations to the Office of the President,
Congress, and the Ombudsman.
Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of
congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep.
Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate
petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the
creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the
legislative power to create public office, threatens the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine
Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of
the Arroyo administration.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
ISSUE 1: Does the creation of the PTC fall within
the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? NO
HELD 1: Sec. 31 contemplates "reorganization"
as limited by the following functional and structural lines:
(1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating
or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa; or
(3) transferring any agency under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These
point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to
be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the
negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a
restructuring of the Office of the President under Section
31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest
meaning attributable to the term "restructure"– an
"alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC
was not part of the structure of the Office of the
President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No.
1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,
The very source of the power of the President
to reorganize any department or agency in the
executive branch is that which constitutes an express
grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order
No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312
(2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration
of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and
 responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau
attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under
the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not
justified by the President’s power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power
of control is entirely different from the power to create
public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive,
while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
powers of the President. It also grants the President
other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that
although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.

ISSUE 2: Is there a valid delegation of power from

Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office? NO

HELD 2: But the creation of the PTC finds

justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17
reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of

all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied).

The allocation of power in the three principal

branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent
in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations
to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in
this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as
the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President
to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that

"executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
 G.R. Nos. 142801-802 July 10, 2001
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA,
REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN KHO, BENIGNO
MANGA, LULU MENDOZA, petitioners, vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON.
SECRETARY ARTEMIO TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS: On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C.
Aquino, issued an Executive Order establishing the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB).
him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or
certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures.
The very source of the power of the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive
branch is that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies
to the Office of the President.

Eleven years after, President Joseph Estrada
issued an Executive Order deactivating the EIIB and the
transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued an
Executive Order creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling
Task Force "Aduana."
Then, the day feared by the EIIB employees
came. President Estrada issued an Executive
Order providing that all EIIB personnel occupying
positions specified therein shall be deemed separated
from the service, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization
resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or
consolidation of positions.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)],
we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It
takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them.
The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department
of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President.
Hence, it is subject to the President's continuing
authority to reorganize.

Agonizing over the loss of their employment,

petitioners now come before this Court invoking our
power of judicial review of the Executive Orders.

ISSUE: Does the President have the authority to

reorganize the executive department? YES

HELD: The general rule has always been that the power
to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public
office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or
by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was
created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by
the same legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus,

agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President's power of control may justify
 G.R. No. 142283 February 6, 2003
ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO, ROMEO M. FERNANDEZ,
VICTORIA S. ESTRADA, JULIETA C. FAJARDO, ADELAIDA
B. GAWIRAN, MARCIANO M. SERVO, VICTORIA S.
DAOANG, FELICIANO N. TOLEDO III, JAYNELYN D.
FLORES, MA. LIZA B. LLOREN, ROMELIA A. CONTAPAY,
MARIVIC B. TOLITOL, PAZ LEVITA G. VILLANUEVA,
EDITHA C. HERNANDEZ, JOSE HERNANDEZ, JR.,
VERONICA C. BELLES, AMELITA S. BUCE, MERCELITA C.
MARANAN, CRISTITUTO C. LLOREN, HERNANDO M.
EVANGELISTA, and CARLOS BACAY, JR., petitioners, vs.
HON. RONALDO D. ZAMORA, in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, HON. ANDREW B. GONZALES, in
his capacity as the Secretary of Education, and HON.
CARLOS D. TUASON, in his capacity as the Chairman of
the Philippine Sports Commission, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E.
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 ("EO 81" for
brevity) which transferred the sports development
programs and activities of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports ("DECS" for brevity) to the Philippine
Sports Commission ("PSC" for brevity).
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary
Andrew B. Gonzales ("Secretary Gonzales" for brevity)
issued Memorandum No. 01592 and Memorandum No.
01594 ("DECS Memoranda" for brevity), which
reassigned all Bureau of Physical Education and School
Sports ("BPESS" for brevity) personnel named in the
DECS Memoranda to various offices within the DECS.
Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is
void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation
by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the
President’s issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of
separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the
DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of
tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS
Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this Court prohibit the
PSC from performing functions related to school sports
development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of
the petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining
order against respondents to desist from implementing
EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act
No. 9155 ("RA 9155" for brevity), otherwise known as the
"Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001", was
enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished
the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and
activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to
the PSC.
ISSUE: WON EO 81 and DECS Memoranda are valid. YES
HELD: Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292" for brevity),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
expressly grants the President continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO
292 provides:
"SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President
to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/
Advisers System and the Common Support System,
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies;
and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or Agencies."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since EO 81 is based on the President’s
continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292, EO 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s delegated
power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law
grants the President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
"to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The
Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the
President. This is the rationale behind the President’s
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.

Petitioners’ contention that the DECS is not part

of the Office of the President is immaterial. Under EO
292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the
Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the
Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function
or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President.
Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of the
President. Therefore, the President has the authority to
transfer the "functions, programs and activities of DECS
related to sports development" to the PSC, making EO 81
a valid presidential issuance.

However, the President’s power to reorganize

the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the
Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power
to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President
Proper but still within the Office of the President is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from
the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies,
and vice versa.

This distinction is crucial as it affects the security

of tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good
faith necessarily results in the employee’s cessation in
office, but in such event there is no dismissal or
separation because the office itself ceases to exist. On
the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies
does not result in the employee’s cessation in office
because his office continues to exist although in another
department, agency or office. In the instant case, the
BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were
at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to
other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued
employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that
these employees "shall be retained by the Department."